[summary] important to the topic:

Accused was found guilty of rape by the RTC and sentenced him to suffer reclusion perpetua.
The CA, however, affirmed but modified the punishment and imposed death penalty. Hence, a
review in the Supreme Court. SC ruled that CA erred in not appreciating the Accused’s age as a
mitigating circumstance. It cannot be absolutely determined with certainty that the Accused
was already 18 years old during the commission of the crime, since there were discrepancies in
the facts provided by the prosecution. SC opted to resolve in favor of the accused. As a
consequence, the presence of the mitigating circumstance lowered the penalty from death to
reclusion perpetua.

FACTS:

A complaint for acts of lasciviousness was filed against accused and upon review of the
evidence by the prosecutor the charge was upgraded to rape. The prosecution alleged that
accused-appellant committed the crime of rape against AAA who was then 5 years old.

[Narration of the event] AAA was playing with her cousin and two other children in a neighbor’s
house when accused invited her to the backyard of the house and raped here. AAA’s cousin
witnessed what happened.

[Procedural History] The RTC found accused-appellant guilty and imposed the penalty of
reclusion perpetua as well as civil indemnity of P50,000.00 and moral damages of P50,000.00.
The record of the case was forwarded to the SC for automatic review, but pursuant to a
modification in the Rules on Criminal Procedure, it was transferred to the CA for appropriate
action and disposition. The CA affirmed the conviction but modified the penalty imposed to
death and increased the civil indemnity to P75,000.00 and awarded exemplary damages of
P25,000.00 aside from the P50,000.00 for moral damages. The case was elevated to the SC for
further review.

For his defense, Accused-appellant denied having committed the crime and interposed the
following:
1.) The inconsistency in the testimonies of AAA and her cousin
2.) The inability of AAA to recall the exact date when the crime was committed
3.) The delay in filing the case (the case was filed 4 years after the alleged rape was committed)
4.) Absence of proof of force or intimidation
5.) Medical report on negative lacerations

ISSUE: Whether or not Sarcia is liable for rape?

HELD:
1.) As it is oft-repeated, inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses, which refer only to
minor details and collateral matters, do not affect the veracity and weight of their testimonies
where there is consistency in relating the principal occurrence and the positive identification of
the accused. Slight contradictions in fact even serve to strengthen the credibility of the
witnesses and prove that their testimonies are not rehearsed. The alleged inconsistencies in
this case are too inconsequential to overturn the findings of the court a quo. What is important
is that the two prosecution witnesses were one in saying that it was accused-appellant who
sexually abused AAA.

2.) Failure to recall the exact date of the crime, however, is not an indication of false testimony,
for even discrepancies regarding exact dates of rapes are inconsequential and immaterial and
cannot discredit the credibility of the victim as a witness. It is not an essential element for the
crime.

3.) The rape victim's delay or hesitation in reporting the crime does not destroy the truth of the
charge nor is it an indication of deceit. It is common for a rape victim to prefer silence for fear
of her aggressor and the lack of courage to face the public stigma of having been sexually
abused. In the absence of other circumstances that show that the charge was a mere
concoction and impelled by some ill motive, delay in the filing of the complainant is not
sufficient to defeat the charge.

4.) Statutory rape does not require force, intimidation, or lack of consent which are not
elements. The only subject of inquiry is whether “carnal knowledge” took place.

5.) Court has consistently ruled that the presence of lacerations in the victim's sexual organ is
not necessary to prove the crime of rape and its absence does not negate the fact of rape. A
medical report is not indispensable in a prosecution for rape.

There was also a shallow hypothesis put forward by accused-appellant that he was accused of
raping AAA due to the instigation of the grandmother of one of his alleged victim (he was
detained for an on-going murder trial at that time). SC dismissed the defense as absurd and
illogical.

The guilt of accused-appellant was established beyond reasonable doubt.

[PENALTY OF THE ACCUSED; IMPORTANT]

Under the said law, the penalty of death shall be imposed when the victim of rape is a child
below seven years of age. In this case, as the age of AAA, who was 5 years old at the time the
rape was committed, was alleged in the information and proven during trial.

However, the Court found ground for modifying the penalty imposed by the CA. “We cannot
agree with the CA's conclusion that the accused-appellant cannot be deemed a minor at the
time of the commission of the offense to entitle him to the privileged mitigating circumstance
of minority pursuant to Article 68 (2) of the Revised Penal Code. When accused appellant
testified on March 14, 2002, he admitted that he was 24 years old, which means that in 1996,
he was 18 years of age. As found by the trial court, the rape incident could have taken place "in
any month and date in the year 1996." Since the prosecution was not able to prove the exact
date and time when the rape was committed, it is not certain that the crime of rape was
committed on or after he reached 18 years of age in 1996. In assessing the attendance of the
mitigating circumstance of minority, all doubts should be resolved in favor of the accused, it
being more beneficial to the latter. In fact, in several cases, this Court has appreciated this
circumstance on the basis of a lone declaration of the accused regarding his age.”

Under Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, when the offender is a minor under 18 years, the
penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper
period. However, for purposes of determining the proper penalty because of the privileged
mitigating circumstance of minority, the penalty of death is still the penalty to be reckoned
with. Thus, the proper imposable penalty for the accused-appellant is reclusion perpetua.

