Search and Seizure - Case Digest

Topic: Search and Seizure
1] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANDRE MARTI,

accused-appellant. --- If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant
must generally be first secured if it is to pass the test of constitutionality. However, if the
search is made at the behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private establishment for its
own and private purposes, as in the case at bar, and without the intervention of police
authorities, the right against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked for only
the act of private individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by
private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the
government.
Facts:
This is an appeal from a decision * rendered by the Special Criminal Court of Manila
convicting accused-appellant of violation the Dangerous Drugs Act.
"On August 14, 1987, between 10:00 and 11:00 a.m., the appellant and his common-law wife,
Shirley Reyes, went to the booth of the "Manila Packing and Export Forwarders" in the Pistang
Pilipino Complex, Ermita, Manila, carrying with them four (4) gift-wrapped packages. The
appellant informed Anita Reyes that he was sending the packages to a friend in Zurich,
Switzerland. Appellant filled up the contract necessary for the transaction, writing therein his
name, passport number, the date of shipment and the name and address of the consignee, namely,
"WALTER FIERZ.
Anita Reyes then asked the appellant if she could examine and inspect the packages. Appellant,
however, refused, assuring her that the packages simply contained books, cigars, and gloves and
were gifts to his friend in Zurich. In view of appellant's representation, Anita Reyes no longer
insisted on inspecting the packages.
"Before delivery of appellant's box to the Bureau of Customs and/or Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job
Reyes (proprietor) and husband of Anita (Reyes), following standard operating procedure,
opened the boxes for final inspection. When he opened appellant's box, a peculiar odor emitted
therefrom. His curiosity aroused, he squeezed one of the bundles allegedly containing gloves and
felt dried leaves inside. Opening one of the bundles, he pulled out a cellophane wrapper
protruding from the opening of one of the gloves. He made an opening on one of the cellophane
wrappers and took several grams of the contents thereof
"Job Reyes forthwith prepared a letter reporting the shipment to the NBI and requesting a
laboratory examination of the samples he extracted from the cellophane wrapper
1
"The package which allegedly contained books was likewise opened by Job Reyes. He
discovered that the package contained bricks or cake-like dried marijuana leaves. It turned out
that dried marijuana leaves were neatly stocked underneath the cigars.
Thereupon, the NBI agents tried to locate appellant but to no avail. Appellant's stated
address in his passport being the Manila Central Post Office, the agents requested
assistance from the latter's Chief Security. On August 27, 1987, appellant, while claiming
his mail at the Central Post Office, was invited by the NBI to shed light on the attempted
shipment of the seized dried leaves. On the same day the Narcotics Section of the NBI
submitted the dried leaves to the Forensic Chemistry Section for laboratory examination.
It turned out that the dried leaves were marijuana flowering tops as certified by the
forensic chemist.
Appellant:
Appellant contends that the evidence subject of the imputed offense had been obtained in
violation of his constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizure and privacy
of communication and therefore argues that the same should be held inadmissible in
evidence.
Issues:
A. "THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE ILLEGALLY

SEARCHED AND SEIZED OBJECTS CONTAINED IN THE FOUR PARCELS.
B. "THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING APPELLANT DESPITE THE

UNDISPUTED FACT THAT HIS RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION WHILE
UNDER CUSTODIAL PROCEEDINGS WERE NOT OBSERVED.
C. "THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE TO THE

EXPLANATION OF THE APPELLANT ON HOW THE FOUR PARCELS CAME
INTO HIS POSSESSION."
Rule:
A. The Court, in Stonehill v. Diokno , declared as inadmissible any evidence

obtained by virtue of a defective search and seizure warrant, abandoning in
the process the ruling earlier adopted in Moncado v. People's Court wherein
the admissibility of evidence was not affected by the illegality of its seizure.
2
In a number of cases, the Court strictly adhered to the exclusionary rule and has
struck down the admissibility of evidence obtained in violation of the
constitutional safeguard against unreasonable searches and seizures.
It must be noted, however, that in all those cases adverted to, the evidence so
obtained were invariably procured by the State acting through the medium of its
law enforcers or other authorized government agencies.
In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the

Constitution cannot be invoked against the State.
This constitutional right (against unreasonable search and seizure) refers to the
immunity of one's person, whether citizen or alien, from interference by government,
included in which is his residence, his papers, and other possessions
"(t)he Fourth Amendment gives protection against unlawful searches and seizures,
and as shown in previous cases, its protection applies to governmental action. Its
origin and history clearly show that it was intended as a restraint upon the activities of
sovereign authority, and was not intended to be a limitation upon other than
governmental agencies; as against such authority it was the purpose of the Fourth
Amendment to secure the citizen in the right of unmolested occupation of his dwelling
and the possession of his property, subject to the right of seizure by process duly served."
It was held that the search and seizure clauses are restraints upon the government
and its agents, not upon private individuals.
“The fourth amendment and the case law applying it do not require exclusion of
evidence obtained through a search by a private citizen. Rather, the amendment
only proscribes governmental action.”
On the other hand, the case at bar assumes a peculiar character since the evidence
sought to be excluded was primarily discovered and obtained by a private person,
acting in a private capacity and without the intervention and participation of State
authorities.
The argument is untenable. For one thing, the constitution, in laying down the
principles of the government and fundamental liberties of the people, does not
govern relationships between individuals.
Corollarily, alleged violations against unreasonable search and seizure may only
be invoked against the State by an individual unjustly traduced by the exercise of
sovereign authority. To agree with appellant that an act of a private individual
3
in violation of the Bill of Rights should also be construed as an act of the State
would result in serious legal complications and an absurd interpretation of
the constitution.
Similarly, the admissibility of the evidence procured by an individual effected

through private seizure equally applies, in pari passu, to the alleged violation,
non-governmental as it is, of appellant's constitutional rights to privacy and
communication.
B. Again, the contention is without merit. The law enforcers testified that
accused/appellant was informed of his constitutional rights. It is presumed that
they have regularly performed their duties and their testimonies should be given
full faith and credence, there being no evidence to the contrary. What is clear from
the records, on the other hand, is that appellant refused to give any written
statement while under investigation as testified by Atty. Lastimoso of the NBI,
C. Coming now to appellant's third assignment of error, appellant would like us to

believe that he was not the owner of the packages which contained prohibited
drugs but rather a certain Michael, a German national, whom appellant met in a
pub along Ermita, Manila; that in the course of their 30-minute conversation,
Michael requested him to ship the packages and gave him P2,000.00 for the cost
of the shipment since the German national was about to leave the country the next
day.
Rather than give the appearance of veracity, we find appellant's disclaimer as

incredulous, self-serving and contrary to human experience. It can easily be
fabricated. An acquaintance with a complete stranger struck in half an hour could
not have pushed a man to entrust the shipment of four (4) parcels and shell out
P2,000.00 for the purpose and for appellant to readily accede to comply with the
undertaking without first ascertaining its contents. As stated by the trial court, "(a)
person would not simply entrust contraband and of considerable value at that as
the marijuana flowering tops, and the cash amount of P2,000.00 to a complete
stranger like the Accused. The Accused, on the other hand, would not simply
accept such undertaking to take custody of the packages and ship the same from a
complete stranger on his mere say-so" (Decision, p. 19, Rollo, p. 91). As to why
he readily agreed to do the errand, appellant failed to explain. Denials, if
unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative self-serving
evidence which deserve no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary
weight than the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.
4
He was previously convicted of possession of hashish by the Kleve Court in the

Federal Republic of Germany on January 1, 1982 and that the consignee of the
frustrated shipment, Walter Fierz, also a Swiss national, was likewise convicted
for drug abuse and is just about an hour's drive from appellant's residence in
Zurich, Switzerland.
Evidence to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible
witness, but it must be credible in itself such as the common experience and
observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances.
As records further show, appellant did not even bother to ask Michael's full name,
his complete address or passport number. Furthermore, if indeed, the German
national was the owner of the merchandise, appellant should have so indicated in
the contract of shipment (Exh. "B", Original Records, p. 40). On the contrary,
appellant signed the contract as the owner and shipper thereof giving more weight
to the presumption that things which a person possesses, or exercises acts of
ownership over, are owned by him.
Application:
The contraband in the case at bar having come into possession of the Government
without the latter transgressing appellant's rights against unreasonable search and seizure,
the Court sees no cogent reason why the same should not be admitted against him in the
prosecution of the offense charged.
Appellant, however, would like this court to believe that NBI agents made an illegal
search and seizure of the evidence later on used in prosecuting the case which resulted in
his conviction.
First, the factual considerations of the case at bar readily foreclose the proposition
that NBI agents conducted an illegal search and seizure of the prohibited
merchandise. Records of the case clearly indicate that it was Mr. Job Reyes, the
proprietor of the forwarding agency, who made search/inspection of the packages.
Said inspection was reasonable and a standard operating procedure on the part of
Mr. Reyes as a precautionary measure before delivery of packages to the Bureau of
Customs or the Bureau of Posts.
Second, the mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search
effected by Reyes into a warrantless search and seizure proscribed by the
Constitution. Merely to observe and look at that which is in plain sight is not a
search. Having observed that which is open, where no trespass has been committed
in aid thereof, is not. Where the contraband articles are identified without a trespass
5
on the part of the arresting officer, there is not the search that is prohibited by the
constitution
That the Bill of Rights embodied in the Constitution is not meant to be invoked against
acts of private individuals finds support in the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission. True, the liberties guaranteed by the fundamental law of the land must
always be subject to protection. But protection against whom?
The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies
as a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the
enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the State to whom the
restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed.
If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally be first
secured if it is to pass the test of constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the
behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private establishment for its own and private
purposes, as in the case at bar, and without the intervention of police authorities, the right
against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of private
individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as
to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.
2] HARRY S. STONEHILL, ROBERT P. BROOKS, JOHN J. BROOKS and

