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Cover illustration: Frans Hals, Regentessen Oude lvIannenhuis, 1664, Frans
Halsmuseum Haarlem Table of Contents

Preface 9

1 The State of the Art in Argumentation Theory II

Frans H. van Eemeren

1.1The Study of Argumentation 11

1.2 Some Crucial Concepts 17

1.3 Overview of the Book 23
Bibliography 25

2 Points ofYiew 27
Peter Houtlosser

2.1 Introduction 27
2.2 Different Approaches to Points of View 28
2.2.1 Classical and Formal Dialectic 28
2.2.2 Pragma-Dialectics 30
2·2.3 Socio-Psychological Research of Persuasion 33
Cover design: Jaak Crasborn bno, Valkenburg aid Geul 2·2.4 Cognitive Research on Reasoning 34
Lay-out: Adriaan de longe,Amsterdam 2.2·5 Argumentative Discourse Analysis 35
2.2.6 Structuralist Informal Logic 36
NUG l 94 1 2.2·7 Procedural Informal Logic 38
ISBN 90 5356523 x 2.2.8 Advocacy and Debate 39
2·2.9 Communicative Action Theory 40
© Sic Sa t, Arnsterdani, 2001 2·3 Starting Points for Further Research 42
/\
Bibliography 48
All rights reserved. Without limiting the rights under copyrights reserved above, no
part of this book may be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval system,
or transmitted, in any form or by any means (electronic, mechanical, photocopy,
recording, or otherwise) without the written permission of both the copyright owner
and the author of this book.
 3 Unexpressed Premises 51 5 Argumentation Structures 101
Susanne Gerritsen A. Francisca Snoeck Henkemans

3.1 Introduction 51 5·1 Introduction 101

3.2 Two Traditional Approaches 52 5·2 Historical Overview 102
3.3 The Deductive-Inductive Distinction 55 5.2.1 Classical Rhetoric 103
3.3. 1 Pluralism 55 5·2.2 Enlightenment Rhetoric 105
3.3.2 Modern Deductivism 57 5·2·3 The EarlyTextbooks 107
3.3.3 Neither Pluralist, nor Deductivist 59 5·3 Current Approaches 111
3-4 The Nature of the Unexpressed Premise 61 5·3·1 The Textbook Distinctions III
3+1 Confusion over Definitions 61 5·3·2 TheoreticalApproaches 119
3-4.2 The Unexpressed Premise as a Gap-Filler 65 5·4 Methods of Analysis in Doubtful Cases 124
3-4.3 Used or Needed Premise 67 5·5 Conclusion 126
3.5 The Role of Context 68 Bibliography 132
3.5.1 The Meaning of'Context' 69
3.5.2 The Position of the Analyst 71
3.6 Argument Schemes 72 6 Fallacies 135
3·7 Conclusion 74 Frans H. van Eemeren
Bibliography 76
6.1 Introduction 135
6.2 Brief History of the Study of Fallacies 136
4 Argument Schemes 81 6.2.1 The Aristotelian Approach to Fallacies 136
Bart Garssen 6.2.2 Idols and Sophisms 141
6.2·3 The Ad Fallacies 142
4.1 Introduction 81 6.2-4 Syllogistic and Inductive Fallacies 144
4.2 Argument Schemes and Finding Arguments 82 6.2·5 The Treatment of Fallacies in Logic Textbooks 145
4.2.1 The Classical Topical Tradition 82 6·3 Modern Theoretical Approaches to the Fallacies 149
4.2.2 Whately's Rhetoric 83 6.3. 1 Hamblin's Criticisms of the Standard Treatment 149
4.2.3 Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's New Rhetoric 84 6.3. 2 Post-Hamblin Treatments of the Fallacies 153
4.3 Argument Schemes and the Evaluation of Argumentation 86 6·3·3 The Woods-Walton Approach 154
4.3.1 American Textbooks on Academic Debate 86 6·3-4 The Formal-Dialectical Approach 156
4.3.2 Hastings' Classification of Types of Warrants 87 6·3·5 The Pragma-DialecticalApproach 157
4.3.3 Schellens' Reasonable Argument Forms 89 6·3·6 Walton's Pragmatic Approach 159
4.3-4 The Pragma-Dialectical Typology of Argument Schemes 91 Bibliography 161
4-4 Argument Schemes and the Description of Argumentative Discourse 93
4·5 Conclusion 94
Bibliography 98
 7 Argument Interpretation and Reconstruction 165
Preface
M. Agnes van Rees

7.1 Introduction 165

7. 2 Argument Interpretation 166
7. 2 . 1 General Characteristics of Discourse OrgamzatIOn
7.2. 2 Features of Argumentative Discourse 170
7. 2.3 Cognitive Processes 175
7.3 Argument Reconstruction 177
7.3.1 Logic 178
7.3.2 Informal Logic 179
7.3.3 Rhetoric 183
7.3-4 Pragma-Dialectics 185
7.4 Conclusion 190
Bibliography 193
8 Argumentation in the Field of Law 201
Eveline T. Feteris
8.1 Introduction 201
8.2 Different Approaches to Legal Argumentation 203
8.2.1 The Logical Approach 203
8.2.2 The Rhetorical Approach 204
8.2·3 The Dialogical Approach 208
8·3 Topics in the Research of Legal Argumentation
8.3. 1 The Philosophical Component 209
8.3. 2 The Theoretical Component 210
8.).3 The Analytical Component 211
8·3·4 The Empirical Component 212
8·3·5 The Practical Component 213
8.4 Conclusion 214
Bibliography 216
Index of Names 227
Index of Terms 230
The Contributors 237
. .
All argumentation theorists' contributions to the study of argumentation,
from whatever perspective they originate and whatever approach they advo-
cate, are aimed at furthering the development of argumentation theory.
Some of these contributions involve purportedly original and creative ampli-
fications of the discipline. They are all of vital importance to the advancement
of the study of argumentation. Other contributions such as translations of
scholarly insight and research findings from argumentation theory into lay
language, course books for students and surveys that offer would-be re-
searchers a systematic overview of central parts or aspects of the field, are also
indispensable to the vitality of the discipline but serve the discipline in a dif-
ferent way: Crucial Concepts in Argumentation Theoryaspires to belong to this
last category.
The research group of the Department of Speech Communication,
Argumentation Theory and Rhetoric at the University of Amsterdam intends
to contribute to the theoretical advancement of the study of argumentation
by developing a pragma-dialectical approach to argumentative discourse.
Among the results of their efforts published in English are Speech Acts in Ar-
gumentative Discussions and Argumentation, Communication and Fallacies
209
(Van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1984 and 1992, respectively), Analysing
Complex Argumentation (Snoeck Henkemans 1992), Studies in Pragma-Di-
alectics (edited by Van Eemeren and Grootendorst in 1994) and Recon-
structing Argumentative Discourse (Van Eemeren and Grootendorst, together
with Sally Jackson and Scott Jacobs, 1994). An introductory course book
based on pragma-dialectical insight is Argumentation by van Eemeren, Groo-
tendorst and Snoeck Henkemans (2001). And a general overview of the vari-
ous theoretical approaches to the study of argumentation from the past to the
present is provided in Fundamentals of Argumentation Theory, an interna-
tional co-production by Van Eemeren, Grootendorst, and Snoeck Henke-
mans with contributions by J. Anthony Blair, Ralph Johnson, Christian Plan-
tin, Douglas N. Walton, Charles A. Willard, John Woods, and David Zarefsky
(1996). The book was later followed by its legal equivalent, Fundamentals of
LegalArgumentation (Feteris 1999).
Crucial Concepts in Argumentation Theory relates most closely to publica-

9
8 TABLE OF CONTENTS
tions intended to be helpful to students of argumentation such as Argumenta-
tion and Fundamentals. The book consists of a series of overviews of the state
of the art in prominent research areas in the study of argumentation. The au-
thors, Frans H. van Eemeren, Peter Houtlosser, Susanne Gerritsen, Bart
Garssen, A. Francisca Snoeck Henkemans, M. Agnes van Rees and Eveline T.
Feteris, aim to provide readers with accurate surveys of the main views and
approaches favored in argumentation studies. Most of the contributions have
already been published in an earlier version of the journal Argumentation.
They have all been revised considerably for this book. The authors would like
to thank all of their colleagues in the community of argumentation scholars
constituted by the International Society for the Study of Argumentation
OSSA) for their help in the shaping of their ideas and texts. With regard to the
current project, they are particularly grateful to J. Anthony Blair, Trudy Govi-
er, Hans Hansen, Scott Jacobs, Erik C.W. Krabbe, Michael Leff, Leah Polcar,
Douglas N. Walton and John Woods, and to Paul Nagtegaal for his invaluable
technical help in preparing the manuscript for publication. May Crucial Con-
cepts in Argumentation Theory be a helpful aid and resource for students of ar-
gumentation.
Frans H. van Eemeren
Amsterdam, January 19, 2001
10 PREFACE
1 The State of the Art in Argumentation Theory
Frans H. van Eemeren
1.1 The Studyof Argumentation
A survey of crucial concepts in argumentation theory cannot proceed with-
out a short introduction regarding the state of argumentation scholarship.
What is the subject matter of the study of argumentation? Argumentation
can be defined as a verbal, social and rational activity aimed at convincing a
reasonable critic ofthe acceptability ofa standpoint by advancing a constellation
ofpropositions justifying or refuting the proposition expressed in the standpoint
(Van Eemeren et aI.1996). This definition does justice to the "process-product
ambiguity" of the word "argumentation" because it not only refers to the ac-
tivity of advancing reasons but also to the shorter or longer text that results
from it.
One of the essential characteristics of argumentation is that it always per-
tains to a specific point of view with regard to a certain issue. The speaker or
writer who advances argumentation defends this "standpoint" to a listener or
reader who doubts the acceptability of the standpoint or has a different stand-
point. The subsequent argumentation is aimed at convincing the listener or
reader of the acceptability of the standpoint. When someone advances argu-
mentation, that person makes an appeal to reasonableness and silently as-
sumes that the listener or reader will act as a reasonable critic when evaluating
the argumentation. Otherwise it would not make sense to advance a certain
line of argumentation.
It is the task of argumentation theorists to determine which soundness cri-
teria should be satisfied for the argumentation to be called r~asonable. Many
argumentation theorists inspired by logic, study argumentation for norma-
tive purposes. There are also argumentation theorists however who pursue
merely a descriptive goal. Linguistically oriented scholars in textual and dis-
course analysis are often only interested in describing how, with varying de-
grees of success, language users make use of argumentation to convince oth-
ers. Although in current research practice both extremes are represented,
most argumentation theorists take a middle position. Their starting point is
that the study of argumentation has a normative as well as a descriptive di-
menSIOn.
11
The study of argumentation has thus far not resulted in a universally accepted
theory. The current state of the art is characterized by the co-existence of a va-
riety of approaches, differing considerably in conceptualization, scope and
degree of theoretical refinement, albeit that all the modern approaches are
strongly influenced by classical and post-classical rhetoric and dialectic. To-
gether with approaches of a more limited scope or a less developed research
program, the most important approaches are discussed in considerable detail
in Fundamentals ofArgumentation Theory (Van Eemeren et aI.1996).As an in-
troduction to the great variety in the field, I shall present a brief overview of
these theoretical contributions.
Toulmin's Model ofAnalysis
Toulmin's The Uses ofArgument, which appeared in 1958, is known mainly for
the model of argumentation presented in this book. This model represents
the "procedural form" of argumentation or the various steps that can be dis-
tinguished in the defense of a standpoint or claim. According to Toulmin, the
soundness of argumentation is primarily determined by the degree to which
the warrant, which connects the data adduced in the argumentation with the
claim that is defended, is made acceptable by a backing.
The procedural form of argumentation is in Toulmin's view"field indepen-
dent." This means that the steps that are taken - and which are represented in
the model- are always the same, irrespective of the subject the argumentation
refers to. The type of backing required, however, is dependent on the field to
which the question at issue belongs. An ethical justification, for instance, re-
quires a different kind of backing than a legal justification. Toulmin thus con-
cludes that the evaluation criteria for determining the soundness of argu-
mentation are "field dependent."
Perelman and Olbrechts- Tyteca's New Rhetoric
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca in La nouvelle rhetorique (1958, English trans-
lation 1969) provide an inventory of frequently-used "argumentation tech-
niques." They regard argumentation as sound if it adduces (greater) assent
with the standpoint that is defended among the audience the argumentation
is aimed at. Thus, in the new rhetoric, the soundness of argumentation is
measured against its effect on the target group. This target group may consist
of a "particular audience;' but it can also be the "universal audience": the peo-
ple who, for the speaker or writer, are the embodiment of reasonableness.
12 FRANS H. VAN EEMEREN
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's contribution to argumentation theory con-
sists, first of all, of an extensive list of elements that can serve as a point of de-
parture or as an argument scheme when constructing the argumentation that
should convince or persuade the audience. With the help of a "quasi-logical"
argument scheme, which resembles a logically valid argument form in some
way, one can, for instance, sometimes achieve the effect that the public con-
siders the standpoint defended in a reasonable way. Another way of justifying
a standpoint is the use of an argument scheme, such as analogy, "that struc-
tures reality;' so that the audience will conclude that the defended standpoint
is in a similar way acceptable as a different kind of standpoint that they al-
ready accept.
Informal Logic
Because some researchers were dissatisfied with the way argumentation was
being treated in introductory logic textbooks, an approach to argumentation
known as. informal logic was propagated in Canada and the United States in
the early seventies. Since 1978, the journal Informal Logic, edited by Blair and
Johnson, has been the voice of the informal logic movement. Informal logic is
not a new kind oflogic, but an approach to the normative study of argumen-
tation in ordinary language which remains closer to the practice of argumen-
tation than formallogic (Blair and Johnson 1987).
Informal logicians would like to develop norms and procedures for inter-
preting, assessing and construing argumentation. Their starting point is the
notion that argumentation should be sound in a logical sense. Apart from the
fact that it is clear that something else is meant by this than that the arguments
used must be valid in a formal-logical sense, it is not yet clear,however, exactly
what. It is clear, however, that informal logicians are primarily interested in
the relations between premises and conclusions in arguments and it is also
clear that their interest is not restricted to reasoning aimed at convincing.
Johnson and Blair (197711993) have indicated what they have in mind when
they refer to an informal logical alternative for the formal criterion of deduc-
tive validity. In their view, the premises of an argument have to meet three cri-
teria: (1) relevance (2) sufficiency and (3) acceptability. These criteria are in-
troduced in Logical Self-Defense; they are adopted, sometimes under different
names, by other informal logicians (e.g., Govier 1987). When considering
"relevance," the question is whether there is an adequate substantial relation
between the premises and the conclusion of an argument. While in the case of
"sufficiency", the question is whether the premises provide enough evidence
for the conclusion; in the case of "acceptability'; whether the premises them-
selves are true, probable, or in some other way trustworthy.
THE STATE OF THE ART IN ARGUMENTATION THEORY 13
 te~pt to formula~e :'problem-sound" rules that are instrumental in resolving
RadicalArgumentativism a dIfference of opmlOn. These rules must also be "conventionally valid" in the
sense that they are inter-subjectively acceptable (Barth and Krabbe 1982: 21-
Ducrot and Anscombre, in the early seventies, developed in a number of - al-
22). When designing a procedure for language users who would like to resolve
most exclusively French - publications a linguistic approach to language use
a dispute by means of a critical dialogue, the "new dialecticians" make use of
and argumentation. Because Anscombre and Ducrot (19 83) believe that all
the ideas put forth by Crawshay-Williams and Naess as well as the ideas of
verbal utterances that lead the listener or reader to a certain conclusion - of-
Lorenzen, Lorenz and other members of the Erlangen School.
ten implicitly _ always involve argumentative relations, they refer to their the-
The first initiatives towards a new dialectic have already been presented by
oretical position as radical argumentativism. Barth and Krabbe. In From Axiom to Dialogue they described a "formal-di-
Ducrot and Anscombre's descriptive approach is characterized by a great
« » « 1 h)) «(b ))" "(( t'll" «b e" alectical" procedure to determine whether a standpoint can be maintained in
interest in words such as only, no ess t an, ut, even, s I , ecaus
the light of certain starting points or "concessions." The term formal dialectics
and "so", which can serve as argumentative "operators" or "connectors" and
was introduced earlier by Hamblin (1970). The indication "formal" refers to
give the utterances a certain argumentative force and argumentative direction.
the strictl~ regimented character of the dialogue games. In dialogue logic an
In a certain context, the sentence "The ring costs only one hundred euros" can
argum~~t IS prese~ted as a dialogue game between a "proponent" and an "op-
point to a conclusion such as "Buy that ring", Meanwhile, the sentence "The
ponent of a theSIS. Together these two parties try to establish whether the
ring costs no less than one hundred euros" points instead to a conclusion such
thesis can be defended successfully against critical attacks. In the defense, the
as"Do not buy that ring". . propo~ent can make use of the propositions the opponent is prepared to
Another observation made by Ducrot andAnscombre is that a word such as
commIt to. The proponent attempts to bring the opponent into a contradic-
"but" only determines the direction of the conclusion that is suggested by the
tory position by skillfully exploiting these concessions. If the proponent suc-
sentence, not the content of this conclusion. This content is also dependent
ceeds, the thesis has been successfully defended given the concessions (ex con-
on the context and the situation in which the sentence is uttered. Whatever
cessis).
conclusion may be drawn in a specific context, the presence of the word "but"
in all cases causes this conclusion to be the opposite of, and also stronger than,
Speech Acts in Argumentative Discussions by Van Eemeren and Grootendorst
the conclusion that has to be drawn from the part of the sentence preceding
(1984) developed a theory of argumentation called pragma-dialectics, which
"but". According to Ducrot and Anscombre, the opposite standpoints sug-
immediately connects with formal dialectics, but is also different. The agree-
gested by"but" in a sentence such as "Paul is rich, but he is married", select two
ment is expressed in the term dialectics; the replacement of formal by pragma
different "argumentative principles" which are on a par with the topoi of clas-
(for "~rag~atic") refers to the differences. The pragmatic elements in prag-
sical rhetoric (Van Eemeren et al. 1996). N0lke (199 2), in this example, as-
ma-dialectlcs concerning speech acts and discourse analysis are primarily in-
sumes that these are "The more someone has the property of being rich, the
spired by insights of "ordinary language philosophers"; the dialectical ele-
more attractive it is for a woman to get to know him better" and "The more
ments are inspired by the insights from the work of "critical rationalists" such
someone is tied to another woman, the less attractive it is for a woman to get
as Karl Popper.
.I~ the ~ragma-dialectical ideal model of a critical'discussion, four stages are
to know him better': In this case, the latter topos is a stronger argument than
the first, which is as it were put aside - overruled - by the latter. Thus, the last
dIstmgUlshed. In the confrontation stage, a participant in the discussion puts
topos determines the eventual argumentative direction of the sentence, which
forward a standpoint while a second participant either expresses doubt con-
leads to an implicit conclusion such as "It is no use trying to get to know Paul
cerning the acceptability of the standpoint or he or she contradicts it. In the
better". opening stage, which is in practice often largely implicit, the participants who
ac~ept the roles of "protagonist" and "antagonist" of the standpoint deter-
mme what the discussion's point of departure is. Here the question becomes
Modern Dialectical Approaches what are the common starting points and which rules are being observed?
The prot~gonist begins to advance an argument in the argumentation stage to
To modern dialecticians, argumentation is part of a procedure to resolve a
defend hIS or her standpoint and adds, if necessary, new arguments to answer
difference of opinion by means of a regulated discussion. Dialecticians at-

THE STATE OF THE ART IN ARGUMENTATION THEORY 15

FRANS Ii. VAN EEMEREN
14
further critical reactions. If the advanced arguments lead to the acceptance of
the process of resolving a difference of opinion. They think that an argumen-
the standpoint by the antagonist in the concluding stage, the difference of
tative text or discussion can be reconstructed with more subtlety, and can be
opinion has been resolved; this is also the case if the protagonist withdraws
more fully accounted for, if the strategic maneuvering that takes place in each
the standpoint because of the antagonist's critical reactions.
dialectical stage of the selection from among the "topical potential" (the pos-
Besides an ideal model of the speech acts performed in the various stages of
sible discussion moves) available in the discussion stage concerned, the adap-
a critical discussion by a protagonist and an antagonist who make an attempt
tation to the wishes of the audience and the use of presentational devices is in-
to resolve their difference of opinion in a reasonable way, the pragma-dialec- vestigated.
tical discussion procedure also includes a series of basic rules which together
constitute a code of conduct for reasonable discussants (Van Eemeren and
Grootendorst 1992). Each violation of a rule amounts to an incorrect discus- 1.2 Some Crucial Concepts
sion move that is an impediment to the resolution of a difference of opinion.
This can happen in each stage of the discussion. The incorrectness involved
The problems involved in the production, analysis and evaluation of argu-
generally resembles one or more of the well-known fallacies or a similar of-
mentation are approached much differently by the various theoretical contri-
fence against reasonableness.
butions to the study of argumentation. The problems argumentation theo-
rists are jointly concerned with can be elucidated by explaining some con-
cepts crucial to the theory of argumentation: "point of view", "unexpressed
Modern Rhetorical Approaches
premise'; "argument scheme': "argumentation structure': and "fallacy". This
book will make it clear that each of these concepts represents an indispens-
In recent years, a powerful re-evaluation of rhetoric has taken place. The irra-
able element in the study of argumentation. In addition, two other promi-
tional and even anti-rational image of rhetoric that has evolved during the
nent problem areas crucial to the study of argumentation will be discussed:
past centuries has now been revised. Meanwhile, the sharp division between
"methods of argument interpretation and reconstruction" and "argumenta-
rhetoric and dialectic made in the past appears in need of blurring. Several ar- tion in the field of law':
gumentation theorists have become aware that rhetoric as the study of per-
suasive techniques is not per se incompatible with maintaining a critical ideal
of reasonableness. Points ofView
It is remarkable that the rehabilitation of rhetoric in the study of argumen-
tation began at about the same time in various countries. A considerable time
It is important to recognize that verbal expressions are not "by nature" stand-
after the pioneering work of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, several argu-
points, arguments, or other units of language use which are interesting to
mentation scholars in the United States began to defend the rational qualities argumentation theorists, but only when they occur in a context where they
of rhetoric. Wenzel (1980), for one, prefers to fully credit rhetoric, but then
serve a specific function in the communication process. This means that these
emphatically in relation to logic, particularly dialectics. In France, Reboul
utterances must be specifically instrumental in achieving a certain goal. An
(1990) prefers to view rhetoric as second only to dialectics in importance. He
oral or written expression is, for instance, a pointof view, if it expresses a cer-
regards rhetoric and dialectic as different disciplines that display some over-
tain positive or negative position with respect to a proposition, thus making it
lap. Rhetoric applies dialectic to public discussions while dialectic is also a clear exactly what the speaker or writer stands for.
part of rhetoric because dialectic provides rhetoric with intellectual tools. In
In ordinary discourse, explicitness is the exception rather than the rule.
Germany, Kopperschmidt (1989) takes it a step further. He argues, viewing
Sometimes the communicative function of an utterance becomes clear after
things from a historical perspective, that rhetoric is the central concern of ar-
the event, when this function is identified by a participant ("So, that is your
gumentation theorists. In the Netherlands, Van Eemeren and Houtlosser
standpoint then, eh?'; "You have heard my major arguments"), but more of-
(1999) have pursued the integration of rhetoric's insight into their "pragma-
ten than not, no explicit identification is offered, while, moreover, the propo-
dialectical" method for analyzing argumentative discourse. In their view, sitional content of the utterance remains ambiguous.
there is a rhetorical goal corresponding with each of the dialectical stages of
Fortunately, there are some verbal indicators which specifically refer to

16 FRANS H. VAN EEMEREN

THE STATE OF THE ART IN ARGUMENTATION THEORY
17
standpoints and argumentation, such as "therefore'; "hence", "so", "thus",
"ergo'; and "since'; "for" and "because': Some of them, like "for:' are used ret-
rogressively to refer to a preceding standpoint; while others like "so", are used
progressively, and precede the standpoint, and some such as "because:' can be
used either way ("I cannot do it because I am ill" and "Because I am ill I cannot
do it"). The fewer the number of verbal pointers, the more necessary it is to
make use of verbal and non-verbal contextual clues. Usually, some back-
ground knowledge of the context and the type of speech event involved, and
even some knowledge about the world, is necessary to detect these clues and
put them to good use.
Confusingly, formulations of standpoints and reasons may be presented in
speech acts that are, at first sight, non-assertive, as in "Let's take an umbrella,
or do you want to get wet?" Taken literally, what the speaker does here is con-
front the listener with a proposal, followed by a question. The (rhetorical)
question, however, must be interpreted as a reason to accept the implicit
standpoint that the two should take an umbrella. To correctly determine the
speaker's commitments, one must analyze this discourse as containing an im-
plicit (and indirect) standpoint defended by an implicit (and indirect) rea-
son: "We should take an umbrella,for we do not want to get wet". In the analy-
sis of such implicitness (and indirectness), and in the justification of this
analysis, an important role is usually played by general standards for reasoned
discourse and by the context (in its broadest sense) of the specific discourse
under analysis.
Unexpressed Premises
Unexpressed elements that are only implicitly present in the discourse are in
practice often the pivotal points of an argument. This is particularly true for
unexpressed premises and unexpressed standpoints. In ordinary arguments,
usually one of the premises is left unexpressed. In some cases, the identifica-
tion of the elements implicit in enthymematic argumentation is quite simple.
It is obvious, for example, that in "Amos is pig-headed because he is a teacher"
the premise that is left unexpressed is "Teachers are pig-headed': In "I am sure
that Amos is pig-headed, since all teachers are pig-headed", it is just as clear
that the unexpressed premise is: "Amos is a teacher".
There are also cases in which the identification of unexpressed premises
may cause more problems - usually, because there are several possibilities. In
order to determine what the commitments of an arguer are, the analyst must
not only carry out a logical analysis, based on a formal validity criterion, but
also a pragmatic analysis, based on standards for reasoned discourse. In the
18 FRANS H. VAN EEMEREN
logical analysis, an attempt is made to reconstruct the argument as one that
has a valid argument form; in the pragmatic analysis, the unexpressed
premise is then more precisely defined on the basis of contextual information
and background knowledge. The logical analysis is thus instrumental to the
achievement of a satisfactory pragmatic analysis.
In the absence of any contextual information or background knowledge,
the pragmatic identification of unexpressed premises will be hard to accom-
plish. A logical analysis must then suffice. Otherwise, there is a danger that the
added premise oversteps the mark, attributing more to the speaker than he or
she is actually committed to. With unexpressed standpoints we are on safer
ground. Starting from the explicit premises, a logical analysis of the underly-
ing argument usually leads to an unequivocal determination of the conclu-
sion representing the unexpressed standpoint that is being advocated.
Argument Schemes
It sh2!lld!12tpe !,*~!!J2!JQ·~nt~d th~t an..YQ!le who puts forward an argument
I
is automatically attempting to logically derive the conclusion from ili--;;-
p~;~et, in some way or another, a transfer of acceptance from the ;x-
plid!: premise to the standpoint must be aimed for. On this point, thus far, for-
mal logic does not have much to offer. Modern logicians, even when they are
cgE:,~~rn~~~~pin&~!ternative systems such as non-monotonic logic
and defaultlogic, seem almost unanimous in their concern with formal valid-
i!y~ertIiansuDStailtive"reraUonSb-etWeenpremises and conclusions. ~-:.
ceEc!rating on thSJ!.J:.Ilbklm of imRlication and truth, they tend to ignore tb;
p~o~~I!1~_ of pl~usible inference and the transmission of acceptanc~
The speaker or writer who puts forward an argument aims to effect a trans-
fer of acceptance from the premises to the standpoint that makes the listener
or reader accept the standpoint. Hence, the speaker attempts to design the ar-
gument in such a fashion that it will convince the listener. Take the following
argument: "Daniel will certainly be concerned about the costs, because he is
an American:' When looking for an argument to defend the standpoint that
Daniel will be concerned about the costs, the arguer may, for example, have
entertained an unfriendly thought like "It is typical of Americans that they are
materialistic." From this thought, the arguer's standpoint may have been
backed up by the argument, the unexpressed premise being "Americans are
inclined to care a lot about money." By arguing in this manner, the speaker or
writer is relying on a more or less ready-made argument scheme.
Argument schemes are conventionalized ways of displaying a relation be-
tween that which is stated in the explicit premise and that which is stated in
THE STATE OF THE ART IN ARGUMENTATION THEORY 19
 the standpoint. The internal organisation of each single argument can be
characterized by the argument scheme being employed. Because an argu-
ment scheme characterizes the type of justification or refutation provided for
the standpoint in a single argument by the explicit premise for the stand-
point, an analysis of the argument schemes used in a discourse produces in-
formation regarding the principles, standards, criteria, or assumptions in-
volved in a particular attempt at justification or refutation. In most cases,
some interpretative effort is required to identify the argument scheme that is
being em ployed, i.e., to discover the topos on which the argumentation rests.
In this endeavor, again, pragmatic knowledge must be brought to bear. !\!~­
ment schemes are ~l!&1hes;ml~s:.P!?.s!udi<:<!Y!~~!1§iY<iYJ:!y~\l2E.~nta!io~__
I
l-iheon~;te- a com lementar alternative to the formal . 0
t~ndtheir v~~y !2~~Jhe point of de~arture in these studies is generally
that in argumentative discourse, dependmg on the argument scheme used,
various types of argumentation can be distinguished and that each type of
argumentation requires that specific critical questions are answered.
Argumentation Structures
A central problem in the analysis of argumentative discourse is determining
the structure of the argumentation. The argumentation structure of a text,
speech or discussion is determined by the way the reasons advanced hang :0-
gether and jointly support the defended standpoint. An adequate evaluatIOn
of the argumentative discourse cannot take place as long as it is unclear what
the structure of the argumentation is. What kind of structural relations can
be distinguished?
Argumentation for or against a standpoint can be simply "single argumen-
tation", which consists of one reason for or against the standpoint. But the
argumentation can also have a more complex argumentation structure, de-
pending on the way the defense of the standpoint has been organized in view
of (anticipated) doubts or criticism. In a more complexly structured
argumentation several reasons are put forward for or against the same stand-
point. These reasons can be alternative defenses of the standpoint which are
unrelated ("It is impossible that you saw my mother last week in Sheringham
in Marks and Spencer's, because my mother died two years ago and She ring-
ham does not have a Marks and Spencer's"), but they can also be interdepen-
dent, so that there is a "parallel chain" of reasons which mutually strengthen
or complement each other ("We have to dine out because there is nothing left
athome and all the shops are closed"), or a "serial chain" of reasons ("I cannot
help you with painting next week, because next week I have no time because I
have to study for an exam").
FRANS H. VAN EEMEREN
20
The structure of argumentation is sometimes clearly indicated by the use of
connecting expressions such as "apart from X, Y", "Y, moreover X", and "for,
because Y, X" respectively. Or the structure may be clear from the content of
the arguments. Often, however, a problem in the analysis of complex argu-
mentation arises because the literal presentation makes insufficiently clear
how the argumentation is structured. To solve this problem, again, all kinds of
contextual and other pragmatic factors need to be taken into account.
Fallacies
Another concept argumentation theorists are especially interested in is that
of the fallacies. \Ti!!ually~,,-erJ:'.l!9rfQi!tive ths:ory of argumentation incll!des<!.
treatment of the fallacies. In some sense the quality of a normative theory of
argumentation canevenbeTudged from the degree to which it makes it possi-
ble to provide an adequate analysis of the fallacies. Conversely, it stands to
reason that offering an analysis of notorious fallacies can be conducive to the
examination of the norms of sound argumentation.
According'to the standard definition, a fallacy is an argument that seems
valid but is not (Hamblin 1970: 12). Well-known objections to this definition
point out that a great number of the generally recognized fallacies are not ar-
guments (e.g., "many questions") and others (in modern interpretations) are
not invalid arguments (e.g., petitio principii) or the fallaciousness is not due
to the invalidity of the argument (e.g., argumentum ad verecundiam, argu-
mentum ad populum, argumentum ad hominem). Therefore, these types of
fallacies are not covered by the definition.
One explanation why fallacy theorists stuck with this definition, even
though many fallacies remain outside its scope, is that until recently most ap-
proaches to fallacies have been restrictively logico-centric. However, if the old
definition is dropped, as most modern argumentation theorists have done,
and fallacies are ~.!1ceive.Q.2..f~~discu~si~ moves which in some way damage
t~ual~~_~_~~~~~!~~.~sc<?~~~.~~~~~~i;~3~~IiEEiE~~~~lJ~~fulli~:~
c~~2ut t~El· F~r this P~T?.!~:~:~,:~~:. o.~:.~~,~_~~£!~!_~lJ.ll,~l.~.::=:~:!-
ated vie. QL~ a pragmatIC approach that makes allowances for the
communicative and interactional context in which fallacies occur is required.
Without taking pragmatic knowledge into account, many fallacies cannot be
satisfactorily analyzed.
In the study of fallacies, a set of norms must be developed for distinguishing
between acceptable and unacceptable moves in argumentative discourse. The
criteria used in deciding whether such a norm has been violated, should also
be investigated. For determining if these criteria are satisfied in specific cases,
THE STATE OF THE ART IN ARGUMENTATION THEORY 21
procedural tools, involving the use of various kinds of contextual informa-
tion, need to be designed. As a preliminary to this last enterprise, it must be es-
tablished whether the situation in which a would -be fallacy occurs is indeed
within the scope of the norms. All contributions to the fulfillment of these
tasks are pertinent to the development of argumentation theory.
Argument Interpretation and Reconstruction
Although not so much a concept as a research area, the problems involved in
argument interpretation and reconstruction require our attention when we are
dealing with the state ofthe art of studying the production, analysis, and eval-
uation of argumentation. These problems are approached quite differently in
each of the various theoretical contributions to the study of argumentation.
The interests of argument interpretation center around the general charac-
teristics of the organisation of discourse and the features of argumentative
discourse that ordinary language users employ to orient themselves with
when interpreting arguments, and around the reasoning processes that are
applied in argument interpretation. When it comes to argument reconstruc-
tion, different methods are employed using various approaches such as for-
mal logic, informal logic, rhetoric and pragma-dialectics.
Argument interpretation is the basis of argument reconstruction. Argu-
mentative discourse can only be systematically reconstructed from a norma-
tive perspective, developed for the purposes of argument evaluation, after it
has been interpreted properly. This is why argumentation theorists need to
not only be engaged in developing methods for reconstructing argumenta-
tive discourse in a highly-motivated manner, but also in disclosing the way in
which ordinary language users proceed in making sense of argumentative
discourse. They have to detect the various verbal and nonverbal tools the ar-
guers put to good use in this endeavor in order to be in a better position to de-
velop reconstruction methods that consciously transcend ordinary interpre-
tative practice.
Argumentation in the Field ofLaw
Legal practice is the argumentative practice par excellence. In modern society,
the institution of the court offers a place where various kinds of disputes that
cannot be resolved without recourse to specific procedures and the judgment
of disinterested outsiders can be resolved. Argumentation theorists are there-
fore well-advised to pay special attention to the argumentative proceedings
22 FRANS H. VAN EEMEREN
applied in legal contexts and the relevant findings in the study of argumenta-
tion in the field of law. As is evident in their writings, the founding fathers of
modern argumentation theory, Stephen Toulmin and Chaim Perelman, were
fully aware of this.
The study of legal argumentation presents a great variety of approaches
and topics of interest. The different approaches usually lead to different re-
search topics and different conceptions of the relation between the soundness
criteria as applied in legal procedures and the soundness criteria as developed
in argumentation theory. In what manner do the two kinds of soundness cri-
teria relate to each other? What kinds of explanations can demonstrate the
differences? What are the reasonableness conceptions underlying the various
approaches to legal argumentation? Such questions are studied in this specif-
ic area of the study of argumentation and their answers can be illuminating to
the field as a whole.
1.3 Overview of the Book
Crucial Concepts in Argumentation Theory aims to provide interested readers
with an overview of the current study of some fundamental problems in ar-
gumentation theory. For this purpose, the next five chapters discuss in greater
detail the five concepts and the two prominent problem areas we have just
briefly described. Various theoretical perspectives are presented by authors
who have paid special attention to these concepts in their earlier work.
In chapter 2, Peter Houtlosser discusses the concept of point ofview. He dif-
ferentiates between the approaches to points of view favored in the pragma-
dialectical argumentation theory, the socio-psychological research of persua-
sion, cognitive research, argumentative discourse analysis, structuralist infor-
mal logic, procedural informal logic, advocacy and debate, and communica-
tive action theory. He also indicates what the starting points could be for fur-
ther research. The chapter closes, just as all the other chapters, with an exten-
sive bibliography on the specific subject.
In chapter 3, Susanne Gerritsen devotes her attention to unexpressed prem-
ises. She first explains two traditional approaches, and then turns to the de-
ductive-inductive distinction and also discusses pluralism, modern deduc-
tivism, and the "neither pluralist nor deductivist stance". She then turns to the
nature of the unexpressed premise, focusin on the confusion of definitions,
the unexpressed premise s a a -filler and utilized and necessa -remises.
When discussing the role of the context, she pays particular attention to the·
meaning of "context" and the position of the analyst. The relation between
unexpressed premises and argument schemes is also discussed.
THE STATE OF THE ART IN ARGUMENTATION THEORY
23
Chapter 4, written by Bart Garssen, is devoted to argument schemes. After in-
troducing the concept, Garssen first concentrates on the use of argument
schemes in finding arguments. He discusses the classical topical tradition,
Whately's rhetoric, and Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's new rhetoric. He
then turns to the relation between argument schemes and the evaluation of
argumentation. He pays particular attention to American textbooks on aca-
demic debate, Hastings' classification of types of warrants, Schellens' reason-
able argument forms, and the pragma-dialectical typology of argument
schemes. Before his concluding remarks, Garssen deals with the use of argu-
ment schemes for describing the characteristics of argumentative discourse.
Francisca Snoeck Henkemans, author of chapter 5, describes the different
conceptions of the various kinds of argumentation structures and the way in
which they are studied. In her historical overview, she deals with classical
rhetoric, enlightenment rhetoric, as well as the early textbooks. In her discus-
sion of modern approaches, Snoeck Henkem~ns explains the textbook dis-
tinctions between linked and convergent premises and between coordinative
and multiple argumentation. The theoretical approaches she considers worth
discussing in more detail are Freeman's Toulminian approach, her own prag-
rna-dialectical approach, and Walton's pragmatic approach. She also pays
specific attention to the methods of analysis in doubtful cases.
In chapter 6, I begin by recounting the history of the study of fallacies. I
move from the Aristotelian approach to fallacies, to idols and sophisms, to the
ad fallacies, syllogistic and inductive fallacies, and the treatment of fallacies in
logic textbooks. Then I turn to modern theoretical approaches to fallacies
such as Hamblin's criticism of the "standard treatment", post -Hamblin treat-
ments of the fallacies, the Woods-Walton approach, the formal dialectical ap-
proach, the pragma-dialectical approach, and Walton's pragmatic approach.
Agnes van Rees, in chapter 7, concentrates on argument interpretation and
argument reconstruction. In her discussion of argument interpretation, she
highlights some general characteristics of discourse organisation features
prevalent in argumentative discourse, patterning and linguistic devices. The
interpretation section closes with some observations concerning the study of
cognitive processes. In the argument reconstruction section, Van Rees dis-
cusses logic, informal logic - paying special attention to unexpressed premis-
es and argumentation structure - rhetoric and pragma-dialectics.
Chapter 8, by Eveline Feteris, is devoted to argumentation in the field oflaw.
Feteris distinguishes different approaches to legal argumentation such as the
logical approach, the rhetorical approach and the dialogical approach. When
discussing the topics in legal argumentation research, she starts from the
pragmadialectical division of the research program into the philosophical
component, the theoretical component, the analytical component, the em-
24 FRANS H. VAN EEMEREN
pirical component, and the practical component. Feteris' contribution to
ends with a broad but selective bibliography.
Bibliography
Anscombre, J.-c., and o. Ducrot (1983). L'argumentation dans la langue.
Brussels: Mardaga.
Barth, E.M. and E.C.W. Krabbe (1982). From Axiom to Dialogue. Berlin: Wal-
ter de Gruyter.
Blair,J.A, and R.H. Johnson (1987). "Argumentation as Dialectical:' Argumen-
tation, 1, 1, 41-56.
Eemeren, EH. van, and R. Grootendorst (1984). Speech Acts in Argumentative
Discussions. Berlin/Dordrecht: Walter de Gruyter/Foris.
Eemeren, EH. van, and R. Grootendorst (1992). Argumentation, Communica-
tion, and Fallacies. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Eemeren, EH. van, and P. Houtlosser (1999). "Strategic Manoeuvring in Ar-
gumentative Discourse:' Discourse Studies, 1, 4, 479-497·
Eemeren, EH. van, R. Grootendorst, A.E Snoeck Henkemans, J.A. Blair, R.H.
Johnson, E.C.W. Krabbe, C. Plantin, D.N. Walton, C.A. Willard, J. Woods,
and D. Zarefsky (1996). Fundamentals ofArgumentation Theory. Mahwah,
NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Govier, T. (1987). Problems in Argument Analysis and Evaluation. Dordrecht:
Foris.
Hamblin, c.L. (1970). Fallacies. London: Methuen. Photographic reprint
Newport News, VA: Vale Press.
Johnson, R.H., and J.A. Blair (1977/1993). Logical Self-Defense. Toronto: Mc-
Graw-Hill Ryerson, 3rd ed., 1993.
Kopperschmidt, J. (1989). Methodik der Argumentationsanalyse. Stuttgart:
Fromann -Holzboog.
N0lke, H. (1992). "Semantic constraints on argumentation: From polyphonic
microstructure to argumentative macro-structure:' In: Eemeren, EH. van,
R. Grootendorst, J.A. Blair, and C.A. Willard (Eds.), Argumentation Illumi-
nated. Amsterdam: SICSATlISSA, 189-200.
Perelman, c., and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca (1958/1969). La nouvelle rhetorique:
traite de l'argumentation. Bruxelles: l'Universite de Bruxelles. English trans-
lation The New Rhetoric. A Treatise on Argumentation. Notre Dame etc.:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1969.
Reboul,o. (1990). "Rhetorique et dialectique chez Aristote." Argumentation,
4,1,35-52.
THE STATE OF THE ART IN ARGUMENTATION THEORY 25
 2 Points ofView
Toulmin, S.E. (1958). The Uses ofArgument. Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press. d J dS N II Peter Houtlosser
Wenzel,J.W.(1980 )."PerspectivesonArgument."In:Rho es, .,an . ewe,
(Eds., 1980 ). Proceedings of the 1979 Summer Conference on Argument. Falls
Church: SCA, 112-133.

2.1 Introduction

In the study of argumentation, argumentation is generally considered to con-

sist of a set of statements put forward to support or rebut, or justify or refute,
some other statement. This other statement can provisionally be referred to
as the point of view. In evaluating its quality, the strength of an argumentation
can only be established if it is clear what point of view the argumentation is
supposed to support or rebut. When it is impossible to establish which point
of view is at issue, it also becomes impossible to determine whether the argu-
mentation is relevant, let alone whether it provides adequate support for that
particular point of view. As everyone knows, it is not always easy to find out
what point of view is at issue in a particular case. One of the central issues in
the study of argumentation is how an analyst can adequately identify the
points of view in an argumentative text or conversation. For this problem to
be resolved, it must first be clear which conception of a point of view should
be adopted.
How exactly is the object of argumentation to be understood? The answer
to this question depends largely on the theoretical perspective from which ar-
gumentation is approached. Different perspectives are motivated by different
concerns and interests. These concerns and interests have consequences for
the way in which the object of argumentation is conceived. Social psycholo-
gists, for instance, are interested in the degree to which persuasive messages
affect people's attitudes; informal logicians in the conditions under which
conclusions can be inferred from premises in natural arguments; discourse
analysts are interested in the way in which people propound their opinions in
talk exchanges; while dialecticians are interested in the degree to which theses
or standpoints are up to critical scrutiny in argumentative discussion.
This chapter provides an overview of the ways in which the object of argu-
mentation is characterized by various approaches to argumentation and the
methods used to identify that object. The overview will commence with the
characterization of the notion of "standpoint" as it is used in the pragma-di-
alectical approach to argumentation (the "Amsterdam School"). Preceding
this characterization, 2.2.1 briefly discusses the dialectical notion of"thesis" as
it is used in classical and formal dialectic. This notion can be regarded as the

27
26 FRANS H. VAN EEMEREN
 vant distinction: "not every problem is a thesis, since some problems are such
forerunner of the pragma-dialectical notion of a "standpoint". In o~der t.o es-
that.,:e hold no opinion about them either way." This implies that a thesis, in
tablish in what respects the pragma-dialectical notion of a standpomt dIffers
addltlOn to pertaining to something controversial, also involves a choice or
from "equivalent" notions used in contemporary argu~entation :esear~h, opinion, which may be absent in the problem as such.
"standpoints" will subsequently be compared to the notlOns used m soc~o­
D~alectical p:oblems are constitutive of "an investigation leading either to
psychological research on persuasion (2.2.3); cognitive rese.arch on reasomng
chOlce and aVOldance or to truth and knowledge, either by itself or as an aid to
(2.2.4); argumentative discourse analysis (2.2.5); structurahst (2.2.6) and pro-
the solution of some other such problem" (104b lOl-103). In other words, for
cedural (2.2.7); informal logic; advocacy and debate (2.2.8); and the commu-
moral or epistemological reasons, they are examined critically. But, as Aristo-
nicative action approach to argumentation (2.2.9)· In conclusion, some i~ter­
~le notes, only some problems and theses deserve dialectical examination: "It
relations between the various notions are indicated; the procedures for Iden-
IS not ne~essary to e~amine every problem and every thesis but only one
tifying them are discussed, as well as some perspectives on further research
about whlCh doubt mIght be felt by the kind of person who requires to be ar-
(2.3)· gued with" (105a 103-105). In order to be a candidate for critical examination
then,. a thesis or problem must, at least potentially, be disputable to someon~
who IS worth arguing with.
2.2 DifferentApproaches to Points ofView Once a thesis or problem enters the examination process, it is argued for,
and argued against, with the help of "dialectical propositions". Aristotle de-
2.2.1 Classical and Formal Dialectic fines a dialectical proposition as a "question which accords with the opinion
held by everyone or by the majority or by the wise-either all of the wise or the
In the Topica (ed. 1966), Aristotle devotes particular attention to the dialecti-
majority or the most famous of them - and which is not paradoxical" (104a 8-
cal notion of thesis. A thesis, as he sees it, is "the conception contrary to gene-
b 11). Rephrased in our current terminology, dialectical propositions are undis-
ral opinion but propounded by someone famous as a philosopher:' (104 119- puted by those who matter intellectually; as such, they are the premises with
120). The fact that a thesis should be contrary to what people thmk about a
which a thesis can be defended.
certain subject is emphasized when Aristotle adds: "Or a thes~s may c~~cer~ To summarize, it can be said iliat by Aristotle's definition, a thesis is a repu-
matters on which we hold a reasoned view contrary to receIved opmlOns
ted philosopher's opinion concerning a disputable philosophical issue which
(104 124-126 ). This definition seems to assume that non-philosoph~rs ~an
b contr~~cts the o~inion of others who are worth arguing with, is put forward
also present a thesis, but the notion that a thesis is only worth consldenng
for c~ltlcal exammation, and must be defended by means of undisputed
when presented by a reputed philosopher is emphasized in Aristotle's addi-
premIses.
tional comment that "to pay any attention when an ordinary person sets forth
views which are contrary to received opinions is foolish" (104b 122-124)· The
~n formal dialectic, a present-day descendant of classical dialectic, propound-
examples of theses that Aristotle supplies- "Contradiction is impossible", "All
mg a thesis is not restricted to philosophers and a thesis is not restricted to
things are in a state of motion" (104b 121-123) - make it clear that t~e conte~t
philosophical issues, as they were in Aristotelean dialectic.' Nicholas Rescher
of a thesis should be a philosophical issue. Aristotle calls such an ISsue a dI-
is a p.hilosopher who remains close to Aristotle; his focus is on systems of di-
alectical problem. A dialectical problem is "something a~o~t which either men alectlc that provide a rational method for scientific inquiry. In Dialectics
have no opinion either way, or most people hold an opmlOn contra.ry to that
(~97~)' Re.scher developed a model of formal disputation. A formal disputa-
of the wise, or the wise contrary to that of most people, or somethm~, about
b tlOn IS a dIscussion involving three parties: a "proponent': an "opponent" and
a "determi~er': ~he proponent formulates a thesis and builds a prima facie
which members of each of these classes disagree among themselves (104
103- 5). Phrased in modern terms, dialectical problems are disputable philo-
10 case ~or ilil~ thesIs by adducing "grounds"; the opponent attacks the propo-
sophical issues. ne~t s thesIs and grounds by objecting and making counter-arguments to
As these definitions suggest, there is a close relation between theses and
whiCh the proponent has to respond; the determiner presides as referee and
dialectical problems. For all practical purposes, they may even be co~side~ed
judge ove~ ilie ~onduct of ilie dispute (1977: 3-4). Apart from iliis type of
to coincide: "a thesis is always a problem" (104b 129) and "almost all dlalectlCal
asymmetncal dispute, Rescher also distinguishes a "symmetrical contradic-
problems are now called theses" (104b 135-137). Nevertheless, there is a rele-

