Resident Marine Mammals vs. Sec.

Angelo Reyes

Facts:

The Resident Marine Mammals are comprised of toothed whales,

dolphins, porpoises, and other cetacean species inhabiting Tañon Strait.
The human petitioners implead themselves in a representative capacity as
legal guardians of the lesser-life forms and as responsible stewards of God’s
creations. The human petitioners assert that they have the obligation to
build awareness among the affected residents of Tañon Straits as well as to
protect the environment as primary steward.

Issue:

Whether or not Resident Marine Mammals have a legal standing to

file a case.

Ruling:

No, Resident Marine Mammals have no legal standing to file a case.

Under Rule 3, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, in part,

provides that, “only natural or juridical persons, or entities authorized by
law may be parties in a civil action.”

Rule 3, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure further defines

real party in interest, “a real party in interest is the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the
avails of the suit.”

In this case, there is no way that humans can claim to speak for
animals let alone present that they would wish to use our court system.
There is no valid reason in law or the practical requirements of this case to
implead and feign representation on behalf of animals.
 Central Visayas Fisherfolk Development Center vs. Sec. Angelo
Reyes

Facts:

Petitioners are representatives of subsistence fisherfolks of

Municipalities of Aloguinsan and Pinamungahan, Cebu, whose rights were
affected by the activities undertaken by Service Contract 46 (SC-46). They
asserts that it violated the Article XII, Section 2 of the Constitution for
Japan Petroleum Exploration Cor., Ltd. (JAPEX) is 100% Japanese-owned.

Issue:

Whether or not the Service Contract 46 is illegal and

unconstitutional.

Ruling:

Yes, the Service Contract 46 is illegal and unconstitutional.

Under Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, it provides in

part, “The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned
corporations involving either technical or financial assistance for large-
scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum and
other mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions provided
by law, based on real contributions to the economic growth and general
welfare of the country.”

In this case, the deletion of service contracts from the enumeration of

the kind of agreements means that service contracts are no longer allowed
in the Constitution.

Further, under Sec. 12 of Presidential Decree No. 1234 covered by the

national Integrated Protected Area System Act of 1992, it provides that,
“proposals for activities which are outside the scope of the management
plan for protected areas shall be subject to an environmental impact
assessment as required by law before they are adopted, and the results
thereof shall be taken into consideration in the decision-making process.”

Public respondents did not validly obtain an Environmental

Compliance Certificate for SC-46 to be secured under the Philippine
Environmental Impact Assessment System.
 Republic vs. Pagadian City Timber Co. Inc.

Facts:

In 1994, petitioner through the DENR and Pagadian City Timber Co.,
Inc. executed Industrial Forest Management Agreement (IFMA) No. R-9-
040, whereby petitioner, represented by Regional Executive Director (RED)
Umali of Region IX, to develop, utilize and manage a specified forest area
covering 1,999.14 hectares located in Barangays Langapod, Cogonan, and
Datagan, Municipality of Labangan, Zamboanga Del Sur, for the production
of timber and other forest products subject to a production-sharing scheme.

Because of numerous complaints that there was a failure in

implementation of Comprehensive Development Management Plan
(CDMP), DENR issued order to assess and evaluate the IFMA.

The result of evaluation and assessment reveals that the holder

violated the DENR Rules and Regulations particularly in Section 26 of DAO
97-04, which are the grounds for cancellation of IFMA.

The holder at the 4th year of existence of IFMA must have developed a
total of 1,597.0 hectares but only 365.2 hectares was planted about only
22.8%.

RED Mendoza ordered the cancellation of IFMA.

Issue:

Whether or not the Court gravely erred in ruling that IFMA is a

contract.

Ruling:

Yes, the Court gravely erred in ruling that IFMA is a contract

considering that it is a license agreement.

Under Section 3, Paragraph (dd) of Presidential Decree No. 705, “a

licensed agreement is defined as the privilege granted by the State to a
person to utilize forest resources within any forest land with the right of
possession and occupation thereof to the exclusion of others, except the
Government, but with the corresponding obligation to develop, protect and
rehabilitate the same in accordance with the terms and conditions set forth
in said agreement.”

In this case, IFMA is not an ordinary contract but a mere privilege

granted by the State to qualified persons. Thus, the cancellation of the
IFMA does not amount to a rescission but a mere withdrawal of the
privilege.
 Mamanteo vs. Deputy Sheriff Magumun

Facts:

In 1996, forestry employers of DENR, Kalinga, intercepted a San

Miguel Corporation Van loaded with narra flitches without legal permit.
After issuing the seizure receipts, the vehicle and its load were confiscated
in favor of the Government.

A criminal complaint for Violation of Sec. 78 of PD 705 was filed

against Martinez, the driver of the van. Thereafter, San Miguel Corporation,
the owner of the van, filed a case for recovery of personal property and
damages with application for writ of replevin with RTC-Cagayan. The trial
court issued a warrant of seizure to take hold of the van and its contents.

Deputy Sheriff Magumun enforced the warrant and took the van
without permission from the DENR employees and officials.

Issue:

Whether or not the conduct of the Deputy Sheriff was proper in

enforcing the warrant of seizure to the vehicle which was already been
forfeited by the government and now was in custodia legis.

Ruling:

No, the conduct of the Deputy Sheriff was not proper.

The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) noted that Rule No. 60
of the Rules of Court, as amended, was silent on what should be done when
the sheriff is informed by the defendant in replevin that the personal
property to be seized has been forfeited in favor of the government and is
already in custodia legis.

The Court ruled that the appropriate action should have been for the
Deputy Sheriff to inform his Judge of the situation by way of partial Sheriffs
Return and wait for instructions on the proper procedure to be observed.