Greece from 1945 to the Present:

a Political Analysis

A study by Brett Johnson

Submitted for HS 5031, Europe Since 1945
Summer Session, 2003
 Greece from 1945 to the Present: a Political Analysis
Introduction

Before we can discuss events in Greece from 1945 to the present, it will be helpful to

understand some of the currents in Greek politics that flowed before 1945. From the inception of

The Modern Greek State when the Greeks began their revolt against their Ottoman Overlords in

1821 until the disaster of the 1920’s the Megali Idea dominated Greek political thought and

iternational action. The Megali Idea, often translated as the Great Idea, was the desire to create a

“Great Greece” where all Greeks were under one Greek government built on the ruins of the

Ottoman Empire. The Greeks looked to the Alexandrian, and, more importantly, the Byzantine

Empire as guideposts for this new state. Under these empires, Hellenic culture had dominated

the entire Eastern Mediterranean Sea. A fact that can still be seen in the myriad of Byzantine

ruins that dot the region and the many Greek Religious communities in Cairo, Jerusalem, Syria,

and Lebanon to this day. The Greeks, However, viewed Byzantium, not Ancient Greece, as the

centerpiece of Hellenic civilization.1 With Byzantium being the focal point of Greek pride, it

was natural that they would want to recapture “the City,” or Constantinople.2

The Great Idea came to an abrupt end in 1922 with the Asia Minor catastrophe. At the

end of World War I the Greeks had occupied parts of Asia minor, and the Allied plan was

intended to break up the Anatolian peninsula into four states; Turkish, Greek, Armenian, and

Kurdish. Kemal Atathrk chose this moment to work for the creation of Modern Turkey. His

nationalism and the impending breakup of Turkey by the Wilsonian idea of Self-determination

created an incredibly brutal situation. Atathrk crushed the Greek Army and, with the exception of

the Greek Community in Constantinople, expelled the entire Christian population from the

Anatolian peninsula.

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 Without the Great Idea, Greek politics was set adrift. It had been the focus of the Modern

Greek Nation since the Greeks began their revolt against their Ottoman Overlords in 1821. With

no external focus, Greek politics devolved rapidly into chaos. Everyone was looking for a

scapegoat, and in 1924 the Greek population voted against the monarchy and created a full

Republic. This would begin a saga for the monarchy that would be an undercurrent of Greek

politics until 1974.

In the following paper we will examine Greek politics from 1945 to the present. Since

history does not occur in a vacuum, we will look first at the years between the World Wars. We

will examine some of the trends, such as the troubled monarchy, that originate here and cast a

long shadow through the history of Greece in the 20th century. Then we will look at the Greek

Civil War and the two separate dynamics that emerged within Greek politics during the War, the

Greek Government in exile and the resistance forces in Greece. Each group carrying its own

agenda, and growing increasingly polarized through the years of the Greek Civil War. Then we

will look at the post civil war order. Watching the establishment of a more democratic Greece

dominated by the right wing but with a renewed ascendancy of the left and their growing anti-

monarch stance. During this period we will look at the destabilization of the political scene as

the Monarchy worked to preserve its position and prevent Andreas Papandreou from ascending

to power in the Center Union when his Father George Papandreou retired. We will then look at

the Cyprus issue as the last remaining area where the Megali Idea had any remaining force. We

will then look at the Colonels, and how their actions in 1974 led to the explosion of the Cyprus

issue onto the international stage and the ultimate downfall of the Colonels. Finally, we will

look at the period from 1974 to the present. Examining how Konstantine Karamanlis returned to

Greece to form a New Democracy, attempting to return Greek politics to Aristotle’s ancient ideal

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of the Golden Mean. We will then proceed to the radical transformation of Greek life when

Andreas Papandreaou’s socialist party, PASOK, took power in the 1980’s. Finally, we will

touch upon the current situation in Greece. Greece has just finished her term as president of the

E.U. and is moving towards an election and hosting the Olympic games in 2004. We will then

briefly examine the role that Greece might play in a new world where the Middle East returns to

its strategic place in international affairs, and Greece is the example of stability in the region.

The Politics of inter War Greece

The dominating personality of inter war Greek politics was Eleftherios Venizelos.3

Venizelos was a Cypriot by birth and became Prime minister of Greece in 1910. He died in 1936

after a brilliant, if not tumultuous career. He left such a stamp on Greek politics that politicians

were referred to as Venizelists and anti-Venizelists until well after World War II.

After the First World War, through Venizelos’ tenacity and support of the Triple Entente

in the war allowed him to press for every advantage at the peace talks. Greece was awarded a

substantial amount of territory in Asia Minor and the Aegean Sea.4 The British, however,

decided that they would colonize Crete. Crete’s strategic position, especially in the days of the

battleship and naval power, was vital to British interests in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea, and

was an important naval base for refueling ships bound to and from India through Suez.

During this time a great internal conflict known as the National Schism was developing

between Venizelists and Anti-Venizelists. This conflict revolved around the monarchy and was

characterized by the purging of the bureaucracy and the military’s officer corps every time power

changed hands in the parliament. To support the Entente, Venizelos had worked in defiance of

King Constantine I who preferred the Central Powers.5 The King’s support of Germany had

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caused both the French and the British military to support Greek efforts to remove him from the

throne. Upon the deposal of Constantine I and the ascension of his son Alexander, the military

and the bureaucracy were purged of Constantine’s supporters. This would become the pattern in

Greece until Metaxas assumed power in the late 1930’s. The constant purges and counter-purges

of the military and the bureaucracy made for an unstable political life in Greece. It was hardly

conducive to the grandiose designs that both sides had for Greece, and would have disastrous

consequences in the near future.

During the negotiations in Paris at the end of World War I, which were held at the Palace

of Severes for the Ottoman Empire, Ottoman Turkey was dismembered in a fashion similar to

that of the Austro-Hungarian Empire6. Mesopotamia7 was given to the British, Syria to the

French, and Armenia and Kurdistan to the United States.8 All of European Turkey was to be

given to Greece and Constantinople was to be internationalized. Greece was also to occupy

Smyrna9 and parts of Asia Minor. For all practical purposes, it appeared that Greece was finally

going to achieve the Great Idea.

The gains Venizelos made, however, were to be short lived. In a stunning electoral

defeat, Venizelos was rejected at the polls in 1920 after the details of Severes were announced. It

is speculated by most sources that the Greeks were exhausted after the war and wanted no more

international adventures. Upon his electoral defeat, Venizelos retired to Paris. As was

customary for the time, the military leadership and the bureaucracy were purged of all Venizelist

influence. It was partly revenge for the anti-royalist purge of 1917 that had been the result of

Constantine I supporting the Central Powers in the war. Another major development at this time

was the Russian Revolution. The new Soviet Government did not want the straits of

Constantinople opened to international shipping10 and provided arms and aid to Atathrk to

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prevent this. They did this because there were U.S. and British troops already intervening in the

Russian Civil War being fought there, and if the capitalist countries could supply the White

Armies through Odessa, the Soviet position might become precarious. Finally the rise, of Kemal

Atathrk had a drastic effect on the implementation of the conditions imposed upon Turkey at

Severes.

As Atathrk’s prestige grew and he gained influence in Turkey the Turks went on what

could best be called a rampage against the non-Turkish, especially the Christian, populations

within Turkey. Apparently, the Turks had decided that since various ethnic groups were going to

be granted their own country, Anatolia needed to be cleansed of all ethnic groups except Turks.