POINTS OF VIEW 29
PETER HOUTLOSSER
 tory debate", in which the opponent has to defend a thesis of his own, which is
contradictory to the thesis of the proponent. According to Rescher's analysis,
propounding a thesis consists of making a categorical assertion. Making such
an assertion involves taking on a commitment to defend both the assertion
and all logical consequences that follow from it. In addition, the proponent
takes on a similar kind of commitment for every subsequent move he makes
since all of them have to be categorical assertions.
Inspired by the semantic approach to argumentation developed by Arne
Naess (1966) and the studies on dialogue logic done by the "Erlangen School"
(Kamiah and Lorenzen 1967, Lorenzen and Lorenz 1978), Barth and Krabbe,
in From axiom to dialogue (1982), proposed sets of systems of rules for critical
dialogues aimed at resolving conflicts or disputes between a proponent and
an opponent concerning one or more externalized or "avowed" opinions. An
avowed opinion, in their conception, is a statement Tput forward by the pro-
ponent and attacked by the opponent. Tis the initial thesis of the discussion.
The next statements in the discussion are all "concessions" - they constitute
the basis from which Tmay be defended and attacked. In a simple or "pure"
conflict, only the proponent has to defend a thesis; he has nothing to attack
(except the attacks made by the opponent); the opponent has no thesis to de-
fend and just has to attack the proponent's thesis. In a mixed conflict, the op-
ponent has something to defend as well - a thesis that opposes the propo-
nent's thesis or a concession which is challenged by the proponent. In both
cases, the proponent has also engaged in attacking statements of the oppo-
nent (see Van Eemeren eta1.1996: 265).
For Barth and Krabbe, discussing a particular thesis makes sense only if the
proponent is prepared to commit himself positively, i.e., to assume an obliga-
tion to defend the thesis against the opponent's criticisms, and if the oppo-
nent is prepared to take on a negative commitment, i.e., to make use of his un-
conditional right to criticize the proponent's thesis systematically. The same
types of commitments are to be taken on with regard to the concessions, the
other statements made in the discussion - the opponent will be positively
committed, the proponent negatively (1982: 57-58).
2.2.2 Pragma-Dialectics
In the pragma-dialectical argumentation theory, argumentative discourse is
studied with a view of critical evaluation. Starting from the assumption that
argumentation is part of a critical discussion aimed at resolving a difference
of opinion, a model has been developed of the stages of the resolution process
and the various types of speech acts that are instrumental in each of these
30 PETER HOUTLOSSER
stages. The model of a critical discussion serY£!LlUULheuristic tool in tb.i:.,~
-I?rocess of aIlalytic recoustruction and as an evaluative tool in the process of
sri tical assessment.
In the pragma-dialectical theory the object of argumentation is referred to
as the standpoint. The pragma-dialectical conception of a standpoint agrees
with the meta theoretical principles of externalization, functionalization, so-
cialization, and dialectification. In agreeement with the principle of external-
ization, a standpoint is not viewed as a psychological attitude or mental state,
but as a verbally expressed position carrying specific commitments and re-
sponsibilities. In agreement with the principle of functionalization, not only
the proposition that expresses a standpoint is subject to analysis, but also the
communicative speech act of advancing a standpoint. In agreement with the
principle of socialization, a standpoint is not just regarded as the individual
expression of someone's subjective opinion, but as a public statement put for-
ward for acceptance by a listener or reader who is assumed not to share the
speaker or writer's point of view. In agreement with the principle of dialectifi-
cation, acceptance of a standpoint is only considered to be justified when the
standpoint turns out to be resistant to the criticisms of an antagonist put for-
ward in a regimented procedure of pro and con discussion.
In Speech Acts in Argumentative Discussions, Frans van Eemeren and Rob
Grootendorst characterize a standpoint as an externalized position of a
speaker or writer in respect to a formulated opinion (1984: 5). This position
can be explicitly expressed with the help of a standard paraphrase:
My point of view in respectto [the opinion lOis that 0 is/is not the case (1984: 114).
Conversely, a speaker or writer who - in this manner, or in a similar one _
states a position indicates that he regards the subject of that position as an
opinion (1984: 96).
A standpoint can be positive or negative. If it is positive, the speaker or
writer externalizes a positive position in respect to a formulated opinion ("I
think that women are better drivers than men"); if it is negative, he external-
izes a negative position ("I do not think that women are better drivers than
men"). The opinion to which the positive or negative position pertains can be
either positive or negative as well ("[I (do not) think that] women are better
drivers then men"; "[I (do not) think that] women are not better drivers than
men"). In advancing a position in respect to an opinion, the speaker or writer
assumes a duty to defend that position when requested to do so. Depending
on whether the position is positive or negative, he has committed himself to
justifying or refuting that opinion for the listener or reader. 2
The speech activity of advancing a standpoint can be characterized by defin-
POINTS OF VIEW
31
 ing it as a speech act and by formulating its felicity conditions. In this endeav-
or, two questions are relevant: (1) What type of speech act (assertive, commis-
sive, directive, expressive, or declarative) is performed in advancing a stand-
point? (2) Under which conditions is this speech act performed happily?
I ~~ording tQ.VaDJ~5:!!!~~eI1aIl~ <:;rootendorst_{19~1"<l<!\,ill!cing a stand-
I pointis.!il!l1ilJ!l0l,!!l! !() performing an assertive - only speech acts belonging
I to the cla~~ 2f£l~S(!!:!!y~~-~£!y"a,~o!nmlimmUQtbs;JMhJ.U:.cQrrectn~"of
I
I
t!t"~E:.~p~~.i!~2natmut~!!l,QLtlLe.§.R~~£h.il~tr,~!iQI_fQeA Of course, in practice
not every standpoint is directly advanced as an assertive. Moreover, advanc-
ing a standpoint is more than performing just any assertive. Unlike most oth-
er assertives (e.g., announcements), standpoints are typically advanced in a
context in which the listener or reader is supposed to have doubts regarding
the acceptability of the assertive.
As with other speech acts, the felicity conditions of advancing a standpoint
can be divided into two groups: (1) identity conditions indicating what makes
an utterance a performance of a particular speech act; (2) correctness condi-
tions indicating what an entirely correct performance of that speech act
amounts to (Van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1984: 42). Jointly, the identity
conditions and the correctness conditions constitute a definition of the
speech act, in this case, the speech act of advancing a standpoint. For advan-
cing a positive standpoint, these felicity conditions read as follows (Houtlosser
1995: 75-83):3
Identity Conditions
Propositional Content Condition
1 The propositional content of the standpoint consists of an expressed opinion O.
2 0 consists of one or more utterances.
Essential Condition
Advancing a standpoint counts as taking responsibility for a positive position in
respect to 0, i.e., as assuming an obligation to defend a positive position in re-
spect to 0, if requested to do so.
Correctness Conditions
Preparatory Condition
1 Speaker S believes that listener L does not (already, at face value, completely)
acceptO.
2 S believes that he can justify 0 for L with the help of arguments.
Sincerity Condition
1 S believes that 0 is the case. 4
2 S has the intention to justify 0 for L with the help of arguments if requested to
do so.
32 PETER HOUTLOSSER
In the pragma-dialectical perspective on argumentative discourse, an utter-
ance can also function as a standpoint without having been presented as such.
An informative assertive, for instance, may start to function as a standpoint if
the listener questions the information provided in the assertive. In such a
case, the speaker has retrospectively committed an offense against the inter-
actional principle that prescribes that speakers must not perform speech acts
that are not acceptable to the listener (Van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1991).
If the speaker has indeed performed a speech act that appears not acceptable
to the listener, then he should attempt to make it acceptable in the second in-
stance - or he must retract it. This means that any assertive that is not explicit-
1y or implicitly accepted by the listener - and that is not retracted by the
speaker - incurs an obligation for the speaker to justity his assertive for the lis-
tener. If he complies with this obligation, he in effect supports the opinion
that his assertive is acceptable and appears to take a positive standpoint in re-
spect of this opinion.
Non-assertive speech acts may also occasion a speaker to defend a stand-
point. If the speaker, for example, requests a listener to do something ("Hold
the door for me, will you?") and the listener makes it clear that he is not in-
clined to comply with that request ("Why?"), the speaker must either justity
his request ("I've got these boxes to carry") or retract it ("OK, leave it") - oth-
erwise he obstructs the normal process of interaction. If the speaker justifies
his request, he actually supports the opinion that his request is acceptable.
Just as in the case of an assertive, he then implies that he takes a positive stand-
point in respect of the opinion at issue. 5
2.2.3 Socio-Psychological Research of Persuasion
At the center of the socio-psychological research of persuasion is the notion
of "attitude': According to Daniel O'Keefe in his critical survey, Persuasion
(1990), with the term attitude, social psychologists refer to a person's inner,
positive or negative evaluation of an object- another person, an institution,
an event, a product, a policy, and so on - based on specific beliefs about the
supposed properties of that object. Attitudes are not innate; they are a
"residue of experience" (1990: 18). They are also enduring and involve a dispo-
sition to act in a certain way. Someone may, for instance, have adopted a nega-
tive attitude towards the European Union as a result of years of negative re-
porting; his attitude will not change just because he has received a few positive
reports, and the tendency is for him to continue to express himself negatively
rather than positively about the Union (see also Krech and Crutchfield 1969:
679)·
When this conception of an attitude is compared with the pragma-dialectical
POINTS OF VIEW 33
 definition of a standpoint, some clear differences emerge. First, an attitude is
an inner state of mind and a standpoint is an externalized position. The exter-
nalized position may - and, in empirical reality, more often than not will- of
course be based on some inner state. If someone advances a standpoint in a
discussion, say the standpoint that the European Union is an undesirable in-
stitution, it is more likely that he already has a more negative attitude towards
the Union than a positive one. Nevertheless, there is no guarantee that this is
indeed the case. A second difference is that only standpoints carry an obliga-
tion to argue. Attitudes do not, despite the fact that standpoints are often in-
spired by attitudes and sometimes even based on attitudes. Advancing a
standpoint creates certain commitments, having an attitude does not. A third
, / ~i~erence b~tween attitudes and standpointsi~JhilJ;l!t:!itlldi;;S inYRly~ ;t2:i~
; LsltIon to act ill a certain way while standpoints per se do not.A speaker's stand-
I ipoint does not necessarily have to agree with his actions; viewed dialectically,
it only needs to be consistent with other externalized positions propounded
by the same speaker in the same discussion. In all other cases, a tu E,uoEudi!lla.-
cy is committed when a discrepan<::y is p()iJ.JJ~.<{illit~e~~e~ s~;:e~~e';"stand-
poi!?:t ,~~h.i~ be?~lv:i()r,"{Uourth and last differen~b~tween attii~d~s and
standpoints is th~t attitudes are enduring and standpoints are not per se.
Viewed dialectically, their existence lasts only until the end of the critical dis-
cussion in which they are scrutinized. Then they have either been accepted, in
which case they are no longer subjected to doubt and no longer have the status
of a standpoint, or they are retracted, in which case they cease to exist.
2.2-4 Cognitive Research on Reasoning
In the area of cognitive research on reasoning, the notion of "belief" plays an
important role. According to Gilbert Harman, whose books Thought (1973)
and Change in view (1986) are prominent in this field, "beliefs" are mentalatti-
tudes. Unlike the attitudes that are central to the socio-psychological research
on persuasion, beliefs are mental attitudes that do not pertain to an object,
but to a relation between an object and a certain feature, or to a (supposed)
state of affairs. "Paul is in the garden'; for instance, expresses the belief that the
feature "being in the garden" comes with the object "Paul"; and "It is raining"
expresses the belief that the present state of the world is such that it is raining. 6
According to Harman, someone who has a certain belief is committed to fully
accept what he believes.7 This person does not find it necessary to investigate
whether what he believes is really true. He also assumes that he has (or had)
good reasons to accept what he believes as true. All the same, he does not have
to be capableof justifying that belief (1986: 13-14, 4 6 -53).
To what extent do beliefs differ from standpoints? First, a belief is an inner
34 PETER HOUTLOSSER
mental state and a standpoint is a position that is externalized in a statement.
Second, the commitments involved in adopting a belief and the commit-
ments involved in advancing a standpoint differ in two respects. In the first
respect, someone who adopts a certain belief assumes certain commitments
towards himself, while someone who advances a standpoint, in the first place,
assumes commitments towards others.s Only in the latter case do the com-
mitments really create obligations that the speaker must live up to in the en-
suing interaction. If, for instance, someone believes that a Labor government
will make for a new dawn, he is only committed to that belief towards himself.
Even ifhe were he to vote for the Tories in the next election, there is not really
much that can be critically stated about his decision (save that he should see
an analyst). But if he seriously advanced the standpoint that Labor would ac-
tually lead to a new dawn, then he can no longer get away with asserting in the
same discussion that one should vote for the Tories. By advancing the new-
dawn standpoint he has assumed an obligation to defend that standpoint.
This implies that he is no longer free to say things that contradict that stand-
point.
Another difference between beliefs and standpoints is that someone who
has adopted a belief should have had good reasons for its adoption. Apart
from the initial requirement at the time of adoption, there is no requirement
, to produce reasons for having a belief. A speaker who has advanced a stand-
point, however, may at all times be required to produce arguments in its favor.
Among other differences between beliefs and standpoints is the fact that
'~ A beliefs belong in a context of inquiry ar:.d stan~points iJ.!.a context of iystifici!,-
tlOIl.:AZontext of inquiry means that reasoning takes place based on certain
premises; inferences are made in which one belief emanates, as it were, from
other beliefs. Beliefs are adopted on the basis of other beliefs. If a belief is re-
jected because it turns out to be false, this usually leads to abandoning other
beliefs as well, namely the beliefs from which it emanated. A context of justifi-
cation implies that a previously disputed standpoint is defended, although
the arguments may in practice, of course, also be advanced before the stand-
point is put forward. Dialectically speaking, however, the standpoint precedes
the arguments - otherwise there is nothing to defend.
2.2.5 Argumentative Discourse Analysis
In argumentative discourse analysis, "opinion" is one of the most prominent
notions. Deborah Schiffrin (1985,1987,1990) presents a characterization of
opinions which is based on her analyses of everyday discourse. She describes
opinions as inherently disputable statements in which an individual, subjec-
POINTS OF VIEW 35
 tive. and evaluative position is presented in respect to a possible, existing, or
desirable state of affairs. 9 A distinctive feature of opinions appears to be that
they are not "externally verifiable': According to Schiffrin, the term opinion
refers to a mental state which is only accessible to the speaker himself (1987:
236; 1990: 244). Someone who expresses an opinion is primarily committed to
the sincerity of his words, not to the truth of what he says. Even when the
speaker refuses to justify his opinion, he cannot be denied the right to main-
tain that opinion. According to Schiffrin, expressed opinions carry no burden
of proof. This feature, to a certain extent, makes opinions immune from criti-
cism (1985: 40; 1990: 248).
At first glance, opinions and standpoints seem to have a great deal in com-
mon. Both opinions and standpoints are a type of statement, both of these
statements express some sort of position which, as a rule, will not go undis-
puted, and both opinions and standpoints can be individual and subjective.
But there are also some crucial differences.
According to Schiffrin, opinions do not carry a burden of proof; stand-
points do; a standpoint must be defended against criticisms. If a standpoint
turns out to be untenable in a discussion, it would be unreasonable to main-
~ain it - although it may, of course, be put forward in a new discussion, so that
It may be defended again. According to Schiffrin, an opinion can also be
maintained if the critic, at the conclusion of a discussion, is still not convinced
of.its ~cceptability. In her view, opinions are subjected to different rationality
cn~e~la than standpoints. Yet, in everyday life, not everyone will agree that
opmlOns do not need to be defended. Although Schriffrin's characterization
of an opinion is avowedly founded on analyses of everyday discourse, it is in
this respect slightly esoteric.
Another important difference between opinions and standpoints is that
someone who expresses an opinion primarily commits himself to being sin-
cere, not to being right, as is the case with someone who advances a stand-
point. When a standpoint is advanced, the sincerity of the speaker is implied
~though not necessarily achieved). Again, Schiffrin's conception of an opin-
1O~ s~ems to depart from the ordinary language user's understanding of an
opmlOn.As a general rule, someone who utters an opinion in everyday life not
only wants to assert that he is being sincere, but also that he is right.lO
2.2.6 Structuralist Informal Logic
The notion of "conclusion" in the structuralist approach to argumentation is
commonly used by prominent informal logicians such as Stephen Thomas in
Practical Reasoning in Natural Language (1986), Trudy Govier in A Practical
PETER HOUTLOSSER
Study of Argument (1992) and Ralph Johnson and Anthony Blair in Logical
Self- Defense (1994). Both Govier and Johnson and Blair regard a conclusion as
a proposition that is derived from one or more other propositions or premis-
es: "The conclusion emerges from the premises" (Govier 1992: 27). They also
regard a conclusion as a statement that is in dispute, and in support of which,
reasons have been put forward: "Any sentence expressing an opinion [that
someone has asserted and is defending] expresses what is called a conclusion
of the argument" (Johnson and Blair 1994: 10, 29-30); "The conclusion is the
claim or statement that is in dispute and that we are trying to support with
reasons" (Govier 1992: 5)." As a consequence, their characterization of a con-
clusion does not apply to the final points of logical patterns that are struc-
turally parallel to, but functionally different from, arguments. For example,
instances of explanatory reasoning such as "Someone else was appointed to
the case, because the person to whom it originally had been assigned was on
holiday" parallel the logical structure of arguments such as "He will surely
come back, because he left the pictures of his mother here"; the proposition
"Someone else was appointed to the case" in the explanation, however, can-
not count as a conclusion in the informal logic sense, since it is not in dispute
and no attempt is made to support it. In this respect, Govier's and Johnson
and Blair's use of the term conclusion differs slightly from the way in which the
word "conclusion" is used in everyday discourse. Colloquially, a conclusion
may very well be the result of a piece of explanatory reasoning.
Because he does not make a distinction between argumentative and
explanatory reasoning, for Thomas a conclusion can also be the result of ex-
planatory reasoning,u He defines a conclusion as "any statement that an au-
thor presents as justified or explained by some reason in a discourse" (19 86 :
34). In comparing conclusions to standpoints, it is preferable to start from
Thomas' definition of a conclusion, because, by using that definition, the dif-
ferences between standpoints and conclusions become clearer than when one
employs Govier's and Johnson and Blair's definitions. .
The first difference, then, is that a conclusion mi!YQt'!_~:;!ate~nt!!1i!i-1S
made (m;~~);c~~Pt~bl~-bi-~th~~~t~t~~~l}i~,Ql!t .~lso a..st~temen1_~U§
,A ~~-;(mQief~en;ib)e1by other statements. With a ~tandpoint, the
I"only Issue is acceptability. Formulas suc~~s~~lj>E~!! ~?~~uCldate Il1ystand- .
point"may be colloquial, ~I,!!~()~~~~~*~"r"<?'~l,~~~f~~~!~~~g~~t~ ;'
munize'a'st;l!tdllciii!dhim~~TIil£i§Jll,]Y acting as if their standpomrm.~ ~ \
~l~~ld~tfo;':'~~~~~~~ggestthat the stan4I2Qint has alr~bee~a:~1 /'
cepted by their anta~on~t,!yll~It:~~it§ .(l<:c:e.p~i!bili4:~~!S§~~.~.a.~()l'lii ,
, The;;;:onddiffe~e;;e between conclusions and standpoints is that conclu-
r sions end a piece of reasoning whereas standpoints get the discussion - and
~ the argumentation - started. In empirical reality, a standpoint may also be
POINTS OF VIEW 37
 concluded from arguments previously propounded and a conclusion may
precede the reasons that support it, but logically, conclusions emerge from
premises already stated, whereas dialectically, standpoints precede their de-
fense. These differences have, by the way, nothing to do with the nature or the
formal properties of the statements by means of which they are advanced; de-
pending on the perspective one takes, the same statement may be analyzed as
a conclusion or as a standpoint.
2.2·7 Procedural Informal Logic
In the procedural informal logic approach of argumentation expounded by
Stephen Toulrnin (195811988) in The Uses ofArgument, the notion of a "claim"
is central. Toulmin starts from the assumption that a speaker who makes an
assertion, by definition, puts forward a claim: "A man who puts forward an as-
sertion makes a claim - a claim on our attention and to our belief. [... ] The
claim [... ] in an assertion is like a claim to a right or a title" (1988: 11). The
"merits" of such a claim depend, according to Toulmin, on the arguments that
can be produced in its support.13 If a speaker advances a claim in an assertion,
the listener has the unconditional right to challenge the speaker to justify this
',' claim. In Toulmin's model of argumentation, this challenge is met by advanc-
ing data. The data may invoke the question of why they are relevant to the
claim. Then, a warrant must be advanced, which may in turn need to be sup-
ported by a backing. Also, conditions of rebuttal may be added to the claim,
which may occasion the speaker to insert a qualifier (1988: 97-105).
According to Toulmin, an adequate argumentative procedure does not
start by advancing a claim, but by posing a question in which a problem is pre-
~ sented. Only then is the claim advanced. The claim is presented as the opti-
mally appropriate answer to the problem question - as the solution of the
';problem. Procedurally, claims are thus connected to problem questions and
their solution (1988: 17-22).
\ How do claims relate to standpoints? Just like in the advancement of a
standpoint, by advancing a claim, the speaker purports that what he is assert-
ing is acceptable. In this respect, there is no difference between claims and
standpoints. Nor is there a difference between claims and standpoints as re-
gards the obligation to provide support when either is challenged. According
to Toulmin's model, claims should be supported to meet the question as to the
grounds on which the claim is based. Standpoints should be supported or re-
tracted to meet the doubts of a listener. A significant difference between
claims and standpoints is that, according to Toulrnin, a claim is implied by
every assertion, whereas not every assertion automatically implies a stand-
PETER HOUTLOSSER
point.'4 In order for an assertion to be a standpoint, additional conditions
must be fulfilled (see 2.2.1).
2.2.8 Advocacy and Debate
A debate in the North American style centers around "propositions." As
Austin Freeley describes it in his prominent book, Argumentation ~nd De~ate
(1993), in a debate two parties attempt, with the help of argument~tI~n, to ~us­
tify or refute to a judge a statement about whi.ch a di~erence of opl~lOn .eXists.
The affirmative side defends the statement ill confhct; the negative SIde at-
tacks it. The statement that is defended and attacked is called the debate
proposition, or proposition (1993: 38). The affirmative side has the burd~~ of
proof of the proposition. This means that they need to justify the propOSIt10~
convincingly to the judge. The negative side has no burden of proof; theH
only task is to attack the proposition (1993: 43). ..
American debate distinguishes between three types of propOSItion: pro-
positions of fact, propositions of value and proposit~~ns o~ policy (199.3: 47-
48 ).'5 The burden of prooffor these types of propositlOns IS, to. a certaI~ e~­
tent, fixed. To each proposition a certain defense scheme apphes that .I~dI­
cates which stock issues should be addressed in defending the propos~t~on.
Stock issues are questions that are related to a particular type of proposIt~on.
The answers to these questions constitute direct justifications or refut~tlO.ns
of the proposition (1993: 60 ).'6 In a debate, the affirmative side should JUStify
all positive answers in order to make the debate proposition ac~eptable to the
judge. In doing so, this party must provide su~porting co~tentlOns for all t.he
positive answers to the questions formulated m the StOCkISSU~S. Th: negatIve
side needs to refute only one positive answer. If they succeed m domg so, the
proposition becomes unacceptable to the judge in accordance with the rules
of debate (1993: 61). ..
There are a number of similarities between debate propositlOns and stand-
points. Both are externalized statements and both ~res~ppose a difference of
opinion. Both debate propositions and standp~ll1ts ll1volve a burden of
proof, and the proponent can acquit himself of hIS burden of proof by for-
warding arguments.
There are also differences. The first difference is contextual. Debate ~ro­
positions are, by definition, part of a form~, regime.nted debate. ~ta~dpomts,
on the other hand, appear both in formahzed, regImented and m mformal,
non-regimented discussions. The second difference is that in a debate that
proceeds in accordance with the rules, ~ach party.has o~~ and only one tas~
with respect to the proposition; dependmg on theIr positlOn, one party mus
POINTS OF VIEW 39
 defend the proposition, the other must attack it. In an ordinary discussion,
the participants have more options. Someone who attacks a standpoint may
also advance and defend the opposite standpoint, and the defender of the ini-
tial standpoint may start attacking this opposite standpoint. These differ-
ences have consequences for the burden of proof. In a debate, the negative
side has no burden of proof for the opposite proposition. In a discussion, the
party attacking a standpoint has no burden of proof for the opposite stand-
point, but if this party advances an opposite standpoint, it assumes a burden
of proof.
2.2·9 Communicative Action Theory
Various argumentation theorists have taken their inspiration from Jiirgen
Habermas' theory of communicative action. One of the most prominent
among.the~ is Josef K~ppersch~~c:~ to Kopperschmidt, argu-
mentation IS presented ill order ~o justify a thes;y. In Kopperschmidt's ap-
proach, the notion of "thesis" is us'Callnrarften:;nt sense than the one devel-
oped in classical and formal dialectics.'! To clarify what "thesis" in Kopper-
schmidt's sense means, it is imperative to explain his Habermasian theoretical
framework. This framework is presented in its fullest form in Methodik der
Argumentationsanalyse (1989; see, for an English introduction, Kopper-
schmidt1987).
Just like Habermas, Kopperschmidt is of the opinion that the validity basis
(Geltungsgrund) of normal communication is constituted by three validity
claims underlying every communicative act: comprehensibility, sincerity,
and truth or rightness. In the normal course of action, speakers and listeners
mutually assume that their utterances are intersubjectively valid in these
three respects; the validity claims underlying their utterances remain implic-
it. The validity claims may, however, always be made problematic and thus be-
come explicit. This happens if one of the interlocutors makes it clear that an
utterance is not - or might not be - intersubjectively valid in every respect
(1989: 16, 40-43).
According to Kopperschmidt, only truth claims and rightness claims need
argumentative support if they are made problematic. Truth claims are im-
p lied by assertive speech acts. These claims refer to (supposed) states of affair;
the speaker guarantees that the information provided in his assertive is reli-
able. Rightness claims are implied by directive speech acts. These claims refer
to actions whereby the speaker guarantees that performing the action men-
tioned in his directive is legitimized by a mutual willingness to act (19 89: 16,
333-334).
40 PETER HOUTLOSSER
If a truth claim or a rightness claim has been made into an issue in the dis-
course, it has been, as Kopperschmidt calls it, virtualized (1989: 97). Virtualiz-
ing a truth claim or a rightness claim implies that its legitimacy is made de-
pendent upon argumentative support; the claim is made the subject of a dis-
cussion in which it now functions as a thesis. As soon as the legitimacy of the
validity claim is established with the help of arguments, it no longer has the
function of a thesis (1989: 98).
A speaker can make an issue of a validity claim by explicitly stating that
what he asserts is true or by advancing argumen ts. A listener can virtualize the
validity claim underlying a speaker's utterance by explicitly disputing that va-
lidity claim, by asking whether it is justified, or by requesting that the speaker
advance arguments in its support (1989: 19, 23).
In Kopperschmidt's view, performing an assertive or directive speech act
implies a guarantee that the underlying validity claim can be made legitimate.
If a speaker performs such a speech act, he undertakes an obligation to defend
the thesis that may result from that speech act, if asked to do so, with the help
of arguments. If a thesis originates from an assertive speech act, the argu-
ments should show what has been asserted to be true; if the thesis originates
from a directive speech act, the arguments should show that it is all right to
perform the action mentioned in the directive (1989: 18,36).
How do theses relate to standpoints? The terms thesis and standpoint ap-
pear to refer to the same thing, albeit from different theoretical perspectives.
Both theses and standpoints are part of a discussion situation and both create
an obligation to defend, which can be redeemed by advancing arguments.
One difference, in Kopperschmidt's view, is that a thesis is not a statement but
a virtualized validity claim. ~~e~~~_i!l"_e Ilotput forward as sucl:Ufa speaker
appears to be explicitly advancing a thesis ("I hereby advanq; the thesis that
w~men are better drivers than men are" )~i!! I<gpp.erscnmidt's analysis this as-
sertion does not count as a thesis. Intha~il~aly~is, the thesis would be the vir-
tualization of the validity claim that it is true that women are better driv{!fs
ihan;;;~n.In contrast, in a pragma-dialectic3I perspective, a standpoint is ad-
vanceo directly. This is, of course, not to say that a standpoint must necessari-
ly always be put forward as such. Because the acceptability of every speech act
can be made an issue of discussion, speech acts other than advancing a stand-
point may also require defense. The speech act involved is then to be recon-
structed as a standpoint.
POINTS OF VIEW 41
2.3 Starting Points for Further Research
A clear distinction appears to exist between, on the one hand, the notions
"conclusion", "claim", "debate proposition" and "thesis", which, from different
perspectives, refer to the same or a similar concept as the pragma-dialectical
notion of a standpoint. On the other hand, the notions "attitude", "belief" and
"opinion", refer to a different concept. "Attitude': "belief" and "opinion" refer
to internal states or expressions of such internal states, which places them in a
different category than standpoints. This does not mean,however, that the in-
ternal states to which they refer do not playa role in advancing a standpoint.
Their "positive" role is roughly that when a standpoint is advanced, the speak-
er makes it known to others that he takes a position towards a proposition
that he considers to be under dispute, i.e., an opinion. This opinion is ex-
pressed in the standpoint. Expressing the opinion implies that the speaker has
a certain belief (positive in the case of a positive standpoint, negative in the
case of a negative standpoint). Advancing a standpoint commits the speaker
to having that belief. The opinion and belief aspects are included in the
speech act definition of advancing a standpoint; the opinion aspect in the
propositional content condition, the belief aspect in the sincerity condition.
A standpoint advanced in the discourse will sometimes also be based on an
attitude that corresponds with the position the speaker claims to uphold. But
since this is, pragmatically speaking, not required, attitudes are not a consti-
tutive part of thepragma-dialectical definition of a standpoint.
In the concluding part of this chapter, two questions remain to be an-
swered: what clues do the approaches discussed earlier offer in the identifica-
tion of the entity they are interested in, and to what extent are these clues rele-
vant for identifying standpoints in the pragma-dialectical sense?
Apart from cognitive research on reasoning, all the approaches discussed
above are concerned with problems of identification. In persuasion research,
several techniques are used to identify a person's attitudes. Most prominent
among them is the "direct measurement technique;' in which respondents are
asked to what extent they evaluate a certain object positively or negatively, or
are requested to evaluate a number of properties of the object to which a sup-
posed attitude pertains (O'Keefe 1990: 19-21). Among the less direct tech-
niques are the "quasi-direct measurement technique" and the "indirect mea-
surement technique", in which verbal and nonverbal reactions to evaluative
statements are measured that indicate a certain attitude (O'Keefe 1990: 20-26,
Krech and Crutchfield 1964: 681-683). None of these techniques can be ap-
plied for identifying standpoints in argumentative discourse.
In Schiffrin's view, a structural clue for identifying opinions is that opinions
are often expressed at the beginning or at the end of conflict discourse. This
42 PETER HOUTLOSSER
clue might also apply to standpoints advanced in discussions that come close
to the ideal of critical discussion; standpoints are advanced in the confronta-
tion stage of such a discussion and maintained or retracted in the concluding
stage. Other clues for identifying opinions can, according to Schiffrin, be
found in external markers such as "it is my opinion that" and internal markers
such as attitude indicating verbs ("think", "believe") and modal expressions
("should", "could"). The indicative function of these verbs and expressions
derives from the fact that they can signal the uncertainty involved in express-
ing an opinion (1990: 244). Although a standpoint does not presuppose un-
certainty but a difference of opinion, the markers of opinions may also be
useful for identifying standpoints. A difference of opinion may, after all, im-
ply some kind of uncertainty. . '
According to the structuralist informal logicians, conclUSIOns can be Iden-
tified both with the help of clues in the presentation and clues in the context.
To the first category belong expressions by which a speaker explicitly indi-
cates that he has the intention of presenting a conclusion, such as "I conclude
that': "so", "therefore", "must", "cannot" and "it is impossible that". Clues in the
context can be derived from the type of discourse, for instance if the text is a
letter to the editor (Thomas 1986: 23, Govier 1992: 6,4 0 , Johnson and Blair
1994: 13-15,29-30). In principle, these clues can also be useful for identifying
standpoints, but reliance on indicating expressions presupposes a systematic
pragma-linguistic analysis of these expressions and a reliance on clues ~n tlIe
discourse context presupposes systematic analysis of discourse in particular
contexts. Another clue is provided by the fact that every argument must have
a conclusion. Thus, if an argument has been identified as such, tlIere should
definitely be a conclusion as well. In order to be able to identify arguments, in-
formal logicians have listed characteristics oflogical structures that t~ey c~n­
sider to be arguments; the listed characteristics can also be useful for Identify-
ing argumentation in the functional sense (e.g., Johnson and Blair 1994: 15-
16).
Toulmin's model appears to provide a clue for identifying claims: a state-
ment is a claim ifit is supported by data (anda warrant) (195 8/ 88 : 97-105)· The
presence of data and/or a warrant may thus indicate the presence of a c~aim.
However, a statement may also have the status of a claim before data (wIth or
without a warrant) have been put forward, so this clue is not always relevant.
Another clue appears to be provided by Toulmin's view that every assertion
implies a claim (1958/1988: 11). Unfortunately, Toulmin does not m~e i.t cl~ar
what is meant by an assertion. If assertions are to be regarded as mdlCative
statements with particular functional characteristics that distinguish them
from other indicative statements, then the data and the warrant cannot be re-
garded as assertions. IS If, however, data and warrants were also regarded as as-
43
POINTS OF VIEW
 sertions, this would run counter to the functional distinctions in Toulmin's
model. All in all, it can be concluded that Toulmin does not really provide
clues for identifying claims, let alone clues that are also relevant for identify-
ing standpoints.
Debate propositions are explicitly formulated at the beginning of the de-
bate. Identifying them is therefore never a problem. All the same, Freeley
mentions a clue for the identification of inciting propositions: they will often
contain the word "should" (1993: 59). Without further analysis, however, this
observation is not of much interest.
In Kopperschmidt's view, a speaker can promote a validity claim to a thesis
by making the claim explicit. He can do this by using so-called meta-linguistic
expressions such as "I assert that" and "it is true that". The listener can pro-
mote a validity claim to a thesis by using expressions such as "it is not true
that" and "I disagree': and by asking "validity questions" such as "why?" (19 89:
65). Another clue is the presence of argumentation: in Kopperschmidt's
analysis argumentation is put forward to legitimize a virtualized validity
claim, and thereby to justify a thesis (1989: 70-73). Although in the latter case,
the problem is again shifted to the identification of argumentation, it should
be clear that the clues provided by Kopperschmidt are, in principle, also rele-
vant for the identification of standpoints.
As argued in Houtlosser (1995), the pragma-dialectical definition of ad-
vancing a standpoint as a speech act provides fruitful criteria for identifying
standpoints. In particular, the first preparatory condition offers a powerful
criterion: a speaker who advances a standpoint is committed to believing that
the listener does not accept the expressed opinion to which the standpoint
pertains at face value. If this belief is justified, a standpoint must, in principle,
be defended. This is so because everyday interaction is governed by the inter-
actional principle that prescribes that speakers should not perform any
speech acts that are not acceptable to the listener. If a speech act turns out to
be unacceptable to the addressee, something has to happen; the speech act
should be made acceptable or retracted. As a consequence, someone who as-
serts something which he believes not to be acceptable to the addressee
should justify or retract his assertion; if he wants to maintain it, he has the
obligation to defend it. Thus, the assertion, in principle, has the status of a
standpoint.
In order to be able to make adequate use of this criterion, it must be made
clear how it can be determined whether the first preparatory condition of ad-
vancing a standpoint is fulfilled. Three types of potential clues are available to
determine whether this is the case (1995: 93-98). First, there are indications in
the presentation of an assertive by the speaker. Additions to the assertive
proper - the propositional content of the assertive - by means of expressions
44 PETER HOUTLOSSER
such as "I believe that" and "I think that" may signal that the first preparatory
condition is fulfilled. Strictly speaking, by adding expressions such as these,
the speaker does something that is superfluous. The fact that he believes that
what he asserts is true is already implied by his assertive; it is formulated in its
sincerity condition. If the speaker can at the same time be assumed to obey
the Gricean maxim that prohibits superfluity, it can be justified to infer an
implicature from the addition, i.e., the implicature that the speaker thinks
that the listener will not accept the assertive proper at face value.
Second, the listener's reaction to the speaker's assertive may be a clue. If the
listener casts doubt on the speaker's assertive and the speaker has understood
that this is the case, then again the first preparatory condition for advancing a
standpoint is fulfilled. In order to be able to identify expressions of doubt by
the listener, insight into the differences between the two main categories of
listeners' reactions pertaining to an assertive's acceptability and listeners' re-
actions pertaining to an assertive's comprehensibility can be of help. Onlyre-
actions that belong to the former category indicate that doubt is cast on a
speaker's assertive.
Third, clues can be found in follow-ups by the speaker. Here too, two main
categories can be distinguished: follow-ups pertaining to the acceptability of
the preceding assertive and follow- ups pertaining to the comprehensibility of
the preceding assertive. The first category consists of statements that are de-
signed to further inform the listener, such as specifications, definitions, and
explanations. The second consists of statements that are intended to convince
the listener, such as motivations, justifications and reasons. Only the latter
type of statement indicates that the listener is assumed not to have accepted
the preceding assertive at face value, and may thus point to a standpoint!9
In Houtlosser (1995), a broad range of clues for the fulfillment of the first
preparatory condition of advancing a standpoint are discussed, as they ap-
pear in the speaker's presentation, his follow-up or in the listener's reaction.
Further research has to make it clear which clues can be derived from the oth-
er felicity conditions. In such research, for instance, one could investigate the
ways that speakers assume an obligation to defend a standpoint and express
their readiness to fulfill that obligation, and in what ways listeners attribute
such an obligation to the speaker.
POINTS OF VIEW 45
 Notes
1 The term formal dialectic was introduced by Hamblin (1970).
2 There are significant similarities between the pragma-dialectical defini-
tion of a s~andpoint and the notion of standpoint in everyday life, but there
are also dIfferences. In everyday life, a standpoint need not necessarily be
pre~ent.ed to others. It is, for instance, common practice for people to
maIntaIn that they hold a particular standpoint on a certain matter with-
out ever having presented this point of view to others, or even without hav-
ing e~p~essed it. It is also not the case that in everyday life standpoints nec-
ess~rilY.Impl~ a burden of proof. People may think that they are entitled to
maIntaIn theI~ standpoint even when they are not capable of supporting it
adequately; WItness familiar contentions such as "This is my point of view
and I have every intention to stick to it."
3 Along the same lines, the felicity conditions for a negative standpoint can
be stated. References to a speaker and listener apply, mutatis mutandis, also
to a writer and a reader.
4 F~llowing V~n Eemeren and Grootendorst's (1984: 21,42) critique of Sear-
Ie s formulatIOn of the sincerity condition of promises, it should be added
t~at someone who has advanced a standpoint does not really have to be-
~Ieve that:he op~nion to which the standpoint pertains is the case; the point
IS that he IS publIcly committed to believing that it is the case.
s For the problems involved in reconstructing standpoints that are not pre-
sented as such, see Van Eemeren, Grootendorst, Jackson, and Jacobs (1993:
Ch·S).
6 For a survey of the various positions on the ontological status of the con-
tent of beliefs, see Schiffer (1987: xvi-xvii).
7 Harman does not explain how a commitment to oneself can best be under-
stood. For a totally opposite view of the relation between belief and accep-
tance, see Cohen (1989).
8 The commitments towards others also involve a commitment to the belief
that the opinion to which the standpoint pertains is true. As indicated in
2.2.1, the speaker does not necessarily need to have this belief, but he is nev-
ertheless responsible for having it - he cannot deny the belief without con-
tradi~ting himself (as happens, for instance, in "In my view they should
leave It at that, but I don't think that they should").
9 An opinion always expresses a belief, but - in Schiffrin's definition _ the re-
verse is not the case: not every belief is inherently disputable.
lO For a conception of opinions that is closer to common sense see Weddle
(1988); an elaboration of such a conception in terms of speech acts is given
by Atelsek (1981).
PETER HOUTLOSSER
11 Interestingly, Whately (182611975) reserves the term conclusion to refer to a
proposition which is proven in an argument; before it is proven, it is still
considered a question.
12 Although Fisher (1988) closely follows Thomas, he sticks to this distinc-
tion.
13 In Toulmin, Rieke, and Janik (1979), claims are defined as "assertions put
forward publicly for general acceptance - with the implication that there
are underlying 'reasons' that could show them to be 'well-founded' and
therefore entitled to be generally accepted" (1979: 29)·
14 In their polyphonic approach, Anscombre and Ducrot (1989) assume that
every assertion expresses different (implicit) viewpoints, for one of which,
as a rule, the speaker claims responsibility (see also Van Eemeren et al.1996:
318-322 ). A viewpoint in this sense is not a standpoint as conceived in
argumentation theory.
15 In the pragma-dialectical argumentation theory, a similar distinction is
made between types of opinion to which a standpoint may pertain (Van
Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992: 159). Crawshay-Williams distinguishes
between types of statements on the basis of relevant testing criteria: logi-
cal, conventional and empirical (1957: 8-13; see also Van Eemeren et al.1996:
74-82).
16 The difference of opinion about the debate proposition presupposes a dif-
ference of opinion about at least one of the answers to the questions for-
mulated in the stock issues. This means that the negative side should offer a
negative response to those questions at least once; otherwise, there is no
difference of opinion.
17 In some rhetorical approaches - especially those that are in part inspired
by dialectics - the term thesis is also applied to refer to a proposition put
forward for the adherence of a public (see, for instance, Perehnan and 01-
brechts-Tyteca 1969).
18 The definition of claim in Touhnin et al. 1979 does not meet this objection.
In that definition, the characteristics of claims also apply to the statements
by means of which data and warrants are advanced. .
19 Explanations may, of course, be instrumental in the process of gettIng a
standpoint accepted. If, for instance, a listener does not exactly underst~nd
what a standpoint is about (or what its implications are), he maya fortIOri
be reluctant to accept it. An explanation may then serve the purpose of elu-
cidating the standpoint. Once it has been elucidated, it must still be in need
of defense. Otherwise it is, dialectically speaking, not a standpoint. By
themselves, explanations do therefore not point to a standpoint.
47
POINTS OF VIEW
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PETER HOUTLOSSER
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There are several reasons why modern theorists of argumentation, rhetoric,

logic, and conversation are interested in unexpressed premises, also referred
to as missingpremises or implicit premises. The first reason is the need to have a
proper method for the identification of unexpressed premises based on a sa-
tisfYing theoretical explanation. The unexpressed premise is seen as an essen-
tial part of an argumentation, and in order to be able to analyze and evaluate
that argumentation, the unexpressed premise must be satisfactorily identi-
fied. This, however, is difficult. Because the analyst is dealing with something
that is implicit, he or she must furnish something that originally was absent.
The second reason why unexpressed premises are of interest to various the-
orists is the need to explain unexpressed premises as language phenomena.
Language users in everyday contexts express certain things explicitly while
leaving other things implicit. They do so without giving it much thought, and
usually this does not pose any serious communication problems. Recent em-
pirical research indicates that ordinary language users have little trouble un-
derstanding the unexpressed premises in given cases:'

The results of the characterising-grouping test indicate that the relation between
the premise and the standpoint is adequately interpreted by the respondents.
Most of them were able to offer informative and pragmatically appropriate
reconstructions of the unexpressed premise ... (Garssen 1999: 226).

Theoretically, however, it is not easy to explain how the involved thought

processes operate, and on what basis the language users arrive at their inter-
pretations. In argumentation theory, unexpressed premises are viewed as one
of the more difficult research subjects. In his account of a summer conference
on argumentation in 1991, Walton remarks:

A third area of concern was that of identifYing missing (non-explicit) premises

and conclusions. Everyone frankly admitted this to be a major, unsolved prob-
lem, even though a traditional method of analysis of enthymemes has been
taught throughout the history oflogic (1996: xii).
50 PETER HOUTLOSSER
51
 This chapter will clarify what the roblem f .
of and what theoretical advances h~ve been ;a~n:xpres~ed :;;emlses consists According to Copi, this treatment of unexpressed premises is restricted to de-
~ave exist.ed since 1987, when Govier published:n ~:~::::ial ::r;~~l::~~:t ductive arguments. In dealing with other types of argument, such as induc-
g premIses. In the discussion about unex ressed' - tive analogy arguments, unexpressed premises play no role. In this case, the
themes were central: the dedu ( . d . p.. ~remlses the following inference is evaluated by using certain evaluative criteria. This stance is in op-
for the treatment of une c lYe-In ~ctIve dIstInctIOn and its implications
position to,for example, Rescher (1964), who thinks that it is warranted to fill
constitutes the unexpres:drepssed .premhlses'l the nature of the statement that
remIse, t e ro e of the txt' l' in an unexpressed premise in every argument consisting of just one premise
expressed premises, the relation between c~n e In ana yZIng un- and a conclusion. Rescher's view, however, deviates from the general concep-
search on argument schem I th unexpresse premises, and the re- tion of the traditional logical approach to unexpressed premises.
these themes, two tradition~: n \baCkground of the discussion about
part. pproac es to unexpressed premises play their
There is, in fact, a second traditional approach to enthymemes that must be
distinguished, which is very different from the logical approach. This second
approach is much less well-known, but parts of it appear in traditional logical
3·2 Two Traditional Approaches approaches and in modern approaches to enthymemes as well. It is based on
Aristotle's treatment of the enthymemes in his Rhetoric. There are many
~;~:~~~i~a~~:yr~e:ee:taAltiOthn texhtbth°Oks insist that there is one traditional points of discussion regarding the exact meaning and the correct interpreta-
tion of Aristotle's views of the definition, form, and content of enthymemes,
. oug emanydes' ( f h'
are not always identical in all cnp IOns 0 t IS approach but the interpretation of his views expressed in modern rhetorical approach-
ment with the following: respects, most of them are more or less in agree-
es seems to amount to the following: 4

An enthymeme is an arg . h' An enthymeme is a form of rhetorical argumentation that is directed at a particu-
Ii . umentm w lCha premise (orthe conclusion) is left im-
ihCIt. :ecau:e of that, the argument as stated is logically (deductively) invalid lar audience, in a particular situation, and with a particular goal. In enthymemes,
ere ore, t e.unexpressed premise (or conclusion) has to be made ex lic't .d the speaker exploits the fact that knowledge or information can be conveyed to
filll~dd
va 1 .
m, applymg the validity rules of (deductive) logic, to render the a~gu~::t that audience without explicitly putting it into words.

I shall call this the traditional rhetorical approach. Interestingly, this approach
I shall refer to this definition of enth m
traditional 10 ical a
. g
.r emes ~nd unexpressed premises as the
pproach. It has Its roots In classical works f e d
is only directed at rhetorical arguments, and according to Aristotle, rhetorical
arguments are something entirely different from apodictic and dialectical ar-
BoethlUs, and evolved in the Middl A . h 0 lCero an guments. Formal logic does not apply to rhetorical arguments. The study of
ers Peter of S a' e ges In t e works of, among many oth-
, p I~ ~Walton 1996: 222, Gerritsen 1999a: 27, 1999b: 229) 2 A _ rhetorical arguments focuses on the interaction between the speaker and the
totype of the traditIonall . 1 h' . . pro audience and the question of how the speaker can convey a certain message to
Cohen) 0 fC" oglCa a~proac IS COPI (1953; reprinted in 1986, with
. ne 0 Opi Sexamples IS: this audience. Therefore, the rhetorical approach and the logical approach of
ul1t:xpll"e~sed p~~~ises are more or1ess eaCh 9ther's opposites, The 6rst mainly
The soul through all her being is immortal, for that which is ever in motion is im-
focuses on.interactional aspects and not on l()g!c, .while the latter focuses \
mortal (1986: 223). mainly on logic and not on interactional aspects.
The rhetorical conception of the enthymeme, viewed historically, is the first
In this argument, the following premise has been left implicit: approach to enthymemes to be distinguished. Although the basic ideas be-
hind it seemed to linger on in the thinking about enthymemes, the traditional
The soul is ever in motion.) logical approach to enthymemes has dominated the study of unexpressed
premises for a very long time, roughly from the early Middle Ages into the
first half of the twentieth century (Gerritsen 1999b). This was due to the fact
that during that period traditional logic dominated in science. As long as it