KARL BECK, petitioners, vs. HON. JOSE W. DIOKNO, in his capacity as
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, --------(1) that no warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said
provision; and
(2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.
Facts:
Upon application of the officers of the government named on the margin 1 — hereinafter
referred to as Respondent-Prosecutors — several judges 2 — hereinafter referred to as
Respondent-Judges — issued, on different dates, 3 a total of 42 search warrants against
petitioners herein4 and/or the corporations of which they were officers, 5 directed to any
peace officer, to search the persons above-named and/or the premises of their offices,
warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and take possession of the following personal
property to wit:
6
"Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals,

portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business
transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and
Bobbins (cigarette wrappers)."
as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense,"
or "used or intended to be used as the means of committing the offense," which is
described in the applications adverted to above as "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff
and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code."
On March 22, 1962, this Court issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for
in the petition. However, by resolution dated June 29, 1962, the writ was partially
lifted or dissolved, insofar as the papers, documents and things seized from the
offices of the corporations above mentioned are concerned; but, the injunction was
maintained as regards the papers, documents and things found and seized in the
residences of petitioners herein. 7
Thus, the documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the
warrants in question may be split into (2) major groups, namely:
(a) those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations and (b)
those found seized in the residences of petitioners herein.
Petitioner:
Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants are null and void, as contravening the
Constitution and the Rules of Court — because, inter alia:
(1) they do not describe with particularity the documents, books and things to be seized;
(2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized;
(3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned petitioners in
deportation cases filed against them;
(4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and
(5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that
issued the warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law --- —
On March 20, 1962, said petitioners filed with the Supreme Court this original action for
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction, and prayed that, pending final
7
disposition of the present case, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued restraining

Respondent- Prosecutors, their agents and or representatives from using the effects seized
as aforementioned, or any copies thereof, in the deportation cases already adverted to,
and that, in due course, thereafter, decision be rendered quashing the contested search
warrants and declaring the same null and void, and commanding the respondents, their
agents or representatives to return to petitioners herein, in accordance with Section 3,
Rule 67, of the Rules of Court, the documents, papers, things and cash moneys seized or
confiscated under the search warrants in question.
Petitioners maintain that the aforementioned search warrants are in the nature of general
warrants and that, accordingly, the seizures effected upon the authority thereof are null
and void.
Respondents:
In their answer, respondents-prosecutors alleged
(1) that the contested search warrants are valid and have been issued in accordance with
law;
(2) that the defects of said warrants, if any, were cured by petitioners' consent; and
(3) that, in any event, the effects seized are admissible in evidence against herein
petitioners, regardless of the alleged illegality of the aforementioned searches and
seizures.
Issue:
(1) whether the search warrants in question, and the searches and seizures made under the
authority thereof, are valid or not; and
(2) if the answer to the preceding question is in the negative, whether said documents,
papers and things may be used in evidence against petitioners herein.
Rule:
Petitioners herein have no cause of action to assail the legality of the contested warrants
and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said
corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the
personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the
interest of each of them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein
8
may be. 8 Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only
by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby, 9 and that the objection to an
unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third
parties. Consequently, petitioners herein may not validly object to the use in evidence
against them of the documents, papers and things seized from the offices and premises of
the corporations adverted to above, since the right to object to the admission of said
papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations , to whom the seized effects
belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against them in
their individual capacity. 11 Indeed, it has been held:
It is clear that a question of the lawfulness of a seizure can be raised only by one whose rights
have been invaded.
With respect to the documents, papers and things seized in the residences of petitioners
herein, the aforementioned resolution of June 29, 1962, denied the lifting of the writ of
preliminary injunction previously issued by this Court, 12 thereby, in effect, restraining
herein Respondent-Prosecutors from using them in evidence against petitioners herein.
Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely:
(1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the
judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and
(2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.
None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. no specific
offense had been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof with respect to the
offense committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who
issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for the same
presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought
has performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given
provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this case
do not allege any specific acts performed by herein petitioners. It would be a legal
heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a "violation of Central Bank
Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal
Code," — as alleged in the aforementioned applications — without reference to any
determinate provision of said laws or codes.
To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely
one of the most fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would
place the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication and
correspondence at the mercy of the whims, caprice or passion of peace officers. This
is the evil sought to be remedied by the constitutional provision
9
The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the contested search
warrants was compounded by the description therein made of the effects to be searched
for and seized, to wit:
"Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers,

portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business
transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and related profit and loss
statements."
Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all
business transactions of petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transactions w
e r e legal or illegal. The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners
and the aforementioned corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the
explicit command of our Bill of Rights — that the things to be seized be particularly
described — as well as tending to defeat its major objective: the elimination of general
warrants.
Relying upon Moncado vs. People's Court (80 Phil. 1) Moncado Doctrine, Respondent-
Prosecutors maintain that, even if the searches and seizures under consideration were
unconstitutional, the documents, papers and things thus seized are admissible in evidence
against petitioners herein. Upon mature deliberation, however, we are unanimously of the
opinion that the position taken in the Moncado case must be abandoned. Said position
was in line with the American common law rule, that the criminal should not be allowed
to go free merely "because the constable has blundered," 16 upon the theory that the
constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is protected by
means other than the exclusion of evidence unlawfully obtained, 17 such as the common-
law action for damages against the searching officer, against the party who procured the
issuance of the search warrant and against those assisting in the execution of an illegal
search, their criminal punishment, resistance, without liability to an unlawful seizure, and
such other legal remedies as may be provided by other laws.
The non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but, also, to spirit of the
constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. To be sure, if the
applicant for a search warrant has competent evidence to establish probable cause
of the commission of a given crime by the party against whom the warrant is
intended, then there is no reason why the applicant should not comply with the
requirements of the fundamental law. Upon the other hand, if he has no such
competent evidence, then it is not possible for the judge to find that there is
probable cause, and, hence, no justification for the issuance of the warrant. The only
possible explanation (not justification) for its issuance is the necessity of fishing
evidence of the commission of a crime. But, then, this fishing expedition is indicative
of the absence of evidence to establish a probable cause.
10
We hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case must be, as it is
hereby, abandoned; that the warrants for the search of three (3) residences of herein
petitioners, as specified in the Resolution of June 29, 1962 are null and void; that the
searches and seizures therein made are illegal; that the writ of preliminary injunction
heretofore issued, in connection with the docucsments, papers and other effects thus
seized in said residences of herein petitioners is hereby made permanent, that the writs
prayed for are granted, insofar as the documents, papers and other effects so seized in the
aforementioned residences are concerned; that the aforementioned motion for
Reconsideration and Amendment should be, as it is hereby, denied; and that the petition
herein is dismissed and the writs prayed for denied, as regards the documents, papers and
other effects seized in the twenty-nine (29) places, offices and other premises enumerated
in the same Resolution, without special pronouncement as to costs.
3. MAXIMO V. SOLIVEN, ANTONIO V. ROCES, FREDERICK K. AGCAOILI,

and GODOFREDO L. MANZANAS, petitioners, vs. THE HON. RAMON P.
MAKASIAR, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila
Facts:
Issues:
Rule:
The addition of the word "personally" after the word "determined" and the
deletion of the grant of authority by the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants to
"other responsible officers as may be authorized by law", has apparently
convinced petitioner Beltran that the Constitution now requires the judge to
personally examine the complainant and his witnesses determination of probable
cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest. This is not an accurate
interpretation.
1) Personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted

by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis
thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or
11
2) If on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause , he may disregard the

fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of
witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of
probable cause.
4. Silva v. Presiding Judge RTC of Negros
This Court defined "probable cause" as follows: "The 'probable cause' for a valid
search warrant, has been defined 'as such facts and circumstances which would
lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed, and that objects sought in connection with the offense are in the
place sought to be searched'. This probable cause must be shown to be within
the personal knowledge of the complainant or the witnesses he may produce and
not based on mere hearsay."
Facts:
On June 16, 1986, Antonieta Silva filed a motion for the return of the said amount
on the grounds that the search warrant only authorized the serving officers to
seize marijuana dried leaves, cigarettes and joint, and that said officers failed or
refused to make a return of the said search warrant in gross violation of Section
11, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.
On July 28, 1987, petitioners filed a motion to quash Search Warrant No. 1 on the
grounds that (1) it was issued on the sole basis of a mimeographed "Application
for Search Warrant" and "Deposition of Witness", which were accomplished by
merely filling in the blanks and (2) the judge failed to personally examine the
complainant and witnesses by searching questions and answers in violation of
Section 3, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.
On July 28, 1987, petitioners filed a motion to quash Search Warrant No. 1 on the
grounds that (1) it was issued on the sole basis of a mimeographed "Application
for Search Warrant" and "Deposition of Witness", which were accomplished by
merely filling in the blanks and (2) the judge failed to personally examine the
12
complainant and witnesses by searching questions and answers in violation of

