Name: Waqas Tanvir

Roll Number: R450217136

SAP ID: 500060593
Promotion of International Nuclear Safety and Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons
Preventing nuclear weapons proliferation and reducing the threat of nuclear and radiological
terrorism around the world are key U.S national security strategic objectives that require
constant vigilance.1NNSA’s office of Defence Nuclear Non-proliferation works globally to
prevent state and non-state actors from developing nuclear weapons or acquiring weapons
usable nuclear or radiological materials, equipment, technology and expertise.2

Title 50 of United States Code Section 2575 (50 U.S.C & 2575) says, “The NNSA
administrator shall develop and annually update a five year management plan for activities
associated with the defence nuclear non-proliferation programs of the administration to
prevent and counter the proliferation of materials, technology, equipment, and expertise
related to nuclear and radiological weapons in order to minimise and address the risk of
nuclear terrorism and the proliferation of such weapons”.3

Global and Regional Nuclear and Radiological Proliferation

“Effective nuclear non-proliferation and arms control measures can support USA, allied and
partner security by controlling the spread of nuclear materials and technology; placing limits
on the production, stockpiling, and deployment of nuclear weapons; reducing misperception
and miscalculation; and avoiding destabilizing nuclear arms competition.”4

According to NNSA and USA, global and regional nuclear proliferation presents a variety of
enduring and emerging risks and these are as follows:-

1. States with existing nuclear weapons capabilities, such as Russia and China, will
continue to modernise their arsenals posing nuclear monitoring challenges and also it
challenges the strategic stability, future arms control, and non-proliferation. Other

1
Aims and Objectives of NNSA, www.energy.gov/nnsa/missions/nonproliferation
2
Duties of NNSA, www.energy.gov/nnsa/missions
3
Section 2575 TITLE 50 UNITED STATE CODE 50 U.S.C & 2575
4
Rick Perry, United States Secretary of Energy
 states with emerging or latent capabilities such as the Democratic People’s Republic
of Korea and Iran, pose other challenges and such challenges include the need to
verify and efficiently implement a potential denuclearization agreement on the Korean
peninsula and detecting and characterizing proliferation activities in Iran. This
triggers the risk of illicit transfers of sensitive nuclear materials, technology, and
expertise may increase. Monitoring for such possibilities will continue to stress
proliferation detection capabilities and reinforce the need for the United States to
maintain nuclear fuel cycle expertise to detect novel signatures of weapons
development.
2. Russian and Chinese state owned enterprises are adopting a competitive posture
towards unclear reactor exports to the developing world which could challenge the
ability of the United States to achieve its non-proliferation objectives and maintain
international norms.
3. Nuclear crisis escalation, including between the United States and its global
competitors such as Russia and China, as well as in regions such as South Asia, will
pose risks particularly as weapons stockpiles are modernised or expanded, and as new
destabilizing capabilities or use doctrines are introduced. Transparency and
confidence building measures will be challenged to attenuate these risks.
4. Strains on the non-proliferation and arms control regimes will pose more serious
risks, whether considering the future of the US-Russia New Start nuclear arms control
agreement, Russian material breach of the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF)
treaty and consequent US withdrawal from INF, continued Chinese resistance to
nuclear transparency and arms control negotiations, or challenges posed to continued
success of the nearly 50 year old treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
(NPT) by the newly negotiated treaty on the prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.

Nuclear & Radiological Terrorism

“We must prevent nuclear weapons and materials from coming into the hands of terrorists
and being used against us, or anywhere in the world.”5

The potential for nuclear terrorism continues to pose a serious threat to the United States and
to international security and stability. For example:

5
Donald J. Trump, President of United States of America
 1. Foreign terrorist organisations in dozens of groups and countries threaten local and
regional USA interests. Despite having experienced significant setbacks in recent
years, some of these groups remain intent on striking the USA homeland.
2. Despite significant USA led efforts to implement sustainable global materials
security, the security of nuclear or radioactive materials could nonetheless be at risk,
particularly in situations of loss of a state’s control of its territory.
3. Insider threats at nuclear facilities around the world increase the risk of nuclear
material falling into the wrong hands.
4. Radioactive materials will be increasingly prevalent as many developing countries
seek to use peaceful applications of radiation at medical, academic and industrial
facilities. Sustainable radioactive material protection efforts and efforts to identify
alternative technologies will need to keep pace.
5. Loss of control of a nuclear or radiological weapon would pose a particularly grave
risk. Nuclear search, render safe, and consequence management capabilities would be
challenged. In the event of a nuclear terrorism incident, rapid and accurate nuclear
forensic capabilities would be called upon to support attribution.