52 SUSANNE GERRITSEN
UNEXPRESSED PREMISES 53
 ~as appli~d to artificial arguments, as an exercise in logic let's say, the tradi-
tlOnalloglcal approach was sufficient. This was also true in cases where a cor-
rect and systematic analysis of everyday argumentation was of no real con-
cern. Copi's aforementioned example serves as an illustration of this. In the
fifties and sixties, there was a growing theoretical and practical interest in ar-
gumentation. It was at this time that it became apparent that the traditional
logical approach was problematic when applied to ordinary arguments. The
first problem is that the traditional logical approach applies only to deductive
arguments, while it is obvious that in real life most arguments do not meet
that requirement. Most ordinary arguments tend to have conclusions that are
not alway.s ~ro~able and therefore seem to be non-deductive. In practice,
however, .It IS dIfficult to distinguish deductive from non-deductive argu-
ments. It IS also unclear how non-deductive arguments should be interpreted
and evaluated without making use of some concept of unexpressed premises.
If the traditional logical approach is applied to all types of arguments, then
problems remain. One such problem is that too many candidates for the un-
expressed premise are generated; often several different statements could ren-
der the argument valid. In such cases, logic does not offer the proper selection
tools. Ful1.hs:rI!lQ!~ th~tr~ditionallogical ilpproach does not take into ac-
count the large variety of implicit elements and their differeritfurlctI~n~~­
:~us, this ~pproach is oflittle help for working out which explicit and implic-
It InformatIon plays a role in any particular argumentation. _ ' "
It is because of these shortcomings of the traditionallogic~l approach that
modern argumentation theorists have made an effort to formulate new views
of unexpressed premises and develop new approaches. This effort also in-
spi.red a renewed interest in the rhetorical approach of enthymemes because
of ItS more pragmatic perspective. In the earlier years of argumentation theo-
ry, unexpressed premises were high on the agenda. In 1980, as part of the re-
search program for "informal logic': Blair and Johnson formulated the fol-
lowing questions with regard to unexpressed premises:
The problem ofassumptions and missingpremises:
What exactly is a missing premise? What different kind of assumptions can be
distinguished in argumentation? Which are significant for argument evaluation?
How are missing premises to be identified and formulated? Are these just pract-
ical and pedagogical questions, or theoretical as well? (1980: 25).
These questions proved difficult to answer - although already at an early
stage, Hitchcock (1980, 1981) and Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (19 82,19 83)
made a concerted effort - and they still feature in the present research on un-
expressed premises.
54 SUSANNE GERRITSEN
3.3 The Deductive-Inductive Distinction
The starting point of the recent research on unexpressed premises began with
the change of focus from deductive arguments, in which the conclusion defi-
nitely follows from the premises, to inductive arguments, in which the con-
clusion is only probable. ~0_bse~~a!i?~0at !he logic.u. approach has some
AhortcomiDZ~ rai~es the question of ~J:1!lt r_<?!~t,?_~~~!_l.()p.ic·sh.0ul~~a?~·c~~.'
i $1,~1~~5?~~EI!~!g1Jmc;ntiltionth~0!y. This question is particularly relevant
Vwhen dealing with unexpressed premises, since strictly speaking the only sys-
tematic concepts and tools available for analysis and identification come
from formal logic; unexpressed premises and formal deductive logic are
closely linked. Formal deductive logic supplies us with a fixed model of argu-
ment. By virtue of this fixed model unexpressed premises are traditionally de-
fined.
Many theorists believe that the traditional deductive model of argument
cannot be applied when analyzing ordinary, inductive arguments. Instead, we
should try to find some useful alternative to the deductive model. If !h-~rel~~_
tionship betweenformallol?;is .'\!1:<lllI1 expr<:!,sed premises is abandoned, how-
ever~ilie;;-;;~~p-i' o{~rl~nexpress~d premise becomes vague and problematic.
In the existing ni:erat~~e~therehasb~~rl a long and extensive discussion on the
topic of whether or not deductive logic can be applied to non-deductive types
of argument, and how to deal with them otherwise.5 The position a theorist
takes in this discussion largely decides the way he or she approaches unex-
pressed premises. Three main points of view can be distinguished. I shall call
them pluralism, modern deductivism and neither pluralist, nor deductivist.
3.3.1 Pluralism
The first point of view regarding the deductive-inductive distinction is that
deductive and inductive arguments have to be dealt with differently when it
comes to unexpressed premises. In this view one cannot use the deductive
model of argument to analyze inductive and other non-deductive types of ar-
gument. An important advocate of this view is Govier (1987). The view is also
endorsed by Woods (1990) and Walton (1996). In their opinion, a theorist
who analyses an inductive argument by means of the deductive model, is a
"deductivist": someone who treats all arguments as if they are about certainty
while they are not. The opponents of deductivism are in favor of a so-called
I pluralist view: 6 The different types of argument, like deductive, inductive,
I conductive and abductive arguments, each require their own interpretative
and evaluative model.? Pluralists believe that a standard deductivistic treat-
() ! ( 11
I ~ -Z
UNEXPRESSED PREMISES 55
 ment of unexpressed premises is fundamentally wrong, because it ignores the
vital distinction between the different types of arguments, and wrongly re-
gards non-deductive arguments consisting of one premise and a conclusion
as incomplete. 8 As a consequence, arguments that are non-deductive are eval-
uated by non-fitting and deductive criteria that are considered too strong.Ac-
cording to Walton, a standard deductivistic analysis often implies "reading
in" premises that are not part of the argument, in order to meet the deduc-
tivistic requirement. This comes down to the fallacy of the straw man (1996:
241). To avoid this fallacy, an option would be to render each argument de-
ductively valid only in a minimal way, by merely adding the logical minimum
(a statement of the form "if (premise), then (conclusion),,). In this type of
method, however, the discerning power of the concept oflogical validity is re-
duced to nothing. Woods (1990: 107) makes this point; he observes that in a
. trivial way, all argumellt~ C:<ln£~ 1J:1~~~sk~."~t:i¥4¥aLid;aiidby.l2i~~_
distinction between IQgic:allyvalid and inYi!Ugj'fl£uIilents dissolves - or so
. pluralists argue. ........ ........."._. ,,' '. - ....." .........-••..-... '-.... _....'-,---
According to the pluralistic view, an unexpressed premise, as it is tradition-
ally understood, must only be supplied in the (rare) case of a real-life deduc-
tive argument. The step from premise to conclusion in inductive and other
kinds of arguments has to be evaluated in some alternative way; in any case,
never by supplying an unexpressed premise that renders the argument de-
ductively valid, since this would amount to deductivism.
In recent years, the main efforts of those who oppose deductivism have
been directed at three elements. First, they have tried to convince proponents
of a deductivistic approach that their method is wrong (Hitchcock 1985,
Govier 1987). Second, they have made efforts to describe and define the char-
acteristics of deductive versus inductive arguments and other kinds of argu-
ments to be able to apply these distinctions to real-life arguments (Govier
1992). In practice, however, the distinctions are difficult to make. Third, plu-
ralists concern themselves with the question of how the inference from the
premises to the conclusion is evaluated in non-deductive types of argument
(Hitchcock 1980, 1981, 1985).
As yet, the efforts to develop a pluralistic treatment of unexpressed premises
do not seem to have had any concrete result; there is still no agreed-upon
overview of types of arguments and proper evaluation criteria. Also, it must
be said that it is necessary to evaluate the inference in every argument, regard-
. i 'ess of its type. !~is also a~plies to a pluralist account. But within such an ac-
,I/Fount, the tradltlOnal notlOn of unexpressed premise is only of limited use,
and so far !lQ?'S~~te~~ve~W~~jK~re4.As a consequence, it is an open
qu~s~i~,,::heth.:~~ shou~~. f.?.r_I!1l!I<lt~~ s!!l.J~m~.!ltili.a~~E~~s.~:'s-;hat'the
\"
\
' ..
/-J .. '~
SUSANNE GERRITSEN
in~!'~~~i~!(l_~<!,i(s.?! W~~!~~t~,:;,!~:~~~~~~~~t.~~~;~~~~.s..~I?-
9
~~~~ot~/
er basis an evaluation of the inference can be made.
• ,_ 0' ~."',_" ,~, •••.,,,.,., _ _ ~ ___ '""_m ....__',...._ .."''"' __.......,_,,_,.,._ /1
3.3.2 Modern Deductivism
A second point of view in the deductive-inductive discussion consists of the
notion that regularly applying deductive rules of validity to fill in an unex-
pressed premise does not necessarily imply a deductivist stance, at least not in
the strict sense of the word. Therefore, there is no objection against a standard
deductivistic analysis of unexpressed premises. Ennis (1982: 70) recognized
the distinction between deduction and induction, but is nevertheless in favor
of a deductivistic method, because this forces the analyst to examine each step
in the argumentation carefully, and guarantees that no steps are missed.
Hitchcock (1980) also favors this "heuristic" deductivism, as Govier (19 87: 89)
has called it. Other defenses of deductivism were expressed by pragma-di-
alecticians such as Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (199 2 ) and Gerritsen
(1995) and by Groarke (1992). I shall refer to these last-mentioned authors as
modern deductivists.
When it comes to unexpressed premises, the inductive-deductive distinc-
tion is not a crucial problem for modern deductivists. As Groarke (199 2 ) ar-
gues, the distinction between deductive and inductive arguments mainly
concerns a difference in the degree of certainty of the inference from premises
to conclusion. It is possible to incorporate this degree of certainty in the
analysis without abandoning the deductive framework. This can be achieved
by adding specific semantic indicators of the strength of the inference ("It is
likely that ... ", "I feel it is certainly so that ... ") to either the premise or the
conclusion if such indicators are absent from the original. Which indicator is
suitable in a given case has to be decided by looking at the context. p~V
~nts()~~~~~~~~i."i~t!,c<lp~roClchargue~l1(lt as l~ng ~s the degre~ of certam1}'j
is taken mto account III thIS way, there ,IS no objection to, applymg a 4educ-
tlvistiCahalysis~ig[y~ri~ly !,QAlfi:lJ,:gumt:n ts,
"'Those;ho'follow a deductivistic approach to unexpressed premises have
focused their attention in recent years mainly on two elements. First, they
have been trying to explain why a deductivistic approach is warranted. This .
o!!:~~~~.0~!}h,<:Y t:!1.E(igeiI1. (l general dis~ussioJ1 of tile p}~ce ,::n~ ful1~tio~
I of forma!J().gk.within,mQd~[!!,<1orgllIllent<!t!QIlJl1eQIT.Iht:~rIJ1<lln_r21.l?! IS
('-i h at !£~(;<;tl_v.a.li<:U!Yl.Yi~W'ed eIllPiric:<!lly, is also a requir~lI!eJ1t of ~rclin<lrY:(ir­
i gumentation: 10 It is always a necessary result of argument analysIs at a logical
leveC(Ie:;'a formal logical reconstruction of the unexpressed premises).
Therefore, the deductivist method is not just used for heuristic reasons.
UNEXPRESSED PREMISES 57
 Most modern deductivists acknowledge that it is unclear which kinds of
co~cepts of validity real language users actually apply. They also admit that
logiCal systems other than the traditional propositional and syllogistic logic
may be more suited for analyzing particular arguments:
Although some commitment to a clear criterion of validity is here required, this
does not necessarily imply a dogmatic commitment to deductivism. At this junc-
ture we do not want to take a specific and definitive stance on the question of
exactly what kind oflogical criterion is to be preferred (Van Eemeren and
Grootendorst 1992: 113).
In practice, though, most modern deductivists still restrict the use of formal
logi~ to the tr~ditionallogical systems. This part of their approach may be
motIvated mamly by heuristic reasons:
Just for the sake of simplicity, we shall restrict ourselves ... to making use of the
well-known and ready-made Instruments of propositional logic and first-order
\ I predicate logic (Van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992: 113).
Modern.deductivists feel it is up to logicians to design logical systems that are
more sUitable for analyzing everyday argumentation. In modern logic, new,
more advanced and complex logical systems are being developed, and at-
tempts are being made to incorporate these results into argumentation theo-
ry.ll
The modern deductivistic approaches have been criticized for their use of
l~gic. J?hnso.n (1999), for e~a~ple, feels it is unclear to what extent pragma-
dIaleCtIcs relIes on the tradltIonal truth-requirement of deductive logic. In
other words, are they deductivists or not?
They [Van Eemeren and Grootendorst, SG J appear to reject Rescher's idea that
an inductive inference is a failed deductive one, and they are sensitive to Govier's
critique of deductivism. Yet in their treatment of unexpressed premises, they
commIt themselves to propositional logic and first-order predicate logic as the
vehIcles for fleshing missing premises. [ ... J To the degree that they are willing to
embrace the traditional concept of validity as having some role to play in their
evaluative apparatus, to that same degree, it appears, that they have no choice but
to embrace some fO~ITI of t!::~-requirement (12~9: 4 13).
Woods claims that the pragma-dialectical ideal model for discussions loses its
value because of its deductivistic nature:
!l
\i"
58 SUSANNE GERRITSEN
Once the distinction between valid and invalid arguments collapses in the ideal
model, the ideal model ceases to justify our interest in it, except negatively (1990:
158).
In opposition to Woods' criticism, it could be said that, although most natural
arguments meet the validity requirement when a deductivistic method is ap-
plied, not all do. Although pluralists think otherwise, a deductivistic analysis
can highlight the fact that a particular argument is logically invalid (Gerritsen
1995).~.
tivistic <Ina.:lysis,
_d.__.ed.U . •t.iV_.i~~i~._m
... C Vo.w.ever,i&that t._.. th~r.5.! 0..
.. _._•. e._. h._O.d.i.S. tho.e.r.e.£.ll<isto
r..e...n_.o..be eI10ugh
t tr.iv. CO.. I1.c!i!i~n.fO
..... contextual
ia. l.. ._A .•r__:a. <i.~. <i. . l!:.c. . : \
eVldeI1:ce!()
support a reconstruction of an ari$ument as non-vali~"a decision which is .
made at th~prasill<!!i!;:lll1t;}'s1.~f ~naJy~!s. ~f~_is~_~i~~11~ .i~ lackin~ ~~i~ of!en S
is), modeI1iS!~g£t!yis!s prefer a reconstruction of the ~r!2u_~.~J.l!_as l()_~i~allr_1
vaM,beca~_s.<:J:h~ __~!'!!iiJQlliili~-_pr~gmatically based :_s.~pposition that
peopl~-g2iwJlll}'a'!~mp.tto.J:ea~Jmjl1alogkf!!!y "e!lli'Y<lY'__ ,)
Modern deductivists differ in one major respect from traditional deduc-
tivists: they consider a logical analysis of an argument as entirely i~suffic~eI!!,.
This analysis has to be complemented and completed by a pragmatical analy-
sis. This is the second reason why a (modern) deductivistic analysis is not triv-
ial. ~ragmatic analysis involves ananal~oLth~J.i.1cr.al..ll1terances i!Ul:!~._ ...
t<:g~~ an~Q[!lle.f.Q~.!he'§R,<:Mt:!.~!:1.c!_t!!_~ ~~~~~I1.~~2.tE:S.?i!l!.<l!iQn
1,;:~~t~;~[~;~i~:~~~~~J~~:S~!Pp~~~ld~:;~~/ct~l~-~~;~~~~~~
dencethateiiablethe analyst to make interpretative decisions that cannot be
made at the logical level. Since the pragmatic analysis is such an important
part of modern deductivistic approaches, they give a great deal of attention to
the questions of what such an analysis should consist of and in what theoreti-
cal framework it should be grounded. 12
3.3.3 Neither Pluralist, nor Deductivist
A third position that can be distinguished in the deductive-inductive discus-
sion, is that the deductive-inductive distinction and the like are not really an
issue at all. The general characteristic shared by these approaches that I put in
this category is that formal logic is more or less absent. What is traditionally
called a premise, for example, is called a reason instead; there is no talk oflogi-
cal validity, logical forms, or deductive and inductive arguments, and the
term unexpressed premise is usually absent as well. Since the theorists who are
in favor of these approaches do not apply the deductive model of argumenta-
/ tion at all, they cannot be called deductivists. And since they do not apply the
typology of different types of arguments either, they are not pluralists.
/
UNEXPRESSED PREMISES 59
 Among the treatments of unexpressed premises in which formal logic plays
no explicit role are the approaches based on the Toulmin model (1958). In
these approaches the unexpressed premise is called the warrant, which is not
explicitly linked to any logical concept. The second concept in the Toulmin
model, which involves an element that is normally left implicit is the backing,
or a statement that supports the warrant.'3 However, one of the main criti-
cisms against the Toulmin model is that it is in fact not very different from the
traditional deductive model. Another problem is that the concepts of warrant
and backing lack conceptual and functional clarity, so not many theorists
work with them anymore. '4
A second group of approaches within this category is associated with "criti-
cal thinking" or "critical reasoning': 15 These approaches analyze and evaluate
ordinary argumentation, including the identification of implicit elements,
without the use of any logical concepts. A recent practical example of such an
approach is Thomson (1996).
A third group are approaches to enthymemes and unexpressed premises by
discourse analysts and conversation analysts. In these approaches logic plays
no role, nor does the deductive-inductive distinction. A well-known contri-
bution to this approach is Jackson and Jacobs (1980: 262). They define the eJl;;
~~r~~me as a?~rgumellt in 'YhichJhesl.l~t~ qlles.tiOUL
<l!!~<?!>i:'<:!~()_Il:5.2t.lh.~ E~siIili:,!,l!.,. This definition highlights the interactional
1
aspect of unexpressed premises. Insight into the structure, sequences and
functional relations in everyday conversation is important because it enriches
the theoretical basis of the analysis of unexpressed premises at the pragmatic
level. However, this insight can only be utilized if what is meant by "the sup-
port matches the questions and objections of the recipient" is first more pre-
cisely defined. Conversational approaches to enthymemes are not primarily
directed at questions like how one analyzes an enthymematic argument, but
at how one properly describes enthymemes from a conversational viewpoint.
A final group of theorists are the rhetoricians, who more or less put formal
logic aside when it comes to the study of enthymemes and unexpressed
premises. Their rhetorical focus on enthymemes is much different from the
logical one. Rhetoricians concern themselves with the relation between a text,
its context, and its effect on the audience. When it comes to enthymemes, they
concern themselves with describing these relations in view of the fact that cer-
tain relevant information is left implicit. Rhetorical studies on enthymemes
examine how information is implicitly conveyed to an audience, and in which
forms and through which channels this information is expressed.
An interesting proposal by Piazza (1995) argues that the traditional account
of an enthymeme as a deductive, one-premise argument is incomplete, be-
cause it ignores the rhetorical situation in which enthymemes are found. She
60 SUSANNE GERRITSEN
argues that the analysis should not be restricted to the premises and the rela-
tion between the premises and the conclusion, but that it should also take into
account the role of the interlocutor, the way in which the message is ex-
pressed, and what she calls "the complexity of the reasoning". Her proposal
implies that the logical and the rhetorical approach should be combined.
Approaches to unexpressed premises in which formal logic is absent, gen-
erally focus on elements that seem to have been taken for granted by the
speaker in a given case, and how this is communicated to the audience. The
perspective is pragmatic, although not always to the same extent and with the
same effect. Not much attention is paid to the definitions of implicit elements
and to the distinctions that have to be made, or to developing systematic pro-
cedures for identifying them.
3.4 The Nature of the Unexpressed Premise
Another question that has dominated the research on unexpressed premises
in recent years concerns the exact nature of the proposition that is labeled the
unexpressed premise. When dealing with real-life examples, it soon becomes
clear that in practice many implicit elements seem to play some kind of role in
the argumentation, while it is not easy to pick out the one that can be consid-
ered the unexpressed premise. Traditional linguistic theories offer some alter-
native implicit elements in ordinary language to the unexpressed premise. Of
these, the presupposition is the most prominent. It is not entirely clear what
the differences and similarities between presuppositions and unexpressed
premises are.
Govier (1987: 92) made an important contribution to this aspect of the re-
search by showing which different kinds of implicit elements can be distin-
guished and how difficult it is to describe these differences and select the un-
expressed premise. Some aspects of the discussion of thi~ ~roble~ are ~~ated
below, particularly the confusion in textbooks over defimtlOns of Im~hClt ele-
ments, the idea that the unexpressed premise is a gap-filler, and the difference
between used and needed premises.
3.4. 1 Confusion over Definitions
In the existing literature, there is much confusion over the defi~itions a~d t~e
terms that are used to refer to implicit elements. One of the malll questlo~s IS
what the difference is between presuppositions and unexpressed premises.
Traditionally, a "presupposition" is viewed as an implicit assumption under-
61
UNEXPRESSED PREMISES
 lying a proposition, the truth of which is a condition for the truth of that
proposition. "There exists a queen of Budavia" is a presupposition for the
proposition "The queen of Budavia is old." In most textbooks, presupposi-
tions and unexpressed premises are treated as two separate kinds of implicit
elements. ~.2Jl~~se t<:xt~.?..<>.!<s, the main difference is that presuppo-
sitions only playa role in the background ofan-arg~;:n~nt; theyare t;~fur
granreTI·and·af~ often triY!ilI:'6Thus, there isusuaIiyno-g~~;U~~~dto identify
tllerrrexplicitly. In contrast, the unexpressed premise is a basic element of the
argument itsel£ It has a particular function that presuppositions do not have;
~n une~pressed premise "fills the gap" or "forms a bridge" between the explic-
It premise and the conclusion (Ennis 1982: 62, Govier 19 87: 9 6, respectively).
!~~~au... s~..un. ~xpr.esse.d. l?r.e. mi~~~.r<:p.. ,,:rt..o. f. . th. e b..il iC il!~!!2f!!.h!hIT have to Qe
~ntlfied, while presuppositions can be left aside.
S..
'/
fhls)io~~;-er: {ssiinpllfylngi:li.ings:'A"comp1i~tion arises when the dis-
tinction between unexpressed premises and presuppositions as described
above are not agreed upon by all the argumentation theorists. When one
compares various textbooks, one discovers many differences between the
terms used to refer to implicit elements and the meanings attached to them.
Terms such as assumption, supposition, missingpremise, implicature, inference,
and implication mayor may not refer to the same thing as presuppositions
and unexpressed premises as they are traditionally understood. Different the-
orists apply their own considerations for choosing one term over another.
Sometimes they attach different definitions to traditional concepts, some-
times they introduce new terms to refer to traditional concepts, and some-
times they introduce new terms for concepts that traditionally were not dis-
tinguished at all.
An example that shows the possible confusion that may arise over terms re-
lated to unexpressed premise is Thomson's textbook Critical Reasoning (1996).
Thomson uses the overall term assumption to refer to any implicit element
that may playa role in an argument. She prefers this term to presupposition:
Sometimes in the process of evaluating arguments, the term 'presupposition' is
us~d instead of'assumption'. We prefer the term 'assumption', because of the pos-
Sibility of confusion between 'presupposing' and 'supposing'. Usually when argu-
ments tell us to "suppose that x is true': they are neither stating nor assuming that
x is true; they are merely exploring what would follow from the truth of x, and of-
ten they are doing this precisely in order to show that x must be false. So we must
not take the presence of the word 'suppose' in an argument to indicate that an as-
sumption is being made. Indeed, since we are using the term 'assumption' to de-
note something which is not stated, there are no special words in arguments to
indicate the presence of this kind of assumption (1996: 23).
62 SUSANNE GERRITSEN
Thomson tries to explain why assumption is a clearer term than presupposi-
tion. Not, however, by referring to what is traditionally understood by pre-
suppositions, but by talking about the kinds ~f statement.s generally c~led hy-
pothetical statements. 17 These statements are m .fact.functlon~yvery dlffere~t
from the traditional presuppositions. The mam difference IS that hypotheti-
cal statements by nature always function as premises of the argument. There-
fore, they are very much in the foreground, not in the background,. of t~e
argumentation. And, in contrast to presuppositions, they have to be Identi-
fied. Another important difference is that hypothetical statements are usually
expressed explicitly, since it would be hard to m~e ~ hn:o.thetical ar~ument
of the kind that Thomson refers to, while leavmg ImplICIt from whICh hy-
pothesis the argument commences. Presuppositions are by definition always
implicit.
In her textbook, Thomson does not use the term unexpressed premise or close
equivalents like missing premise and implicit reason. In her explanation of ~e
meaning of "assumption", she further distinguishes a subclass t~at may com-
cide with what are traditionally viewed as unexpressed premises. A second
subclass seems to be the traditional presuppositions. Thomson's other sub-
classes are not so obviously related to a traditional category of implicit ele-
ments. This is how she introduces the different types of assumptions:
In the sense of "assumption" set out above, arguments have many assumptions.
For each argument we encounter, there will be a whole host of shared back-
ground information - for example, the meanings of the words in which the argu-
ment is expressed, and general knowledge which give support to the reasons
which are presented. Sometimes these assumptions will be so uncontentious.that
we will not be interested in making them explicit. Sometimes, however, we will
suspect that an argument rests upon a dubious assumption, and it will be im-
portant for us to express exactly what that assumption is in order to assess the ar-
gument. .
We shall say more later about assumptions concerning the meamng of words, as-
sumptions about analogous or comparable situations, and assumptions con-
cerning the appropriateness of a given explanation. But for this chapter, we shall
focus on ... (1996: 24).
In this explanation, Thomson distinguishes assumptions .concerning the
meaning of words as a subtype. In traditional theory, these kinds of assu~p­
tions are regarded as presuppositions. Thomson seems to put assu~ptlOns
about analogous or comparable situations and assumptions concermn~ the
appropriateness of a given explanation in the same subclass as assumptIOns
UNEXPRESSED PREMISES
 about the meaning of words. Perhaps she regards them as presuppositions as probably well-known to everyone who practices argument analysis, but agai~
well. Traditionally, however, these kinds of assumptions are not classified. it seems that no generally agreed-upon term for it is available. (In pragma-dl-
Against this part of Thomson's classification one might argue that it is impos- alectical terms: a single argumentation in a subordinate chain of single argu-
sible to label these kinds of assumptions a priori as presuppositions, for an as- mentations has been left implicit.)
sumption about an analogous situation may very well be the unexpressed Below, an overview of Thomson's terms and distinctions with regard to im-
premise in a given case. In fact, in analogy arguments it is exactly an assump- plicit elements, as compared to tradition is presented:
tion of this nature that is distinguished as the unexpressed premise.'s The
same can be said about her "assumptions concerning the appropriateness of Thomson's assumptions Traditional terms
an explanation" - it seems difficult to classify them a priori. Implicit elements
cannot be labeled by only looking at their content, as Thomson does here. Subclass 1
Thomson describes two further subclasses of assumption. Interestingly, the - meaning of words presupposition
underlying criterion is now a functional one: - analogous or comparable situations unclear
- appropriateness of given explanation unclear
... we shall focus on the following two important ways in which assumptions
function in an argument: first, in giving support to the basic reasons presented in Subclass 2
the argument; second, as a missing step within the argument - perhaps as an ad- - in support of basic reasons back-up?
ditional reason which must be added to the stated reasons in order for the con- - as a missing step: - additional reason unexpressed premise
clusion to be established, or perhaps as an intermediate conclusion which is sup- - intermediate conclusion implicit part of
ported by the reasons, and in turn supports the main conclusion (1996: 24). subordinate
argumentation
It is not immediately transparent how these two kinds of assumptions relate
to the traditional concepts. I believe that Thomson's first kind of assumption
does not have an equivalent in traditional theory. It resembles a concept dis- This discussion illustrates that theorists attach different meanings to differ-
tinguished by Ennis (1982) and Burke (1985), the so-called back-up, which is ent terms for implicit elements. It is important to be aware of the confusion
also a statement that lends support to the explicit premise!9 Ennis' and that can result from this.
Burke's descriptions and examples of back-up, however, are not unambigu-
ous. Furthermore, the problem with this idea of back-up is that an analyst can
always think of further reasons that support the reasons that are stated, but 3.4.2 The Unexpressed Premise as a Gap-Filler
there is hardly ever enough evidence to prove that adding these reasons to the
argument is interpretatively correct, nor is there any theoretical basis for Apart from the confusion over terms, there are other com plicatio.ns regarding
making decisions like these. 20 the distinction between presuppositions and unexpressed premIses. Accord-
The second kind of assumptions that Thomson distinguishes, the interme- ing to the traditional definition, presuppositions are "in the background". In
diate conclusions, may overlap with, or be the same as, the traditional unex- actual argumentative practice, however, this is not always the case, for in some
pressed premise, because she says that they form a "missing step': which may cases presuppositions turn out to be decisive for the quality of the argume~­
mean the same as "filling a gap" or "forming a bridge". This missing step, tation. In those cases they are, or so it seems, "in the foreground". One tradI-
Thomson states, may be an assumption that must be added to the explicit rea- tional recognized instance of this is the fallacy of many questions. There is no
sons in order for the conclusion to follow, or an intermediate conclusion clear tool available for tracking down presuppositions. There is also no argu-
which is supported by reasons and, in turn, supports the main conclusion. mentation theory where the identification of relevant presuppositions is sys-
The first specification does fit in with the traditional understanding of unex- tematically incorporated into the analysis. This is a particular problem when
pressed premises as assumptions that must be added in order for the conclu- a presupposition does seem to be relevant in the foreground, because then the
sion to follow. The second specification refers to an analytical case that is difference between it and an unexpressed premise is more difficult to deter-
mine.

SUSANNE GERRITSEN
UNEXPRESSED PREMISES
 The crucial question here is what it means when an unexpressed premise is a
gap-filler and the presupposition is not, which is supposed to be the distin-
guishing feature between them. In itself, it seems to be an advantage when it
can be said that an unexpressed premise needs to fill a gap, or form a bridge,
between the stated premises and the conclusion, since this implies a function-
al perspective. It is impossible to identify unexpressed premises by their con-
tent only; they may be about any subject and they can have all kinds of status-
es with regard to their truth or acceptability and the degree to which they are
shared or known by the interlocutors. The only way to get a grip on them
seems to be to pin down what function they have in an argument. This can
only happen, however, when it is determined what "filling a gap" amounts to,
in particular when it comes to identifying the unexpressed premise.
When it is said that an unexpressed premise should fill a gap, what is often
meant is that the unexpressed premise is a kind of if-then-statement such as
the one in the following example:
Conclusion: This article is about argumentation.
Premise: It is written by an argumentation theorist.
Unexpressed premise: Ifthis article is written by an argumentation theorist,
then this article is about argumentation.
Here the if-then statement is the so-called logical minimum. Of course, filling
in the logical minimum is entirely in line with the traditional logical ap-
proach, and such a method therefore suffers from the same shortcomings.
The objection that such a method amounts to deductivism has already been
mentioned. Another objection is that supplying the logical minimum is a
void act; since the statement is no more than a reiteration of the argument, it
does not add anything and it cannot be tested for its truth or acceptability.2l
Few theorists feel that the logical minimum is a likely candidate for the unex-
pressed premise.
A second kind of if-then statement that may serve as a candidate for the un-
expressed premise is one or another generalized version of the logical mini-
mum that fits into the context at hand. Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (199 2:
62-66) and Groarke (1995), for example, argue that we should fill in this type
of unexpressed premises. :!,!J.~~gY<lnta~Qf this methRd, s:gmp<!!~.~:LJQ~
previous one, is thatit results in a statementthat is not uncontentious There-
fore, it adds something extra to the argument, and it is te~t~bie.Bu~ i~:' oppo-
nents argue that this method also just amounts to deductivism because it
i renders the argument deductively valid and is universally applied to all argu-
. ments consisting of one premise and a conclusion." Some also feel that this
method has a disadvantage in that the analyst has to decide which terms in the
66 SUSANNE GERRITSEN
logical minimum have to be generalized, and to what extent. Others argue
that there is no way around this, because it is an intrinsic part of analyzing ar-
guments. 23 In pragma-dialectics, for example, it is part of the analysis at the
pragmatic level to decide what the content of the unexpressed premise may
be, and to what extent the logical minimum has to be generalized, or speci-
fied, on the basis of the text and the context. 24
If the unexpressed premise is always a generalized version of the logical
minimum that fills the gap between the premises and the conclusion, it differs
from a presupposition, which is never an if-then-statement (or a variant of it)
that links the premises to the conclusion. It is clearly some other kind of state-
ment. Pluralists, however, would not agree with this definition of an unex-
pressed premise.
3.4.3 Used or Needed Premise
Even if everyone agreed that the unexpressed premise is a generalized version
of the logical minimum, another problem arises with regard to the nature of
the unexpressed premise. Some theorists (Ennis 1982, Govier 1987, and Wal-
ton 1996) argue that there are two kinds of unexpressed premises, depending
on the goal of the analysis. The two kinds are "used" versus "needed" premis-
es. Used premises are interpretatively correct; they are the (implicit and ex-
plicit) premises that the speaker had in mind while expressing the argument.
Implicit used premises have to be identified when the goal of the analysis is
"interpretation". Needed premises, on the other hand, are not interpretatively
correct, but only logically; they are the premises that are needed to make the
argument valid.>5 Needed implicit premises are filled in when the goal is
"truth seeking" or "evaluation", which means that the analyst checks to what
extent the truth of the conclusion is proven by the premises. 26 The distinction
can also be taken to imply that used premises and needed premises are by def-
inition different in nature, so that the two analytical goals always result in un-
expressed premises with different contents.
The distinction between used and needed premises is introduced by Ennis
(1982: 64). He argues that it is important to make this distinction to avoid con-
fusion and to develop a systematic method for identifying unexpressed
premises whereby analysts should decide beforehand what their particular
goal is and at what kinds of unexpressed premises their analysis is directed. At
the time when Ennis expressed these views, there was indeed confusion with
respect to the analytical goals, especially among informal logicians. Nowa-
days, most theorists seem to agree that "truth seeking" should not be the goal
of argument analysis. All the same, the used-needed distinction remains a
UNEXPRESSED PREMISES
 point of attention. For Walton (1996: 248), needed premises are not a big
problem, because we can arrive at needed premises by relying on the rules of
deductive logic and concepts like "argumentation schemes': Formulating
used premises on the other hand is much harder: Walton feels more casework
is needed in order to give a "classification of the different kinds of en-
thymemes and the different bases they rely on in argumentation" (1996: 25 0 ).
The used-needed complication is only an issue for those who embrace the
distinction in the first place. Not everybody does, because it implies that
"used" premises are not the premises that make the argument logically valid.
This conclusion, at least, follows from Walton's treatment of the subject. A
rather serious consequence would be that it would be assumed that ordinary
people do not reason in a logically valid way. This would lead to a definitive
split between logic and argumentation theory on the one hand, and the study
of ordinary argument on the other. For those who agree with the distinction,
the analysis at a pragmatic level directed at the used premises (interpretation)
is something entirely separate from an analysis at a logical level directed at the
needed premises (evaluation): they are two different activities one can under-
take and one can choose for either one or the other. It is hard to see, however,
what we would gain by making such a divide. This understanding of interpre-
tation versusevaluation is also in sharp contrast to other approaches, such as
pragma-dialectics, where an interpretation always precedes evaluation, and
interpretation is motivated by the need for evaluation.
3.5 The Role of Context
A third important development in the study of unexpressed premises is the
increased theoretical and practical interest in the role of the context in the
analysis. In the traditional logical approach, as the Copi example earlier in
this chapter shows, context hardly played a role. But in studying real-life argu-
mentation one is confronted with the importance of specific and detailed
contextual information for arriving at a satisfying analysis. This applies to all
aspects of the analysis of an argument, but especially for implicit elements
like unexpressed premises. When the context is not taken into consideration
in a given case, it seems virtually impossible to identify the unexpress€d
premises. Many theorists have stressed that contextual information is often
decisive in making analytical decisions and that the context should therefore
be included in our analyses. Several problems, however, need to be resolved.
68 SUSANNE GERRITSEN
3.5.1 The Meaning of'Context'
~::1~;.t~fi~~;';;~ ~Ji~~E~~;~..:u~;[ti"~;!;~~~t=~;;t;
\. -~dofother information that may somehow playa role in that text. This
rather broad definition makes it hard to pin down what the exact relevant
context in a specific case is, let alone allow one to decide what the proper un-
expressed premise is in the specific context. Even if the analyst recognizes the
importance of using contextual information in the analysis, it is not exactly
clear how this is best done.
In modern argumentation theory, especially in its early years, there was a
tendency to look at argument examples isolated from the context in which
they originally functioned. The only arguments studied were those consisting
of a conclusion and one or two premises. Today, practically everybody ac-
knowledges that no justice can be done using this method to determine what
an ordinary argument is about. In other words, it turns argument analysis
into a rather meaningless activity. Today's theorists study larger samples of
text and try to take context into account, so that he or she can arrive at a more
detailed analysis. Good examples consist of attempts that analyze argumenta-
tion in specific situations and contexts, such as a judicial setting (Feteris 1999)
or an institutional setting (Berkenbosch and Van der Geest 1999)·
When looking for the proper unexpressed premise, it would be helpful if
there was a method or procedure of some kind for determining and articulat-
ing the relevant context. The concept 0~!~se4J)!~mi§~i.s elltir~!.y ..
context-dependent; with.()~!_~.S.2.!!!~2f!2the.S:Q!l~~2!. !!~Ecll.Y.l11aJ<~s .<lIlY sens~.
( pragffiaiically:-ifthere-is imprecision in the analysis with regard to under-
standmg the context, this can easily lead to differences of opinion about the
exact content of a particular unexpressed premise. And even when extensive
information is available, there is almost always room for alternative interpre-
tations - albeit only to some extent in everyday life - because otherwise peo-
ple would be unable to communicate and understand each other.
Jacobs (1999) emphasizes the need for looking at argumentative material
not in isolation, but from a conversational viewpoint, in order to understand
what the argument is really about:
Too often the problem of reconstructing arguments has been a problem of re-
fashioning stated propositions, filling in missing premises, drawing out implied
conclusions, but without any sensitivity to the total message that is being con-
veyed .... Information conveyed in a message is not limited to what can be ex-
tracted from sentences by rules of syntax, semantics, and logic .... When people
interpret a message, they construct a context of assumptions and inferences to
UNEXPRESSED PREMISES
 make sense of what was said and of what was not said but could have been said,
and that make sense of how and when all of it is said. The words are not the mes-
sage.... It is the context of interpretive assumptions and inferences that is the
message (1999: 398).
Following Van Eemeren (1990), Jacobs proposes a "normative pragmatics" as
3.5.2 The Position ofthe Analyst
a corrective and a complement to the traditional approach of the analysis.'?
The question of how to include contextual information is particularly rele-
vant to those who are in some way affiliated with the traditional logical ap-
proach, if only by explicitly moving away from that approach like informal 10-
gicians and pragma-dialecticians. For tl10se who work from a (traditional or
modern) rhetorical framework, how contextual information is included is
not really an issue. To them, the concept of enthymemes and implicit infor-
J mation has always been about context. Rhetorical approaches to enthymemes
do not focus On ~lling in the cor~ect unexpressed premises (in fact, the term-
or a synonym - IS seldom mentlOned); they concentrate on the relation be-
tween entl1ymemes and the broader context, which in rhetoric is often called
i
i. culture.
Lucaites, Condit, and Caudill (1999) give an overview of contemporary
rhetorical theory in which they also clarify the role of the enthymemes. In
their view, three structural relationships are important for the understanding
of a text: the relation between the text and its sources, the text and culture, and
the text and its effect. In discussing the second relation, they stress tl1at the
(Aristotelian) enthymeme is a core concept, since it relies On doxa, which is,
tl1ey maintain, the classical equivalent of "cultur~'~ Doxa is ill:ostly·silent
(1999: 71). A recent rhetorical study, Horwitz (1999), is directed at this partic-
ular relationship between entl1ymemes and culture. She defines enthymemes
as the constellation of assumptions and inferences that listeners make when
hearing someone speak. Horwitz argues that people sometimes construe
\ these enthymemes, just on the basis ofthe speaker's appearance (race, gender,
etc.), which may lead the audience to arrive at a negative judgment of the
speaker. In other words, they form certain enthymemes in tl1eir heads, which
may prevent the speaker's message from coming across accurately. A speaker
can prevent this from happening, or the speaker can "block the enthymeme"
by employing certain rhetorical techniques (1999: 385).
Rhetorical approaches rely on a certain understanding of context or cul-
ture. Since they are not directed at identifying the precise unexpressed
premises, tl1ere is also no great need to specifically indicate which informa-
tion constitutes the context of an argument. The rhetorical concept of con-
text may be useful in defining and specifying the concept of context necessary
70 SUSANNE GERRITSEN
for tl1e correct interpretation of the unexpressed premise, but it does not offer
a reliable metl10d for identifying the relevant context when looking for tl1e
unexpressed premise.
! r {I
, \i
......__._-----_. (, c0.Cu \.\
\ A second problem witl1 regard to the notion of conte~ ~as. to do with the po-
\\sifiOiiOffheanalyst~ Compared to the speakers and listeners who are actually
~inVclved in the--;;g~"illentation, it is almost always harder for an analyst to de-
cide on the meaning of the utterances involved. The interlocutors are present
when tl1e argument is expressed, and tl1ey are provided with all kinds of clues,
botl1 verbal and non-verbal, that help tl1em to interpret tl1e message. They
can also interact and ask for clarification. The analyst, however, does not have
tl1ese options.
Many theorists feel we should be analyzing arguments as tl1ey were intend-
ed by tl1eir speakers, and not some interpretation of their arguments. In other
words, interpretative correctness is the aim, however hard it may be to
achieve. Even those with "evaluation" and "needed premises" as tl1eir goals
would usually not go so far as to totally abandon their concern for interpreta-
tive correctness. The problem, however, is how to decide what is interpreta-
tively correct. This problem is often thought to involve the speaker's inten-
tions; how can we know what tl1eywere?
In pragma-dialectics, the analysis is not directed at the speaker's intentions,
but at his or her externalizable "commitments" instead. 2s The concept of
commitment comes from speech act theory. Recently, Walton also suggested
that in argument analysis we should be concerned with tl1e speaker's commit-
ments (but only when the goal is to identify used premises) (1996: 251). The
idea of commitment is sometimes subject to confusion, since semantically
tl1e word "commitment" has several meanings and connotations. In speech
act theory, it means tl1at by uttering certain propositions (in a specific con-
text) a speaker commit~himself or herself to something, depending on the
kind of speeChac~oyed. Someone who expresses a verbal utterance tl1at
amounts to a promise, tl1ereby commits oneself to actually doing what one
said, since this is the essence of the speech act of making a promise. The
speaker will be held to the promise, even ifhe or she never intended to live up
to it. Similarly, someone who produces a claim commits oneself to the truth
of that claim, for tl1at is the essence of tl1e speech act of making a claim, and
this also holds true for a speaker who is well aware of the fact that he or she is
lying. The "commitments" tl1at are distinguished analytically are supposed to
be in agreement with empirical reality; actual language users are thought to
UNEXPRESSED PREMISES 71
 interpret the speech acts of others by identifYing and remembering the com-
mitments speakers take upon themselves, rather than their intentions.
Nowadays, the concept of commitment is generally preferred over that of
the speaker's intentions. The advantage is that the concept of commitment is
set in a reliable theoretical framework, that of speech act theory. "Commit-
ment" better defines what an analyst should be aiming for when he or she is
interpreting an argument than the concept of intention. Another advantage is
that the concept of commitment is linked to that of context; commitments,
whether in real life or in argument analysis, are attributed on the basis of the
text and the context. The link between a speaker's intentions and the context
is much less clear. In practice, it is therefore easier to decide what someone is
committed to than what he or she intended; in most cases, commitments can
be attributed on the basis of what someone has said in a certain way in a cer-
tain situation. In this regard, intentions are much more difficult to attribute.
It should also be noted, however, that the concept of commitment only offers
a partial solution to the problem. The analyst is often still at a disadvantage
compared to the speakers and listeners involved, because for them it is almost
always easier to decide which commitments ensue from the speech acts per-
formed.
3.6 Argument Schemes
A fourth and last development in the research on unexpressed premises has to
do with the increased interest in the notion of argument schemes. In studying
argument schemes, the object is not the formal structure of the argument, but
its generalized content. In other words, some arguments are about causal re-
lations, while others rely on resemblances, and so on. Argument schemes are
discussed separately in chapter 4 of this book, so the discussion here will now
concentrate on the relation between the study of argument schemes and that
of unexpressed premises. Garssen's (1999) description of argument schemes,
based on Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992), refers to this relation:
There seems to be general agreement among argumentation theorists that argu-
mentation schemes are principles or rules underlying arguments that legitimize
the step from premises to standpoints. They characterize the way in which the ac-
ceptability of the premise that is explicit in the argumentation is transferred to
the standpoint. The argumentation scheme that has been used by an arguer
determines the specific relation that is established between the explicit premise
and the standpoint that is being justified. This relation is not a formal one but a
pragmatic one (1999: 225).
72 SUSANNE GERRITSEN
From this, it seems clear that the formulation of the relation Garssen talks
about as a specific statement results in the unexpressed premise.
Recently, several other authors have also pointed out that argument
schemes may offer insights that are relevant to the problem of unexpressed
premises. Blair (1992: 209) looks into Aristotelian topoi and the notion of ar-
gument scheme, which he believes may offer useful alternatives to the re-
stricted deductive understanding of unexpressed premises. Walton (1996:
245) regards argument schemes as an "important new tool for the analysis of
enthymemes ... ":
Argumentation schemes ... are the forms of argument (structures or inferences)
that enable one to identify and evaluate common types of presumptive argumen-
tation in everyday discourse (1996: 245).
MthoufZh the ~17.~I<:h£.~_~..!~-'E_~!!L.ss:.h~._.~~
.. gU;I._~.l!I.IYEe..I.~~~~~?it ~!~~~tyet .
been "translated" into the terms of unexpressed premises. Two things seem
( ~thlsreg~;d~T~b;gi~-~i£h~id~;;tifYing th~·~q~ument scheme that
, is employed helps when one is trying to formulate the unexpressed premise.
Deciding whether one is dealing with a causal relation, or an analogy, or some
other relation, gives a clue as to the kind of unexpressed premise that would
be appropriate. However, this clue is only very general, while the problems of
identifYing unexpressed premises are often about details and peculiarities. It
may be helpful to know that one is dealing with a causal relation, but then it
must still be decided what the particular causal relation is. It is therefore still
unclear to what extent argument schemes may actually be a way out of the
problem of the unexpressed premises.
If argument schemes are a useful tool for identifYing unexpressed premises,
the question arises of what the relation is between argument schemes and the
traditional logical schemes. What status do argument schemes have? Do they
replace the logical schemes or do they complement them? And how? In prag-
ma-dialectics the relation between the premise and the standpoint is not a
formal but a pragmatic one. Although it is clear what this means, it is also a
fact that in pragma-dialectics unexpressed premises have a formal aspect.
How are the formal and the pragmatic aspect connected? And argument
schemes in pragma-dialectics are defined as specific sorts of deductively valid
arguments, so the reproach of deductivism seems also to apply to an ap-
proach of unexpressed premises in which they are identified by means of ar-
gument schemes. (I suspect that for this reason Walton restricts argument
schemes to needed premises only.)
UNEXPRESSED PREMISES 73
3.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, four recent developments in the research on unexpressed
premises have been discussed. First, attention was given to the discussion
about the distinction between deduction and induction and its conse-
quences. Second, the issue of the nature of the statement that is the unex-
pressed premise was dealt with. Third, the role of the context and its impor-
tance for the analysis of argumentation was discussed. Last, attention was
paid to the relation between argument schemes and unexpressed premises.
All in all, three different directions emerge in which the research on unex-
pressed premises is presently going. The first is the further combining oflogi-
cal and pragmatic insights in order to systematically and correctly identify the
unexpressed premise. The combination of logical and pragmatic insights
seems fruitful, and it is a direction that more and more argumentation theo-
rists nowadays take. Interestingly, these authors come from various back-
grounds. 29 The second direction amounts to investigating the rhetorical
study and understanding of the enthymemes, as well as other pragmatic
views on unexpressed premises. The insights found are then incorporated
into argumentation theory, in order to elaborate what a pragmatic analysis
consists of. The third direction involves turning to the study of argument
schemes, and exploiting its potential for facilitating the identification of un-
expressed premises.
Notes
1 In Garssen (1997) these findings are presented more extensively.
2 Cf. Cicero's Topica, Boethius' In Topica Cicerones and Peter of Spain's
Tractatus seu summulae logicales.
3 With the help of the syllogistic model of argument, this particular
unexpressed premise is not so hard to identify.
4 Cf. Solmsen (1929), Kennedy (1963), and Burnyeat (1994 and 1996).
5 Cf., among others, Govier (1987), Woods (1990), Berg (1992), Groarke
(1992), and Walton (1996).
6 This point is emphasized by Govier (1987). See also her textbook, Govier
(1992).
7 Cf. Hitchcock (1982) on "conduction:>and Peirce (1965) and Bybee
(1991) on "abduction". / 29 Some authors that argue for this specifically are: Van Eemeren and
8 Cf. Hitchcock (1985).
9 This point is, for example, made by Groarke (1992).
10 Cf. Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992).
74 SUSANNE GERRITSEN
11 See Haack (1978) for an overview of such modern logical systems.
Starmans (1999) discusses recent attempts to define a criterion of
validity in argumentative models in a formal way. See also Starmans
(1996).
12 Cf. Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (199 2) and Jacobs (1999)·
13 In Gerritsen (1999a: 36-55) the Toulmin model is discussed in the
context of the study of unexpressed premises.
14 See, for a discussion of shortcomings of the Toulmin model, Hample
(1977), Van Eemeren et al. (1996, Ch. 5) and Johnson (19 81 ).
15 See for "critical thinking" Fisher and Scriven (1997).
16 Classical contributions to the study of presuppositions are Strawson
(195 0 and 1952) and Donnellan (1966,1968). Much less known are
attempts to formulate a "pragmatic" notion of presupposition. Cf., for
example, Keenan (1973) and Stalnaker (1974, 1975, 1978).
17 The first statement in the following argument is an example of a
hypothetical statement: "Suppose for the sake of argument that smoking
is not bad for your health. Why then is there overwhelming evidence
that smokers get lung cancer?"
18 This is, for example, the case in the pragma-dialectical argument scheme
of a comparison (Van Eemeren and Grootendorst 199 2, Garssen 1997).
19 The "back-up" is something distinct from Toulmin's backing. The latter
supports the warrant, while a back-up does not, that is, judging from
the examples Ennis and Burke offer (Gerritsen 1999 a: 78).
20 See Gerritsen (1999a:76) for a discussion of Ennis (1982) and Burke
(1985).
21 See Govier (1987: 26) for a discussion of the drawbacks of adding the
logical minimum (which she calls the 'associated conditional').
22 Cf. Govier (1987: 89).
23 Groarke (1992,1995) makes this point for example.
24 Cf. Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992: 62-66).
25 Gerritsen (1999a: 73-75) discusses the literature on the used-needed
distinction.
26 Govier (1987: 100) refers to the first as the "interpretative view" and to
the latter as the "reconstructive view:'
27 Cf. Van Eemeren, Grootendorst, Jackson and Jacobs (1993)·
28 See Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992: 66) and Gerritsen (1995: 108)
on commitments and unexpressed premises.
Grootendorst (1992), Piazza (1995), Walton (1996), and Jacobs (1999)·
UNEXPRESSED PREMISES 75
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UNEXPRESSED PREMISES 77
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i
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Berlin: Weidemann.

SUSANNE GERRITSEN
UNEXPRESSED PREMISES 79
4 Argument Schemes
Bart Garssen

4.1 Introduction

Someone who advances argumentation presupposes, in principle, that the

advanced premise will be seen as an acceptable proposition and that this
premise is linked, in an adequate way, to the standpoint he wishes to defend.
The link between the argument and the standpoint is adequate if the accept-
ability of the premise is "transferred" to the standpoint by means of the "argu-
ment scheme" that is being used. The premise and standpoint can be linked in
several ways. This explains why argumen tation theory is concerned with dis-
tinguishing various argument schemes.
Each argument scheme represents a specific principle of support.' In an ar-
gument scheme the "internal structure" of a single argumentation is revealed
while the argumentation structure represents the "external structure" of the
argumentation as a whole (Van Eemeren et al. 1996: 18-19). The term argu-
ment scheme or argumentation scheme (in French known as scheme argumen-
tatifJ was probably first used by Perelman, but other authors denote similar
notions with different terms. Argument schemes are defined and categorized
in various ways. The differences between the categorizations made in the lit-
erature on argumentation are connected with the goals each approach is aim-
ing to achieve. In some approaches, argument schemes are seen as tools for
the evaluation of argumentation, in other cases, they are tools for finding ar-
guments, and in still other cases, they serve as a starting point for the descrip-
tion of argumentative competence in a certain language.
This chapter provides an overview of the most important approaches of
argument schemes. 4.2 describes the approaches concerned with the finding
of arguments, 4.3 the approaches that focus on the evaluation of argumenta-
tion, and 4-4 discusses the descriptive approach to argument schemes.

81
 4.2 Argument Schemes and Finding Arguments
4.2.1 The Classical Topical Tradition
The topical systems are part of the classical theories of invention, which are
intended to provide guidelines for finding and selecting the proper argu-
ments to be used in a public speech (rhetoric) or in a discussion (dialectic).
The various topical systems proposed in the classical period consist of or-
dered lists of different types of arguments. In that s~the t~£~cal s~~
?r{)vi<l~ thel0E!!9ps (or topic~ w~'<:!5:c!h.~ a!gl!!!le~!~ c~!1~e .f~l!l!~L ~
oX t~ese topics .~ere is a~~!!!,:S!!Q!lbe~,k!Lt~I.e1niswhat~~e
ci1lb1~hati~~~~£C~!~,lV~alcQll~piQf'tQiW?
.fQr!~.~R2.Il.~JQ~u~ent sche~i!l!!l.2d<:!!!. ~~h.!:~!9 argumenta-
.~!on~1:k£!:~jQpjca) SfStems as deYdo.~Arj~Qtls:. ~iJ;!a:Q.illl.d Boe~
are brieflI discussed. ,
'A;i~t~tl;;~7h~~~ system of invention includes the~p:(~
pertaining to one of the three oratorical genres (the political speech, the cere-
monial speech, and the judicial speech) and general topics that pertain to all
genres. In the specific topics, generally accepted opinions and values are ex-
pressed that can be used to link a premise to the thesis that the speaker wishes
to defend. These opinions and values are related to the goal that is pursued in
the specific genre. The political topics, for instance, point to the lines of action
that will lead to happiness ("Good things are the things that amuse our
friends and that are hated by our enemies"). Or, to find the premises for a cer-
emonial speech (laudation), the speaker can choose from the topics that are
related to virtuousness. The topics relevant to the judicial speech help the
speaker find arguments for proving that the accused has committed the crime
by pointing to motives, circumstances, or character traits that will lead to the
committing of a crime. Basically, these specific topics consist of general state-
ments that can be directly used as premises in the discourse, which serve as in-
ference licenses linking pre . es to theses.
In th~..general to i s (~ abstract rhetorical principles are expressed
that can be used as princip es of inference in all genres.3 While the specific
' t~are ready-made statements _tha!..(;<l!LR~J!§~g~S.Qtig.KU:uLde:\::t.c~§ be-
~~he premise and tlJ£ the~i~!u~~g~Eer<Il t()pic~ ~()n,.si§tsof general and
~bst~t princil2les. Aristotle distinguishes 28 topics. Some of these topics re-
\ semble the argument schemes that can be found in modern classifications
("If the cause exists, the effect does; if it does not, there is no effect").
In his dialectical topic (Topica), Aristotle describes strategies that can be
used to refute an '2£l'0nent's thesis in a discussion. A thesis is refuted when it
is~~Cth<!t'the p.!e~-;ongfull¥ crttrib~dtoasubject. The. dialectj-
82 BART GARSSEN
c<iLtQ12 ics consist of rules for the a ssigumwtcl.pJ:s;~q.2lli>j~1l, Becau~.
the attacker of the thesis should know which rule applies to the relation be- •
'~. n suob
.. eC.t.
dialectical topics t. .iS e.x£. ress,e~., i,n L.he.!h',_,e'§.. 'i~'Ar
an. d.,predicat.e'.!!:.-,a,
according to tYP~9.f2E~.d1c~~.~~.~mtl2!h.p~t. .. istotle s.ort,ed."th,~ ~i."
and a~:~~:.~()E ~~~.!~~i!L~!iirk.Qn!P.~!b£§!2.'.'Ih~~QQliis,Q.~~llJ!l9i.~t
E~~~t" .~~!,b.e ~~.~~.9E;.~!!!!~.E~~: th~.~~r,t~~ ~!~_~.gs>.2~lt!n~~Lsgjp_;+
.£rise~.l.~e members of the speCies ~~.~l!.~~~~E!)'.:J9~ the !~.!::~l~l.~.!: at:1
tacker shOUIa-mention~§Q~.£!fic~_~1'1~<1.~l:l!~!~.~t!~!l.21~QQ.iToplca IV
~;o1D2).4
In his Topica, Cicero discusses rhetorical topics that are abstract argumen-
tative principles; similar to those Aristotle described in his general rhetorical ,
topics. Cicero distinguishes three types of topics: topics that are intrinsic to I
the subject that is mentioned in the thesis (definition), topics that are some- ..
how related to the subject (comparison, genus-species, cause-effect, and con- (
--
tradiction), and topics that are not related (extrinsic) -
to
---
the subje<:tJ.<l!fi~·
..-. - -
\\
"--~. -.--~~--~-~- ~., -~.-.--
ment from authorityl: I' .
The df;Uectical topica developed by Boethius in his De differentiis topicis can
be seen as a synthesis of the dialectical topical system of Aristotle and Cicero's
Topica. ~arting from various types ()~,edicate~. Boethiu.s, forf!1ula. te~ gener- )'
'!Hy~.£~pted statements (maximes) that he c:!.t.~go~.~~.2,~!he basis_~th£~- ))
stract argumentative £rincillies i.1s.!Rif.§.. Q!: .diffgl1a!1:laLthi!1J!!1£i~he. thQ~ V
statements. While Boethius' list of differentia is exhaustive, there is an endless'
~u~ber of possible maximes. For instance, starting with the maxime, "That
whose end is good, is itself also good" (topic from the end) we can construct
the following argumentation: "If it is good to be happy, then justice is also
JI
good; for it is the end of justice that he who lives according to justice be
brought to happiness': Boethius' t~pica is t~f..I!lc.>st imP. O,!~ill11§Q1!r£s:_cliruPj:.1
~on in the develoR.,ment of med~~~<:..,!!~ste!lli,W1rd 19 62: 311 ). !
4.2.2 Whately's Rhetoric
Centuries later, Whately (1846) presented a classification of forms of argu-
mentation as a tool for the finding of arguments. 5 On the basis of what the
speaker wants to demonstrate with his argumentation, Whately discerns be-
tween two main categories of type of arguments: argumentation forms t~~'1
"mkht h~been employed - I!.~!.!~..?!~~~11!~?~ut- to acc2~m !()F ,the f"!s:1_
9r. principle maintained. sI.\PMl:iin~!!~. !!!:!.!!!&:<;!1!eslJ(1846: 46), and argu: .
ments that cannot be employed in this way. The former ~!~!}:'_i~called !:!
iiriori
and comprises argument fro~~;Ji~eto-e£fec!,~:ilii1i tQ.!!.ff£.!i!lt f~.
!hiI!Bl signifif!§.z to assign t4.e_<;!~~2fjl' (1846 : 4 6 ). T.t!:~.c;211'i~~~~~~1,2f
~rg_~ments ~~~~~b:~~e~ int~~~~_~~:::~~':.!~,~.::~~~~e!~':~
ARGUMENT SCHEMES
 r tion into two notions ("Astrology is not a real science but a quasi-science").
~1!~J.ukl;gi~g~ill":~ment from an effect to a condition."
A special type of sign argumentation is ;;;g~~~ntati~-;&-;nt;;timQP¥" in
which the premise refers to the existence of the testimony and the conclusion
to the truth of what is attested. This truth is considered as a condition of the
testimony having been given: "the testimony would not have been given, had
it not been true" (1846: 58).
In the different kinds of argument belonging to the category oLexampl.«.
one or more known instances belonging to the same class are represented as
typical examples of that class, in order to draw a conclusion related to all indi-
vidual members of that class. I.~ ~~e subtypes are "induction", "argumen-
!a~~~!?!:I§~c;!£W comIlarig>JL~qgi~ In inductive argumentation, "w;
assume as a major premise, that what is true (in regard to the point in ques-
tion) of the individual or individuals which we bring forward and appeal to, is
true of the whole class to which they belong" ("Astronomy was decried at its
first introduction, as adverse to religion, therefore every science is likely to be
decried at its first introduction, as adverse to religion") (1846: 86-87). In argu-
mentation based on comparison the reasoning process must go one step fur-
ther since the result of the initial inductive process is taken as a premise for in-
ferring something about another individual case ("Every science is likely to be
decried at its first introduction, as adverse to religion, therefore geology is like
to be decried"). Argumentation based on comparison is therefore a com-
pound argument consisting of ~_!_!!2:~~!_i~~"~_f~.E£!~ucti~
Normally, the inductive step will be implicit; the arguer reasons directly from
the known to the unknown case ("Astronomywas decried at its first introduc-
tion, as adverse to religion, therefore the same will happen with geology")
(1846: 87). The third subtype in the category of example is analogy, which
Whately sees as a comparison of ratios (1846: 90).
4.2.3 Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's New Rhetoric
In La nouvelle rhetorique: traite de l'argumentation, Perelman and Olbrechts-
Tyteca (1958) provide a description of discursive techniques that might be
successful in practice. Their aim is to show how an audience can be motivated
to transfer the likelihood of the premises in an argum...£.ntation to the thesis.
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca make a distinction between argument
( s~hemes based on the principle of "association" and argumen~hemes ba~d
\ ~ principle of "dissociati£"n". Association consists of bringing together
elements that were previously regarded as separate, while dissociation con-
sists in separating elements that were previously regarded as part of a single
entity. The result of a dissociation is always a differentiation of an existing no-
BART GARSSEN
The speaker's aim is to get his audience to accept the "new" meaning of the
term and abandon the old meaning. A dissociation results ill a (re2definitio!J -,
~"'~ I,
or specification of a term: This can add con~~derab!yto ~h~ gen~ralper§.lli!§,i~_!1
effect of the ar umentat~ .}Nonethele~s, s~c.e dIS, soc,la,~lOn doe, ~. n~t eS~~-_,IIJI
IS a specific kind oflink betwe~~IS ~~ld !~t!!,~ !.h~SIS .an~:v.~!!!s s~d my
the premise, it cannot be consi~~!e~~!: argl!~.~,~!2E~~~J ..,
The argument schemes that are based on association are subdIVIded m
"quasi-logical argumentation", "argumentation based on the structure of re-
ality" and "argumentation establishing the structure of reality" (1969: 193-
404). Quasi-logical argumentation derives its persuasive force from its like-
ness to logical reasoning and mathematical proof. This form of argU~~1\
~~ never yield a cOqIpell~J2!QQfJ2!!t ,<;'<!!,!Q~, ,rhetqr,j£i!~!:.<;;~
Perelman and Olbrecbts 'I¥teJ;il.d~gjl)~~hf,!lyq:;i~~1S!14.~i,:m<!!h.~~
~-;ical use of relatjons and princu?k.~~fl1 i!;1t5~!1t~~di<::tt<.{~>,id._e.Iltity~ reci-
~cityl transitivi!;y, eart-whole, comJ?~2.,11Qtmath,~m!!!i£ifiI2J.2~!!~,~,~L -
~~- ..
In argumentation that is based on the structure of reality there IS an appeal to
the ideas of the auditorium about the way in which reality is structured "to es-
tablish a solidarity between accepted judgments and others which one wishes
to promote" (1969: 261). Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca distinguish "argu-
mentation that is based on a sequential relation" and "argumentation that is
based on a coexistential relation". In the former a phenomenon is related to its
effects or consequences (1969: 262), while in the latter a person is related to his
of her actions, a group to its constituting members - or more generally - an
essence to its manifestations (1969: 262). A special subtype of argumentation
based on a sequential relation is "pragmatic argumentation", in which an ac-
tion or event is evaluated on the basis of the merits that are attributed to the
consequences. 6 In argumentation based on a coexistential relation the things
that are connected are situated on different phenomenological levels, one
more structured or abstract than the other (a person's character traits and his
or her behavior). Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca regard the relation between
the person and his or her acts as the prototypical coexistential relation. The
person is the essential factor in this relation and the acts are (non-essential
and temporal) manifestations of the person. An accepted opinion about a
person's acts is transferred to his of her character - or the other way around.
This argument scheme is used when a thesis in which a person's certain future
acts are mentioned is defended by referring to certain (past) acts of that same
person ("Someone who has ever bore false witness in the past will not hesitate
to bear false witness again"). Based on the idea the auditorium has formed of
a person, it can make judgments about the acts of that person. That is exactly
ARGUMENT SCHEMES
85
 what happens in "argumentation based on authority," in which the prestige of
an (alleged) authority is transferred to its statements or judgments in such a
way that the auditorium thinks the statements are true or reliable.
In argumentation that establishes the structure ofreality, a certain rule or em-
piric~ regul~ri~ is established by pointing to a specific case (example) or by
refernng to ~Im~lar cases (analogy). Argumentation based on an example can
be a generalIzatIOn on the basis of one or more specific instances or it can be
'arguin~ from the particular to the particular: which is called argument from
comparzson by others. A special instance of argumentation by example is ar-
gum.entation on .the basis ofa mode~ in which the speaker tries to persuade his
audIence to act m a certain way by resorting to the prestige of someone who
functions as a model. The argument by analogy must be seen as what others
call figurative analogy.
4·3 Argument Schemes and the Evaluation of Argumentation
4.3. 1 American Textbooks on Academic Debate
American textbooks on debate normally include an account of the academic
debate format, instru:tio~s for the organisation of argumentation appropri-
ate to debate, and gUIdelmes for persuasive presentation. As a rule, the in-
str~ction for the organisation of the argumentation includes finding the re-
qUIred proof and evidence for the debate proposition. First the speaker
should select the premises for his defense and then he should see whether
these premises constitute adequate reasonings that supply enough evidence
for the ~ebate Pro~osition. In the chapters about reasoning, expositions of
the claSSICal syllOgism and the difference between deduction and induction
are presented. In most cases, that exposition is followed by an overview of
argumentation types that in some cases are called kinds of argument and in
others,forms of argument or modes of reasoning in discussion. This classifica-
tion functions ~s.a to~l for the evaluation of the speaker's own argumentation
~nd for the antiCIpatIOn of the opponents critique on the argumentation and
IS usually accompanied by evaluative questions (ortests)/
In his famous and widely used textbook Argumentation and Debate, which
may be .se~n a~ representative of the practical literature on debate, Freeley
~1993) dIstmgUIshes four types of argument: "reasoning by example': "reason-
mg by analogy," "causal reasoning" and "sign reasoning': In reasoning by ex-
ample, ~ g~neral conclusion is inferred from one or more specific cases. In
Freeley s VIew, the conclusion always consists of a generalization. To test this
type of argument the speaker should, among other things, establish whether
86 BART GARSSEN
the examples are representative and whether there are a reasonable number of
examples. "Reasoning by analogy" "consists of making a comparison between
two similar cases and inferring that what is true in one case is true in the oth-
er" (1993: 167). Freeley makes a distinction between "literal analogy", in which
the cases that are compared are in the same classification; and "figurative
analogy", in which the cases that are compared are in different classifications.
According to Freeley, figurative analogy has no value as logical proof, but
makes the speaker's point rather effectively. To test literal analogies, the
speaker should, among other things, see whether there are significant points
of similarity critical to the comparison.
In causal argumentation something is predicted on the basis of a claimed
causal generalization: "One infers that a certain factor (a cause) is a force that
produces something else (an effect)" (1993: 169). The reverse is also possible:
"If an effect is known to exist, it may be reasoned that it was produced by a
cause" (1993: 170). To test causal argumentation the evaluator should, at the
very least, see whether the alleged cause is relevant to the effect described and
whether this is the sole or distinguishing causal factor. s
In Freeley's view, reasoning by sign is based on a correlation between two vari-
ables (the substance and its attribute). Here, the arguer claims that the two
variables mentioned are so closely related that the presence or absence of one
may be taken as an indication of the presence or absence of the other: "The at-
tribute is part or a characteristic of the substance or totality with which we are
concerned" (1993: 175). Following Whately, Freeley adds that reasoning by
sign is used to show that the proposition is valid (contrary to ca~sal reason-
ing, which is used to show why the proposition is valid). In evaluatmg reason-
ing by sign, one should determine, among other things, whether the alle?ed
substance-attribute relation holds and whether it is inherent rather than Just
incidental.
Other textbook classifications differ from Freeley's typology in regard to
organisation and the number of argument types. 9 Yet, on closer view, the dif-
ferences are not substantial and therefore, one can speak of a standard treat-
ment or "canon" of argument schemes.
4.3.2 Hastings' Classification of Types of Warrants
In A Reformulation of the Modes of Reasoning in Argumentation, Hastings
(19 62 ) observes that most argumentation textbooks do not agree on the defi-
nition of the different types of reasoning, on the number of types of reason-
ing that should be distinguished, and on the method of classification of types
ARGUMENT SCHEMES
 another event. Like reasoning from sign to unobserved event, reasoning from
of argument. To create order in this apparent chaos, Hastings proposes a new
circumstantial evidence to hypothesis is argumentation from effect to cause. In
cla~sification of forms of reasoning. Starting from the Toulmin model, he de-
this case, a series of indications is put forward intended to show that the hy-
sCrIbes and classifies the most important types of warrants in terms of the
pothesis mentioned in the claim is true.lO ,.. .
Free-floating forms of reasoning, Hast~ngs thlf~ .mam catego~;, :ncludes
reasoning process, "moving from the data to the conclusion on the authority
?f the.warrant" (19~2: 21). Hastings distinguishes nine processes of reasoning,
"reasoning from comparison" (or reasonmg from lIteral analogy ), reas~n­
m whIch he recogmzes three general patterns: "verbal reasoning", "causal rea-
ing from analogy", and "reasoning from author~ty".. With these reasonm.g
soning" a~d "free floating forms of reasoning". According to Hastings, in ver-
forms, it is not possible to give a general charactenzatIOn of the warrant, as IS
bal reasonmg, the step from data to claim is in one way or another based on the n
possible with the other two main categories. Also, the three.forms of reaso .-
me~ning of th~ terms used in the argumentation: "they are based upon sym-
ing are not linked to a specific type of conclusion. In reasonmg fro~ compan-
bolic formulatIOns that exist in the language and thinking of people because
son, "one event is shown to be similar to another, and conclUSIOns dra~n
of s~mantic reinforcement" (1962: 139). There are three subcategories: "rea-
about the first event are then applied to the second" (19 62: 93)· In reasonmg
s~mng from example to a descriptive generalization': "reasoning from crite-
from analogy, the second, analogical event is sim~lar: not on the basis of facts
na to a verbal classification" and "reasoning from definition to characteris-
or circumstances, but on the basis of abstract prInCiples; the structure of the
tics." In reasoningfrom example to a descriptive generalization, a general state-
abstract relationships of the two events is the same. In spite of what most de-
ment is justified by a premise in which a reference is made to one or more spe-
bate textbooks claim, Hastings believes that reasoning on the basis of analog.y
cific facts or situations ("The increase in muggings indicates that our society
provides some probative force, though it is less than reasoning from compan-
gets more violent every day"). The general form of the warrant in this type of
son. As an example, he quotes Trwnan, who proposed that the United States
reasoning is "the instances are typical and adequately described by the con-
clusion" (1962: 27). In reasoningfrom criteria to a verbal classification, a person immediately intervene in Korea:
or situation is characterized on the basis of certain characteristics ("Maxwell
The best time to meet the threat is in the beginning. It is easier to put out a fire in
is smart because he is very good in math"). According to Hastings, in the war- 62
the beginning when it is small than after it has become a roaring blaze (19 : 114)·
rant for this type of reasoning, the meanings of terms that are used in the
characterization ("being smart") are given by referring to certain criteria
The warrant in reasoningfrom authority states that the fact that a specific per-
("people who are very good in math are smart").
son (or institution) has made a statement is a sign of the truth of that state-
In reasoning from definition to characteristics, an event or situation is de-
ment (1962: 132 ).
Hastings' "reformulation" is not adopted in the major textbooks o.n deb~te,
fined in a certain way and, on the basis of this definition, either attributes or
characteristics of the event or logical implications are drawn. Contrary to rea-
except for the textbook that he and Windes (1966) published later. HIS claSSIfi-
soning from criteria to a verbal classification this form of argumentation
cation, however, is used as a point of departure for other scholars, such as
moves "from a class to the classifying attributes" ("Dolphins are mammals,
therefore dolphins are viviparous") or "from a principle to an application of Schellens.l1
that principle" ("We should not kill communists because we are Christians")
(1962: 49). In the warrant, the consequences or implications of the definition
are mentioned. 4.3.3 Schellens' Reasonable Argument Forms
Causal reasoning, Hastings' second main category, comprises the sub-
In his Dutch monograph, Redelijke argumenten, Schellens (19 85) investigated
categories "reasoning from sign to unobserved event", "reasoning from cause
what evaluative tools the critical reader has at his disposal to assess the
to effect" and "reasoning from circumstantial evidence to hypothesis." A com-
reasonableness of argumentation (1985: 4)· He provides an operational defin-
ition of reasonableness by formulating a series of argumentative ~chemas a~~
mon characteristic of these types of reasoning is that the warrant consists of a
causal generalization. In reasoningfrom sign to unobserved event, an observed
the evaluative criteria that go with them. To evaluate argumentatIOn, the cntl-
or known event is taken as an indication of the existence of an unobserved
cal reader should first reconstruct the argumentation (that is normally en-
event. The unobserved event is the cause of the observed event. In reasoning
thymematic) by adding the unexpressed premise. Then he should see
from cause to effect, a certain event is predicted on the basis of the existence of

ARGUMENT SCHEMES
88 BART GARSSEN
 whether the premises are acceptable, by "moulding" the argumentation in
one of the argument schemes and asking the evaluative questions that go with
the scheme.
Following Hastings, Schellens makes a distinction between two main
categories: "bound" and "unbound" (or free-floating) argumentation forms.
Th~ bound argumentation forms are all tied to a certain type of conclusion,
whIle ~e unbound argumentation forms can be used to defend any type of
conclusIOn.
Schellens classifies the bound argumentation forms on the basis of the na-
t~re I~f the ~o~clus~on. The conclusion can be factual (descriptive) or evalua-
t~ve. "He dlstm gu.lshes between the following forms of bound argumenta-
tion: argumentation based on regularity", "argumentation based on rules"
and "pragmatic argumentation': In argumentation based on regularity, the
step from premise to conclusion is a descriptive generalization that relates to a
c~rtain empirical law. According to the nature of the conclusion, Schellens
~lscerns be~een "argumentation defending a prediction" and "argumenta-
tIOn defendmg an explanation': In his opinion, predictions can be defended by
~ea~s of causal and non-causal generalizations. In causal generalizations, it
IS claImed that what is mentioned in the argument in general leads to what is
mentioned .in the conclusion. 13 In argumentation defending an explanation,
~om the eXlsten~e of something that is presented as an effect, something else
IS deduced that IS the cause of that effect. Schellens classifies three forms of
argumentation defending an explanation: "argumentation form effect to
cause", "argumentation from sign" and "argumentation from time to causali-
ty': In argumentation from time to causality, a causal connection is defended
by pointing at the simultaneous appearance of two events.
In the second subcategory of bound argumentation, argumentation based
~n rules, the st~p of the premise to the conclusion is a normative generaliza-
tion; a conventIOn or an explicit agreement. Based on the nature of the con-
clusion, Schellens classifies "argumentation based on evaluative rules" (for
conclusions in which something is evaluated) and "argumentation based on
rules of conduct" (for conclusions in which behavior is regulated). In argu-
mentation based on evaluative rules, something is evaluated by referring to a
certain quality. In argumentation based on rules of conduct, the conclusion is
an advice, a command, or a prohibition, while the premise consists of the con-
ditions that render the advice, the command, or prohibition acceptable.14
In "pragmatic argumentation;' the third subcategory of bound argumenta-
tion, the conclusion says something about the desirability of a certain course
of action. Pragmatic argumentation is seen as a new category because it ap-
peals to both descriptive generalizations (concerning the probability of conse-
90 BART GARS SEN
quences) and normative generalizations (concerning the desirability of conse-
quences).
The second main category, free-floating argumentation, includes "argument
from authority", "argument from example" and "argument from analogy". In
argument from example, a general statement is defended by referring to a spe-
cific instance. Schellens points out that there is a difference between argument
from example and inductive generalizations, which hardly ever occur in
every-day argumentation. In argument from example, the number of specific
instances is too small to treat as an induction. Furthermore, the general state-
ment in the conclusion is not necessarily a generalization (1985: 192). In argu-
ment from analogy, the conclusion is defended by referring to similar cases
(1985: 197). Like many other authors, Schellens distinguishes between "literal"
and "figural" analogies.
4.3.4 The Pragma-Dialectical Typology of Argument Schemes
In the pragma-dialectical argumentation theory developed by Van Eemeren
and Grootendorst (1984,1992), argumentation is seen as part of a critical dis-
cussion that is aimed at resolving a difference of opinion. ~derJg~'.l§'~s
~her a single argument m~~§'!1~mllri.hU1iQ!1!2tQ~.E~~01~!~~.~!~~._cgJ~
fgence of opinion, one has to check whether.~~.'t.:~~.~Ilt~~~~f!1..!!:!segj~~~
prQIY'iate and usencorrect!J.An argument scheme is appropriate if it is an ad-
equate means for the defense of the standpoint and if the participants agree to
its application. The ar~ment scheme is_~~.Q.<::9.!.!~<::!ly ifa!!!h~ !.~!e"?E!
critical questions that the antagonist in th~..Q!.~!~ <::o.1:!J<!ilsl<..can be an~wered
s~tisfactorily. In that way, the use of a certain argument scheme determines
the course of the dialectical exchange.
Van Eemeren and Grootendorst classify the argument schemes in three main
categories: symptomatic argumentation of the "token" type, comparison
argumentation of the "resemblance" type and instrumental argumentation of
the "consequence" type. These three argumentation types are categorized ac-
cording to the way in which the argument scheme concerned is to be evaluat-
ed. The "ratio" for distinguishing between the three argument schemes is the
fact that each scheme corresponds to special assessment criteria pertaining to
the relation between the premise and the conclusion. The argument schemes
differ from each other because each scheme comes with different critical
questions.'5 Because in each argument scheme the premise is linked in a dif-
ferent way to the standpoint, symptomatic argumentation has to be evaluated
in a different way than causal argumentation, comparison argumentation in
ARGUMENT SCHEMES 91
a different way than causal argumentation, and causal argumentation in a dif-
ferent way than symptomatic argumentation. '6
!!!arg,l!,~~:~?~,t~~t~~. ~as~~ ?~~~ s>:Tlltgmatic rdaJiQn~~~
~e~~.~~~~b~ mell!!9pmg ~n the 12~~"!,~~~1fu: charact~~~!i~?fwh~
T_<:?t,:~~:~~~~lJ1J~~~~nre!~E~~~,~/)'lracteri~tL~ a~ a !¥pical
(1~i!!~~~h!~11l!!~,!l~~~h~.~,;~~~?!,<l2)~~<?l~5,~The central critical question
that accompanies symptomatic argumentation is whether the quality that is
mentioned in the premise is really typical for what is mentioned in the stand-
point. One of the argument schemes that is based on a symptomatic relation
is the argument from authority, in which it is assumed that the fact that some-
one claims something automatically entails the truth of that claim. Another
special type of symptomatic argumentation is based on the meaning ofa term.
Here, the fact that something has certain qualities automatically entails a cer-
tain classification or designation.
In argumentation based on a relation of comparison, the standpoint is de-
fended by presenting the controversial as something that has similarities with
something that is not controversial in order to show that what applies to what
is already accepted also applies to what is not yet accepted. The key critical
question accompanying comparison argumentation is whether there are
enough relevant similarities. Argument from analogy belongs to the main cat-
egoryof comparison argumentation, in which the abstract relations are com-
pared between elements from two (dissimilar) situations and comparison ar-
gumentation based on the principle ofjustice that claims that people who are
in similar situations should be treated similarly.
In argumentation based on a causal relation, an event that is mentioned in
the argument is presented as the cause of what is mentioned in the standpoint
- or the other way around - while the standpoint is defended by showing that
the latter is the result of the former - or the other way around. By presenting
an accepted fact in the argument as something that leads to the event that is
mentioned in the standpoint (or as something that is the result of that event),
the acceptability of the arguments is transferred to the standpoint. The key
critical question that has to be answered in the evaluation of causal argumen-
tation is whether the event that is presented as the cause really leads to the
event that is presented as a result. One of the causal argument schemes is
means-end argumentation or pragmatic argumentation, in which a certain act
is presented as the means to reach a given goal. Typical for this type of argu-
mentation is that the act or course of action that is mentioned in the stand-
point automatically leads to the goal mentioned in the argument. Thus, the
recommended course of action is presented as an adequate means or even the
best way to reach the goal.
92 BART GARSSEN
4-4 Argument Schemes and the Description of Argumentative Discourse
In Alltagslogik, Kienpointner (1992) presents a typology of argument schemes
in order to give a complete description of the different types of argumenta-
tion that are used and are found agreeable in the German language commu-
nity. Kienpointner intends to base his typology on the distinction between
different types of warrants (1992: 43). His typology is an eclectic compilation
of classical and modern classifications.
Kienpointner distinguishes between three main classes: (1) "warrant-using
argumentation schemes" ("schlufiregelbenutzende Argumentationsschema-
ta"), (2) "warrant-establishing argumentation schemes" ("schlufiregeletablie-
rende Argumentationsschemata") and (3) "argumentation schemes that nei-
ther use nor establish warrants" ("Schemata, die weder Schlufiregeln einfach
beniitzen noch etablieren") (1992: 243).'7 The first of these main classes con-
sists of argument schemes in which the premise is connected to the conclu-
sion by way of a warrant that is assumed to be already acceptable. In this re-
spect, the warrant is "used': This main class is subdivided into four subclasses:
(1) "schemes of classification" including argumentation schemes based on de-
finition, "genus-species argumentation" and "part-whole argumentation";
(2) "schemes based on a comparison"; (3) "schemes of contradistinction
based on contrary oppositions, contradictions, incompatibilities, and con-
verse oppositions"; and (4) "causal argumentation schemes" including cause-
effect argumentation, argumentation based on motives and means-end
argumentation.
The second major class consists of argument schemes in which a warrant
that is expressed in the conclusion is justified by means of inductive argu-
mentation: "the warrant is the conclusion and is not a premise in the argu-
mentation" (1992: 243). The main class comprises only one argumentation
type: "inductive argumentation in the restricted sense':
The third major class consists of argument schemes that cannot be classi-
fied in the first or second major class and comprises "illustrative argumenta-
tion;' "argumentation based on analogy:' and "argumentation based on au-
thority:'
In this way, the obtained twenty-one subclasses are subdivided in subsub-
classes -among other things - on the basis of nature of the conclusion (nor-
mative versus descriptive). This differentiation results in a classification of
fifty-eight argument schemes.
ARGUMENT SCHEMES
93
4.5 Conclusion
The classifications of argument schemes that are described here show striking
similarities. The designers of the classifications often used common sources
(Aristotle, Whately) and they have influenced one another considerably. The
standard classification of types of argument in the debate textbooks results
from Whately's typology, while Whately, for his part, was influenced by Aris-
totle's system of rhetorical invention. Hastings tried to enhance the classifica-
tions from debate textbooks and tried to motivate the necessity of categories
of argumentation forms. Although Hastings' typology is more complex, it
still resembles the standard classification in many respects. Schellens takes
Hastings' classification as a point of departure and also uses the classification
of starting points developed by Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca who, for their
part, were influenced by the classical topical systems of Aristotle and Cicero.
Finally, Kienpointner's eclectic classification system follows all of the other
classifications. He bases his typology particularly on the scholastic topics.
However, with respect to the descriptive nature of his classification, his orien-
