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Facts

Petitioners challenged the Comelec’s Omnibus Resolution No. 3785 , which approved
the participation of 154 organizations and parties, including those herein impleaded, in
the 2001 party-list elections. Petitioners sought the disqualification of private
respondents, arguing mainly that the party-list system was intended to benefit the
marginalized and underrepresented; not the mainstream political parties, the non-
marginalized or overrepresented. Unsatisfied with the pace by which Comelec acted on
their petition, petitioners elevated the issue to the Supreme Court. 

Issue
Can political parties participate in the party list elections ?

ruling

ye they can participate

Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides that members of the House of


Representatives may be elected through a party-list system of
registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.

Furthermore, under Sections 7 and 8, Article IX (C) of the Constitution, political parties
may be registered under the party-list system.

Sec. 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or coalition shall be valid,
except for those registered under the party-list system as provided in this Constitution.

Sec. 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered under the party-list


system, shall not be represented in the voters' registration boards, boards of election
inspectors, boards of canvassers, or other similar bodies. However, they shall be
entitled to appoint poll watchers in accordance with law. 30cräläwvirtualibräry

In this case, political parties, even the major ones may participate the partylist election
and cannot be disqualified. Therefore the respondents are allowed to participate on the
said election.
ACTS:
Republic Act No. 9176 created an additional legislative district for the province of Camarines
Sur by reconfiguring the existing first and second legislative districts of the province. The said
law originated from House Bill No. 4264 and was signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo on 12 October 2009.
To that effect, the first and second districts of Camarines Sur were reconfigured in order to
create an additional legislative district for the province. Hence, the first district municipalities of
Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao, and San Fernando were combined with the second
district Municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a new second legislative district.
Petitioners claim that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716 violates the
constitutional standards that requires a minimum population of two hundred fifty thousand
( 250,000) for the creation of a legislative district. Thus, the proposed first district will end up
with a population of less than 250,000 or only 176,383.

Is the population of 250,000 an indispensable constitutional


requirement for the creation of a new legislative district in a
province?

Ruling

no, it is not an indispensable constitutional requirement.

The second sentence of  Section 5 (3), Article VI of the constitution states that: “ Each city with
a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one
representative.”
There is a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city to a district on one hand,
and the entitlement of a province to a district on the other. For a province is entitled to at least a
representative, there is nothing mentioned about the population. Meanwhile, a city must first
meet a population minimum of 250,000 in order to be similarly entitled.

It should be clearly read that Section 5(3) of the constitution requires a 250,000 minimum
population only for a city to be entitled to a representative, but not so for a province.

The provision draws a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city to a
district on one hand, and the entitlement of a province to a district on the other. For
while a province is entitled to at least a representative, with nothing mentioned about
population, a city must first meet a population minimum of 250,000 in order to be
similarly entitled.

The use by the subject provision of a comma to separate the phrase "each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand" from the phrase "or each province"
point to no other conclusion than that the 250,000 minimum population is only required
for a city, but not for a province. [

In this case To be clear about our judgment, we do not say that in the reapportionment
of the first and second legislative districts of Camarines Sur, the number of inhabitants
in the resulting additional district should not be considered. Our ruling is that population
is not the only factor but is just one of several other factors in the composition of the
additional district. Such settlement is in accord with both the text of the Constitution
and the spirit of the letter, so very clearly given form in the Constitutional debates on
the exact issue presented by this petition.

Issue:
Does the publication of the Rules of Procedures Governing Inquiries in Aid of
Legislation through the Senate’s website, satisfies the due process requirement of law?
Does the the Senate can be allowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned legislative
inquiry without duly published rules of procedure?

Held:

No, The Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned legislative inquiry
without duly published rules of procedure, in clear derogation of the constitutional requirement.

Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that "[t]he Senate or the House of
Representatives, or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure." The requisite of publication of the rules is
intended to satisfy the basic requirements of due process.42 Publication is indeed imperative, for it
will be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law or
rule of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one. 43 What constitutes
publication is set forth in Article 2 of the Civil Code, which provides that "[l]aws shall take effect after
15 days following the completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper
of general circulation in the Philippines."44

In this case The absence of any amendment to the rules cannot justify the Senate’s defiance of the
clear and unambiguous language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution. The organic law
instructs, without more, that the Senate or its committees may conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation only in accordance with duly published rules of procedure, and does not make any
distinction whether or not these rules have undergone amendments or revision. The constitutional
mandate to publish the said rules prevails over any custom, practice or tradition followed by the
Senate
REPRESENTATIVE TEDDY BRAWNER BAGUILAT, JR., REPRESENTATIVE EDCEL C.
LAGMAN, REPRESENTATIVE RAUL A. DAZA, REPRESENTATIVE EDGAR R. ERICE,
REPRESENTATIVE EMMANUEL A. BILLONES, REPRESENTATIVE TOMASITO S. VILLARIN,
and REPRESENTATIVE GARY C. ALEJANO, Petitioners
vs.
SPEAKER PANTALEON D. ALVAREZ, MAJORITY LEADER RODOLFO C. FARINAS, and
REPRESENTATIVE DANILO E. SUAREZ, Respondents

Facts

The petition alleges that prior to the opening of the 17th Congress on July 25, 2016, several news
articles surfaced about Rep. Suarez's announcement that he sought the adoption or anointment of
President Rodrigo Roa Duterte's Administration as the "Minority Leader" to lead a "cooperative
minority" in the House of Representatives (or the House), and even purportedly encamped himself in
Davao shortly after the May 2016 Elections to get the endorsement of President Duterte and the
majority partisans. The petition further claims that to ensure Rep. Suarez's election as the Minority
Leader, the supermajority coalition in the House allegedly "lent" Rep. Suarez some of its members to
feign membership in the Minority, and thereafter, vote for him as the Minority Leader

Under this provision, the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall be elected by a majority
vote of its entire membership. Said provision also states that the House of Representatives may
decide to have officers other than the Speaker, and that the method and manner as to how these
officers are chosen is something within its sole control.  In the case of Defensor-Santiago v.
23

Guingona,  which involved a dispute on the rightful Senate Minority Leader during the 11th
24

Congress (1998-2001), this Court observed that "[w]hile the Constitution is explicit on the manner of
electing x x x [a Speaker of the House of Representative,] it is, however, dead silent on the manner
of selecting the other officers [of the Lower House]. All that the Charter says is that ' [e]ach House
shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary.' [As such], the method of choosing who
will be such other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the
aforequoted constitutional provision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the [House of
Representatives] itself, not by [the] Cour
Arroyo vs. De Venecia G.R. No. 127255, August 14, 1997

A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240, which amends certain
provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code. Petitioners, who are members
of the House of Representatives, charged that there is violation of the rules of
the House which petitioners claim are constitutionally-mandated so that their
violation is tantamount to a violation of the Constitution.

The law originated in the House of Representatives. The Senate approved it with
certain amendments. A bicameral conference committee was formed to
reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate versions of the
bill. The bicameral committee submitted its report to the House. During the
interpellations, Rep. Arroyo made an interruption and moved to adjourn for lack
of quorum. But after a roll call, the Chair declared the presence of a quorum.
The interpellation then proceeded. After Rep. Arroyo’s interpellation of the
sponsor of the committee report, Majority Leader Albano moved for the
approval and ratification of the conference committee report. The Chair called
out for objections to the motion. Then the Chair declared: “There being none,
approved.” At the same time the Chair was saying this, Rep. Arroyo was asking,
“What is that…Mr. Speaker?” The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking
simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the
Majority Leader’s motion, the approval of the conference committee report had
by then already been declared by the Chair.

On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the President of the Senate and certified by the respective
secretaries of both Houses of Congress. The enrolled bill was signed into law by
President Ramos.