The sheer numbers of Greeks deported or killed by Atathrk’s army is staggering. In 1914, there

were 1.6 million Greeks in Asia Minor and by December 2, 1922 there were only 500 or 600

Thousand left in Anatolia.11 As the Greek Army in Anatolia was routed, the Turks eventually

entered Smyrna where the Greek population was massacred. The U.S. consul believed that the

massacre had been planned and reported that the city was burned to prevent the Greeks from

returning to Asia Minor.12 According to the 1928 census in Greece 1.25 million Refugees came

into Greece from Anatolia.13

This catastrophe effectively ended the Megali Idea in Asia Minor and plunged Greece

into a period of political chaos. In 1922 a group of Venizelist officers staged a coup, forced the

abdication of King Constantine I, who had been returned to the throne upon the untimely death

of Alexander from a septic monkey bite, and crowned George II as King of the Hellenes. Many

of the royalist ministers who led the war were charged with treason and six of them, including

the Prime minister, were executed. Unfortunately, this action only served to throw fuel on the

fire of the National Schism since it was believed that now not only was your job in jeopardy if

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your party lost power, but your life might also be in danger as well.14 In 1924 the coup leaders

held two elections. The first of these elections returned Venizelos to power, but he was unable to

reconcile the pro-and anti monarchist forces within his party and returned to his self-imposed

exile.15 The second election was a plebiscite where the monarchy was abolished.16 This

launched Greece into a period of incredible instability. Between 1924 and 1928 there were ten

Prime Ministers, two presidents were deposed and one resigned, and there were eleven military

coups. Finally in 1927 a republican constitution was drawn up.17 This would provide little

stability though.

In 1928 Venizelos returned from exile and won 71% of all contested seats in parliament

with a coalition of old liberals and refugees. This coalition, however, was not extremely stable.

Within the old liberals, there was a strong anti-royalist strain and the refugees from Anatolia

were leaning farther to the left and becoming increasingly radicalized.18 Venizelos left power in

1932 as the international economic situation hit Greece.

After Venizelos’ departure from office The politicians of Greece embarked on a tragic

series of events that would lead to the rise of General Metaxas and the abolition of the

democratic process in the land that gave the world the democratic process. In 1933 there was a

failed assassination attempt carried out against Eleftherios Venizelos. The attempt on his life

caused Venizelos to make the poor decision of supporting a coup in 1935. When this coup failed

Venizelos was discredited and his dedication to the principles of republicanism was also called

into question. After the coup Venizelos retired to Paris, where he died in 1936.19 The failed

coup caused the Populist Party, which was pro-monarchy, to win the elections in 1935. They

staged a plebiscite where George II won 97% of the vote to return to the throne and re-establish

the monarchy. Modern scholarship views this plebiscite as rigged.20

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 Upon his return to the throne George II tried to restore stability and calm the divisions of

the National Schism by pardoning the participants of the 1935 Venizelist coup. Unfortunately

the political situation remained rancorous and the Greek political landscape showed no signs of

stabilizing. In 1936 King George II made the fateful decision to appoint General Ioannis

Metaxas to head the government. Metaxas quickly convinced Parliament to dissolve itself and

installed himself as dictator.

Ioannis Metaxas is often called a fascist, but the point is highly debatable. Metaxas never

conformed to the German or Italian models of Fascism. Metaxas also had no mass base, no

political ideology, and no imperialist goals. Although we can safely speculate that there were no

imperialist goals because there were so few Greeks left outside areas where the Greek

Government already controlled. Metaxas did begin to change his style in 1938 and began to

form a Fascist Ideology based in Hellenism and looking to the Glories of the Byzantine

Empire.21 He then proceeded to calm politics by crushing dissent and jailing opposition. This,

in the long run, had the effect of slamming a lid on a pot of boiling water. It looked calm but

pressure was building for a real explosion that would occur in the form of a civil war.

Metaxas, despite his quasi-fascist22 behavior, resisted Axis demands in 1941. When the

Italians alleged Greek violations of the Albanian frontier and made demands on Greek territory

on October Metaxas is reported to have said “oxi,” or no. This touched off an Italian invasion,

which the Greeks actually stopped. As is discussed in my paper on the Greek Civil war, if

Greece were to enter the war on the side of the Allies, the southern flank of the impending

invasion of the Soviet Union would be exposed. Consequently, the Germans could not allow

Greece to be a part of the Allies and launched an invasion of Greece. I think that it is important

to discuss the Greek resistance. It played a significant, if not overlooked, role in the overall war

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effort, and has contributed to the almost mythological status that has been applied to Oxi Day in

Greek communities throughout the world. According to German Field Marshall Keitel:

The unbelievable strong resistance of the Greeks delayed by two or more vital
months the German attack against Russia; if we did not have this long delay, the
outcome of the war would have been different in the eastern front and in the war
in general.23

This assertion is backed up by the casualty figures of the Germans during their invasions.

There were approximately 5,100 casualties on the mainland where 1,100 men were killed and

4,000 were listed as missing or wounded.24 German estimates of casualties during the invasion

of Crete range between 3,986 and 6,453 total losses.25 The delay of the soviet invasion and the

loss of so many troops can be looked at as a major reason for the German defeat.

Despite their heavy losses, the Germans were not defeated. As they advanced on Athens

the Greek government and the Royal Family evacuated, first to Crete and then to Cairo. Their

evacuation created de facto two rival groups vying for the control of Greece; resistance groups in

Greece and the Government in exile. Within these resistance there were several competing

groups, among which were EAM/ELAS, a Communist dominated organization, EDES a group

of Venizelist officers, and many other smaller groups. Among these smaller groups I will

mention the group X, led by the Cypriot George Grivas. X was a right wing organization that is

alternately described as a terrorist group or a band of resistance fighters.26 I only mention this

group here because its leader, Col. George Grivas, will play a key role in the Cyprus conflict

during the 1970’s.

The occupying forces of the Axis powers never really established control of the

countryside but were limited to the major population centers. The mountainous countryside was

controlled by the largest of the armed resistance groups, ELAS and EDES. Both of these groups

were anti-monarchist and had the support of most of the population of the mainland. Due to their

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distance, the government in exile did not realize the unpopularity of the monarchy, particularly

the person of George II, whom most Greeks blamed for the brutal Metaxas dictatorship. The

politicians in exile were also still playing out the traditional Venizelist and anti-Venizelist roles

that had characterized inter war Greek politics and were rapidly becoming outdated. On this

chaotic stage the KKE, the Greek Communist Party, now took advantage of the inattention of the

principal players to steal a starring role.

In 1943 and 1944, ELAS decided to press its advantage over the other groups and began

military operations against them. Most of the smaller groups were eliminated and EDES was the

only major resistance group to survive, although they lost much of their territory. It is likely that

the British intervention is all that saved EDES from elimination at the end of 1944.27 In March

of 1944 EAM set up a rival government within Greece known as the Political Committee of

National Liberation (PEEA). The establishment of this government on the mainland provoked a

riot among Greek troops in Egypt. The British suppressed this mutiny and attempted to establish

a new Government in Exile under George Papandreou.28 The KKE, having every advantage,

refused to participate in Papandreou’s coalition until a Soviet Delegation visited EAM

headquarters. At this point, the KKE decided to abandon PEEA and participate in the

Government in Exile.29

When the war ended, reestablishing democratic institutions was an important goal of the

returning Government in Exile. Nevertheless, the political situation had never fully stabilized

either before or after the second round of the Greek Civil War was fought around Athens in

1944. In fact, the situation in Greek politics in 1944 through 1946 resembled the situation of the

1930’s, except there was a greater intensity in the violence as right wing groups persecuted the

left and leftist bands terrorized the countryside out of the reach of the right. All this occurred

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under the watchful eyes of the British who could do othing to stop it. In March of 1946, Royalist

Popular Party won a majority in parliament in elections that had been boycotted by the left.

Before and during these elections Colonel Grivas’ X was actively persecuting members of the

left. After the elections there was a definite spike in political violence as the right wing took

power and the left wing prepared for another attempt at revolution.

On September 1, 1946, the right wing party backing the monarchy held a Plebiscite on

the monarchy’s future in Greece. King George II received 1,666,511 of 1,861,145 votes cast.30

The validity of this vote has been called into question for several reasons. One of which is that

the vote really failed to measure how many anti-monarch Venizelist republicans viewed this

election as a choice between Communism and the monarchy31 and cast their vote for the

Monarchy as the lesser of two evils. The results are also hard to gauge due to allegations that the

voter registration process was fixed to prevent the registration of left wing voters, and the reports

of terrorization of voters. Unfortunately, after only seven months on the throne George II died

on April 1, 1947 and was succeeded by his brother Paul I.