tation to the classical topical tradition, and the amount of argument schemes,
his classification especially resembles Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's ty-
pology. In terms of the number and the nature of the schemes, the pragma-di-
alectical typology resembles the classification of Freeley.
There are also important differences between the approaches. These relate
especially to the systematics of the different classifications and the number of
argument schemes that are distinguished.
In most classifications, causal argumentation, argumentation based on
comparison, and argumentation based on authority are distinguished. Also
sign argumentation is distinguished in many taxonomies, but it is not always
conceptualized in the same way.
A typology is theoretically adequate if it lives up to the goal it is designed to
serve. To be practically applicable, a typology of argument schemes should be
accepted by language users as an acceptable starting point. In addition, lan-
guage users should be able to identify the argument schemes that are distin-
guished. Warnick and Kline (1992) empirically investigated the extent to
which argument schemes distinguished by Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca
could be identified in texts. They concluded that it is possible for trained ana-
lysts to identify most of the argument schemes. Hastings (1962) and Schellens
(1985) examined the usefulness of their own typologies by examining
whether language users were capable of identifying the argument schemes in
argumentative texts. Hastings found that most respondents were able to iden-
tify the argument schemes from his classification. Schellens typology did not
receive the same empirical support when tested (1985). However, in another
94 BART GARSSEN
test, he found that respondents, when informed about his argument schemes,
were better able to develop adequate critical questions for some argument
schemes than the respondents who were not informed.
Kienpointner examined the general acceptability of some of the argument
schemes in his classification. In his research, respondents had to evaluate a se-
ries of arguments that were based on the argument schemes concerned. He
found that the respondents' judgments about the relevance and acceptability
of the arguments were predominately negative.
Garssen (1995,1997) examined whether language users have a notion of the
special relation between the standpoint and the premise and how well the re-
lations between premises and standpoints as they are perceived by language
users correspond to the pragma-dialectical argument schemes. In order to es-
tablish whether language users have a pre-theoretical notion of the relation
between the standpoint and the conclusion, he designed a test in which re-
spondents had to react to argumentation by criticizing the relation between
the premise and the standpoint. The fact that there is a correspondence be-
tween the critical reactions and the standard critical questions accompanying
the pragma-dialectical argumentations indicates that the respondents had a
notion of the specific type of relation between the premise and the stand-
point.
In several investigations into argumentative language use, existing classifi-
cations of argument schemes are taken as a point of departure. Sanders, Gass,
and Wiseman (1990: 709-718) for instance, examined whether different eth-
nic groups differ in their judgments of the probative force of different argu-
ment schemes ("argument by example", "argumentation by analogy" and
"cause-effect argumentation"). Based on their findings Sanders, Gass and
Wiseman conclude that there is no relation between ethnic origin and prefer-
ences for certain argumentation types.
In "Proverbs and Practical Reasoning: A Study in Socio-Logic;' GOOdWi~J
~IUiWenzel examined to what extenTaiftei~t a-t.S~mentatiYi.l2rijiciPTes~
r:vealed in proverbs tha~ c~mmonly used in West:r~lt~~7~: ~89 ). ;
In many proverbs, the prmClp!e otStg~xpressea qUIte d1stmct-
ly ("A man is known by the company he keeps"), however, many other argu-
mentative principles are also represented in proverbs (cause: "Where bees are,
there is honey"; generalization: "The burnt child dreads the fire"). Goodwin
and Wenzel therefore conclude that "proverbs (1) reflect an implicit typology 1\
of patterns of reasoning or argument, (2) illustrate and comment uponlegiti-
mate patterns of inference and (3) caution against general and specific fallaci-
es" (1979: 302). \
ARGUMENT SCHEMES 95

Notes
1 Argument schemes are general and abstract patterns with an infinite
number of possible substitution instances. In this respect they correspond
to logical reasoning patterns. With an argument scheme, however, the
transfer of acceptability is based on more than just the formal characteris-
tics of the scheme that is used.
2 There are also topics that do not point to a possible connection between
premise and thesis. The topics in Cicero's De inventionefor instance
should be seen as pointers to certain topical themes.
3 Grimaldi (1958) believes that the special topics are always used in combi-
nation with these rhetorical principles. In other words, every special topic
can be seen as an application of a general topic.
4 This example illuminates the double function of the dialectical topics:
they supply a general rule and an application of that rule in the form of an
advice (van Eemeren et al.1996: 38).
5 According to Ehninger (1963), in Whately's rhetoric, its "more particular
purposes are (1) to arm the pulpit orator for his task of conveying to an
unlettered congregation the indisputable doctrines of the Christian faith,
and (2? to arm the Christian controversialist who is called upon to defend
the eVIdences of religion against the onslaught of the skeptic:'
6 Perel~an and Olbrechts-Tyteca also pay special attention to specific vari-
ants l.ike the argume~t ofwaste according to which it is better not to stop a
certam course of actIOn when one has already invested a lot of energy.
7 For an early example of a classification like this, see Laycock and Scales
(1913: 164). Other representative classifications can be found in McBurney
and Mills (1964) and Kruger (1960).
8 Freeley does not make an effort to distinguish between different evalua-
tive questions for the two types of causal reasoning (cause-to-effect and
effect -to-effect).
9 C:>'N,eill, ~aycock, and Scales (1927: 155) consider 'argument by generaliza-
tIOn a~d argume~t fr~m analogy' as subcategories of'arguments by ex-
ample. They conSIder argument from sign' as 'argument from effect to
cause' (1927: 14~). In addition to the types of argument formulated by
Freeley, Brocknede, and Ehninger (1963) distinguish 'classification' and
'authority:
10 In Hasti~gs' view, the hypothesis expressed in the conclusion provides the
expla~atIOn, f~r the facts mentioned in the premise. Hastings admits that
there l~ a striking resemblance between this reasoning form and reasoning
from slgn',Ho:vever, t~ere are clear differences: in sign reasoning normally
only one sIgn IS mentIoned and there is a strong correlation between the
BART GARSSEN
sign and the hypothesis, while in a~gume~t from circumsta~tial evidence
to hypothesis more than one sign IS mentIOned, the correlation between
signs and the hypothesis is weak, and the signs relate to 'several types of
events' (1962: 87).
11 In Argumentation Schemes for Presumptive Reasoning (199 6 ), Walt,on takes
Hastings' classification as a point of departure and adds mO,re v~nants.
Walton argues that in "presumptive reasoning" the, condusIO~ IS never, .
true in an absolute sense, but based on a presumption. By asking the ~ntI­
cal questions that pertain to the argumentation sc~em~ use~, exceptIOns
may come to light, which will render the presumptIO~ mvalld.
12 Schellens refers to Perelman's distinction between pomts of departure re-
lating to the real and points ofdeparture relation to the preferable.
13 According to Schell ens, the prediction does not necessarily concer~s ~ fu-
ture event; it is also possible to prove an unknown past event by pOl~tI,ng
to the causes of this event. Schellens calls this variant the quasi predICtIOn.
Like Hastings, he distinguishes a variant in which a future event is predict-
ed on the basis of a cause yet to occur (conditional prediction).
14 The step from premise to conclusion is legitimized by a rule that states
when the measure or step mentioned in the conclusion should be taken.
15 With each argument scheme come specific critical questions. The most
central critical question pertains directly to the relation betwe~n the ,
premise and the standpoint. The other critical questio~s, pert am to addI-
tional factors that may hinder transference of acceptabilIty, ,
16 In the pragma-dialectical argumentation theory the verbal pres~ntatIO~
of argument schemes is a subject of investi~ation.A s~pt~matIc relatI~~
can, for instance, be pointed out by expressIOns such as X IS by nature Y
and "it is characteristic for X that y". Verbal expressions for pointing out
comparison relations are, for instance, "X is comparable to Y" and "X cor-
responds to Y" and a relation of causality can be pointed out by expres-
sions such as "X leads to y" and "y results from X" (Van Eemeren and
Grootendorst 1992: 98-99).
17 The distinction between 'schluftregeletablierende' and' schlu~r~ge~-, '
benUtzende argumentation schemes corresponds to Toulmm s dIstmctIOn
8
between 'warrant-using' and 'warrant-establishing' arguments (195 : 120),
There is also a correspondence with Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's dis-
tinction between argumentation based on the structure of reality and ar-
gumentation establishing the structure of reality.
97
ARGUMENT SCHEMES
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99
ARGUMENT SCHEMES
 5 Argumentation Structures
A. Francisca Snoeck Henkemans

5.1 Introduction

The structure of argumentation is an important issue for current approaches

to the theory and practice of argument analysis. Recurrent questions are:
How can one lay bare the structure of a complex argument? Which types of
structures should be distinguished and on what grounds?
Laying out the structure of an argument is not only necessary to under-
standing how arguers defend their positions, but also indispensable for evalu-
ating their argumentation. An overall judgment of the quality of a complex
argument requires not just a clear picture of individual arguments, but also
insight into the relations among these arguments.' If it is not clear whether or
not an individual argument or reason is independent of other arguments that
make up the complex argument, it cannot be clear how damaging the conse-
quences of a negative evaluation of that argument are.
In most approaches, at least three types of argument structures are dis-
tinguished: (1) serial reasoning or subordinate argumentation, (2) linked rea-
soning or coordinate argumentation and (3) convergent reasoning or multiple
argumentation. Reasoning is serial if one of the reasons supports the other. If
reasoning is linked, each of the reasons given is directly related to the stand-
point and the reasons work together as a unit. When each reason separately
supports the standpoint (to some degree), the reasoning is convergent. A
complex argument can combine all of these types of argument structures.
Although at first sight there seems to be general agreement on the relevant
types of distinctions between argument structures, at closer inspection the
authors disagree with each other on a number of points. Often the same ter-
minology is used for distinctions that differ in crucial respects. Moreover, the
various characterizations of argument structures reflect fundamental differ-
ences of approach to argumentation. The most important difference is the
one between structural (or logical) approaches, in which attention is paid
only to the structural aspects of argument structure as they manifest them-
selves in the product of the reasoning process; and functional (or dialectical)
approaches, in which the emphasis is on the process in which these structures
arise and the functions the various argument structures fulfil in this process.

101
 Apart from differences in definitions of argumentation structures and dif-
ferences of approach, there is much discussion about the best method of
analysis, especially in doubtful cases where there is room for more than one
interpretation. For some authors, the ambiguities in the definitions and the
problems of analysis have been a reason to question the importance of the
distinctions. They argue that in practice distinguishing between the various
argument structures is often so difficult that it is better not to make these dis-
tinctions at all. This is especially true for the notoriously problematic distinc-
tion between linked and convergent arguments.
Finally, there is also disagreement about the history of the distinctions, in
particular about the origins of the linked-convergent distinction. Because
more insight into the historical backgrounds of the distinctions between var-
ious types of argument structure might enhance our understanding of the
current controversies, this survey begins with a historical overview. 5.3 dis-
cusses the main definitions of linked and convergent argument structures or
their equivalents that are given in current approaches. 5.4 is devoted to the
various methods proposed in the literature to deal with doubtful cases.
5.2 Historical Overview
Attention to the analysis of argument structure first transpired in American
debate and logic textbooks in the second half of this century. Two major influ-
ences are identifiable in these textbooks: classical rhetoric and Enlightenment
rhetorical theorists such as Campbell and Whately.
Although the concepts are not fully developed, and the contemporary
terminology is absent, argument structures similar to our present-day con-
cepts were present in nascent form in both the classical rhetorical tradition
and the 18th century Enlightenment rhetorics. The functional approach, in
which the independence or interdependence of arguments is determined by
the requirements for the burden of proof to be met by the arguer, can be
found both in the classical and the Enlightenment rhetoric. The logical ap-
proach, in which the term argument structure refers to relationships among
premises within different inference types, is prominent in the work of En-
lightenment rhetoricians. They make a distinction between the type of link-
age between premises in a deductive argument or proof and the way in which
premises are combined in an inductive (or "moral") argument. In the latter
argument, the premises each separately lend some degree of support to the
conclusion (and are in that sense independent), but they need to be combined
to make the conclusion (more) probable.
102 A. FRANCISCA SNOECK HENKEMANS
5.2.1 Classical rhetoric
In early Roman rhetoric, both subordinate arguments and arguments con-
sisting of a number of reasons in direct support of a (sub )standpoint were
distinguished. 2 In Cicero's De Inventione, a specific type of complex argument
is discussed, the epicheirema, also called the five-part argument. Kennedy gives
the following description of the five-part argument:
it is in fact a kind of amplification of the Aristotelian syllogism and enthymeme
in which a proposition (part 1) is supported by a variety of reasons (part 2), then a
second proposition (what would be the minor premise in a syllogism) is stated
(part 3), and that is followed by a variety of reasons for believing it (part 4). The
fifth part then states the conclusion. Such an argument in Greek is sometimes
called an epicheirema,literally"ahandful" (1994: l20).
Since part 2 and part 4 consist of reasons in support of another reason, they
can be seen as serial reasoning or subordinate argumentation. In both cases,
the support provided by the subordinate argumentation should consist of a
variety of reasons. Cicero gives the following example of support for the mi-
nor premise "Of all things nothing is better governed than the universe":
And then ... they introduce another proof, that is of the minor premise, in this
way:" For the risings and the settings of the constellations keep a fixed order, and
the changes of the seasons not only proceed in the same way by a fixed law but are
also adapted to the advantage of all nature, and the alternation of night and day
has never through any variations done any harm;' All these points are proof that
the nature of the world is governed by no ordinary intelligence (De inventione, 1.
59)·
It is not clear whether these reasons are supposed to form one combined de-
fence (and are thus a case of "linked" reasoning) or whether they should lend
independent support (and are a case of "convergent" reasoning).
Also in the classical theory of stasis, the concepts of dependent and indepen-
dent reasons seem to have been recognized, albeit not explicitly. The issues
that had to be proven in a criminal court case differed depending on whether
the arguer's position was that of the defendant or that of the prosecutor. 3 In
choosing the status for his defence, according to Quintilian, the defendant has
four options:
There are four different methods which may be employed in every case, and he
who is going to plead should study them as first essentials. For, to begin with the
ARGUMENTATION STRUCTURES 103
 defendant, far the strongest method of self-defence is, if possible, to deny the
charge. The second best is when it is possible to reply that the particular act with
which you are charged was never committed. The third and most honourable is
to maintain that the act was justifiable. If none of these lines of defence are feasi-
ble, there remains the last and only hope of safety: ... we must evade the charge
with the aid of some point oflaw, making it appear that the action has been
brought against us illegally (Quintilian 3, 6, 83-84).
Each of these ways to defend the accused is, in principle, a sufficient defence.
It is, however, also possible to combine different types of defences. Quintilian
gives the following explanation of the reasons for using such a multiple de-
fence:
There are also a number who are in doubt as to a form of defence which I may ex-
emp
ifY as follows: "IfI murdered him, I did right; but I did not murder him."
What, they ask, is the value of the first part, if the second can be proved, since they
are mutually inconsistent, and if anyone employs both arguments, we should be-
lieve neither? This contention is partly justified; we should employ the second
alone if the fact can be proved without a doubt. But if we have any doubts as to
being able to prove the stronger argument, we shall do well to rely on both. Dif-
ferent arguments move different people .... one who is confident of his powers as a
marksman may be content with one shaft, whereas he who has no such confi-
dence will do well to launch several and give fortune a chance to come to his assis-
tence (Quintilian 4, 5,13-14).
The prosecutor makes use of the same issues in choosing his main arguments,
but he has to prove all four points in order to make his case:
The accuser '" must prove that something was done, that a particular act was
done, that it was wrongly done, and that he brings his charge according to law
(Quintilian 3,6, 85).
In view ofthe req uirements of the burden of proof, the prosecutor's main rea-
sons for finding the accused guilty must be regarded as interdependent, since
the success of the argument as a whole depends on the success of each of its
component parts.4
A different type of interdependency is at stake in the following fragment
from the Rhetorica ad Herennium, where the ideal order of the arguments is
discussed:
10 4 A. FRANCISCA SNOECK HENKEMANS
In the Proof and Refutation of arguments it is appropriate to adopt an Arrange-
ment of the following sort: (1) the strongest arguments should be placed at the
beginning and at the end of the pleading; (2) those of medium force, and also
those that are neither useless to the discourse nor essential to the proof, which are
weak if presented separately and individually, but become strong and plausible
when conjoined with the others, should be placed in the middle (Rhetorica ad
Herennium 3, 10, 18).
Unlike the prosecutor's main arguments, according to the author of the
Rhetorica ad Herennium, some of the arguments that are supposed to be
placed in the middle are not "essential to the proof': The reason of their de-
pendency on other arguments is that they are too weak to stand on their own,
and they become stronger when combined with the other arguments.
5.2.2 Enlightenment Rhetoric
In The Philosophy of Rhetoric (199111776), Campbell makes a distinction be-
tween "scientific evidence" and "moral evidence". One of the main differences
between these two types of evidence is a difference in structure; whereas sci-
entific evidence consists of a set of interdependent premises which together
form one argument, moral evidence consists of a number of independent ar-
guments:
scientific evidence is simple, consisting of only one coherent series, every part of
which depends on the preceding, and, as it were, suspends the following: moral
evidence is generally complicated, being in reality a bundle of independent
proofs. The longest demonstration is but one uniform chain, the links whereof,
taken severally, are not to be regarded as so many arguments, and consequently
when thus taken, they conclude nothing; but taken together, and in their proper
order, they form one argument, which is perfectly conclusive (45)·
Although each of the reasons given in moral reasoning is independent of the
others, with each new reason the conclusion may become more likely:
In moral reasoning ... there is often a combination of many distinct topics of ar-
gument, no way dependent on one another. Each hath a certain portion of evi-
dence belonging to itself, each bestows on the conclusion a particular degree of
likelihood, of all which accumulated the credibility of the fact is compounded
(199 1 /177 6 : 45)·
ARGUMENTATION STRUCTURES 105
Campbell acknowledges that it is possible to give more than one independent
proof of the same proposition, but he believes that there is not much point in
doing this:
It is true, the same theorem may be demonstrable in different ways, and by dif-
ferent mediums; but as a single demonstration, clearly understood, commands
the fullest conviction, every other is superfluous (199111776: 45).
Campbell also gives a description of the consequences that will result from
taking away one or more parts of a demonstration or a moral argument:
[A demonstration] may be compared to an arch, no part of which can subsist in-
dependently of the rest. If you make any breach in it, you destroy the whole ....
[Moral reasoning] maybe compared to a tower, the height whereofis but the ag-
gregate of the heights of the several parts reared above one another, and so may
be gradually diminished, as it was gradually raised (199111776: 45-46).
Whately discusses two different ways in which reasons may be combined in
order to produce a stronger argument (and thus may be considered as linked).
A first type of case consists of reasons which separately have little or no
weight, but can lend sufficient support to a conclusion when taken together:
The remark above made, as to the force of concurrenttestimonies, even though
each, separately, might have little or none, but whose accidental agreement in a
falsehood would be extremely improbable, is not solely applicable to the Argu-
ment from Testimony, but may be extended to many arguments of other kinds
also; in which a similar calculation of chances will enable us to draw a conclusion,
sometimes even amounting to moral certainty, from a combination of data
which singly would have had little or no weight (1846: 74).
In inductions, according to Whately, mentioning just one instance can in
some cases suffice to justify a general conclusion. But if not, then a number of
instances are needed to support the conclusion:
In human affairs .,. our uncertainty respecting many of the circumstances that
may affect the result, obliges us to collect many coinciding instances to warrant
even a probable conclusion (1846: 88).
Instead of combining a number of similar reasons of the same type (i.e., a
number of testimonies, signs or instances) it is also possible to produce a
stronger argument by combining different types of reasons. A second type of
106 A. FRANCISCA SNOECK HENKEMANS
linkage implicitly distinguished by Whately consists of a combination of dif-
ferent types of reason, where the one reason is a means of showing that specif-
ic objections against the other reason (that there are certain exception-mak-
ing circumstances to the general rule or "warrant" underlying that reason) are
not valid:
the a priori Argument and Example support each other, when used in con-
junction ... A sufficient Cause being established, leawes us still at liberty to suppose
that there may have been circumstances which will prevent the effect from taking
place; but Examples subjoined show that these circumstances do not, at least al-
ways, prevent that effect (1846: 138).
From his discussion of issues related to the burden of proof, it becomes clear
that Whately also allows for the possibility of putting forward more reasons
than are required, so that the defence as a whole consists of a number of inde-
pendent reasons. If the arguer has the presumption, then the burden of proof
belongs with the other side and putting forward further evidence in support
of the presumption amounts to giving an argument ex abundanti, a superflu-
ous argument:
It is a point of great importance to decide in each case ... on which side the Pre-
sumption lies, and to which belongs the [onus probandi] Burden ofProof For
though it may often be expedient to bring forward more proofs than can be fairly
demanded of you, it is always desirable, when this is the case, that it should be
known, and that the strength of the cause should be estimated accordingly (1846:
112).5
So, there is nothing against doing this, provided it is made clear to the oppo-
nent that one is doing more than required.
5.2.3 The Early Textbooks
American textbooks on argumentation and debate that started appearing in
the fifties reflected, to a large extent, the traditional views on argument struc-
ture. But there were also a number of new developments. Modern tradition
has it that Monroe Beardsley (1950) was the first to represent the structure of
argumentation by using diagrams (consisting of numbered statements and
arrows indicating support relationships). Beardsley also introduced part of
the terminology that is still used by informal logicians to refer to the different
argument structures. He gives the following definitions:
ARGUMENTATION STRUCTURES 107
 In a convergent argument, several independent reasons support the same con-
elusion ... In a divergent argument, the same reason supports several conclusions
... A serial argument contains a statement that is both a conclusion and a reason
for a further conclusion (1950: 19).
However, Thomas claims that it was he who first distinguished between
linked and convergent arguments and not Beardsley, as others have thought:
The distinction between linked and convergent inferences was not drawn by
Beardsley, not even in his fourth edition of Thinking Straight. It was introduced
in the 1973 edition of PRNL [Practical Reasoning in Natural Language J. Beardsley
represented linked and convergent inferential relationships alike, using multiple
arrows for (what I call) linked relationships, as if all reasoning with multiple rea-
sons were convergent (except that this distinction did not exist in his system).
The concept of linked reasoning, and the distinction between it and convergent
reasoning, needed to be added to Beardsley's system of analysis before it could be
generally applied at all (1986: 457).
As far as the terminology is concerned, this seems to be correct, but similar
distinctions between interdependent and independent reasons had already
been made before 1973. One example is Mills (1968), who makes a distinction
between cases where there is "one conclusion with several coordinate rea-
sons" and cases where one has "one conclusion supported by two or more
pairs of coordinate reasons". The latter type of structure is "more likely to be a
case than an argument". An example of the first type of structure is:
Conclusion: Our top debaters are top scholars
Reasons:
1. They are John, Mary, and Jim.
2. Johnhasa3.9
3. Mary has a 3.8
4· Jim has a 3.7
Mills (1968: 182-183)
An example of the second type of structure, according to Mills, would be a
case involving a value proposition where each pair of reasons consists of a cri-
terion and its application. 6 Mills also introduces a diagram convention for
making the distinction between these two types of structures (1968: 183).
From his examples it becomes clear that Mills makes a distinction between ar-
guments with a structure comparable to a linked argument (the first type)
and a structure which is comparable to a convergent argument (the second
type, where each pair of reasons constitutes an independent reason).
108 A. FRANCISCA SNOECK HENKEMANS
Just as in the classical and enlightenment tradition, for most of the earlier
textbook authors the distinction between interdependent and independent
reasons coincides with the distinction between the structure of the premises
in a deductive argument and the structure in an inductive (or non-deductive)
argument.
The distinction then is that in a deductive argument the premises need to be
taken together to constitute a reason, whereas in an inductive argument a
combination of reasons is needed to make the conclusion more or less proba-
ble. McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills explain that a combination of (inductive)
analogies may strengthen the support for a conclusion:
From a series of analogies showing the success of a certain project, we argue that
it will be successful in a particular case .... Reasoning from analogy becomes in-
creasingly strong as the number of comparisons is increased, or in other words, as
the analogies are cumulated (1951: 108).
And Ray and Zavos explicitly compare deductive arguments to a chain of
links, and contrast this with the more gradual type of support supplied by in-
duction and arguments from circumstance: 7
Deductive reasoning is often compared to a chain. The last link in the chain is de-
pendent not to some degree but totally on the connection of every other link....
Induction and argument from circumstance can be better compared to the rela-
tion of the legs of a table to the tabletop. Each leg, though cooperating with the
others, supports the top independent of the other legs (at least to a point) (1966:
101).
In the early textbooks, the tradition of the classical theory of stasis in which it
depends on tile requirements of proof, the arguer must meet what the result-
ing structure of his argument is, is also preserved. A good example of a text-
book in which this approach is taken is Windes and Hastings' Argumentation
and Advocacy (1965).
According to Windes and Hastings, the issues an advocate needs to prove in
order to establish the guilt of X in an embezzlement case are:
1 Certain property was misappropriated.
2 X misappropriated the property.
3 The misappropriation was fraudulent, i.e., without the consent of the owner.
4 The property was for the personal use of X (1965: 75).
ARGUMENTATION STRUCTURES 109
In such cases, the issues taken together form one linked argument and the ad-
vocate has to provide sufficient evidence for each of the issues:
Usually there is one over-all argument leading directly to the proposition, and the
elements of this argument are further supported by sub-arguments. The over-all
argument states the issues and the sub-arguments are contentions in support of
the issues ... Each one of the issues must be established for the proposition [X is
guilty of embezzlement] to be established. If any issue is not proved, then the
proposition is not proved (1965: 215-216).
The task of the opponent (the negative advocate) is easier: The other party
"can logically defeat the proposition by defeating one of these issues" (1965:
232).
Apart from cases where the advocate needs to put forward a number of in-
terdependent reasons (corresponding to the issues) in order to defend the
proposition, Windes and Hastings also discuss the possibility of constructing
an argument with independent lines of reasoning:
5.}.1 The Textbook Distinctions
Another aspect of case building to note is that independent lines of reasoning
may lead to the same conclusion. We may, for example, use three reasoning
processes to support the conclusion "the corn crop of Dullnia is failing':
1 Dullnia is buying corn on the world market. (Reasoning from effect to cause.)
2 The testimony of an agricultural expert who visited Dullnia. (Testimonial evi-
dence.)
3 The presence of drough t and poor growing conditions this year. (Cause to ef-
fect).
In this series of arguments rather than having a clear set of issues to be establish-
ed, the proof of the proposition depends on the number and plausibility of the
component arguments. In such cases one strong one may be sufficient, but the
more independent arguments which lead to the same conclusion, the more prob-
able is that conclusion (1965: 216-218).
For Windes and Hastings, two criteria seem to be relevant in determining
whether arguments are interdependent or not: (1) whether the arguments
given by the arguer form part of a clear set of issues that should be established
(the "burden of proof-criterion") and (2) whether the argumentation as a
whole is based on one reasoning process or whether the arguer uses different
"reasoning processes" (the "different types of argument -criterion").
110 A. FRANCISCA SNOECK HENKEMANS
5.3 Current Approaches
Since the seventies, a large number of textbooks have appeared in which at-
tention is devoted to the analysis of the structure of arguments and to ways of
portraying this structure in a diagram. With the exception of Van Eemeren
and Grootendorst's (1992) pragma-dialectical textbook, all these books are
written by informal logicians. It was not until the nineties that the subject of
argument structure started receiving a theoretical treatment. In the journals
Informal Logic and Argumentation, the distinctions made by informallogi-
cians between different types of structure are discussed. Three monographs
on argument structure also appear, each of which proposes a dialectical ap-
proach to argument structure.
Since most of the discussion centered on problems involved in the distinc-
tion between linked and convergent arguments, I shall restrict my further dis-
cussion of the literature to these two types of structure.
Linked and Convergent Premises
Thomas (197311986) was the first to use the terms linked and convergent in de-
scribing interdependent and independent premise support, and his way of
portraying these two structures has become standard. Although Thomas has
had a large influence on all later informal logic accounts of argument struc-
ture, his own definitions of these two types of structures are different from
those of the other authors. Whereas most informal logicians continue the tra-
dition of associating linked arguments with deductive reasoning and conver-
gent arguments with inductive reasoning (or other types of non-deductive
reasoning), Thomas deviates from this tradition:
The natural-logic concept of linked inference ... bridges the supposed sharp line
of the traditional induction-deduction dichotomy, severely straining ... the tradi-
tional theory that "induction" and "deduction" comprise two completely differ-
ent kinds of inference ... Both of these supposedly different "types of reasoning"
receive identical diagrammatic representations (1986: 461).
Thomas gives the following definitions of" linked" and "convergent" reason-
ing:
ARGUMENTATION STRUCTURES 111
 When a step of reasoning involves the logical combination of two or more rea-
sons, they are diagrammed as linked (1986: 58).
When two or more reasons do not support a conclusion in a united or combined
way, but rather each reason supports the conclusion completely separately and
independently of tiIe other, tiIe reasoning is convergent. (1986: 60)8
Both deductively valid reasoning and inductive reasoning from several simi-
lar items of evidence are analysed as linked by Thomas. In the case of induc-
tive reasoning, the reason for linking the premises is not that each reason sep-
arately does not give any support to the conclusion, but that the support is
stronger when the reasons are combined (1986: 59).
Linked arguments form one single argument, whereas convergent argu-
ments consist of separate arguments: 9
A convergent argument is equivalent to separate arguments (or evidence coming
from separate areas) for the same conclusion (1986: 61).
The closest formal approximation to the natural-logic portrayal of convergent
inference would perhaps be two separate deductions leading to two different to-
kens of tiIe same conclusion (1986: 459).
For this reason, convergent arguments are less vulnerable to the criticism of
the acceptability of their premises than linked arguments:
An important feature of convergent reasoning is that the support given to the
conclusion by each separate reason, or line of reasoning, would remain un-
affected even if tiIe other ... reason(s) were false (1986: 61).10
Pinto and Blair's (1993) definitions closely resemble Thomas' distinction be-
tween linked and convergent arguments. They make a distinction between a
"group" of premises that together form one inference and "independent"
groups of premises which can be seen as parallel inferences to arrive at the
same conclusion:
What makes for groups of premisses which are independent of each other? The
fact that tiIe premisses work in combination to support tiIe conclusion con-
stitutes them as a set or group, and the fact that tiIe premisses of each group are
able to provide their support witiIout any help from premisses in any other group
make them independent of each other (1993: 77).
112 A. FRANCISCA SNOECK HENKEMANS
From their examples it becomes clear that, just like in Thomas' approach, a
premise group may both consist of premises that deductively entail the con-
clusion, and of premises that taken together make a conclusion likely or plau-
sible (1993: 111).
Independent groups of premises should be evaluated separately for infer-
ence strength:
you should consider each independent group separately and try to judge how
strongly its premisses taken together are linked to the conclusion (109).
Even though independent groups of inferences (or "parallel inferences")
should be evaluated separately, they are linked up by Pinto and Blair when di-
agramming their structure. This becomes clear from step three in their dia-
gramming method:
Step 3: Make a full diagram showing all the inferences in tiIe reasoning. In
doing so,link up any ... parallel inferences (1993: 260).
Pinto and Blair do not specify what the consequences are for the overall eval-
uation if one of the groups of premises provides strong support, yet the other
weak. The fact that they link parallel inferences in the diagrammatic repre-
sentation, however, suggests that they think that the groups of premises
should be assessed in combination with evaluating the overall strength of the
argument.
Whereas Thomas and Pinto and Blair analyse both deductive and non-de-
ductive arguments as linked, Govier's (1992) distinction between linked and
convergent support more or less coincides with the distinction between de-
ductive and non-deductive arguments, albeit that she also considers analo-
gies as linked:
In most deductively valid arguments, and in analogies, the support provided by
the premises is linked, not convergent. There are exceptions, as when a person of-
fers two separate premises, both of which deductively entail the conclusion, but
this is quite rare. There are arguments in which support is convergent and in
which the premises do not entail tiIe conclusion nor support it by analogy ...
These arguments we call conductive arguments .... Some philosophers have re-
ferred to tiIese arguments based on separately relevant factors as good reasons ar-
guments. The relevant factors provide reasons for tiIe conclusion, tiIough they do
not deductively entail it (1992: 308-309).
ARGUMENTATION STRUCTURES 113
Linked arguments are thus deductions or analogies, and convergent argu-
ments are non-deductive (i.e., conductive) unless they consist of two premis-
es that each deductively entail the conclusion. Yet, according to Govier, "One
might also insist that such a case represents several arguments all with the
same conclusion" (1992: 356 ) ."
As soon as a premise can be seen as separately relevant, the argument is
analysed as convergent by Govier, even if the premises need to be taken to-
gether to provide sufficient support to the conclusion. But analysing an argu-
ment as convergent has no further consequences for the evaluation: It is not
the case that each of the premises should then be separately assessed. Govier
claims that the separate premises in a convergent argument should always be
treated as a unit:"2
There are ... two basic facts to understand right now about the way in which
premises support conclusions. First, premises should be considered together in
their support. Second, they may be linked or convergent. In the latter case, it
would be possible to see each premise as providing a separate reason or separate
bit of evidence, in support of the conclusion, but the whole argument requires us
to think of these separate strands together, as the weight of support accumulates
(1992: 48).
Groarke, Tindale and Fisher (1997) and Copi and Cohen (1990) give defini-
tions similar to Govier's of linked and convergent premises.'3 Groarke, Tin-
dale, and Fisher make the distinction in the following way:
Linked premises work together. Taken independently, they do not support the ar-
gument's conclusion. Convergent premises do not require each other, for they
support the conclusion independently of the argument's other premises (1997:
35).
If all of the premises but one of a convergent argument were to be taken away,
"we would have a weaker argument, but the premise would still provide some
evidence for the conclusion. None of the premises requires one of the other
premises for this to be the case" (1997: 36). In other words, the premises are in-
dependent in the sense that they are separately relevant, that is, lend some
support to a conclusion by themselves.'4
According to Copi and Cohen, premises depend on each other if each
premise "supports the conclusion through the mediation of the other pre-
miss" (1990: 20). If one of two interdependent premises were true, but the
other not, "the conclusion would have been given no support at all" (20). Two
premises support a conclusion independently if each "supplies some warrant
114 A. FRANCISCA SNOECK HENKEMANS
for accepting the conclusion and would do so even in the absence of the other
premiss" (1990: 19). How independent then are the arguments in a convergent
argument, according to Copi and Cohen? Do they consider them as separate
arguments for the same conclusion, as Thomas does? This is not the case:
Emerging practice is to say that it is one argument with two independent prem-
isses. The principle seems to be that the number of conclusions determines tlIe
number of arguments. So by a "single argument" is meant an argument to a single
conclusion, regardless of how many premisses are adduced in its support (199 0 :
19-20).
This remark, however, does not really clarify what exactly Copi and Cohen
mean by "independent premises", since they now introduce a new criterion
for the "singleness" of an argument; the number of conclusions instead of the
probative force of the individual reasons.
Johnson and Blair (1994) use a different definition of "single argument"
than Copi and Cohen: they speak of a single argument if it contains one
"premise set" and one conclusion (1994: 37). Premises belong to one set, if
they are "relevant in combination" (p. 36). Convergent arguments consist of a
combination of two or more premise sets, and therefore, of a combination of
arguments:
When there are, in effect, two or more distinct independent grounds for a con-
d usion, tlIink of each ground as a separate argument (1994: 38).
Convergent arguments can typically be found in a" case" which consists (min-
imally) of arguments for the claim and arguments against the claim (1994:
247). Each distinct argument for a claim is called a "line of argument". In cases
where the premises constitute several independent lines of arguments, the
relevance is checked for each premise individually, but the sufficiency of these
premises should be established by considering them as a whole:
Check the premises individually for relevance .... Finally, check for sufficiency: Do
tlIe premises, taken together, satisfy tlIe sufficiency requirement? Do they provide
enough support for the conclusion? (1994: 269)
From this comparison of informal logical approaches to argument structure,
a number of differences emerge. For Thomas, premises are both interdepen-
dent when no premise separately lends any support to the conclusion, where-
as the combination of premises does and when each premise separately pro-
vides some support to the conclusion, but the combination of premises forms
ARGUMENTATION STRUCTURES 115
a stronger argument than each premise by itself. Both deductive andnon-de-
ductive arguments consisting of premises whose separate support is too weak
for them to stand on their own are analysed as linked by Thomas. Only if each
reason alone is enough, if true, to support the conclusion, and if the falseness
of one reason does not weaken a step of reasoning from the other to the con-
clusion, then the reasoning may be regarded as convergent. Linked arguments
are seen as equivalent to one single argument, whereas convergent arguments
are regarded as a combination of single arguments, which should each be
evaluated for their strength of support separately. Pinto and Blair seem to em-
ploy similar definitions oflinked and convergent arguments as Thomas. They
also think independent groups of premises should be assessed separately for
their strength of support, but they are less clear as to how these separate as-
sessments should be used in the overall evaluation of an argument.
Other authors, such as Govier, Copi and Cohen, and Groarke, Tindale and
Fisher, employ a more restricted definition of interdependency. For them, ar-
guments are interdependent only when they are separately irrelevant to the
conclusion and relevant in combination. As soon as premises can be seen as
separately relevant (as providing some support to the conclusion), they can
then be considered independent, and thus convergent. This is also the case if
they can only lend sufficient support to the conclusion in combination. To the
evaluation of whether the amount of support the premises lend to the con-
clusion is sufficient, it makes no difference whether the premises are indepen-
dent or interdependent in these approaches; they are always considered to-
gether in their support during the evaluation.
Johnson and Blair's position seems to be intermediate: on the one hand,
just like Thomas and Pinto and Blair, they consider convergent arguments as
separate arguments. On the other hand, they claim that the sufficiency of sup-
port should always be assessed by checking whether the different premises (or
reasons) taken together provide sufficient support for the conclusion. In their
approach, it is unclear what the consequences would be for the evaluation of
the argument as a whole if one of the lines of argument was flawed but one or
more of the other arguments prove to be acceptable!5 In Johnson and Blair's
view, the question of whether an argument is single or convergent is only im-
portant for determining whether one should take the premises together in
determining their relevance, or whether each premise should in principle be
relevant by itself. The singleness or complexity of an argument does not make
any difference to the evaluation of the strength of the argument: in either
case, the premises are considered as a whole. Although Johnson and Blair ob-
serve that convergent arguments are typical of a "case;' in which one should
respond adequately to relevant objections, they do not devote any attention
to the connection between the burden of proof and the argument structures
that result from arguers' attempts to fulfil their obligations.
116 A. FRANCISCA SNOECK HENKEMANS
Coordinative and Multiple Argumentation
Although at first sight the definitions given by Van Eemeren and Grooten-
dorst (199 2 ) seem to resemble the definitions provided by Thomas, Johnson
and Blair, and Pinto and Blair, there is an important difference - both the
equivalent of a linked argument (coordinatively compound argume~tation)
and the equivalent of a convergent argument (multiple argumentat.lOn) are
seen as forms of complex argumentation consisting of a number of smgle ar-
gumentations:
Analytically, complex argumentation can always be broken down into single ar-
gumentations (1992: 73)·
The distinction between coordinative and multiple argumentation is there-
fore not that coordinative argumentation describes the relations between
premises within one single argument and that multiple arg~mentation con-
sists of a combination of single arguments, but that the relatIons between the
single arguments that constitute these two types of c~mplex argument. are
different. In multiple argumentation, "the constituent smgle argumentatlOns
are, in principle, alternative defences of the same standpoint" (199 2: 73)· In.co-
ordinatively compound argumentation, "unlike in multiple argumentatlOn,
all the component single argumentations are, in principle, necessary for a
conclusive defence of the standpoint" (199 2 : 77)·
In pragma-dialectics, unlike in most inform~ logical appro.ach~s, coor~i­
natively compound argumentation always consIsts of a combmatlOn of (m-
dependently relevant) arguments, that nonetheless need to be t~en t.ogether
for reasons of sufficiency. Coordinatively compound argumentatIon IS there-
fore comparable to the concept of a convergent argument in the definitions
given by Govier, Groarke, Tindale and Fisher, and Copi and Cohen. The
premise structure of a single argument is not dealt with b~ Van Eemer~n and
Grootendorst in the context of argument structure. Prenuse structure IS seen
as an issue of a different hierarchical nature than argument structure. Each
separate argument in a coordinatively compound ar~umentation c~n b.e
analysed as a single argument, consisting of two premIses, one of whICh IS
,6
usually left unexpressed.
Van Eemeren and Grootendorst give the following two examples to explain
the difference between the two structures. Example (1) is an example of a
multiple argument; example (2) of a coordinative argument:
117
ARGUMENTATION STRUCTURES
 (1) Postal deliveries in Holland are not perfect. You cannot be sure that a letter
will be delivered the next day, that it will be delivered to the righ t address and that
it will be delivered early in the morning (1992: 73).
(2) Postal deliveries in Holland are perfect. You can be sure that a letter will be
delivered the next day, that it will be delivered to the right address, and that it will
be delivered early in the morning (1992: 77).
In example (1), each of the single argumentations is in principle sufficient to
defend the standpoint. What would be the reason for an arguer to produce
multiple argumentation if one single argument might have sufficed? Van
Eemeren and Grootendorst mention the following possible reasons:
It is possible that the speaker tries to cater for various kinds of doubt about his
standpoint, pertaining to different aspects ... Multiple argumentation can also be
used for rhetorical reasons; the profusion of arguments makes the defence appear
stronger. The speaker gives the impression of having taken account of every pos-
sible objection to his standpoint... Because acceptance is liable to gradations, in
producing a multiplicity of arguments the speaker may gradually overcome the
last remaining morsel of doubt in the listener. It may also simply be that after one
argument the speaker advances another quite different sort of argument in the
hope that it will be more successful (1992: 74).
In example (2), the three argumentations that support the standpoint that
postal deliveries in Holland are perfect are interdependent: "Only if they are
taken together, they are deemed to provide sufficient grounds for accepting
the standpoint. If [any1of the single argumentations proves to be unaccept-
able, the entire coordinatively compound argumentation falls apart" (1992:
77).
The main reason that Van Eemeren and Grootendorst give for putting for-
ward a coordinative argument is:
In many cases, it is not possible to remove all the antagonist's doubts by means of
one argument. When defending his standpoint, the protagonist then has to ad-
vance two or more connected arguments that, only when taken together, are sup-
posed to constitute a well-rounded and conclusive defence (1992: 77).
Each individual argument (or reason) in a coordinative argumentation gives
some partial support to the standpoint, but the degree of support per argu-
mentmayvary:
118 A. FRANCISCA SNOECK HENKEMANS
Although the term coordinative may suggest that the argumentation consists of a
series of arguments that are equally important, this need not be so. It is, for in-
stance quite possible for one argument to account for, say, 60% of the cogency of
the argumentation, the next fOrIo%, and the third for 20% (1992: 77)·
Apart from the fact that the concept of argument structure applies to combi-
nations of single arguments in Van Eemeren and Grootendorst's approach, a
second difference with the informal logicians' approach is that they explicitly
connect argument structures with the dialectical situation; it depends on the
antagonist's doubts and the way the arguer attempts to deal with these doubts
what the resulting structure of his argument will be. In this respect, the prag-
rna-dialectical approach can be seen as a continuation of the functional
aproach of the theory of stasis and debate.
5.3.2 Theoretical Approaches
Freeman's Toulminian Approach
In the nineties, three monographs on argument structure appeared: Free-
man's Dialectics and the Macrostructure of Arguments (1991), Snoeck
Henkemans' Analysing Complex Argumentation (1992) and Walton's Argu-
ment Structure (1996). What these three approaches have in common are:
first, dissatisfaction with the unclear and ambiguous way in which the con-
cepts of independent and interdependent arguments were defined in the lit-
erature; second, the goal of arriving at more precise definitions and giving a
functional justification of structural distinctions by means of a dialectical ap-
proach. Whereas Freeman and Snoeck Henkemans propose a dialectical
model of argument structure, Walton's contribution consists mainly of a crit-
ical discussion of the existing definitions and tests for deciding whether an ar-
gument is linked or convergent. He supports the dialectical approaches to ar-
gument structure and introduces a new system of diagramming argument
structure.
Freeman's (1991) thesis is that argument structures should be analysed as
the results of argumentative processes, i.e., of challenger-respondent dia-
10guesY His approach to argument structure is to a large extent based on the
procedural model introduced in Toulmin's The Uses of Argument (1958). In
Freeman's view, a theory of argument structure should provide a clear-cut de-
marcation of argument structures. Such a theory should provide "a rationale
for distinguishing different types of argumentative elements and structural
configurations" (1991: 37).
119
ARGUMENTATION STRUCTURES
In his endeavour to provide such a rationale, Freeman takes the "basic dialec-
tical situation" as a starting point; a respondent develops an argument in re-
sponse to the questions of a challenger. The situation is dialectical, and not
merely dialogical, if the challenger's questions are aimed at critically testing
the claim and the whole interactive process is clearly regimented.
In the basic dialectical situation, the challenger can ask three types of basic
dialectical or argument generating questions: acceptability questions, rele-
vance questions, and ground adequacy questions. Each of these questions
calls for a specific elaboration of the argument by the respondent and results
in a different type of argument structure. ,8 Linked and convergent argument
structures (as well as other types of argument structure) are analysed as an-
swers to different types of dialectical questions: a linked structure is the result
of the respondent's answer - by means of a "relevance explaining premise"
(1991: 93-94) - to the question of relevance ("Why is that reason relevant to
the claim?"). A convergent structure results from the arguer giving more evi-
dence for the conclusion in response to a ground adequacy question ("Can
you give me another reason?") (1991: 95). Then, the result of the exchange is an
argument with premises that are each independently relevant to the conclu-
sion.
For Freeman, linked structure is exclusively connected with the question of
relevance: "premisses are linked when we need to take them together or they
are intended to be taken together to see why we have a relevant reason for the
conclusion" (1991: 94). According to Freeman, the source of confusion in the
definitions of linked structure in most textbooks is the lack of clarity as to
whether the arguments are linked because each of the premisses by itself is ir-
relevant to the conclusion, or because each of the premisses by itself provides
insufficient support for it. In addition to the normal concept of a linked argu-
ment, Freeman introduces a second type of , linkage; referred to as 'modal
linkage.' Freeman introduces a special notation for this type oflinkage. In this
way, he thinks, "we have a perspicuous way of accommodating some intu-
itions of those who want to link, while still keeping modality and relevance is-
sues distinct" (1991: 104). In modal linkage, each premise constitutes a sepa-
rate reason for the conclusion, but the premisses only lend sufficient support
to the conclusion in combination. Snoeck Henkemans (1994) points out that
it is questionable whether Freeman has indeed succeeded in achieving his aim
of clarifying the distinction between linked and convergent arguments:
This solution merely adds to the confusion concerning the concepts of'linked'
and 'convergent' structure: an argument can now be (modally) linked and con-
vergent at the same time. Another problem is that Freeman ignores the possibility
that a convergent argument consists of premisses that are not only separately rel-
120 A. FRANCISCA SNOECK HENKEMANS
evant but also have sufficient weight by themselves; in his approach, all conver-
gent arguments are 'modally linked.' Instead of clarifying the distinction between
linked and convergent arguments, his solution amounts in fact to drawing a dis-
tinction between two types oflinked argument (1994: 320 -3 21 ).
Snoeck Henkemans' Pragma-DialecticalApproach
Snoeck Henkemans (1992) gives a pragma-dialectical analysis of multiple and
coordinative argumentation as resulting from different types of defensive
moves aimed at removing different forms of criticism. This analysis can be
seen as an elaboration of Van Eemeren and Grootendorst's (1984) pragma-di-
alectical discussion procedure in which different types of argumentation are
regarded as functional means to further the resolution of a difference of opin-
ion. Snoeck Henkemans (92-93) develops a model in which rules are given for
responding to criticism. It depends on the type of criticism and the wayan ar-
guer chooses to deal with this criticism which form of complex argumenta-
tion will arise in a discussion. When an arguer's attempt to get his standpoint
accepted on the basis of an argument meets with criticism, the arguer can use
various types of argumentative strategies to eventually make his standpoint
acceptable. He can advance more arguments to respond to the criticism, he
can attempt to counter the criticism with new arguments, or he can withdraw
the original argument and undertake a new attempt at defending the stand-
point.
If the antagonist has criticized the argument for reasons of sufficiency, the
protagonist can attempt to remove the criticism by supplementing his argu-
ment with another argument. This can be done in two ways. The protagonist
can add one or more arguments that -in combination with the argument giv-
en earlier - should suffice to convince the antagonist of the acceptability of
the standpoint (direct defence). The protagonist can also refute the counter-
argument that has been used by the antagonist against the original argument
(indirect defence). Both types of defence result in coordinative argumenta-
tion. But in the direct defence case, the argumentation is called cumulative
and in the indirect defence case it is called complementary.'9 In both cases, the
arguments that are put forward must be combined, because the arguer can
only convince the opponent of the acceptability of the standpoint if he suc-
ceeds in removing the opponent's doubt or criticism regarding the sufficiency
of the argumentation.
In multiple argumentation, the only connection between the arguments is
that they are all advanced as a defence of the same standpoint. In a completely
externalized discussion, a protagonist who finds that he is not capable of deal-
121
ARGUMENTATION STRUCTURES
 ing with the antagonist's criticism, may withdraw his argument and under-
take a new attempt to defend the standpoint. The argumentation is then mul-
tiple in the sense that more than one attempt to defend the standpoint has
been undertaken, but the final result is in fact a single argument. In an implic-
it discussion this is different; in anticipation of a possible non-acceptance of
his argument, the protagonist may advance a new argument. Each of these ar-
guments is a separate attempt to defend the standpoint, and is motivated by
the (potential) failure of a previous attempt.
Walton's PragmaticApproach
In his approach to argument structure, Walton (1996: xiv) proclaims that he
uses methods similar to Freeman (1991) and Snoeck Henkemans (1992) and
has taken a pragma-dialectical approach, although some of his solutions will
be different. His main goals are to develop more refined guidelines for identi-
fying linked and convergent arguments and to rescue and refine the tech-
nique of argument diagramming. Walton discusses numerous examples of
linked and convergent arguments and develops a classification and termino-
logy of the different tests used in the literature to determine whether an argu-
ment is linked or convergent.
Walton discusses the following five t\>~ts (for simplicity, he applies them only
to two premise arguments):
1 Falsity/No Support Test: If one premise is false, the conclusion is not given any
support.
2 Suspension/Insufficient Proof Test: If one premise is suspended (not proved,
not known to be true) the conclusion is not given enough support to prove it.
3 Falsity/Insufficient Proof Test: If one premise is false, the conclusion is not giv-
en enough support to prove it.
4 Suspension/No Support Test: If one premise is suspended (not proved, not
known to be true), the conclusion is not given any support.
S Degree of Support Test: reasons are dependent when together they make the
overall strength of the argument much greater than they would considered sepa-
rately (1996: 119-120, 127).
Whereas the first four tests are based on the idea of whether the conclusion is
given enough or any support to prove it and are thus "absolutistic, 'all-or-
nothing' kinds of tests" (1996: 121), the Degree of Support Test is a matter of
degrees. 2o
122 A. FRANCISCA SNOECK HENKEMANS
In order to determine which of these tests is best, Walton thinks one should
consider the purpose of distinguishing between these structures, the evalua-
tion of argumentation:
The critic needs to know whether it is necessary to refute both the ... premises, or
if it is enough to find fault with just the one, in order for the whole argument to
fall down .... From this point of view, the pragma-dialectical viewpoint represent-
ed by the Van Eemeren and Grootendorst conception of the linked-convergent
distinction is basically the right one, because it is centrally concerned with the
question of whether a set of premises is sufficient for a conclusion, where "suffi-
cient" means adequate to resolve the other party's doubts in a context of a critical
discussion (1996: 175).
Walton adopts a functional interpretation of the linked-convergent distinc-
tion, "meaning that it relates to how the premises of an argument function to-
gether in supporting the conclusion in a context of dialogue" (1996: 177). Seen
from this perspective, the fact that there are many cases in which it is hard to
determine whether an argument is linked or convergent, is not an indication
that the linked-convergent distinction is vague or incoherent: "it is possible to
see why, in many cases, it is difficult or even impossible to determine categori-
cally whether the argument is linked or convergent. The reason: there just is-
n't enough evidence given to enable us to determine how the argument is be-
ing used in the given context" (178).
Walton's conclusion is that the Suspension/Insufficient Proof Test is the
best test in the sense that "it is congenial to our pragmatic theory of argument
because of its frankly dialectical conception of an argument as a dialectical
exchange". According to Walton, this test is used by pragma -dialecticians such
as Van Eemeren and Grootendorst and Snoeck Henkemans.Applying this test
is problematic, however, since it is extremely difficult in practice to determine
whether or not the support for a conclusion is sufficient (1996: 180-181).
Moreover, the fact that this text contextualizes the distinction between co-or-
dinative and multiple argumentation may be positive in itself, but it also
makes the test more difficult to apply in cases where this contextual back-
ground is not available. In such cases, according to Walton, the Degree of Sup-
port Test is most useful to determine whether the argument can best be ana-
lyzed as linked or as convergent (1996: 179-181).
Finally, Walton also proposes a new method of diagramming linked and
convergent arguments, the "graph method":
The most important thing is to see that, by changing from the old notation to the
graph method, we are freed from always being forced to model an argument as ei-
ARGUMENTATION STRUCTURES 123
 ther linked or convergent. It is for this reason that the recommendation is made
here that we should move from the existing method of argument diagramming
to the new method of reasoning graphs (1996: 187).21
5·4 Methods of Analysis in Doubtful Cases
According to Snoeck Henkemans (1992: 43), the problem of making a choice
between a linked or a convergent analysis of an argument is not just caused by
a lack of clarity in the definitions, but also by the lack of information concern-
ing clues in the verbal presentation. Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992: 75-
85) are an exception; they mention a number of words and expressions that
can be indicative of coordinatively compound and multiple argumentation.
Examples of indicators of multiple argumentation are: "quite apart from",
"and then I haven't even mentioned the fact that': and "needless to add that':
Indicators of coordinatively compound argumentation are: "in addition to
the fact': "when it is also remembered that", "as well as the fact that':
Snoeck Henkemans (1992) adds three types of clues to Van Eemeren and
Grootendorst's indicators of argumentative structure: pragmatic clues in the
way the arguer has presented the standpoint, dialogical clues in his references
to criticism, and dialectical clues following from the assumption that he ob-
serves the procedural norms for a critical discussion, specifically those norms
that are related to the burden of proof. 22 Among the pragmatic clues are ex-
pressions by means of which the arguer indicates the force of his standpoint
and the quantifYing elements in the propositional content of the standpoint:
they influence the burden of proof. Among the dialogical clues are the ar-
guer's acknowledgements and refutations of counterarguments. Among the
dialectical clues are the procedural norms pertaining to a critical discussion.
One of them concerns the requirements an arguer should meet if his argu-
mentation is to defend the acceptability, or un acceptability, of a speech act;
the other concerns the requirements he should meet to justify the use of a par-
ticular argumentation scheme. These two types of requirement enable the
analyst to determine whether, in order to lend sufficient support to the stand-
point, the arguments that are advanced should be taken together, or whether
they should be taken to stand by themselves.
In cases where there is doubt as to whether an argument should be analysed
as linked or convergent, informal logicians generally instruct the analyst to
apply the types of tests that have been classified by Walton (199 6 ). Groarke,
Tindale and Fisher (1997) are an example:
124 A. FRANCISCA SNOECK HENKEMANS
If you have difficulty deciding whether you should join one premise P to another,
ask whether the support it provides for the conclusion depends on some other
premise(s) (1997: 36).
Problems in deciding on the right structure of an argument are generally at-
tributed to a lack of clarity in the definitions and the absence of clear and de-
cisive tests. According to Walton, when diagramming arguments, there are
many cases in which there is room for more than one interpretation. 23 This
leads to a pedagogical problem in argumentation courses, which is com-
pounded "by the use of short contextual examples as arguments, conjoined
with the use of a test that appears to be precise, decisive, and non-contextual"
(1996: 108). In a functional approach in which it primarily depends on the
context of the dialogue how the structure of a given argument should be
analysed, one should be prepared to accept that there will be cases in which
there will not be enough contextual evidence to enable a well-founded deci-
sion (1996: 178). Apart from contextual evidence - evidence concerning the
type of dialogue, the stage of the dialogue and the burden of proof - the ana-
lyst can make use of structural evidence - evidence of the type of reasoning
(deductive, practical) being used - and textual evidence - indicator words,
such as "My one reason for believing is this, and my other reason is that" and
"This reason, taken along with my other reason ... shows that my conclusion is
true", which give clues as to how the argument is structured. Once all these
types of evidence have been collected, the relevant test can be applied as a
fourth resource that may help in the identification of the argument.
Some authors propose a special policy for problematic cases. The policy
which both Thomas (1986) and Noh (1984: 32) propose for doubtful cases is to
start with a linked interpretation. To Nolt, the main reason for advocating this
policy is that it is the most charitable. He thinks that in borderline cases an ar-
gument is usually strongest if it is regarded as linked. Thomas realizes that
there may be situations where this policy might not be to the advantage of the
arguer:
Probably, you will want to separate reasons, and diagram reasoning as con-
vergent, anytime you suspect that one of the lines of reasoning is bad, while the
other line of reasoning is good (1986: 65).
Thomas justifies his approach by saying that it is in accordance with his Prin-
ciple of Charity: "When unclarity exists, analyze reasoning in whatever way it
gives the greatest strength" (1986: 89). Snoeck Henkemans (1992) objects to
this solution because she thinks that the analysis and the evaluation of an ar-
gument are mixed up in this policy.24 Whether the arguer's reasons are good
125
ARGUMENTATION STRUCTURES
 or bad, only becomes relevant when the argumentation is evaluated. In deci-
ding on whether the argumentation is best analyzed as convergent or as
linked, a different issue is at stake:
The decision on whether to analyze the argumentation as linked or as convergent
only depends on the degree of support which the premisses, either separately or
jointly, lend to the standpoint, and should not be confused with an assessment of
the acceptability of the premisses (1992: 42).25
Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992: 81-82) propose a policy, called the
strategy of maximally argumentative analysis, which is the converse of Nolt's
and Thomas' policy. In cases that cannot be decided on pragmatic grounds,
they advise that one start by analysing the argumentation as multiple (i.e.,
convergent). They justify this strategy as follows:
By way of this strategy, all single argumentations are being given the greatest pos-
sible credit ... analyzing the structure as multiple can, at the same time, be called
more and less "charitable" than analyzing it as coordinative. It is more charitable,
because in multiple argumentation each individual argument is supposed to
have its own, independent argumentative force and, in addition, dropping one
unacceptable argument does not automatically undermine the whole argumen-
tation. It is less charitable, because in multiple argumentation, in principle, all the
individual arguments must be separately conclusive. More important tlIan chari-
ty, however, is from a dialectical perspective that the quality of each and every in-
dividual argument shall be examined critically (1992: 81-81).
5.5 Conclusion
Two approaches to argument structure, the functional approach of the classi-
cal theory of stasis (and the debate tradition) and the logical approach of
identifying argument structure with different inference types, have contin-
ued to exist until the present. Dialectical approaches to complex argumenta-
tioncan be seen as a continuation of the tradition of viewing argument struc-
tures as the result of an arguer's attempts to deal adequately with an oppo-
nent's objections in a context of dialogue. Just as in classical status theory, it
depends on the requirements the arguer should meet to provide sufficient
support for his standpoint (and thus on the dialogical context) whether or
not these arguments should be taken together, or seen as separate, alternative
defences. In contrast to all informal logical approaches, argument structures
in pragma-dialectics are always analysed as combinations of single argu-
126 A. FRANCISCA SNOECK HENKEMANS
ments. As a result, a large category oflinked arguments dealt with by informal
logicians, i.e., those linked arguments that are equivalent to one single argu-
ment, falls outside the scope of the pragma-dialectical treatment of argument
structures.
In informal logic, the logical tradition is still predominant. Informallogi-
cians are either concerned with describing different types of premise struc-
ture within one (deductive or non -deductive) inference, or with distinguish-
ing between arguments with one inference and arguments consisting of a
number of inferences, that is, with the distinction between single and complex
argumentation.
The definitions of the key concepts, linked and convergent arguments, giv-
en in informal logic, differ considerably. The guidelines that are given for
evaluating linked and convergent arguments also vary from author to author.
Authors who give a narrow definition of linked arguments, regarding only
premises as interdependent that need to be taken together in order to be rele-
vant, generally advise that one always consider all the premises together when
evaluating the argument, regardless of the structure of the argument. In this
interpretation of argument structure, part of the rationale for making the dis-
tinction between interdependent and independent arguments is lost. There
also seems to be a general (though unsupported) belief among informallogi-
cians that structures consisting of combinations of separate arguments are
extremely rare, and therefore not worth any serious attention. This belief in
itself may be traced back to the logical tradition where presenting more than
one independent proof is, generally speaking, superfluous. In the context of
our everyday discussions, however, one can rarely be sure that a defence that
should be conclusive will really convince our opponent and one is often at the
same time addressing several opponents with different views. Presenting a
number of arguments which would, if acceptable, each provide sufficient
support for the conclusion, may then often be the only realistic option.
Notes
1 A "complex argument" is an argument that consists of a number of single
arguments that support a conclusion. A "single" or "individual" argument
is the equivalent of a "reason."
2 The Aristotelian 'sorites' can also be analyzed as a serial argument in sup-
port of the major premise.
3 In his study of classical status theory, Braet (1984: 55) points out that classi-
cal rhetoricians seem to have had some idea of the difference in burden of
proof for the defendant and the prosecutor, but that they did not devote
ARGUMENTATION STRUCTURES 127
 any systematic attention to this difference. The emphasis was always on
the defendant. Quintillian is an exception.
4 The same difference in obligations for the defendant and the prosecutor is
found at the sublevels of the argumentation. Cicero (De inventione2, 32-
33) points out that the prosecutor cannot just prove that the accused had a
motive for his crime unless he also proves that the character of the defen-
dant is consistent with his having such a motive (and vice versa). The de-
fendant should show that the accused has never committed any offence,
and "this argument will be strengthened if it can be shown that when he
had an opportunity of doing a dishonest deed with impunity he had no
desire to do so" (Cicero, De inventione 2, 3S).
S According to Whately, in refuting an opponent's argument though, one
should be careful not to adduce much more than is sufficient to prove
one's conclusion, since otherwise one's opponents may become distrust-
ful (1963: 16S).
6 Mills gives the following example: "Installment buying is harmful if it en-
courages people to live beyond their means, and it does so; it is harmful if
it causes inflation, and it does so, etc." (1968: 183).
7 Ray and Zavos (1966: 99) give the following definition of an argument
from circumstance:" [It] is an argument in which a number of particulars
are brought to bear on some point. It is usually used to prove the occur-
rence of some past event."
8 According to Thomas, the main criterion for the independence of premis-
es is that the falseness of one reason would not weaken the step from the
other to the conclusion. In this way each of them individually supports the
conclusion: "It is possible to have a correct convergent diagram in which
the result of combining the separated reasons would (if this were done) be
a stronger argument than either reason provides alone, as long as the
negation or Jalsityof the various separated reasons would not decrease the
support given by the other(s) to the conclusion"(1986: 62).
9 Yanal (1991: 139) gives a similar analysis of the distinction between depen-
dent and interdependent reasons: "What ... is the difference between de-
pendent and independent reasons? ... Dependent reasons form one argu-
ment; independent reasons form multiple arguments."
10 The idea that convergent arguments are less vulnerable than linked argu-
ments is "all myth" according to Conway (1991: ISS): "Even when premises
clearly'work together; we know perfectly well that the falsity of one need
not necessitate rejecting the entire argument." With any sort of argument,
when we find that one of the premises are false, "we dismiss the unaccept-
able premises and evaluate the support on the basis of those that remain.
We do not need a notion of convergent support to enable us to do this."
128 A. FRANCISCA SNOECK HENKEMANS
Conway concludes that we can very well do without the notion of"conver-
gence" (IS6).
11 It is not clear to which category inductive generalizations belong in Govi-
er's classification.
12According to Conway (1991: 148-149), if individual relevance is the criteri-
on for convergence, the distinction does not correspond to our intuitions
about the "separateness" of premises. Moreover, an argument being con-
vergent on this criterion cannot serve as an "instruction" to evaluate each
line of support separately or to evaluate the degree of support of the
premises for the conclusion in any other particular way. Conway con-
cludes: "if there is any evaluative importance to the linked/convergent dis-
tinction, understood in this way, it is not in the area of the degree of sup-
port premises give to a conclusion" (199 1: 149).
13 Similar definitions oflinked and convergent arguments as Govier's are
also given by Kelley (1988: 6-87), albeitthat he uses the terms additive and
nonadditive premises. Fisher's (1988: 19) definition of independent argu-
ments is somewhat different, since he analyses independent reasons as
reasons that the author intends to lend conclusive support to the conclu-
sion by themselves: reasons "may be presented as independently justify-
ing" a conclusion "so that if you accept one of the reasons the author ex-
pects you to accept the conclusion:' Noh's (1984) criterion for indepen-
dence is ambiguous: on the one hand he seems to consider arguments as
interdependent if they form one inference, and independent if they each
constitute a separate inference; on the other hand he recommends com-
bining inferences to produce a single inference in cases where such a com-
bined inference would make a stronger case (1984: 32). In this respect, his
approach is more like Thomas' approach.
14 Vorobej (199Sb) gives similar definitions as Govier (199 2) and Copi and
Cohen (1990), but also introduces a third category of premise structure:
the hybrid argument. In convergent arguments, according to Vorobej,
"each premise, in isolation, is relevant to or provides a reason in support
of the conclusion" (199Sb: 289). If a set of premises is relevant to the con-
clusion, whereas no subset of the premise set is relevant to the conclusion,
an argument is linked (199Sb: 290). In hybrid arguments, the relation be-
tween the premises is asymmetric. One premise (or premise set) is rele-
vant on its own and another premise (or premise set) is not relevant to the
conclusion on its own. The latter premise (or premise set) supplements
the other premise (set): taken together, the premises provide a better argu-
ment for the conclusion than the one relevant premise (or premise set)
alone (199Sb: 292).
IS According to Conway (1991: 149), there are many authors who are unclear
ARGUMENTATION STRUCTURES 129
 as to how the evaluation oflinked and convergent arguments should take
place: "Remarkably, most who claim that the linked/convergent distinc-
tion is important for evaluation say nothing about how to evaluate con-
vergent arguments:'
16 Even though each coordinative argument is analyzed as composed of a
number of single argumentations that each consist of two premises, one
of which has been left unexpressed, in reconstructing a coordinative argu-
ment, one combined unexpressed premise is made explicit. This is done to
make it clear that it is only in combination that the arguments are sup-
posed to lend sufficient support to the standpoint. For instance, in an ex-
ample of a coordinative argument that is provided by Van Eemeren and
Grootendorst (1992: 89), two single arguments are given for the stand-
point that" The Telegraph is a good newspaper": (1) The Telegraph contains
facts, news, and background information; (2) The Telegraph is a common-
sense newspaper. In the diagram of this argument, the following unex-
pressed premise is made explicit: "A newspaper that combines quality
with wisdom is good."
17 The basic ideas of Freeman's approach were already introduced earlier, in
an article in Informal Logic (198S) and in his textbook Thinking Logically
(1988).
18 Freeman thinks that there is independent confirmation for the fact that
these questions are central to any argumentative exchange, since they per-
tain to the three criteria for argument appraisal distinguished by most in-
formal logicians, they parallel Grice's (197S) conversational maxims and
are also represented in Rescher's (1977) challenging moves of formal dis-
putation.
19 The terms cumulative and complementary stem from an unpublished
manuscript of Pinto and Blair's. In this manuscript, they distinguish be-
tween three types of interdependency: "linked" premise sets, "cumulative"
premise sets and "complementary" premise sets. Snoeck Henkemans
(1992: 94) analyses linked premise sets (which consist of a minor and a
major premise) as single arguments. Explicitizing an unexpressed premise
in response to an arguer's reaction is, according to her, only adequate in
cases where there is a problem concerning the comprehensibility, not the
acceptability of the argument. Since all forms of complex argumentation
are seen by her as attempts to remove an opponent's doubt or criticism,
and thus, to resolve a problem concerning the acceptability of a given ar-
gument, making explicit the unexpressed premise cannot result in com-
plex argumentation. Cumulative and complementary arguments are re-
garded by Snoeck Henkemans as two different ways of responding to criti-
cism about the sufficiency of one of the other arguments: "if the attempt
130 A. FRANCISCA SNOECK HENKEMANS
to answer criticism consists of adding another argument that supports the
standpoint directly, the coordinative argumentation is cumulative. If it
consists of a refutation of a counter-argument, the coordinative argumen-
tation is complementary" (1992: 174). These two types of support are remi-
niscent of Whately's (1846: 88, 138) ways of combining arguments.
20 In the discussion of the informal logical distinction between linked and
convergent arguments, the tests that are used to identify linked and con-
vergent reasoning are often the subject of discussion. According to
Vorobej (1994), most authors propose isolation tests for linked arguments
(tests that require the analyst to find out whether the premises are relevant
in isolation, or whether they provide less support in isolation than taken
together). The problem with those tests is that (in a weak form) they yield
the result that any argument with a single irrelevant, superfluous premise
is linked, and they do not classify all deductively valid arguments as
linked. The latter is the case because many deductively valid arguments
contain no premises, which are independently irrelevant to the conclusion
(1994: 149). Vorobej's own alternative is to use an elimination test, which
says that "an argument is linked if the type of (positive) support which its
premises offer its conclusion would be weakened upon elimination of at
least one of its premises" (1994: lSI). On this test, every deductively valid
argument (with two exceptions) is linked, all analogical arguments are
linked, and all arguments positively corroborating hypotheses. The test
classifies as convergent all conductive arguments and inductive general-
izations. Isolation-relevance tests are comparable to Walton's Suspen-
sion/No Support Test, while the Elimination test is similar to Walton's De-
gree of Support Test. Vorobej acknowledges that his Elimination test can-
not do justice to the idea "that in a linked argument all the premises must
be considered together if we are to recognize a persuasive case for accept-
ing the conclusion" and "that convergent arguments are equivalent to, and
ought to be treated as, more than one single argument" (1994: lS6). How-
ever, he believes such ideas are of questionable value "insofar as they tend
to generate accounts of the linked! convergent distinction which seriously
run the risk of undermining the significance of that very distinction"
(1994: 157). This is because, according to Vorobej, convergent arguments
consisting of multiple arguments are extremely rare (1994: lS7).
21 Apart from the fact that I fail to see the advantage of not having to make a
decision between a linked or a convergent diagram, I do not think this is
correct: Walton explains that with the graph method, linked arguments all
get the same number, while convergent diagrams receive different num-
bers (1996: 187).
22 A difference between the indicators of multiple and coordinative argu-
ARGUMENTATION STRUCTURES 131
 mentation mentioned by Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992) com-
pared with the clues offered by Snoeck Henkemans is that the first type of
clues indicate how the author intends the text to be understood, whereas
the second type of clues are clues about how reasons offered in support of
a conclusion support the argument according to the most charitable
analysis.
23 Both Walton (1996) and Snoeck Henkemans (1992) mention a similar type
of argument of which it may be difficult to establish in practice whether it
is linked or convergent. Walton calls this type of argument "evidence-ac-
cumulating" (132-133), Snoeck Henkemans "cumulative coordinative
argumentation". According to Snoeck Henkemans (1992: 175), it is pre-
dictable that multiple argumentation will be particularly difficult to dis-
tinguish from cumulative argumentation. This is because it is not always
clear whether the arguer can be assumed to be anticipating that he will
have to withdraw some of his arguments, or whether he may be assumed
to believe that the arguments he has advanced strengthen each other.
24 According to Vorobej (1994: 153), classifying arguments as either linked or
convergent inevitably involves adopting an evaluative point of view dur-
ing the analysis. The objection might therefore be raised that "there is little
point in invoking a distinction between linked and convergent arguments
as an aid to argument evaluation if the distinction can be drawn only after
engaging in that very process of evaluation': But Vorobej thinks this objec-
tion is not sound. Appraising an argument requires several stages. There-
fore, "the fact that some distinction is drawn by employing evaluative con-
cepts and adopting an evaluative point of view does not preclude that dis-
tinction from serving a useful purpose in the evaluative enterprise" (1994:
153).
25 Vorobej makes a similar observation. He claims that determining whether
an argument is linked or convergent requires appraising the actual degree
oflogical support provided by (various combinations of) the premises.
Although this means that the linked/ convergent distinction does not op-
erate purely at the descriptive level, the process of evaluation is not com-
pleted once the structure of the argument has been decided on, and the
way one should proceed with the evaluation also differs depending on the
outcome of the analysis (1994: 153).
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134 A. FRANCISCA SNOECK HENKEMANS
6 Fallacies
Frans H. van Eemeren
6.1 Introduction
According to a standard definition that was generally accepted until fairly
recently, a "fallacy" is an argument that seems valid but is not. In the last
decades, however, argumentation theorists have made several important ob-
jections to this definition: the word "seems" brings in an undesirable amount
of subjectivity; "validity" is misleadingly presented as an absolute and conclu-
sive criterion; the definition ignores that some well-known fallacies are, by
certain logical standards, "valid" arguments; the definition restricts the con-
cept of fallaciousness to patterns of reasoning, whereas a great number of
generally-recognized fallacies fall outside this scope. These objections explain
why a broader definition is ~owadays pref~rre~. c:.~~ are uS:~alj
l~sdefi~!!!~tscc!1:!!se._l- 0' C;c
This chapter presents an overview of the hIstory of the study of fallaCIes and
the development of views on fallacies from the classical theoretical approach-
es to the modern theoretical approaches. The discussion of the classical ap-
proaches (6.2) starts with the Aristotelian approach (6.2.1), which has thor-
oughly influenced all theories regarding the fallacies. This is followed by Ba-
con's concept of the "idols" and the "sophisms" of Port-Royal (6.2.2), and by
the "at!' fallacies as introduced by Locke (6.2.3) and Whately's "syllogistic"
and "inductive" fallacies (6.2.4). This overview of the classical approaches '.-.
ends with a survey of the traditional treatment of the fallacies in logic text-
books, which Hamblin christened the standard treatment (6.2.5)· The discus-
sion of modern theoretical approaches to the fallacies (6.3) starts with Ham-
blin's criticisms of the standard treatment (6.3.1). Then various post-Ham-
blin treatments of the fallacies an; introduced (6.3.2). Subsequently, some dis-
tinct modern approaches are highlighted: the Woods-Walton approach
(6.3.3), the formal-dialectical approach (6.3.4) and the pragma-dialectical ap-
proach (6.3.5). The survey of the state of the art in the study of fallacies ends
with a short expose of Walton's prominent pragmatic approach (6.3. 6 ).
135
 6.2 Brief History of the Study of Fallacies doms, take turns to demonstrate their debating skills (Euthydemus 275d-
276C; see Hamilton and Cairns, eds. 1994: 389-390). Socrates is describing to
6.2.1 The Aristotelian Approach to Fallacies Crito how Euthydemus debates the young Clinias:

The history of the study offallacies begins with Aristotle (384-322 BCE). Aris- Well, Euthydemus began something like this, I think.
totle addresses the fallacies in De sophisticis elenchis, the Topics, Prior Analytics
and Rhetoric. In De sophisticis elenchis and the Topics, he treats the subject Now Clinias, which of mankind are the learners, the wise or the ignorant?
quite thoroughly. The Prior Analytics, meanwhile, contains additional re-
marks, and Rhetoric discusses only a selection from the list compiled in De so- This was a large question; so the boy blushed, and looked at me in doubt. Seeing
phisticis elenchis. De sophisticis elenchis means "On refutations as used by the that he was troubled I said, My dear Clinias, cheer up and answer like a man,
Sophists" (the English title is Sophistical Refutations). This is why fallacies are whichever you think, for perhaps it will do you a deal of good.
sometimes called sophisms.
Aristotle places fallacies in the context of a dialectic in which one person at- Just then, Dionysodorus leaned over me, and whispered in my ear, smiling all
tacks a thesis and another person defends it. Refuting the thesis of one's oppo- over his face, Now look here, Socrates, I prophesy that whichever the lad answers,
nent is one way to win a debate. In this perspective, fallacies are false moves he will be refuted!
employed in the attacker's efforts to refute the defender's thesis. Sophistical
Refutations deals with those that are only apparent refutations (paralogisms). While he spoke, Clinias made his answer, so I had no chance to warn the boy to
In his treatise on dialectic, the Topics, Aristotle discusses both the correct take care, and he answered that the wise were the learners.
moves attackers may use to refute the defender's thesis, as well as incorrect
moves in reasoning, such as petitio principii (better known as begging the And Euthydemus said, There are people you call teachers, aren't there?
question or circular reasoning); in Rhetoric, he discusses some of the fallacies
mentioned in Sophistical Refutations, referring also to the fallacy now known He agreed.
as post hoc ergo propter hoc ("after this, therefore on account of this").
Aristotle divides the incorrect or false refutations that can be used in a di- The teachers are teachers of the learners; for example, ilie music master and the
alectical context into two groups. The first group consists of Sophistical refu- grammar master were teachers of you and the other boys, and you were learners?
tations that are dependent on language (in dictione), while the second con-
sists of Sophistical refutations independent of language (extra dictionem). He said yes.
Aristotle then divides these groups of fallacies into altogether thirteen differ-
ent tIT~_~i!lAi<::'!tin~i~ ei}ch_@sehQw falsemoyeSCaDJ1.!;_mllI~_ by the ~ Of course at the time when you were learning, you did not yet know ilie iliings
ft:l1l:kr . you were learning?
