SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 131457. April 24, 1998.]

HON. CARLOS O. FORTICH, PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR OF BUKIDNON,

HON. REY B. BAULA, MUNICIPAL MAYOR OF SUMILAO, BUKIDNON,
NQSR MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION ,
petitioners, vs . HON. RENATO C. CORONA, DEPUTY EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, HON. ERNESTO D. GARILAO, SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM , respondents.

Ramon Quisumbing, Jr. Law Office for petitioners.

The Solicitor General for respondents.
Aquilino Q. Pimentel for intervenors.

SYNOPSIS

The alleged farmer-bene ciaries strikers protested the March 29, 1996 decision of
the O ce of the President (OP), which approved the conversion of a 144-hectare land
from agricultural to agro-industrial institutional area. This led the OP, through then Deputy
Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona, to issue the so-called "Win-Win" Resolution on
November 7, 1997, substantially modifying its earlier decision after it had already become
nal and executory. The said Resolution modi ed the approval of the land conversion only
to the extent of 44 hectares, and ordered the remaining 100 hectares to be distributed to
qualified farmer-beneficiaries.
The petitioners now seek to annul and set aside the "Win Win" Resolution and to
enjoin respondent Secretary Garilao of the Department of Agrarian Reform from
implementing the said Resolution.
The crucial issue to be resolved in this case is: What is the legal effect of the "Win-
Win" Resolution issued by the OP on its earlier decision involving the same subject matter,
which had already become final and executory? TASCDI

The rules and regulations governing appeals to the OP are embodied in

Administrative Order No. 18, which provides in Section 7, that: "Decisions . . . become nal
after the lapse of 15 days from receipt of a copy thereof by the parties, unless a motion for
reconsideration thereof is filed within such period: . . .
When the OP declared the decision of March 29, 1996 nal and executory, as the
rst motion for reconsideration was not seasonably led, the said O ce had lost its
jurisdiction to re-open the case or modify the decision. Having lost its jurisdiction, the OP
has no more authority to entertain the second motion for reconsideration led by
respondent DAR Secretary, which second motion became the basis of the assailed "Win-
Win" Resolution.
Section 7 of AO No. 18 and Section 4, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court mandate that
only one motion for reconsideration is allowed to be taken from the decision of March 29,
1996.
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 Thus, the act of the OP in re-opening the case and substantially modifying its March
29, 1996 decision which had already become nal and executory, was in gross disregard
of the rules and basic legal precept that accord finality to administrative determinations.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; ERROR OF JUDGMENT, AS DISTINGUISHED FROM ERROR OF

JURISDICTION. — An error of judgment is one which the court may commit in the exercise
of its jurisdiction, and which error is reviewable only by an appeal. On the other hand, an
error of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by the court, o cer or
a quasi-judicial body without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
which is tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction. This error is correctable only by the
extraordinary writ of certiorari.aHcACT

2. ID.; FORUM SHOPPING; TEST TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE RULE AGAINST

FORUM SHOPPING IS VIOLATED. — The test for determining whether a party has violated
the rule against forum shopping is where a nal judgment in one case will amount to res
adjudicata in the action under consideration.
3. ID.; REAL PARTY IN INTEREST; DEFINED; MOVANTS IN CASE AT BAR ARE
NOT REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST. — The rule in this jurisdiction is that a real party in
interest is a party who would be bene ted or injured by the judgment or is the party
entitled to the avails of the suit. Real interest means a present substantial interest, as
distinguished from a mere expectancy or a future, contingent, subordinate or
consequential interest. Undoubtedly, movants' interest over the land in question is a mere
expectancy. Ergo, they are not real parties in interest.
ADSIaT

4. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; APPEALS TO THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT; RULE

GOVERNING THEM. — The rules and regulations governing appeals to the O ce of the
President of the Philippines are embodied in Administrative Order No 18. Section 7 thereof
provides: "SEC. 7. Decisions/resolutions/orders of the O ce of the President shall, except
as otherwise provided for by special laws, become nal after the lapse of fteen (15) days
from receipt of a copy thereof by the parties, unless a motion for reconsideration thereof
is led within such period. Only one motion for reconsideration by any one party shall be
allowed and entertained, save in exceptionally meritorious cases." It is further provided for
in Section 9 that "The Rules of Court shall apply in a suppletory character whenever
practicable."
5. ID.; THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT WAS IN ERROR WHEN IT MODIFIED A
DECISION WHICH HAD ALREADY BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY. — When the O ce of
the President issued the Order dated June 23 1997 declaring the Decision of March 29,
1996 nal and executory, as no one has seasonably led a motion for reconsideration
thereto, the said O ce had lost its jurisdiction to re-open the case, more so modify its
Decision. Having lost its jurisdiction, the O ce of the President has no more authority to
entertain the second motion for reconsideration led by respondent DAR Secretary, which
second motion became the basis of the assailed "Win-Win" Resolution. Section 7 of
Administrative Order No. 18 and Section 4, Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court mandate
that only one (1) motion for reconsideration is allowed to be taken from the Decision of
March 29, 1996. And even if a second motion for reconsideration was permitted to be filed
in "exceptionally meritorious cases," as provided in the second paragraph of Section 7 of
AO 18, still the said motion should not have been entertained considering that the rst
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 motion for reconsideration was not seasonably led, thereby allowing the Decision of
March 29, 1996 to lapse into nality. Thus, the act of the O ce of the President in re-
opening the case and substantially modifying its March 29, 1996 Decision which had
already become nal and executory, was in gross disregard of the rules and basic legal
precept that accord finality to administrative determinations. cDAEIH