Section 3, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.
Based on the aforecited constitutional and statutory provisions, the judge must,
before issuing a search warrant, determine whether there is probable cause by
examining the complainant and witnesses through searching questions and
answers.
In the case at bar, we have carefully examined the questioned search warrant as
well as the "Application for Search Warrant" and "Deposition of Witness", and
found that Judge Ontal failed to comply with the legal requirement that he must
examine the applicant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and
answers in order to determine the existence of probable cause.
The officers implementing the search warrant clearly abused their authority when
they seized the money of Antonieta Silva. This is highly irregular considering that
Antonieta Silva was not even named as one of the respondents, that the warrant
did not indicate the seizure of money but only of marijuana leaves, cigarettes and
joints, and that the search warrant was issued for the seizure of personal
property (a) subject of the offense and (b) used or intended to be used as means
of committing an offense and NOT for personal property stolen or embezzled or
other proceeds of fruits of the offense.
5. Morano v Vivo- The constitutional guarantee set forth in Section 1(3), Article III
of the Constitution, requiring that the issue of probable cause be determined by a
judge, does not extend to deportation proceedings (Tu Chuan Hai vs.
Commissioner of Immigration, 55 Off. Gaz., No. 28, pp. 681-683).
"Sec. 37. (a) The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner
of Immigration or of any other officer designated by him for the purpose and deported
upon the warrant of the Commission of Immigration after a determination by the Board of
Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the
alien:
13
They say that the Constitution limits to judges the authority to issue warrants of
arrest and that the legislative delegation of such power to the Commissioner of
Immigration is thus violative of the Bill of Rights.
Section 1 (3), Article III of the Constitution, we perceive, does not require judicial
intervention in the execution of a 􏰂nal order of deportation issued in accordance
with law. The constitutional limitation contemplates an order of arrest in the
exercise of judicial power 4 as a step preliminary or incidental to prosecution or
proceedings for a given offense or administrative action, not as a measure
indispensable to carry out a valid decision by a competent official, such as a legal
order of deportation, issued by the Commissioner of Immigration, in pursuance of
a valid legislation.
The deportation of an alien who is found in this country in violation of law is not a
deprivation of liberty without due process of law. This is so, although the inquiry
devolves upon executive officers, and their findings of fact, after a fair though summary
hearing, are made conclusive."
"The law is to the effect that temporary visitors who do not depart upon the
expiration of the period of stay granted them are subject to deportation by the
Commissioner of Immigration, for having violated the limitation or condition
under which they were admitted as non-immigrants .
And, in a case directly in point, where the power of the Commissioner to issue
warrants of arrest was challenged as unconstitutional because "such power is
only vested in a judge.
6. In re Harvey v. Santiago
One of the constitutional requirements of a valid search warrant or warrant of

arrest is that it must be based upon probable cause. Probable cause has been
defined as referring to "such facts and circumstances antecedent to the issuance
of the warrant that in themselves are sufficient to induce a cautious man to rely
on them and act in pursuance thereof".
In this case, the arrest of petitioners was based on probable cause determined
after close surveillance for three (3) months during which period their activities
14
were monitored. The existence of probable cause justified the arrest and the
seizure of the photo negatives, photographs and posters without warrant
That petitioners were not "caught in the act" does not make their arrest illegal.
Petitioners were found with young boys in their respective rooms, the ones with
John Sherman being naked. Under those circumstances the CID agents had
reasonable grounds to believe that petitioners had committed "pedophilia"
defined as "psycho- sexual perversion involving children" .
It is therefore even doubtful whether the arrest of an individual may be ordered by

any authority other than a judge if the purpose is merely to determine the
existence of a probable cause, leading to an administrative investigation." For, as
heretofore stated, probable cause had already been shown to exist before the
warrants of arrest were issued.
What is essential is that there should be a specific charge against the alien
intended to be arrested and deported, that a fair hearing be conducted (Section
37[c]) with the assistance of counsel, if desired, and that the charge be
substantiated by competent evidence.
7. Alvarez v. CFI
That the search and seizure made are illegal for the following reasons:
(a) Because the warrant was based solely upon the affidavit of the petitioner who
had no personal knowledge of the facts necessary to determine the existence or
non-existence of probable cause, and
(b) because the warrant was issued for the sole purpose of seizing evidence
which would later be used in the criminal proceedings that might be instituted
against the petitioner, for violation of the Anti- Usury Law.
8. Mata v. Bayona
Under the Constitution "no search warrant shall issue but upon probable cause to
be determined by the Judge or such other responsible officer as may be
authorized by law after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce". Constitutional injunction, Section 4 of Rule
126 which provides that the judge must before issuing the warrant personally
15
examine on oath or affirmation the complainant and any witnesses he may

produce and take their depositions in writing, and attach them to the record, in
addition to any affidavits presented to him.
Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient.
The examining Judge has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce and to attach them to the record. Such written
deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may be able to properly
determine the existence or non-existence of the probable cause, to hold liable
for perjury the person giving it if it will be found later that his declarations are
false.
We, therefore, hold that the search warrant is tainted with illegality by the failure
of the Judge to conform with the essential requisites of taking the depositions in
writing and attaching them to the record, rendering the search warrant invalid.
The searching questions propounded to the applicants of the search warrant and
his witnesses must depend to a large extent upon the discretion of the Judge
just as long as the answers establish a reasonable ground to believe the
commission of a specific offense and that the applicant is one authorized by law,
and said answers particularly describe with certainty the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized. The examination or investigation which
must be under oath may not be in public.
9. People v. Del Rosario
The manner the police officers conducted the subsequent and much-delayed
search is highly irregular. Upon barging into the residence of accused-appellant,
the police officers found him lying down and they immediately arrested and
detained him in the living room while they searched the other parts of the house.
Although they fetched two persons to witness the search, the witnesses were
called in only after the policemen had already entered accused-appellant's
residence (pp. 22-23, tsn, December 11, 1991), and, therefore, the policemen had
more than ample time to plant the shabu. Corollary to the constitutional precept
that, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until
the contrary is proved (Sec. 14(2), Article III, Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines) is the rule that in order to convict an accused the circumstances of
16
the case must exclude all and each and every hypothesis consistent with his
innocence.
The Constitution expressly ordains the exclusion in evidence of illegally seized

articles.
Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible
for any purpose in any proceeding.
That is the every reason why such a police operation is called a "buy-bust"
operation. The police poseur- buyer "buys" dangerous drugs from the pusher and
"bust" (arrests) him the moment the pusher hands over the drug to the police
officer.
10. Umil v. Ramos
11. People v. Sucro- there was a surveillance instructed by the Chief of Police which
resulted to stop and frisk.
That searches and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant is not an

absolute rule (Manipon, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 143 SCRA 267 [1986]). Among the
exceptions granted by law is a search incidental to a lawful arrest under Sec. 12,
Rule 126 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, which provides that a person
lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which
may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant.
(People v. Castiller, G.R. No. 87783, August 6, 1990).
12. People v. Rodriguez
As provided in the present Constitution, a search, to be valid, must generally be

authorized by a search warrant duly issued by the proper government authority
(Section 2, Article III, 1987 Constitution). True, in some instances, this Court has
allowed government authorities to conduct searches and seizures even without a
search warrant. Thus,
1) when the owner of the premises waives his right against such incursion;
2) when the search is incidental to a lawful arrest;
3) when it is made on vessels and aircraft for violation of customs laws;
17
4) when it is made on automobiles for the purpose of preventing violations

of smuggling or immigration laws;
5) when it involves prohibited articles in plain view;
6) or in cases of inspection of buildings and other premises for the
enforcement of fire, sanitary and building regulations, a search may be
validly made even without a search warrant.
In the case at bar, however, the raid conducted by the NARCOM agents in the
house of Jovencio Rodrigueza was not authorized by any search warrant. It
does not appear, either, that the situation falls under any of the
aforementioned cases. Hence, appellant's right against unreasonable search
and seizure was clearly violated. The NARCOM agents could not have justified
their act by invoking the urgency and necessity of the situation because the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses reveal that the place had already
been put under surveillance for quite some time. Had it been their intention to
conduct the raid, then they should, because they easily could, have first
secured a search warrant during that time.
13. Go y Tambunting v. Court of Appeals
We do not believe that the warrantless "arrest" or detention of petitioner in the

instant case falls within the terms of Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure which provides as follows: "Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant;
when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest
a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense
has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the
person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment
or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case
is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another. In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested
without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail,
and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7."
Petitioner's "arrest" took place six (6) days after the shooting of Maguan. The
arresting officers obviously were not present, within the meaning of Section 5(a),
at the time petitioner had allegedly shot Maguan. Neither could the "arrest"
effected six (6) days after the shooting be reasonably regarded as effected
18
"when [the shooting had] in fact just been committed" within the meaning of
Section 5 (b). Moreover, none of the "arresting" officers had any "personal
knowledge" of facts indicating that petitioner was the gunman who had shot
Maguan. The information upon which the police acted had been derived from
statements made by alleged eyewitnesses to the shooting -- one stated that
petitioner was the gunman; another was able to take down the alleged gunman's
car's plate number which turned out to be registered in petitioner's wife's name.
That information did not, however, constitute "personal knowledge." It is thus
clear to the Court that there was no lawful warrantless arrest of petitioner within
the meaning of Section 5 of Rule 113.
14. ROMEO POSADAS y ZAMORA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT

OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. ---- “Stop
and Frisk” is a valid warrantless search.
Buri bag- illegal possession of firearms.
Issue: W/N the warrantless search on the person of petitioner is valid.
Facts:
1. On October 16, 1986 at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning Pat. Ursicio Ungab and
Pat. Umbra Umpar, both members of the Integrated National Police (INP) of the
Davao Metrodiscom assigned with the Intelligence Task Force, were
conducting a surveillance along Magallanes Street, Davao City. While they
were within the premises of the Rizal Memorial Colleges they spotted petitioner
carrying a "buri" bag and they noticed him to be acting suspiciously.
2. They approached the petitioner and identified themselves as members of the INP.
Petitioner attempted to flee but his attempt to get away was thwarted by the two
notwithstanding his resistance.
3. They then checked the "buri" bag of the petitioner where they found one (1)
caliber .38 Smith & Wesson revolver with Serial No. 770196 1 two (2) rounds
of live ammunition for a .38 caliber gun, 2 a smoke (tear gas) grenade 3 a and
two (2) live ammunitions for a .22 caliber gun.
4. They brought the petitioner to the police station for further investigation. In the
course of the same, the petitioner was asked to show the necessary license or
authority to possess firearms and ammunitions found in his possession but he
failed to do so. He was then taken to the Davao Metrodiscom office and the
prohibited articles recovered from him were indorsed to M/Sgt. Didoy, the officer
19
then on duty. He was prosecuted for illegal possession of firearms and

ammunitions in the Regional Trial Court of Davao City wherein after a plea of not
guilty and trial on the merits a decision was rendered on October 8, 1987 finding
petitioner guilty of the offense charged.
CA: Not satisfied therewith the petitioner interposed an appeal to the Court of
Appeals wherein in due course a decision was rendered on February 23, 1989
affirming in toto the appealed decision with costs against the petitioner
Hence, the herein petition for review, the main thrust of which is that there being no
lawful arrest or search and seizure, the items which were confiscated from the
possession of the petitioner are inadmissible in evidence against him.
OSG:
In justifying the warrantless search of the buri bag then carried by the petitioner,
argues that under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court a person lawful arrested
may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything used as proof of a commission of
an offense without a search warrant. It is further alleged that the arrest without a
warrant of the petitioner was lawful under the circumstances.
The Solicitor General argues that when the two policemen approached the
petitioner, he was actually committing or had just committed the offense of
illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions in the presence of the police
officers and consequently the search and seizure of the contraband was incidental
to the lawful arrest in accordance with Section 12, Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure. The Court disagreed to this.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides as follows:
"SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment
or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is
pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
20
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant
shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded
against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7. (6a, 17a)"
Ruling:
At the time the peace officers in this case identified themselves and apprehended the
petitioner as he attempted to flee they did not know that he had committed, or was
actually committing the offense of illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions. They
just suspected that he was hiding something in the buri bag. They did now know what its
contents were. The said circumstances did not justify an arrest without a warrant. llcd
However, there are many instances where a warrant and seizure can be effected
without necessarily being preceded by an arrest, foremost of which is the "stop and
search" without a search warrant at military or police checkpoints, the
constitutionality or validity of which has been upheld by this Court in Valmonte vs. de
Villa,
“Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden . A
reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according
to the facts of each case. “
The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and probably in other areas) may be considered as a security measure
to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing effective territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for the
benefit of the public. Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures to thwart plots to destabilize the government in the interest
of public security. In this connection, the Court may take judicial notice of the shift to urban centers and their suburbs of the
insurgency movement, so clearly reflected in the increased killings in cities of police and military men by NPA "sparrow units,"
not to mention the abundance of unlicensed firearms and the alarming rise in lawlessness and violence in such urban centers, not
all of which are reported in media, most likely brought about by deteriorating economic conditions — which all sum up to what
one can rightly consider, at the very least, as abnormal times. Between the inherent right of the state to
protect its existence and promote public welfare and an individual's right against a
warrantless search which is however reasonably conducted, the former should prevail.
True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the men in uniform in the same manner that all
governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the
citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal times, when conducted within reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for an
orderly society and a peaceful community.
Application:
Thus, as between a warrantless search and seizure conducted at military or police

checkpoints and the search thereat in the case at bar, there is no question that,
indeed, the latter is more reasonable considering that unlike in the former, it was
effected on the basis of a probable cause. The probable cause is that when the petitioner
acted suspiciously and attempted to flee with the buri bag there was a probable cause that
21
he was concealing something illegal in the bag and it was the right and duty of the police
officers to inspect the same.
It is too much indeed to require the police officers to search the bag in the possession of
the petitioner only after they shall have obtained a search warrant for the purpose.
"The assailed search and seizure may still be justified as akin to a "stop and frisk" situation
whose object is either to determine the identity of a suspicious individual or to maintain the
status quo momentarily while the police officer seeks to obtain more information. This is
illustrated in the case of Terry vs. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
The United States Supreme Court held that "a police officer may in appropriate circumstances
and in an appropriate manner approach a person for the purpose of investigating possible
criminal behavior even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest." In such a
situation, it is reasonable for an officer rather than simply to shrug his shoulder and allow
a crime to occur, to stop a suspicious individual briefly in order to determine his identity or
maintain the status quo while obtaining more information. . . .
Conclusion:
Clearly, the search in the case at bar can be sustained under the exceptions heretofore discussed,
and hence, the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures has not been
violated."
15. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROGELIO

MENGOTE Y TEJAS, accused-appellant.
Issue: W/N the weapon was not admissible as evidence against appellant because it had
been illegally seized and was therefore the fruit of the poisonous tree.
Facts:
 Accused-appellant Rogelio Mengote was convicted of illegal possession of

firearms on the strength mainly of the stolen pistol found on his person at the
moment of his warrantless arrest.
 The incident occurred shortly before noon of August 8, 1987, after the Western
Police
 District received a telephone call from an informer that there were three
suspicious- looking persons at the corner of Juan Luna and North Bay Boulevard
in Tondo, Manila. A surveillance team of plainclothesmen was forthwith
dispatched to the place.
22
 As later narrated at the trial by Patrolmen Rolando Mercado and Alberto Juan, 1
they there saw two men "looking from side to side," one of whom was holding his
abdomen. They approached these persons and identified themselves as
policemen, whereupon the two tried to run away but were unable to escape
because the other lawmen had surrounded them.
 The suspects were then searched. One of them, who turned out to be the accused-
appellant, was found with a .38 caliber Smith and Wesson revolver with six live
bullets in the chamber.
 His companion, later identified as Nicanor Morellos, had a fan knife secreted in
his front right pants pocket. The weapons were taken from them. Mengote and
Morellos were then turned over to police headquarters for investigation by the
Intelligence Division.
 Besides the police officers, one other witness presented by the prosecution was
Rigoberto Danganan, who identified the subject weapon as among the articles
stolen from him during the robbery in his house in Malabon on June 13, 1987.
 He pointed to Mengote as one of the robbers. He had duly reported the robbery to
the police, indicating the articles stolen from him, including the revolver.
 For his part, Mengote made no effort to prove that he owned the firearm or that he
was licensed to possess it and claimed instead that the weapon had been "planted"
on him at the time of his arrest.
 The gun, together with the live bullets and its holster, were offered as Exhibits A,
B and C and admitted over the objection of the defense. As previously stated, the
weapon was the principal evidence that led to Mengote's conviction for violation
of P.D. 1866. He was sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
Appeallant:
 It is submitted in the Appellant's Brief that the revolver should not have been
admitted in evidence because of its illegal seizure, no warrant therefor having
been previously obtained. Neither could it have been seized as an incident of a
lawful arrest because the arrest of Mengote was itself unlawful, having been
also effected without a warrant.
 The defense also contends that the testimony regarding the alleged robbery in
Danganan's house was irrelevant and should also have been disregarded by the
trial court.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.
There is no question that evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search or seizure is

