Some Implications of Genetic Mutation: Toward a More Natural Theology

By Jan C. Heller

The Problem
5Following the theologian and physicist Ian Barbour, David H. Smith characterizes the ideal
relationship between theology and the natural sciences in terms of dialogue.1 With this
characterization, Smith suggests (among other things) that each field has sufficient integrity
on its own to warrant a respectful treatment by participants in the other, but not enough to
justify compartmentalizing or isolating one from the other. Said differently, Smith claims that
10each field has its own contribution to make to the dialogue, but that each ought to be open to
input and critique from the other.
I accept this characterization, but want to explore some implications of it for Christian
theology and ethics that Smith does not pursue. For when Christians engage in a genuine
dialogue with the natural sciences in the sense that Barbour and Smith understand it, questions
15can be raised concerning whether and, if so, how and to what extent, the findings of these
sciences affect our fundamental conceptions of God and God's purposes for creation and
humankind. My motivation for raising such questions arises from observing how Christians
too often evaluate developments in the natural sciencesthey do so exactly as Barbour and
Smith suggest we ought not. That is, Christians too often evaluate the findings in the natural
20sciences solely in terms of their own, prior faith-commitments, holding these normatively
constant as it were, and appropriating only those scientific findings that do not directly
challenge these prior commitments. However, if a genuine dialogue is to take place between
participants in these fields, Christians must be willing to consider how the findings of the
natural sciences might lead them to re-evaluate their commitments, perhaps even to the point
25of reconceptualizing or relinquishing some of their most fundamental and cherished beliefs.
Given the limitations of space for this article, I will here simply try to illustrate how such
questions arise as a problem internal to Christian theology, and then sketch some implications
of them for theology and ethics. To do this, I will utilize one of several possible issues arising
with our current understanding of evolutionary theory, namely, the mechanism of genetic
30mutation. In the end, I suggest that such implications drive us to reconsider what has
traditionally been called "natural theology."
How the Problem Arises
Smith correctly points outs that the three traditional sources of authority for Christians
generally, and Anglicans particularly, are scripture, tradition, and what he calls the "standards
35of rational or coherent thought." The third source is often characterized in terms of human
experience understood in its broadest sense. It can thus include not only the widely accepted
standards of rationality that Smith discusses, but also the widely accepted empirical and
theoretical findings of the natural sciences as well .2 In this way, then, the findings of the
natural sciences can be viewed as one authoritative source (among others) for Christian
40theology, and this because knowledge of the natural or "created" world presumably permits us
to infer something about God as Creator and about God's purposes as Creator and Sustainer
for creation and humankind.
Of course, just what substantively the natural sciences permit us to infer about God and God's
purposes have been and continue to be matters of much debate. I take up this issue
45momentarily. Here, I want to suggest that we not overlook the importance of this claim. For

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 the claim that the findings of the natural sciences permit us to infer something about God and
God's purposes for creation and humankind suggests (in principle, at least) that the findings of
these sciences can be viewed as a concern internal to Christian theology. This view is in
contrast (perhaps since Copernicus) to the way the sciences have too often been viewed by
5Christians, namely, as a concern external to theology and one that raises questions from which
Christian beliefs must be insulated. (Happily, one can find a number of exceptions to this
observation, but it still holds as a generalization, I think.) In any case, if it can be accepted that
the findings of the natural sciences are properly viewed as a concern internal to Christian
theology, then the question of whether these findings can affect our fundamental conceptions
10of God and God's purposes for creation and humankind is not really at issue. They can and do.
The more interesting and vexing question, then, is the substantive one, namely, how and to
what extent these conceptions are affected.
This substantive question typically arises when the three authoritative sources for Christian
theology conflict-in our case, when the centrally held interpretations of scripture and the
15tradition conflict with interpretations of human experience as they are represented in the
widely accepted findings of the natural sciences.3 1 qualify "interpretations of scripture and
the tradition" with "centrally held," and the "findings of the natural sciences" with "widely
accepted," in recognition of the fact that none of the participants in this dialogue can claim
final certainty for his or her interpretations or findings, but that some of these are nevertheless
20so central or basic to the ongoing development of the fields that they enjoy a status that is now
rarely questioned. Such conflicts may be construed as a theological problem for Anglicans
precisely to the extent that Smith is correct (and I think he is) in asserting that, "We
[Anglicans] have always been attracted to the notion of the unity of truth," that is, to the
notion that these sources, if properly understood, would not finally conflict.
25This said, I submit that one centrally held interpretation of Christians is the claim that God's
purposes for creation include a special concern for humankind, both collectively and
individually, and that one widely accepted finding of the biological sciences is the mechanism
of genetic mutation as it is understood in contemporary evolutionary theory. I further submit,
however, that this Christian interpretation and this scientific finding may be in such confict
30with each other that they cannot be held coherently in the same theological construal of
reality.
Construing Genetic Mutation as a Theological Problem
In his intriguing book Human Evolution, Reproduction, and Morality ,4 Lewis Petrinovich
suggests that genetic mutation is only one of five basic biological phenomena that that we
35need to understand in order to grasp the central claims of contemporary evolutionary theory.
The others are inheritance, natural selection, isolation, and genetic drift. Here, however, we
need focus only on the role that genetic mutation plays in the evolution of life, and this only in
a very general sense. The point I am interested in highlighting has to do with why genetic
mutations are absolutely necessary for life to survive on this or any other planet.
40Genetic mutation refers simply to the random, spontaneous changes that are introduced into
an individual organism's genotype. These changes may be introduced in a variety of ways, and
they may or may not be evident in the organism's phenotype. Natural selection works on the
phenotypic level, and those mutations that manifest themselves on this level are sorted
generally by how well they increase the reproductive success of the individual organism and
45its offspring. Thus, whether a genetic mutation is "selected" depends on a number of complex
factors in both the cellular and extra-cellular environments of the organism. Petrinovich puts it
this way:

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 To understand the action of genes at an adequate level one must understand the structure and
characteristics of the environments in which particular genes are expressed because
environmental influences determine the range of reactions that are possible, in terms of
phenotypic expression?
5The implication of Petrinovich's statement is profound, for without genetic mutation life on
earth would not survive as the environment changes. This insight is commonplace for
biologists, but consider some of its implications for the theological and ethical questions
addressed during the Presiding Bishop's Consultation on Bioethics (8-9 June 1999,
Washington, D.C.).
10Our concern during the consultation was primarily directed toward the consequences of
current genetic research for humans, particularly those humans who suffer from anomalies
resulting from genetic mutations. If we, as Christians, accept that the continuation of human
life and the reduction of human suffering are goods warranted by our tradition, then current
genetic research is uncovering with everincreasing sophistication some of the molecular
15mechanisms by which we might realize these goods, at least in the long term. However, this
same research adds to our knowledge of evolution on the molecular level, and it suggests that
individual humans (along with individual members of all other species) must experience
genetic mutations if life on earth is to survive collectively. But of course, it is only the very
occasional mutation that proves beneficial (i.e., is selected) for the individual organism
20experiencing it. Given common environmental conditions at both the cellular and extra-
cellular levels, the vast majority of mutations do not contribute to the survival of individual
organisms or of life in general. Indeed, in humans, these mutations are the source of much
suffering and the principal justification for the massive research effort in molecular biology
now being conducted around the world. Nevertheless, were it not for these mutations, humans
25would not even exist, for all life would have died on this planet eons ago.
Genetic mutation, then, is not only a problem that Christians might be motivated to address in
therapeutic terms (because the continuation of human life and the reduction of human
suffering are viewed as goods), but also a problem that Christians may wish to address in
theological terms. The theological issues come into sharper relief when we put the
30environmental determinants of genetic mutation just discussed alongside the traditional
Christian claims that God is specially concerned with humankind as a species and as
individuals. Cast in this light, it appears that God, the presumed creator and sustainer of
genetic mutation as an evolutionary mechanism, is willing to permit untold numbers of
individual organisms to endure untold numbers of genetic mutations, the vast majority of
35which will not be beneficial relative to the organisms in question, in order to advance God's
purposes for life on earth collectively. And, as some commentators observe:
A God of unlimited power and goodness certainly could have created a world with somewhat
different laws than the present ones which would have produced the same results in the
biological world with the same mechanism of natural selection but without its present
40fantastic wastefulness. This could be done, e.g., by assuring a larger percentage of favorable
mutations. 6
Some Theological and Ethical Implications
Such issues raise a number of theological problems, but again I wish to focus on our
traditional notions of God's purposes for creation with respect to human flourishing. Is God as
45concerned as the tradition claims about human flourishing? Can the Christian claim that God
cares about humans (to the point of "loving" them) be sustained in light of what we know
about the role that genetic mutation plays in evolutionary theory? I suggest that these
questions can be addressed on both the collective and individual levels.