DECISION

MARTINEZ , J : p

The dramatic and well-publicized hunger strike staged by some alleged farmer-
bene ciaries in front of the Department of Agrarian Reform compound in Quezon City on
October 9, 1997 commanded nationwide attention that even church leaders and some
presidential candidates tried to intervene for the strikers' "cause." LLjur

The strikers protested the March 29, 1996 Decision 1 of the O ce of the President
(OP), issued through then Executive Secretary Ruben D. Torres in OP Case No. 96-C-6424,
which approved the conversion of a one hundred forty-four (144)-hectare land from
agricultural to agro-industrial/institutional area. This led the O ce of the President,
through then Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona, to issue the so-called "Win-Win"
Resolution 2 on November 7, 1997, substantially modifying its earlier Decision after it had
already become nal and executory . The said Resolution modi ed the approval of the land
conversion to agro-industrial area only to the extent of forty-four (44) hectares, and
ordered the remaining one hundred (100) hectares to be distributed to quali ed farmer-
beneficiaries.
But, did the "Win-Win" Resolution culminate in victory for all the contending parties?
The above-named petitioners cried foul. They have come to this Court urging us to
annul and set aside the "Win-Win" Resolution and to enjoin respondent Secretary Ernesto D.
Garilao of the Department of Agrarian Reform from implementing the said Resolution.
Thus, the crucial issue to be resolved in this case is: What is the legal effect of the
"Win-Win" Resolution issued by the O ce of the President on its earlier Decision involving
the same subject matter, which had already become final and executory?
The antecedent facts of this controversy, as culled from the pleadings, may be
stated as follows:
1. This case involves a 144-hectare land located at San Vicente, Sumilao,
Bukidnon, owned by the Norberto Quisumbing, Sr. Management and Development
Corporation (NQSRMDC), one of the petitioners. The property is covered by a Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 14371 3 of the Registry of Deeds of the Province of Bukidnon.
2. In 1984, the land was leased as a pineapple plantation to the Philippine
Packing Corporation, now Del Monte Philippines, Inc. (DMPI), a multinational corporation,
for a period of ten (10) years under the Crop Producer and Grower's Agreement duly
annotated in the certificate of title. The lease expired in April, 1994.
3. In October, 1991, during the existence of the lease, the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) placed the entire 144-hectare property under compulsory
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 acquisition and assessed the land value at P2.38 million. 4
4. NQSRMDC resisted the DAR's action. In February, 1992, it sought and was
granted by the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB), through its Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator (PARAD) in DARAB Case No. X-576, a writ of prohibition with preliminary
injunction which ordered the DAR Region X Director, the Provincial Agrarian Reform O cer
(PARO) of Bukidnon, the Municipal Agrarian Reform O ce (MARO) of Sumilao, Bukidnon,
the Land Bank of the Philippines (Land Bank), and their authorized representatives "to
desist from pursuing any activity or activities" concerning the subject land "until further
orders." 5
5. Despite the DARAB order of March 31, 1992, the DAR Regional Director issued
a memorandum, dated May 21, 1992, directing the Land Bank to open a trust account for
P2.38 million in the name of NQSRMDC and to conduct summary proceedings to
determine the just compensation of the subject property. NQSRMDC objected to these
moves and led on June 9, 1992 an Omnibus Motion to enforce the DARAB order of March
31, 1992 and to nullify the summary proceedings undertaken by the DAR Regional Director
and Land Bank on the valuation of the subject property.
6. The DARAB, on October 22, 1992, acted favorably on the Omnibus Motion by
(a) ordering the DAR Regional Director and Land Bank "to seriously comply with the terms
of the order dated March 31, 1992;" (b) nullifying the DAR Regional Director's
memorandum, dated May 21, 1992, and the summary proceedings conducted pursuant
thereto; and (c) directing the Land Bank "to return the claim folder of Petitioner
NQSRMDC's subject property to the DAR until further orders." 6
7. The Land Bank complied with the DARAB order and cancelled the trust
account it opened in the name of petitioner NQSRMDC. 7
8. In the meantime, the Provincial Development Council (PDC) of Bukidnon,
headed by Governor Carlos O. Fortich, passed Resolution No. 6, 8 dated January 7, 1993,
designating certain areas along Bukidnon-Sayre Highway as part of the Bukidnon Agro-
Industrial Zones where the subject property is situated.
9. What happened thereafter is well-narrated in the OP (TORRES) Decision of
March 29, 1996, pertinent portions of which we quote:
"Pursuant to Section 20 of R.A. No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code, the Sangguniang Bayan of Sumilao, Bukidnon, on March 4,
1993, enacted Ordinance No. 24 converting or re-classifying 144 hectares of land
in Bgy. San Vicente, said Municipality, from agricultural to industrial/institutional
with a view of providing an opportunity to attract investors who can inject new
economic vitality, provide more jobs and raise the income of its people.
"Parenthetically, under said section, 4th to 5th class municipalities may
authorize the classi cation of ve percent (5%) of their agricultural land area and
provide for the manner of their utilization or disposition.
"On 12 October 1993, the Bukidnon Provincial Land Use Committee
approved the said Ordinance. Accordingly, on 11 December 1993, the instant
application for conversion was led by Mr. Gaudencio Beduya in behalf of
NQSRMDC/BAIDA (Bukidnon Agro-Industrial Development Association).
"Expressing support for the proposed project, the Bukidnon Provincial
Board, on the basis of a Joint Committee Report submitted by its Committee on
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 Laws, Committee on Agrarian Reform and Socio-Economic Committee approved,
on 1 February 1994, the said Ordinance now docketed as Resolution No. 94-95.
The said industrial area, as conceived by NQSRMDC (project proponent) is
supposed to have the following components:

"1. The Development Academy of Mindanao which constitutes

the following: Institute for Continuing Higher Education; Institute for
Livelihood Science (Vocational and Technical School); Institute for
Agribusiness Research; Museum, Library, Cultural Center, and Mindanao
Sports Development Complex which covers an area of 24 hectares;

"2. Bukidnon Agro-Industrial Park which consists of corn

processing for corn oil, corn starch, various corn products; rice processing
for wine, rice-based snacks, exportable rice; cassava processing for starch,
alcohol and food delicacies; processing plants, fruits and fruit products
such as juices; processing plants for vegetables processed and prepared
for market; cold storage and ice plant; cannery system; commercial stores;
public market; and abattoir needing about 67 hectares;

"3. Forest development which includes open spaces and parks

for recreation, horse-back riding, memorial and mini-zoo estimated to cover
33 hectares; and

"4. Support facilities which comprise the construction of a 360-

room hotel, restaurants, dormitories and a housing project covering an area
of 20 hectares.

"The said NQSRMDC Proposal was, per Certi cation dated January 4,
1995, adopted by the Department of Trade and Industry, Bukidnon Provincial
O ce, as one of its agship projects. The same was likewise favorably
recommended by the Provincial Development Council of Bukidnon; the municipal,
provincial and regional o ce of the DAR; the Regional O ce (Region X) of the
DENR (which issued an Environmental Compliance Certi cate on June 5, 1995);
the Executive Director, signing 'By Authority of PAUL G. DOMINGUEZ,' O ce of
the President — Mindanao; the Secretary of DILG; and Undersecretary of DECS
Wilfredo D. Clemente.
"In the same vein, the National Irrigation Administration, Provincial
Irrigation O ce, Bagontaas Valencia, Bukidnon, thru Mr. Julius S. Maquiling,
Chief, Provincial Irrigation O ce, interposed NO OBJECTION to the proposed
conversion 'as long as the development cost of the irrigation systems thereat
which is P2,377.00 per hectare be replenished by the developer . . .' Also, the
Kisolon-San Vicente Irrigators Multi Purpose Cooperative, San Vicente, Sumilao,
Bukidnon, interposed no objection to the proposed conversion of the land in
question 'as it will provide more economic bene ts to the community in terms of
outside investments that will come and employment opportunities that will be
generated by the projects to be put up . . .'

"On the same score, it is represented that during the public consultation
held at the Kisolan Elementary School on 18 March 1995 with Director Jose
Macalindong of DAR Central O ce and DECS Undersecretary Clemente, the
people of the affected barangay rallied behind their respective o cials in
endorsing the project.
"Notwithstanding the foregoing favorable recommendation, however, on
November 14, 1994, the DAR, thru Secretary Garilao, invoking its powers to
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 approve conversion of lands under Section 65 of R.A. No. 6657, issued an Order
denying the instant application for the conversion of the subject land from
agricultural to agro-industrial and, instead, placed the same under the compulsory
coverage of CARP and directed the distribution thereof to all quali ed
beneficiaries on the following grounds:

"1. The area is considered as a prime agricultural land with

irrigation facility;

"2. The land has long been covered by a Notice of Compulsory

Acquisition (NCA);

"3. The existing policy on withdrawal or lifting on areas covered

by NCA is not applicable;

"4. There is no clear and tangible compensation package

arrangements for the beneficiaries;

"5. The procedures on how the area was identi ed and

reclassi ed for agro-industrial project has no reference to Memo Circular
No. 54, Series of 1993, E.O. No. 72, Series of 1993, and E.O. No. 124, Series
of 1993. LLjur

"A Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid Order was led on January
9, 1995 by applicant but the same was denied (in an Order dated June 7, 1995)." 9