The fallacies dependent on language consist of six types, all connected with
the ambiguities and shifts of meaning which, because of the imperfections of No, he said.
the language, may occur in ordinary colloquial language (accent, form of ex-
pression, combination of words, division of words, equivocation, and amphi- Then you were wise when you did not know these iliings?
boly). The fallacies that are independent of language are divided into seven
types, all of which could also occur if the language were perfect (accidens, se- Certainly not, he said.
cundum quid -later known as hasty generalization - (affirming the) conse-
quent, non-cause as cause, petitio principii, ignoratio elenchi or "ignorance of If not wise, then ignorant?
refutation," and many questions).
Let us take an example of a language-dependent fallacy from Plato's Euthy- Yes.
demus dialogue. In this dialogue, two Sophists, Euthydemus and Dionyso-

FRANS H. VAN EEMEREN FALLACIES 137

 So you boys, while learning what you did not know, were ignorant and were
learning?
The boy nodded.
So, the ignorant learn, my dear Clinias, not the wise as you suppose.
When he said this, it was like conductor and chorus - he signaled, and they all
cheered and laughed, I mean Dionysodorus and Euthydemus and their followers.
Euthydemus' rebuttal of Clinias' thesis is directly followed by Dionysodorus'
rebuttal of the thesis that those who learn are the ignorant. In both cases use-
or misuse - is made of the ambiguity of the words "wise" ("learned" and "sen-
sible") and "ignorant" ("untaught" and "stupid").
An example of one of Aristotle's language-independent fallacies can also be
found in the same Platonic dialogue (Euthydemus 298d-299a, see Hamilton
and Cairns, eds. 1994: 412). The debate is conducted between Dionysodorus
and a spectator, Ctesippus:
Just tell me, have you a dog?
Yes, and a very bad one, said Ctesippus.
Has he got puppies?
Very much so, he said, as bad as he is.
Then the dog is their father?
I have seen him myself, he said, on the job with the bitch.
Very well, isn't the dog yours?
Certainly, he said.
Then being a father he is yours, so the dog becomes your father and you the pup-
pies' brother.
Dionysodorus quickly broke in again, that Ctesippus might not get in his retort
first. One more little question. Do you beat this dog?
FRANS H. VAN EEMEREN
Ctesippus said with a laugh, No mistake, I do, for I can't beat you!
Well then, you beat your own father, the other said.
These examples show that the distinction between language-dependent and
language-independent fallacies is not without problems. The fallacy in the di-
alogue about learnin~ems from ambiguity, and is thus dependent on lan-
guage. Yet in the dialogue about the dog the situation is more complex. The
fallacy in the argument "This dog is a father, this dog is yours, therefore this
dog is your father", too, appears to be dependent on, rather than being inde-
pendent of, language. According to Aristotle, however, this kind of fallacy is_;
caused by an j1Jegjtjma;;~f~attribute from an accidental prore!:!YQ.f a.
subject (accidens) to ..!~!~l1J~.i~~.LU.§.~1i_llLy.ice.-Jte.tSIL(.sapbistiCiJ.L.RejUtariQl1~
1665 28-34,l79a 26-32.).
What Aristotle here means by "accidental" is not clear. Hamblin (1970: 85)
thinks that Aristotle calls a property accidental if the subject and predicate
terms of the statement in which the property is attributed to someone or
something are not convertible. If an accidental property is treated in an argu-
ment as if it were a convertible property, a fallacy is created which is indepen-
dent oflanguage (see also Bueno 1988). This can be illustrated by the follow-
ing invalid argument, taken from Hamblin (1970: 85, cf. Sophistical Refuta-
tions166b 34):
(1) Coriscus is different from Socrates
(2) Socrates is a man
Therefore:
(3) Coriscus is different from a man
Premise (2) contains a statement of an accidental property of Socrates, for
"Socrates is a man" cannot be converted into ''A man is Socrates" since not
every man is identical to Socrates. It is uncertain in which way the example
should be analyzed. Perhaps one may read premise (1) as attributing "being
different from Coriscus"to Socrates, the subject of premise (2). In the conclu-
sion (3) this attribute is applied to "being a man", the accident expressed in
premise (2). Thus an attribute ("being different from Coriscus") is shifted
from a subject (Socrates) to its accident ("being a man").
The example of the dog presents even more difficulties. What seems to be
involved is that the statement "This dog is [aJ father" is not convertible, be-
cause not all fathers are identical to this dog. Therefore, the fatherhood must
here be regarded as an "accidental" property, so that the presented conclusion
cannot be drawn.
FALLACIES 139
 Judging from introductions to logic and popular books on fallacies such as
Fearnside and Holther (1959), modern authors have little difficulty with Aris-
totle's language-dependent fallacies. Clear - albeit not always very realistic-
examples of fallacies of ambiguity are given, generally in the form of puns. A
frequently recurring example is the following (see, e.g., Copi 195311972: 93):
(1) Some dogs have fuzzy ears
(2) My dog has fuzzy ears
Therefore:
(3) My dog is some dog
Another example is:
(1) After her finals Laura went crazy [with joy]
(2) Crazy people [lunatics] must be locked up
Therefore:
(3) Laura must be locked up
Language-independent fallacies present more problems to modern authors,
at least if they want to stick to Aristotle's classification. In some logic text-
books, the difficulty is solved by moving the accidens fallacy into the category
of language-dependent fallacies (e.g., Cohen and Nagel 193411964). Usually,
however, this fallacy is given a non -Aristotelian interpretation. It is then a fal-
lacy because of the application of a general rule, without any modification, to
a specific case in which accidental circumstances render it inapplicable (see,
e.g., Copi 1972: 81). The following argument is an example of this fallacy:
Member of Parliament, Giebels, is entitled to publish tlIe contents of his con-
versation with the queen, since in Holland we have freedom of speech.
In this argument, an appeal is made to the general rule that in Holland free-
dom of speech applies to everybody. The fallacy arises because the argument
ignores the accidental circumstance that this general rule does not apply to a
confidential meeting of a Member of Parliament wiili the queen.
Several other language-independent fallacies on Aristotle's list have under-
gone similar changes in modern textbooks, sometimes to ilie point of be com-
ing almost unrecognizable. One rea~~n for these ~!!.~~g~~i~_~mdoubtedly the
obscurityoJ!!Qm~ Qf Aristotle'sd~flIl~ti<??~;a_~:~f~SIJJ:i~lhiltiS...asi.t~re. an
, invitati().11 to multifarious reinterpr.etations.. Anoilier reason is that many
modern authors have not taken their definitions and examples of fallacies
straight from Aristotle but from other authors who, in turn, may themselves
140 FRANS H. VAN EEMEREN
not have gone straight back to Aristotle either. I_n this way, ol~_~jst~es may I
be perp~!uated. The treatment of ilie following fallacy pr~~ides an example
(Hambli~970~ 29):
(1) What you bought yesterday, you eat today
(2) You bought raw meat yesterday
Therefore:
(3) You eat raw meat today
According to De Rijk (1962), in his survey of the treatment of fallacies in
twelfth-century logic, iliis example first appears in the Munich dialectica. This
argument is usually regarded as belonging to ilie type of fallacy which is
known as secundum quid ("in a certain respect') - in modern terminology
reinterpreted as hasty generalization - the second of Aristotle's language-in-
dependent falla~ieS:-Intlie -nineteenth century, De Morgan still considered !
this example as a secundum quid, but the passage in which he discusses acci-
dens and secundum quid fallacies may easily be read as stating that ilie exam-
ple is an accidens fallacy. Before De Morgan, no author regarded it as an acci-
dens fallacy, whereas following him several writers do (e.g., Cohen and Nagel
1934h964 and Copi 195311972).
6.2.2 Idols and Sophisms
Aristotle's standard definition of a fallacy as seemingly valid reasoning iliat is
really invalid has remained authoritative for a long time. All the same, later
authors often ignored the dialectical context of the definition, and over-
looked the differences between a deductively valid argument and Aristotle's
view of good reasoning as having a conclusion that not only follows necessar-
ily from ilie premises of the syllogism, but is also different from, as well as
based on, these premises. In oilier respects, however, until the Renaissance
most scholars only seemed to repeat Aristotle. Then there were also authors,
such as the French dialectician Petrus Ramus (1515-1572), who have dismissed
his views or abandoned ilie study of fallacies altogether.
Although the Ramist British philosopher Francis Bacon (1561-1626) con-
siders the study of fallacies to be "excellently handled" by Aristotle, his con-
tention in The Advancement ofLearning (160511975) is iliat there are more im-
t ~~!l!~~!c_i~~~~ch!!s errors 9J th9ugh~.':~~~~r~~?Il~=Za~i~4}~Y:f~!_~~
I
~~':!~2.!"-!Po~~ Among the latter are the "false
idols of the marketplace:
appearances that are imposed upon words, which are framed and applied ac-
cording to conceit and capacities of the vulgar sort" (p. 134). The Aristotelian
FALLACIES 141
 list of fallacies is also the starting point in Logic or the Art of Thinking (1662),
the "Port-Royal Logic," by the seventeenth century French scholars, Antoine
Arnauld and Pierre Nicole, who possibly worked together with Blaise Pascal.
These fallacies are included in this first modern approach and can, in the first
place, be seen as ~s.f!phisms of the scientific m~thod. Second, fallacies found in
p()pular discourse are li;ted~~~~~~~;;g the force ;jihr~~~(~
ing them argumenttl,?!J1.4J7i:~Etlluiri), and drawing a generaI co;;;i;;Si~'n from an
l;icompzete-lnduction.~TIiisdi~~between fallacies associated with scientif-
ic subjects and fallacies in public discourse replaces the language-dependent
versus language-independent distinction.
.6.2.3 The Ad Fallacies
The most important addition to the fallacies of Aristotle's list consists of the
fallacies known as the ad fallacies, a category of arguments first distinguished
by the seventeenth-century philosopher John Locke (1632-17°4). Among
them, the argumentum ad hominem ("argument directed at the man") is the
most familiar.
In the study of argumentation, the term argumentum ad hominem is nowa-
days mostly used in a pejorative sense. It refers to the fallacy of attacking the
opponent personally, one way or another, instead of responding to the actual
arguments put forward by the opponent in support of a standpoint. There is
also a long-standing nonpejorative tradition, however, in which arguing ad
hominem is regarded as indispensable for successful argumentation (see
Nuchelmans 1993 for the Aristotelian roots of the pejorative and nonpejora-
tive meanings of the term argumentum ad hominem).
It is not quite clear what Locke had in mind when he discussed the
argumentum ad hominem in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding
(169°/1961, cf. Hamblin 1970: 41,158-163 and Finocchiaro 1974). In the chapter
"Of reason," he introduces three more types of" ad arguments": ad verecundi-
am, ad ignorantiam and ad judicium. This gave him the reputation of being
the "inventor" of the category of the" ad fallacies': Yet he does not explicitly
state that he considers the ad arguments to be fallacious:
... it may be worth our while a little to reflect on four sorts ofarguments that men,
in their reasonings with others, do ordinarily make use of to prevail on their as-
sent, or at least so to awe them as to silence their opposition (Essay IV, iii).
The argumentum ad hominem is placed third on Locke's list:
FRANS H. VAN EEMEREN
A third way is to press a man with consequences drawn from his own principles
or concessions. This is already known under the name of argumentum ad
hominem (Essay IV,iii).
The latter remark reveals that Locke does not assume that he was introducing
anything new. His source for this meaning of argumentum ad hominem is not
easy to trace. Hamblin claims that Locke is referring to a Latin translation of a
passage from Aristotle's Sophistical Refutations and to several medieval trea-
tises (1970: 161-162, see also Nuchelmans 1993). Originally the ad hominem
made use of the other party's concessions in one's argument, but now it is a
general term for the fallacy of attacking the other party's person either direct-
ly by depicting them as stupid, bad or unreliable (abusive variant) or indirect-
1y by casting suspicion on the opponent's motives (circumstantial variant) or
pointing out a contradiction in the other party's words or deeds (tu quoque-
you too! -variant).
The following example is a modern case of an argumentum ad hominemm
the Lockean sense:
How can you say the Casinos in Las Vegas should be closed down? You've always
said everyone should be free to decide for himself what to do or not to do.
In the following text fragment two other of the four sorts of argument men-
tioned by Locke are used, the argumentum ad verecundiam ("awe-directed ar-
gument" or argument of shame) and the argumentum ad ignorantiam ("igno-
rance-directed argument"):
Of course Beethoven dictated that symphony to Rosemary Brown: in Playboy the
famous author Elisabeth Kiibler-Ross recently explained that communication
with the dead is perfectly possible. Anyway, nobody has ever proved that dead
composers don'tmanifest themselves in this way.
The argumentum ad verecundiam is generally described as a misplaced appeal
to authority. This does not quite conform to the literal meaning of verecundia
("diffidence, awe, shanIe, embarrassment, modesty"), though it appears to be
in line with what Locke intended. With Locke, the argumentum ad verecundi-
am refers to cases in which it is suggested or stated that it would be arrogant of
listeners to set themselves up in opposition to the authority to which the
speaker appeals in the argument. Nowadays, the term ad verecundiam is often
used to refer to a fallacy that involves an incorrect appeal to an authority.
It can be reconstructed from Locke's remarks that an argumentum ad igno-
rantiam for him relates to the burden of proof in a debate. An inadmissible
FALLACIES 143
 way of evading one's duty is to give arguments for one's point of view when
expressing an opinion contrary to somebody else's. Nowadays, the argumen-
tum ad ignorantiam is generally regarded as a fallacious appeal to ignorance
or lack of proof (as in the example above). On the basis of the observed fact
that something has not been proven notto be the case, it is concluded that it is
the case (orthe other wayaround).
Although it is clear from An Essay Concerning Human Understanding that
Locke was aware of the intended effect on others of these three kinds of argu-
ments, it must be emphasized, again, that it is not clear whether Locke himself
regarded the argumentum ad hominem, the argumentum ad verecundiam and
the argumentum ad ignorantiam as fallacious arguments, as is usually done in
present-day literature (the argumentum ad judicium is not fallacious but sets
a standard for using proofs drawn from the foundations of knowledge or
probability). Definitions of the argumentum ad hominem similar to Locke's
can be found in the works of the nineteenth-century British logician Whately,
the nineteenth-century German philosopher Schopenhauer, the twentieth-
century American philosopher Johnstone Jr., and the twentieth-century Bel-
gian philosopher Perelman (see Van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1993).
An example of an argumentum ad hominem in the modern non-Lockean
pejorative sense is the following:
The argument that the state may not impose limitations on free speech and thus
may not contemplate any curtailment of the cable television explosion only has
the appearance of being sound. This reasoning is used by groups with a vested in-
terest in seeing the cable explosion continue unabated. It is therefore a false argu-
ment.
6.2.4 Syllogistic and Inductive Fallacies
In his Elements of Logic (1826/1975), the logician and rhetorician Richard
Whately (1787-1863), wanted to present an improved account of the fallacies
from a logical point of view. Defining a fallacy in the appendix as "any argu-
ment, or apparent argument, which professes to be decisive of the matter at
hand, while in reality it is not': he replaces the established definition with a
wider one. Next to the class of (syllogistic) logical fallacies (e.g., four terms as a
violation of the rule defining a syllogism as a form of reasoning with no more
than three terms, and the, semiological, fallacy of false analogy), Whately, in
his tree of classification, distinguishes a broad class of (valid) nonlogical (or
material) fallacies, divided into fallacies that involve a wrongly-assumed
premise (petitio principii, false premise) and irrelevancies (ignoratio elenchi),
such as the ad fallacies.
144 FRANS H. VAN EEMEREN
Whately has had a great influence on the textbook tradition in both Britain
and the United States. Whereas Whately holds that reasoning should conform
to the syllogism, the British philosopher John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) pro-
pounds in A System ofLogic, Ratiocinative and Inductive (1843/1970 ) that only
inductive inferences count as reasoning. Although Mill created a category of
inductive fallacies, his views on the fallacies and the empirical investigation of
the fallacies have not led to crucial theoretical innovations.
6.2.5 The Treatment of Fallacies in Logic Textbooks
An important characteristic of traditional accounts in later logic textbooks is
the shift in the approach to the fallacies that replaced the Aristotelian dialecti-
cal perspective by a monologic perspective. Fallacy theory then deals exclu-
sively with errors in reasoning instead of deceptive maneuvers made by a par-
ty who tries to outwit the other party. Because some of the fallacies on Aristo-
tle's list are intrinsically linked with the dialogue situation, one of the conse-
quences of abandoning the context of debate is that the reason a particular
fallacy should be regarded as a fallacy may become obscure.
An example is "many questions" in Aristotle's category of language-in-
dependent fallacies. Alt~ough it is clear why Ari~t?!~e ree<lr5!~ manlqUestio~S,
as a fallacious refutatlo;;' i~tliec~;text~f debate, it is less clear why exactly he
c~~~!:fi~~ih:i~;r2E.i~~~~I~~fu~:~~te.~()~r.~~ ~i~~~~~.~-~~.~e~e~d~.~t.~all~~i~~}
After all, it is precisely the way in which the question is framed that otters the
possibility of checkmating one's adversary. This fallacy occurs when a ques-
tion is asked that can only be answered by answering at least one other ques-
tion that is "concealed" in the original question at the same time. In modern
interpretations, the answer to the original question presupposes a particular
answer to one or more other questions. By (implicitly or explicitly) forcing
someone to answer a question other than the one that is asked, the fallacy of
many questions is committed. Since many questions hinges on the dialogue sit-
uation' this fallacy can only be adequately analyzed in a dialectical approach.
. II1.l~~~~1!~.41~LAJ:!.§lQtl~1"~£kfulder i§.,<t!I.<?~!.g"!s>"~r}i.!~t
\ :~~~i:fitt~~~~!~~;;~f~~-<!~~~~~?'Il~'<lIl~ to answer thems.~p~r.(lt.e!y.c5pph!~~~
thef~ll~~i~g-;;xamples of many questions fallacies are commonly given as
an illustration:
(1) Are you still beating your wife?
(2) When did you stop beating your wife?
FALLACIES 145
 A person who answers question (1) as intended, with a simple Yes or No,
thereby admits being, or having been, in the habit of beating his wife. This is
because (1) contains the following presupposition:
(Ia) You used to beat your wife
The same presupposition is contained in question (2), but in that case there is
also a second presupposition:
(2a) You no longer beat your wife
Asking questions of the many questions type can serve to pin down an oppo-
nent who fails to spot the treacherous nature of such a question. According to
Aristotle, such questions are incorrect ways of making opponents contradict
themselves in a debate. This happens, for example, if the thesis that the de-
fender has never beaten his wife is at some point refuted through the No an-
swer of the defender to question (1) of the attacker (of course, the defender is
in even deeper water if he answers Yes).
By addressing the dubious presupposition(s), the defender avoids giving a
direct answer to the original question. In the case of question (2), this strategy
might lead to these replies:
(2') I am still beating her
(2") I have never beaten her
Answer (2") is the best way to parry question (2) if the discussion hinges on
whether the defender is or was in the habit of beating his wife. A "direct" an-
swer, such as "Last week", would lead to an immediate and irrevocable defeat
in the debate. The wording of question (1) virtually forces the defender of the
thesis to answer yes, or no, and thus to admit what the opponent tries to
demonstrate: that the defender is, or was, in the habit of beating his wife.
Instead of distinguishing fallacies in dictione from fallacies extra dictionem,
logic textbooks frequ~ntly make a distinction between fa~~cies of a,mbi~
?! ~le~~~;;~:~~~I!,a.CI_~s. ?r~~?~~e.g., Copi 1972). Thehrst are caused by
leXIcal or grammaticaTambigulty ("Pleasing students can be trying") or shifts
of accent ("Why did Adam eat the apple?': "Why did Adam eat the apple?");
they correspond more or less with Aristotle's fallacies in dictione. Fallacies of
re~an ~~~~~i;nE!~ ~~~~!:t£.f~acLe.-.~:!~eY-':~':'~~E~I:.:,a~_!~:.?e~a._~~~~~
.. ..
no log~cal )ustIfica.tion for t~~,?J:iI1~~I1_~.x.::g::ssed; aJ! th~ ~~~'_!~.:.L~ay be:. a
effective means to persuade an audience. Alongside secundum
\\ rhetoncally -- -.--
.. --..... ..... ..._.-,-- ....-~.~"---..-.
----.~" ..--... -.-------".-.. --- ..-
146 FRANS H. VAN EEMEREN
quid, accidens, many questions, ad hominem, ad verecundiam, and ad ignora.n-
tiam, this category includes false analogy, and ethical and pathetlc fallaCIes
(parading one's own qualities and playing on the sentiments of the audience).
Other fallacies of relevance, including begging the question, follow below.
Begging the question, also known as petitio principii or circular reas~ning,
means that the arguer assumes that what needs to be proven (the questlOn at
issue) has already been shown to hold. A simple example is: "God exists be-
cause the Bible says so, and the Bible is God's word:'
Ignoratio elenchi ("ignorance of refutation") amounts in the "standard
interpretation" to an argument that does not address the thesis that happens
to be the point at issue, but a different opinion attributed, rightly or not, to the
other party. Thus, a person who doubts whether state-controlled housing
projects are a useful means of alleviating a housing shortage ~ay, for ex~­
pie, be opposed to them by advancing arguments for the theSIS that there IS a
serious shortage of houses. This, however, is not the point at issue.
A non seq~"Cl~2~~n~!i2!!9w") !S a form of argumentation, simila: to
19norailo~l~nchi, in which the arguments that are used ~nd the concluSlOn
that is drawn may in themselves be correct, but the concluslOn does not follow
from the arguments. The Dutch author, Piet Grijs, once gave this absurd ex-
ample:
The devil painted tile world. But he is not allowed to deduct the costs from his
taxes. Then his nephew appears, in tile year 1982. His nephew has an affair with
tile Prime Minister, and that is why the trees turn green again.
As the name suggests, post hoc (ergo propter hoc) ("after this, therefore on ac-
count of this") means that merely because the one event follows the other
temporarily, then the first caused the second. This fallacy is used when it is
claimed that the rise in (un)employment that has manifested itself since the
new government took office is the result of the new government's policies,
when it is, in fact, perfectly clear that there are other causes.
The argumentum ad baculum ("argument of the stick"), the appeal to force,
amounts to resorting to the use of threats against an adversary who refuses to
accept one's standpoint. The threat may involve physical force, but also other
measures. Usually, threats are issued indirectly, sometimes preceded by an
emphatic assurance that no pressure is being put upon the listener or reader:
Of course, I leave it entirely to you to take a stand, but you must realize that we are
your biggest advertiser (and if you publish that article about our role in South
Africa you can forget about our advertising account).
147
FALLACIES
 The argumentum ad misericordiam ("pity argument") is a fallacy in which an
unjustified appeal is made to the audience's compassion in order to further
one's own interests:
If you don't improve my grade for this course I will lose my self-esteem and find it
difficult to continue with my life.
,; The argumentum ad populum ("argument directed at the people"), some-
\ times referred to as "mob appeal" or as "snob appeal", "app~~_
p\~~~~s_~f~ particlJlaL@sl}.~~his is, for instance, done by contrasting "we"
• (the speaker and his audience) and "they" (those against whom the discourse
is aimed). The following might be an example:
·There is nothing to be gained from these proposals: We socialists all know that the
, arms race is carefully maintained by the arms manufacturers and that in the final
analysis it's just a matter oflining the pockets of a crowd of unscrupulous share-
holders. / ,;i -;
The argumentum ad consequentiam ("consequence-directed argument" or
"wishful thinking") is a fallacy in which a specific favorable or unfavorable
light is cast on a factual thesis just by pointing out its possible desirable or un-
desirable consequences. For exam pIe:
We may suppose no H-bombs will ever hit the Netherlands, for our country is so
small that nothing would remain of it. (From a Civil Defense pamphlet issued in
the sixties)
Or:
God exists; otherwise life would be without hope.
The slippery slope fallacy is a special case of argumentum ad consequentiam, in
which the speculation on unsubstantiated negative consequences of a pro-
posed course is carried to an extreme. This fallacy entails wrongly suggesting
that by taking the proposed course one will be going from bad to worse. In
discussions about legalizing abortion and euthanasia, this type of argument
occurs frequently:
If we start making euthanasia legal, we'll end up with gas chambers like in Nazi
Germany.
148 FRANS H. VAN EEMEREN
"Straw man" is the fallacy of attributing a fictitious or distorted standpoint to
another party that makes it easier to deal with.
Somewhere between the fallacies of ambiguity and the fallacies of rele-
vance, we find the fallacies of composition and division. The fallacy of composi-
tion arises when characteristics of the parts are attributed to the whole in or-
der to make a standpoint with respect to the whole acceptable. For example:
All the parts of the machine are light in weight, therefore the machine is light in
weight.
We use real butter, cream, and fresh lettuce, so our meals are delicious.
The fallacy of division is the converse:
The machine is heavy; therefore all the parts of the machine are heavy.
The Catholic Church is a church for poor people; therefore the Catholic Church
is poor.
These examples show that properties of the parts are not automatically trans-
ferable to the whole, and vice versa. Here the words "light" and "heavy" refer to
relative properties. As soon as there are enough light parts, they will make the
machine heavy.
6.3 Modern Theoretical Approaches to the Fallacies
6.3. 1 Hamblin's Criticisms of the Standard Treatment
In Fallacies (1970 ), an influential survey of the history of the study offallacies
since Aristotle, the Australian philosopher, Charles Hamblin, observes such a
uniformity in contemporary treatments of fallacies in prominent logic text-
books that he speaks of the standard treatment, "the typical or average account
as it appears in the typical short chapter or appendix of the average modern
textbook" (1970: l2).
This characterization is based on textbooks by Cohen and Nagel
(1934119 6 4), Black (1946), Oesterlee (1952), Copi (195311972), Schipper and
Schuh (19 60 ), and Salmon (1963), but also applies to other textbooks, such as
Beardsley (195 0 ), Fearnside and Holther (1959), Carney and Scheer (1964),
Rescher (1964), Kahane (1969,1971), Michalos (1970 ), Gutenplan and Tamny
(197 1), and Purtill (1972). It should be added, however, thatthe unanimity in
1
the textbooks is not as striking as Hamblin suggests.
149
FALLACIES
 Hamblin's book, which also contains Hamblin's own theoretical contribution
to the study of fallacies, is now a standard work on the subject. It is not only
important because of the excellent historical overview, but also because of its
diagnosis of the shortcomings of the standard treatment. These criticisms are
devastating:
'" what we find in most cases, I think it should be admitted, is as debased, worn-
out and dogmatic a treatment as could be imagined - incredibly tradition-
bound, yet lacking in logic and historical sense alike, and almost without connec-
tion to anything else in modern logic at all (1970: 12).
This quotation illustrates Hamblin's earlier lament:
We have no theory of fallacy at all, in the sense in which we have theories of cor-
rect reasoning or inference (1970: 11).
According to Hamblin, the shortcomings of the standard treatment already
reveal themselves in the standard definition of the term fallacy:
A fallacious argument, as almost every account from Aristotle onwards tells you,
is one that seems to be valid but is notso (1970: 12).
The problem with this definition is that most fallacies discussed in the stan-
dard treatment do not fit with it. In fact, only a few formal fallacies fall with-
out any problems under the definition. This applies, for instance, to two cases
of treating a sufficient condition as a necessary condition: affirming the conse-
quent and denying the antecedent (inferring from the premises "If A then B"
and "B" that ''If: and inferring from the premises "If A then B" and "not-A"
that "not B': respectively).
The mismatch between the definition and the fallacies in most other cases is
sometimes due to the fact that there is no argument; in other cases, the reason
is that the argument is not invalid at all in modern interpretations. As an ex-
ample of the former, Hamblin mentions the fallacy of many questions, and as
an example of the latter, he refers to the fallacy of begging the question (petitio
principii, circular reasoning). With respect to the fallacy of many questions,
Hamblin writes:
... a man who asks a misleading question can hardly be said to have argued, validly
or invalidly, for anything at all. Where are his premises and what is his conclu-
sion? (1970: 39)
150 FRANS H. VAN EEMEREN
And with respect to the fallacy of begging the question, he says:
However, by far the most important controversy surrounding petitio principii
concerns J.S. Mill's claim that all valid reasoning commits the fallacy (1970: 35).
This can be illustrated with an example:
That is my bicycle; therefore this is my bicycle.
In a debate about whose bicycle it is, this argument is unlikely to have much
effect, since the premise only repeats the conclusion. But according to stan-
dard logic, the argument as such is not invalid, since it substantiates a valid ar-
gument form:
A; therefore A.
In still other cases, it would be highly overdoing things if one looked for the
error in the invalidity of the argument, since the fallaciousness primarily has
to do with the incorrectness of an unexpressed premise. This is true for fallac-
ies such as the argumentum ad verecundiam and the argumentum ad
populum, but also for the argumentum ad hominem. We can demonstrate this
point by referring to an earlier example of an argumentum ad verecundiam:
Of course Beethoven dictated that symphony to Rosemary Brown: in Playboy the
famous auilior Elisabeili Kiibler-Ross recently explained iliat communication
with the dead is perfectly possible.
The "fault" here appears to exist not so much in the form ofthe argument as in
the incorrectness of an unexpressed premise (d. Van Eemeren and Grooten-
dorst 1992: 60-72). If this unexpressed premise is made explicit, the argument
is not per se invalid:
(1) Elisabeth Kiibler-Ross has said iliat communication with the dead is possible
(2) Kiibler-Ross is an authority in the field of occultism: everything she says
about it is true
Therefore:
(3) It is possible that Beethoven dictated that symphony to Rosemary Brown
This argument has the following form:
FALLACIES 151
 (1') X says that S is possible; this is a statement of type T
(2') Every thing X says about statements of type T is true
Therefore:
(3') S is possible
If an objection is made to the original argument, it is not very likely that it will
concern the form of the argument. More likely it will be the content that caus-
es problems. Such an objection would, for example, be "It's easy enough for
Kiibler- Ross to say things like that" or "Just how does that Kiibler- Ross person
know so much, then?"
Another example of overdoing things by looking at the validity of the argu-
ment is Copi's illustration of the abusive variant of the argumentum ad homi-
nem, a head-on personal attack in which the opponent is portrayed as stupid,
dishonest or unreliable, thereby undermining the opponent's credibility:
Bacon's philosophy is untrustworthy because he was removed from his chancel-
lorship for dishonesty (1972: 75).
In this example, there is indeed an argument, but its fallaciousness seems to
be lurking in the unacceptability of the unexpressed premise (Why should a
swindler not have any interesting philosophical ideas?) rather than in the in-
validity of the argument. Many examples of the argumentum ad hominem are
not even presented as arguments that have the form of a premise-conclusion
sequence. Granted, some of them could be reconstructed as such without dif-
ficulty, but others cannot. Take this example from Schopenhauer's "Eristische
Dialektik;'written between 1818 and 1830:
Vertheidigt er [der GegnerJz.B. den Selbstmord, so schreit man gleich "warum
hangst du dich nicht auf" [If the opponent defends suicide, one immediately yells
"Why don't you hang yourselR"J (p.685)
It is not immediately clear what the reconstruction should look like:
(a) Suicide is wrong, because you don't hang yourself
(b) Your defense of suicide is worthless since you don't hang yourself
(c) You are inconsistent becauseyou defend suicide but you don't
hang yourself
(d) You should hang yourself because you defend suicide
It is difficult to make a well-founded choice between the alternatives because
it is hard to determine what the speaker can be held to. Each reconstruction
seems somewhat more absurd than the next.
FRANS H. VAN EEMEREN
Here we face, in Hamblin's words, the problem of "nailing" a fallacy: the ac-
cused can quasi-naively maintain that no argument has been advanced.
Hamblin describes how that defense could proceed with regard to the use of
an argumentum ad hominem:
Person A makes statement S: person B says "It was Cwho told you that, and I hap-
pen to know that his mother-in-law is living in sin with a Russian": A objects,
"The falsity of S does not follow from any facts about the morals of Cs mother-
in-law: that is an argumentum ad hominem": Bmayreply"I did not claim that it
followed. I simply made a remark about incidentals of the statement's history.
Draw what conclusion you like. If the cap fits ..." (1970: 224).
6.3.2 Post-Hamblin Treatments of the Fallacies
Hamblin's criticisms of the standard treatment have led to various kinds of
reactions (see Grootendorst 1987). In textbooks on logic, there was initially
very little noticeable effect. In reprints of Copi (1953), Rescher (19 6 4), Carney
and Scheer (1964), for example, no attempt was made to deal with Hamblin's
objections. Copi, for one, states in his preface to the fourth edition of Intro-
duction to Logic (1972) that in the chapter on fallacies he made grateful use of
Hamblin's critical remarks; however, a closer comparison reveals that, aside
from a few minor alterations, Copi adheres strictly to the standard treatment.
An extreme reaction is Lambert and Ulrich's, who thought it better to totally
drop informal fallacies from logic textbooks (1980: 24-28). Lambert and Ul-
rich clarified their drastic step by means of a discussion of the argumentum ad
hominem, which they define as an attempt to cast doubt on someone's stand-
point by bringing that person's reputation into disrepute. They contend that
it is impossible to characterize the argumentum ad hominem satisfactorily by
appealing to its form or to its content. Their general conclusion runs as fol-
lows:
... until a general characterization of informal fallacies can be given which enables
one to tell with respect to any argument whether or not it exhibits one of the in-
formal fallacies, knowing how to label certain paradigm cases of this or that mis-
take in reasoning is not really useful for determining whether a given argument is
acceptable (1980: 28).
As exemplified in Hans V. Hansen and Robert C. Pinto's collection of read-
ings, Fallacies (eds. 1995), Hamblin's book has been a great source of inspira-
tion to argumentation scholars. Post-Hamblin attempts to create a better al-
FALLACIES
153
 ternative to the standard treatment may differ considerably in their ap-
proaches, objectives, methods and emphases, but they invariably refer to his
criticisms. Pace philosophers such as Augustus de Morgan (1806-1871) and
Gerald Massey (born 1934), who do not believe that a theory of fallacies is
possible, several new theoretical approaches have developed.
Apart from their own involvement, Hansen and Pinto's book shows the ac-
tive involvement in the study of the fallacies of other contemporary Canadian
and American informal logicians, such as J. Anthony Blair, Ralph H. Johnson,
Alan Brinton, Trudy Govier, James B. Freeman and David Hitchcock. They
pay special attention to the conditions under which a specific argumentative
I i move should count as a fallacy. ]:he ~~~Rhers JohnJ~!!Q~!!~:U::I~
"~I Siegel's (122.2), still embryoIlic, ep!~teIl1j~ ~r£,!ch.ItJ>J"~~,juiifferenL
' view o~:he f~!La.~i~§.as ~d~~l!1Q!s_,t:Q ~J(P~~~E.~<?~I.:..~. Besides'
, Hambhns (197 0 ) own contrIbUtion to the theory of fallacies, which is cast in
I
I the mold of a system of rules called formal dialectics, other constructive pro-
posals are made by the American philosopher Maurice Finocchiaro (1987)
and the Finnish-American logician Taakko Hintikka (1987). Finocchiaro opts
for a middle course between abstract theoretical considerations and data-ori-
ented empirical observation. Hintikka argues, in a dialectical vein, that the
Aristotelian fallacies should not be primarily viewed as wrong inferences, but
as interrogative mistakes in question -dialogues.
Various approaches to the fallacies have recently developed that involve an
extensive research program. Among them are the formal approach chosen by ,
Woods and Walton, the formal-dialectical approach proposed by Barth and
Krabbe, the pragma-dialectical approach initiated by Van Eemeren and
Grootendorst and Walton's pragmatic approach. These distinct contribu-
tions to the study of fallacies will now be discussed separately.
6·3·3 The Woods-Walton Approach
The most continuous and extensive post-Hamblin contribution to the study
of the fallacies is provided by the Canadian logicians and argumentation the-
orists, John Woods and Douglas N. Walton. In a series of co-authored articles
and books and several independently authored publications, they substanti-
ate their remedy for the standard treatment. They deal with the various kinds
of fallacies by calling on more sophisticated modern logics than just syllogis-
tic, propositional, and predicate logics. The Woods-Walton approach is ex-
hibited in the textbook Argument: The Logic ofthe Fallacies (1982). Aiming for
a better and more coherent treatment of the fallacies than the standard treat-
ment provides, Woods and Walton take the theoretical framework of logic as
154 FRANS H. VAN EEMEREN
their starting point. They conclude that deductive logic is not sufficient to
deal with all the different types of fallacies. In their opinion, however, it does
not follow that the theory of fallacies should necessarily be non-formal.
As their collected papers, Fallacies: Selected Papers 1972-1982 (1989), makes
clear, Woods and Walton take the view that the fallacy itself should determine
how it might be dealt with theoretically. Common methodological starting
points of their approach are that fallacies can be usefully analyzed with the
help of the structures and theoretical vocabulary oflogical systems, including
systems of dialectical logic, and that successful analyses of a great many fallac-
ies will have features that qualify those analyses as formal in some sense. They
tend to organize the fallacies into grades of formality. First, there are fallacies,
such as the classical fallacy of "four terms", that are formal in the strict sense;
they are analyzable with the help of concepts wholly or partly described in the
technical vocabulary or the formal structures of a system oflogic or other for-
mal theory (four terms, for example, with the help of the classical definition of
a syllogism). At the second grade of formality, there are fallacies, such as the
fallacies of ambiguity, which are not formal in the strict sense, but whose
commission is partly made explicable by reference to logical forms. At the
third grade of formality, there are fallacies, such as petitio principii, which are
formally analyzable in an even weaker sense.
This third grade of formality, which is most prominently realized in Woods
and Walton's work, can be clarified by turning to a definition of formal ana-
lyzability they approve of:
A fallacy F is formally analyzableto the extent that its analysis introduces concepts
which are described, in whole or part, by employing the technical vocabulary
and! or the formal structures of a system oflogic or other sort of formal theory.
In English, "formality", it must be noted, is a multiple-ambiguous word. All
sort of things and situations count as formal, from "formal evening" to "for-
mal speech", all the way up to theories oflogical form. There is "good form" in
tennis, and telling off-color jokes is considered "bad form" in polite society.
The concept of formality that gives sense to the definition of formal analyz-
ability is approximately this. Sometimes a definition is said to be "formal"
when it is exact, explicit, general and rigorous. So, for example, the definition
of the successor of any number n as the number n + 1 would qualify as "for-
mal" in this present sense. Similarly, a theory could be said to be a "formal the-
ory" to the extent that its definitions were formal, and its assertions were ex-
plicitly and rigorously demonstrated. Especially significant would be those
theories, such as number theory, or set theory, whose sets of theorems are in-
finitely large, but which are nonetheless finitely axiomatizable. For such a
FALLACIES 155
 thing to be true, it is basically the case that axioms are given by way of finite
numbers of axiom schemata.
Two examples of the formal analyses typical of the Woods-Walton approach
are mentioned here. They illustrate the general conception of formality that
enters into the work of Woods and Walton at the third grade. In several chap-
ters of Fallacies: Selected Papers, Woods and Walton analyze the logical struc-
ture of dialectical arguments that satisfy the "no-retraction rule" as argu-
ments that have the property of cumulativity. Cumulativity is analyzed, in
turn, as a certain kind of"Kripke-structure", introduced by Saul A. Kripke in
his "Seman tical analysis of intuitionistic logic I" (1965). Woods and Walton
show that the fallacy of petitio principii cannot be committed in such struc-
tures, that is, that the formally analyzable property of cumulativeness pre-
cludes the petitio. 2
In another example, Woods and Walton set out to show that the analysis of
the fallacies of composition and division rests on a good theoretical account of
the part-whole relation. This assumption seems a reasonable one, in as much
as these fallacies involve incorrect inferences from properties of wholes to
properties of their parts, and from properties of parts to properties of the
wholes of which they are parts. In Fallacies: Selected Papers, the authors show
that neither ordinary set theory nor a standard deviation from it known as
"mereology" will suffice for the correct analysis of composition and division
fallacies (1989: Ch. 8). The formal theory ofthe part -whole relation known as
aggregate theory, as developed by Tyler Burge (1977: 97-118), is a more ade-
quate theoretical toO!.3
In their analyses of fallacies, Woods and Walton draw upon Hamblin's con-
cepts of commitment sets and retraction. Thus, their analyses are not only for-
mally oriented, but also dialectical. Another typical feature of the Woods-
Walton approach is that it is pluralistic. History has endowed a great many
rather different phenomena with the name of fallacy. In Woods and Walton's
view, it makes no more sense to suppose that they must all be given a common
analysis than it does to suppose that all diseases should be given the same di-
agnosis and treatment. \/ ,{J , ,; r !,
11
,l 1-1\.
1
7
....
I
I
-
I "';
~ 7
6·3-4 Th'Fo'm,"-[Ji,"e<lic,"APP'~''-- "? "c. 'II "Ny I,
A major methodical attempt to create a "formal-dialectical" theoretical
framework, partly based on the dialogue logic of the Erlangen School, is un-
dertaken by the Dutch philosophers and logicians Else M. Barth and Erik
C. W. Krabbe. They envision a theory of rational argumentation as a finite set
FRANS H. VAN EEMEREN
of production rules for rational arguments. Only (and all) arguments that
can be generated by these rules are rational arguments, and fallacies can be
analyzed as argumentative moves that cannotbe generated by the rules. They
provide a description of the sets of rules constituting such systems of formal
dialectics in From Axiom to Dialogue (1982). Instead of being given ad hoc ex-
planations, as in the standard treatment, the fallacies in formal dialectics can
be systematically analyzed, which is illustrated in Barth and Martens (1977)
with respect to the argumentum ad hominem. In fact, in Barth and Martens
(1977), the argumentum ad hominem is not treated as a fallacy but as an admis-
sible discussion move" ex concessis': According to Barth and Martens, each in-
dividual rule of the formal-dialectical rules for generating rational argu-
ments states a sufficient condition for the rationality of a generated argu-
ment; all (and only) arguments that can be generated by one or more of these
rules are rational arguments. Fallacies can thus be "unmasked" as argumenta-
tive moves that cannotbe generated by the production rules (1977: 96).
~ _ _ _ , , _ _ _ >~". __ • _ _ _ _ ~ __ ~~~o- ••• ~--'- . . '·~· - . - - - - - - - - •• , - _ . _ '"~""." •• , . . . " . - - - ' •• - -,------, - .----. _ •• - ----.' --
6.3.5 The Pragma-Dialectical Approach
The "pragma-dialectical" approach, developed in Speech Acts in Argumenta-
tive Discussions (1984) and Argumentation, Communication, and Fallacies
(199 2 ) by the Dutch argumentation theorists Frans H. van Eemeren and Rob
Grootendorst, links up with formal dialectics. It starts, however, from the
conviction that the single-minded preoccupation with the logical aspects of
arguments should be abandoned and that the fallacies can be better under-
stood as wrong moves in the communication process of argumentative dis-
course. A fallacy is in the pragma-dialectical approach regarded as a hin-
drance or impediment for the resolution of a disagreement, and the specific
nature of a particular fallacy depends on the way in which it interferes with
the resolution process.
In the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation, a critical-rationalist
philosophy of reasonableness is given shape in an ideal model of critical dis-
cussion that specifies the stages that are to be distinguished analytically in the
resolution process and the verbal moves that are constitutive of each of these
stages. In all stages of a critical discussion, the protagonist and the antagonist
of the standpoint at issue must observe all the rules for the performance of
speech acts that are instrumental in resolving the dispute. These rules can be
recapitulated in a series of basic principles, each of which expresses a separate
standard or norm for critical discussion. Any infringement, whichever party
commits it, and at whatever stage in the discussion, is a possible threat to the
resolution of a difference of opinion and must therefore be regarded as an in-
FALLACIES 157
 correct discussion move or "fallacy." The term fallacy is thus systematically
connected with the rules for critical discussion and defined as a speech act that
prejudices or frustrates efforts to resolve a difference ofopinion.
When it comes to the detection of fallacies, the pragma-dialectical analysis
starts with interpreting an utterance in a discourse aimed at resolving a differ-
ence of opinion as a particular kind of speech act. Then it must be determined
i whether the performance of this speech act agrees with the rules for critical
It discussion. If the speech act violates any of these rules, it must be determined
II wha~ kind. of ~orm viol~tio.n it entails. Only after it has become clear which
I' speClfi~ cntenon for satIsfying a norm pertaining to a particular stage of the
resolutIOn process has not been met, can it be determined which fallacy has
been committed.
'. Rilth~!~haI1~?!l§.id~I:ing the fall(l~ie,§flS belonging1Mn unstructured list of
\nom~~al:":<lt~E()!:i~~iEherit~QJ:!Q1J1 th~PilS!, ~j!! !h~ st~ treatme%~
~~S~d'::'IIl:g~ fallaci~_~!Q1~yj21ati01l1.QfgJl~<:!!!d the sa~~dity) norm,
a~ I~ ~he 10gIco-~en!!:ic approaches, t~:l?!:'!K...~gl.i!l£.qjcal ap12rOOCh differ~
t:f.t~at~~~!~riety of ~ A comparison shows that fallacies
't hICh were tradItIOnally only nommally lumped together are now either
,hown to have something in common or clearly distinguished, whereas gen-
uinely related fallacies that were separated are brought together. For instance,
two variants of ad populum are distinguished, the one being a violation of the
Relevance Rule that a party may defend its standpoint only by advancing ar-
gumentation related to that standpoint, the other being a violation of the Ar-
gument Scheme Rule that a standpoint may not be regarded as conclusively
defended if the defense does not take place by means of a correctly applied ap-
propriate argument scheme. This shows that these variants are, in fact, notof
the same kind. And analyzing one particular variant of ad verecundiam and
one particular variant of ad populum as violations of the same Argument
Scheme Rule makes it clear that, seen from the perspective of resolving a dif-
ference of opinion, these variants areof the same kind.
The pragma-dialectical approach also enables the analysis of thus far un-
recognized and unnamed "new" obstacles to resolving a difference of opin-
ion. Examples are declaring a standpoint sacrosanct, a violation of the Free-
dom Rule that parties must not prevent each other from putting forward
standpoints or casting doubt on standpoints; evading or shifting the burden of
proof, violations of the Burden of Proof Rule that a party who puts forward a
standpoint is obliged to defend that standpoint if asked to; denying an unex-
pressed premise, a violation of the Unexpressed Premise Rule that a party may
not falsely present something as a premise that has been left unexpressed, or
deny a premise that has been left implicit; and making an absolute ofthe success
of the defense, a violation of the Closure Rule that a failed defense must result
FRANS H. VAN EEMEREN
in the protagonist retracting the standpoint and a successful defense in the
antagonist retracting the doubt (Van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2001).
6.3.6 Walton's Pragmatic Approach
Written in a similar theoretical vein, Douglas N. Walton's Informal Fallacies
(1987) marks a new stage in his development. To find a solution to the prob-
lems involved in analyzing fallacies, Walton now not only makes formal logic
subservient to dialectic, but also turns to pragmatics, albeit in a very broad
sense. Walton, a highly prolific author, now tends to _<::()_IE.1:~~~.!E~_s.!!:t_c!Y.2nn:-
dividual fallacies with exa~..!!!!!-life.~algngjh~Q!1!!i£&Q~­
I ~Yses, he associates fallacies with illicit "dialectical shifts"
from one type of dialogue to another. An argument that appears correct may
actually be incorrect when it is used after a shift in a type of dialogue where it
is no longer appropriate or even obstructive in view of the type of dialogue
the participants were originally engaged in. An ad baculum involving a veiled
threat, for example, can be appropriate in a negotiation dialogue but not in a
persuasion dialogue. A systematic treatment of normative models of dia-
logue, which can serve as guidelines for a critical evaluation of fallacious dia-
logue shifts, is given in Walton and Krabbe (1995)·
Early signs of the new developments in Walton's approach to the fallacies
can be found in Logical Dialogue-Games and Fallacies (1984). In this book, a
new theoretical approach is chosen to provide an analysis of informal fallacies
frequently encountered in ordinary argumentation. In Walton's opinion, the
standard treatment lacks an analysis of this group of fallacies because this
treatment starts from a limited definition of validity. The so-called logical di-
alogue games developed by Hamblin, Mackenzie, Hintikka and Rescher pro-
vide a more suitable theoretical framework for the analysis of fallacies such as
the argumentum ad hominem, petitio principii, argumentu m ad ignorantiam,
ignoratio elenchi, many questions, argumentum ad baculum, straw man and ar-
gumentum ad verecundiam. Another early sign of the direction Walton's work
was going to take is Arguer's Position (1985). This book deals with the question
under which conditions the circumstantial variant of the argumentum ad
hominem is a sound form of argumentation. Starting from Grice's theory of
conversation, the relevance logic of Davidson and Porn, and the theoretical
proposals concerning formal dialogue games, an analysis is given of the ad
hominem. Walton's conclusion is that ad hominem refutations are sometimes
effective and sound, but ad hominem attacks are usually not.
Among Walton's other individual books are Informal Fallacies (1987) and
Informal Logic (1989). The first book we mentioned already; it deals with the
FALLACIES 159
 question how the reasonableness or unreasonableness of argumentation in
everyday language can be assessed. How should argumentation be judged
and when is criticism justified? Walton shows that many of the informal fal-
lacies represent a valuable form of criticism. In some cases so-called fallacies
can be regarded as reasonable argumentation. A functional and dialogical
perspective is favored in Plausible Argument in Everyday Conversation
(199 2b ). Walton distinguishes between various types of dialogues and differ-
ent types of reasoning. He examines how arguments are used in the various
types of dialogues and which fallacies can be committed. In The Place ofEmo-
tion in Argument (1992a) it is argued that in persuasive dialogues it can be le-
gitimate to try to convince the interlocutor by appealing to the emotions. In
some cases, however, such an appeal is fallacious. A Pragmatic Theory ofFalla-
cy (1995) describes how an argument is (mis)used in the context of conversa-
tion. I,U.~~!lli!~<L!h-'!L!h,~~~Qdd.!~~tbook f~1!g~asically reasQoahJ!!
!,:e~llIIlPtivetypesof arguments~h.~!~~,Y,~Q'£~ll1l:i,\:dinappxoptjateJyju a pat:-
ticular normative structure of dialogue, iI1y~lviI?:g'!:~hiftfr!?!ll on~~ of di::.
alogue to anq!h~J.
,I) ""s~'ill'~"~rWalton's books are specifically devoted to a particular fallacy. In
Begging the Question: Circular Reasoning as a Tactic ofArgumentation (1991), a
pragmatic approach to dialogues leads to a theory of circular reasoning as an
informal fallacy. Circular reasoning is analyzed as an attempt to evade the
burden of proof by blocking the dialogue and depriving the opponent of the
opportunity to ask critical questions. Slippery Slope Arguments (199 2c) dis-
cusses the assessment of slippery slope arguments. Walton differentiates four
types of slippery slope and provides a dialectical analysis. Other books by
Walton dealing with specific fallacies are Arguments from Ignorance (1996b),
FaliaciesArisingfromAmbiguity (1996a),Appeal to Pity: ArgumentumAd Mis-
ericordiam (1997), Ad Hominem Arguments (1998a), Appeal to Expert Opinion:
Arguments from Authority (1998b ) and Appeal to Popular Opinion (1999).
Notes
1 For differences within the standard treatment of the argumentum ad
hominem, see Van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1993: 54-57.
2 See, in particular, Woods and Walton 1989: Ch.1O and 19.
3 See Woods (1980), Woods and Walton (1989: Ch. 8),and Burge (1977:
97-118).
160 FRANS H. VAN EEMEREN
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York: SUNY Press.
Walton, D.N. (1998a). Ad Hominem Arguments. Tuscaloosa: University of Al-
abama Press.
Walton, D.N. (1998b). Appeal to Expert Opinion: Arguments from Authority.
University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press.
FALLACIES
Walton, D. (1999). Appeal to Popular Opinion. University Park, PA: Penn-
sylvania State University Press.
Walton, D.N., andE.C.W. Krabbe (1995). Commitment in Dialogue: Basic
Concepts ofInterpersonal Reasoning. New York: SUNY Press.
Whately, R. (1826/1975). Elements ofLogic. A facsimile reproduction with an
introduction by Ray E. McKerrow. Delmar, N.Y: Scholars' Facsimiles and
Reprints.
Woods, 1. (1980). "What is Informal Logic?" In: Blair, J.A., and R.H. Johnson
(Eds.), Informal Logic: The First International Symposium. Point Reyes, CA:
Edgepress,57-68.
Woods, J., and D.N. Walton (1982). Argument: The Logic ofthe Fallacies.
Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson.
Woods, J., and D.N. Walton (1989). Fallacies: Selected Papers 1972 -1982.
Berlin/Dordrecht: De Gruyter/Foris.
164 FRANS H. VAN EEMEREN
7 Argument Interpretation and Reconstruction
M. Agnes van Rees
7.1 Introduction
Arguments occur in actual, ordinary discourse such as written texts of all
kinds, speeches and other types of oral discourse including everyday con-
versation, negotiation, and discussion. The elements that make up an argu-
ment are usually not fully explicit in the discourse. Or if they are, they are of-
ten expressed in an indirect fashion; their argumentative character is not im-
mediately evident. On top of that, argumentative elements are usually inex-
tricably intertwined with other textual structures in the discourse. Yet, ordi-
nary language users recognize arguments and respond to arguments, extract-
ing implicit elements, getting at what is expressed indirectly, and unraveling
the argument from the amalgam of details happening in the discourse. The
interpretative activity that this involves is necessary for ordinary listeners or
readers, because each utterance directed at them invites their reactions, and
they need to gain an understanding of what it means in order to find a basis
on which to react. In this chapter, the te!!!!_~r£!:!1!!ent 0terpre~!!!i0'2 wi!!!?~.. '
~~~~.to refer to.~~~i~ or~~rI~I!Z!li!gf~~r.~.5L<?l!!_9L<!~~.to.~!!~r~r/
the arguments III a Cliscourse.1
--I;; many iespects:;;g~~;;;tation scholars who want to describe, explain or
evaluate the arguments occurring in a particular piece of discourse face the
same problems as ordinary language users. However., u~IQ<.:_~9~t.Q!4in<l;ry
language users, argumentation~c~?!.a.~~~ave the~r~ticallymotiYil!:d.~~;~~ ()f
whatargumentatlonls:~nd what evaluation st':ll}<:t'!rg§ilI~ ~21'!iS.<1.j:>!e. ~d a~_
soon as meY'begirifo'apply these'~i~w~ to actual argumentative discourse,
li:hey'rtiiCffii~.itiflL~@;,·Adual d!scourse';'hyits n~t~:;:e;' tYPically d~es not
conform to the conceptions of a theoretical model in a straightforward man-
ner. On the one hand, the argumentative elements that occur in the model are
hardly ever explicitly present in the discourse, or if they are, they are expressed
in an indirect fashion. On the other hand, lots of things other than those spec-
ified in the model are present in the discourse. Th~~!!!~!l.~lhat'.il!K'!..~~-1
tion SChOlars. havet.~. :.~.'<::£!lstr~~.!h.~_<!!~~._.0.. U!§~.I.~gy~~. ,,! e>,f._!p. . e. .i.EP~. r. . tic.,!l. . .I.a...r. . . !~e.(~. .-
retical interests and in terms of the categories of their particular theo!~!ical
mCldeIs.Argumentreconstructlon;-then, inv~lves identifjring~~~ns~l~ting~ll
_~"';k'~
 those and only those elements that are relevant to the theoretical perspective
and for the theoretical purpose of the analyst.
Ordinary language users' understanding of discourse is studied in various ar-
eas of the social sciences, with different research methods and different con-
ceptions of what it is to use language for communicating and interacting. 2
Notably, fields like discourse analysis, conversation analysis, linguistics and
psycholinguistics are of relevance here. Understandably, argumentation as
such is not the main focus of interest in these fields. Yet, there are many studies
that address topics that are relevant for getting a clearer idea of how ordinary
language users actually understand and interpret argumentative discourse. In
7.2 the research pertaining to argument interpretation will be reviewed.
Surveying the research in argumentation theory, we find that the subject of
argument reconstruction only rarely receives any attention as a topic for
reflection in its own right. With the exception ofVan Eemeren, Grootendorst,
Jackson and Jacobs (1993), no book-length publications on the subject have
appeared. Usually, the literature deals with specific topics such as reconstruct-
ing unexpressed premises or argumentation structure. As Wayne Brockriede
(1985), to mention just one classic source, has made amply clear, anything in
any piece of discourse can be the focus of analysis, but it all depends on the
emphasis and the perspective the analyst wishes to apply. This means that ar-
gument reconstruction can never be separated from the theoretical goals, the
theoretical focus and the theoretical apparatus with which the discourse is
approached. ~~S<?~~!~!:!fl!'Q!lJilw.\t)':s Rr~§l!Rp'gSe,S.allartiJ:;ular,.p.Qin~
In 7.3 an overview is given of what the various theories ()f ~rgumen,t£,~::,;!,9
say about the aims of reconstruction and the tqeoretical!'lpp¥~~!lli!J:
should be brought to bear on it.
, .f/~"<·f ,- . '. , . ""'",'~."
) ~ /,; i.
7.2 Argument Interpretation
This section first reviews some general characteristics of discourse organi-
zation that ordinary language users orient to when interpreting an argument
(7.2.1). The exposition will then move on to research findings regarding par-
ticular features of argumentative discourse specifically relevant for argument
interpretation: patterning and linguistic devices that serve as indicators of
argumentative structures for ordinary language users (7.2.2). Finally, research
into the everyday reasoning processes which ordinary-language users apply
in argument interpretation will be discussed (7.2.3).
I !
I
I I i,'., ; / ,I
(>
166 M. AGNES VA~ REES
/ /
7.2.1 General Characteristics of Discourse Organization
Ordinary language users are guided in their interpretation of discourse by
knowledge gathered from various sources. Foremost among these are knowl-
edge about the type of speech event or the language activity the discourse is
embedded in, and knowledge of conventional structures and strategies of dis-
course.
Imbedding Activity
Hymes (1972) introduced the term speech evenEto
-.~--~.-~~<-,,-,--".,.,.,-"-- -.
refer to sOE~o~cl1.!tll~a.IIY~t!.~=~!
-' ", - 1
tablished !ypes gf verbal interacti0!l~which form part of the verbal repertoire j
.,....,.... , .., ,,,,, "''''-''''''- " . ",,,.,,,,,,_.,,.,..''''''. 1
of the memb~I.:~j?fi!:,~E.~.~~~,~.I1l,!~ity. Each speech event is made up of a.
p~~ticli"lar constellation of dimensions that define speech events. For exam·
pIe, the members of a particular speech community may distinguish a partic-
ular speech event such as the academic lecture. As a particular speech event,
they will expect it to be situated in a particular physical setting, the lecture
hall; they will expect it to be participated in by a particular constellation of
speakers and listeners, that is, one speaker and a number oflisteners, who oc-
cupy these positions by virtue of the particular types of roles they enact; they
will expect it to have particular functions; they will expect the participants to
have particular goals; they will have particular expectations as to the type of
topics, the type of speech acts, the overall arrangement or order of these, and
the ~tyle of language use; and they will expect there to be a particular set of
norms in effect that will determine who is supposed to do what and when.
These expectations shape the interpretation that the members of this speech
community assign to the behavior, both verbal and non-verbal, of the partici·
pants in this particular type of speech event.
Levinson (1979) focuse~QJe closely on the relatio~hi£~~w~~ech
ev~hich he c~ivity types, and the verbal and nonverbal contribu·
tioiis"io theactivity, il1c1udmg ~terpretation which these receive. He con-
tends that activity types - which he defines as goal-defined, socially constitut-
ed, bounded events, with particular constraints on participants, setting, etc.-
serve as a strong constraint on the kinds of allowable contributions, and the
way these are interpreted. According to Levinson, the goal inherent to the ac-
tivity type determines the parts that make up the activity as a whole, the pre-
structured sequences that make up each sub-part, and the functional adequa-
cy of individual contributions therein. The given arrangement of a particular
activity may be seen as a consequence of the rational organization of the
activity around a dominant goal.
ARGUMENT INTERPRETATION AND RECONSTRUCTION
In this view, the structural properties of an activity constrain the function of
the verbal contributions, as well as the interpretation these contributions may
receiveY'It's five past twelve now" may, in the context of an academic lecture,
and uttered by the lecturer at the beginning of the event, function as, and be
interpreted as, announcing the beginning of the activity. In the same vein,
Levinson shows how, in the context of court proceedings, more specifically
cross-examination, questions by the cross-examiner function to extract from
the witness answers that build up an argument for the jury, and are inter-
preted as such by the participants.
Rational Organization
The rational, goal-oriented organization of discourse is elaborated by Jacobs
and Jackson (1983).4 They show how coherence in discourse can be accounted
for by assuming that there is a fundamental system of rational principles for
producing cooperative speech activity that underlies discourse. In their view,
language use is a goal-oriented activity in which the participants try to reach
goals through the verbal means conventionally associated with these goals,
speech acts, while mutually aligning themselves to one another's actions. 5
What this means for the interpretation of utterances is that each utterance is
interpreted in the light of some jointly pursued, socially defined goal that it
can be assumed to be relevant to, as a particular speech act attempting to
change particular beliefs and/or wants of the listener, implicating particular
further intended consequences, or establishing particular sub-goals in the
pursuit of a broader goal. 6
Jacobs and Jackson (1983), along with others (e.g., Van Eemeren and
Grootendorst 1984, 1992, Van Rees 1992a, 1992C), apply Searle's (1969,1975) fe-
licity conditions for the performance of speech acts and Grice's (1975) Coop-
erative Principle as a theoretical framework for explaining the interpretation
of speech acts in further detail. They present the view that conversationalists
(like, in fact, participants in other forms of verbal interaction, both oral and
written), barring evidence to the contrary, assume that a speaker will not per-
form senseless, superfluous, or insincere acts. Consequently, when a listener
believes that a speaker knows (and knows that the listener knows he knows)
that the preparatory or sincerity conditions for a particular speech act db not
apply, he will assume that the speaker performed a different act. For example,
the sincerity conditions for a question imply that the speaker wants the listen-
er to provide him with certain information; the preparatory conditions, that
the speaker does not himself already have the information required, but
thinks the listener does? It would be insincere to ask someone something that
168 M. AGNES VAN REES
one does not want to know, and senseless to ask him something which one al-
ready knows, or which one does not believe he knows. So, if a speaker says
(1) Three 0' dock, right?
a listener can interpret this utterance as a question about the starting time for
a meeting, provided he thinks the speaker may not be sure about the time of
the meeting and wishes to obtain information on that score, and provided
that he also thinks the speaker assumes that he (the listener) has access to that
information. If, on the contrary, he believes that the speaker already knows
what time the meeting is beginning and has no need for information regard-
ing it, he can interpret the utterance as an attempt to remind him of it.
The felicity conditions also play an important role in explaining the inter-
pretation of cases in which a speech act is performed indirectly. In the indirect
performance of a speech act, the literal force which the utterance carries in
view of its syntactic and semantic characteristics differs from the force which
the utterance actually obtains. An example is
(2) Would you mind not ringing so late in future?
in which the utterance has the literal force of a question asking about the will-
ingness of the listener not to ring so late, whereas its actual force is that of a re-
quest to desist from ringing so late in future. In the indirect performance of a
speech act, the speaker literally asks whether, or asserts that, one of the felicity
conditions for that act is fulfilled. In the example above, the request is made
by asking whether one of the preparatory conditions for requesting has been
fulfilled, namely the condition of willingness on the part of the listener to ac-
cede to the request. Language users are aware of these regularities and have no
trouble in interpreting indirect speech acts. 8
Another aspect of the rational, goal-oriented character of the organization
of discourse is the use which speakers make of strategic devices. An important
goal of participants in verbal interaction is to protect both their own social
faces and that of their interlocutors (Goffrnan 1955). In order to do this, they
apply various face-saving strategies in performing speech acts (Brown and
Levinson 1987). Mitigating a face-threatening speech act by performing it in-
directly is one such strategy. Another is to preface speech acts with preparato-
ry moves in which the fulfillment of the felicity conditions of these speech
acts is explored (Levinson 1983). Language users apply their knowledge ofthe
strategic use of language in interpreting speech acts. This knowledge aids
them in inferring what speech act a speaker may be performing in an indirect
or implicit fashion, and in projecting intended speech act sequels.
ARGUMENT INTERPRETATION AND RECONSTRUCTION
 These insights as to the rational, goal-oriented and strategic organization of
discourse may be brought to bear in accounting for the interpretation of
argumentative discourse, notably the interpretation of utterances as part of
an argument. In the conception of language use which has been elaborated
above, argumentation is viewed as a functional category - a speech act aimed
at a particular goal, that of the regulation of disagreement (Van Eemeren and
Grootendorst 1984, Jacobs and Jackson 1981). This implies that in a context of
disagreement, argumentation is a relevant and foreseeable speech act. In such
a context, an utterance which allows for interpretation as an argument can be
interpreted accordingly. Moreover, argumentation is viewed as supporting
the validity of a speech act, which depends upon the fulfilment of its felicity
conditions. For that reason, argumentation can be expected to address the
fulfilment of these same felicity conditions. So, if an utterance in a context of
disagreement addresses issues that involve the fulfilment of the felicity condi-
tions of a particular speech act which stands in need of support, that utter-
ance can be interpreted as an argument for that speech act. 9 For example, in:
(3) Since you're standing there anyway, could you please close the door.
the (indirect) request to close the door is preceded by a clause referring to the
preparatory condition for requests specifying that the speaker assumes the
listener is in a position to do that which is required. "Since you're standing
there anyway" can be interpreted as an argument for the validity of the speak-
er's request.
7.2.2 Features of Argumentative Discourse
Research into the way in which argument is "done" in everyday conversation
may provide additional insight into the interpretation of argument. Lan-
guage users' awareness of the patterns through which argument develops,
and of the linguistic devices through which it is expressed, may guide them in
interpreting argument.
Patterning
Coulter (1990) describes the elementary pattern which argument, in a two-
party conversation, follows. lO Argument is basically produced through a two-
part sequence: a declarative assertion by S1 followed by a counter-assertion by
S2.1t can be expanded into a four-part structure: 1. a declarative assertion by
170 M. AGNES VAN REES
Sl; 2. an expression of disagreement by S2; 3. an utterance soliciting an ac-
count by Sl; 4. a counter-assertion by S2." For example:
(4) 1 Sl: well, he had all the chances and didn't make much of them
2 S2: that's not really true
3 Sl: oh? why not?
4 S2: for a start, you could hardly blame him for his wife's illness and
that's when the rot started
Following the second speaker's counter-assertion, the first speaker may also
produce a back-down, or a reassertion. Explicit back-downs are terminations
for an argument sequence.
Muntigl and Turnbull (1998) contend that arguments in every-day
conversation contain a minimum of three turns: in Tt, Sl makes a claim, in
T2, S2 disputes this claim, and in T3, S1 disagrees with T2 by either supporting
the T1 claim or directly contesting the T2 disagreement. On the basis of struc-
tural characteristics and pragmatic functions of the contribution, the authors
distinguish four types ofT2 disagreements:
- Irrelevancy claims, in which S2 asserts that the previous claim is not rele-
vant to the discussion at hand. These tend to follow T1 immediately or tend
to overlap.
- Challenges, in which S2 implicates that Sl cannot provide evidence for his
claim and demands that he provides it. These are often preceded by reluc-
tance markers and are typically in an interrogative form with question
words (why, when, who).
- Contradictions, in which S2 utters the negated proposition expressed by
the previous claim.l2
- Counter-claims, in which S2 proposes an alternative claim that does neither
directly contradict nor challenge Sl'S claim, allowing further negotiation of
that claim. These tend to be preceded by pauses, prefaces, and mitigating
devices.
By showing that there are regularities in the sequential distribution of the acts
that make up an argumentative exchange, the authors demonstrate that these
categories are also something that the participants themselves orient to. They
explain this distribution by pointing to the different degrees of face threat
that are inherent in the different types of reactions. The degree of second
turn's face aggravation determines third turn's orientation; the more damag-
ing T 2, the more likely Sl will focus on restoring his face; second turns with a
ARGUMENT INTERPRETATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 171
 low degree of face threat are followed by equally low face-threatening third
turns.
Vuchinich (1990) describes patterns through which conversationalists may
end an argument. The closing problem in verbal conflict is how to bring
about the arrival of the opponent at a point where one speaker's oppositional
turn will not elicit an oppositional turn from the other. A terminal exchange is
used by participants to coordinate the closing of verbal conflicts. It takes two
basic forms, both with a fundamental two-slot structure, which can close a
verbal conflict immediately when applied. One consists of an oppositional
move, followed by assent (either agreement or compliance). Assent marks ac-
ceptance of the validity of the oppositional attack, and signals submission.
The other type of terminal exchange consists of a concession offering, fol-
lowed by acceptance of the offering. It can be extended to include multiple
concession offerings. This sequence displays consensus on the terms specified
by the concession. Participants can also close a verbal conflict while avoiding
the second slot in a terminal exchange. In those cases, oppositional turns con-
tinue with neither participant submitting until the topic is changed (stand-
off) or until the opponents withdraw from participation (withdrawal).
Linguistic Devices
Schiffrin (1985) examines various devices through which the opinion which is
defended is indicated in everyday argument. A structural clue to that opinion
is the boundary position it is given at the beginning of an extended turn, as
well as at the end of the turn, and at internal boundary positions, between two
pieces of support. Verbal indicators may point to the opinion as a concluding
generalization: indefinite pronouns, stative verbs and present tense. Further-
more, there is a clue in the differential distribution of conjunctions: coordin-
ative conjunctions often introduce the opinion; subordinative conjunctions,
the support. Finally, disputability, an important characteristic of opinions, is
often marked by devices to intensify or emphasize the content of the conver-
sation.
Vuchinich (1990) mentions various linguistic, paralinguistic or kinesic de-
vices which can be used to express opposition. Cues conveying the opposi-
tional character of a turn and its level of intensity include increased volume,
rapid tempo, contrastive stress and exaggerated intonation contours. Turn
taking becomes more competitive during verbal conflict. Overlaps and
interruptions are frequent.
Pomerantz (1984) has shown that opposition usually takes the marked
form of dispreferred responses: disagreement is produced in delayed form
172 M. AGNES VAN REES
(e.g., preceded by silence or repair initiation, hesitation particles and fillers),
prefaced by token agreement, mitigated, hedged or phrased indirectly. One
way of indirectly expressing disagreement, as Tsui (1991) has shown, is
through the use of "I don't know" by a second speaker following an assess-
ment by a first speaker. When it forms the entire turn, it functions as a strong
disagreement; when it is pushed further down into the turn and prefaced by
token agreements, hesitations, particles, etc., it becomes a weak disagree-
ment. The pragmatic motivation behind its production is often a concern
with saving face of oneself or another. In prefacing a statement with a declara-
tion of insufficient knowledge, speakers signal that they are not committed to
the truth of the proposition expressed, leaving room to retreat from the origi-
nal position, if challenged.
Schiffrin (1987) describes pragmatic and interactional functions of connec-
tives that turn up in argumentative discourse. She describes what sequential
positions they take in the discourse, what elements they connect, and from
this description she induces their pragmatic and interactional functions as
discourse markers. Her description of "and", for example, is as follows. "And"
coordinates idea units, establishing local connections within a particular ac-
tion frame, such as presenting a position, or presenting support for that posi-
tion. It signals the speaker's identification of an upcoming unit which is coor-
dinate in structure to some prior unit. In addition, "and" signals that the
speaker defines what is being said as a continuation of what preceded. 13
"But" is described by Schiffrin as marking a speaker's definition of an up-
coming unit as a contrasting action. This includes marking a speaker's effort
to return to the fulfilment of a prior expectation after intervening material.
"But", in such a case, establishes a contrast with the interceding material
immediately prior to it, and prefaces a repetition of the earlier, non-adjacent
text. It thus becomes a point-making device which indicates the speaker's
commitment to a particular assertion, when his point has been interrupted,
misunderstood, and/or challenged, but also when the speaker is issuing a
challenge of another speaker's point.
"So" serves as a marker of main idea units, which are presented as resulting
from something else, while "because" serves as a marker of subordinate idea
units, which are presented as a cause of something else. The cause-result
relationship can be located in different domains: fact based (cause-result);
knowledge based (warrant-inference); action based (motive-action per-
formed through talk, e.g., claiming) .'4 In addition, "so" serves to mark a tran-
sition such as turn ending, unit closure, and/or topic completion.
The French linguists Anscombre and Ducrot have done extensive research
into linguistic indicators of argumentative relations in natural discourse
(Ducrot 1980, 1984, Anscombre and Ducrot 1983, 1989).'5 Initially, they
ARGUMENT INTERPRETATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 173
concentrated on connectives explicitly signaling argumentation through lin-
guistic representation of causal relations between facts, such as "therefore",
"consequently'; etc. But the main thrust of their approach as it developed
subsequently, is much broader. It concerns the many and various linguistic
devices which may serve to express the inherent argumentativity of all use of
language. '6
The inherent argumentativity of the use of language rests on two founda-
tions. In the first place, all utterances potentially point to particular classes of
conclusions (this is called argumentative orientation). For example, calling
something cheap, may point to a conclusion of it being less good, or, on an-
other score, a better buy; saying that someone works hard, may point to her
becoming more tired, or getting better results. This is so because the predicate
of each uttered sentence implicitly refers to a top os, a generalization which all
members of a linguistic community have in common in their cultural back-
ground, in which gradations of properties are related to gradations of other
properties. In the second place, each utterance is part of an implicit dialogue
(this is called polyphony), which means that different points of view may be
represented in it, to only some of which the speaker commits himself.
The role of connectors and other linguistic devices is to signal the direction
of the argumentativity in an utterance and to signal to what viewpoints the
speaker does or does not commit himself. For example, in:
(5) There is a small chance that they will succeed
the speaker takes a (moderately) positive position towards their chance of
succeeding, while in:
(6) There is little chance thatthey will succeed
the speaker takes a negative position towards this chance. In addition, the dif-
ferent formulations in these utterances activate different directions in which
the topos that is implicitly referred to in the predicate is to be applied. The first
utterance activates the direct application of the top os, for example: "the more
chance of success there is in it, the more support an undertaking deserves".
The second utterance activates the converse application of the top os, for ex-
ample: "the less chance of success there is in it, the less support an undertak-
ing deserves".
Another example of the signaling role of linguistic devices is provided by
the use of the connective "but", as in:
174 M. AGNES VAN REES
(7) This restaurant is expensive, but good.
In Anscombre and Ducrot's view, in a context of discussing whether to go to a
particular restaurant or not, "but" indicates an opposition between two con-
clusions authorized by the two different topoi inherent in the predicates "ex-
pensive" and "good"; the more expensive a restaurant, the less advisable it is to
go there, and: the better a restaurant, the more advisable it is to go there.
Moreover, "but" indicates that the second conclusion is the one the speaker
wants to commit himself to, distancing himself from the first conclusion.
Anscombre and Ducrot's basically linguistically oriented work has provi-
ded a starting point for research specifically aimed at gaining more insight
into argument interpretation. Snoeck Henkemans (1995a), for example, has
shown how it can be deduced from Anscombre and Ducrot's analysis of the
French equivalents of "even" and "incidentally" that these expressions may
function as indicators of argumentation structure in complex argumenta-
tion, "even" pointing to cumulatively or complementarily coordinated
argumentation, "incidentally'; to multiple argumentation.
7.2.3 Cognitive Processes
That textual indications can indeed help the language user to interpret argu-
mentative discourse is demonstrated in experimental research into the way in
which language users understand argumentation. Van Eemeren, Grooten-
dorst and Meuffels (1984,1985,1989) found that verbal indicators of argu-
mentation, like "because", but also indicators "in the broad sense", like "owing
to" and "on the basis of", significantly facilitate recognition. If indicators like
these are absent, the presence of standpoint markers such as "I am of the
opinion that" also contributes to the ease of recognition of the argumentation
accompanying the standpoint. Jungslager (1994) shows that the latter phe-
nomenon is the result of a top-down processing strategy, in which the appear-
ance of a standpoint raises expectations as to argumentation following. Her
findings also support the findings of Van Eemeren, Grootendorst and Meuf-
fels (1985) that ~B!sentatio:n.Qrd~L9f standpQ!!lb!Igl!!!l~!~~ilit<lt.es argl!-
ment recognItion, compared to .j!.l?!~~entation order of argurnent-stand-
p(§(As to therecogii.hio~·;;findirect ;giImentation, it was [(;und that the
presence of a definite context in which a literal (non-argumentative) inter-
pretation would be unsatisfactory, greatly facilitated recognition.
Johnson-Laird (1983,1993) has studied reasoning processes of ordinary lan-
guage users. He found that human reasoning does not proceed through for-
mal, syntactic derivation on the basis of formal rules. Rather, premises func-
ARGUMENT INTERPRETATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 175
tion for natural-language users as the input for erecting a mental model of the
perceived information, corresponding to the structure of the situation. In the
inference process, semantic information from the premises is retained and
combined with existing beliefs and knowledge in a parsimonious fashion to
draw conclusions that express things not explicit in the premises. Semantic
information is retained in the sense that the way the information is framed by
the phrasing of the premises is crucial to the representation it receives in the
mental model. Problems occur because only the minimal number of explicit
models covering the premises that are stated, is erected. Implicit alternative
models representing possibilities not explicitly stated are not fleshed out. This
means that reasoners who are presented with the sentence "If she was running
after the train then she was trying to catch it" do not initially think about an
alternative situation in which the antecedent is false. Errors in reasoning,
then, are conclusions that correspond only to some of the possible models of
the premises. Typically, language users erect just a single model, representing
the premises as stated: human beings are satisficers. A critical factor in the
construction of the mental model is the availability of relevant knowledge. It
is this knowledge which makes it possible to construct alternative models of
the situation, and implicit models turn out to be fleshed out under the influ-
ence of knowledge of the contingencies.
The mental model theory has been corroborated experimentally in all the
main areas of deduction: propositional reasoning, relational reasoning and
quantified reasoning. It applies to inductive reasoning as well. Johnson-Laird
describes induction as a search for a model that is consistent with observation
and background knowledge. In inductive reasoning, both descriptive and
explanatory (abduction), language users start from a collection of proposi-
tions, assertions or perceptual observations, and then frame a hypothesis that
leads to a better description or understanding of the information contained
in these premises in relation to a background of general knowledge, going be-
yond the initial information. Inductions appear to be constrained in several
ways: they take into account available knowledge; they formulate the most
specific generalizations consistent with the data and background knowledge;
and they seek the simplest possible hypothesis consistent with the evidence.'?
In induction, as in deduction, people concentrate on what is explicit in their
models, and so they seldom seek anything other than evidence that might
corroborate their inductive hypotheses. They eschew negative instances, and
encounter them only when these arise indirectly as a result of following up al-
ternative hypotheses. As in deduction, there are equally marked effects of how
a problem is framed. And, finally, knowledge appears to play exactly the same
part as in deduction; it biases the process to yield more credible conclusions,
and it makes it possible to construct alternative models of the situation.
176 M. AGNES VAN REES
Johnson-Laird's findings concur with those of Noordman (1979), who also
observes that logical reasoning begins with and is influenced by the language
in which a problem is stated. In his research into the psychological processing
of conditional sentences, Noordman found that conditional conjunctions are
interpreted predominantly as expressions of an equivalence relation.'s In ex-
plaining these results, Noordman mentions Grice's quantitative maxim:
make your contribution as informative as required. The speaker has to supply
all the relevant information. Accordingly, the speaker of a conditional sen-
tence is cooperative only if the necessary conditions he does not mention are
irrelevant or satisfied.'9
Noordman did find some differences between the particular conjunctions
used. In addition, a difference in the nature of the communication in condi-
tional sentences was demonstrated between sentences expressing a condi-
tion-consequence relation and sentences expressing an inference relation.
Subjects feel there is a difference between conditional sentences, depending
on whether the actual cognitive "cause" or condition is in the antecedent part
of the sentence or in the consequent part. If the cognitive condition is in the
antecedent part, the sentence expresses a condition-consequence relation, in
which the condition is the "topic", or "known" information, and the conse-
quence the "comment", or "new" information. This is, for example, the case in
the following sentence:
(8) If John did not pay the examination fee, he did not get his driver's license.
If the condition is in the consequent part, the sentence expresses an inference
relation, in which the cognitive consequence in the first part of the sentence is
the topic, and the condition the comment. This is the case in the following
sentence:
(9) IfJohn got his driver's license, he paid the examination fee.
This latter type of sentence proved significantly more difficult to process.
7.3 ArgumentReconstruction
Any piece of discourse can be reconstructed in a multitude of ways, depend-
ing on the theoretical interests and the conceptual apparatus that the analyst
brings to bear on it. This section will detail the way in which argumentation
scholars from various theoretical schools approach argument reconstruc-
tion: logic (7.3.1), informal logic (7.3.2), rhetoric (703·3), and pragma-dialec-
tics (7.3-4)·
ARGUMENT INTERPRETATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 177
7·3·1 Logic
they belong to. Here, too, the terms actually used have to be interpreted a~d
substituted by terms with a sometimes different, and in all cases, more prec~se
Logicians want to discover the formal structure of the reasoning underlying
meaning than the original. For example, the English "or" usually has exclUSIve
an argument, usually in order to be able to determine the validity of the
meaning, while the V of propositional logic has inclusive meaning: the Eng-
reasoning, although sometimes their aim is to merely elucidate complex
lish "if then" usually is far more material than "material implicatIOn", and,
forms of reasoning. They will reconstruct the argument in terms of premises
moreover, often used interchangeably with "if and only if" (see 7.2.3).
and conclusions, and the reconstruction will be guided by the type of formal
system or logic (e.g., propositional, modal, deontic), and by the kind of valid-
As can be gathered from the above, the reconstruction crucially depends on
ity criterion they choose to apply. Examples of reconstruction in logic can be
the system oflogic used and the concept oflogical validity applied in eval~at­
found in logic textbooks, such as Copi and Cohen (1990), Kahane (1976) and
Rescher (1975). ing the argument. But, no matter what system guides the reconstructIOn,
there is a large gap between ordinary-language discourse and form~l-l~n­
In arguments in ordinary discourse, the formal structure of the reasoning
guage logic. There is a fairly recent movement in logic towards desIgnmg
underlying the argument, on which the validity of that reasoning depends, is
"stronger': non -monotonic logics which can account better for the character-
rarely immediately evident. Both the logical form of the constituent proposi-
istics of natural language (Van Benthem 1996). Yet, applying these stronger
tions and the logical form of the reasoning as a whole have to be recon-
logics still requires the same reconstruction steps. The necessity of account-
structed. Nuchelmans (as cited in Van Eemeren et al.1996) has analyzed this
ing for each reconstruction step remains as urgent as before. .
process of logical reconstruction as encompassing a number of abstraction
steps. Unfortunately, in the literature, the many problems of reconstructIOn
which crop up at every stage of fitting the actual discourse to the logical mod-
First, an abstraction is made from the actual persons putting forward an
el are largely ignored. Actually, it even stretches the point a bit to .talk a~out
argument at a particular time, in a particular place, in a particular context,
reconstruction at all here. Usually, what we find in logic textbooks IS fabncat-
and in a particular situation. This results in a list of propositions, constituting
ed examples, consisting of no more than a few sentences. Real-life disc~ur~e
premises and conclusion. This step requires, among other things, indexical
interpretation, disambiguation and explicitation of implicit elements. of any length is rarely encountered. Thi~ llleans, fir~ that no _attentIO!1Is
Second, the actual expressions in the original argument are disregarded. given to the in!eq)re!_ation of ~iscou~s,~tl~aJ:s-~m~I}t, q_~tof of that, no ac-=
count is gi~~-ofhow the analysis is arrived at. After ~resentatIOn of the exam-=:_
The propositions isolated in the first step are couched in the type of standard
pIes, the logical analysis is supplied as self-evident.
paraphrase that is required, by the type of logic applied., be it propositional, -" . .-

