DOCTRINE: Protection of laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification.

The classification to be reasonable, (1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane
to the purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; (4) must apply
equally to all members of the same class.                     

FACTS:

1. Respondent Cayat, native of Baguio, Benguet and a member of the non-Christian tribe
was found guilty of violating sections 2 and 3 of Act No. 1639 for possessing an intoxicating
liquor (one bottle of gin) which is not a native wine.
2. Section 2 of the said act prohibits any native of the Philippines who is a member of the
non-Christian tribe to buy, receive and possess any intoxicating liquor other than their so-called
native wines. Consequently, Section 3 thereof provides for its punishment.
3. Cayat challenges the constitutionality of Act No. 1639 on the grounds that it is
discriminatory and denies the equal protection of the laws, violative of the due process and it is
an improper exercise of police power.
ISSUES:

1. Whether the Act No. 1639 violates the equal protection clause?
RULING:

  No, the Act No. 1639 is not violative of the equal protection clause.
 Equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable
classifications. The classification to be reasonable, (1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2)
must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only;
(4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.
 Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. On the first requisite, the classification rests
on real and substantial distinctions. The non-Christian tribes refer not to the religious belief, but
in a way to the geographical and more directly to the natives of the Philippines of a low grade of
civilization. Second, Act No. 1639 was designed to insure peace and order among the non-
Christian tribes. The experience of the past and the lower court observed that the use of highly
intoxicating liquors by the non-Christian tribes often resulted in lawlessness and crimes, which
hamper the efforts of the Government to raise their standard of life and civilization. Third, the
said act is intended to apply for all times as long as the conditions exist. Legislature understood
that civilization of a people is a slow process and that hand in hand with it must go measures of
protection and security. Fourth, the act applies equally to all members of same class.

The People of the Philippines vs. Romeo Doriquez

G. R. Nos. L-24444-45, July 26, 1968
Castro, J:

Facts:

The Accused Romeo Doriquez, on August, 28, 1964, was charged with the offense of grave oral
defamation and six days later, or on September 3, 1964, the same Doriquez was indicted before the
same court for discharge of firearm, committed.

Upon arraignment, he pleaded not guilty to the two indictments. He moved to dismiss both
informations, claiming that (1) the court a quo has no jurisdiction over the offense of grave oral
defamation in virtue of Republic Act 3828 which enlarged the original exclusive jurisdiction of city
and municipal courts; and (2) the institution of the criminal action for discharge of firearm places him
in double jeopardy or he had already been in jeopardy once in the municipal court of Batad, Iloilo
which dismissed, without his consent, the information charging him with the offense of alarm and
scandal.

The court denied the motion to dismiss. The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by
the trial court in its order of March 20, 1965.
 Issues: Whether accused Doriquez was placed in double jeopardy by charging the offense of
discharge of firearm.

Held: No. For double jeopardy to attach in his favor, the accused must prove, among other things,
that there is "identity of offenses." It is altogether evident, however, that the offense of discharge of
firearm is not the crime of alarm and scandal, nor is it an attempt or a frustration of the latter felony.
Neither may it be asserted that every crime of discharge of firearm produces the offense of alarm and
scandal.

Nor could the reverse situation be true, for the less grave felony of discharge of firearm does not
include or subsume the offense of alarm and scandal which is a light felony. Although the indictment
for alarm and scandal filed under Article 155 of the Revised Penal Code and the information for
discharge of firearm instituted under article 258 of the same Code are closely related in fact (as the two
apparently arose from the same factual setting, the firing of a revolver by the accused being a common
element), they are definitely diverse in law.

Firstly, the two indictments do not describe the same felony - alarm and scandal is an offense
against public order while discharge of firearm is a crime against persons. Secondly, the indispensable
element of the former crime is the discharge of a firearm calculated to cause alarm or danger to the
public, while the gravamen of the latter is the discharge of a firearm against or at a certain person,
without intent to kill. The plea of double jeopardy cannot therefore be accorded merit, as the two
indictments are perfectly distinct in point of law howsoever closely they may appear to be connected in
fact. It is a cardinal rule that the protection against double jeopardy may be invoked only for the same
offense or identical offense.

The instant appeal is premature, and the present appeal is dismissed. This case is hereby ordered
remanded to the court of origin for immediate trial on the merits.

Imelda Romualdez-Marcos vs Commission on Elections and Cirilo Roy Montejo

G.R. No. 119976, September 18, 1995
Kapunan, J:

Facts:

Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
Representative of the First District of Leyte in 1995, providing that her residence in the place was
seven (7) months.

On March 23, 1995, Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District of
Leyte and also a candidate for the same position filed a petition for cancellation and disqualification
with the COMELEC charging Marcos as she did not comply with the constitutional requirement for
residency as she lacked the Constitution’s one-year residency requirement for candidates for the House
of Representative.

In her Amended Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, the petitioner changed seven months to since
childhood under residency. Thus, the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied. In said
Answer, petitioner averred that the entry of the word "seven" in her original Certificate of Candidacy
was the result of an "honest misinterpretation" 10 which she sought to rectify by adding the words
"since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy and that "she has always
maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence.

On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing petitioner’s proclamation
showing that she obtained the highest number of votes in the congressional elections in the First
District of Leyte.