10. Thus, the DAR Secretary ordered the DAR Regional Director "to proceed with
the compulsory acquisition and distribution of the property." 1 0
11. Governor Carlos O. Fortich of Bukidnon appealed 1 1 the order of denial to
the O ce of the President and prayed for the conversion/reclassi cation of the subject
land as the same would be more beneficial to the people of Bukidnon.
12. To prevent the enforcement of the DAR Secretary's order, NQSRMDC, on
June 29, 1995, led with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, prohibition with
preliminary injunction, 1 2 docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 37614.
13. Meanwhile, on July 25, 1995, the Honorable Paul G. Dominguez, then
Presidential Assistant for Mindanao, after conducting an evaluation of the proposed
project, sent a memorandum 1 3 to the President favorably endorsing the project with a
recommendation that the DAR Secretary reconsider his decision in denying the application
of the province for the conversion of the land.
14. Also, in a memorandum 1 4 to the President dated August 23, 1995, the
Honorable Rafael Alunan III, then Secretary of the Department of the Interior and Local
Government (DILG), recommended the conversion of the subject land to
industrial/institutional use with a request that the President "hold the implementation of
the DAR order to distribute the land in question."
15. On October 23, 1995, the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 37614, issued
a Resolution 5 ordering the parties to observe status quo pending resolution of the
1
petition. At the hearing held in said case on October 5, 1995, the DAR, through the Solicitor
General, manifested before the said court that the DAR was merely "in the processing
stage of the applications of farmers-claimants" and has agreed to respect status quo
pending the resolution of the petition. 1 6
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 16. In resolving the appeal, the O ce of the President, through then Executive
Secretary Ruben D. Torres, issued a Decision in OP Case No. 96-C-6424, dated March 29,
1996, reversing the DAR Secretary's decision, the pertinent portions of which read:
"After a careful evaluation of the petition vis-a-vis the grounds upon which
the denial thereof by Secretary Garilao was based, we nd that the instant
application for conversion by the Municipality of Sumilao, Bukidnon is impressed
with merit. To be sure, converting the land in question from agricultural to agro-
industrial would open great opportunities for employment and bring about real
development in the area towards a sustained economic growth of the
municipality. On the other hand, distributing the land to would-be bene ciaries
(who are not even tenants, as there are none) does not guarantee such benefits.
"Nevertheless, on the issue that the land is considered a prime agricultural
land with irrigation facility it maybe appropriate to mention that, as claimed by
petitioner, while it is true that there is, indeed, an irrigation facility in the area, the
same merely passes thru the property (as a right of way) to provide water to the
ricelands located on the lower portion thereof. The land itself, subject of the
instant petition, is not irrigated as the same was, for several years, planted with
pineapple by the Philippine Packing Corporation.
"On the issue that the land has long been covered by a Notice of
Compulsory Acquisition (NCA) and that the existing policy on withdrawal or lifting
on areas covered by NCA is not applicable, su ce it to state that the said NCA
was declared null and void by the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board (DARAB) as early as March 1, 1992. Deciding in favor of NQSRMDC, the
DARAB correctly pointed out that under Section 8 of R.A. No. 6657, the subject
property could not validly be the subject of compulsory acquisition until after the
expiration of the lease contract with Del Monte Philippines, a Multi-National
Company, or until April 1994, and ordered the DAR Regional O ce and the Land
Bank of the Philippines, both in Butuan City, to 'desist from pursuing any activity
or activities covering petitioner's land.
"On this score, we take special notice of the fact that the Quisumbing
family has already contributed substantially to the land reform program of the
government, as follows: 300 hectares of rice land in Nueva Ecija in the 70's and
another 400 hectares in the nearby Municipality of Impasugong, Bukidnon, ten
(10) years ago, for which they have not received 'just compensation' up to this
time.
"Neither can the assertion that 'there is no clear and tangible compensation
package arrangements for the bene ciaries' hold water as, in the rst place, there
are no beneficiaries to speak about, for the land is not tenanted as already stated.
"Nor can procedural lapses in the manner of identifying/reclassifying the
subject property for agro-industrial purposes be allowed to defeat the very
purpose of the law granting autonomy to local government units in the
management of their local affairs. Stated more simply, the language of Section
20 of R.A. No. 7160, supra, is clear and affords no room for any other
interpretation. By unequivocal legal mandate, it grants local government units
autonomy in their local affairs including the power to convert portions of their
agricultural lands and provide for the manner of their utilization and disposition
to enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities.
"WHEREFORE, in pursuance of the spirit and intent of the said legal
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 mandate and in view of the favorable recommendations of the various
government agencies abovementioned, the subject Order, dated November 14,
1994 of the Hon. Secretary, Department of Agrarian Reform, is hereby SET ASIDE
and the instant application of NQSRMDC/BAIDA is hereby APPROVED." 1 7

17. On May 20, 1996, DAR filed a motion for reconsideration of the OP decision.
18. On September 11, 1996, in compliance with the OP decision of March 29,
1996, NQSRMDC and the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) executed a
Memorandum of Agreement whereby the former donated four (4) hectares from the
subject land to DECS for the establishment of the NQSR High School. 1 8
When NQSRMDC was about to transfer the title over the 4-hectare donated to DECS,
it discovered that the title over the subject property was no longer in its name. It soon
found out that during the pendency of both the Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, with
Preliminary Injunction it led against DAR in the Court of Appeals and the appeal to the
President led by Governor Carlos O. Fortich, the DAR, without giving just compensation,
caused the cancellation of NQSRMDC's title on August 11, 1995 and had it transferred in
the name of the Republic of the Philippines under TCT No. T-50264 1 9 of the Registry of
Deeds of Bukidnon. Thereafter, on September 25, 1995, DAR caused the issuance of
Certi cates of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) No. 00240227 and had it registered in the
name of 137 farmer-bene ciaries under TCT No. AT-3536 2 0 of the Registry of Deeds of
Bukidnon.
19. Thus, on April 10, 1997, NQSRMDC led a complaint 2 1 with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Malaybalay, Bukidnon (Branch 9), docketed as Civil Case No. 2687-97,
for annulment and cancellation of title, damages and injunction against DAR and 141
others. The RTC then issued a Temporary Restraining Order on April 30, 1997 2 2 and a Writ
of Preliminary Injunction on May 19, 1997, 2 3 restraining the DAR and 141 others from
entering, occupying and/or wresting from NQSRMDC the possession of the subject land.
20. Meanwhile, on June 23, 1997, an Order 2 4 was issued by then Executive
Secretary Ruben D. Torres denying DAR's motion for reconsideration for having been led
beyond the reglementary period of fteen (15) days. The said order further declared that
the March 29, 1996 OP decision had already become final and executory.
21. The DAR led on July 11, 1997 a second motion for reconsideration of the
June 23, 1997 Order of the President.
22. On August 12, 1997, the said writ of preliminary injunction issued by the RTC
was challenged by some alleged farmers before the Court of Appeals through a petition
for certiorari and prohibition, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 44905, praying for the lifting of
the injunction and for the issuance of a writ of prohibition from further trying the RTC case.
23. On October 9, 1997, some alleged farmer-bene ciaries began their hunger
strike in front of the DAR Compound in Quezon City to protest the OP Decision of March
29, 1996. On October 10, 1997, some persons claiming to be farmer-bene ciaries of the
NQSRMDC property filed a motion for intervention (styled as Memorandum In Intervention)
in O.P. Case No. 96-C-6424, asking that the OP Decision allowing the conversion of the
entire 144-hectare property be set aside. 2 5
24. President Fidel V. Ramos then held a dialogue with the strikers and
promised to resolve their grievance within the framework of the law. He created an eight
(8)-man Fact Finding Task Force (FFTF) chaired by Agriculture Secretary Salvador
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 Escudero to look into the controversy and recommend possible solutions to the problem.
26