syllogistic, predicate or other. This step requires substituting expressions.

Third, the logically relevant elements are isolated from the content ele-
7.3.2 InformaiLogic
ments. The latter are referred to in abbreviated form. Here too, reconstruc-
tion is required, guided by the logical system applied. Arguments in which the
Among informal logicians, there are varying opinions as to the purpose of re-
underlying reasoning turns on the class membership of terms, for example,
construction. Some scholars want to discover whether the conclusion of an
will be reconstructed in terms of syllogistic logic, in which the logical parti-
argument is true, while other scholars want to discover whether the conclu-
cles consist of quantifier expressions, such as "all" or "some'; negation, and
sion of an argument is well-supported by what the arguer put forward, and
copula, which govern content elements consisting of general terms. Argu-
yet other scholars want to discover what the arguer meant (Adler 19~2, Berg
ments in which the underlying reasoning turns on operations on proposi-
1992, Govier 1987). Yet, most informal logicians will reconstruct the dl~course
tions as a whole, will be reconstructed in terms of propositional logic, in
in such a way that they will be able to determine to what degree and m w~at
which the logically relevant particles consist of the propositional operators
way the premises of an argument support the conclusion. 20 In informal lOgIC,
"not'; "and'; "or': "if-then'; "if and only if", which operate on content elements
consisting of propositions. as in formal logic, as a critical reaction against which it originated, recon-
struction aims to isolate the premises and conclusion of the reasoning under-
Finally, the logically relevant elements are substituted by their formalized
lying an argument. But there are at least two important d~~e:ences ~etween
logical constant counterparts, which possess a precise meaning in the logic
informal logicians and the formal logicians whom they cntiCIze, whlCh have
implications for their treatment of argument reconstruction.
M. AGNES VAN REES
ARGUMENT INTERPRETATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 179
First, for informal logicians, deductive validity is no longer necessarily the
prime or only standard for evaluating an argument. One of the important is-
sues in informal logic concerns exactly this question of the validity standard
to be applied. Most informal logicians hold that some arguments lend them-
selves to evaluation in terms of deductive validity, while others may be more
appropriately evaluated in terms of other standards. This issue has important
implications for reconstruction. It means that not all arguments must neces-
sarily be reconstructed as deductively valid. This is especially relevant in the
matter of reconstructing unexpressed premises.
Second, informal logicians view arguments as elements of ordinary, con-
textually embedded language use, directed by one language user to another in
an attempt to convince him of the plausibility (not necessarily the truth) of
the conclusion. For reconstruction, this implies taking into account the situ-
ated character of the discourse to be reconstructed.
There are two main issues pertaining to reconstruction that are dealt with
in informal ·logic: unexpressed premises and argument structure. Even
though Govier mentions other issues to be resolved in reconstruction, such as
reconstructing a passage as an argument and reconstructing the type of argu-
ment, these hardly receive any attention at all in the literature. In what fol-
lows, only a brief outline of the discussion of these main issues will be pre-
sented. They receive more extensive treatment in other chapters in this vol-
ume.
Unexpressed Premises
Arguments often appear to be incomplete, in the sense that the premises as
stated do not by themselves warrant inference of the conclusion as stated. En-
thymematic arguments, as these arguments are called, may be reconstructed
by the addition of one or more premises in such a wayas to make the inference
possible. In such a case, a so-called unexpressed premise is added.
The first issue regarding unexpressed premises is the question of exactly
when an unexpressed premise is to be reconstructed at all. Govier (1987) pre-
sents the following guideline as a preliminary answer. An unexpressed
premise should be reconstructed in cases in which an inference gap between
the stated premises and stated conclusion is perceived. As Govier herself
points out, this issue is intimately related to the further question of what kind
of validity criterion is to guide the reconstruction, in other words, as what
kind of inference structure is the argument to be reconstructed? This ques-
tion forms part of a wider debate among informal logicians about the need to
posit different forms of validity or justified inference.
180 M. AGNES VAN REES
On one side of this debate, there are the so-called deductivists (e.g., Scriven
1976 , Thomas 1986), who maintain that all arguments can be made deductive-
ly valid by the addition of an unexpressed premise. This premise must take
the form of the associated conditional, "if premise(s), then conclusion", or
variations thereof, involving generalizations of one or more content terms.
On the other hand, there are those (e.g., Govier 1987, Hitchcock 1987) who
contend that there are different types of argument to be distinguished, some
of which can indeed be considered to pretend to deductive validity, while oth-
ers cannot. As examples of this latter type, they mention arguments byanalo-
gy, empirical induction, and abduction or inference as to the best explana-
tion. In cases like these, the addition of a reconstructed unexpressed premise,
which would make the reasoning deductively valid, would do no justice to the
fundamentally different inference type underlying the argument. These crit-
ics of deductivism also point out that if the reconstructed premise takes the
form of the associated conditional, no new information is added above what
is already contained in the combination of premises and conclusion as stated.
Moreover, such a reconstruction would lead to an infinite regression, because
the whole extended set of premises requires a new associated conditional that
links this new set of premises to the conclusion. And if the reconstruction
takes the form of a universal generalization of one or more content expres-
sions, there is no end to the number of possible premises that can be added.
Groarke (1992,1999) has advanced a response to these objections. Groarke
argues that reconstructing these "other types" of arguments by adding
premises that make a deductively valid argument is perfectly possible without
doing injustice to the "different character" of the argument. As a case in point,
he cites empirical induction, in which the uncertain or inconclusive nature of
the conclusion is perfectly preserved in a deductivistic reconstruction. As
Groarke points out, it is not the nature of the inference in which the
uncertainty resides. Instead, it must be located in the shape of either the
premises or the conclusion. These may contain elements (such as the expres-
sion "probably") which account for this uncertainty or inconclusiveness.
Also, while it certainly must be admitted that in adding premises to make the
reasoning valid, there is a problem concerning the formulating of a correct re-
construction, these problems are not unique to deductivism. Non-deductiv-
ist analysis may also require the addition of unexpressed premises to account
for the beliefs or intentions of the arguer who infers a particular conclusion
from a particular premise. And in that case, there are unresolved problems in
formulating a correct reconstruction as well. The only thing that is different is
that these problems are made more difficult to solve by the absence of a clear
criterion, such as the one formal validity offers.
In any case, once it has been decided that a "gap" occurs between the
ARGUMENT INTERPRETATION AND RECONSTRUCTION
premises as stated and the conclusion, and a premise must be added, the sec-
ond issue regarding unexpressed premises becomes what the analyst's strate-
gy should be in deciding exactly which premise should be added.
On the one hand, there are authors, like Scriven and Thomas, who recom-
mend applying a principle of charity. This principle assumes that arguers try
to put forward good reasons for their claims. That is, in reconstructing unex-
pressed premises, we should add premises that, apart from making the infer-
ence formally valid, have the quality of being true. At times, the application of
this principle may even lead to charitable alterations of stated premises or,
even of stated conclusions.
On the other hand, critics of this view, notably Govier, maintain that this is
too strong a strategy, since people sometimes make errors in reasoning and
arrive at incorrect beliefs.21 Applying a principle of charity forces us to ignore
indicators of implausible assertions or faulty reasoning in order to make a
passage out as more rational than it appears to be. Also, it requires us to as-
sume that others think exactly as we do.
Govier pleads for the application of what she calls "moderate charity" (un-
less there is evidence indicating that even this is not applicable). When indica-
tors in wording, context and background knowledge as to the beliefs, inten-
tions and commitments of the arguer count equally in favor of several dis-
tinct interpretations, we must adopt the premise that generates the most
plausible argument. Unfortunately, in spite of the professed attention to ar-
gument as a form of ordinary, contextually embedded language use or situ at -
ed discourse, in informal logic, as yet, no systematic study has been undertak-
en of what these indicators are and how exactly they should be used in recon-
structing unexpressed premises. 22 A further complication is the fact that in-
formal logicians tend to take a somewhat equivocal view of the object of
reconstruction. They make no clear distinction between such different, if not
plainly incompatible purposes such as reconstructing the beliefs the arguer
had in mind, reconstructing the plausible beliefs the arguer must have had in
mind, and reconstructing what the arguer is committed to by virtue of his
words.
Argumentation structure
When a conclusion is supported by more than one argument, it becomes cru-
cial to reconstruct how these arguments hang together. The way in which ar-
gumentation structure is reconstructed has important consequences for the
evaluation of an argument. The issue is particularly relevant in the distinc-
tion between independent (convergent) and interdependent (linked) argu-
M. AGNES VAN REES
mentation. Basically, in convergent argumentation, each of the arguments
supports the standpoint independently, while in linked argumentation the
arguments, in one way or another, depend on each other to support the
standpoint. Various definitions of the di.stinction between these two types of
complexity have been given by informal logicians (e.g., Noh 1984, Thomas
1986, Govier 1988, Pinto and Blair 1989, and Freeman 1991).23
As for reconstructing argumentation structure, most authors admit that it
is often difficult to determine in practice whether a given argumentation is
linked or convergent, due to ambiguities and implicitness in its presentation.
Sometimes, in the reconstruction of the structure of the argumentation, as in
the reconstruction of unexpressed premises, the principle of charity is in-
voked. Nolt and Thomas do this, for example, when in unclear cases they ad-
vise a strategy of assuming that the arguments are linked. According to Noh,
that would seem to be the strongest attribution. Thomas says that this will
prevent the analyst in the evaluation stage from judging two arguments that
he has reconstructed as independent, to be too weak to stand independently.
Many authors emphasize that the presentation of arguments plays an im-
portant role in identifying the structure of the argumentation. Yet, in actual
fact, not much attention is paid to the systematic exploration of the clues pro-
vided by the verbal presentation. Instead, informal logicians usually rely on
their personal evaluation of whether or not the premises independently give
enough support to the conclusion. In the first case, the argument should be
reconstructed as convergent, in the second, as linked. For example, Govier
(19 88 :143) gives the following guideline for determining the structure of a
linked argument:
The way to determine the pattern is to imagine all premises except one in this
group to be false, and to ask whether the remaining premise would still give any
support to the conclusion in this case.
7.3.3 Rhetoric
Rhetoricians will reconstruct the discourse in such a way as to be able to de-
termine its persuasive effectiveness. The reconstruction will be in terms of the
elements considered to contribute to the persuasive effect of the discourse on
an audience. Contr~ to the approaches discussed so f~r.'..~~~_t~~i~al )
reconstruction,~rally speaking, is not gtil~~by~~est~<l~~~~!J ~
eYalli"illoll.1Ilesole purPOse of the reconstruction is to gain a descriptive in- i --
~ight into the elements which contribute to the persuasive effect of the dis-
course.
ARGUMENT INTERPRETATION AND RECONSTRUCTION
There are various conceptions of rhetorical analysis, each isolating particular
aspects of discourse for reconstruction. Foss (1989) distinguishes Neo-
Aristotelian, generic, metaphoric, narrative, fantasy-theme and cluster analy-
ses. 24 In Neo-Aristotelian analysis, the reconstruction focuses on the means of
persuasion mentioned by Aristotle and further elaborated in Hellenistic and
Roman schools of rhetoric. The reconstruction aims to abstract from the dis-
course, among other aspects: the parts of the discourse (exordium, narratio,
confirmatio, refutatio, digressio, peroratio), the genre (deliberative, juridical,
epideictic), the types of issue (e.g., conjectural, legal, juridical), the means of
persuasion (logos, pathos, ethos), the topics, the figures of speech, and other el-
ements of style. I_n generic analysis, rhetorical means are correlated with tr£es
of situations. The reconstruction isolates elements such as metaphors, im-
a~!s! .. ,()~·-~~~t~E·C~~~rufi\ir~·:;;'bIs.K~m~i'lill~t4.-i~r.xi~ati~ns. In
metaphoric analysis, the reconstruction focuses on the identification of the
major metaphors underlying the discourse. The analysis is aimed at revealing
how these metaphors create a particular reality. In narrative analysis, the re-
construction identifies elements of narrative structure such as events, charac-
ters, temporal relations, causal relations and themes. Other types of analysis
try to identify the key terms in the discourse, constituting the rhetor's motive,
or to reconstruct the worldview underlying a particular piece of discourse. An
example of the latter type of analysis is provided by Michael Billig's (1987,
1988,1991) work which aims to uncover social, psychological and ideological
assumptions underlying positions taken in argumentative discourse.
One Neo-Aristotelian approach that has gained particular popularity among
argumentation theorists, is Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's New Rhetoric.
In Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969), these authors undertake to give a
systematic description of argumentative techniques that may be used in ordi-
nary language to convince or to persuade an audience. This description basi-
cally amounts to a typology of argumentation schemes, that is, a typology of
kinds of argumentation that can be used to increase the acceptability of a the-
sis. Although the authors do not pay specific attention to the matter of analy-
sis or reconstruction, their system may be used as a guide for reconstructing
the argumentative techniques that underlie a particular discourse. However,
critics have pointed out that the categories are not clearly defined, that there is
no single criterion underlying the taxonomy and that, accordingly, the cate-
gories in the taxonomy are not mutually exclusive. 25 This makes it difficult for
an analyst to arrive at an unequivocal reconstruction.
Although some authors have argued that an analysis in terms of Perelman
and Olbrechts-Tyteca's typology is feasible, their work does not reveal how an
actual reconstruction is arrived at. Kienpointner (1993) merely presents the
M. AGNES VAN REES
results of an analysis of a text in terms of the typology, without giving an ac-
count of his reconstruction. Warnick and Kline (1992) present a coding sys-
tem, but without guidelines for applying the system to actual discourse. Their
observation that three individuals could apply the system with an acceptable
level of consistency is maybe reassuring, but certainly not very instructive.
\ ~_~!2"_proble~~i12.~_.<lE_~_Il:1_e_~~o~§. ~Ie(,:.on~trl:lgioQ_~~~ll_C:h!:.~c:~i~ I
I very little a~~~t~~!1_!~ the~e. Yl!rLo.1lS.rhetQl:ical.app-roache.~. There is a general l
idea that context, or rhetorical situation (Bitzer 196~~<?LP.ril!l~j!pjJ2..r~,~
) ~~;~}:~~~~;~~!:;~~~Y~~~~!t~~r~~i
,
structlon. How these elements can be identified, what clues can be made use
~«~ ... "
1. of for their reconstruction, what strategies can be applied in their reconstruc-
tion - these are questions which are not even posed, let alone answered. 26
7.3-4 Pragma-Dialectics
Pragma-dialectic analysts will reconstruct the discourse in such a way to en-
able them to determine the contribution it makes to the rational resolution of
a conflict of opinion. 27 The reconstruction is pragmatic, in that it aims at elu-
cidating the speech acts performed in the various stages of the discourse. It is
dialectic, in that it is resolution-oriented, that is, it aims to identify the ele-
ments considered to be relevant to the rational solution of disagreement. The
reconstruction results in an analytic overview of all aspects of the discourse
crucial for the resolution of the difference of opinion:
"" (1) the standpoints at issue in the difference of opinion
(2) the positions adopted by the parties, their starting points and conclusions
(3) the arguments, both implicit and explicit, adduced by the parties
(4) the argumentation structure of the arguments (," l: >-. -
(5) the argument schemes used in the arguments. 28
~
As can be seen from this list, pragma-dialectic reconstruction encompasses
more than just the logical premise-conclusion relation: it also extends to the
argument schema underlying the argument. Also, it pertains to more than
just the argumentation stage; reconstruction occurs in all the stages of a criti-
cal discussion: it concerns type of conflict (confrontation stage), concessions
and common starting points of the participants (opening stage), and the way
in which the conflict is resolved (concluding stage).
ARGUMENT INTERPRETATION AND RECONSTRUCTION
 In reconstructing the dialectically relevant speech acts, a selective idealization
of the discourse is performed, which can be described in terms of four dialec-
tical reconstruction transformations. These are: deletion, addition, substitu-
tion and permutation. In deletion, those elements that are not immediately
relevant to the process of resolving the dispute are omitted. This amounts to
the removal of elaborations, clarifications, digressions and repetitions.29 In
addition, the discourse as given is supplemented with elements that are rele-
vant to the resolution of the dispute, but which have been left unexpressed.
Implicit elements are made explicit; unexpressed steps are filled in. In substi-
tution, the elements which have a dialectical function in the discourse are pre-
sented clearly and explicitly. This involves replacing ambiguous or vague
formulations with well-defined standard phrases, elucidating the function of
indirectly phrased elements, and representing elements with the same func-
tion by the same standard phrase. In permutation, the elements in the original
discourse are ordered or rearranged in such as way as to elucidate their func-
tion in the resolution of the dispute. The dialectically relevant elements are al-
located to the various stages in the resolution process in their ideal order.
, The basis for reconstruction in pragma-dialectics.is twofold. On the one
\\ ha~~~()rIIlati:,,~ .~?l1sRl~!:.'!!!2!1§A,R~r!i!!nillg.tQ.!h~J!2!~t;~
"'i \o~r!yon~l res~lut~o~,~~~ C?::Qic~.~L()r~j()I.1' An ideal model of criticaldis-
CUSSlOn, III which the stages of dispute resolution and the speech acts to be
performed at each stage are delineated, serves ~h,~yristic.llnd a alytic tool ..
l1
that guides the analysis. By pointing out which speech acts are relevant' in the
. consecutive stages of the resolution process, the model has the heuristic func-
tion of indicating which speech acts have to be considered in the reconstruc-
tion. Speech acts that are immaterial to the resolution process are to be ig-
nored, implicit elements are to be made explicit, indirect speech acts are to be
restated as direct speech acts, and the steps of the resolution process are to be
presented in their proper order.
) O~ the ~ther han~, in tllstifying th~n'!constru(tiQ.!1, Jh~.[c: . '!r!.~~~[is~_
lcol1slderatlOns ref~rrl~~.~.the !:.~~~:~~ 0Lth~p~rt!Sld!~E<ysC:Q~!:~~tg.!>~ re-
I co~~tructed, ,viewed a~ail1st aoa~k~.ro~n~ of in~igh!§ ePQ\.!.t the oJ:.K<!!li?i!!.~~
. of9!§j:.Q.u.r~~ V1general. Use is made of various sources of empirical evidence:
ethnographic evidence about speech events and their purposes and organiza-
tion; knowledge of conventional structures and strategies in discourse, such
as rules and regularities for the performance of speech acts; and cues which
indicate how the participants themselves understand the discourse. As Van
Eemeren, Grootendorst, Jackson and Jacobs note:
186 M. AGNES VAN REES
None of these sources works alone, and all work against the background of the
analyst's own cultural knowledge and intuitive competence as a native speaker. .~
Ultimately, the acceptability of any reconstruction will rest on its overall coher::..
j~Jts~countability t~ the details o.f the te~t, and its consistency with o~her in -.
formation about how thiS case works 111 particular, h~w relateq cases of thiS ~
work in general and bow disCQ!lH'i!.m'~~9.~J199I.i'!L... " ...... j
-r-
In general, the empirical considerations justifying the reconstruction are
shaped by the pragmatic perspective inherent in pragma-dialectics, which
views language use as a rational enterprise in which speakers perform speech
acts as a means for achieving communicative and interactional goals. The re-
construction takes into account all the rules, conventions and regularities
pertinent to the performance of speech acts in ordinary discourse, as well as
all textual and contextual indicators for the elements which playa part in the
rational resolution of differences of opinion.
Sometimes empirical features of the text suggest multiple meanings, and
sometimes, empirical features do not provide decisive clues. In such cases, the
discourse will be reconstructed in such a way that it is congruent with the dis-
tribution of speech acts in the ideal model of a critical discussion, thus using a
strategy of ma:~J!!!:B1Zx"tjj.alecticaLaJJ.a.l.}!.s4. For example, for an analysis of
speechacts~the argumentation stage, this means that if the communicative
force is not completely clear, an argumentative interpretation will be tried, re-
sulting in a reconstruction of these speech acts as argumentation. To be sure, a
maximally dialectical analysis of this sort is chosen only where such an analy-
sis is not ruled out by empirical considerations.
A prime example of the application of pragmatic principles in pragma-di-
alectic reconstruction is the treatment of implicit or indirectly expressed ele-
ments of the resolution process. Implicitness and indirectness are ordinary
phenomena of everyday language use, which generally cause little difficulty to
ordinary language users. Searle (1975) and Grice (1975) have explained how it
is that speech acts can be performed implicitly and indirectly and how it is
possible for a listener to understand what a speaker who performs an implicit
or indirect speech act means. This explanation is drawn upon by Van
Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984,1990, and 1992) in accounting for the re-
construction of im plicit or indirect elements of the resolution process. As an
example, let us examine the following closing sentences of an essay text advo-
cating instant abolishment of nuclear arms:
ARGUMENT INTERPRETATION AND RECONSTRUCTION
 (10) Why hesitate any longer? After all, we have a world to lose.
The first question the analyst has to answer is: is this an argumentative se-
quence? An affirmative answer could be justified along the following lines.
The text is an essay in which a position is being advocated. These are the clos-
ing lines of the text. They may be expected to contain something like a sum-
mary conclusion to the argument. Such a conclusion would be relevant in
such a position. Also, one of the meanings of the expression "after all" is that
the clause following it states a reason for the statement preceding it, establish-
ing a particular, argumentative relevance of the second sentence to the first.
All this points to the conclusion that we do have an argumentative sequence
here with the first sentence presenting a standpoint and the second an argu-
ment for that standpoint.
However, at first sight, the first sentence does not look very much like a
standpoint. It begins with a wh-pronoun and ends with a question mark.
How can the analyst account for reconstructing it nevertheless as a stand-
point? First of all, we note that a literal question as to what the reasons are for a
prolongation of hesitation, seems rather out of place. The reader, not being
present, cannot provide an answer. Nor does the writer himself proceed to an-
swer the question in the text; rather, the sentence initiates the terminating se-
quence of the discourse. A non-literal analysis, then, seems to be indicated.
Second, we note that the form of the question, with a missing copula, is of a
particular kind conventionally used for performing speech acts other than
those of a question. The presence of any points in the same direction. Both
characteristics are conventional marks of a rhetorical question, an utterance
with the form of a question but the function of a statement. The writer impli-
cates, in other words, that there is no reason to continue hesitating. Last, we
note that the propositional content of the question (and the implied state-
ment) refers to the preparatory condition for the performance of another '
speech act, namely that of a proposal. A preparatory condition for putting
forward a proposal is that there is good reason to do what the speaker propose
to do. By implying that there is no good reason to keep on hesitating, the
writer of this text proposes to quit hesitating any longer. And in the next sen-
tence' he gives an argument for the position that this is a proposal meriting
acceptance.
Once we have established that we have an argumentative sequence here, a
second question arises. Taken strictly by themselves, the statement that we
should quit hesitating and the statement that we have a world to lose, seem at
first sight to have nothing to do with each other. That would mean that we
would have to charge the writer with irrelevancy here. But by virtue of the
Communicative Principle we may assume that in actual fact he is being rele-
188 M. AGNES VAN REES
vant. In order to do justice to this assumption, we ascribe to the writer a com-
mitment to an implicit premise connecting the two statements. So, on prag-
matic grounds, the reconstruction must encompass a representation of this
implicit premise as well.
The reconstruction of this implicit premise is also accounted for along
pragmatic lines. We can formulate a number of statements that would fulfill
the requirement of connecting the two statements which make up the argu-
ment as presented. In choosing one that we may hold the writer to, once again
we may appeal to the Communicative Principle. As this principle demands, it
should be a premise by which the writer can be assumed to have performed
the speech act of argumentation in a valid and sincere way. Since the felicity
conditions for the valid and sincere performance of this speech act require
that the speaker believe that his argument does strengthen the acceptability of
the standpoint and that the listener believes this as well, the premise should be
one that makes the connection between standpoint and argument valid ac-
cording to some shared criterion of logical validity.3 D Yet, although it should
be within the range of statements to which the writer, according to the above,
could be held by virtue of what he has said, the premise should be one which is
sufficiently informative for the speaker not to have violated the maxim of
quantity. That is, the premise should be more general than the logical mini-
mum or associated conditional. Knowledge of the world and of the context
play an important part in the analyst's decision at this point. In this particular
example, the analyst might reconstruct an implicit premise such as: if a par-
ticular line of conduct results in fatal damage to the world, one should relin-
quishit.
Another resource for accounting for particular reconstructions is knowl-
edge of the principles of conversational organization and awareness of the
manifold purposes which conversationalists aim to achieve in their contri-
butions to a conversation, as Van Rees (199sa, 1995b, and 1996) has demon-
strated. Deviations from the ideal model can be accounted for in terms of
these principles, such an account providing a justification for the application
of particular dialectical transformations.
In pragma-dialectics, the object of the reconstruction are not the beliefs or
intentions of the arguer, or what the arguer ought to believe or intend, or
what would make a conclusion true. It is no more and no less than what the
arguer can be held to in view of his words. That is why a systematic justifica-
tion of the reconstruction is considered of prime importance.
Although in pragma-dialectics the importance of a systematic account of
the reconstruction of argumentative discourse is acknowledged, much re-
mains to be done to make such an account possible. On the one hand, the nor-
mative conceptual apparatus must be further developed and filled in. On the
ARGUMENT INTERPRETATION AND RECONSTRUCTION
 other hand, more insight needs to be gained into the pragmatic conventions,
the procedures, strategies and linguistic devices which ordinary language
users employ in producing and interpreting argumentative discourse, and
into the way in which normatively relevant elements show up in ordinary
argumentative discourse. Recent research into argumentative indicators
(Snoeck Henkemans 1995 a and b, 1999, and 2000) and into the way in which
language users try to manipulate conflict resolution through rhetorical
means (Van Eemeren and Houtlosser 1998, 1999 a, b, and c) represents a move
in the right direction.
7.4 Conclusion\.g·:
, \ " ,{\ '
.7r\'" '/' 0"'-'"'"
. C
~T~~ti!!!~~I?!~!lt.iQD is the work that ordinary language users do to rec-
ognize and understand the arguments that a speaker or writer adduces to
support his standpoints, even if these arguments are expressed indirectly or
implicitly or if they are intertwined with other textual structures. A~!!!.~!!t
rec9!1!'.!!.ll.<:t.ioJ1is what an argum.ent~!!Q!! s«:;lwhu: do~~ ifhe wants to describe,
exylain or e"ahlate argu~~~t~ti~~"irom a particuJar the9re!iS~R~£~~~!~i5:-
Although in this chapter the two activities have been treated separately,
there is an important connection between them. Interpretation is the basis of
~
:,~.~.!!.~lCtion. Before argumentation theorists can reconstruct a Riece of ar-
gumentative discourse, they need to have interpreted it. Moreover, recon-
-;'
• -structT~;~q;riresth~~;;:d sy~~;;:;':rtic"i;;:teg;;tion of both a critical
. :'/~~eciI~~-?-0~;:mai:l~~9iLOf~rgument~,~;i~di~~E-m:
t~r,<:~!j?", .~~g~~~!,,:,v,.~~.an,',~~de. scri£!i.:v.~ E~Esp. e~!,~'Y~,. b.,a,s!!.A.Q!!.!h~22.::.
~sClentlfic st~dy ot human !>~~~~_iiuiute.~~t i!l!l~tllr~:l~~:
uage .llllii.~~~!anding of discourse.,
. The majority of th';~tair;~theories that have been discussed in this
chapter do not make the grade in their approach to reconstruction exactly be-
cause they pay too little attention to the way in which argumentation is ex-
pressed in ordinary discourse and the way in which ordinary language users
interpret argumentation. As a consequence, the reconstructions that are per-
formed usually remain unaccounted for and the problems that occur when
natural language use is molded to fit a theoretical model are neglected. That is
an unfortunate situation, because only when these problems receive the at-
tention that they deserve, work in the reconstructional component of argu-
mentation theory can advance.
190 M. AGNES VAN REES
Notes
1 Jackson (1992) refers to this activity as "naive reconstruction:'
2 Van Eemeren, Grootendorst, Jacobs, and Jackson (1993: 50-6) distinguish
various perspectives and approaches: etic!emic, a priori/a posteriori, se-
quential/conventional/rational.
3 A similar view is advocated by Gumperz (1992a,b).
4 The idea that discourse is organized around an over-all goal also has been
elaborated by others, such as Rehbein (1977) and Ehlich and Rehbein
(1986), but Jacobs and Jackson explicitly elaborate this view in order to
clarify the organization and interpretation of argument.
5 The relationship between goals and speech acts is not as one-directional
and static as this formulation suggests. Tracy (1991) presents a collection
of articles emphasizing the complex, dynamic, multi-directional nature of
this relationship.
6 This conception of the notion of relevance as relevance with regard to
communicative and interactional goals is not only more encompassing,
but also more adequate than that of Sperber and Wilson (1986), which
only covers relevance with regard to propositions.
7 These conditions apply to the question per se, that is, as an attempt to get
the listener to provide certain information. In asking a question, the
speaker poses as someone for whom these conditions are fulfilled. This is
not to deny that sometimes questions are asked in order to reach other
objectives, and that in those cases these conditions may not be fulfilled in
actual fact. Yet, in order to reach those other objectives, the speaker does
something which has as its aim to elicit certain information, and asking a
question, with all the implications attached to the performance of this
speech act, is an efficient way of doing that.
8 Empirical backing for this claim can be found in Clark (1979)·
9 The fulfillment of the felicity conditions in turn may be challenged by an
interlocutor. When this occurs, the problematized element functions as a
"virtual standpoint" in need of defense. The entire complex of recon-
structible commitments associated with the performance of a speech act
can be considered as a "disagreement space", a structured set of
opportunities for argument (Jackson 1992, van Eemeren, Grootendorst,
Jacobs and Jackson 1993).
10 The term argument is used here in its procedural sense of having an argu-
ment. .
11 Actually, what we have in 4 is an argument for the counter-assertlOn.
12 This type of disagreement is also mentioned by Co~ter (~990). .
13 As Schiffrin points out, the identification of the umts whIch are bemg
191
ARGUMENT INTERPRETATION AND RECONSTRUCTION
 continued and their structural equivalents, depends on the use of textual
information beyond "and" itself.
14 A similar distinction is made by Sweetser (1990), criticized by Snoeck
Henkemans (1999).
15 Their work has been made accessible to the English-speaking world by
publications of Lundquist (1987), Nolke (1992), Verbiest (1994), Snoeck
Henkemans (1995a, 1995b).
16 As will become clear from what follows, these authors use the term argu-
mentativityin a rather idiosyncratic sense. No argument need be present
in cases in which Anscombre and Ducrot point to an inherent argumen-
tativity. They merely use the term to refer to the fact that a speaker
through his use oflanguage may express a particular perspective on the
matter at hand,
17 This observation, I think, applies also to what ordinary language users do
when making implicit premises explicit.
18 Noordman mentions in passing that people are not violating the rules of
logic when they interpret a conditional sentence not as material implicati-
on but as equivalence. If in actual fact, due to all kinds of pragmatic fac-
tors, the relation between the antecedent and the consequent in the
conversational context is a biconditional relation, then people are think-
ing lo~icallywhen they interpret a conditional sentence as a biconditional
sentence.
19 A connection between this maxim and the mental models hypothesis is
evident: they are each other's complement. If more processing than the
satisficing minimum is necessary on the listener's part, more information
should be given by the speaker.
20 Various criteria are applied for determining the support the premises lend
to the conclusion, such as relevance, sufficiency, and acceptability (John-
son and Blair 1993 and more or less similar ones in Govier 1987, and Free-
man 1988).
21 Adler (1996) argues that applying the principle of charity does not exclude
the possibility that people make mistakes and commit fallacies.
22 A case in point is offered by Wreen (1989), who mentions a number of re-
construction principles (among others: interpret charitably, situate the
argument in its context, and take all relevant background information
into consideration), but subsequently carries out a reconstruction (of an
ad baculum argument) without clarifying how the application of these
principles leads to the reconstruction as performed.
23 A review is given in chapter 5 of this book by Snoeck Henkemans.
24 Cf. also Wenzel (1987), who mentions as topics for rhetorical analysis,
among others: the main line of argument, narrative form, ethos as created
192 M. AGNES VAN REES
by style, humor, and other signs of good character and good will, audience
adaptation, root metaphors, stylistic analysis of the order and relation of
elements in the discourse.
25 For a concise exposition of the taxonomy and of its weaknesses, see Van
Eemeren et al. (1996).
26 Examples of analyses in which a reconstruction of the ideological position
of the author of a given text is accounted for byway of a detailed descrip-
tion of the textual features in which this position is manifested, can be
found in a body ofliterature not specifically focused on argumentation as
such, namely that of critical discourse analysis (for instance, Van Dijk 1988,
Fairclough 1989, Kitis and Milapides 1997)·
27 For an extensive discussion of pragma-dialectic reconstruction, see Van
Eemeren, Grootendorst, Jacobs, and Jackson (1993)·
28 Cf. Van Rees (1992b) and Walton (1992) on reconstructing discourse as a
critical discussion; Houtlosser (1998), Koetsenruijter (1994), Slot (1993) on
reconstructing standpoints; Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (19 82 ,19 83)
on reconstructing unexpressed premises; Snoeck Henkemans (199 2) on
reconstructing argumentation structure; and Garssen (1994) on recon-
structing argument schemes.
29 On applying deletion in cases of repetition, cf. Van Rees (199 6 ).
30 According to Van Eemeren et al. (1996), no dogmatic commitmentto de-
ductivism is intended.
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ARGUMENT INTERPRETATION AND RECONSTRUCTION
199
 8 Argumentation in the Field of Law
Eveline T. Feteris

