Republic of the Philippines "In the absence of a retirement plan or agreement
Congress of the Philippines providing for retirement benefits of employees in the
Metro Manila
Ninth Congress
Republic Act No. 7641 December 9, 1992
AN ACT AMENDING ARTICLE 287 OF PRESIDENTIAL
DECREE NO. 442, AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS
THE LABOR CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, BY PROVIDING
FOR RETIREMENT PAY TO QUALIFIED PRIVATE SECTOR
EMPLOYEES IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY RETIREMENT PLAN
IN THE ESTABLISHMENT
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
Philippines in Congress assembled::
Section 1. Article 287 of Presidential Decree No. 442, as
amended, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the Philippines,
is hereby amended to read as follows:
"Art. 287. Retirement. – Any employee may be retired
upon reaching the retirement age established in the
collective bargaining agreement or other applicable
employment contract.
"In case of retirement, the employee shall be entitled to
receive such retirement benefits as he may have earned
under existing laws and any collective bargaining
agreement and other agreements: Provided,however,
That an employee's retirement benefits under any
collective bargaining and other agreements shall not be
less than those provided herein.
establishment, an employee upon reaching the age of
sixty (60) years or more, but not beyond sixty-five (65)
years which is hereby declared the compulsory retirement
age, who has served at least five (5) years in the said
establishment, may retire and shall be entitled to
retirement pay equivalent to at least one-half (1/2) month
salary for every year of service, a fraction of at least six
(6) months being considered as one whole year.
"Unless the parties provide for broader inclusions, the
term one-half (1/2) month salary shall mean fifteen (15)
days plus one-twelfth (1/12) of the 13th month pay and
the cash equivalent of not more than five (5) days of
service incentive leaves.
"Retail, service and agricultural establishments or
operations employing not more than (10) employees or
workers are exempted from the coverage of this provision.
"Violation of this provision is hereby declared unlawful
and subject to the penal provisions provided under Article
288 of this Code."
Section 2. Nothing in this Act shall deprive any employee of
benefits to which he may be entitled under existing laws or
company policies or practices.
Section 3. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its
complete publication in the Official Gazette or in at least two (2)
national newspapers of general circulation, whichever comes
earlier.
Approved: December 9, 1992. lawphi1Ÿ
 Republic of the Philippines including respondents, decided to avail of the voluntary
SUPREME COURT resignation option. On December 29, 2004, respondents were
Manila paid their separation pay.6 On January 3, 2005, respondents
executed their respective waivers and quitclaims.7
FIRST DIVISION
The following day, January 4, 2005, some of Goodrich’s former
G.R. No. 188002 February 1, 2010 employees, including herein respondents, filed complaints against
Goodrich for illegal dismissal with prayer for payment of their full
GOODRICH MANUFACTURING CORPORATION & MR. NILO monetary benefits before the NLRC. Despite several
CHUA GOY, Petitioners, conferences, no amicable settlement was reached by the parties.
vs.
EMERLINA ATIVO, LOVITO SEBUANO, MICHAEL On November 22, 2005, Labor Arbiter Florentino R. Darlucio
FERNANDEZ, JUNIFER* CASAS, ROLANDO ISLA, ELISEO rendered a Decision declaring that there was no illegal dismissal
DEL ROSARIO, MARK JON MARTIN, EDISON GAMIDO, but held that petitioners were still liable to the respondents for
WARRY BALINTON, ROBERT RAGO and ROBERTO their unpaid emergency cost of living allowance (ECOLA), 13th
MENDOZA, Respondents. month pay, and service incentive leave (SIL) pay. The Labor
Arbiter likewise found the separation pay paid by Goodrich to be
DECISION insufficient. The dispositive portion of the Labor Arbiter’s decision
reads:
VILLARAMA, JR., .:J
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
1 rendered ordering respondents Goodrich Manufacturing Corp. to
This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision dated
pay the complainants the following:
November 28, 2008 and Resolution2 dated May 20, 2009 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 103078. The appellate court
set aside the February 21, 2007 Decision3 and January 29, 2008
Resolution4 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC),
and reinstated the November 22, 2005 Decision5 of the Labor
Arbiter.

The facts follow.

Respondents are former employees of petitioner Goodrich

Manufacturing Corporation (Goodrich) assigned as machine or
maintenance operators for the different sections of the company.
Sometime in the latter part of 2004, on account of lingering
financial constraints, Goodrich gave all its employees the option
to voluntarily resign from the company. Several employees,

All other claims are dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.8
Dissatisfied, both parties appealed to the NLRC. On February 21,
2007, the NLRC reversed and set aside the Labor Arbiter’s
decision. In disposing the issue, the NLRC explained:
Going over the complainants’ deeds of waiver and quitclaim, We
are convinced [that] the considerations they received are not
unreasonable, vis-à-vis the awards granted [to] them in the
assailed Decision. Notably, the awards even include the 13th
month pays for 2002 and 2003 which, by respondents’ proof
(Rollo 219 to 233) appear already paid. We also noted that
complainants are not shown to have signed the deeds of waiver
and quitclaim involuntarily, without understanding the implication
and consequences thereof. x x x. 1avvphi1
Respondents’ counterclaim is denied. There is no showing that
complainants prosecuted their complaint in bad faith.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision appealed from
is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and complainants’
monetary claims are hereby dismissed.
Respondents’ counterclaim is also dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.9
Respondents moved for reconsideration, but the same was
denied for lack of merit,10 prompting them to elevate the matter to
the Court of Appeals.11
On November 28, 2008, the appellate court rendered its decision
in favor of the respondents. The pertinent portion of the decision
reads:
The record is devoid of any indication that the petitioners were
coerced into resigning from the company. On the contrary, the
record supports the view that the petitioners chose to resign
without any element of coercion attending their option. The
quitclaim they executed in favor of the company amounts to a
valid and binding compromise agreement. To allow petitioners to
repudiate the same will be to countenance unjust enrichment on
their part. The court will not permit such a situation.
xxxx
However, We defer to the findings of the [L]abor [A]rbiter that
petitioners are entitled to their unpaid thirteenth month pay,
ECOLA and service incentive leave pay (SIL) at the amounts
computed by the [L]abor [A]rbiter. These are benefits to which
petitioners are entitled by statute, and which private respondent[s]
failed to disprove.
WHEREFORE, the questioned Decision and Resolution of
respondent National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC),
Second Division, dated February 21, 2007 and January 29, 2008,
respectively, are hereby SET ASIDE and the Decision of Labor
Arbiter Florentino Darlucio, dated November 22, 2005, [is]
REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.12
Petitioners are now before this Court raising the same issues:
whether the release, waiver and quitclaim signed by respondents
are valid and binding; and whether respondents may still receive
the deficiency amounts due them.
Petitioners contend that to allow respondents to recover their
monetary claims would render nugatory the legal consequences
of a valid quitclaim. They further argue that waivers and
quitclaims, by their very nature, set aside all the other claims
which the employee may be entitled to by the stroke of a pen.13
Petitioners’ argument is meritorious.
It is true that the law looks with disfavor on quitclaims and
releases by employees who have been inveigled or pressured
into signing them by unscrupulous employers seeking to evade
their legal responsibilities and frustrate just claims of
employees.14 In certain cases, however, the Court has given
effect to quitclaims executed by employees if the employer is able
to prove the following requisites, to wit: (1) the employee
executes a deed of quitclaim voluntarily; (2) there is no fraud or
deceit on the part of any of the parties; (3) the consideration of
the quitclaim is credible and reasonable; and (4) the contract is
not contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals or good
customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by
law.15
Our pronouncement in Periquet v. National Labor Relations
Commission16 on this matter cannot be more explicit:
Not all waivers and quitclaims are invalid as against public policy.
If the agreement was voluntarily entered into and represents a
reasonable settlement, it is binding on the parties and may not
later be disowned simply because of a change of mind. It is only
where there is clear proof that the waiver was wangled from an
unsuspecting or gullible person, or the terms of settlement are
unconscionable on its face, that the law will step in to annul the
questionable transaction. But where it is shown that the person
making the waiver did so voluntarily, with full understanding of
what he was doing, and the consideration for the quitclaim is
credible and reasonable, the transaction must be recognized as a
valid and binding undertaking.17
In the case at bar, both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC ruled that
respondents executed the quitclaims absent any coercion from
the petitioners following their voluntary resignation from the
company.18
In their Comment19 dated October 1, 2009, respondents
themselves admitted that they were not coerced to sign the
quitclaims.20 They, however, maintain that two (2) reasons moved
them to sign the said documents: first, they believed Goodrich
was terminating its business on account of financial hardship; and
second, they thought petitioners will pay them the full amount of
their compensation.21 Respondents insist that they were deceived
into signing the quitclaims when they learned that they were not
paid their full monetary benefits and after discovering that the
company did not really close shop, but instead only assumed a
different company name.22
We are not persuaded.
First, the contents of the quitclaim documents that have been
signed by the respondents are simple, clear and
unequivocal.23 The records of the case are bereft of any
substantial evidence to show that respondents did not know that
they were relinquishing their right short of what they had expected
to receive and contrary to what they have so declared. Put
differently, at the time they were signing their quitclaims,
respondents honestly believed that the amounts received by them
were fair and reasonable settlements of the amounts which they
would have received had they refused to voluntarily resign from
the said company.
Second, respondents claim that they were deceived because
petitioners did not really terminate their business since Mr. Chua
Goy had set up another company with the same line of business
as Goodrich. Such contention, however, was not proven during
the hearing before the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. Hence, such
claim is based only on respondents’ surmises and speculations
which, unfortunately, can never be used as a valid and legal
ground to repudiate respondents’ quitclaims.