25. On November 7, 1997, the O ce of the President resolved the strikers'

protest by issuing the so-called "Win/Win" Resolution penned by then Deputy Executive
Secretary Renato C. Corona, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the O ce of the
President, through Executive Secretary Ruben Torres, dated March 29, 1996, is
hereby MODIFIED as follows:

"1. NQSRMDC's application for conversion is APPROVED only with

respect to the approximately forty-four (44) hectare portion of the
land adjacent to the highway, as recommended by the Department
of Agriculture.

"2. The remaining approximately one hundred (100) hectares traversed

by an irrigation canal and found to be suitable for agriculture shall
be distributed to quali ed farmer-bene ciaries in accordance with
RA 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law with a right of
way to said portion from the highway provided in the portion
fronting the highway. For this purpose, the DAR and other concerned
government agencies are directed to immediately conduct the
segregation survey of the area, valuation of the property and
generation of titles in the name of the identi ed farmer-
beneficiaries.

"3. The Department of Agrarian Reform is hereby directed to carefully

and meticulously determine who among the claimants are quali ed
farmer-beneficiaries.

"4. The Department of Agrarian Reform is hereby further directed to

expedite payment of just compensation to NQSRMDC for the
portion of the land to be covered by the CARP, including other lands
previously surrendered by NQSRMDC for CARP coverage.

"5. The Philippine National Police is hereby directed to render full

assistance to the Department of Agrarian Reform in the
implementation of this Order.
"We take note of the Memorandum in Intervention led by 113 farmers on
October 10, 1997 without ruling on the propriety or merits thereof since it is
unnecessary to pass upon it at this time.
"SO ORDERED." 2 7

A copy of the "Win-Win" Resolution was received by Governor Carlos O. Fortich of

Bukidnon, Mayor Rey B. Baula of Sumilao, Bukidnon, and NQSRMDC on November 24, 1997
2 8 and, on December 4, 1997, they led the present petition for certiorari, prohibition
(under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court) and injunction with urgent prayer for a
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction (under Rule 58, ibid.),
against then Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona and DAR Secretary Ernesto D.
Garilao.
On December 12, 1997, a Motion For Leave To Intervene 2 9 was led by alleged
farmer-bene ciaries, through counsel, claiming that they are real parties in interest as they
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 were "previously identi ed by respondent DAR as agrarian reform bene ciaries on the 144-
hectare" property subject of this case. The motion was vehemently opposed 3 0 by the
petitioners. LLjur

In seeking the nulli cation of the "Win-Win" Resolution, the petitioners claim that the
O ce of the President was prompted to issue the said resolution "after a very well-
managed hunger strike led by fake farmer-bene ciary Linda Ligmon succeeded in
pressuring and/or politically blackmailing the O ce of the President to come up with this
purely political decision to appease the 'farmers,' by reviving and modifying the Decision of
29 March 1996 which has been declared nal and executory in an Order of 23 June 1997 . .
." 3 1 Thus, petitioners further allege, respondent then Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C.
Corona "committed grave abuse of discretion and acted beyond his jurisdiction when he
issued the questioned Resolution of 7 November 1997. . ." 3 2 They availed of this
extraordinary writ of certiorari "because there is no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law." 3 3 They never led a motion for reconsideration of
the subject Resolution "because (it) is patently illegal or contrary to law and it would be a
futile exercise to seek a reconsideration . . ." 3 4
The respondents, through the Solicitor General, opposed the petition and prayed
that it be dismissed outright on the following grounds:
(1) The proper remedy of petitioners should have been to le a petition
for review directly with the Court of Appeals in accordance with Rule
43 of the Revised Rules of Court;
(2) The petitioners failed to le a motion for reconsideration of the
assailed "Win-Win" Resolution before filing the present petition; and
(3) Petitioner NQSRMDC is guilty of forum-shopping.
These are the preliminary issues which must rst be resolved, including the incident
on the motion for intervention filed by the alleged farmer-beneficiaries.
Anent the rst issue, in order to determine whether the recourse of petitioners is
proper or not, it is necessary to draw a line between an error of judgment and an error of
jurisdiction. An error of judgment is one which the court may commit in the exercise of its
jurisdiction, and which error is reviewable only by an appeal. 3 5 On the other hand, an error
of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by the court, o cer or a
quasi-judicial body without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
which is tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction. 3 6 This error is correctable only by
the extraordinary writ of certiorari. 3 7
It is true that under Rule 43, appeals from awards, judgments, nal orders or
resolutions of any quasi-judicial agency exercising quasi-judicial functions, 3 8 including the
O ce of the President , 3 9 may be taken to the Court of Appeals by ling a veri ed petition
for review 4 0 within fteen (15) days from notice of the said judgment, nal order or
resolution, 4 1 whether the appeal involves questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of
fact and law. 4 2
However, we hold that, in this particular case, the remedy prescribed in Rule 43 is
inapplicable considering that the present petition contains an allegation that the
challenged resolution is "patently illegal" 4 3 and was issued with "grave abuse of
discretion" and "beyond his (respondent Secretary Renato C. Corona's) jurisdiction" 4 4
when said resolution substantially modi ed the earlier OP Decision of March 29, 1996
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 which had long become nal and executory. In other words, the crucial issue raised here
involves an error of jurisdiction, not an error of judgment which is reviewable by an appeal
under Rule 43. Thus, the appropriate remedy to annul and set aside the assailed resolution
is an original special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, as what the petitioners have
correctly done. The pertinent portion of Section 1 thereof provides:
"SEC. 1. Petition for certiorari. — When any tribunal, board or o cer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its
or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may le a veri ed
petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that
judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal,
board or o cer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may
require.
xxx xxx xxx."