8.1 Introduction

In law, argumentation plays an important role specifically when someone

presents a legal claim and wishes others to accept this claim. A lawyer who
pleads a case in court must justify his or her case with arguments.' The judge
who makes a decision is expected to support it with arguments. In fact, in
many legal systems the judge is obligated to justify his or her decision. When a
legislator introduces a bill in Parliament, he or she is expected to support this
proposal with reasons. Legal scholars are also expected to justify their opin-
ions to colleagues. In fact, everybody who advances a legal standpoint and
wishes this standpoint to be accepted by others, will have to present justifying
arguments.
This explains why, for argumentation theorists, legal argumentation is not
only an important field for research, but also an important context for the ap-
plication of ideas developed in argumentation theory. In the field of law, re-
search questions can be how ideas developed in law and legal theory (ju-
risprudence) on criteria for the soundness oflegal argumentation are related
to ideas developed in argumentation theory. What kinds of general and spe-
cific standards of rationality must be met when justifying a legal decision? Is it
sufficient for the judge to only mention the facts of the case and the laws, or is
he also expected to explain why legal statutes are applicable to a particular
case? How can the interpretation of a law be justified in a rational way? What
is the relation between legal rules, legal principles and general moral norms
and values in the context oflegal justification? Are there any special norms for
the decision of a judge when compared with the justification of other legal
standpoints? As to the application of insights from argumentation theory to
the field of law, research questions can be how insights from argumentation
theory can be applied in a judicial context. How can a general argumentation
model be used for analyzing and evaluating legal arguments? How can legal
arguments be reconstructed in terms of a general model of argumentation?
How can general standards of rationality be applied to legal arguments?
In this chapter, a survey of research by argumentation theorists and legal
theorists carried out in the past thirty years is presented. By giving an outline