On October 18, 1944, George Papandreou landed in Piraeus, the port city of Athens. He

proceeded to set up a “Government of National Unity” that included members of all active

political parties, including the Communists.32 Also in 1944 both resistance Groups, ELAS and

EDES, placed themselves under the command of British Lieutenant General Ronald Scobie.

Despite these outer symbols, the Government was hardly unified. The old parties were

wrangling for power and position and the Communists withdrew from the government for

several months before returning.33

On December 3, 1944 EAM/ELAS supporters demonstrated over the proposed

demobilization of the guerrilla fighters and the proposed structure of the new Greek National

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Army.34 EAM wanted ELAS forces to have parity with, if not a majority over, pro-monarchist

units, something that the British would not allow. Somehow during the demonstrations, shots

were fired and full-scale war broke out. ELAS fighters had a clear advantage at the beginning of

the fighting, since they were numerically superior to both the Greek National Army and the

British Advanced Forces that were in Athens. Had it not been for the British reinforcements

deployed to Athens, and the use of British air power, it is likely that the KKE would have been

able to gain control of the Greece at that time.35 By the time the fighting was concluded the

British were able to force ELAS to disarm, but both EAM and the KKE were still legal

organizations.

After the battle of Athens was settled at Varzika, large scale white terror commenced

against the left. The left had been promised amnesty, and the actions of the right wing left them

feeling deceived.36 Many of the members of the gendarmerie and the National Army were

members of the Metaxas regime and collaborators with the Nazis. They were fueled in their rage

against the KKE and EAM by a discovery of mass graves of ELAS victims and a number of hit

lists of intended victims of future EAM/KKE terror. The attacks against the left were noted for

their incredible ferocity.37 The British, operating on a simplistic philosophy that assumed all

monarchists were good and all Communists were bad, would plant the seeds of anti-western

sentiment that would manifest itself in the vehement anti-western and anti-American rhetoric of

Andreas Papandreou.

The right wing won power under the leadership of Field Marshal Papagos and the Greek

Rally Party in the elections of 1946. As the right wing gained a dominance in Greek politics that

would last until the 1960’s and not be completely broken until the collapse of the Colonel’s

Putsch in 1974. Soon after their electoral victory the Greek government passed law 509. Law

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509 outlawed attempts, or intentions, to detach any part of Greek territory.38 It also made any

attempts to overthrow “the prevailing social system” illegal and gave the police broad powers to

decide who was guilty of these crimes.39 Law 509 also re-instituted a piece of the Metaxas

regime and mandated that Greeks carry “certificates of lawful opinions.” The effect of law 509

was to subjugate the left, and to make members of the left wing second class citizens. These

provisions of Law 509 remained in effect until 1974.

These conditions caused the armed left wing gangs in the countryside to become

increasingly militant and aggressive.40 Between 1945 and 1947 KKE leader Nikos Zachariades

vacillated between resistance to the right wing and open revolt against Greek institutions. This

vacillation caused most urban Communists to be either caught in the white terror that swept the

country or to be placed under such close surveillance that they were unable to escape the city to

join their comrades in arms when full revolt broke out in 1947.41 We must, however, understand

that caution was required on Zachariades’ part. He knew that open revolt would end up costing

the KKE a great deal of internal support and that there was no hope of sustaining a revolution

without outside supplies. These supplies didn’t come until 1947.42

In October of 1948 the national headquarters of the Democratic Army of Greece (DSE)

was established by the KKE. Despite numerous obstacles, the DSE made significant gains until

1949. By this time, Tito had split with Stalin and most of the equipment the DSE was receiving

from outside stopped coming. In addition, the Tito-Stalin split caused the border between

Greece and Yugoslavia to be closed to the Communist guerrillas of the DSE. The lack of a place

for the DSE to retreat to and regroup would prove devastating to the DSE after a major defeat at

Grammos in 1949. The last major contributor to the DSE’s defeat was United States aid. The

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United States sent $706.7 million to Greece through the Marshall Plan43 and 353.6 million worth

of military aid outside of the Marshall Plan.44

After the Greek Civil War ended, 44 political parties participated in the 1950 elections.

With this many participants it was quite natural that no single party received a clear majority.

When no coalition could be established to govern, a new election had to be called in 1951. The

United states, after giving the Greeks over a billion dollars worth of aid, looked with alarm upon

the apparent return to traditional political instability and decided to intervene. The U.S.

threatened to cut off aid to Greece unless they abandoned proportional representation and

switched to simple majority representation.45 This move, while it was little more than Theodore

Roosevelt’s “Big Stick Diplomacy” in economic terms, did provide enough political stability that

the Marshall plan was able to jump start the Greek Economy.

With economic and electoral stability the Greek Rally Party, was able to win 247 of 300

seats in parliament. Papagos led Greece into its first, period of stability since before the

Anatolian disaster of the 1920’s. Under Papagos’ leadership, Greece was able to join NATO in

1952. Papagos also devalued the Drachma to spur exports and to draw western capital to Greece.

He was also able, for the first time, to open talks over the fate of Cyprus with the British and the

Turks. These talks failed in 1955 due to political violence against the Turkish Cypriots and the

British conducted by EOKA (National Organization of Cypriot Fighters), under the leadership of

Colonel George Grivas,46 and pogroms targeted at the Greek community in

Constantinople/Istanbul.47 General Papagos died in office in 1955 and was replaced by the

young Konstantine Karamanlis.

King Paul appointed Konstantine Karamanlis Prime Minister in the hopes that he would

be able to form and lead a government. He was successful in forming a government and would

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remain Prime Minister until 1963. He presided over a period of continued growth and political

stability. He was also convinced that Greece’s fortunes lay with the western nations and, on this

philosophy, he won associated status in the European Community in 1962. He continued to

establish close ties to the United States, and was even privileged with a visit to Greece by

President Eisenhower.48

There were, however, problems beneath the surface during Karamanlis’ leadership. One

of these problems was the growth of crony capitalism. For crony capitalism to function the

economy needed light taxation, high tariff protection, easy credits and a cheap, docile, labor

force.49 This form of capitalism created a high concentration of wealth when compared to other

developed countries of the time. The Greek people, however, didn’t think of themselves as a

developing country and calls for social reform tobring greece inline with the developed countries

in the western world grew.

As is natural in the pendulum of democratic politics, the Greeks’ political opinions began

to swing back to the left. In the 1961 elections allegations of tampering and corruption were

rampant. The army and police, who had been alarmed by high support for the left in the 1958

elections, openly intimidated voters in left leaning areas and elsewhere.50 Even Karamanlis was

beginning to think that the power of the military was inappropriate for a modern democracy. He

clashed with King Paul, and the unpopular queen Frederika, over the military’s power and the

monarchy’s relationship with the military.51 George Papandreou seized upon this issue and the

allegations of electoral tampering in 1961 and gained a slim majority in parliament in 1964.

This rise of the left, combined with Karamanlis’ conflict with the Monarchy caused him

to follow Venizelos’ pattern. He resigned from politics, and retired to Paris in 1963. Swirling

around Karamanlis’ resignation were three issues. One, the Cyprus question. Since 1955 the

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subject of Cypriot Enosis52 with mainland Greece had been a problematic issue between Greece

and Turkey. Many Turks, looking to their Ottoman past view Cyprus as Turkish, yet Greeks,

looking to their Byzantine past, and the fact that 80% of the population of Cyprus is Greek, view

Cyprus as Greek. There was also the Constitutional question of the Monarchy’s proper role in

Greek Politics. At Karamanlis’ resignation he suggested that the new Parliament have the

authority to revise the constitution,53 a suggestion that was not looked upon favorably by King

Paul and his queen. Finally there was the quiet undercurrent of an anti-democratic tradition in

the military left over from the days of Metaxas.