NNSA Plan to Prevent, Counter, and Respond to the Challenges of Nuclear &
Radiological Proliferation & Terrorism

The NNSA strategic vision identifies five missions:-

1. Maintain the safety, security and effectiveness of the Nation’s nuclear deterrent
2. Reduce global nuclear & radiological security threats and strengthen the nuclear
enterprise
3. Provide safe and effective integrated nuclear propulsion systems for the US navy
4. Strengthen key science, technology and engineering capabilities
5. Modernise the national security infrastructure.6

The office of Defence Nuclear Non-proliferation (DNN) has worked to stop non-state actors
and would be proliferant states from developing nuclear weapons or acquiring WUNM,
equipment, technology and expertise to create an improvised nuclear devise. Failure to do so
would be catastrophic for the United States, and its allies and partners.7

6
NNSA’s EFFORTS TO PREVENT NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, FY2020_NPCR
7
Prevent, Counter, and Respond: NNSA PLAN TO REDUCE GLOBAL NUCLEAR THREATS (FY
2020-FY 2024) pg no.: 2-2
The Defence Nuclear Non-proliferation (DNN) comprises of four program offices that are
designed to be flexible and responsive to an enduring and dynamic threat environment:-

1. The office of Global Material Security: This office supports the NNSA strategic goal
of securing nuclear and radioactive material and the interdiction and investigation of
the trafficking of those materials to reduce the risk of nuclear proliferation and
nuclear and radiological terrorism. GMS executes this mission by working with
partner countries to increase the security of nuclear and radioactive materials, as well
as to improve the partner countries’ abilities to detect, disrupt and investigate illicit
nuclear trafficking.
2. The office of International Nuclear Security (INS): It works to strengthen the security
of nuclear materials and facilities worldwide. This mission is executed with partner
countries through nuclear security system upgrades, which include cyber security
systems as well as related training.
3. The office of Radiological Security (ORS): It works worldwide with domestic and
international partners, such as hospitals, universities, industry, and research institutes,
to enhance the security of vulnerable radioactive sources that could be used by
terrorists in a radiological dispersal device (RDD) or radiological explosive device
(RED). This is done through three strategies, protect, remove and reduce. Radioactive
sources needed for vital medical, research and commercial purposes are protected
through physical security enhancement, training to quicken response time to improve
security system effectiveness, and collaboration with industry on security-by –design,
which incorporates security into the design stage to ensure that radiological devices
and facilities are more secure storage or dispositioned.
4. The Office of Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence (NSDD) works with
partner countries to detect, disrupt, and investigate the smuggling of nuclear and other
radioactive materials that could be used in acts of terrorism.

Accomplishments of NNSA

1. Trained over 6,700 law enforcements and responders on alarm response.

2. Involved over 70 partner countries to build their capabilities to detect, disrupt, and
investigate smuggling of nuclear and radioactive materials.
3. Secured 87 buildings with high risk radioactive material in 24 countries, including 42
buildings in the United States itself.
 4. Conducted over 100 bilateral and multilateral nuclear and radiological security
workshops, including a workshop on mitigating insider threats with Argentina, a
workshop on design basis threat with Brazil, and the first IAEA International Training
Course on cyber security for nuclear facilities.

Future Program Plans of NNSA

1. Remove additional excess and unwanted sealed radioactive sources from locations in
the United States.
2. Continue ongoing nuclear security capacity building cooperation in at least 20 high-
priority countries and annually initiate capacity building cooperation in up to 13
additional countries.
3. Develop and implement cyber security training courses and technical exchanges to
collaborate with international partners on cyber security best practices for nuclear and
radiological facilities.
4. Provide flexible radiation detection systems for targeted screening of small maritime
vessels and at high priority airports in the Middle East, Africa and Asia.
5. Expand support for the voluntary replacement of high activity radioactive sources
with non-radio isotopic based technologies.
6. Work with up to 16 partners to strengthen foreign partner nuclear forensic
capabilities.
7. Complete development of fundamental material protection, control, and accounting
curriculum for a national nuclear security training centre in Kazakhstan and complete
development of nuclear security training centre in Argentina.
8. Continue to collaborate with industry on security by design and security standards.