Issue

Only the proceedings of the House of Representatives on the conference committee report on H.
No. 7198 are in question. Petitioners' principal argument is that R.A. No. 8240 is null and void
because it was passed in violation of the rules of the House; that these rules embody the
"constitutional mandate" in Art. VI, §16(3) that "each House may determine the rules of its
proceedings" and that, consequently, violation of the House rules is a violation of the Constitution
itself. They contend that the certification of Speaker De Venecia that the law was properly passed is
false and spurious.

 the due enactment of the law in question is confirmed by the Journal of the House of November 21,
1996 which shows that the conference committee report on H. No. 7198, which became R.A. No.
8740, was approved on that day. The keeping of the Journal is required by the Constitution, Art. VI,
§16(4) provides:

Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish the same,
excepting such parts as may, in its judgment, affect national security; and
the yeas and nays on any question shall, at the request of one-fifth of the Members present,
be entered in the Journal.

Each House shall also keep a Record of its proceedings.

The Journal is regarded as conclusive with respect to matters that are required by the Constitution to
be recorded therein.   With respect to other matters, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the
46

Journals have also been accorded conclusive effect. Thus, in United States v. Pons,   this Court
47

spoke of the imperatives of public policy for regarding the Journals as "public memorials of the most
permanent character," thus: "They should be public, because all are required to conform to them;
they should be permanent, that rights acquired today upon the faith of what has been declared to be
law shall not be destroyed tomorrow, or at some remote period of time, by facts resting only in the
memory of individuals." As already noted, the bill which became R.A. No. 8240 is shown in the
Journal. Hence its due enactment has been duly proven.

It would be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department for this Court either
to set aside a legislative action as void because the Court thinks the House has disregarded its own
rules of procedure, or to allow those defeated in the political arena to seek a rematch in the judicial
forum when petitioners can find their remedy in that department itself. The Court has not been
invested with a roving commission to inquire into complaints, real or imagined, of legislative
skullduggery. It would be acting in excess of its power and would itself be guilty of grave abuse of its
discretion were it to do so. The suggestion made in a case   may instead appropriately be made
48

here: petitioners can seek the enactment of a new law or the repeal or amendment of R.A. No. 8240.
In the absence of anything to the contrary, the Court must assume that Congress or any House
thereof acted in the good faith belief that its conduct was permitted by its rules, and deference rather
than disrespect is due the judgment of that body. 

Abayan case

ISSUE: Does respondent HRET have jurisdiction over the question of


qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan as nominees of
Aangat Tayo and Bantay party-list organizations, respectively, who
took the seats at the House of Representatives that such organizations
won in the 2007 elections?
HELD: HRET has jurisdiction. As this Court also held in Bantay Republic
Act or BA-RA 7941 v. Commission on Elections, a party-list representative is in
every sense "an elected member of the House of Representatives." Although the
vote cast in a party-list election is a vote for a party, such vote, in the end, would
be a vote for its nominees, who, in appropriate cases, would eventually sit in the
House of Representatives. What is inevitable is that Section 17, Article VI of the
Constitution provides that the HRET shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to, among other things, the qualifications of the members of the House of
Representatives. Since, as pointed out above, party-list nominees are "elected
members" of the House of Representatives no less than the district
representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their
qualifications. By analogy with the cases of district representatives, once the
party or organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the
nominee has taken his oath and assumed office as member of the House of
Representatives, the COMELEC's jurisdiction over election contests relating to
his qualifications ends and the HRET's own jurisdiction begins.

Hence, respondent HRET did not gravely abuse its discretion when it dismissed
the petitions for quo warranto against Aangat Tayo party-list and Bantay party-
list but upheld its jurisdiction over the question of the qualifications of
petitioners Abayon and Palparan.
GARCILLANO vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, et.al G.R. No. 170338
December 23, 2008

Facts:

Tapes ostensibly containing a wiretapped conversation purportedly between the


President of the Philippines and a high-ranking official of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) surfaced. The tapes, notoriously referred to as the "Hello Garci" tapes,
allegedly contained the President’s instructions to COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio
Garcillano to manipulate in her favor results of the 2004 presidential elections. These
recordings were to become the subject of heated legislative hearings conducted
separately by committees of both Houses of Congress.