And third, the considerations received by the respondents from

Goodrich do not appear to be grossly inadequate vis-à-vis what
they should receive in full. As correctly pointed out by the NLRC,
the total awards computed by the Labor Arbiter will definitely even
be lesser after deducting the 13th month pay for the years 2002
and 2003, which have already been received by the respondents
prior to the filing of their complaints, but which the Labor Arbiter
still included in his computation. The difference between the
amounts expected from those that were received may, therefore,
be considered as a fair and reasonable bargain on the part of
both parties.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Court of

Appeals Decision dated November 28, 2008 and Resolution
dated May 20, 2009 in CA-G.R. SP No. 103078 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the NLRC Decision
dated February 21, 2007 is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines entailed regular flights from Manila to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, and
SUPREME COURT back.
Manila
On August 25, 2004, the In-Flight Service Senior Manager of
FIRST DIVISION Saudia assigned in Manila received an inter-office Memorandum
dated August 17, 2004 from its Jeddah Office regarding the
G.R. No. 183915 December 14, 2011 transfer of 10 flight attendants from Manila to Jeddah effective
September 1, 2004. The said memorandum explained that such
MA. JOY TERESA O. BILBAO, Petitioner, transfer was made "due to operational requirements."3 Bilbao was
vs. among the 10 flight attendants to be transferred.
SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES, Respondent.
Bilbao initially complied with the transfer order and proceeded to
DECISION Jeddah for her new assignment. However, on September 7,
2004, she opted to resign and relinquish her post by tendering a
resignation letter, which reads:
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Jeddah IFS Base Manager (F)
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the
F/A Maria Joy Teresa O. Bilbao
reversal of the May 30, 2008 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in
PRN: 3006078
CA-G.R. No. 102319 and its July 22, 2008 Resolution2 denying
22 / 07 / 1425 H 7 / 09 / 2004
petitioner Ma. Joy Teresa O. Bilbao’s (Bilbao) motion for
reconsideration. The assailed decision affirmed the ruling of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) which held that RESIGNATION
Bilbao was not illegally dismissed and had voluntarily resigned.
The NLRC reversed and set aside the decision of the Labor I am tendering my resignation with one (1) month notice effective
Arbiter which ruled that Bilbao, together with two other 18 October 2004. Thank you for the support you have given me
complainants, was illegally dismissed by respondent Saudi during my 18 years of service.
Arabian Airlines (Saudia) and ordered the payment of full
backwages, separation pay, and attorney’s fees. (signed)
________________
The facts are as follows: F/A’s SIGNATURE
3006078
Bilbao was a former employee of respondent Saudia, having
been hired as a Flight Attendant on May 13, 1986 until her (signed) September 7, 2004
separation from Saudia in September 2004. During the course of _________________
her employment, Bilbao was assigned to work at the Manila AMIN GHABRA
Office, although the nature of her work as a flight attendant SNR. MGR. IFS JED (F)
 (signed)
ABDULLAH BALKHOYOUR
GM IFS CABIN CREW
8/8/1425
21/9/04 ADMIN ACKNOWLEDGEMENT / DATE4
On October 28, 2004, Bilbao executed and signed an
Undertaking5 similar to that of a Receipt, Release and Quitclaim
wherein she acknowledged receipt of a sum of money as "full and
complete end-of-service award with final settlement and have no
further claims whatsoever against Saudi Arabian Airlines."6
In spite of this signed Undertaking, however, on July 20, 2005,
Bilbao filed with the NLRC a complaint for reinstatement and
payment of full backwages; moral, exemplary and actual
damages; and attorney’s fees. Two of the other flight attendants
who were included in the list for transfer to Jeddah, Shalimar
Centi-Mandanas and Maria Lourdes Castells, also filed their
respective complaints against Saudia. These complaints were
eventually consolidated into NLRC-NCR Case Nos. 00-07-06315-
05 and 00-08-06745-05, and assigned to Labor Arbiter Ramon
Valentin C. Reyes.
For her part, Bilbao maintained that her resignation from Saudia
was not voluntary. She narrated that she was made to sign a pre-
typed resignation letter and was even reminded that the same
was a better option than termination which would tarnish her
record of service with Saudia. Bilbao and her co-complainants
shared a common theory that their transfer to Jeddah was a
prelude to their termination since they were all allegedly between
39 and 40 years of age.
Upon the other hand, Saudia averred that the resignation letters
from Bilbao and her co-complainants were voluntarily made since
they were actually hand-written and duly signed. Saudia asserted
that Bilbao and her co-complainants were not subjected to any
force, intimidation, or coercion when they wrote said resignation
letters and even their undertakings, after receiving without protest
a generous separation package despite the fact that employees
who voluntarily resign are not entitled to any separation pay.
Saudia also added that the transfer of flight attendants from their
Manila Office to the Jeddah Office was a valid exercise of its
management prerogative.
On August 31, 2006, Labor Arbiter Reyes rendered a
Decision7 declaring that Bilbao, together with co-complainants
Centi-Mandanas and Castells, was illegally dismissed, and
ordering Saudia to pay each of the complainants full backwages
from the time of the illegal dismissal until the finality of the
decision, separation pay of one month for every year of service
less the amount already received, plus ten percent (10%)
attorney’s fees on the amounts actually determined to be due the
complainants.
Saudia filed an appeal before the NLRC alleging that Bilbao and
her co-complainants voluntarily executed their resignation letters
and undertakings; thus, they were not illegally dismissed.
Moreover, Saudia opined that Bilbao and her co-complainants’
claim of illegal dismissal was a mere afterthought as they waited
for almost one year from the date of their alleged dismissal to file
their respective complaints.
Bilbao followed suit and also appealed before the NLRC, arguing
that she was entitled to the payment of moral and exemplary
damages since her termination was allegedly attended by bad
faith, fraud and deceit.
On June 25, 2007, the NLRC granted Saudia’s appeal, and
reversed and set aside the decision of the Labor Arbiter. The
decretal portion of the NLRC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the
respondents’ appeal is hereby GRANTED. The decision
1âwphi1
appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one is
issued finding the respondent not guilty of illegal dismissal.
For lack of merit, the complainant Bilbao’s appeal is DISMISSED.
Accordingly, the complaint is DISMISSED.8
In a Resolution9 dated October 26, 2007, the NLRC amended its
earlier Resolution dated June 25, 2007, to state that Castells and
Centi-Mandanas were also not entitled to moral and exemplary
damages. Moreover, the NLRC failed to find any compelling
justification or valid reason to modify, alter or reverse its earlier
resolution, thus:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Appeals
and Motions for Reconsideration of complainants Maria Lourdes
Castells and Shalimar Centi-Mandanas are hereby DISMISSED
for lack of merit.
Likewise, the Motion for Reconsideration of Maria Joy Teresa
Bilbao is DENIED.
No further motion of similar nature shall be entertained.10
Bilbao went to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari
alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC in
ruling that she was not illegally dismissed and not entitled to the
payment of moral and exemplary damages.
On May 30, 2008, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Resolutions
of the NLRC dated June 25, 2007 and October 26, 2007, and
held that the resignation of Bilbao was "of her own free will and
intelligent act."11
Dissatisfied, Bilbao filed a motion for reconsideration which was
denied by the Court of Appeals in the Resolution dated July 22,
2008.
Hence, the instant petition for review filed by Bilbao on the
following grounds:
6. GROUND FOR THIS PETITION/ISSUES
6.1. The Court of Appeals committed reversible error in
upholding the erroneous Decision of the NLRC, Third
Division which Decision reversed the Labor Arbiter’s
findings. The Court of Appeals decided the case in a way
probably not in accord with law or with applicable