inadmissible in any proceeding for any purpose. That is the absolute prohibition of
Article III, Section 3(2), of the Constitution. This is the celebrated exclusionary rule
based on the justification given by Judge Learned Hand that "only in case the
23
prosecution, which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their
wrong will the wrong be repressed."
OSG:
The Solicitor General, while conceding the rule, maintains that it is not applicable in the
case at bar. His reason is that the arrest and search of Mengote and the seizure of the
revolver from him were lawful under Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules of Court reading
as follows:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or private person may without a warrant, arrest a person:Cdpr
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final
judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the
nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7.
We have carefully examined the wording of this rule and cannot see how we can agree
with the prosecution.
Par. (c) of Section 5 is obviously inapplicable as Mengote was not an escapee from a
penal institution when he was arrested. We therefore confine ourselves to determining the
lawfulness of his arrest under either Par. (a) or Par. (b) of this section.
Par. (a) requires that the person be arrested (1) after he has committed or while he is
actually committing or is at least attempting to commit an offense, (2) in the
presence of the arresting officer.
The Solicitor General submits that the actual existence of an offense was not necessary as
long as Mengote's acts "created a reasonable suspicion on the part of the arresting
officers and induced in them the belief that an offense had been committed and that
the accused-appellant had committed it.
Rule:
 These requirements have not been established in the case at bar. At the time of the
arrest in question, the accused-appellant was merely "looking from side to side"
and "holding his abdomen," according to the arresting officers themselves.
24
There was apparently no offense that had just been committed or was being
actually committed or at least being attempted by Mengote in their presence.
 " The question is, What offense? What offense could possibly have been suggested
by a person "looking from side to side" and "holding his abdomen" and in a place
not exactly forsaken?
 These are certainly not sinister acts. And the setting of the arrest made them less
so, if at all. It might have been different if Mengote had been apprehended at an
ungodly hour and in a place where he had no reason to be, like a darkened alley at
3 o'clock in the morning. But he was arrested at 11:30 in the morning and in a
crowded street shortly after alighting from a passenger jeep with his companion.
He was not skulking in the shadows but walking in the clear light of day. There
was nothing clandestine about his being on that street at that busy hour in the blaze
of the noonday sun.
 On the other hand, there could have been a number of reasons, all of them
innocent, why his eyes were darting from side to side and he was holding his
abdomen. If they excited suspicion in the minds of the arresting officers, as the
prosecution suggests, it has nevertheless not been shown what their suspicion
was all about. In fact, the policemen themselves testified that they were
dispatched to that place only because of the telephone call from the informer
that there were "suspicious-looking" persons in that vicinity who were about
to commit a robbery at North Bay Boulevard. The caller did not explain why he
thought the men looked suspicious nor did he elaborate on the impending crime.
 There was nothing to support the arresting officers' suspicion other than
Mengote's darting eyes and his hand on his abdomen. By no stretch of the
imagination could it have been inferred from these acts that an offense had
just been committed, or was actually being committed, or was at least being
attempted in their presence.
 Par. (b) is no less applicable because its no less stringent requirements have also
not been satisfied. The prosecution has not shown that at the time of Mengote's
arrest an offense had in fact just been committed and that the arresting
officers had personal knowledge of facts indicating that Mengote had
committed it. All they had was hearsay information from the telephone caller,
and about a crime that had yet to be committed.
 The truth is that they did not know then what offense, if at all, had been
committed and neither were they aware of the participation therein of the
accused-appellant. It was only later, after Danganan had appeared at the
police headquarters, that they learned of the robbery in his house and of
Mengote's supposed involvement therein.
 As for the illegal possession or the firearm found on Mengote's person, the
policemen discovered this only after he had been searched and the
investigation conducted later revealed that he was not its owners nor was he
licensed to possess it.
25
 Before these events, the peace officers had no knowledge even of Mengote'
identity, let alone the fact (or suspicion) that he was unlawfully carrying a firearm
or that he was involved in the robbery of Danganan's house.
 In arrests without a warrant under Section 6(b), however, it is not enough that there is reasonable ground to believe
that the person to be arrested has committed a crime. A crime must in fact or actually have been committed first.
That a crime has actually been committed is an essential precondition. It is not enough to suspect that a crime may
have been committed. The fact of the commission of the offense must be undisputed. The test of reasonable ground
applies only to the identity of the perpetrator.
 If the arrest was made under Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules of Court in connection with a crime about to be
committed, being committed, or just committed, what was that crime? There is no allegation in the record of such a
justification. Parenthetically, it may be observed that under the Revised Rule 113, Section 5(b), the officer making the
arrest must have personal knowledge of the ground therefor as stressed in the recent case of People v. Burgos.
Conclusion:
 It would be a sad day, indeed, if any person could be summarily arrested and
searched just because he is holding his abdomen, even if it be possibly because of
a stomachache, or if a peace officer could clamp handcuffs on any person with a
shifty look on suspicion that he may have committed a criminal act or is actually
committing or attempting it. This simply cannot be done in a free society. This is
not a police state where order is exalted over liberty or, worse, personal malice on
the part of the arresting officer may be justified in the name of security.
16. SAMMY MALACAT y MANDAR, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, and

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. A hand GRENADE
Facts:
 Petitioner Sammy Malacat y Mandar was charged with violating Section 3 of

Presidential Decree No. 1866.
 The said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly keep, possess
and/or acquire a hand grenade, without first securing the necessary license and/or permit
therefor from the proper authorities.
 The prosecution admitted that the police authorities were not armed with a
search warrant nor warrant of arrest at the time they arrested petitioner.
 In response to bomb threats reported seven days earlier, he was on foot patrol with
three other police officers (all of them in uniform) along Quezon Boulevard,
Quiapo, Manila, near the Mercury Drug store at Plaza Miranda. They chanced
26
upon two groups of Muslim-looking men, with each group, comprised of

three to four men, posted at opposite sides of the corner of Quezon Boulevard
near the Mercury Drug Store. These men were acting suspiciously with "[t]their
eyes . . . moving very fast." 6
 Yu and his companions positioned themselves at strategic points and

observed both groups for about thirty minutes. The police officers then
approached one group of men, who then fled in different directions. As the
policemen gave chase, Yu caught up with and apprehended petitioner. Upon
searching petitioner, Yu found a fragmentation grenade tucked inside petitioner's
"front waist line." 7 Yu's companion, police officer Rogelio Malibiran,
apprehended Abdul Casan from whom a .38 caliber revolver was recovered.
Petitioner and Casan were then brought to Police Station No. 3 where Yu placed
an "X" mark at the bottom of the grenade and thereafter gave it to his
commander.
 On cross-examination, Yu declared that they conducted the foot patrol due to a
report that a group of Muslims was going to explode a grenade somewhere in the
vicinity of Plaza Miranda. Yu recognized petitioner as the previous Saturday, 25
August 1990, likewise at Plaza Miranda, Yu saw petitioner and 2 others attempt to
detonate a grenade. The attempt was aborted when Yu and other policemen chased
petitioner and his companions; however, the former were unable to catch any of
the latter. Yu further admitted that petitioner and Casan were merely standing on
the corner of Quezon Boulevard when Yu saw them on 27 August 1990. Although
they were not creating a commotion, since they were supposedly acting
suspiciously, Yu and his companions approached them. Yu did not issue any
receipt for the grenade he allegedly recovered from petitioner. 9
 Josefino C. Serapio declared that at about 9:00 a.m. of 28 August 1990, petitioner
and a certain Abdul Casan were brought in by Sgt. Saquilla 10 for investigation.
Forthwith, Serapio conducted the inquest of the two suspects, informing them of
their rights to remain silent and to be assisted by competent and independent
counsel. Despite Serapio's advice, petitioner and Casan manifested their
willingness to answer questions even without the assistance of a lawyer.
Serapio then took petitioner's uncounselled confession (Exh. "E"), there being no
PAO lawyer available, wherein petitioner admitted possession of the grenade.
Thereafter, Serapio prepared the affidavit of arrest and booking sheet of petitioner
and Casan. Later, Serapio turned over the grenade to the Intelligence and Special
Action Division (ISAD) of the Explosive Ordinance Disposal Unit for
examination.
 During the preliminary examination of the grenade, he "found that [the] major
components consisting of [a] high filler and fuse assembly [were] all present," and
concluded that the grenade was "[l]ive and capable of exploding.
27
Petitioner:
Petitioner was the lone defense witness. He declared that he arrived in Manila on 22 July
1990 and resided at the Muslim Center in Quiapo, Manila. At around 6:30 in the evening
of 27 August 1990, he went to Plaza Miranda to catch a breath of fresh air. Shortly
after, several policemen arrived and ordered all males to stand aside. The policemen
searched petitioner and two other men, but found nothing in their possession. However,
he was arrested with two others, brought to and detained at Precinct No. 3, where he was
accused of having shot a police officer. The officer showed the gunshot wounds he
allegedly sustained and shouted at petitioner "[i]to ang tama mo sa akin." This officer
then inserted the muzzle of his gun into petitioner's mouth and said, "[y]ou are the one
who shot me."
Petitioner denied the charges and explained that he only recently arrived in Manila.
However, several other police officers mauled him, hitting him with benches and guns.
Petitioner was once again searched, but nothing was found on him. He saw the grenade
only in court when it was presented.
In support thereof, petitioner merely restates his arguments below regarding the validity
of the warrantless arrest and search, then disagrees with the finding of the Court of
Appeals that he was "attempting to commit a crime," as the evidence for the prosecution
merely disclosed that he was "standing at the corner of Plaza Miranda and Quezon
Boulevard" with his eyes "moving very fast" and "looking at every person that
come (sic) nearer (sic) to them." Finally, petitioner points out the factual similarities
between his case and that of People v. Mengote to demonstrate that the Court of Appeals
miscomprehended the latter.
In sum, petitioner argued that the warrantless arrest was invalid due to absence of any of
the conditions provided for in Section 5 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, citing People
vs. Mengote. 23 As such, the search was illegal, and the hand grenade seized, inadmissible
in evidence.
RTC:
28
The trial court ruled that the warrantless search and seizure of petitioner was akin
to a "stop and frisk," where a "warrant and seizure can be effected without
necessarily being preceded by an arrest" and "whose object is either to maintain the
status quo momentarily while the police officer seeks to obtain more information."
15 Probable cause was not required as it was not certain that a crime had been
committed, however, the situation called for an investigation, hence to require probable
cause would have been "premature. " 16 The RTC emphasized that Yu and his companions
were "[c]onfronted with an emergency, in which the delay necessary to obtain a
warrant, threatens the destruction of evidence" 17 and the officers "[h]ad to act in
haste," as petitioner and his companions were acting suspiciously, considering the time,
place and "reported cases of bombing." Further, petitioner's group suddenly ran away in
different directions as they saw the arresting officers approach, thus "[i]t is reasonable for
an officer to conduct a limited search, the purpose of which is not necessarily to discover
evidence of a crime, but to allow the officer to pursue his investigation without fear of
violence." 18
The trial court then ruled that the seizure of the grenade from petitioner was
incidental to a lawful arrest, and since petitioner "[l]ater voluntarily admitted such
fact to the police investigator for the purpose of bombing the Mercury Drug Store,"
concluded that sufficient evidence existed to establish petitioner's guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
The trial court thus found petitioner guilty of the crime of illegal possession of
explosives.
Issue:
1. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE SEARCH UPON THE PERSON
OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT AND THE SEIZURE OF THE ALLEGED HANDGRENADE
FROM HIM "WAS AN APPROPRIATE INCIDENT TO HIS ARREST."
2. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING AS EVIDENCE AGAINST ACCUSED-