Intervenor Sagge alleges violation of his right to due process considering that he is
summoned to attend the Senate hearings without being apprised not only of his rights
therein through the publication of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in
Aid of Legislation, but also of the intended legislation which underpins the investigation.
He further intervenes as a taxpayer bewailing the useless and wasteful expenditure of
public funds involved in the conduct of the questioned hearings.

The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit in their pleadings and even on oral
argument that the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation
had been published in newspapers of general circulation only in 1995 and in 2006. With
respect to the present Senate of the 14th Congress, however, of which the term of half
of its members commenced on June 30, 2007, no effort was undertaken for the
publication of these rules when they first opened their session.

Respondents justify their non-observance of the constitutionally mandated publication


by arguing that the rules have never been amended since 1995 and, despite that, they
are published in booklet form available to anyone for free, and accessible to the public
at the Senate’s internet web page.
PERLA GARCIA, PAZ CRUZ and GERALDINE PADERNAL, petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (HRET) and REP. HARRY
ANGPING (3rd DISTRICT MANILA), respondents.
FACTS:
On May 29, 1998, within the prescribed ten (10) day period from respondent Harry Angping's
proclamation as duly elected Representative for the 3rd District of Manila, petitioners, all duly
registered voters in the district, filed a petition for quo warranto1 before the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) against Congressman Harry Angping. Petitioners
questioned the eligibility of Congressman Angping to hold office in the House of
Representatives, claiming that the latter was not a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a
constitutional requirement. They prayed that Congressman Angping be declared ineligible to
assume or hold office as member of the House of Representatives and for the candidate who
received the highest number of votes from among the qualified candidates to be proclaimed the
winner.
Upon filing of their petition, petitioners duly paid the required P5,000.00 filing fee.2
On June 10, 1998, however the HRET issued a Resolution3 dismissing the petition for quo
warranto for failure to pay the P5,000.00 cash deposit required by its Rules. After recieving a
copy of the aforesaid Resolution, petitioners paid the P5,000.00 cash deposit4 on June 26, 1998
and attached the corresponding receipt to the Motion for Reconsideration5 they filed with the
HRET on the same day. Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration was, however, denied, in view
of Rule 32 of the 1998 HRET Rules which required a P5,000.00 cash deposit in addition to filing
fees for quo warranto cases.6
issue

is HRET commited
committed grave abuse of discretion?
ruling

Under the Constitution,11 the HRET shall be the sole judge of all


contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of its
members.Indeed, in Libanan v. House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal,12 we explained our assumption of jurisdiction in election
related cases involving the HRET as follows --

x x x. In Robles vs. HRET (181 SCRA 780), the Court has explained


that while the judgments of the Tribunal are beyond judicial
interference, the Court may do so, however, but only in the exercise
of this Courts so-called extraordinary jurisdiction, upon a
determination that the Tribunals decision or resolution was rendered
without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
or paraphrasing Morrero, upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and
improvident use by the Tribunal of its power as constitutes a denial
of due process of law, or upon a determination of a very clear
unmitigated error, manifestly constituting such grave abuse of
discretion, that there has to be a remedy for such abuse.

In the old, but still relevant, case of Morrero vs. Bocar (66 Phil.
429), the Court has ruled that the power of the Electoral
Commission is beyond judicial interference except, in any event,
upon a clear showing of arbitrary and improvident use of power as
will constitute a denial of due process. The Court does not, to
paraphrase it in Co vs. HRET (199 SCRA 692), venture into the
perilous area of correcting perceived errors of independent branches
of the Government; it comes in only when it has to vindicate a
denial of due process or correct an abuse of discretion so grave or
glaring that no less than the Constitution itself calls for remedial
action.