After Karamanlis’ resignation the elections of 1963 held no sign of electoral malpractice

and Papandreaou’s Centre Union won 138 of the 300 seats in parliament. The United

Democratic Left (EDA), which was little more than a front for the outlawed KKE, held 28 seats

and the balance of power. When Papandreou was unable to come to terms with the Communists,

though some say he refused to govern with them,54 new elections had to be held in 1964. The

1964 elections propelled George Papandreaou’s Centre Union to power, giving them 52.7

percent of the vote, 173 seats in Parliament, and a clear “Mandate for change.”55 In March of

1964 King Paul died and was succeeded by his twenty-three year old son Constantine II.

All of these events led to a deepening concern in the military. King Paul had been their

patron in the royal palace, and Karamanlis’ Greek Rally Party had been their political ally.

Added to the loss of their royal patron and their connection to the ruling party, there was

increasing Turkish belligerence over the Cyprus issue. Many members of the military began to

fear a deterioration of public order and rumblings of a military coup could be heard in the

distance. These factors, combined with some extremely shortsighted decisions, would take

Greece from a tense situation to a full-blown crisis.

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 Papandreaou’s first project after he assumed office was to work to end the vendetta

against the losers of the Greek Civil War. He released many political prisoners, but did not

legalize the KKE. He then instituted educational reforms, raising the age upon which Greek

children could leave school. He then appointed his son Andreas as Minister of the Economy in

an attempt to modernize the Greek economy along Western lines.

Andreas Papandreou was a Harvard educated economist, and had been the chair of the

economics department at the university of California at Berkley. Andreas instituted a number of

economic policies designed to modernize the Greek economy along Keynsian lines. He cut

Income tax by 10%, increased public spending, and introduced welfare legislation. He also

established minimum prices for produce and encouraged banks to make borrowing easier.56

Andreas was significantly more left leaning than his father was. He had been a member

of a Trostkyite organization as a young man in Athens and alleges that the Metaxist police

severely beat him for his activities. It can also be said that Andreas lacked the diplomatic style

of his father and was well known for using inflammatory, anti-western rhetoric. His leftist views

would make him a number of enemies and land Andreas the center of several controversies

before the Colonel’s Putsch in 1967.

The First of these scandals was the Aspida57 incident. In May of 1965 a conspiracy

among Greek officers on Cyprus was discovered and Andreas Papandreou’s name was brought

up in the investigation. This incident, highly publicized at the time, was a result of the rejection

of a plan for Cyprus’ Enosis with Greece. The agreement had been forged by U.S. diplomat

Dean Acheson and stated that Cyprus would become Greek, but Turkey would be allowed to

maintain military bases. Andreas’ admission that he was “instrumental in securing the rejection

16
of the Acheson Plan” caused a storm and, with hindsight, may have been one of his gravest

errors since it is unlikely that any settlement achieved now would have such generous terms.58

It is significant to note that the investigation that uncovered the Aspida conspiracy was

conducted by the infamous George Grivas, now a General in command of the Greek Army’s

garrison on Cyprus and commander of the National Guard.59 General Grivas had become a very

important, if not controversial, figure in the Cypriot community. It is speculated that he rigged

the Aspida investigation to punish Andreas for his role in preventing Cypriot enosis with Greece

in 1964. Aspida was a secret left wing organization alleged to be working closely with Andreas.

Although Andreas claims he “knew nothing about Aspida60” the damage was done. The report

had been sent to the king and to defense minister Petrous Garouphalias.

The Aspida controversy was not the only scandal that erupted in the Greek political arena

during this time. It was also revealed that the Army had indeed played a role in the violence of

the 1961 elections. The young King Constantine II, however, combined this scandal with a

serious tactical blunder. He actually demanded that the military officers that had conducted the

investigation into the violence be dismissed for violating the hierarchical principals of the

army.61 This scandal had far reaching consequences, since the voter intimidation was traced all

the way back to General Ioannis Gennimatas, Chief of Staff for the Greek Army, in what is

known as Operation Pericles. Pressure mounted from the left to remove Gennimatas 62 while the

military became increasingly disillusioned with the Papandreou government.63 The Aspida

scandal was investigated by a parliamentary committee which came to the conclusion that

Aspida was little more than a small organization of a few junior officers. This conclusion was

unsatisfactory to the Palace. The king considered the investigation a whitewash and ordered a

full-scale investigation into the affair.64 A telegram from the Greek Embassy in Athens to the

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U.S. Department of State sheds some light on why the king was so concerned by the Aspida

affair.

Particularly disturbing to King was implication that "Aspida" represented

essentially anti-monarchy element in armed forces which might be used at a
critical moment by its leaders as an instrument of political and/or military
pressure against throne.65

Swirling within this struggle for control of the army, which was careening towards a

crisis, were rumors of a military coup against the Papandreou government. The Army leadership

was extremely concerned about Andreas Papandreou, the likely successor to George Papandreou.

There was an assumption that Andreas would take over the leadership of the Centre union soon,

as his father’s health was failing. There was a distinct fear in the Army that Andreas Papandreou

would lead Greece out of the Western alliance if he was to come to power.66

Nonetheless, the disclosure of the army’s role in the 1961 elections raised serious

questions in Greece. Papandreou also knew that if he did not get control of the military,

democratic institutions in Greece would be in grave danger. “The Army belongs to the nation,”

quickly became a slogan of the Centre Union.67 To get control over the army Papandreou

decided that he would ask the king to dismiss General Gennimatas. He also decided to ask

minister of defense Garoufalias to resign and assume that post himself. One can only imagine

the surprise of George Papandreou when he asked Garoufalias to resign and was told that the

Minister of Defense took orders from the king, not the Prime Minister.68 This action by the

young King Constantine, who was widely seen to be under the influence of Queen Fredrika, was

outrageous to the left. They held that the ability to appoint and dismiss ministers belonged to the

Prime Minister, and not the king.69 In a telegram to Washington, the U.S. Ambassador expressed

deep concern over the actions of the king in this situation and his increasing isolation under the

influence of his mother and other political advisorsthat had been presumably selected by his

18
mother. There was a distinct fear that the Royal House’s continued interference in elected the

government would drive both George and Andreas Papandreou closer to the Communist party.

[The] king has been isolated in Corfu presumably depending principally upon
Queen Mother, his political advisor Choidas and his long-time confidant, Major
Arnaoutis, as advisors and intermediaries. In extensive conversation with
Choidas . . . I expressed serious reservations as to wisdom of direct collision
between Papandreou and King under current circumstances. Since that time I
have twice seen him socially. On each occasion he asserted he wished to talk with
me again and promised to get in touch with me, but conspicuously failed to do so.
I had also expressed my own opinion clearly to General Papathanassiades,
Marshal of the Court, who asserted that he entirely agreed and that he had
transmitted not only his own but my views to the King.
My present feeling is that the King has acted with imprudent haste and
abruptness, thereby incurring serious risk to internal stability which might
possibly have been avoided. If King's action results in establishment of relatively
stable new government (presumably headed by a Center Union personality
depending principally upon ERE support for its existence) without bringing EDA
and the Papandreous even closer and without possible violence, he will have
proved to be shrewder judge of the situation than I am prepared to hope.70

Andreas Papandreou calls the king’s refusal to allow the Prime Minister to appoint and

dismiss members of the cabinet as he saw fit a serious threat to “crown Democracy.” He asserts

that only the parliament can vote confidence to the ministers and the king does not interfere.

Although, in defense of the Greek Royal Family I must state that as recently as Queen Victoria

the English monarch intervened in the affairs of the government as well as in the appointment

and dismissal of ministers. I must also add that the Russian Imperial family was brought down

in the February Revolution that revolved, in part, over the fledgling parliamentary procedures

that liberals in Russia were trying to build and conservatives were trying to stop. Eventually the

King’s refusal to accede to Papandreou’s demands to reshuffle his cabinet caused George

Papandreou to resign as Prime Minister on July 15, 1965.