APPELLANT THE HANDGRENADE ALLEGEDLY SEIZED FROM HIM AS IT WAS A
PRODUCT OF AN UNREASONABLE AND ILLEGAL SEARCH.
OSG:
In its Brief for the Appellee, the Office of the Solicitor General agreed with the trial court
and prayed that its decision be affirmed in toto. 24
In its decision of 24 January 1996, 25 the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, noting,
first, that petitioner abandoned his original theory before the court a quo that the grenade
29
was "planted" by the police officers; and second, the factual finding of the trial court that
the grenade was seized from petitioner's possession was not raised as an issue. Further,
respondent court focused on the admissibility in evidence of Exhibit "D," the hand
grenade seized from petitioner. Meeting the issue squarely, the Court of Appeals ruled
that the arrest was lawful on the ground that there was probable cause for the arrest as
petitioner was "attempting to commit an offense.
We are at a loss to understand how a man, who was in possession of a live grenade and in the company of other suspicious
character[s] with unlicensed firearm[s] lurking in Plaza Miranda at a time when political tension ha[d] been enkindling a
series of terroristic activities, [can] claim that he was not attempting to commit an offense. We need not mention that Plaza
Miranda is historically notorious for being a favorite bomb site especially during times of political upheaval. As the mere
possession of an unlicensed grenade is by itself an offense, Malacat's posture is simply too preposterous to inspire belief.
In so doing, the Court of Appeals took into account petitioner's failure to rebut the
testimony of the prosecution witnesses that they received intelligence reports of a bomb
threat at Plaza Miranda; the fact that PO Yu chased petitioner two days prior to the
latter's arrest, or on 27 August 1990; and that petitioner and his companions acted
suspiciously, the "accumulation" of which was more than sufficient to convince a
reasonable man that an offense was about to be committed.
The police officers in such a volatile situation would be guilty of gross negligence and dereliction of duty, not to mention
of gross incompetence, if they [would] first wait for Malacat to hurl the grenade, and kill several innocent persons while
maiming numerous others, before arriving at what would then be an assured but moot conclusion that there was indeed
probable cause for an arrest. We are in agreement with the lower court in saying that the probable cause in such a
kind of proof necessary to convict, but rather the practical
situation should not be the
considerations of everyday life on which a reasonable and prudent mind, and not legal
technicians, will ordinarily act.
Rule:
First, serious doubt surrounds the story of police officer Yu that a grenade was found in
and seized from petitioner's possession. Notably, Yu did not identify, in court, the
grenade he allegedly seized. According to him, he turned it over to his commander
after putting an "X" mark at its bottom; however, the commander was not
presented to corroborate this claim. On the other hand, the grenade presented in court
and identified by police officer Ramilo referred to what the latter received from Lt.
Eduardo Cabrera and police officer Diotoy not immediately after petitioner's arrest,
but nearly seven (7) months later or on 19 March 1991; further, there was no evidence
whatsoever that what Ramilo received was the very same grenade seized from petitioner.
In his testimony, Yu never declared that the grenade passed on to Ramilo was the
grenade the former confiscated from petitioner. Yu did not, and was not made to,
identify the grenade examined by Ramilo, and the latter did not claim that the grenade
he examined was that seized from petitioner. Plainly, the law enforcement authorities
failed to safeguard and preserve the chain of evidence so crucial in cases such as these.
30
Second, if indeed petitioner had a grenade with him, and that two days earlier he
was with a group about to detonate an explosive at Plaza Miranda, and Yu and his
fellow officers chased, but failed to arrest them, then considering that Yu and his
three fellow officers were in uniform and therefore easily cognizable as police
officers, it was then unnatural and against common experience that petitioner
simply stood there in proximity to the police officers. Note that Yu observed petitioner
for thirty minutes and must have been close enough to petitioner in order to discern
petitioner's eyes "moving very fast."
Finally, even assuming that petitioner admitted possession of the grenade during his
custodial investigation by police officer Serapio, such admission was inadmissible in
evidence for it was taken in palpable violation of Section 12(1) and (3) of Article III
of the Constitution,
The general rule as regards arrests, searches and seizures is that a warrant is needed in
order to validly effect the same.31 The Constitutional prohibition against unreasonable
arrests, searches and seizures refers to those effected without a validly issued warrant, 32
subject to certain exceptions. As regards valid warrantless arrests, these are found in
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which reads, in part:
Sec. 5. Arrest, without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped . . .
A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated under Section 5(a) has been
denominated as one "in flagrante delicto," while that under Section 5(b) has been described as a
"hot pursuit" arrest.
Turning to valid warrantless searches, they are limited to the following: (1) customs
searches; (2) search of moving vehicles; (3) seizure of evidence in plain view; (4) consent
searches; 33 (5) a search incidental to a lawful arrest; 34 and (6) a "stop and frisk."
In the instant petition, the trial court validated the warrantless search as a "stop
and frisk" with "the seizure of the grenade from the accused [as] an appropriate
incident to his arrest," hence necessitating a brief discussion on the nature of these
exceptions to the warrant requirement.
At the outset, we note that the trial court confused the concepts of a "stop-and-frisk" and
of a search incidental to a lawful arrest. These two types of warrantless searches differ
31
in terms of the requisite quantum of proof before they may be validly effected and
in their allowable scope.
Here, there could have been no valid in flagrante delicto or hot pursuit arrest
preceding the search in light of the lack of personal knowledge on the part of Yu, the
arresting officer, or an overt physical act, on the part of petitioner, indicating that a
crime had just been committed, was being committed or was going to be committed.
Having thus shown the invalidity of the warrantless arrest in this case, plainly, the search
conducted on petitioner could not have been one incidental to a lawful arrest.
A "stop-and-frisk" as a "limited protective search of outer clothing for weapons," .
Other notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is not required to conduct a
"stop and frisk," 40 it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not
validate a "stop and frisk." A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police
officer's experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person
detained has weapons concealed about him. 41
Finally, a "stop-and-frisk" serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective
crime prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition that a police officer
may, under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a
person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even without
probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation
which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with
whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and
fatally be used against the police officer.
(3) reasons why the "stop-and-frisk" was invalid:
First, we harbor grave doubts as to Yu's claim that petitioner was a member of the group
which attempted to bomb Plaza Miranda two days earlier. This claim is neither
supported by any police report or record nor corroborated by any other police
officer who allegedly chased that group. Aside from impairing Yu's credibility as a
witness, this likewise diminishes the probability that a genuine reason existed so as to
arrest and search petitioner. If only to further tarnish the credibility of Yu's testimony,
contrary to his claim that petitioner and his companions had to be chased before being
apprehended, the affidavit of arrest (Exh. "A") expressly declares otherwise, i.e., upon
arrival of five (5) other police officers, petitioner and his companions were "immediately
collared."
Second, there was nothing in petitioner's behavior or conduct which could have
reasonably elicited even mere suspicion other than that his eyes were "moving very
32
fast" — an observation which leaves us incredulous since Yu and his teammates were
nowhere near petitioner and it was already 6:30 p.m., thus presumably dusk. Petitioner
and his companions were merely standing at the corner and were not creating any
commotion or trouble,
Third, there was at all no ground, probable or otherwise, to believe that petitioner was
armed with a deadly weapon. None was visible to Yu, for as he admitted, the alleged
grenade was "discovered" "inside the front waistline" of petitioner, and from all
indications as to the distance between Yu and petitioner, any telltale bulge, assuming that
petitioner was indeed hiding a grenade, could not have been visible to Yu.
When the policemen approached the accused and his companions, they were not yet
aware that a hand grenade was tucked inside his waistline. They did not see any bulging
object in [sic] his person. 43
What is unequivocal then in this case are blatant violations of petitioner's rights solemnly
guaranteed in Sections 2 and 12(1) of Article III of the Constitution.
Conclusion:
In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity of
the incidental search, the legality of the arrest is questioned in a large majority of these
cases, e.g., whether an arrest was merely used as a pretext for conducting a search. In this
instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be
made — the process cannot be reversed. At bottom, assuming a valid arrest, the arresting
officer may search the person of the arrestee and the area within which the latter may
reach for a weapon or for evidence to destroy, and seize any money or property found
which was used in the commission of the crime, or the fruit of the crime, or that which
may be used as evidence, or which might furnish the arrestee with the means of escaping
or committing violence. Here, there could have been no valid in flagrante delicto or hot
pursuit arrest preceding the search in light of the lack of personal knowledge on the part
of Yu, the arresting officer, or an overt physical act, on the part of petitioner, indicating
that a crime had just been committed, was being committed or was going to be
committed. Having thus shown the invalidity of the warrantless arrest in this case,
plainly, the search conducted on petitioner could not have been one incidental to a lawful
arrest.
We now proceed to the justification for and allowable scope of a "stop-and-frisk" as a

