CHAPTER 3

PRESCRIPTION OF ACTIONS

Art. 1139. Actions prescribe by the mere lapse of time fixed by law. (1961)

Art. 1140. Actions to recover movables shall prescribe eight years from the time the
possession thereof is lost, unless the possessor has acquired the ownership by prescription
for a less period, according to Articles 1132, and without prejudice to the provisions of
Articles 559, 1505, and 1133. (1962a)

Art. 1141. Real actions over immovables prescribe after thirty years.
This provision is without prejudice to what is established for the acquisition of ownership
and other real rights by prescription. (1963)

Art. 1142. A mortgage action prescribes after ten years. (1964a)

Art. 1143. The following rights, among others specified elsewhere in this Code, are not
extinguished by prescription:
(1) To demand a right of way, regulated in Article 649;
(2) To bring an action to abate a public or private nuisance. (n)

Art. 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time the
right of action accrues:
(1) Upon a written contract;
(2) Upon an obligation created by law;
(3) Upon a judgment. (n)

Art. 1145. The following actions must be commenced within six years:
(1) Upon an oral contract;
(2) Upon a quasi-contract. (n)

Art. 1146. The following actions must be instituted within four years:
(1) Upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff;
(2) Upon a quasi-delict;
However, when the action arises from or out of any act, activity, or conduct of any public
officer involving the exercise of powers or authority arising from Martial Law including
the arrest, detention and/or trial of the plaintiff, the same must be brought within one (1)
year. (As amended by PD No. 1755, Dec. 24, 1980.)

Art. 1147. The following actions must be filed within one year:
(1) For forcible entry and detainer;
(2) For defamation. (n)
Art. 1148. The limitations of action mentioned in Articles 1140 to 1142, and 1144 to
1147 are without prejudice to those specified in other parts of this Code, in the Code of
Commerce, and in special laws. (n)

Art. 1149. All other actions whose periods are not fixed in this Code or in other laws
must be brought within five years from the time the right of action accrues. (n)

Art. 1150. The time for prescription for all kinds of actions, when there is no special
provision which ordains otherwise, shall be counted from the day they may be
brought. (1969)
Art. 1151. The time for the prescription of actions which have for their object the
enforcement of obligations to pay principal with interest or annuity runs from the last
payment of the annuity or of the interest. (1970a)

Art. 1152. The period for prescription of actions to demand the fulfillment of obligation
declared by a judgment commences from the time the judgment became final. (1971)

Art. 1153. The period for prescription of actions to demand accounting runs from the day
the persons who should render the same cease in their functions.
The period for the action arising from the result of the accounting runs from the date
when said result was recognized by agreement of the interested parties. (1972)

Art. 1154. The period during which the obligee was prevented by a fortuitous event from
enforcing his right is not reckoned against him. (n)

Art. 1155. The prescription of actions is interrupted when they are filed before the court,
when there is a written extrajudicial demand by the creditors, and when there is any
written acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor. (1973a)

G.R. No. L-52278 May 29, 1980

MARCIANA DE MORALES, Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF

FIRST INSTANCE OF MISAMIS OCCIDENTAL, BRANCH II OZAMIS CITY,
FELICIDAD BUSARANG AND FORTUNATO GONZAGA, Respondents.

ABAD SANTOS, J.:

This is a petition to review and set aside the Order, dated October 10, 1979, of the
respondent judge which dismissed the petitioner's complaint on ground of prescription. It
has been filed pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 5440 for only a question of
law is involved.

The antecedent facts are: On September 26, 1957, Rosario Morales-Terez and Santiago
Terez, petitioner's predecessors-in-interest, filed Civil Case No. 2031 in the Court of First
Instance of Misamis Occidental, Branch 11 at Ozamis City, against Felicidad Busarang
and Fortunato Gonzaga, private respondents herein, for the recovery of possession,
ownership, unpaid rentals and damages of one-half of a piece of land and one-half of the
house built thereon situated at the poblacion of Ozamis City. After issues had been
joined, the trial court issued an Order, dated January 24, 1963, dismissing the complaint,
third-party complaint and counter-claim for failure to prosecute. A motion for
reconsideration was filed by the Terez spouses based on reasons which need not be stated
here so the court issued another Order, dated August 12, 1963, modifying the dismissal to
be without prejudice.