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 On the collective level, the mechanism of genetic mutation may or may not give us grounds to
question God's purposes for humankind, depending on how evolution is interpreted
theologically. For example, human existence and our current domination of other species are
commonly viewed by evolutionary theorists as an accident of evolution. We arose as a result
5of the complex, random forces of evolution, and we will eventually become extinct or evolve
into other forms of life in the same way. But others, perhaps most notably for Christians,
Teilhard de Chardin, argue that evolution can be understood teleologically. In this view,
evolution is said to lead quite naturally to the "higher" qualities represented in the human
species (though it must also be acknowledged that this same argument suggests that evolution
10might also lead humans to continue to evolve into other forms of life that are not recognizably
human). In any case, the first view-which has greater scientific support-may be impossible to
reconcile with Christian claims about God's special concern for humankind as a species. It
stands as a continuing challenge to the tradition's views on God's purposes for humankind.
The second view, however, enjoys some support among Christians, and is thought to be
15coherent with at least many traditional Christian claims about God's special concern for the
human species.
On the individual level, however, evolutionary theory may be utterly irreconcilable with
traditional Christian claims. Christians have always claimed that individual humans and their
suffering matter to God. This is perhaps best represented by pointing to the overall
20soteriological thrust of the tradition. Here, God-at great cost to God and for our benefit as
humans-is portrayed as directing the course of (post-fall) salvation history to the calling of
Israel as a chosen people, to the incarnation of God in Jesus Christ, to the founding of the
Church, and to the eventual restoration to some kind of (pre-fall or better) existence at the end
of history. And, while the salvation God provides for humans is always mediated through a
25community (i.e., a collectivity), it is clear that Christians have consistently claimed that God's
concern extends to the salvation of individuals. Obviously, however, the salvation that God
offers to individuals does not guarantee they will not suffer.
The problem of undeserved suffering or natural evil cannot be pursued in any depth here.
Suffice it to say that interpreting the implications of genetic mutation-even if we understand it
30on the collective level in terms of a teleologically biased evolutionary theory-suggests that
countless individuals (with most never surviving gestation) must suffer the effects of
countless deleterious mutations in order to advance God's purposes for life collectively. God
may "save" such individuals if they are human, or somehow compensate their suffering (if
such a thing were even conceivable) in an afterlife, but we are left wondering if God could not
35have achieved the same ends with less suffering.
There are also a number of ethical implications we could pursue in light of the above
discussion, but I believe the most important one concerns how these questions at least seem to
undercut central Christian claims regarding God's special concern for humankind, if not as a
species then at least as individuals. I discuss this ethical implication elsewhere as the "de-
40centering of the human person," building on the work of James M. Gustafson.7
The ethical problem such questions raise for Christians can be put starkly: Christians believe
that God can be viewed as benevolent at least to the extent that God has established the
conditions for life collectively to flourish on earth, and this includes human life. This belief (if
we ignore for now the theological analogue to the "naturalistic fallacy") provides Christians
45with ethical warrants to be concerned with how our actions affect those conditions that
promote and sustain life on earth, both now and in the future. Such warrants could include, for
example, a concern for the rise and extinction of species, global warming, and genetic
research both for scientific and therapeutic ends-all of which presumably contribute to our
understanding of how humans might work with God to promote God's purposes for creation

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 and humankind. However, in light of what we are learning about the evolutionary mechanisms
that God has evidently established in order to promote the flourishing of life on earth, it may
be that our traditional warrants concerning individual humans are undercut; that is, it may be
that we have warrants to treat individuals as means to some good end in the same way that
5God evidently treats individuals (or, perhaps better said, permits individuals to be treated),
namely, as a means to advance God's purposes. But of course, in traditional Christian terms,
without the prior consent of the human persons in question to be so treated, such actions
would represent a gross violation of their dignity.
Such ethical implications, when they cannot be rationalized (in the best sense of the term),
10create a possible dilemma for Christian theologians and ethicists with regard to the weight
they give to the sources of authority for theology when they conflict. Should we integrate the
widely accepted findings of the natural sciences into our fundamental conceptions of God and
God's purposes for creation and humankind when these findings conflict with centrally held
interpretations of scripture and tradition, or should we (irrationally) continue to hold these
15interpretations and perhaps risk the charge that we are doing so for self-interested reasons
(self-interested because they promote our favored view of reality)? This is not an easy choice
in my estimation, for the implications with which genetic research in general and genetic
mutation in particular confront us go "all -the way down," that is, to some of our most
cherished and basic Christian beliefs. Moreover, in trying to decide how much weight we
20should give scientific sources, we may need to reconsider the importance of what is typically
discussed as "natural theology." Largely ignored by most of the twentieth century's prominent
theologians, natural theology can be understood as theological reflection on the created order,
that is, as asking what might be inferred about God and God's purposes for humankind based
on observations of the created order. And if Smith is correct that we Anglicans seek the unity
25of truth, then integrating such observations into our theology is not only a matter of
intellectual integrity, but also a matter internal to theology itself. That is, it is a matter of
Christian faith itself, not a matter imposed on us by sources external to our faith. And this
makes it all the more urgent.
Notes
301 David H. Smith, "Creation, Preservation, and All the Blessings. . . " Anglican Theological
Review LXXXIA.
2 Of course, this category can also include other fields not considered here, for example,
history.
3 These sources can also conflict internally, but I do not consider this complication here.
354 See Lewis Petrinovich, Human Evolution, Reproduction, and Morality (Cambridge, MA:
The MIT Press, 1998), pp. 43-52.
5 Ibid., p. 44. Emphasis added.
6 P. Hare and E. Madden, Evil and the Concept of God (Springfield: Charles C. Thomas,
1968), pp. 54-55, quoted in Charles Taliaferro, Contemporary Philosophy of Religion
40 (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1998), p. 342.
7 Jan Christian Heller, Human Genome Research and the Challenge of Contingent Future
Persons: Toward an Impersonal Theocentric Approach to Value (Omaha: Creighton
University Press, 1996), pp. 132-136.
Jan C. Heller, Ph.D., is System Director, Office of Ethics and Theology, Sisters of Providence
45Health System based in Seattle.
Source: Anglican Theological Review, Fall 1999.

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