"limited protective search of outer clothing for weapons," as laid down in Terry, thus: We
merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him
reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and
that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where
in the course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and
33
makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter
serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he is entitled for the
protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the
outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to
assault him. Such a search is a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment . . . Other
notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is not required to conduct a "stop
and frisk," it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop
and frisk." A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer's experience and
surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons
concealed about him. Finally, a "stop-and-frisk" serves a two-fold interest: the general
interest of effective crime prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition
that a police officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner,
approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even without
probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation
which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with
whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and
fatally be used against the police officer.
17. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. IDEL AMINNUDIN y

AHNI, defendant-appellant.
The accused-appellant claimed his business was selling watches but he was
nonetheless arrested, tried and found guilty of illegally transporting marijuana. The
trial court, disbelieving him, held it was high time to put him away and sentenced him to
life imprisonment plus a fine of P20,000.00.
Idel Aminnudin was arrested on June 25, 1984, shortly after disembarking from the M/V
Wilcon 9 at about 8:30 in the evening, in Iloilo City. The PC officers who were in fact
waiting for him simply accosted him, inspected his bag and finding what looked liked
marijuana leaves took him to their headquarters for investigation. The two bundles of
suspect articles were confiscated from him and later taken to the NBI laboratory for
examination. When they were verified as marijuana leaves, an information for violation
of the Dangerous Drugs Act was filed against him. 2 Later, the information was amended
to include Farida Ali y Hassen, who had also been arrested with him that same evening
and likewise investigated. 3 Both were arraigned and pleaded not guilty. 4 Subsequently,
the fiscal filed a motion to dismiss the charge against Ali on the basis of a sworn
statement of the arresting officers absolving her after a "thorough investigation." 5 The
motion was granted, and trial proceeded only against the accused- appellant, who was
eventually convicted.
34
According to the prosecution, the PC officers had earlier received a tip from one of their
informers that the accused-appellant was on board a vessel bound for Iloilo City and was
carrying marijuana. 7 He was identified by name. 8 Acting on this tip, they waited for him
in the evening of June 25, 1984, and approached him as he descended from the gangplank
after the informer had pointed to him. 9 They detained him and inspected the bag he was
carrying. It was found to contain three kilos of what were later analyzed as
marijuana leaves by an NBI forensic examiner, 10 who testified that she conducted
microscopic, chemical and chromatographic tests on them. On the basis of this finding,
the corresponding charge was then filed against Aminnudin.
Respondent:
In his defense, Aminnudin disclaimed the marijuana, averring that all he had in his bag
was his clothing consisting of a jacket, two shirts and two pairs of pants. 11 He alleged
that he was arbitrarily arrested and immediately handcuffed. His bag was confiscated
without a search warrant. At the PC headquarters, he was manhandled to force him
to admit he was carrying the marijuana, the investigator hitting him with a piece of
wood in the chest and arms even as he parried the blows while he was still
handcuffed. 12 He insisted he did not even know what marijuana looked like and
that his business was selling watches and sometimes cigarettes. 13 He also argued that
the marijuana he was alleged to have been carrying was not properly identified and
could have been any of several bundles kept in the stock room of the PC
headquarters.
It is not disputed, and in fact it is admitted by the PC officers who testified for the
prosecution, that they had no warrant when they arrested Aminnudin and seized the bag
he was carrying. Their only justification was the tip they had earlier received from a
reliable and regular informer who reported to them that Aminnudin was arriving in
Iloilo by boat with marijuana. Their testimony varies as to the time they received the
tip, one saying it was two days before the arrest, 20 another two weeks 21 and a third
"weeks before June 25." 22 On this matter, we may prefer the declaration of the chief of
the arresting team, Lt. Cipriano Querol, Jr.,
RTC:
The trial court was unconvinced, noting from its own examination of the accused that he
claimed to have come to Iloilo City to sell watches but carried only two watches at the
time, traveling from Jolo for that purpose and spending P107.00 for fare, not to mention
his other expenses. 15 Aminnudin testified that he kept the two watches in a secret
pocket below his belt but, strangely, they were not discovered when he was bodily
searched by the arresting officers nor were they damaged as a result of his manhandling. 1
35
6 He also said he sold one of the watches for P400.00 and gave away the other,
although the watches belonged not to him but to his cousin, 17 to a friend whose full
name he said did not even know.18 The trial court also rejected his allegations of
maltreatment, observing that he had not sufficiently proved the injuries sustained by him.
OSG:
There is one point that deserves closer examination, however, and it is Aminnudin's claim
that he was arrested and searched without warrant, making the marijuana allegedly found
in his possession inadmissible in evidence against him under the Bill of Rights. The
decision did not even discuss this point. For his part, the Solicitor General dismissed this
after an all-too-short argument that the arrest of Aminnudin was valid because it came
under Rule 113, Section 6(b) of the Rules of Court on warrantless arrests. This made the
search also valid as incidental to a lawful arrest.
Transcript:
Because we were very very sure that our operation will yield positive result.
Is that your procedure that whenever it will yield positive result you do not need a search warrant anymore?
Search warrant is not necessary."
That last answer is a cavalier pronouncement, especially as it comes from a

mere lieutenant of the PC. The Supreme Court cannot countenance such a
statement. This is still a government of laws and not of men.
Issue:
W/N the search was valid. W/N the evidence is admissible in courts.
Ruling:
In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest,
committing a crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had
just done so. What he was doing was descending the gangplank of the M/V
Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication that called for his arrest. To all
appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking
from the vessel. It was only when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of
the marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so subject to
apprehension. It was the furtive finger that triggered his arrest. The identification
by the informer was the probable cause as determined by the officers (and not a
36
judge) that authorized them to pounce upon Aminnudin and immediately arrest
him.
Without the evidence of the marijuana allegedly seized from Aminnudin, the
case of the prosecution must fall. That evidence cannot be admitted, and
should never have been considered by the trial court for the simple fact is that
the marijuana was seized illegally. It is the fruit of the poisonous tree, to use
Justice Holmes' felicitous phrase. The search was not an incident of a lawful
arrest because there was no warrant of arrest and the warrantless arrest did not
come under the exceptions allowed by the Rules of Court. Hence, the
warrantless search was also illegal and the evidence obtained thereby was
inadmissible.
Conclusion:
Where it is not disputed that the PC officers had no warrant when they arrested
Aminnudin while he was descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and seized the
bag he was carrying, and that their only justification was the tip they had earlier received
from a reliable and regular informer who reported to them that Aminnudin was arriving
in Iloilo by boat with marijuana, the search was not an incident of a lawful arrest because
there was no warrant of arrest and warrantless arrest did not come under the exceptions
allowed by the Rules of Court. Hence, the warrantless search was also illegal and the
evidence obtained was inadmissible.
The present case presented no such urgency. From the conflicting declarations of the PC
witnesses, it is clear that they had at least two days within which they could have
obtained a warrant to arrest and search Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on the M/V
Wilcon 9. His name was known. The vehicle was identified. The date of its arrival was
certain. And from the information they had received, they could have persuaded a judge
that there was probable cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a warrant. Yet they did
nothing. No effort was made to comply with the law. The Bill of Rights was ignored
altogether because the PC lieutenant who was the head of the arresting team, had
determined on his own authority that a "search warrant was not necessary."
In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing
a crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done so.
What he was doing was descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no
outward indication that called for his arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of the
other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only when the informer
37
pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so
subject to apprehension. It was the furtive 􏰄nger that triggered his arrest. The
identification by the informer was the probable cause as determined by the o􏰃cers (and
not a judge) that authorized them to pounce upon Aminnudin and immediately arrest him.
18. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MIKAEL
MALMSTEDT, * defendant-appellant.
In an information dated 15 June 1989, accused-appellant Mikael Malmstedt

(hereinafter referred to as the accused) was charged before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of La Trinidad, Benguet, Branch 10, in Criminal Case No. 89-CR-
0663, for violation of Section 4, Art. II of Republic Act 6425, as amended,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended. The factual
background of the case is as follows:
Accused Mikael Malmstedt, a Swedish national, entered the Philippines for the
third time in December 1988 as a tourist. He had visited the country sometime in
1982 and 1985.
In the evening of 7 May 1989, accused left for Baguio City. Upon his arrival
thereat in the morning of the following day, he took a bus to Sagada and stayed
in that place for two (2) days.
At around 7:00 o'clock in the morning of 11 May 1989, accused went to the
Nangonogan bus stop in Sagada to catch the first available trip to Baguio City.
From Baguio City, accused planned to take a late afternoon trip to Angeles City,
then proceed to Manila to catch his flight out of the country, scheduled on 13
May 1989. From Sagada, accused took a Skyline bus with body number 8005
and Plate number AVC 902. 1
At about 8:00 o'clock in the morning of that same day (11 May 1989), Captain
Alen Vasco, the Commanding Officer of the First Regional Command (NARCOM)
stationed at Camp Dangwa, ordered his men to set up a temporary checkpoint
at Kilometer 14, Acop, Tublay, Mountain Province, for the purpose of checking
38
all vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region. The order to establish a
checkpoint in the said area was prompted by persistent reports that vehicles
coming from Sagada were transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs.
Moreover, information was received by the Commanding Officer of NARCOM,
that same morning, that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had in his possession
prohibited drugs. 2
The group composed of seven (7) NARCOM officers, in coordination with Tublay
Police Station, set up a checkpoint at the designated area at about 10:00 o'clock
in the morning and inspected all vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region.
At about 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon, the bus where accused was riding was
stopped. Sgt. Fider and CIC Galutan boarded the bus and announced that they
were members of the NARCOM and that they would conduct an inspection. The
two (2) NARCOM officers started their inspection from the front going towards
the rear of the bus. Accused who was the sole foreigner riding the bus was
seated at the rear thereof.
During the inspection, CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on accused's waist.