decisions of the Supreme Court.
6.2. The Court of Appeals committed palpable error in
ruling that petitioner was not forced to resign; the Court of
Appeals decided the case in a way probably not in accord
with law and contrary to applicable decisions of the
Supreme Court.
6.3. The Court of Appeals committed patent mistake in
ruling that the petitioners’ (sic) termination was valid
because respondent had the right to terminate the
petitioner even without just cause; this is an outright
violation of the Labor Code and applicable laws and
jurisprudence; The Court of Appeals likewise erred in
validating the resignation because it was accompanied
with words of gratitude and payment of separation
benefits.12
In her Petition13 dated September 15, 2008, Bilbao asserts that
the initial step of Saudia in transferring her to Jeddah was, by
itself, constructive dismissal since the transfer order was
unreasonable, discriminatory, attended by bad faith, and would
result to demotion in rank or diminution in pay. Moreover, Bilbao
maintains that her resignation letter was not voluntarily made as it
was in a pre-typed form supplied by Saudia, and was
accomplished when she was under pressure and had no choice
but to resign. Lastly, Bilbao insists that the undertaking or waiver
and quitclaim that she signed in favor of Saudia was invalid as
she particularly puts in issue the voluntariness of its execution.
In its Comment14 dated November 14, 2008, Saudia preliminarily
asserts that the petition raises the factual issue of whether or not
Bilbao voluntarily resigned from her employment with Saudia,
which is not proper for a petition for review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, thus warranting its outright dismissal.
Nonetheless, Saudia presents its arguments and contends that it
validly exercised its management prerogative in transferring
Bilbao to another work station. Saudia then enumerates the
following factual circumstances which allegedly reveal the
voluntariness of Bilbao’s resignation, to wit:
a) [Bilbao’s] resignation letter was penned in her own
handwriting and duly signed by her;
b) [Bilbao] tendered her letter of resignation in Jeddah,
KSA on 07 September 2004;
c) [Bilbao] is of sufficient age and discretion, could read,
write, and understand English and a college graduate;
d) There is no proof that any material or physical force
was applied on her person or her family;
e) [Bilbao] then voluntarily executed an Undertaking
acknowledging receipt of various sums of money and
irrevocably and unconditionally releasing Saudia, its
directors, stockholders, officers and employees from any
claim or demand whatsoever in law or equity which they
may have in connection with her employment with
respondent;
f) [Bilbao] received generous financial benefits without
protest;
g) It took [Bilbao] at least one (1) year from the date of the
alleged dismissal to file her Complaint against [Saudia];
and
h) The intimidation, force or coercion allegedly employed
by [Saudia] surfaced, for the first time, when the
Complaint were (sic) filed on 20 July 2005, which was
then amended on 01 September 2005.15
Lastly, Saudia claims that Bilbao is not entitled to any award of
moral and exemplary damages since there is no dismissal, much
less illegal dismissal committed by Saudia, as Bilbao voluntarily
resigned from her employment.
This Court finds no merit in the petition.
At the outset, it bears stressing that the jurisdiction of this Court in
a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as
amended, is generally confined only to errors of law. It does not
extend to questions of fact. This rule, however, admits of
exceptions, such as in the instant case, where the findings of fact
and the conclusions of the Labor Arbiter are inconsistent with
those of the NLRC and the Court of Appeals.16 To recall, the
Labor Arbiter found that Saudia illegally dismissed Bilbao, while
the NLRC and the Court of Appeals are in agreement that Bilbao
voluntarily tendered her resignation.
After a review of the case, we uphold the findings of the Court of
Appeals that Bilbao voluntarily resigned from her employment
with Saudia. Her resignation letter and undertaking that
evidenced her receipt of separation pay, when taken together
with her educational attainment and the circumstances
surrounding the filing of the complaint for illegal dismissal,
comprise substantial proof of Bilbao’s voluntary resignation.
Resignation is the voluntary act of an employee who is in a
situation where one believes that personal reasons cannot be
sacrificed in favor of the exigency of the service, and one has no
other choice but to dissociate oneself from employment. It is a
formal pronouncement or relinquishment of an office, with the
intention of relinquishing the office accompanied by the act of
relinquishment. As the intent to relinquish must concur with the
overt act of relinquishment, the acts of the employee before and
after the alleged resignation must be considered in determining
whether he or she, in fact, intended to sever his or her
employment.17
In the instant case, Bilbao tendered her resignation letter a week
after her transfer to the Jeddah office. In the said letter, Bilbao
expressed her gratitude for the support which Saudia had given
her for her eighteen years of service. Clearly, her use of words of
appreciation and gratitude negates the notion that she was forced
and coerced to resign. Besides, the resignation letter was hand-
written by Bilbao on a Saudia form and was in English, a
language she is conversant in.
Additionally, instead of immediately filing a complaint for illegal
dismissal after she was allegedly forced to resign, Bilbao
executed an Undertaking in favor of Saudia, wherein she
declared that she received her full and complete end-of-service
award with final settlement, to wit:
I, the undersigned employee
Name/ MARIA JOY TERESA O. BILBAO
PRN/ 3006078
hereby declare that I have received my full and complete end-of-
service award with final settlement and have no further claims
whatsoever against Saudi Arabian Airlines.
By signing this undertaking, I also fully Understand that any other
future claims filed by me shall not be considered, accepted, or
entertained.
Name: MARIA JOY TERESA O. BILBAO
PRN: 3006078
Signature: (SGD.)
Date: October 25, 200418
What is more, Bilbao waited for more than 10 months after her
separation from Saudia to file a complaint for illegal dismissal.
Despite the foregoing circumstances, Bilbao maintains that she
was forced and coerced into writing the said resignation letter in
the form prepared by Saudia, and that she was left with no other
option but to resign. Saudia, on the other hand, claims that
Bilbao’s resignation was voluntary, thus, there could be no illegal
dismissal.
Even assuming that Saudia prepared the form in which Bilbao
wrote her resignation letter as claimed, this Court is not
convinced that she was coerced and intimidated into signing it.
Bilbao is no ordinary employee who may not be able to
completely comprehend and realize the consequences of her
acts. She is an educated individual. It is highly improbable that
with her long years in the profession and her educational
attainment, she could be tricked and forced into doing something
she does not intend to do. Under these circumstances, it can
hardly be said that Bilbao was coerced into resigning from
Saudia.
Besides, Bilbao did not adduce any competent evidence to prove
that she was forced or threatened by Saudia. It must be
remembered that for intimidation to vitiate consent, the following
requisites must be present: (1) that the intimidation caused the
consent to be given; (2) that the threatened act be unjust or
unlawful; (3) that the threat be real or serious, there being evident
disproportion between the evil and the resistance which all men
can offer, leading to the choice of doing the act which is forced on
the person to do as the lesser evil; and (4) that it produces a well-
grounded fear from the fact that the person from whom it comes
has the necessary means or ability to inflict the threatened injury
to his person or property.19 In the instant case, Bilbao did not
prove the existence of any one of these essential elements. Bare
and self-serving allegations of coercion or intimidation,
unsubstantiated by evidence, do not constitute proof to
sufficiently support a finding of forced resignation. It would be
utterly unfair and unjust to hold that Saudia illegally dismissed
Bilbao and to impose upon it the burden of accepting back Bilbao
who unequivocally and voluntarily manifested her intent and
willingness to sever her employment ties.
Anent the Undertaking signed by Bilbao, this Court is of the
opinion that the same was validly and voluntarily executed.