The COMELEC reversed itself and issued a second Resolution directing that the proclamation of
petitioner be suspended in the event that she obtains the highest number of votes.

In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May 1995, Marcos claimed that she was the overwhelming
winner of the elections based on the canvass completed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers.

Issues:

Whether the petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the First Distritc of Leyte for a
period of one year at the time of the May 9, 1995 elections.

Held:

Yes. The court is in favor of a conclusion supporting petitioner’s claim of legal residence or
domicile in the First District of Leyte.

In Ong vs. Republic  this court took the concept of domicile to mean an individual's "permanent
home", "a place to which, whenever absent for business or for pleasure, one intends to return, and
depends on facts and circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent." 21 Based on the foregoing,
domicile includes the twin elements of "the fact of residing or physical presence in a fixed place"
and animus manendi, or the intention of returning there permanently.

An individual does not lose his domicile even if he has lived and maintained residences in
different places. In the case at bench, the evidence adduced by private respondent plainly lacks the
degree of persuasiveness required to convince this court that an abandonment of domicile of origin in
favor of a domicile of choice indeed occurred. To effect an abandonment requires the voluntary act of
relinquishing petitioner's former domicile with an intent to supplant the former domicile with one of
her own choosing (domicilium voluntarium).

It cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a
result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952. For there is a clearly
established distinction between the Civil Code concepts of "domicile" and "residence." 

Even assuming for the sake of argument that petitioner gained a new "domicile" after her
marriage and only acquired a right to choose a new one after her husband died, petitioner's acts
following her return to the country clearly indicate that she not only impliedly but expressly chose her
domicile of origin (assuming this was lost by operation of law) as her domicile.

WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications
to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's
questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE.
Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim
petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.

Agapito A. Aquino vs Commission on Elections, Move Makati, Mateo Bedon and Juanito Icaro

G.R. No. 120265 September 18, 1995

Kapunan, J:

Facts:

When Agapito Aquino ran for the position of Representative for the new Second Legislative District of
Makati City, he provided in his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) that he has resided in Palm Village,
Makati City for the past 10 months. A petition to disqualify Aquino was filed on the ground that he
lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for congressman which, under Section 6, Art. VI of
the 1987 Constitution, should be for a period not less than one year immediately preceding the May 8,
1995 elections. Aquino filed another COC this time stating that he had resided in the constituency
where he sought to be elected for one year and thirteen days. A hearing was conducted by the
COMELEC n the disqualification case wherein Aquino presented a lease contract to prove his
residency. On the basis thereof, the Comelec declared Aquino eligible to run.

The opposing parties filed an MR to the Comelec en banc. Meanwhile, elections were held and
Aquino garnered the highest vote for his district. However, the Comelec En Banc, acting on the MR,
declared Aquino disqualified as a candidate for lack of the residence qualification and enjoined his
proclamation as winning candidate. Aquino filed a certiorari petition with the Supreme Court
questioning (1) the jurisdiction of Comelec to order the suspension of his proclamation. Aquino
contends that after the elections, it was no longer Comelec but the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET) that has jurisdiction over the disqualification case; and (2) the legal impossibility of
enforcing the one year residency requirement of congressional candidates in this case since he was
running for a newly created political district which was only existing for barely four months; and (3)
the propriety of COMELEC in instructing the Board of Canvassers of Makati City to proclaim as
winner the candidate receiving the next higher number of votes.

Issue:

Whether COMELEC's finding of non-compliance with the residency requirement of 1 year

against the petitioner is valid.

HELD:

Yes, COMELEC's finding of non-compliance with the residency requirement of 1 year against the
petitioner is valid.

Petitioner in his Certificate of Candidacy, indicated not only that he was a resident of San Jose,
Concepcion, Tarlac in 1992 but that he was a resident of the same for 52 years immediately preceding
that election. His certificate indicated that he was also a registered voter of the same district. His birth
certificate places Concepcion, Tarlac as the birthplace of both of his parents Benigno and Aurora.
Thus, what stands consistently clear and unassailable is that this domicile of origin was Concepcion,
Tarlac.

The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident in his leasing a
condominium unit instead of buying one. While a lease contract maybe indicative of respondent's
intention to reside in Makati City it does not engender the kind of permanency required to prove
abandonment of one's original domicile especially since, by its terms, it is only for a period of two (2)
years, and respondent Aquino himself testified that his intention was really for only one (l) year
because he has other "residences" in Manila or Quezon City.

While property ownership is not and should never be an indicia of the right to vote or to be voted
upon, the fact that petitioner himself claims that he has other residences in Metro Manila coupled with
the short length of time he claims to be a resident of the condominium unit in Makati indicate that the
sole purpose of transferring his physical residence is not to acquire's new residence or domicile but
only to qualify as a candidate for Representative of the 2nd District of Makati City.
Finally, petitioner's submission that it would be legally impossible to impose the one year residency
requirement in a newly created political district is specious and lacks basis in logic. A new political
district is not created out of thin air. It is carved out from part of a real and existing geographic area, in
this case the old Municipality of Makati.

Wherefore, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. Our Order
restraining respondent COMELEC from proclaiming the candidate garnering the next highest number
of votes in the congressional elections for the Second District of Makati City is made PERMANENT.