The o ce of a writ of certiorari is restricted to truly extraordinary cases — cases in

which the act of the lower court or quasi-judicial body is wholly void. 4 5
The aforequoted Section 1 of Rule 65 mandates that the person aggrieved by the
assailed illegal act "may le a veri ed petition (for certiorari) in the proper court." The
proper court where the petition must be led is stated in Section 4 of the same Rule 65
which reads:
"SEC. 4. Where petition led . — The petition may be led not later than
sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution sought to be
assailed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or omissions of a lower
court or of a corporation, board, o cer or person, in the Regional Trial Court
exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as de ned by the Supreme Court. It
may also be led in the Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its jurisdiction. If it
involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, and unless otherwise
provided by law or these Rules, the petition shall be led in and cognizable only
by the Court of Appeals. (4a)"

Under the above-quoted Section 4, the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and
Regional Trial Court have original concurrent jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, 4 6
prohibition 4 7 and mandamus. 4 8 But the jurisdiction of these three (3) courts are also
delineated in that, if the challenged act relates to acts or omissions of a lower court or of a
corporation, board, o cer or person, the petition must be led with the Regional Trial
Court which exercises jurisdiction over the territorial area as de ned by the Supreme
Court. And if it involves the act or omission of a quasi-judicial agency, the petition shall be
led only with the Court of Appeals, unless otherwise provided by law or the Rules of
Court. We have clearly discussed this matter of concurrence of jurisdiction in People vs.
Cuaresma, et. al., 4 9 through now Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa, thus:
". . . This Court's original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari (as well as
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction) is not
exclusive. It is shared by this Court with Regional Trial Courts (formerly Courts of
First Instance), which may issue the writ, enforceable in any part of their
respective regions. It is also shared by this Court, and by the Regional Trial Court,
with the Court of Appeals (formerly, Intermediate Appellate Court), although prior
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 to the effectivity of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 on August 14, 1981, the latter's
competence to issue the extraordinary writs was restricted to those 'in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction.' This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken
as according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained
freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor will be directed. There
is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of
appeals, and should also serve as a general determinant of the appropriate forum
for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial
hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary
writs against rst level ('inferior') courts should be led with the Regional Trial
Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals." (Citations omitted)

But the Supreme Court has the full discretionary power to take cognizance of the
petition led directly to it if compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues
raised, warrant. This has been the judicial policy to be observed and which has been
reiterated in subsequent cases, namely: 5 0 Uy vs. Contreras, et. al., 5 1 Torres vs . Arranz, 5 2
Bercero vs. De Guzman, 5 3 and Advincula vs. Legaspi, et. al. 5 4 As we have further stated in
Cuaresma:
". . . A direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue
these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons
therefor, clearly and speci cally set out in the petition. This is established policy.
It is a policy that is necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Court's
time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive
jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Court's docket."

Pursuant to said judicial policy, we resolve to take primary jurisdiction over the
present petition in the interest of speedy justice 5 5 and to avoid future litigations so as to
promptly put an end to the present controversy which, as correctly observed by
petitioners, has sparked national interest because of the magnitude of the problem
created by the issuance of the assailed resolution. Moreover, as will be discussed later, we
nd the assailed resolution wholly void and requiring the petitioners to le their petition
first with the Court of Appeals would only result in a waste of time and money.
That the Court has the power to set aside its own rules in the higher interests of
justice is well-entrenched in our jurisprudence. We reiterate what we said in Piczon vs.
Court of Appeals: 5 6
"Be it remembered that rules of procedure are but mere tools designed to
facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would
result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial
justice, must always be avoided. Time and again, this Court has suspended its
own rules and excepted a particular case from their operation whenever the higher
interests of justice so require. In the instant petition, we forego a lengthy
disquisition of the proper procedure that should have been taken by the parties
involved and proceed directly to the merits of the case."

As to the second issue of whether the petitioners committed a fatal procedural

lapse when they failed to le a motion for reconsideration of the assailed resolution before
seeking judicial recourse, su ce it to state that the said motion is not necessary when the
questioned resolution is a patent nullity, 5 7 as will be taken up later.
With respect to the third issue, the respondents claim that the ling by the
petitioners of: (a) a petition for certiorari, prohibition with preliminary injunction (CA-G.R.
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 SP No. 37614) with the Court of Appeals; (b) a complaint for annulment and cancellation
of title, damages and injunction against DAR and 141 others (Civil Case No. 2687-97) with
the Regional Trial Court of Malaybalay, Bukidnon; and (c) the present petition, constitute
forum shopping.
We disagree.
The rule is that:
"There is forum-shopping whenever, as a result of an adverse opinion in
one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in
another. The principle applies not only with respect to suits led in the courts but
also in connection with litigation commenced in the courts while an
administrative proceeding is pending, as in this case, in order to defeat
administrative processes and in anticipation of an unfavorable administrative
ruling and a favorable court ruling. This specially so, as in this case, where the
court in which the second suit was brought, has no jurisdiction (citations
omitted).