Indeed, not all waivers and quitclaims are invalid as against
public policy. There are legitimate waivers and quitclaims that
represent a voluntary and reasonable settlement of workers’
claims which should be respected by the courts as the law
between the parties.20 And if such agreement was voluntarily
entered into and represented a reasonable settlement, it is
binding on the parties and should not later be disowned.
Periquet v. National Labor Relations Commission,21 held that:
Not all waivers and quitclaims are invalid as against public policy.
If the agreement was voluntarily entered into and represents a
reasonable settlement, it is binding on the parties and may not
later be disowned simply because of a change of mind. It is only
where there is clear proof that the waiver was wangled from an
unsuspecting or gullible person, or the terms of settlement are
unconscionable on its face, that the law will step in to annul the
questionable transaction. But where it is shown that the person
making the waiver did so voluntarily, with full understanding of
what he was doing, and the consideration for the quitclaim is
credible and reasonable, the transaction must be recognized as a
valid and binding undertaking. x x x.22
This Court quotes with approval the finding of the NLRC, to wit:
Having signed the waiver, it is hard to conclude that [Bilbao was]
merely forced by the necessity to execute the "undertaking."
[Bilbao is] not [a] gullible nor unsuspecting [person] who can
easily be tricked or inveigled and, thus, need the extra protection
of law. [She is a] well-educated and highly experienced flight
[attendant]. The "undertaking" executed by [Bilbao is] therefore
considered valid and binding on [her] and [Saudia].
Due to [her] voluntary resignation, [Bilbao is] actually not entitled
to any separation pay benefits. Thus, the financial package given
to [her] is more than sufficient consideration for [her] execution of
the "undertaking."23
Clearly then, Bilbao’s claim that she was illegally dismissed
cannot be sustained. There is no showing that the Undertaking
and resignation letter were executed by Bilbao under force or
intimidation. Bilbao’s claims for reinstatement, payment of
backwages without loss of seniority rights and with interest, moral
and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees must inevitably fail.
This Court has always reminded that:
Although the Supreme Court has, more often than not, been
inclined towards the workers and has upheld their cause in their
conflicts with the employers, such inclination has not blinded it to
the rule that justice is in every case for the deserving, to be
dispensed in the light of the established facts and applicable law
and doctrine. An employee who resigns and executes a quitclaim
in favor of the employer is generally stopped from filing any
further money claims against the employer arising from the
employment.24
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated May
30, 2008 and the Resolution dated July 22, 2008 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 102319 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 112965 January 30, 1997
PHILIPPINES TODAY, INC., BETTY GO-BELMONTE, MAXIMO
V. SOLIVEN, ARTURO A. BORJAL, and ISAAC G.
BELMONTE, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and FELIX R.
ALEGRE, JR., respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
May a "Memorandum for File" which did not mention the words
"resign" and/or "resignation" nonetheless juridically constitute
voluntary resignation? In answering this question, the Court took
into account not merely the literal meaning of the words and
phrases used but, more importantly, the peculiar circumstances
attendant to its writing as well as antecedent, contemporaneous
and subsequent actions, which were inconsistent with the desire
for continued employment of the writer, an intelligent executive
occupying a position of trust in the Philippine Star and gifted with
an unusual writing ability.
These circumstances and actions are explained by this Court in
re-solving this petition for certiorari assailing the Decision 1 of the
National Labor Relations Commission (Second Division) 2 in NLRC
NCR CA 001863-91 entitled "Felix R. Alegre, Jr. vs. Philippines
Today, Inc." promulgated on September 30, 1993, which reversed
the decision of Labor Arbiter Pablo C. Espiritu, Jr., dated May 15,
1991. In a Resolution dated November 16, 1993, petitioners' motion
for reconsideration was denied. 3
The Facts
The undisputed facts are as follows: Petitioner Philippines Today,
Inc. (PTI) is the owner of the Philippine Star, a daily newspaper of
national and international circulation, while the individual
petitioners are officers and members of the board of directors of
PTI, namely, Betty Go-Belmonte, chairman of the board; Arturo A.
Borjal, president; Maximo V. Soliven, publisher and chairman,
editorial board; and Isaac G. Belmonte, treasurer. Private
Respondent Felix R. Alegre, Jr. was employed by PTI in July
1986 as a senior investigative reporter of the Philippine Star with
a monthly salary of eight thousand pesos (P8,000.00). He later
became chief investigative writer and then assistant to the
publisher. His monthly compensation was correspondingly
increased to ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00).
On October 20, 1988, Respondent Alegre filed a request for a
thirty-day leave of absence effective on the same date, citing the
advice of his personal physician for him to undergo further
medical consultations abroad. 4 Four days later, on October 24,
1988, he wrote a "Memorandum for File" 5 addressed to Petitioner
Betty Go-Belmonte with copies furnished to members of the board of
directors of PTI, the text of which is reproduced below:
MEMORANDUM FOR FILE.
FOR: BETTY GO-BELMONTE
Chairman & CEO, The STAR Group of
Publications.
FROM: FELIX R. ALEGRE, JR.
DATE: 24 October 1988
SUBJECT: HAVING IT ALL
Truth like medicine hurts. But it cures.
The nice little chat we had last Thursday was
most revealing. And certainly disconcerting.
What you had to tell me pained me, of course. But
it has helped me just as much. It enabled me to
see things clearly in their right perspectives. More
importantly, it provided me with the answers to the
questions that had long nagged me in my wakeful
state.
For quite a time, I got this sinking feeling of being
treated like a pariah of sorts by most of the senior
executives around here. The frustration at my
inability to put a finger at such a feeling somehow
enhanced the angst within me. Until our chat. Now
all the demons of my anxiety have been
exorcised. And I am left alone to lick the wounds
of my betrayal. It isn't easy, I know. But I shall pull
through. Your candor and demonstrated faith in
my person have been most assuaging. And for
that alone, I am most grateful.
It has never occurred to me that, in my
acceptance of the invitation from no less than the
publisher himself, to join him at the Philippines
Today, Inc., and the STAR Group of Publications,
I was unwittingly signing my own death warrant as
well. The insults he had later on hurled at my
person, the malicious innuendoes he had spread
around, casting doubts on my personal and
professional integrity, had mercilessly torn at my
soul, causing metaphysical death.
My credentials as a working journalist, I'd like to
believe, got me this job at the STAR in the first
place. And my bylines in the series of articles in
the STAR From Day One of my official affiliation
with the Company, should establish that fact.
I was an investigative reporter at the Manila Times
when the publisher offered me to work with him at
the STAR in 1986.
I was given the assignment as senior investigative
reporter, then chief investigative writer, until I was
given a fancy title of assistant to the publisher.
As a corporate guy assisting the publisher in his
day-to-day official function — and this is where I
feel very strongly about citing some specifics of
the things I did in this area, to wit:
. . . (omitted are said "specifics" of Respondent
Alegre's accomplishments as assistant to the
publisher deemed by this Court as not relevant to
the appreciation of this memorandum in relation to
the consideration of the petition.)
As can be gleaned from this recital of some of the
"things done" (despite my distaste for trumpeting
one's deeds, but has to be said, to set the record
straight, in this instance), one can see that I
obviously don different hats at any one time, doing
administration and operations functions, apart
from my journalistic duties. That I work as a
teamplayer, and trying hard to be good (sic) it,
cannot be denied.
FOR DOING ALL THESE in the best spirit of ly,
corporate team-upmanship, what did I get in
RETURN? copy furnished:

1. A pittance, salary/compensation-wise. Members of the

Board, Phils.
2. Being conveniently bypassed in promotions, Today, Inc.
pay hikes, and other perks. Dr. Ronaldo G.
Asuncion
3. Hindered from active participation in corporate Mr. Antonio Roces
affairs, by shooting at my ideas that otherwise
would have been workable and profitable for the On December 6, 1988, Respondent Alegre received from
Company and its people (CF. Item 2 of my memo Petitioner Belmonte a letter, 6 as follows:
dtd 06 September 88 which had you interested in
and supportive of). MR. FELIX ALEGRE

4. Personally and professionally maligned, and Dear Jun,

accused of being an NPA (non-performing
asshole, pardon my French).
By and large, all that I got are the twin demons of
a civilized, unconscionable society: ECONOMIC
INJUSTICE and PROFESSIONAL SABOTAGE.
During our board meeting yesterday, we
discussed your letter dated October 24, 1988, and
the Board decided to accept your resignation and
that it would take effect on November 22, 1988
upon expiration of your one-month leave.

When push comes to a shove . . . . . anything or I would like to take this opportunity to say that we
everything comes crashing down. I'M HAVING IT were happy to have had you with the STAR Group
ALL! of Publications and that we would like to wish you
the best of luck.
Since I am on leave, I guess I won't be able to see
you for a while. I wish to take this opportunity to God bless. Thank you.
express my profound appreciation and sincere
thanks for your genuine concren (sic) and honest
initiatives to do a good turn on my behalf. You
have been most candid and forthright with me. I
can't be any less.

Thank you for everything. God bless.

The following day, Respondent Alegre wrote Petitioner Belmonte
expressing surprise over the acceptance of his "resignation" as
stated in the above-quoted letter. His letter 7 partly stated:
It certainly beats me to be told that my
"'resignation" has been accepted, when in truth
and in fact, no such move, however implicit it may
be, and no such letter has ever been made from
my end.
xxx xxx xxx
I am writing this letter not, certainly, to make any
appeal, but simply to go on record that I did not
resign. I filed a leave of absence. Yes. And that
was dully (sic) approved. Then I sent you
a memorandum for file expressing my sentiments
on certain things, candid statements that came to
be (sic) expressed inspired by your candor and
sincerity in our last little chat. Now, if you read that
memo to meanresignation, that is your
responsibility. And I am not just about to contest it.
...
This was followed by another letter on January 2, 1989, wherein
Alegre, through counsel, 8 reiterated that he never resigned. He
accused petitioners of illegal dismissal as can be perceived allegedly
from the discrimination against him in promotions, benefits and the
ploy to oust him by considering his memorandum as a resignation.
He claimed that as a result, he suffered mental anguish, social
humiliation, besmirched reputation and moral shock. He thus
demanded indemnification for "the material and moral losses he has
incurred". He further wrote that he was not insisting to be taken back
after being shown that he was no longer wanted in the company.
Counsel 9 for petitioners, in a reply on January 19, 1989, explained
that the acceptance of Alegre's resignation was a collective decision
of the board of directors since "nobody in his right mind would write a
memorandum of the sort he wrote and still not resign. To them, the
memorandum was tantamount to a resignation even if Mr. Alegre did
not say so in so much words." With respect to his claim for damages,
petitioners' counsel said, "he has not shown any specific fact or
circumstance that would justify his claim, even remotely." Hence,
"the Star cannot accede to the same."
On May 17, 1989, Respondent Alegre filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal and damages against herein petitioners.10 The labor
arbiter dismissed said complaint in his decision of May 15, 1991. We
quote significant portions of said decision:
This office has minutely disected (sic) the letter
and while it be said that nothing therein mentions
about resigning from his position as Assistant to
the Publisher, a perusal of the letter as a whole
shows that the intention of the complainant was to
resign from his post. The subject as — "Having it
all" together with his frustrations and
disappointment in the office coupled with his
statement that "when push comes to a shove,
everything comes crushing (sic) down" and that:
he is "having it all" and with his concluding
sentence of "Thank you for everything" are (sic)
clear indications that he was in fact resigning.
As a journalist and a writer, complainant need not
write his letter of resignation in black and white.
He can do so in many other ways, words and
actions to show his real intention of leaving his
job.
xxx xxx xxx
Complainant's subsequent overt acts particularly
his failure to report to his job after the expiration of
his leave of absence, his being gainfully employed
with the Office of Senator Laurel (as Chief of
 Staff) and his act of clearing and removing his reinstatement, moral and exemplary damages and attorney's
personal files, things and belongings from his fees. 12
desk prior to his (complainant) knowledge or
receipt of the letter accepting his resignation(,) Issues
clearly indicates that complainant was not
terminated from his job but rather he resigned Petitioners argue that the NLRC committed grave abuse of
from his job. . . discretion:

xxx xxx xxx 1. in finding them guilty of illegally dismissing Respondent Alegre;