George Papandreou’s resignation should have prompted Constantine to call for elections,

but he did not. For the next two years he tried to form a stable government among his allies in

19
the Greek Parliament, but was never able to accomplish this. During this time, the political

situation continued to deteriorate as the officers accused in the electoral irregularities of 1961

were declared innocent71 and rumors of a “Big Junta” among the army’s top generals was feared.

In one field report from the U.S. Department of State it is noted that there is:

continued concern over the political situation of the rightist Greek military
conspiratorial group, which has been in existence since late 1963. One of the
group's leaders, Lieutenant Colonel Georgios72 Papadopoulos, stated on 22
November that if the political situation continues to deteriorate at the present rate,
drastic action, i.e., dictatorship, will be needed.73

All of this combined to create a serious crisis of confidence in the monarchy among the general

population.74

Finally, the king called for elections in 1967. It appeared that George Papandreou’s

Centre Union would win by a large majority. There was a distinct fear that George would soon

retire due to age and health concerns and that Andreas would take over the leadership of the

Centre Union and the government that the party would control.75

Neither the elections nor the “Big Junta” ever took place. On April 21, 1967 a group of

colonels, led by George Papadopoulos, staged a putsch and seized control of Greece. These

Colonels acted on their fear that if the Centre Union were to win the upcoming election, there

would be a purge of the armed forces.76 I did find it odd in my research that most of the sources

refer to the Colonel’s seizure of power using the German word putsch or the Spanish word junta

instead of the French term coup d’etat. Why this choice would be made is perplexing, but

looking at the actions and general incompetence of the Colonels, I would speculate that the

French term coup d’etat carries a certain level of grace and sophistication to it. Grace and

sophistication are certainly qualities that the Colonels in Greece lacked.

20
 King Constantine did attempt a counter-coup in December of 1967, but he was forced

into exile when this attempt failed. He describes April 21 as “the worst day of my life.”77 As it

will later turn out, this counter-coup would be the last action the Greek monarchy would take as

the ruling family in Greece. In December of 1973, colonel Ioannides abolished the monarchy

and in 1974 when Karamanlis put the question to the people, the monarchy was voted out of

existence in Greece with 70% of the population being against the monarchy. It is ironic that this

election reflected almost exactly the results of the 1924 elections, which were the only other

elections on the question of the monarchy that were not rife with allegations of electoral

tampering and vote rigging.78

The most significant aspect of the Colonels’ brief stay in power was the sudden and

disastrous solution to the Cyprus question due to their miscalculations. The other important part

of the Colonels’ regime was that it was a Metaxist style dictatorship. Their regime immediately

purged the Army and the bureaucracy of anyone who didn’t support them, and they quickly

resorted to terror and propaganda to secure their hold on Greece.79

Cyprus

At this point, I feel that it is critical to insert a brief discussion of the Island of Cyprus

into our examination of Greece. Although Cyprus has not ever been a part of the Modern Greek

State, the Greek people of this island have always felt themselves to be part of the Greek Nation.

Over 80% of the island’s population is Greek, and Modern Greece’s greatest statesman,

Eleftherios Venizelos, was born and is buried there. The question of Cypriot enosis with Greece

has played a significant role in 20th century politics.

21
 The drive for Cypriot unity with Greece has its roots in the Megali Idea. The

civilizations of Greece and Cyprus have been intertwined since ancient times. The Minoan

Civilization left a distinct impression on the ancient Greek world through the legend of King

Midas and the Minotaur. Both Alexander the Great and Byzantium held Cyprus to be a critical

part of their Eastern Mediterranean Empires.

Despite the drive to make Cyprus part of Greece, the reality in achieving this has proved

very difficult to achieve due to its strategic location. British shipping to and from India passed

through Cyprus on its way to and from the Suez canal, and the British had established

governance over the Island in 1878. They fully wrested the island from the Ottoman Empire

after World War I. This started a long cycle of violence designed to either unify the island with

Greece, or to prevent this from taking place depending, of course, on which side was perpetrating

the violence. In 1931, as well as the years 1955-1959 most of the violence was directed at the

British by Greeks. The British were the colonial powers and it was the British who would make

the decision as to when, or if, Cyprus would be unified to the mainland and whether this would

be to Greece or to Turkey.

Violence that related to the Cyprus question was not limited to the Island of Cyprus. On

September 6, 1955, there was a riot that lasted over 24 hours in the Greek quarter of

Constantinople/Istanbul. This riot has been blamed on Turkish authorities desire to exact

revenge upon the ill treatment of the Turkish Cypriots by their Greek counterparts and to

illustrate the seriousness of the Turkish claims over Cyprus.80 By 1959, after repeated attempts

to find a solution acceptable to the four inflexible parties involved,81 Britain declared Cyprus an

independent republic in 1959, setting up themselves, Greece and Turkey as guarantors of the

Island’s independence.

22
 A group of Greek Cypriots under the leadership of George Grivas formed the National

Organization of Cypriot Fighters (EOKA) in 1951.82 EOKA was a terrorist group designed to

target British rule on the Island. Colonel Grivas’ had become a political leader in 1956 after the

British exiled Cypriot Archbishop Makarios in 1956. Without the Archbishop to restrain them,

EOKA became more violent. In 1958 the British proposed a partition of the island into Turkish

and Greek sections. This proposal was seized upon by the Turkish Cypriots but rejected by the

Greeks.

After independence violence broke out between the Greek and Turkish communities on

Cyprus. EOKA remained active, still wanting Enosis with Greece, but had shifted their targets to

the Turks on the Island rather than the British. This violence continued to escalate and by 1964,

Turkey was preparing to invade the island. It was only intervention by Lyndon Johnson that

prevented a full-scale invasion of the island. President Johnson dispatched Dean Acheson to

attempt to propose a solution and avert a war between NATO Allies. The proposed solution was

that Cyprus be unified with Greece, but that Turkey would be allowed to maintain military bases

on the island since it considered the island to be a vital part of its defense. Unfortunately, both

Andreas Papandreou and the Cypriot President Archbishop Makarios rejected this solution.83

After General Grivas had been appointed to the Cypriot National Guard, violence broke

out in Turkish Cypriot enclaves. Approximately half of the 24,000 men in the Cypriot National

Guard were from the Greek National Army.84 After the violence in 1967 Turkey decided to take

decisive action and massed troops in Turkish Thrace85 preparing to invade the island. They

demanded that General Grivas leave the island immediately, the Cypriot National Guard be

immediately disbanded, and that reparations be paid to the victims of the recent violence.

Through U.S. mediation General Grivas left the island and all foreign troops in excess of the

23
amount allowed under the Treaty of alliance that the British had forged in 1959 were to leave the

island.86 The National Guard of Cyprus, however, was not dissolved.87 By the early 1970’s,

however, Cyprus was de facto a divided and partitioned country.

The Colonels in Athens brought the Conflict in Cyprus to a head. In 1971, General

Grivas, a supporter of the Putsch on the mainland secretly returned to Cyprus and established

EOKA-B, a new Terrorist organization that intended to achieve enosis by force. The death of

General Grivas in 1974 didn’t stop the group’s violence. By 1973, however, Colonel Dimitrios

Ioannides had taken over the reigns of the Greek government from George Papadopolous.

Colonel Ioannides was a supporter of Grivas and enosis. In 1974, when an EOKA-B plan to

assassinate Archbishop Makarios, the president of the Republic of Cyprus, was uncovered

Makarios demanded that the troops under the command of the Greek Army leave Cyprus.

Rather than respect the will of the president of the sovereign nation of Cyprus, Colonel

Ioannides ordered the Cypriot National Guard to take control of the island on July 2, 1974.

Enosis was the next logical step in this plan. The Turkish government, however, had other plans

for Cyprus, and was not about to sit idly by while Cyprus was unified with the Greek State.