"The test for determining whether a party violated the rule against forum
shopping has been laid down in the 1986 case of Buan vs. Lopez (145 SCRA 34),
. . . and that is, forum shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are
present or where a nal judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the
other, as follows:
'There thus exists between the action before this Court and RTC
Case No. 86-36563 identity of parties, or at least such parties represent the
same interests in both actions, as well as identity of rights asserted and
relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts, and the
identity on the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment
rendered in the other action, will, regardless of which party is successful,
amount to res adjudicata in the action under consideration: all the
requisites, in fine, of auter action pendant.'" 5 8

It is clear from the above-quoted rule that the petitioners are not guilty of forum
shopping. The test for determining whether a party has violated the rule against forum
shopping is where a nal judgment in one case will amount to res adjudicata in the action
under consideration. A cursory examination of the cases led by the petitioners does not
show that the said cases are similar with each other. The petition for certiorari in the Court
of Appeals sought the nulli cation of the DAR Secretary's order to proceed with the
compulsory acquisition and distribution of the subject property. On the other hand, the civil
case in RTC of Malaybalay, Bukidnon for the annulment and cancellation of title issued in
the name of the Republic of the Philippines, with damages, was based on the following
grounds: (1) the DAR, in applying for cancellation of petitioner NQSRMDC's title, used
documents which were earlier declared null and void by the DARAB; (2) the cancellation of
NQSRMDC's title was made without payment of just compensation; and (3) without notice
to NQSRMDC for the surrender of its title. The present petition is entirely different from the
said two cases as it seeks the nulli cation of the assailed "Win-Win" Resolution of the
O ce of the President dated November 7, 1997, which resolution was issued long after
the previous two cases were instituted.
The fourth and nal preliminary issue to be resolved is the motion for intervention
led by alleged farmer-bene ciaries, which we have to deny for lack of merit. In their
motion, movants contend that they are the farmer-bene ciaries of the land in question,
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 hence, are real parties in interest. To prove this, they attached as Annex "I" in their motion a
Master List of Farmer-Bene ciaries. Apparently, the alleged master list was made
pursuant to the directive in the dispositive portion of the assailed "Win-Win" Resolution
which directs the DAR "to carefully and meticulously determine who among the claimants
are quali ed farmer-bene ciaries." However, a perusal of the said document reveals that
movants are those purportedly "Found Quali ed and Recommended for Approval." In other
words, movants are merely recommendee farmer-beneficiaries.
The rule in this jurisdiction is that a real party in interest is a party who would be
bene ted or injured by the judgment or is the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Real
interest means a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy or
a future, contingent, subordinate or consequential interest. 5 9 Undoubtedly, movants'
interest over the land in question is a mere expectancy. Ergo, they are not real parties in
interest.
Furthermore, the challenged resolution upon which movants based their motion is,
as intimated earlier, null and void. Hence, their motion for intervention has no leg to stand
on.
Now to the main issue of whether the nal and executory Decision dated March 29,
1996 can still be substantially modified by the "Win-Win" Resolution.
We rule in the negative.
The rules and regulations governing appeals to the O ce of the President of the
Philippines are embodied in Administrative Order No. 18. Section 7 thereof provides:
"SEC. 7. Decisions/resolutions/orders of the O ce of the President
shall, except as otherwise provided for by special laws, become nal after the
lapse of fteen (15) days from receipt of a copy thereof by the parties, unless a
motion for reconsideration thereof is filed within such period.
"Only one motion for reconsideration by any one party shall be allowed and
entertained, save in exceptionally meritorious cases." (Emphasis ours)

It is further provided for in Section 9 that "The Rules of Court shall apply in a suppletory
character whenever practicable."
When the O ce of the President issued the Order dated June 23, 1997 declaring the
Decision of March 29, 1996 nal and executory, as no one has seasonably led a motion
for reconsideration thereto, the said O ce had lost its jurisdiction to re-open the case,
more so modify its Decision. Having lost its jurisdiction, the O ce of the President has no
more authority to entertain the second motion for reconsideration led by respondent DAR
Secretary, which second motion became the basis of the assailed "Win-Win" Resolution.
Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 18 and Section 4, Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of
Court mandate that only one (1) motion for reconsideration is allowed to be taken from
the Decision of March 29, 1996. And even if a second motion for reconsideration was
permitted to be led in "exceptionally meritorious cases," as provided in the second
paragraph of Section 7 of AO 18, still the said motion should not have been entertained
considering that the rst motion for reconsideration was not seasonably led, thereby
allowing the Decision of March 29, 1996 to lapse into nality. Thus, the act of the O ce of
the President in re-opening the case and substantially modifying its March 29, 1996
Decision which had already become nal and executory, was in gross disregard of the
rules and basic legal precept that accord finality to administrative determinations.
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 In San Luis, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al. 6 0 we held:
"Since the decisions of both the Civil Service Commission and the O ce of
the President had long become nal and executory, the same can no longer be
reviewed by the courts. It is well-established in our jurisprudence that the
decisions and orders of administrative agencies, rendered pursuant to their quasi-
judicial authority, have upon their nality, the force and binding effect of a nal
judgment within the purview of the doctrine of res judicata [Brillantes v. Castro, 99
Phil. 497 (1956), Ipekdijna Merchandising Co., Inc. v. Court of Tax Appeals, G.R.
No. L-15430, September 30, 1963, 9 SCRA 72.] The rule of res judicata which
forbids the reopening of a matter once judicially determined by competent
authority applies as well to the judicial and quasi-judicial acts of public, executive
or administrative o cers and boards acting within their jurisdiction as to the
judgments of courts having general judicial powers [Brillantes v. Castro, supra at
503]."