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is 2. in awarding Respondent Alegre moral and exemplary damages
hereby rendered dismissing the complaint for and attorney's fees without any actual and legal basis; and,
illegal dismissal and damages for lack of merit,
and ordering respondent, Philippines Today, Inc.,
3. even assuming that Respondent Alegre was illegally
to pay complainant the amount of THIRTY
dismissed, in contravening and disregarding this Court's ruling
THOUSAND (P30,000.00) PESOS by way of
in Alex Ferrer, et al. vs. NLRC (Second Division) 13 by erroneously
separation pay in the interest of compassionate computing backwages, as it did not deduct the amounts earned by
labor justice and; dismissing Respondents (sic) Respondent Alegre while he was admittedly employed in the office of
counterclaim for damages for lack of Senator Sotero H. Laurel.
merit. 11
The pivotal question is whether the Memorandum for File of
On appeal by Alegre, the above decision was set aside by the Respondent Alegre addressed to Petitioner Belmonte constitutes
NLRC. Adopting the definition in Black's Law Dictionary (5th a letter of resignation.
Edition) of resignation as a "formal renouncement or
relinquishment of an office," it held that herein Respondent Alegre
In construing it so, petitioners advance these arguments: (1)
did not resign as there was no actual act of relinquishment to
Respondent Alegre had spoken openly to Petitioner Belmonte of
constitute complete and operative resignation. According to the
his desire to leave the Philippine Star; (2) the contents of his
NLRC, the request for a leave of absence by Respondent Alegre
memorandum indicate an intention on his part not to return to his
meant that he intended to return after the period of his absence.
job even if he did not categorically mention resignation; (3) he
Such intent was bolstered by his filing of a request for an
never returned to work after his authorized leave expired and
extension of his leave. Further, when he received the letter of
even cleared his desk of his personal belongings; and, (4) he
Petitioner Belmonte dated November 9, 1988 informing him of the
obtained employment as chief of staff of the office of Senator
acceptance by the Board of his resignation, he immediately wrote
Sotero Laurel for which he was paid a higher salary. Having been
a letter to Petitioner Belmonte, expressing in no uncertain terms
led to believe that Alegre wanted to resign and in honestly
that he did not resign. These circumstances led the NLRC to hold
perceiving his memorandum as a resignation letter, petitioners
that Respondent Alegre was constructively dismissed without just
cannot be held liable for moral and exemplary damages because
cause and to order petitioners to pay him full backwages for three
they believe their action was in accordance with law. Lastly,
years from the time of dismissal, separation pay in lieu of
petitioners contend that, even assuming they were liable for
illegal dismissal, the NLRC, in granting backwages, should have
deducted the amount earned by Alegre from his subsequent
employment.
Private respondent, on the other hand, maintains that he had no
intention of resigning from PTI. He insists that: (1) in writing the
memorandum, he was merely lamenting the work environment at
PTI and apprising Petitioner Belmonte of the situation; (2) a
resignation should be unequivocal in nature; (3) his non-return to
work after his original leave expired is explained by his
subsequent request for an extension thereof due to medical
reasons; (4) and the letter of Petitioner Belmonte obviated any
desire for him to return to his work since petitioners practically
terminated his employment. He further contends that petitioners'
tenacious resistance in admitting their mistake bespeaks of bad
faith and shows their real intention to end his services, which
entitles him to moral and exemplary damages. In representation
of public respondent, the Solicitor General supported private
respondent's position.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
Pivotal Issue: Did the Memorandum for File Constitute
Voluntary Resignation?
After a thorough scrutiny of the Memorandum for File of
Respondent Alegre and a careful deliberation on the peculiar
circumstances attendant to its writing and the antecedent,
contemporaneous and subsequent actions of private respondent,
we hold that said memorandum juridically constituted a letter of
resignation.
We see merit in the findings and conclusions drawn by the labor
arbiter. They are more in accord with prudence, common sense
and sound judgment. The labor arbiter correctly deduced from
Alegre's memorandum and attendant actuations that he resigned.
In contrast, the NLRC was too strict in its interpretation of what
constitutes "resignation." It adhered literally to the dictionary
meaning of the word without relating it to the peculiarity of the
factual circumstances surrounding the case. Courts and quasi-
judicial bodies, in the exercise of their functions and in making
decisions, must not be too dogmatic as to restrict themselves to
literal interpretations of words, phrases and sentences. A
complete and wholistic view must be taken in order to render a
just and equitable judgment.
Incendiary words and sarcastic remarks negate alleged
desire to improve relations
Alegre's choice of words and way of expression betray his
allegation that the memorandum was simply an "opportunity to
open the eyes of (Petitioner) Belmonte to the work environment in
petitioners' newspaper with the end in view of persuading (her) to
take a hand at improving said environment." Apprising his
employer (or top-level management) of his frustrations in his job
and differences with his immediate superior is certainly not done
in an abrasive, offensive and disrespectful manner. A cordial or,
at the very least, civil attitude, according due deference to one's
superiors, is still observed, especially among high-ranking
management officers. The Court takes judicial notice of the
Filipino values of pakikisama and paggalang which are not only
prevalent among members of a family and community but within
organizations as well, including work sites. An employee is
expected to extend due respect to management, the employer
being the "proverbial hen that lays the golden egg," 14 so to speak.
An aggrieved employee who wants to unburden himself of his
disappointments and frustrations in his job or relations with his
immediate superior would normally approach said superior directly or
otherwise ask some other officer possibly to mediate and discuss the
problem with the end in view of settling their differences without
causing ferocious conflicts. No matter how the employee dislikes his
employer professionally, and even if he is in a confrontational
disposition, he cannot afford to be disrespectful and dare to talk with
an unguarded tongue and/or with a bileful pen. Here, respondent
Alegre was anything but respectful and polite. His memorandum is
too affrontive, combative and confrontational. It certainly causes
resentment, even when read by an objective reader. His incendiary
words and sarcastic remarks, to quote some:
For quite a time, I got this sinking feeling of being
treated like a pariah of sorts by most of the senior
executives around here. The frustration at my
inability to put a finger at such a feeling somehow
enhanced the angst within me. . . . Now all the
demons of my anxiety have been exorcised. And I
am left alone to lick the wounds of my betrayal. . .
. Respondent Alegre a well-educated journalist
It has never occurred to me that, in my
acceptance of the invitation from no less than the
publisher himself, to join him . . . , I was
unwittingly signing my own death warrant as well.
The insults he had later on hurled at my person,
the malicious innuendoes he had spread around,
casting doubts on my personal and professional
integrity, had mercilessly torn at my soul, causing
metaphysical death.
negate any desire to improve work relations with
Petitioner Soliven and other PTI executives. Such strongly
worded letter constituted an act of "burning his bridges"
with the officers of the company.
Seeking relief incompatible with writing offensive letter
Any management officer, much so an immediate superior, would
be offended, if not enraged, with the insults and innuendoes
stated in said memorandum; more so because the memorandum
was not directly addressed to him but to the chairman and CEO
and copy furnished all other officers and members of the board of
directors. Any discerning mind can perceive that the letter is not
simply a recitation of respondent Alegre's gripes,
disappointments, frustrations and heartaches against the
company and its officers particularly Petitioner Soliven, as
postulated by the Solicitor General in his comment. 15 If it were so,
why was it not addressed directly to the person concerned? His
memorandum clearly indicated that his problems involved, or were
supposedly caused by only one person, Mr. Soliven, his immediate
superior. But it was not even addressed to him! How can he expect
amends in their relations if that was all he wanted? The Solicitor
General was simply turning a blind eye to the obvious fact that said
memorandum, for all intents and purposes, was intended, wittingly or
unwittingly, to end employment relations.
It should not escape our attention that respondent Alegre is a
professional journalist and persuasive writer. On top of that, he
was a law graduate. He must have known the drilling effect of his
bitter and sarcastic remarks upon the petitioners and must have
intended the same. Ordinary words are to be construed in their
ordinary meaning. Common sense dictates that Alegre meant to
resign when he wrote the memorandum. Otherwise, he should
have used a more tempered language and a less confrontational
tone. Moreover, he held a position of evident responsibility
requiring the utmost confidence of his immediate superior. As
assistant to the publisher doing, in his very own words,
"administration and operations functions, apart from (my)
journalistic duties," it is apparent that Alegre was not employed
simply for his writing skills. Top management certainly reposed
full trust and confidence in him and placed him in a position of
considerable management influence.
PTI officers of uncommon intelligence and perception
Furthermore, his memorandum was addressed to the chairman
and chief executive officer of PTI and furnished all members of
the board of directors. These officers which include the likes of
the late Betty Go-Belmonte, Maximo V. Soliven and Arturo A.
Borjal, long-time and well-respected journalists acclaimed locally
and internationally, are themselves people of uncommon
perception and intellect. They will not miscomprehend the
meaning and intent of Alegre's memorandum, which was not by
any means a simple way of seeking relief but well a way to get
out of the company. What else could he have meant with these
concluding remarks:
By and large, all that I got are the twin demons of
a civilized, unconscionable society: ECONOMIC
INJUSTICE and PROFESSIONAL SABOTAGE.
When push comes to a shove . . . . . anything or
everything comes crashing down. I'M HAVING IT
ALL!
Respondent Alegre, being a journalist himself and having worked
with them for sometime, knew how his letter would be perceived
and received. Besides, as discussed earlier, Alegre is likewise a
well-educated man of more than average intelligence. The
conclusion is inevitable that he had more than enough sense to
anticipate the consequences and effects of his words and actions.
Indeed, what a man sows, he reaps.
Trust and confidence breached
In addition, respondent Alegre is a highly confidential employee
who holds his job at the pleasure of his employer or, stated
otherwise, for as long as he enjoys the trust and confidence of his
employer. Corollarily, he likewise must repose trust and
confidence in his employer or, at the very least, his immediate
superior. But any superior hurled with invectives from a
confidential employee, much more one occupying a managerial
position at the same time, will definitely lose trust and confidence
in the latter. And there can be no way to interpret such letter other
than as a withering of trust and confidence by the employee in his
boss. The use of offensive language can only mean expression of
disloyalty and disrespect. It renders the writer unworthy of the
trust and confidence demanded by his position. It is beyond
human nature to expect two persons with underlying mistrust in
each other to continue to work together effectively, not to say,
harmoniously.
Antecedent, Contemporaneous and Subsequent Actions
Affirming Resignation
In addition to his memorandum and the circumstances attendant
thereto which were just discussed, the Court notes some peculiar
actions confirming Alegre's intention to terminate his employment
with the Star.
(1) Medical reasons for leave of absence not proved
First, he claims that his leave of absence was due to medical
reasons, for which he was supposed to seek relief abroad.
However, the Court scoured the records but found nothing to
show that he actually underwent any medical check-up. Much
less, medical examination abroad. Nothing really backs up such
claim except his bare statements which, evidentially, are at best