In the present case A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the


Rules of Court will prosper only if there is a showing of grave abuse
of discretion or an act without or in excess of jurisdiction on the part
of respondent tribunal.15 In the absence of such a showing, there is
no reason for this Court to annul the decision of the respondent
tribunal or to substitute it with its own judgment, for the simple
reason that its is not the office of a petition for certiorari to inquire
the correctness of the assailed decision.
, we find that the HRET committed no grave abuse of discretion. The
instant petition must be dismissed.

TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., AND LAKAS-NATIONAL UNION OF CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS (LAKAS-NUCD), petitioners,


vs.
NEPTALI A. GONZALES, ALBERTO ROMULO and WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA, respondents.
NATIONALIST PEOPLE'S COALITION, petitioner-in-intervention

To suffice the 12 representatives of Senate in the Commission on Appointments, they


agreed to use the traditional formula, having LDP with 7. members, NPC with 2.5
members, LAKAS-NUCD with 1.5 members and LP-PDP-LABAN with 0.5 member.
Respondent-senator Alberto Romulo then nominated for and in behalf of the LDP, eight
senators. Such nomination was objected by petitioner-senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr. To
resolve the case, Senator Arturo Tolentino proposed a compromise with elected
members consisting of eight LDP, one LP-PDP- LABAN, two NPC and one LAKAS-
NUCD. Petitioner Guingona, Jr. then filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of
prohibition to prohibit the recognition of Senators Romulo and Tañada as members of
the CA as it is a violation of the rule of proportional representation and that it is the right
of the minority political parties in the Senate, consistent with the Constitution, to
combine their fractional representation in the Commission on Appointments to complete
one seat therein, and to decide who, among the senators in their ranks, shall be
additionally nominated and elected thereto.

Issue does the election of Senators Romulo and Tañada as members of the
Commission on Appointments in accordance with the provision of Section 18 of Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution

Ruling No. the respondents' claim to membership in the Commission on Appointments


by nomination and election of the LDP majority in the Senate as not in accordance with
Section 18 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution

Section 18 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and therefore violative of the same because it is not in compliance with the requirements that
twelve senators shall be elected on the basis of proportional representation of the resulting fractional membership of the political parties
represented therein. To disturb the resulting fractional membership of the political parties in the Commission on Appointments by adding
together two halves to make a whole is a breach of the rule on proportional representation because it will give the LDP an added member in
the Commission by utilizing the fractional membership of the minority political party, who is deprived of half a representation.

The provision of Section 18 on proportional representation is mandatory in character and does not leave any discretion to the majority party
in the Senate to disobey or disregard the rule on proportional representation; otherwise, the party with a majority representation in the
Senate or the House of Representatives can by sheer force of number impose its will on the hapless minority. By requiring a proportional
representation in the Commission on Appointments, Section 18 in effect works as a check on the majority party in the Senate and helps to
maintain the balance of power. No party can claim more than what it is entitled to under such rule. To allow it to elect more than its
proportional share of members is to confer upon such a party a greater share in the membership in the Commission on Appointments and
more power to impose its will on the minority, who by the same token, suffers a diminution of its rightful membership in the Commission.

Drawing from the ruling in the case of Coseteng vs.  Mitra, Jr.,  12 a political party must have at least two senators in the Senate to be able to
have a representatives in the Commission on Appointments, so that any number less than 2 will not entitle such a party a membership in the
Commission on Appointments. This applies to the respondent Senator Tañada.

In this case the election of Senator Alberto Romulo and Senator Wigberto Tañada as members of the Commission on Appointments as null
and void for being in violation of the rule on proportional representation under Section 18 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution of the
Philippines. Accordingly, a writ of prohibition is hereby issued ordering the said respondents Senator Romulo and Senator Tañada to desist
from assuming, occupying and discharging the functions of members of the Commission on Appointments; and ordering the respondents
Senate President Neptali Gonzales, in his capacity as ex-officio Chairman of the Commission on Appointments, to desist from recognizing
the membership of the respondent Senators and from allowing and permitting them from sitting and participating as members of said
Commission.

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