Turkish troops invaded Cyprus on July 20, 1974. The Colonels in Athens would fall three days

later. After a temporary cease-fire on 30 July, hostilities resumed on 15 August, 1974 and in the

next three days Turkish forces would capture 38% of the Island. The island was partitioned, and

remains so to this day.

24
 The End of the Colonels Regime to the Present.

The Colonels quietly stepped out of power in 1974, but their problems had begun some

time before that. In the fall of 1973, students began to demonstrate in Athens and by November

17, 1973 tanks were used to violently break up the riots.88 This incident served only to illustrate

the regime’s lack of control. It also triggered a reshuffling of the leadership. Ioannides replaced

Papadopolous and decided that the way to regain popularity was to play the Cyprus card.

Unfortunately for the Greeks, his decision was a disaster. The conflict on Cyprus escalated

tensions between Greece and Turkey and many Greeks felt that there was a danger that the

fighting would spread to mainland Greece.89

Konstantine Karamanlis was recalled from his self-imposed exile in Paris to rebuild the

Greek state. He arrived in Athens on July 24, 1974 to a hero’s welcome90 and immediately set to

work healing the wounds from the coup and the rancorous years leading up to it. One of his

long-term tasks was to reduce the extremism that had torn the Greek political landscape apart

since the 1920’s. Before he could do this, it was necessary to break the political power of the

army and return the Greek National Army to a position where the civilian government controlled

the army, and not the other way around. Karamanlis handled this in a delicate fashion, not

wanting to repeat the mistakes of the 1920’s. Ioannides and the other three top leaders of the

Putsch received death sentences that were commuted, the police force and many people serving

in the military were tried and convicted, and Putsch sympathizers were purged from the

universities.91

When Karamanlis arrived, he knew that the task of reconstructing Greek civil society

would be no Lilliputian task. He acknowledged that the Greeks have a “bad habit of putting

25
political antagonism first and our national interests second.92” He also stated his belief that

Greek democracy failed due to the lack of “calm political habits and customs.93” It appeared

that, at least this time, a Greek politician had finally remembered the Golden Mean and intended

to follow it.

Karamanlis Intended to forge a New Democracy for Greece.94 To this end he legalized

the KKE and put the question of the monarchy to the Greek people. The Monarchy’s poor

decisions in the years leading up to the Putsch combined with the personal unpopularity of the

Queen Mother combined to apparently end the Monarchy’s turbulent history in Greece. One

cannot declare the monarchy completely dead yet. King Constantine II is still alive and has had

periodic run-ins with the various governments of Greece for behaving as if he is still entitled to

have a throne in Greece, and his sister Sofia is married to the reigning Spanish King, Juan

Carlos. I did find it a little disappointing that the Royal Family’s website failed to discuss the

events leading up to the 1967 Putsch and there was no biographical information on Queen

Fredrika, the unpopular Queen Mother.

Another significant act was Karamanlis’ withdrawal of Greece from all NATO military

commitments. During the 1955 riots in Constantinople and Yzmir, Greek NATO officials had

been attacked at Yzmir yet the Greeks had shown great restraint in not allowing this incident to

provoke a greater conflict batween Greece and turkey within NATO. Karamanlis, however, was

disappointed in the letter he received from Eisenhower that did not seem to differentiate between

the victim and aggressor. In 1974 when Karamanlis came to office, he was working feverishly to

stop the violence in Cyprus. When the Turks unilaterally broke off peace talks and re-opened

hostilities on the island, Karamanlis was again disappointed in the NATO response to Turkish

aggression. In protest of the perceived bias against Greece, he pulled the Greek military out of

26
NATO, although he did not withdraw completely.95 Despite his disagreements with NATO,

Karamanlis retained his western orientation, joining the European Economic Community.

Karamanlis’ most important reform was in the political arena. His idea was to make

Greece into a more modern western style democracy. New Democracy (ND) was founded on

these principals, and was not intended to merely be the personal entourage of the party’s founder,

as had been the case up until this point.96

In 1981, the political pendulum swung again and ND was defeated as Andreas

Papandreou’s Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) gained a parliamentary majority. The

party rose to power as it toned down its Marxist rhetoric and backed away from its calls of taking

the “Third Road to Socialism” under their leadership. Though the Marxist rhetoric was toned

down, it was never abandoned. Also the party, by its own admission, has not toned down its

anti-right wing rhetoric.97 This has caused some to question PASOK’s democratic character and

commitment to plurality.98

I do think that it is safe to speculate that these questions are not something that should

generate a great deal of concern. Papandreou’s government was toppled amidst bribery scandals

in 198999 and they did relinquish power without resorting to arms. PASOK returned to power in

1993 after Papandreou was acquitted of the bribery charges. He resigned in 1995 due to failing

health and died in 1996.

Papandreou’s death also seems to have eliminated the questions about PASOK’s

democratic character. Andreas Papandreou was described on more than one occasion as an

authoritarian character and has been replaced by Costas Simitis at the party’s head. Simitis is a

reformer who wants to move PASOK closer to the center of the political spectrum.100 His

reforms, however have been called a sham by some, and it had been suggested that PASOK be

27
disbanded altogether.101 Amidst the turmoil of a new influence peddling scandal and an

expected loss in the 2004 elections PASOK is expected to go through a changing of the guard

after the elections. Finally, PASOK seems to be moving away from the oldest undemocratic

tradition in democratic societies, as it appears that they have ruled out vote buying through

handing out political favors from the government just prior to the elections.102

As has been mentioned earlier, New Democracy (ND) was founded in 1974 by

Konstantine Karamanlis in 1974 and left power in 1981. They lost due to the longstanding drive

among Greek society for radical social change. The Greeks have long desireed radical change,

and it has always caused a great deal of trouble in Greece and in the democratic process. The

measure of Karamanlis’ reforms can be taken in PASOK’s victory in 1981 and the smooth

transfer of power from ND to PASOK. ND regained power briefly from 1990-1993, and under

the leadership of Konstantine Karamanlis’ nephew, Dr. Kostas Karamanlis,103 ND appears to be

in a position to take control of the reigns of government again. ND currently carries a 7-point

lead in the polls.104

Also on the horizon for Greece are the 2004 Olympic Summer Games, which will be

hosted by Athens. Greece is working hard to clean up its image for the games. Roads and

infrastructure are being built to get spectators to the various events centers and proposals have

even gone as far as recommending that extra brothels be licensed for the games. Naturally, this

proposal has been met with displeasure from Archbishop Christodulous in Athens, head of the

Orthodox Church in Greece.

The most important factor in Greece cleaning up its image is the breakup and capture of

many of the leaders of November 17, “Europe's most elusive terrorist group.105” 17 November,

as it is referred to in Greece, was an anti-American, anti-western terrorist group named for the

28
massacre of students on November 17, 1973. They conducted their first attack in December of

1975.106 The Government’s apparent inability to catch them, or even identify them, led to

allegations that the group had ties to PASOK. Something that I personally could not help but

notice was that the group was broken by a PASOK government, but it was broken after George

Papandreou’s death. More than likely this is coincidence, but it certainly appears to give

credence to some of the old allegations.

Greece and the European Union.

Greece re-joined the European Community in 1981 after having been removed from this

organization by the behavior of the Colonels. They have since held the presidency of the EU

four times,107 their most recent term ended in 2003 when they passed the reigns of the presidency

to the Italians on July 1. Some of the Greek objectives for the EU were; to complete the

enlargement process and form long term, common objectives and uniform practices for dealing

with the immigration problem. They wanted mostly to put the message that Europe “belongs to

all European peoples without exceptions or exclusions.108

Enlargement holds a big place in Greece’s desires and goals for the EU. One of the

primary reasons for this is that among the ten new member states to join is the Republic of

Cyprus. That the Southern half of the island has been allowed to join the EU without the

northern half should have a major, and positive effect on Greco-Turkish relations. That Turkey

also wants to join the EU could eventually lead to the end of the thirty-year division of the

island.