self-serving.
(2) Cleared desk of personal belongings
Second, respondent Alegre cleared his desk of his personal
belongings even before he knew of the acceptance of his
resignation. 16 Such act certainly bares his intent to leave his job.
Respondent Alegre has not refuted nor offered any sufficient
explanation for this action. We cannot but give due credit to the
petitioners' contention that such act was expressive of his intent to
resign.
(3) Did not report back to work
Third, respondent Alegre did not return to his job after his
authorized leave of absence expired in November 1988. Although
he sent another letter 17 requesting for an extension of his leave,
there is no showing on record that the same was approved by
petitioners. It is standard office procedure that applications for leave
of absence are subject to the approval of the employer. These are
not automatically granted upon filing. Except to cite in his request
"travel log (sic) coupled with advice of my physician," respondent
Alegre has nor proven the emergency nature of the cause/s of his
extended leave. Again, we cannot but give due credence to
petitioners' contention that this was another operative evidence of
Alegre's intent to resign.
His non-return to work, though, is not equivalent to abandonment
of work. For in the latter, it is necessary to prove "clear and
deliberate intent" coupled with unjustified absence and overt acts
unerringly pointing to the fact that the employee simply does not
want to work anymore. 18 In the case at bench, Alegre voluntarily
resigned through his memorandum albeit written in the guise of a
grievance letter. The law and jurisprudence on abandonment have
thus no application in the present case.
(4) Not deprived of chance to return to work
Fourth, if Respondent Alegre had really no intention to resign, he
could have reported back to work. His contention that he was
effectively deprived of any chance to return to his work because
of the acceptance of his purported resignation cannot be
sustained. He claims that he received the notice dated November
9, 1988 only on December 6, 1988. But this means that for about
two weeks after his leave expired, he had all chances to return to
his work. Yet he chose not to. The obvious reason is that he had
actually no intention of doing so.
(5) Alegre expressly manifested intention to resign
Prior to sending his memorandum, Respondent Alegre informed
Petitioner Belmonte of his intention to resign from the Philippine
Star. This is shown by the testimony (cross examination) of the
late Mrs. Belmonte before the labor arbiter on January 13, 1990,
as follows:.
ATTY. BORRETA:
And you took that action, meaning the Board acted on this Memo
for File which you considered as his letter of resignation without
consulting or talking with the complainant first?
WITNESS:
The complainant had also applied for leave of absence and he
talked with me that he was leaving for the United States. Actually
I remember he requested a conversation but he did not specify
what the conversation was about, Your Honor. He was telling me
that he wanted to leave, has signed another job. And I told him
that that is not my prerogative and I am only Chairman of the
Board; and he came upon the recommendation of our Publisher
and he was at that time Assistant to the Publisher; that he should
talk to the Publisher first and I even advised him to patch up
whatever differences he might have. In that conversation, he said
something about leaving and he even said tome that when he
leaves, he would ask his two (2) sons who were working with us
to leave too. And I think I made a comment, and that must be
what he was referring to. I said; oh, but your sons are very
hardworking. In fact I said the Publisher, Max Soliven, told me
that "sana you were as good as your sons" maybe that was his
feeling. That is my way of trying to tell him that your sons are very
hardworking because he said when I leave I am going to ask
them to leave too. Maybe because of that he gave me the
impression that he wanted to leave.
ATTY. BORRETA:
And this happened before he wrote this memo for file on October
24, 1988?
WITNESS:
Yes, sir
ATTY. BORRETA:
And because of that you got the impression that he had the
intention to resign?
WITNESS:
Yes, sir. 19
(6) Assumed job in another office
Finally, the most telling of the actions undertaken by Respondent
Alegre which evidently demonstrate his intent to resign was his
immediate employment as chief of staff of the office of then
Senator Sotero H. Laurel, with a much higher compensation at
P14,600.00 per month plus P2,000.00 per month driver's
allowance. He admitted in his testimony before the labor arbiter
on November 6, 1989 that he was employed therein about a year
before (the date of his testimony) or sometime in November
1988. 20 The date coincided with the period of his leave of absence
or immediately thereafter. If he had no intention of resigning and was
on leave for medical reasons as he alleged, why then did he
commence a new job in another office at about the same period? His
assumption of a new job prior to receiving Mrs. Belmonte's letter on
December 6, 1988 is clearly inconsistent with any desire to remain in
employment with PTI. This is particularly evident because both jobs
required full-time work. Moreover, working in a newspaper which
prides in its independence from partisan activities is incompatible
with a concurrent political office held by respondent.
Side Issue: May a Resignation Be Unilaterally
Withdrawn?
Having established that Respondent Alegre resigned, we now
tackle the corollary issue of whether he can unilaterally withdraw
his resignation. We hold that he cannot do so.
The case of Intertrod Maritime, Inc. vs. NLRC 21 is in point. The
employee therein who was a ship engineer, while at Port Pylus,
Greece, requested for relief due to "personal reasons." The master of
the ship, who had authority to "sign off" an employee requesting
relief, approved his request but informed the employee that
repatriation expenses were for his account and that he had to give
thirty days notice in view of clause 5 of the employment contract.
When the vessel was at Port Said, Egypt four days later, the master
"signed him off" and paid him in cash all amounts due him less
repatriation expenses. On his return to the Philippines, the employee
filed a complaint charging his employer with breach of employment
contract and violation of the National Seamen Board rules and
regulations. He claimed that his request for relief was only for the
sole purpose of enabling him to take care of a fellow member of the
crew who was hospitalized in Greece. Hence, after he was
disallowed from disembarking thereat, the reason no longer existed
and, consequently, he was illegally dismissed when he was forced to
"sign off" in Egypt even as he signified his intention of continuing his
work.
The Court ruled against the employee. It held that resignations,
once accepted, may not be withdrawn without the consent of the
employer. If the employer accepts the withdrawal, the employee
retains his job. If the employer does not, the employee cannot
claim illegal dismissal. To say that an employee who has
resigned is illegally dismissed, is to encroach upon the right of
employers to hire persons who will be of service to them.
Obviously, this is a recognition of the contractual nature of
employment which requires mutuality of consent between the
parties. An employment contract is consensual and voluntary.
Hence, if the employee "finds himself in a situation where he
believes that personal reasons cannot be sacrificed in favor of the
exigency of the service, then he has no other choice but to
disassociate himself from his employment". 22 If accepted by the
employer, the consequent effect of resignation is severance of the
contract of employment.
A resigned employee who desires to take his job back has to re-
apply therefor, and he shall have the status of a stranger who
cannot unilaterally demand an appointment. He cannot arrogate
unto himself the same position which he earlier decided to leave.
To allow him to do so would be to deprive the employer of his
basic right to choose whom to employ. Such is tantamount to
undue oppression of the employer. It has been held that an
employer is free to regulate, according to his own discretion and
judgment, all aspects of employment including hiring. 23 The law,
in protecting the rights of the laborer, impels neither the oppression
nor self-destruction of the employer. 24
Consistent with our ruling in Intertrod, the resignation of
respondent Alegre after its acceptance by petitioners can no
longer be withdrawn without the consent of the latter. In fairness
to the employer, an employee cannot backtrack on his resignation
at his whim and without the conformity of the former.
The instant case is unlike Molave Tours Corporation
vs. NLRC 25 and People's Security, Inc. vs. NLRC 26 In Molave,
acting on reports that the employee was on several occasions found
drunk within work premises, the employer required him to explain in
writing said charges. Notwithstanding his explanation and request for
a confrontation with his accusers, the employee was made to sign a
resignation letter. Two months after, he filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal. The labor arbiter, affirmed by the NLRC, found that the
employee was merely forced and intimidated into resigning. The
Court reiterated that resignation must be voluntary on the part of the
employee. It thus ordered the employer to reinstate the employee
and award backwages and other benefits due him since there was
no effective resignation.
Likewise in People's Security, there was a finding of involuntary
resignation. The employees therein who were security guards
were not given assignments by their employer after the latter's
security services contract with Meralco expired. The employees
requested for loans to be deducted from their security bond
deposits, which requests were denied by the employer who
insisted that they must turn in their resignations first before their
security bond deposits could be released. Not having been given
new work assignments and being in dire financial need, the
employees submitted their resignation letters. Three months later,
they filed money claims which were later amended to include
illegal dismissal. The employer contended that the employees
voluntarily severed their employment because they turned in their
resignation letters and assumed jobs with another security
agency. Again, the Court held that resignation is a voluntary act
of the employee. When the employees were told that they would
not be granted loans unless they resigned, they had no choice
since they desperately needed money to meet their respective
families' needs. They were also forced to accept jobs at another
agency as a practical solution to their employment problems
which were caused by the employer's refusal and failure to
provide them with new assignments.
In the case of Indophil vs. NLRC, 27 on the other hand, the
employee voluntarily submitted a resignation letter but later tried to
retrieve the same. He contended though, that he was thereafter
prevented by the company guard from entering the work premises
because of his resignation. He sued for illegal dismissal. His
employer claimed abandonment of work since he was required to
report and to explain his unauthorized absences but did not. In
holding that there was no dismissal, the Court regarded the
employer's act of requiring the employee to report and explain his
unauthorized absences as non-acceptance of the previous
resignation of the employee. Thus, the employer still considered him
as its employee in spite of the filed resignation letter. With respect to
the latter's allegation that he was prevented by the company guard
from entering the premises, the Court chided him for not having
inquired into its veracity and for simply relying on the bare statement
of the guard. It said that the employee should be more vigilant of his
rights.
The above three cases are dissimilar to the case at bar. In the
first two cases, there were involuntary resignations while in the
third there was an unaccepted resignation. In the instant case,
however, the resignation was voluntary and it was accepted by
the employer. Thus, our grant of the petition.
Since we find no case of illegal dismissal, we will no longer pass
upon the two other issues raised by petitioners which are mere
consequences of the contrary finding made by the NLRC.
Necessarily, there can be no award of any moral or exemplary
damages, backwages and separation pay.
Epilogue
assumption of a higher paying job in a political office which was
incompatible with his work at the Star.
In deciding cases, this Court does not matter-of-factly apply and
interpret laws in a vacuum. General principles do not decide
specific cases. Rather, laws are interpreted always in the context
of the peculiar factual situation of each case. Each case has its
own flesh and blood and cannot be decided simply on the basis
of isolated clinical classroom principles. The circumstances of
time, place, event, person, and particularly attendant
circumstances and actions before, during and after the operative
fact should all be taken in their totality so that justice can be
rationally and fairly dispensed.