[NOT IMPORTANT; PERO BAKA MATANONG LANG]

RA 9344 (Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006) took effect while the case was pending
before the SC. No suspension of sentence. The promulgation of the sentence of conviction of
accused-appellant by the RTC cannot be suspended as he was about 25 years of age at that
time. Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344 provides for the automatic suspension of sentence of a child in
conflict with the law, even if he/she is already 18 years of age or more at the time he/she is
found guilty of the offense charged. However, Sec. 40 of the same law limits the said
suspension of sentence until the said child reaches the maximum age of 21. Thus, the
application of Secs. 38 and 40 to the suspension of sentence is now moot and academic.
However, accused-appellant shall be entitled to appropriate disposition under Sec. 51 of R.A.
No. 9344 which provides for confinement of convicted children.

[summary/doctrine] important to the topic:

Accused was found guilty of violating R.A. No. 7610 (Special Protection Of Children Against
Abuse, Exploitation And Discrimination Act). RTC sentenced him to suffer the maximum penalty
prescribed. CA, however, modified it to the minimum penalty as there was no modifying
circumstances. Accused questioned the penalty, it not being within the RPC, alternatively the
lower penalty in the RPC should apply (Physical Injuries). SC ruled that there are instances when
the penalties provided for in a special law adopt the nomenclature of the penalties under the
RPC. In such cases, the ascertainment of the indeterminate sentence will be based on the rules
applied for those crimes punishable under the RPC.

FACTS:
[Narration for the prosecution] Shiva (Offended Party) and the petitioner were classmates at
BNHS. When Shiva and her group were sewing inside the classroom the petitioner, who was
then under the influence of alcohol, arrived. The petitioner started to attack his classmates. The
rest of them ran away, but the petitioner went after them. He boxed Shiva on her left flank
leaving the latter with a fractured rib. Shiva passed out and was thereafter taken to the
hospital, where she stayed for two days. Before finally leaving, the petitioner also boxed Dennis
Kenept (Dennis). Back then, Shiva was 14 years old, while the petitioner was 19. The petitioner
dropped out from BNHS after the incident.

[Narration for the defense] One of their classmates threw an object at the petitioner's back.
The petitioner reacted by boxing that classmate. When the petitioner stepped out of the room,
Dennis followed him and a fist fight ensued between the two. Shiva came to pacify them, but
she was shoved, causing her to fall to the ground. The petitioner posited that since he and
Dennis were grappling at that time, there cannot be any certainty as to who actually injured
Shiva.

Procedural History:
RTC found the accused in violation of R.A. No. 7610 (Special Protection Of Children Against
Abuse, Exploitation And Discrimination Act) and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment of four
(4) years, 9 months, and 11 days of prision correccional as minimum to seven (7) years and 4
months of prision mayor as maximum, and to pay [Shiva] the amount of P25,000.00 as
temperate damages.
CA affirmed the conviction but modified the penalty imposed and the damages awarded. They
instead sentenced the petitioner to suffer imprisonment of four (4) years, nine (9) months and
eleven (11) days of prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years, eight (8) months and one
(1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, and to pay Shiva actual damages in the amount of
P18,428.00. In the absence of any modifying circumstances, the much higher penalty should
not be imposed.

ISSUE:
1.) [Issue not important] Whether or not CA erred in ruling that the injury inflicted on Shiva was
intentional and deliberate, and applying the much higher penalty provided for under Section 10
of R.A. No. 7610, instead of Article 265 of the RPC for slight physical injuries?
2.) [Important to the topic] Whether or not Section 10 of R.A. No. 7610 penalizes acts of child
abuse which are not covered by the RPC, that assuming arguendo that the petitioner caused
Shiva's injury, Article 265 of the RPC should instead be applied?

HELD:
1.) The petitioner was convicted of violation of Section 10 (a), Article VI of R.A. No. 7610, a
special law. Physical abuse of a child is inherently wrong, rendering material the existence of a
criminal intent on the part of the offender. In the petitioner's case, criminal intent is not
wanting. Even if the Court were to consider for argument's sake the petitioner's claim that he
had no design to harm Shiva, when he swung his arms, he was not performing a lawful act. He
clearly intended to injure another person. Criminal liability shall be incurred by any person
committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended.

Article 265 of the RPC punishes physical injuries in general. On the other hand, R.A. No. 7610 is
intended to "provide special protection to children from all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty,
exploitation and discrimination and other conditions, prejudicial to their development.” It is
clear that Shiva was 14 years old when she received the blow, which fractured her rib. Being a
child, she is under the protective mantle of R.A. No. 7610, which punishes maltreatment of a
child, whether the same be habitual or not. Further, under R.A. No. 7610, stiffer penalties are
prescribed to deter and prevent violations of its provisions.

2.) There are instances when the penalties provided for in a special law adopt the
nomenclature of the penalties under the RPC. In such cases, the ascertainment of the
indeterminate sentence will be based on the rules applied for those crimes punishable under
the RPC.

Although R.A. No. 7610 is a special law, the rules in the [RPC] for graduating penalties by
degrees or determining the proper period should be applied. Thus, where the special law
adopted penalties from the [RPC], the [Indeterminate Sentence Law] will apply just as it would
in felonies.

In the petitioner's case, the maximum imposable penalty is prision mayor in its minimum
period. The minimum period is further subdivided into three. As to the minimum of the
indeterminate sentence, Section 1 of the IS Law provides that it shall be within the range of the
penalty next lower to that prescribed for the offense. As there were no established attendant
mitigating or aggravating circumstances, CA imposed the minimum indeterminate penalty
within the allowable range, and the Court now finds no compelling reason to modify the
same.