On May 7, 1978, petitioner as plaintiff and as successor-in-interest of Rosario Morales-

Terez filed Civil Case No. OZ-704 in the court presided by the respondent judge, against
Felicidad Busarang and Fortunato Gonzaga with allegations and reliefs substantially
similar to those stated in Civil Case No. 2031 which had been previously dismiss without
prejudice.
On May 31, 1978, private respondents filed their answer, denying the allegations of the
complaint and setting up, among others, the affirmative defense that plaintiff's cause of
action was barred by prescription. On October 10, 1979, the respondent judge issued an
Order which is the subject of the present petition and which reads: 

During the hearing of the special affirmative defense of prescription, the defendants
presented as evidence the Order of the Court dated August 12, 1963 dismissing without
prejudice Civil Case No. 2031 entitled Rosauro Terez, et al., versus Felicidad Busarang,
et al, and that after the lapse of fifteen years, the right of the plaintiffs to recover
possession and ownership of the real property had already prescribed and/or that the
plaintiffs had been guilty of laches by sleeping on their rights during this period.

It appears that Civil Case No. 2031, involved the same parties and subject-matter with the
same relief prayed for in this case. After the former case was dismissed on August 12,
1963 without prejudice, the herein plaintiffs shall have refiled the case within ten (10)
years, otherwise their right to recover possession and ownership of the real property shall
prescribed. Ultimately, during this period the nature of the possession of the defendants
had been good faith, public and with the belief that there has been no flaw in the title
after the first case was dismissed.

WHEREFORE, the complaint is hereby dismissed on the ground of prescription without

pronouncement as to costs.

The questioned Order has to be set aside as prayed by the petitioner.

There are two kinds of prescription provided in the Civil Code. One is acquisitive, i.e. the
acquisition of a right by the lapse of time. (Art. 1106, par. 1) Other names for acquisitive
prescription are adverse possession and usucapcion. The other kind is extinctive
prescription whereby rights and actions are lost by the lapse of time. (Arts, 11 06, par. 2
and 1139.) Another name for extinctive prescription is litigation of action.

The differences between acquisitive and extinctive prescriptions are well-stated as

follows: chanrobles virtual law library

Prescription was a statute of limitations. Whereas usucaption expressly 'vests the

property' and raised a new title in the occupant, prescription did nothing more than bar
the right of action. The concept most fundamental to a system of title by possession is
that the relationship between the occupant and he land in terms of possession is capable
of producing legal consequences. In other words, it is the possessor who is the actor.
Under a statute of stations, however, one does not look to the act of the possessor but to
the neglect of the owner. In the former the important feature is the claimant in possession,
and in the latter it is the owner out of possession which controls.

(Montgomery, Prescriptive Acquisition of land Titles, XXVI, Philippine Law Journal,

353, 356-357 [195].)

In the present case, it is extinctive prescription which is involved and the subject matter
being real or immovable property, the relevant provision of the Civil Code is Art. 1141
which reads: 

Art. 1141. Real actions over immovables prescribe after thirty years.
This provision is without prejudice to what is established for the acquisition of ownership
and other real rights by prescription.

Indubitably, from August 12, 1963, to May 7, 1978, less than thirty (30) years had
elapsed. Hence the action had not yet prescribed. However, the respondent judge
apparently relying on paragraph 2 of the above-quoted article has ruled in effect that the
action is barred because the defendants have acquired the subject matter of the action by
acquisitive prescription of ten (10) years (See Art. 1136, Civil Code.) This is manifest
error for the defendants have not claimed acquisitive prescription in their answer and
even if they did, it cannot be given judicial sanction on mere allegations. The law
requires one who asserts ownership by adverse possession to prove the presence of the
essential elements which in ordinary acquisitive prescription of real estate are good faith,
a just title (which according to Art. 1131 is, never presumed but must be proved), and the
lapse of time fixed by law. (Art. 1117, par. 2, Civil Code.) This was not done by the
defendants before the respondent judge dismissed the complaint against them.

WHEREFORE, the Order, dated October 10, 1979, of the respondent judge is hereby set
aside and he is ordered to reinstate Civil Case No. OZ-704. Costs against the private
respondents.

SO ORDERED.

Registered owner's action to

recover possession is not barred by
prescription or by laches

An action to recover possession of a registered land never prescribes in view of the

provision of Sec. 44 of Act No. 496 to the effect that no title to registered land in
derogation of that of a registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse
possession. It follows that an action by the registered owner to recover a real property
registered under the Torrens System does not prescribe. [51] The rule on imprescriptibility
of registered lands not only applies to the registered owner but extends to the heirs of
the registered owner as well.[52] Therefore, petitioner's right to recover possession did
not prescribe.
Likewise, laches did not bar petitioner's right of recovery. An action to recover registered
land covered by the Torrens System may not generally be barred by laches. Neither can
laches be set up to resist the enforcement of an imprescriptible legal right. [53] It is a
principle based on equity and may not prevail against a specific provision of law, because
equity, which has been defined as "justice outside legality," is applied in the absence of
and not against statutory law or rules of procedure.[54]