Suspecting the bulge on accused's waist to be a gun, the officer asked for
accused's passport and other identification papers. When accused failed to
comply, the officer required him to bring out whatever it was that was bulging on
his waist. The bulging object turned out to be a pouch bag and when accused
opened the same bag, as ordered, the officer noticed four (4) suspicious-looking
objects wrapped in brown packing tape, prompting the officer to open one of the
wrapped objects. The wrapped objects turned out to contain hashish, a
derivative of marijuana.
Thereafter, accused was invited outside the bus for questioning. But before he
alighted from the bus, accused stopped to get two (2) travelling bags from the
luggage carrier.
Upon stepping out of the bus, the officers got the bags and opened them. A
teddy bear was found in each bag. Feeling the teddy bears, the officer noticed
that there were bulges inside the same which did not feel like foam stuffing. It
was only after the officers had opened the bags that accused finally presented
his passport.
39
Accused was then brought to the headquarters of the NARCOM at Camp

Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet for further investigation. At the investigation room,
the officers opened the teddy bears and they were found to also contain
hashish. Representative samples were taken from the hashish found among the
personal effects of accused and the same were brought to the PC Crime
Laboratory for chemical analysis.
In the chemistry report, it was established that the objects examined were
hashish, a prohibited drug which is a derivative of marijuana. Thus, an
information was filed against accused for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.
Respondent:
During the arraignment, accused entered a plea of "not guilty." For his defense, he
raised the issue of illegal search of his personal effects. He also claimed that the
hashish was planted by the NARCOM officers in his pouch bag and that the two
(2) travelling bags were not owned by him, but were merely entrusted to him by
an Australian couple whom he met in Sagada. He further claimed that the
Australian couple intended to take the same bus with him but because there
were no more seats available in said bus, they decided to take the next ride and
asked accused to take charge of the bags, and that they would meet each other
at the Dangwa Station.
Likewise, accused alleged that when the NARCOM officers demanded for his
passport and other identification papers, he handed to one of the officers his
pouch bag which was hanging on his neck containing, among others, his
passport, return ticket to Sweden and other papers. The officer in turn handed it
to his companion who brought the bag outside the bus. When said officer came
back, he charged the accused that there was hashish in the bag. He was told to
get off the bus and his picture was taken with the pouch bag placed around his
neck. The trial court did not give credence to accused's defense.
Rule:
The claim of the accused that the hashish was planted by the NARCOM officers,
was belied by his failure to raise such defense at the earliest opportunity. When
accused was investigated at the Provincial Fiscal's Office, he did not inform the
40
Fiscal or his lawyer that the hashish was planted by the NARCOM officers in his
bag. It was only two (2) months after said investigation when he told his lawyer
about said claim, denying ownership of the two (2) travelling bags as well as
having hashish in his pouch bag.
In a decision dated 12 October 1989, the trial court found accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, specifically Section 4,
Art. II of RA 6425, as amended.
The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. 5
However, where the search is made pursuant to a lawful arrest, there is no need
to obtain a search warrant. A lawful arrest without a warrant may be made by a
peace officer or a private person under the following circumstances. 6
"SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating
that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be
forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance
with Rule 112, Section 7. (6a, 17a)."
Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs (hashish). A crime was actually
being committed by the accused and he was caught in flagrante delicto. Thus, the search made upon his personal
effects falls squarely under paragraph (1) of the foregoing provisions of law, which allow a warrantless search
incident to a lawful arrest.
While it is true that the NARCOM officers were not armed with a search warrant
when the search was made over the personal effects of accused, however, under
the circumstances of the case, there was sufficient probable cause for said
officers to believe that accused was then and there committing a crime. LLphil
41
Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances which could
lead a reasonable, discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed, and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the
place sought to be searched. 8 The required probable cause that will justify a
warrantless search and seizure is not determined by any fixed formula but is
resolved according to the facts of each case.
Warrantless search of the personal effects of an accused has been declared by

this Court as valid, because of existence of probable cause, where the smell of
marijuana emanated from a plastic bag owned by the accused, 10 or where the
accused was acting suspiciously, 11 and attempted to flee.
19. Espano v. CA- buy- bust/ Flagranti Delicto
20. Papa v. Mago- If importation has been terminated (all fees were paid off) then it is no
longer within the powers of Customs otherwise it is with Customs and valid for a
warrantless search.
21. People v. Musa- We, therefore, hold that under the circumstances of the case,
the "plain view" doctrine does not apply and the marijuana contained in the
plastic bag was seized illegally and cannot be presented in evidence.
22. Valmonte v. De Villa
Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence and promote
public welfare and an individual's right against a warrantless search which is
however reasonably conducted, the former should prevail.
True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the

men in uniform, in the same manner that all governmental power is susceptible
of abuse. But, at the cost of occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even
irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal times, when
conducted within reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for an orderly
society and a peaceful community.
42
43
44

Search and Seizure - Case Digest

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Search and Seizure - Case Digest

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Topic: Search and Seizure

1] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANDRE MARTI,

A. "THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE ILLEGALLY

B. "THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING APPELLANT DESPITE THE

C. "THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE TO THE

A. The Court, in Stonehill v. Diokno , declared as inadmissible any evidence

In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the

Similarly, the admissibility of the evidence procured by an individual effected

C. Coming now to appellant's third assignment of error, appellant would like us to

Rather than give the appearance of veracity, we find appellant's disclaimer as

He was previously convicted of possession of hashish by the Kleve Court in the

2] HARRY S. STONEHILL, ROBERT P. BROOKS, JOHN J. BROOKS and

"Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals,

disposition of the present case, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued restraining

In their answer, respondents-prosecutors alleged

"Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers,

3. MAXIMO V. SOLIVEN, ANTONIO V. ROCES, FREDERICK K. AGCAOILI,

1) Personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted

2) If on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause , he may disregard the

4. Silva v. Presiding Judge RTC of Negros

complainant and witnesses by searching questions and answers in violation of

One of the constitutional requirements of a valid search warrant or warrant of

It is therefore even doubtful whether the arrest of an individual may be ordered by

examine on oath or affirmation the complainant and any witnesses he may

9. People v. Del Rosario

The Constitution expressly ordains the exclusion in evidence of illegally seized

10. Umil v. Ramos

That searches and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant is not an

12. People v. Rodriguez

As provided in the present Constitution, a search, to be valid, must generally be

4) when it is made on automobiles for the purpose of preventing violations

13. Go y Tambunting v. Court of Appeals

We do not believe that the warrantless "arrest" or detention of petitioner in the

14. ROMEO POSADAS y ZAMORA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT

Buri bag- illegal possession of firearms.

Issue: W/N the warrantless search on the person of petitioner is valid.

then on duty. He was prosecuted for illegal possession of firearms and

Thus, as between a warrantless search and seizure conducted at military or police

15. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROGELIO

 Accused-appellant Rogelio Mengote was convicted of illegal possession of

There is no question that evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search or seizure is

16. SAMMY MALACAT y MANDAR, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, and

 Petitioner Sammy Malacat y Mandar was charged with violating Section 3 of

upon two groups of Muslim-looking men, with each group, comprised of

 Yu and his companions positioned themselves at strategic points and

2. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING AS EVIDENCE AGAINST ACCUSED-

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped . . .

A "stop-and-frisk" as a "limited protective search of outer clothing for weapons," .

(3) reasons why the "stop-and-frisk" was invalid:

We now proceed to the justification for and allowable scope of a "stop-and-frisk" as a

17. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. IDEL AMINNUDIN y

Search warrant is not necessary."

That last answer is a cavalier pronouncement, especially as it comes from a

18. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MIKAEL

In an information dated 15 June 1989, accused-appellant Mikael Malmstedt

During the inspection, CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on accused's waist.

Accused was then brought to the headquarters of the NARCOM at Camp

Warrantless search of the personal effects of an accused has been declared by

19. Espano v. CA- buy- bust/ Flagranti Delicto

22. Valmonte v. De Villa

True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the

You might also like