29
 Dr. Kostas Karamanlis is a firm believer that Greece’s place in the world will again

assume greater importance in the coming years. He believes that Greece is an anchor of stability

in Southeastern Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean Sea.109 It is a strange thing to think that

Greece, this country of political extremes and turbulence that has been virtually non-stop since

the 1920’s, has become the paradigm of stability in a restless region since 1974. But he is quite

accurate in his assessment. Greece straddles the eastern and western cultures of the Eastern

Mediterranean Sea. She is also the senior member of the EU in the area. These two factors

combine to place her in a unique position to take a leading role within the EU as it expands in the

area.

He did express serious concern about the apparent NATO willingness to redraw the

borders of Albania after the Kosovo conflict. There are so many separatist movements in the

Balkans that he argued, successfully at the time, that any redrawing of the borders of Albania

would destabilize the entire Balkan region. Greece has every reason to be concerned about this

as well. The backers of “greater Albania” in Kosovo have larger territorial ambitions than just

Kosovo. Their ambitions include parts of northern Greece, and the Former Yugoslav Republic

of Macedonia. Greek fears of continued Albanian expansionism seemed to be justified as an

Albanian Separatist movement began in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Which

brings us to the other major concern that Greece has in the region. In the north of Greece, there

is a province called Macedonia. It is mostly a Greek province, but there is a small Macedonian

Slav population that wants to create a larger Slavic Macedonia that includes all Macedonians

under one Macedonian government. The Concerns that Greece has over the Macedonian

separatist movement led to the cumbersome Former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia being

30
made the official name of the old Yugoslavian province of Macedonia when it achieved

independence.

Conclusions

Greece has been through massive changes since 1945. Most significant of these changes

is the relative stability that has dominated the political life in Greece since 1974. Before this,

Greece’s politics can be characterized as unstable at best. Dominated by the idea of “Greater

Greece” and the return to ancient glories, the Greek politicians embarked on several disastrous

adventures in Asia Minor and Cyprus. Both of these adventures were driven by the Megali Idea

and both of which accomplished nothing save further destabilization of the Greek polity.

The Civil War and the resurgence of the right led to an electoral backlash in the 1960’s.

George and Andreas Papandreou would ride this backlash to power and leave a stamp on Greek

politics and, in many ways, lay the foundations for the changes that Karamanlis was to build on

in 1974. Despite the controversy generated by the Papandreous, one can, and should, lay the

causes of the constitutional crisis and the Putsch of the colonels in 1967, at the feet of the

Monarchy. In their zeal to protect their own interests and their allies in the military they thrust

the Greek polity into a crisis that it was not equipped to deal with through its democratic

traditions.

The period from 1974 to the present has been a period of relative stability for Greece.

They have had political scandals but they did not bring the government to the point of collapse

with each crisis. Greece’s stability in the region is one of the most positive developments for the

entire Eastern Mediterranean region.

31
 The increasing stability within Greece and its unique place in history and geography

could make it an essential player in the post-Cold War world. As the Cold War ends, we are

seeing the Middle East is becoming more important to world affairs. Greece, though it has

remained western in its focus since her liberation from the Ottoman Empire in the 1820’s,

retained a distinctively Eastern Mediterranean culture. Greece's traditional politics have focused

to the East. From before the time of Alexander the Great the Greeks looked to the East for

economic and cultural advancement. The Greeks have also spent 400 years under a Middle

Eastern Empire. The cultural influences between Greece and the other Middle Eastern cultures

are distinct in music, and the two cultures have been interacting for so long that it is hard to

determine whose folk music influenced whom. The Arabic musical scale, according to a

musician that I know, is only different by one-half tone on one note. The lack of a Communist

government in Greece, as befell the other Balkan nations that suffered Ottoman rule, and

American pressure in the 1950’s have allowed Greece to develop ways to deal with the cultural

scars without resorting to violence. Greece’s other great contribution to the area could be the

lack of extraterritorial ambitions by Greece. As many of her Balkan neighbors are wiling to go

to great lengths to establish a greater, and larger, version of themselves that include all members

of a particular ethnicity, Greece can be an example of what a dangerous path this can be. If there

is any country that would understand the perils of this philosophy, it would be Greece. As the

cold war ends and the United States turns its eyes towards the Middle East as a strategic location,

the Greek experience will become one that will grow in importance and value.

1
A view shared by Robert Byron in his 1929 work, The Byzantine Achievement.
2
Boatswain, Timothy and Nicholson, Collin. A Traveler’s History of Greece: Third Edition. Interlink Books, New
York, 1998. Page 176-177
3
He lived from 1864-1936. His name is also spelled Eleutherios Venizelos.
4
The Library of Congress Federal Research Division. Greece: A country Study. Data as of 1994.
http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/grtoc.html

32
5
Constantine’s support of the Central powers caused the British and the French to blockade Greece and successfully
force Constantine to quit the throne in favor of his son Alexander. The Website greekroyalfamily.org is eager to
emphasize that this was not an abdication though.
http://www.greekroyalfamily.org/english/family_constantine1.html
6
Stephens, Robert. Cyprus: A Place of Arms. Praeger: London, 1966. www.cyprus-conflict.net/turkey-
greece%20history.htm
7
Modern Iraq
8
These countries were to be in the Eastern half of modern Turkey.
9
Modern Yzmir, or Ismir.
10
Stevens.
11
James, Edwin L. “Turks proclaim banishment edict to 1,000,000 Greeks, The New York Times December 2,
1922. Page 1 Column 1. http://www.ahmp.org/1922nyt.html
12
Antonopoulos, Thanassis. “Growing Pains.” The Athens News Agency. 1999.
www.ana.gr/hermes/2000/janfeb/1900.htm
13
Hellenic Republic, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “The Asia Minor Holocaust of 1922.”
http://www.mfa.gr/english/greece/through_time/history/ottoman.html Click on the link to “Asia Minor catastrophe
in 1922.”
14
The Library of Congress Federal Research Division. Greece. “Inter-war Struggles.”
15
The Library of Congress Federal Research Division. Greece. “Political Turmoil in the 20’s.”
16
Greek Royal Family.org. History of the Greek Monarchy: King George II.
www.greekroyalfamily.org/english/family_george2.html
17
The Library of Congress Federal Research Division. Greece. “Political Turmoil in the 20’s.”
18
The Library of Congress Federal Research Division. Greece. “The Second Venizelos Golden Age.”
19
The Library of Congress Federal Research Division. Greece. “The crises of the 1930’s.”
20
The Library of Congress Federal Research Division. Greece. “The crises of the 1930’s.”
21
Kofas, Jon V. Authoritarianism in Greece: The Metaxas Regime. East European Monographs: Boulder. 1983.
22
Kofas.
23
Pitiris, Phanos. “October 28, 1940” www.stuorg.iastate.edu/hellenicsa/events/phanos_oct_28.html
24
Center of Military History. The German Campaigns in the Balkans (spring 1941). Part Three, chapter 18. United
States Army: Washington. 1986. http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/wwii/balkan/20_260_3.htm
25
Center of Military History. The German Campaigns in the Balkans (spring 1941). Part Four, Chapter 21. United
States Army: Washington. 1986. http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/wwii/balkan/20_260_4.htm
26
The Library of Congress Federal Research Division. Cyprus: A Country Study. Data as of January 1991.
http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/cytoc.html. “World War II and Postwar Nationalism.”
27
Close, David, Ed. The Greek Civil War, 1943-1950: Studies of Polarization. Routlledge: New York, 1993. Page
74.
28
Close. The Greek Civil War. Page 74.
29
Close. The Greek Civil War. Page 77.
30
Carey, Jane and Carey, Andrew. The Web of Modern Greek Politics. Columbia University Press: New York.
1968. Page 141.
31
Carey. Page 141.
32
Carey. Page 135.
33
Carey. Page 135.
34
Dear I.C.B. Ed. Oxford Companion to the Second World War. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
www.ucc.ie/staff/jprodr/macedonia/helmod2d.html
35
Dear.
36
Boatswain. Page 236.
37
Close. Greece Since 1945. Page 20.
38
This provision was placed into the law because many of the KKE’s supporters were the Macedonian separatists in
the northern regions of Greece.
39
Close. Greece Since 1945. Page 27.
40
Close. Greece Since 1945. Page 28.
41
Close. Greece Since 1945. Page 29.
42
Close. Greece Since 1945. Page 29.