The orderly administration of justice requires that the judgments/resolutions of a

court or quasi-judicial body must reach a point of nality set by the law, rules and
regulations. The noble purpose is to write nis to disputes once and for all. 6 1 This is a
fundamental principle in our justice system, without which there would be no end to
litigations. Utmost respect and adherence to this principle must always be maintained by
those who wield the power of adjudication. Any act which violates such principle must
immediately be struck down.
Therefore, the assailed "Win-Win" Resolution which substantially modi ed the
Decision of March 29, 1996 after it has attained nality, is utterly void. Such void
resolution, as aptly stressed by Justice Thomas A. Street 6 2 in a 1918 case, 6 3 is "a lawless
thing, which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever and
whenever it exhibits its head." 6 4
WHEREFORE, the present petition is hereby GRANTED. The challenged Resolution
dated November 7, 1997, issued by the O ce of the President in OP Case No. 96-C-6424,
is hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. The Motion For Leave To Intervene led by alleged
farmer-beneficiaries is hereby DENIED.
No pronouncement as to costs. LLjur

SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Melo, Puno and Mendoza, JJ ., concur.

Footnotes

1.Annex "AA," Petition; Rollo, pp. 163-167.

2.Annex "A," Petition; Ibid., pp. 48-63.

3.Annex "B," Petition; Rollo, pp. 64-65.

4.Par. 12, Petition; Ibid., p. 6.

5.Annex "C," Petition; ibid., pp. 66-67.

6.Annex "D," Petition; ibid., p. 68.

7.Annexes "E," "F" and "G," Petition; ibid., pp. 69-71.
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 8.Annex "H," Petition; Ibid., p. 72.
9.Annex AA," Petition; Ibid., pp. 163-166.

10.Annex "S," Petition; Ibid., p. 113.

11.Annex "T," Petition; Ibid., pp. 115-120.

12.Annex "U," Petition; Ibid., pp. 121-146.

13.Annexes "V" and "V-1," Petition; Ibid., pp. 147-150.

14.Annex "W," Petition; Ibid., pp. 151-153.

15.Annex "X," Petition; Ibid., pp. 154-156.

16.Annex "Y," Petition; Ibid., pp. 157-158.

17.Ibid., pp. 166-167

18.Par. 37, Petition, rollo, pp. 14-15.

19.Annex "BB," Petition; Ibid., p. 168.

20.Annex "CC," Petition; Ibid., pp. 169-176.

21.Annex "DD," Petition; Ibid., pp. 177-189.

22.Annex "EE," Petition; Rollo, pp. 190-191.

23.Annex "GG," Petition; Ibid., pp. 193-194.

24.Annex "FF," Petition; Ibid., p. 192.

25.Par. 17, Respondents' Comment, rollo, p. 532.

26.Par. 18, ibid., p. 533.

27.Rollo, pp. 61-62.

28.Par. 3, Petition; Ibid., p. 4.

29.Rollo, pp. 195-200.

30.Ibid., pp. 280-282

31.Petition, ibid., p. 17.

32.Ibid., p. 18.

33.Ibid., p. 4.

34.Ibid., p. 5.
35.Fernando vs. Vasquez, et. al., 31 SCRA 288.

36.Ibid; Section 1, Rule 65, Revised Rules of Court.

37.Ibid.

38.Except those issued under the Labor Code of the Philippines (Sec. 2, Rule 43, Revised Rules
of Court).

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 39.Section 1, Rule 43, Revised Rules of Court.

40.Sections 3 & 5, ibid.

41.Section 4, ibid.

42.Section 3, ibid.

43.Petition, rollo, p. 5.
44.Ibid., p. 18.

45.Fernando vs. Vasquez, et al., 31 SCRA 288.

46.Section 1, Rule 65, Revised Rules of Court; People vs. Cuaresma, et. al., 172 SCRA 415, 423;
Vergara, Sr. vs. Suelto, et. al., 156 SCRA 753, 766.
47.Section 2, ibid.

48.Section 3, ibid.
49.Supra.

50.Cited in Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. One, 1997 edition, p. 721.
51.G.R. Nos. 111416-17, Sept. 26, 1994.

52.G.R. No. 123352, Feb. 7, 1996.

53.G.R. No. 123573, Feb. 28, 1996.

54.G.R. No. 125500, Aug. 7, 1996.

55.Eugenio vs. Drilon, et. al., G.R. No. 109404, Jan. 22, 1996; 252 SCRA 106, 110.
56.190 SCRA 31, 38.

57.Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. vs. Public Service Commission, L-19850, Jan. 30, 1964; Luzon
Surety Co. vs. Marbella, et al., L-16088, Sept. 30, 1960; Dir. of Lands vs. Santamaria, 44
Phil. 594, all cited in Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, supra, p. 710.
58.First Philippine International Bank, et. al. vs. Court of Appeals, et. al., 252 SCRA 259, 283
(Jan. 24, 1996).

59.Garcia vs. David, 67 Phil. 27.

60.174 SCRA 258, 271.

61.Legarda, et al. vs. Savellano, et al., 158 SCRA 194, 200.

62.One of the first Justices of the Supreme Court of the Philippines.

63.El Banco Español-Filipino vs. Palanca, 37 Phil. 921.

64.Ibid., at p. 949.

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