Both the Constitution and the Labor Code mandate a bias in favor WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED.
of labor. Hence, this Court , as a matter of judicial policy, leans The assailed Decision and Resolution of the NLRC are SET
backwards to protect labor and the working class against the ASIDE. The temporary restraining order issued by this Court is
machinations and incursions of their more financially entrenched made PERMANENT. No costs.
employers. In the present case, however, it is obvious to us that
private respondent's memorandum could not have been intended SO ORDERED.
merely to persuade management to improve the work
environment at the Philippine Star. Rather, it was evidently a
recitation of the facts and reasons why respondent Alegre could
no longer continue working under what he believed were
unbearable conditions in the work place. The offensive language
used by a well-educated man endowed with unusual writing skill
could not have been intended merely for the "suggestion box."
That it was addressed and given to persons of uncommon
perception themselves takes the letter out of ordinary employer-
employee communications. It is true that there was no direct
mention of the word "resignation." However, the incendiary words
employed denote a clear intent to end the writer's association of
trust and confidence with his superiors and employer. This intent
becomes even more manifest when viewed in light of attendant
acts of Alegre, particularly his prolonged leave of absence, his
clearing of his own desk of personal belongings, his failure to
report back to work after the expiration of his approved leave, his
verbal expression of his intent to resign, and most notably, his