33
43
Marshal Foundation.org. Marshall Plan Expenditures: Economic assistance April 3, 1948 to June 30, 1952.
www.themarshallfoundation.org/about_gcm/marshall_plan.htm#expenditures.
44
Close. Greece Since 1945. Page 33.
45
The Library of Congress Federal Research Division. Greece: A country Study. Data as of 1994.
http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/grtoc.html. “Civilian Politics Resume.”
46
The Library of Congress. Greece. “Civilian Politics Resume.”
47
Holland, Robert. Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, 1954-1959. Clarendon Press: Oxford. 1998.
www.cyprus-conflict.net-istanbul_riots.htm
48
The Library of Congress Greece. “The Rise of Karamanlis”
49
Close. Greece Since 1945. Page 47.
50
The Library of Congress Greece. “Electoral Shift to the Left.”
51
The Library of Congress Greece. “Electoral Shift to the Left.”
52
Unification.
53
Woodhouse, C.M. Karamanlis: The restorer of Greek Democracy. Clarendon Press: Oxford. 1982. Page 150.
54
Boatswain, 249.
55
The Library of Congress Greece. “Conditions for overthrow.”
56
Boatswain, Page 249.
57
Aspida is a Greek word meaning shield.
58
Stavrou, Nicolaos, Ed. Greece under Socialism: A NATO Ally Adrift. Orpheus Publishing Inc.: New Rochelle,
1988. Page 71.
59
Patrick, Richard A. Political Geography and the Cyprus Conflict, 1963-1971. Dept. of Geography, University of
Waterloo, 1976. http://www.cyprus-conflict.net/Patrick,%20chp%204.htm
60
Papandreou, Andreas. Democracy at Gunpoint: The Greek Front. Doubleday & Company, Inc.: Garden City.
1970. Page 148.
61
Papandreou. Page 144.
62
Papandreou. Page 144.
63
The United States Department of State. Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey:
Released by the Office of the Historian Documents 194-217. “194. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the
Department of State. Antagonism of Army Towards Papandreou”
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/xvi/4771.htm
64
Stavrou. Page 74.
65
The United States Department of State. Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey:
Released by the Office of the Historian Documents 194-217. “194. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the
Department of State. Attitude of Palace” http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/xvi/4771.htm
66
The United States Department of State. Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey:
Released by the Office of the Historian Documents 194-217. “194. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the
Department of State. Rumors of Coup d'Etat” http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/xvi/4771.htm
67
Papandreou. Page 145.
68
Papandreou. Page 155.
69
Papandreou. Page 155.
70
The United States Department of State. Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey:
Released by the Office of the Historian Documents 194-217 “199. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the
Department of State. Athens, July 9, 1965. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/xvi/4771.htm
71
Katris, John A. Eyewitness in Greece: The Colonels Come to Power. New Critics Press, Inc.: St. Louis. 1971.
Page 173.
72
The Greek form of George.
73
The United States Department of State. Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey:
Released by the Office of the Historian Documents 243-272. “245. Field Information Report. Athens, December
20, 1966.” http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/xvi/4764.htm
74
Katris. Page 173.
75
Stavrou. Page 79.
76
The Library of Congress Greece. “Ascension of the Colonels.”
77
Greek Royal Family.org. The Royal Family, Profile: HM King Constantine.
www.greekroyalfamily.org/english/family_constantine_pfile.html
78
The Library of Congress Greece. “Dealing with the Monarchy and the Military”

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79
Boatswain. Page 252.
80
Holland.
81
The Turkish Cypriots who wanted partition of the island and Unification with Turkey, Greek Cypriots who
wanted no partition and unification with Greece, Greece who shared the Cypriot position, and Turkey who wanted
no partition and unification of the entire Island with Turkey. A statement of the Turkish position can be found at
http://www.cyprus-conflict.net/zorlu_in_london.htm.
82
“Cyprus War for Union with Greece.” Land Forces of Britain, the Empire and the Commonwealth.
Regiments.org. 2003. http://www.regiments.org/milhist/about/copyright.htm
83
The Library of Congress Federal Research Division. Cyprus: A Country Study. Data as of January 1991.
http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/cytoc.html. “Intercommunal Violence.”
84
The Library of Congress Federal Research Division. Cyprus. “Intercommunal Violence, 1963-67”
85
The European portion of Turkey, on the border with Greece.
86
Turkey, as well as Greece, had troops from its national army on the island as well.
87
The Library of Congress Federal Research Division. Cyprus. “Intercommunal Violence, 1963-67”
88
It is this event that gave the terrorist organization 17 November its name.
89
One such Greek is Pete Gatseos. Owner of the Restaurant South Central II in Englewood, Colorado. He
immigrated to the U.S around Christmas of 1974 due to his father’s fears that the Cyprus conflict would expand.
90
Woodhouse. Page 213.
91
The Library of Congress Greece. “Dealing with the Monarchy and the Military.”
92
Woodhouse. Page 222.
93
Woodhouse. Page 223.
94
Nea Demokratia is the Greek term for new democracy. It also became a political party led by Karamanlis.
95
The Library of Congress Greece. “Cyprus and the U.S.”
96
Woodhouse. Page 237.
97
PASOK. “Our Course Our Ideas Our Political Strategy.” ΠΑΣΟΚ. 1999-2001
www.pasok.gr/en/policies/index.asp?id=2
98
Stavrou. Page 11-12.
99
“Greece out of office, Into the Dock?: Papandreou is accused in the Kokostas Scandal.” Time Magazine.
September 25, 1989. TIME.com: Time Magazine Archive, 2003.
100
“Greece: Simitis Outlines a Centrist Future for PASOK.” Civilitas Research.com . Civilitas Research 7 July,
2003. www.civilitasresearch.com/resources/view_article.cfm?article_id=44
101
Dragoumis, Mark. “What PASOK Needs, is Euthanasia and a Decent Burial.” Athens News. July 11, 2003.
Page A99. www.athensnews.gr.athweb/nathens.print_uniqu?e=C&f=13022&m=A99&aa=6&eidos=S
102
Yannapoulos, Dimitris. “No Room for Electoral Handouts” Athens News. July 11, 2003. Page A35.
www.athensnews.gr/athweb/nathens.print_uniqu?e=C&f=13022&m=A35aa=1&eidos=S
103
Konstantine Karamanlis died in April of 1998.
104
“Healthy seven-point lead for Conservatives.” Athens News. December 6, 2002. Page A07
www.athensnews.gr/athweb/nathens.print_uniqu?e=C&F=22991&m=A07&aa=2&eidos=S
105
Davenport, Coral M. “How 'November 17' was Foiled.” The Christian Science Monitor. July 22, 2002.
http://www.csmonitor.com/2002/0722/p06s01-wogi.html
106
Kassimiris, George. “N17: Greece’s Socialist Spectre.” Jane’s Intelligence Review. 9/6/2000.
www.newsite.janes.com/security/international_security/news/jir/jir000609_1_n.shtml
107
Our Europe, Sharing the Future in a Community of Values. The Priorities of the Greek Presidency 2003. The
Ministry of Foreign affairs. www.eu2003.gr//multimedia/pdf/2002_12/267.pdf
108
Our Europe.
109
Karamanlis, Dr. Kostas. “The EU’s Anchor of Stability in a Troubled Region. The Washington Quarterly.
Spring 2000. www.ND.gr/sp_en_6.asp

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