201
of the various approaches and topics, a map will be drawn of the field of study
and an overview will be given of the various developments in the field of re-
search.
In the past thirty years, scholars from both argumentation theory and legal
theory have addressed various aspects of the legal argument. The interest in
legal argumentation began with legal theory. In the 1970S and 1980s, a number
of international legal theory conferences were dedicated to the topic of argu-
mentation and law. 2 In argumentation theory, the interest in legal argumen-
tation began to grow in the 1970S and 1980s. At the International Society for
the Study of Argumentation (ISSA) conferences on argumentation and the
Speech Communication Association (SCA) conferences, legal argumenta-
tion is always one of the conference themes. 3
Various authors began publishing research surveys in the field oflegal argu-
mentation after 1970. The first of these were mainly concerned with logical
approaches. Horovitz (1972) surveys the discussions between formalists and
non-formalists concerning the role oflogic in legal argumentation. He con-
cludes that the disagreement between the two sides depends largely on differ-
ent uses of basic terms and that the non-formalistic thesis depends substan-
tively on erroneous views. Kalinowski (1972) describes various approaches in
legal logic and proposes a specific theory for legal argumentation in which a
classification of the types of reasoning is presented. Later surveys concentrate
on aspects which relate to argumentation theory and language philosophy.
Struck (1977) discusses various argumentation models. He argues that none
of the models including empirical description models (Toulmin, topics),
normative evaluation models from epistemology (logic, critical rationalism,
hermeneutics), society theory (Marxism, Habermas, Erlanger Schule) offer a
suitable instrument for assessing the rationality of legal argumentation. He
concludes that social topics and rhetoric can offer such an instrument. Alexy
(1989) develops a theory oflegal argumentation based on insights from ana-
lytic moral philosophy (including Stevenson, Wittgenstein, Austin, Hare,
Toulmin, and Baier), Habermas' consensus theory of truth, the Erlangen
School's theory of practical deliberation, and Perelman's theory of argumen-
tation. Rieke (1982) reviews various forms of research on argumentation in
the legal process. He discusses contributions from such divergent fields as
rhetorical analysis, judge's instructions, lawyer communication functions,
television and trials. Rieke argues that an analysis of judicial reasoning in con-
flicts involving freedom of expression is an area for potential research.
A number of journals in the field of argumentation theory, speech commu-
nication, informal logic, legal theory and legal philosophy also publish arti-
202 EVELINE T. FETERIS
cles on legal argumentation on a regular basis. 4 Recently, a number of jour-
nals have published special issues on legal argumentation.s
Research on legal argumentation over the past thirty years has exposed a rich
variety of topics, approaches, ideas and principles. Legal argument is studied
in various contexts such as legal theory (jurisprudence), the legislative pro-
cess, the legal process and ilie process of judicial decision-making. Various
methodological approaches can be distinguished in these writings. Some au-
thors opt for a normative approach which emphasizes how a judge can justify
his or her decision in a rational way, or how a legal discussion can be conduct-
ed reasonably. Others prefer a descriptive approach, concentrating on real-
life processes of argument, for instance by investigating argumentative tech-
niques which are effective in convincing a certain legal audience.
There are also various aspects which can be the object of study. Some au-
thors concentrate on the philosophical and methodological aspects; some de-
velop theoretical models and attempt to establish the norms for rational justi-
fication; some concentrate on the description of legal practice; still others
specify methods for developing practical skills in analyzing, evaluating and
writing legal texts.
To give a clear picture of the similarities and differences between the vari-
ous contributions, the research in this chapter is treated from two angles. In
8.2 the research is first divided into three main approaches oflegal argumen-
tation: the logical, the rhetorical, and the dialogical approach. In 8.3, the re-
search is discussed with respect to the various topics which are the objects of
study that can be distinguished in these approaches. To make the survey as
complete and representative as possible, the discussion of the various contri-
butions has been kept necessarily brief. A more elaborate and detailed discus-
sion of the various theories can be found in Fundamentals ofLegalArgum en-
tation (Feteris 1999a).
8.2 Different Approaches to Legal Argumentation
8.2.1 The Logical Approach
The approach in the study oflegal argumentation with the longest tradition is
the logical approach. In a logical approach, the role of formal validity is em-
phasized as a criterion of rationality for legal argumentation and logical Ian -
guages are used for reconstructing legal arguments. From a logical perspec-
tive, it is a necessary condition of the acceptability of a legal justification that
the argument underlying the justification be reconstructible as a logically
ARGUMENTATION IN THE FIELD OF LAW 203
 valid argument. Another condition would include that the reasons put forth
as a justification are acceptable according to legal standards; the decision (the
conclusion) only follows from the legal rule and the facts (the premises) if an
argument is logically valid.
Some authors view the requirement of logical validity as a standard of
soundness of legal argumentation that must be related to the requirement
that a legal decision should be based on a general rule. When someone claims
that a legal decision is based on a general rule, he or she claims that the same
solution should be chosen in similar cases.
The authors who take the logical approach have different opinions as to
whether an analysis of legal arguments requires a deontic logic. Following
KIug (1951), some authors argue that normative concepts such as "obliged"
and "prohibited" can be defined by means of normative predicates, and with-
out needing to postulate a special class of operators, such as "it is obliging
that" and "it is permissible that." And accordingly, they add, that legal argu-
ments can be reconstructed adequately in terms of a predicate logic. 6
Others, like Soeteman (1989), are of the opinion that a deontic logic, in
which normative concepts are analyzed as separate logical constants, is more
suitable for analyzing legal arguments? A deontic logic involves a further
elaboration of propositional logic and predicate logic, and can thus be used
not only for the same types of arguments, but also for other types that these
more elementary systems are not capable of formulating. 8
Recently, various authors working in the field of artificial intelligence and
law offered a different kind of elaboration of standard logic for the analysis of
legal reasoning. Hage et al. give a logic for reasoning with legal rules; in such a
reason based logic, arguments for and against a legal standpoint can be
weighed with greater assurance than is possible in standard logic. 9 In another
development, Prakken developed a logical system for a dialogical analysis of
legal argument. Because existing logical systems reconstruct only mono-
logues, he developed logical systems in which it is possible to compare argu-
ments for and against conflicting conclusions put forward in the context of a
dialogue. 1O
8.2.2 The Rhetorical Approach
As a reaction to the logical approach and the emphasis it places on formal as-
pects oflegal argumentation, the rhetorical approach emphasizes the content
of arguments and the context-dependent aspects of acceptability. In this ap-
proach, the acceptability of argumentation is dependent on the effectiveness
of the argumentation for the audience to which it is addressed. The audience
204 EVELINE T. FETERIS
might consist of individuals, such as a magistrate in Traffic Court, or collec-
tions of people, such as a criminal trial jury, the lawyers-subscribers of a legal
journal or the legal community as a whole. Prominent contributions to the
rhetorical approach are Perelman's "new rhetoric", Toulmin's argumentation
model and Viehweg's topical approach. All three authors have written about
the legal argument, and their ideas have been further developed by others.
In Logique juridique. Nouvelle rhetorique (1976) Perelman describes the start-
ing points and argumentative techniques used in law to convince an audience
of the acceptability of a particular legal decision. He describes how judges use
certain generally accepted starting points in justifying their decisions. Exam-
pies of such starting points are legal principles such as those of fairness, equi-
ty, good faith, freedom, etc. Argument schemes, such as analogy and a con-
trario, enable a judge to win the assent of others. By using analogical reason-
ing, a judge can show that a certain rule which is applicable to certain cases is
also applicable to a case similar in relevant respects. By using a contrario rea-
soning he or she can show that a rule is not applicable to an actual case which
may seem similar at first sight.
In legal argumentation literature, Perelman's ideas are frequently cited. In
Practical Reasoning in Human Affairs: Studies in Honor of Chaim Perelman
(edited by Golden and Pilotta 1986), various authors discuss the application
of Perelman's ideas in the field of law. Haarscher focuses on Perelman's ideas
about justice, Makau discusses his legal model and Rieke describes various
approaches of the process oflegal decision-making and describes the advan-
tages of Perelman's rhetorical approach for the argumentative analysis of le-
gal decision-making.
In Chaim Perelman et la pensee contemporaine (edited by Haarscher 1993)
various authors concentrate on the legal aspects of Perelman's ideas. Christie
delves into the role of the universal audience in law, Ankaku discusses the in-
fluence of Perelman's ideas on legal thinking in Japan, Maneli discusses the
importance of Perelman's new rhetoric as legal philosophy and methodology,
Kamenka and Erh-Soon Tay apply Perelman's ideas to common law and con-
tinental European law and Terre discusses the role of the judge in Perelman's
new rhetoric.
The AnIerican legal philosopher Maneh (1993) argues that Perelman's
rhetorical criterion of soundness offers an attractive alternative to formal log-
ical criteria. The AnIerican Speech Communication theorists, Makau (1984)
and Schuetz, (1991) have adjusted Perelman's theory for the analysis of certain
examples of legal argument. Schuetz shows how precedent is used in a Mexi-
can criminal court to give an effective defense of a particular legal position.
Makau shows how the US Supreme Court addresses a composite audience, an
ARGUMENTATION IN THE FIELD OF LAW 205
 audience consisting of a number of different addressees: justices (both pre-
sent and future), lower court justices, legal administrators, legislators,
lawyers, participating litigants, legal scholars and other educated members of
the political world. Each of these groups reflects unique, often conflicting sets
of interests, values and beliefs. Wiethoff (1985) discusses Perelman's philoso-
phy oflegal argument.
In The Uses ofArgument, Toulmin (1958) employs examples drawn from the
legal process to establish that argument-adequacy is not determined by for-
mal logical validity. He shows that argument is field-dependent. The accept-
ability of the content of the argument, however, depends on its subject matter
and on the audience to which it is addressed. In An Introduction to Reasoning
(1984) Toulmin, together with Rieke and Janik, further elaborates his model
for the analysis of arguments in various contexts. In a chapter on legal argu-
mentation, they adapt the procedure specifically to the analysis of legal argu-
ment.
In the literature on legal argumentation, various authors have used Toul-
min's model. Some authors only use his terms, others use the model as an ana-
lytical tool for reconstructing relevant elements oflegal arguments. Peczenik
(19 83: 4-5) employs Toulmin's terminology for his claim that a legal decision is
always derived from a statement about the facts in combination with a war-
rant as an inference rule. Rieke and Stutman (1990: 95-98) use Toulmin's ter-
minology in distinguishing various elements in the argument of an attorney.
They specify which parts of an argument playa role in convincing a jury.
Newell and Rieke (1986) consider legal doctrine as a set of warrants for legal
decisions. Using decisions handed down by the US Supreme Court, they
show how legal principles function as a warrant for legal decisions. If an argu-
ment by the Supreme Court attains the status of a generally accepted princi-
ple, according to Newell and Rieke, such an argument does not require fur-
ther justification. Snedaker (1987) employs the Toulmin model for an analysis
and evaluation of the famous Sam Sheppard trial.
There are also authors who draw upon classical rhetorical theory. In a topical
approach to legal argumentation, Aristotle's Topics is the starting point for
theories involved in finding relevant arguments. In a legal context, arguments
must be based on general viewpoints (topoi) which can convince a legal audi-
ence. Examples of such legal topoi are general legal principles such as those of
fairness, of equity, etc. A prominent representative who employs the topical
approach is the German legal theorist, Viehweg (1954).Il By using topoi, in his
view, arguments can be found and formulated which can be used for justify-
ing a legal decision.12
206 EVELINE T. FETERIS
Others use the classical status theory, a theory on the various standard ques-
tions that should be answered with regard to a certain issue. Hohmann (1989)
and McEvoy (1991, 1995) apply classical status theory to the analysis of legal
argument. A modern version of status theory is the theory of so-called stock
issues applied by Dicks (1976), in the analysis of the famous Angela Davis trial.
There are also authors who pay attention to important aspects of medieval
rhetorical theories for legal argumentation. Hohmann, for one, describes
medieval (1995, 1998) and renaissance (1999) perspectives on logic and
rhetoric in legal argumentation.
In American speech communication, various authors describe legal argu-
mentation from a rhetorical perspective. Rieke (1986,1991) uses a rhetorical-
dialogical perspective. He argues that the analysis of legal decisions must oc-
cur in the context of the broader process' oflegal decision-making. According
to him, this process is a dialogue in which judges, together with others, try to
structure their normative convictions by using dialectical and rhetorical
structures.
Dicks (1981) describes the rhetorical strategies in a legal process. Hample
(1979) discusses the role of choices in the legal decision-making process.
From the perspective of legal realism he describes the rhetorical techniques
used by judges to hide their personal motives. Olson and Olson (1991) de-
scribe rhetorical techniques in a criminal process in which the illegal import
of foreigners is discussed.
Modern versions of a rhetorical approach can also be found among the au-
thors who belong to the Critical Legal Studies movement or the Law and Lit-
erature movement. These authors consider a legal text to be a social, cultural
and political phenomenon and analyze the way in which linguistic and textu-
al techniques are used to express (or hide) a particular ideology.'3 Herbeck
(1995a) explains the contribution of the Critical Legal Studies approach to ar-
gumentation theory. He discusses the role of legal reasoning in the American
legal system and considers the implications tlIis conception of jurisprudence
has for argumentation theory. Scallen (1995) discusses the most recent mani-
festations of the debate in the Law and Literature movement. She traces the
evolution of the Law and Literature schools and shows how these schools
have influenced the conceptual development and teaching of American law.
She also points out connections between the Critical Legal Studies and Law
and Economics movements in the US and raises questions about the Law and
Literature movement.
An important representative of this kind of approach in American law is
Posner (1988,1990, and 1992). Various authors such as Herbeck (1995), Janas
ARGUMENTATION IN THE FIELD OF LAW 207
 (1995) and Panetta and Hasian (1995) discuss the importance of Posner's ideas
for legal argumentation. Other representatives of such a critical approach are
Cornell (1992), Delgado (1995) and Fish (1989).
Various authors have published cases studies from the perspective of
la~/rhetoric/literature. Klinger (1989) argues that the literary approach offers
an Im~ortant p~rspective for the study oflegal decisions. Twigg (1989) gives a
narrative analYSIS of US Supreme Court decisions which interpret the United
States Constitution and shows which political ideology upholds this inter-
pretation. Recently, several argumentation journals have dedicated special is-
sues to the rhetorical approach oflegal argumentation. In one such special is-
sue of Argumentation, edited by Lempereur et al. (1991), the importance of
(classical) rhetorical ideas for legal argumentation is discussed. In a special is-
sue of Argumentation and Advocacy, Makau, Lawrence, Srader, Bruschke and
Klinger discuss legal communication and argumentation.
8.2·3 The Dialogical Approach
Recently, a new approach to legal argumentation has emerged in which legal
~rgu~entation is considered from the perspective of a discussion procedure
In whICh a legal position is defended according to certain rules for rational
~iscuss.ion. In such approaches, which can be called dialogical, legal argument
IS ~onsidered as part of a dialogue about the acceptability of a legal stand-
pomt. The rationality of the argument depends on whether the procedure
meets certain formal and material standards of acceptability. Prominent rep-
resentatives of a dialogical approach to legal theory are Aarnio (1977,19 87),
Alexy (1989). and Peczenik (1983,1989 ).14 Just as Habermas, they consider legal
argumentatIOn a form of rational communication for reaching a rational
consensus by means of discussion.
With respect to the analysis and evaluation of arguments, these authors
draw a distinction between formal, material and procedural aspects of justifi-
cation. With regard to the product of an argument, Aarnio (19 87), Alexy
(1989), MacCormick (1978), Peczenik (1983) and Wr6blewski (1974) distin-
guish two levels in the reconstruction of the justification of legal decisions.
On the level of the internal justification, the formal aspects are deployed where
the argument is reconstructed as a logically valid argument with laws and
facts as premises, and the decision as conclusion. The external justification
utilizes the material aspects, which asks the question: can the facts and the law
or norm used in the internal justification be considered acceptable?
A dialogical approach requires discussions to accord with certain proce-
dural criteria of rationality. For a legal decision to be acceptable, it is impor-
208 EVELINE T. FETERIS
tant that the participants observe certain rules. The basic principles of such
systems (e.g., that of Alexy) are the principles of consistency, efficiency, testa-
bility, coherence, generalizability and sincerity. Aarnio (1987) and Peczenik
(1983,1989) depart from these rules and make several additions.
In the Netherlands, Feteris, and Kloosterhuis and Plug, approach legal ar-
gumentation from a dialogical perspective. They use a pragma-dialectical ap-
proach in which the process oflegal argumentation is considered a contribu-
tion to a rational discussion. From this viewpoint, the legal process is ana-
lyzed in terms of an ideal model for rational dispute-resolution. Feteris (1987,
1990, 1991, 1993a, 1993b, and 1995) notes various similarities and differences
between legal and non-legal discussions. Kloosterhuis (1994,1995, and 1999)
deVelops an analytical framework for the reconstruction of argumentation
based on analogy and a contrario reasoning. Plug (1994,1995, and 1999) pro-
poses how the justification of a legal decision can be analyzed from the per-
spective of a critical discussion and describes the various argumentation
structures used in the justification.
8.3 Topics in the Research of Legal Argumentation
8.3.1 The Philosophical Component
In the previous section, the theoretical approaches prominent in the research
of legal argumentation have been described. Now various topics that are the
object of study in these approaches will be reviewed. In order to give a syste-
matic survey of the topics, they are related to the various components of a re-
search program oflegal argumentation. In a research program, a distinction
can be made between the philosophical, theoretical, analytical, empirical and
practical components. 15
The philosophical component pertains to the normative foundation of a the-
ory of legal argumentation. The philosophical component raises questions
regarding the rationality criteria for legal argumentation and the differences
between legal norms of rationality and other (moral) norms of rationality.
Two important questions raised in the philosophical component are which
general (moral) and which specific legal criteria of rationality should be used
in evaluating legal argument. Habermas (1988) examines the question of
which criteria legal argumentation should meet in order to be morally ac-
ceptable. He notes the special institutionalized procedures that should guar-
antee that morally acceptable decisions are reached in a legal system. Alexy
(1989) develops a theory oflegal argument that combines claims about the ra-
ARGUMENTATION IN THE FIELD OF LAW 209
 tionality of general practical argumentation with specific insights on legal
norms of rationality. Following Alexy, Gun ther (1989) takes legal argumenta-
tion to be a special form of general moral argumentation, which takes place
under certain restrictions.
8.3.2 The Theoretical Component
In the theoretical component, theoretical models for legal argumentation are
developed in which the structure of legal argument and the norms and rules
for argument-acceptability are formulated. Wroblewski (1974) has developed
a model which isolates the elements that enter into the justification of a legal
decision. An adapted version of this model is elaborated by Aarnio (1987) and
Alexy (1989 ).A distinction is made between two levels of justification - the in-
ternal and the external. Aarnio (1987), Alexy (1989), MacCormick (197 8) and
Peczenik (1983, 1989) attempt to specify applicable norms for these two levels.
Apart from these general theoretical developments, there are also accounts
which pay attention to specific aspects of rational legal argument. Aarnio
(1987),Alexy and Peczenik (1990), Gunther (1989), MacCormick (1978) Mac-
Cormick and Summers (1991), and Peczenik (1983, 1989) emphasize coher-
ence as one of the most important of these criteria.
Other authors emphasize the fallacies found in law. Hohmann (1991) discuss-
es the role of fallacies in legal argument. Prott (1991) discusses International
Court decisions in which various fallacies occur such as the argumentum ad
hominem, the argumentum ad absurdum, the argumentum ad consequentiam
and the argumentum a fortiori.
In American speech communication, an important question is how legal
argumentation can be described as a specific field of argumentation to which
special soundness criteria should be applied. Rieke (1981) introduces a pro-
posal for a research project for legal argumentation as a specific field, and dis-
cusses its distinctive features. Asbell Sheppard and Rieke (1983) offer an ana-
lytical model for representing legal argumentation. Schuetz (1981) draws at-
tention to problems arising from the assumption that legal argumentation is
a distinct field.
Others raise the question of which specific fields of argumentation can be
distinguished inside the Law. Hollihan et al. (1986) describe the characteris-
tics of the argumentation process in a small claims court. Schuetz (1986) also
discusses the legislative process.
210 EVELINE T. FETERIS
8.3.3 The Analytical Component
The analytical component shows how to reconstruct legal argumentation in
terms of an analytical model. The object of a rational reconstruction is to get a
clear view of the stages of the argumentation process, the explicit and implicit
arguments, and the argumentation structure. In turn, rational reconstruc-
tion forms a basis for the evaluation of arguments.
The type of approach and the criteria of rationality presupposed in the ap-
proach depend on a specific kind of reconstruction being performed. In a
logical approach, a reconstruction is applied in which the argument is ana-
lyzed as a chain of logically valid arguments. Various authors, such as Alexy
(1989), Koch (1980) and MacCormick (1978), specify the way in which a re-
construction oflegal argumentation should be performed from this perspec-
tive. Authors such as Makau (1984), Schuetz (1986, 1991) and Snedaker (1987)
describe how a reconstruction can be carried out in a rhetorical analysis. Fe-
teris (1991) discusses the transformations which should be carried out in a di-
alogical approach to legal argumentation.
One of the central subjects in the analysis oflegal argumentation is how the
justification of the interpretation of a legal rule should be carried out. In recon-
structing legal arguments, a distinction is often made between so-called
'clear' cases in which there is no doubt about the applicability of the law to the
case, and 'hard' cases in which the law must be interpreted to make it applica-
ble to the case. Various authors such as Aarnio (1977, 1987), Alexy (1989), Mac-
Cormick (1978) and Peczenik (1983,1989) specify various distinct levels in the
justification oflegal interpretations.
Summers (1978) develops a model for the rational reconstruction oflegal
decisions and describes the methods and elements for constructing and eval-
uating legal decisions. In Interpreting Statutes (edited by MacCormick and
Summers 1991), an account is presented of a research project on the interpre-
tation of statutes in various countries (Germany, Finland, France, Italy,
Poland, Great Britain, the United Stated and Argentina). The conclusion is
that different countries employ different interpretation methods in the argu-
mentation of their higher courts.
Another important reconstruction question is how arguments based on rea-
soning from analogy and a contrario should be analyzed and evaluated.Argu-
ments from analogy are used to show that a new situation which is not cov-
ered explicitly by the law can fall under a law which may be intended for other
cases that are relevant to the studied case. Arguments based on a contrario
reasoning reveal that a new case may not fall under an applicable law.
The first question in this context is how these argument schemes can be re-
ARGUMENTATION IN THE FIELD OF LAW 211
 constructed as logically valid arguments. Kaptein (1994,1999), Klug (1951)
and Soeteman (1989) believe that such argument schemes can be reconstruct-
ed as logically valid arguments. According to them, the main question is
which logical system is the most suitable for this purpose. Kaptein argues that
analogical and a contrario arguments can be analyzed in a propositional logic.
Henket (1992) argues that a contrario argumentation should not be analyzed
as a material implication, but, depending on the interpretation of the law, as a
replication or an equivalence. Benoit and France (1980) discuss examples of
analogical argumentation in American law. Henket (1991) examines analogy
and the use of rules in practical reasoning.
Using a pragma-dialectical framework, Kloosterhuis (1994,1995, and 1999)
develops an instrument for analyzing and evaluating arguments based on
analogy. He distinguishes various forms of analogy, describes which explicit
and implicit elements are represented, and how the argumentation can be
evaluated in a rational way. Feteris (1999b) and Plug (1994, 1995, and 1999) dis-
cuss methods for reconstructing the structure of the justifications oflegal de-
cisions.
8·3·4 The Empirical Component
In the empirical component, the construction and evaluation of arguments
in actual legal practice is investigated to determine how the legal practice cor-
respondes to or conflicts with theoretical models. The empirical component
also examines how possible discrepancies might be explained.
In various case studies, specific characteristics of the legal argumentation
process are described. Benoit (1981) gives an account of an empirical investi-
gation into the argumentative strategies of the US Supreme Court. Benoit
(1989) emphasizes court reactions to lawyers' arguments. Benoit and D'Agos-
tine (1994) discuss the way a multiple audience discourse functions in law.
Benoit and France (1983) examine the effect of opening statements and clos-
ing arguments on jury verdicts. Dickens and Schwartz (1970,1971) discuss the
role of oral argumentation before the Supreme Court. Dunbar and Cooper
(1981) describe various kinds of statements made by a judge in the consecu-
tive stages of a legal process. Hagan (1976) gives an argumentative description
of the Roe v. Wade case. Hollihan et al. (1986) and Riley et al. (1987) consider
the arguments of litigating parties in a small claims court. Hunsaker (1978)
considers the case of Brown v. Board of Education as an example of social
protest. Hie (1995) describes the pragmatic and discursive roles of rhetorical
questions in English legal discourse. Kominar (1985) discusses the role the de-
mand for argumentative accountability plays in the justification oflegal deci-
212 EVELINE T. FETERIS
sions in Canada. Neumann et al. (1976) give an account of an investigation
into the argumentative practice of the German Bundesgerichtshofin criminal
cases. Schuetz (1991) provides an analysis of a Mexican criminal process in
terms of Perelman's theorical concepts. Snedaker and Schuetz (1985) describe
the argumentative structure of opening statements in an American trial.
Walker and Daniels (1995) describe alternative systems to the litigation
framework and compare these alternative systems, which include arbitration,
mediation and multi-party facilitation. Wasby et al. (1976) describe the role of
oral argument in court.
8.3.5 The Practical Component
The practical component considers how the various results gained in the
philosophical, theoretical, analytical and empirical components of the re-
search might be used in legal practice. Practical applications can be found in
methods for improving skills in analyzing, evaluating and writing legal argu-
mentation. These methods are often used for teaching in universities and in
law schools.
In the United States, the improvement of argumentative skills in legal edu-
cation is treated in the broader context of logic or legal theory. In An Intro-
duction to Law and Legal Reasoning, Burton (1985) discusses various forms of
legal reasoning such as analogical reasoning and deductive reasoning. In his
Introduction to Logic, Copi (1990) adds a chapter on logic and the law, dealing
with such matters as fallacies in the law and inductive and deductive reason-
ing in law. In Legal Reasoning, Golding (1984) considers different aspects ofle-
gal reasoning such as various types oflegal argument, precedent and analogy.
In a chapter on legal reasoning in Principles of Reasoning, Russow and Curd
(1988) discuss the role of argument in legal reasoning, the structure of legal
reasoning, analogy and precedent. In a chapter on legal reasoning in An Intro-
duction to Law and Legal Reasoning, Toulmin, Rieke, and Janik (1984) review
the layout oflegal arguments. In Germany, Haft (1981) discusses the problems
oflegal reasoning from a rhetorical perspective. In Great Britain, Twining and
Miers (1991) discuss problems encountered in the application oflaws in legal
interpretation and legal reasoning.
Luebke (1995) and Plumer (1995) discuss the application of ideas taken
from informal logic for the Law School Admission Test (LSAT), a standard-
ized, multiple-choice examination required for admission to nearly all law
schools in the United States and Canada. This test measures, among other
things, the reading and comprehension of complex texts, the organization
and management of information and the ability to draw reasonable infer-
213
ARGUMENTATION IN THE FIELD OF LAW
 ences from the information, the ability to reason critically and the analysis
and evaluation of the reasoning and arguments of others.
8.4 Conclusion
This chapter has presented a survey of the various approaches and topics
found in legal argumentation research during the past thirty years. With re-
gard to the various approaches, it can be said that the attention has shifted
from purely logical and rhetorical approaches to an approach in which logi-
cal, rhetorical and communicative aspects are combined to form what is
called the dialogical approach. In the 1970S and 1980s, a number of compre-
hensive theories oflegal argumentation were developed in which legal argu-
mentation was approached from a dialogical perspective (Aarnio, Alexy,
Peczenik; see also Feteris, Kloosterhuis and Plug). What these approaches
have in common is that the argumentation rationality is related to the quality
of the procedure utilized in the discussion. It is also related to the question of
whether certain rules for rational discussion have been met. In these theories,
the focus is on the starting points and rules for rational legal discussions, on
methods for analyzing and evaluating legal arguments and on methods for
the construction of rational legal justifications.
As far as the various topics of study are concerned, various components of a
research project can be found.
In the philosophical component, general ideas developed in argumenta-
tion theory about the rationality of argumentation are linked with ideas
about the rationality oflegal argumentation and interpretation developed in
legal theory. Authors like Aarnio, Alexy and Peczenik have developed theories
in which they apply ideas of argumentation theories to the legal arena. They
determine the general and specific legal criteria of rationality that apply to
particular legal discussions. Various rationality criteria can be distinguished
such as procedural and material criteria. The procedural criteria relate to the
discussion procedure and the justification process. The material criteria con-
cern the standards of rationality that apply to the evaluation of legal argu-
ments in specific legal fields and legal communities.
The theoretical component has developed various models for legal argu-
mentation and discussions. With respect to the formal aspects of legal
argumentation, these models contain rules for rational legal discussions and
a description of the structure of legal arguments. With respect to the struc-
ture of legal arguments, a distinction is made between internal and external
aspects. The internal aspects are related to the formal logical structure oflegal
214 EVELINE T. FETERIS
arguments, the external aspects are related to the material aspects, of how the
arguments used can be justified in light of certain legal standards of sound-
ness.
The analytical component performs reconstructions of various forms ofle-
gal argumentation. Examples include logical, rhetorical and dialectical analy-
sis of aspects oflegal argumentation. In the analysis, the emphasis is on the re-
construction of various forms of argument used in the interpretation oflegal
rules.
The empirical component performs various case studies of (aspects of) the
legal process, which clarify how various theoretical models can be used in de-
scribing a legal argument. The case studies range from an analysis of US
Supreme Court arguments to an analysis of arguments in a small claims
court.
The practical component offers recommendations for the analysis, evalua-
tion and construction oflegal argumentation. We can see that theoretical, an-
alytical and empirical ideas may be combined to develop methods for i~­
proving argumentative skills in legal education. It is hoped that cooperatIOn
among representatives of the various disciplines will result in a legal argu-
mentation theory that will have both theoretical and practical value for the
progress of contemporary research and the successful application of theoreti-
cal insights by the legal system and law schools.
Notes
1 In some legal systems, there are statutory provisions that define the re-
quired elements of a publicly justified decision. For instance, u~der sec-
tion 121 of the Dutch Constitution, a legal judgement must speClfythe
grounds underlying the decision. In Germany, s. 313 (1) of.the Code of ~iv­
il Procedure (ZPO) states that a legal decision must contam the operative
provisions of the decision, the facts, and the reasons on which th~ decision
is based. In Sweden, according to the Code of Procedure, a court Judge-
ment must contain a statement of claim and defense, the issues as present-
ed to the court, the reasons given by the court for its order or decree, and
the order or decree itself. For a description of conventions and styles of
justifying legal decisions in various countries, see MacCormick and Sum-
mers (1991).
2 See, for instance, Die juristischeArgumentation (197 2 ), Krawietz et al. (eds.
1979), Hassemer et al. (eds.1980),Aarnio et al. (eds.1981), Krawietz and
Alexy (eds.19 83)·
3 See,for instance, Eemeren, van et al. (eds.199 1, 1995), Wenzel (ed.19 87),
Zarefsky et al. (eds. 1983), Ziegelmueller and Rhodes ( eds. 19 81 ).
ARGUMENTATION IN THE FIELD OF LAW
215
 4 See, for instance, the journals Archiv filr Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie, Ar-
gumentation, Argumentation and Advocacy (formerly the Journal ofthe
American ForensicAssociation) , Informal Logic, International Journal for
the Semiotics ofLaw, and Rechtstheorie.
5 See, for instance, Feteris and Schuetz (1996), Lempereur (1991), and Mat-
Ion (1994).
6 See, for instance, Tammelo et al. (1981), MacCormick (199 2:195-199),
Rodig (1971), Yoshino (1981).
7 See,for instance, Alexy (1980:198-199), Kalinowski (1972), Koch (1980),
Soeteman (1989), and Weinberger (197 0 ).
8 For a more extensive treatment of the arguments for and against a deontic
logic with respect to legal argumentation see, for instance, Rodig (1971),
Soeteman (1989).
9 See Hage et al. (1994).
10 SeePrakken(1993).
11 For a critique of Viehweg's theory, see Alexy (1989: 20- 24).
12 Other authors working in a topical-rhetorical tradition based on
Viehweg's ideas, are Ballweg (1982), Esser (1979), Horn (1967), Schrecken-
berger (1978), Seibert (1980), and Struck (1977).
13 For a survey of a literary approach ofthe law see Posner (1988), and White
(19 84,1989, and 1990).
14 For a description of a combination of the insights of these authors, see
Aarnio, Alexy, and Peczenik (1981), in which an outline is given of a theory
oflegal argumentation and legal discussions.
15 For the introduction of the various components of a general research pro-
gramme of argumentation, see Van Eemeren (1987). See also Van Eemeren
and Grootendorst (1992).
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225
ARGUMENTATION IN THE FIELD OF LAW
224 EVELINE T. FETERIS
Index of Names

Aarnio, A. 208,209,210,211,214 Cairns,H. 137,138

Adler, J. 179,192 Campbell,G. 102,105-106
Alexy,R. 208,209,210,211,214 Carney, J.D. 149,153
Anscombre, J.-e. 14,46,49,173,175 Caudill, S. 70
Aristode 24,28-29,46,53,70,73,82-83, Cicero 52,78,82-83,94,97,103,130
94, 129,13 6 - 139,140,141,143,145,149, Clark, H.H. 191
184,206 Cohen, e. 114-117,131,178
Arnauld,A. 141 Cohen,L.J. 46,49
Atelsek, J. 46,49 Cohen, M.R. 52,140,141,149
Condit, M.e. 70
Bacon, E 135,141 Conway, D.A. 130,131
Barth, E.M. 15,3°,46,154, 156-157 Cooper, M. 212
Beardsley, M.e. 107-108,149 Copi, I.M. 52,54,68,114-117,131,140,141,
Benoit, W.L. 212 146,149,152,153,178,213
Benthem, J. van 179 Cornell, P. 208
Berg, J. 78,179 Coulter, J. 170,191
Berkenbosch, R. 69 Crawshay-Williams, R. 15,46,49
Billig, M. 184 Crutchfield, R.S. 33,42,47
Bird,O. 83
Biro,J. 154 Davidson, D. 159
Bitzer,L.E 185 Delgado, R. 208
Black, M. 149 Dickens, M. 212
Blair, I.A. 13>37,43,46,47,54,73,112-113, Dicks, V.I. 207
115-117,132,154, 183 Dijk, T.A. van 193
Boethius 52,78,82-83 Donnellan, K. 79
Braet,A.e. 129 Ducrot, O. 14,46,49,173,175
Brinton, A.A. 154 Dunbar, N. 212
Brockriede, W. 98,166
Eemeren, EH. van 11,12,14,15-16,30,31-
Brown, P. 169
33,46,48,49,54,57,58,66,7°,72,78,79,
Bueno, A.A. 139,164
81,91,98-99,117-119,121,123,124,126,
Burge, T. 156
132,133,144,151,154,157-158,164,166,
Burke, K. 64,79
168,170,175,178,186-187,190
Burnyeat, M.E 78
Ehlich, K. 191
Burton, S.J. 213
Ehninger, D. 98
Bybee, M.D. 78
Ennis, R.H. 57,62,64,67,79

227
Fearnside, W.W. 139,149 Harman, G. 34,47,49 Kominar, R.A. 212
Oesteriee, j .A. 149
Feteris, E. T. 24,25,69,203,209,212,213, Hasian, M. 208 Kopperschmidt, J. 16,40-41,44,47
O'Keefe, D. 33,4 2,47
214 Hastings, A.C 24,87-90,94,98,109-110 Krabbe, E.CW. 15,30,46 ,154,15 6 -157,
Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1. 12-13,16,24,84-85,
Finocchiaro, M.A. 142,154 Henket, M. 212 159
94,9 8 -99, 184
Fisher, A. 46,49,79,131 Herbeck, D.A. 207 Krech, D. 33,4 2,47
O'Neill,j.M. 109
Fisher,1. 114,116,117,124 Hintikka,J. 154,159 Kripke, S.A. 15 6
Foss, S.K. 184 Hitchcock, D. 54,56,57, 78,154,181 Kruger, A.N. 98
Freadhoff, K. Panetta, E. 208
Hohmann, H. 207,210
Pascal, B. 141
Freeley,A.J. 38,44,46,86-87,94 Hollihan, T.A. 210,212 Lambert, K. 153
Peczenik,A. 206,208,209,210,211, 21 4
Freeman, J.B. 24,119,122,132,154,183 Holther, W.B. 139,149 Laycock. C 98
Peirce, C.S. 7 8
Horovitz, J. 202 Lempereur,A. 208
Perelman, Ch. 12-13,47,49,16,23,24,81,
Garssen, B.J. 24,51,72,73,78,79,95,193 Horwitz, L. 70 Levinson, S.C 167,169
84-85,94,98-99,144,184,205,213
Gass, R.H. 95 Houtlosser, P. 16,23,32,44-45,46,190 Locke, J. 135,142 -144
Peter of Spain 52,78
Geest,1. van der 69 Hunsaker, D.M. 212 Lorenz, K. 15,30,47
Piazza, F. 60,79
Gerritsen, S. 23,52,53,57,59,78,79 Hymes, D. 167 Lorenzen, P. 15,3 0 ,47
Pinto, R.C. 112-113,116-117,132,153,154,
Goffman, E. 169 Lucaites, J.1. 70
183
Golden, J.1. 205 Hie, C 212 Luebke,S.W. 213
Plato 136
Golding, M.P. 213 Lundquist,1. 192
Plug, j. 209,212, 214
Goodwin, P.D. 95 Jackson, S. 46,48,60,79,166,168,170,
Plumer,G. 213
Govier, T. 13,37,43,46,52,55,56,57,58, 186 MacCormick, N. 208,210,211
Pomerantz,A. 172
61,62,67,78,79,113-114,116-117,131,154, Jacobs,S. 46,48,60,69,70,78,79,166, Mackenzie, J. 159
Popper, K. 15
179-183 168,170,186 Makau, j.M. 205,208,211
Posner, R.A. 207, 208
Grice, H.P. 132,159,168,177,187 Janas,M. 207-208 Maneli, M. 205
Prakken, H. 204
Grimaldi, W.M.A. 98 Janik, A. 48,49,206,213 Martens,j.1. 157
Prott,1.V. 210
Groarke,1. 57,66,78,79,114,116-117,124, Johnson, R.H. 13,37,43,47,54,58,79,115- Massey,G. 153
purtill, L.1. 149
181 117,154,192 McBurney,j.H. 9 8 , 109
Grootendorst, R. 15-16,31-33,46,48,49, Johnson-Laird,Ph.N. 175-176 McEvoy, S.T. 207
Quintilian 103-104, 129
54,57,5 8,66,72,78,79,91,99,111,117- Johnstone Jr., H. 144 Meuffels, B. 175
119,121,123,124,126,132,133,144,151, Jungslager, ES. 175 Michalos,A.C 149
Ramus, P. 141
153,154,157-158,164,166,168,170,175, Miers, D. 213
Ray, J. 109,13 0
178,186-187 Kahane, H. 149,178 Milapides, M. 193
Reboul, O. 16
Gumperz, J.J. 191 Kalinowski, G. 202,216 Mill,j.S. 144-145,15 1
Rees, M.A. van 24,168, 189,199
Gunther, K. 210 Kamiah, W. 30,47 Mills, G.E. 98,108, 109,13 0
Rehbein,j. 191
Gutenplan, S.D. 149 Kaptein, H. 212 Morgan, A. de 141,153
Rescher, N. 29-30,47,53,58 ,13 2,149,153,
Keenan, E.L. 79 Muntigl, P. 171
159,178
Haack,S. 78 Kelley, D. 78,131 Rieke, R.D. 48,49,202,206,207,210,213
Habermas, J. 40,202,208,209 Kennedy, G.A. 103 Naess,A. 15,30 ,47
Rijk, 1.M. de 141
Haft, E 213 Kienpointner, M. 93-95,185 Nagel, E. 140,141,149
Riley, P. 212
Hagan,M.R 212. Kitis, E. 193 Neumann, U. 213
Hage, J.C 204,225 Kline, S.L. 94,185 Newell, S.E. 206 Salmon, W.e. 149
Hamblin, CL. 15,21,24,47,48,135,139, Klinger, G. 208 Nicole, P. 141 Sanders, J.A. 95
140 ,142,143,149-153,154,156,159 Kloosterhuis, H. 209,212,214 N0lke, H. 14,19 8 Scales, R.L. 98
Hamilton, E. 137,138 Klug, U. 204,212 Nolt, J.E. 125,126,131, 183 Scali en, E.A. 207
Koch, H.J. 211 Noordman,1.G.M. 17 6 -177,19 2 Scheer, R.K. 149,153
Hample, D. 78
Nuchelmans, G. 142 ,143,178
Hansen, H.Y. 153,154 Koetsenruijter, W. 193

229
INDEX OF NAMES
228 INDEX OF NAMES
 Schellens, P.J. 24,89-91,94,9 8 -99 Twigg, R. 208
Schiffer, S. 47,48
Twining, W. 213
Schiffrin, D. 34-35,42-42,47,48,172-173 Index of Terms
Schipper, E.W. 149
Ulrich, W. 153
Schopenhauer,A. 144,152
Schuetz, J. 205,210,211,213,216 Verbiest,A.E.M. 192
Schuh, E. 149
Viehweg, Th. 206
Schwartz, R. 212
Vorobej, M. 131,133,134
Scriven, M. 79,181-182
Vuchinich, S. 172
Searle, J.R. 48,168,187
Siegel, H. 154 abusive variant of argumentum ad 83,86,89
Walker, G.B. 213
Slot,p. 199 hominem 143,152 argumentation based on regularity 90
Walton, D.N. 24,51,52,55,5 6 ,67,68,71, accent 136 argumentation based on a rule of con-
Snedaker, K. 206,211, 213
73,78,79,98,119,122,123,124,125,133,
Snoeck Henkemans,A.F. 24,119,120, acceptability 13,31,32,33,36,37,38,39, duct 90
134,135,154-156,159-160,164
121-122, 123, 124, 125,132,133,134,175, 41,44-45,4 6 ,49 argumentation based on the structure of
Warnick, B. 94
190 acceptable see acceptability reality 85
Weddle, P. 48,49
Socrates 137-139 acceptance see acceptability argumentation by analogy see analogical
Weinberger, O. 216
Soeteman, A. 204, 212 accidens (fallacy) 83,136,139,140,141, argument(ation)
Wenzel, J.W. 16,95
Solmsen, F. 78 147 argumentation by authority 84,86,89,
Whately, R 24,48,49,83-84,94,98,102, accident, topos of
Sperber, D. 191 92
106-107,130,132,135,144,87
Stalnaker, RC. 79 a contrario argument/reasoning 205, argumentation from circumstantial evi-
Wilson, D. 191
Starmans, R. 78 209, 211, 212 dence to hypothesis 89
Windes, RR 109-110
Strawson, P.E 79 activity type 167 argumentation from criteria to a verbal
Wiseman, RL. 95
Stutman, R.K. 206 ad fallacies 142-144,146 classification 88
Woods, J. 24,55,56,58,78,135,154-156, addition (transformation) 186 argumentation from definition to char-
Summers, R.S. 210,211
164
Sweetser, E. 192 affirmative side in a debate 39 acteristics 88
Wreen, M. 199
affirming the consequent 136,150 argumentation from example 83,88,91
Wroblewski, J. 208,210
Tammelo, L 216 ambiguity see fallacy of ambiguity argumentation from example to de-
Tamny, M. 149 amphiboly 136 scriptive generalisation see argumen-
Yanal, R.J. 130
Thomas, S.N. 37,43,48, 49, 108, 111-112, analogical argument( ation)/reasoning tation from example
113,115-117,125,126,130,131,181-183 83,86,89,91,92,97, 205,209,211,212, argumentation from sign to unobserved
Zavos, H. 109,130
Thomson, A. 60,62,63,64,65 213 event 88
Tindale, C. 114,116-117, 124 analogy see analogical argument argumentation from time to causality
Toulmin, S.E. 12,23,24,38-39,43-44,48 , analytic overview 185 90
50 ,60,78,79,88,99,202,206, 213 analytical component 211,225 argumentation in law 22-23,201-225
Tracy, K. 191 antagonist 15,31,38 argumentation scheme see argument
Tsui,A.B.M. 173 a priori argumentation 83 scheme
Turnbull, W. 171 argument 27,41,44 argumentation stage 15-16
argumentation 11,34-35,37 argument(ation) structure 20-21,101-
argumentation based on a coexistential 134,166,175,182-183, 185,199
relation see argumentation based on argumentation that structures/establish-
the structure of reality es the structure of reality 13,86
argumentation based on a sequential re- argumentative direction 14
lation see argumentation based on the argumentative discourse analysis 35-36
structure of reality argumentative force 14
argumentation based on comparison argumentative orientation 174

230 INDEX OF NAMES

231
 argument from analogy see analogical
ad hominem 143,159 data 12 face 169,171-173
argument(ation)
claim 12,37,38-39,43-44 debate proposition (of fact, value, poli- fallacy 21-22,135-164,210,213
argument interpretation 22, 165-166,
classical dialectic 28- 29 fallacy dependent on language 136-140
170 ,175,190 cy) 39
closing 172
argument reconstruction 22, 165-166, declaring a standpoint sacrosanct 158 fallacy extra dictionem see fallacy inde-
closure rule 158
177,180,190 deductive argument(ation)/reasoning pendent oflanguage
clue for identifying standpoint 44-45 109,112,113,116,176, 213 fallacy in dictione see fallacy dependent
argument scheme 13,19-20,72 -73,81-99,
clue in the verbal presentation 124
185,205 deductive-inductive distinction 55 on language
cognitive research on reasoning 28,34-
argument scheme rule 158 deductivism 181,199 fallacy independent oflanguage 136,
35,42,175-177
argument scheme that structures reality defend (obligation to) 30,32-33,44-45 140141
coherence 209
85 definition, topos of 83 fallacy of ambiguity 146,155
combination of words 136
argumentum ad baculum 142,147,159 deletion 186 fallacy of clearness 146
commit(ment) 30 ,31,32,34,35,49,71- denying an unexpressed premise 158
argumentum ad consequentiam 148 fallacy of composition 148-149,156
72,156
argumentum ad hominem 21,142,143, denying the antecedent 150 fallacy of division 148-149,156
communicative action, theory of 40-41
144,146,151,152-153,157,159,164 deonticlogic 178,203 fallacy offour terms 144,155
comparison argumentation 91
argumentum ad ignorantiam 142,143, diagram 107,113,123,133 fallacy of relevance 146
complementary argumentation 121,132- dialectic(al)/dialogical (approach) 14-
144, 146, 159 false analogy 144,146
133
argumentum ad judicium 142,144 17,82, 203,208,209, 211 false premise 144
complex argument(ation) 101, 103,117, dialectical problem 28-29 felicity condition 168-170,189,197
argumentum ad misericordiam 147-148
126, 127, 129
argumentum ad populum 21, 148, 151, dialectical proposition 29 felicity condition for standpoint 32,45
composite audience 20 5,206
158 dialectical shift 159 field-(in)dependent 12,206,210
composition, see fallacy of composition
argumentum ad verecundiam 21,142, dialectification, principle of 31 figurative analogy 91
concession 15,30
143,144,146,151,158,159 difference of opinion 30-31,39,43 form of expression 136
concluding stage 16
artificial intelligence 203 disagreement 170-173,185,198 formal analysis 155
conclusion 37-38,43
assertion/assertive 30 ,32,33,3 8,39,40 - dispreferred response 172 formal dialectic(s) 15,29-30,154,156-157
conditional 177,181, 189,198
4 1,43,45 dispute see difference of opinion formal disputation 29
conflict of opinions (pure, mixed) 30
associated conditional see logical mini- division of words 136 formal validity 178-181,189,203,206
confrontation stage 15
mum division see fallacy of division four terms see fallacy of four terms
connective 173-174
association 84 doubt (identification of) 29,32,34,39,45 freedom rule 158
consistency 209
assumption see unexpressed premise doxa 70 free-floating form of reasoning 89,90,
context 68-72
attitude (positive, negative) 33-34.42 drawing a general conclusion from an 91
conventionally sound/valid 15
attitude indicating verb 43 incomplete induction 142 functionalization, principle of 31
convergent argumentation/reasoning
audience 12, 204, 20 5,206
101,102,108,111-112,113,114,115,116,119, gap-filler 62,64,65-67
empirical component 212,215
backing 12, 60 120,121,122,124,125,127,130,131,133, general topics 82
enthymeme 52, 180
134, 183
back-up 64,65 epicheirema/epicheireme 103 generic analysis 184
co-operation/co-operative principle equivocation 136 genus, topos of 83
begging the question see petitio principii
168, 189
belief 34-35,42,48,49 ethical fallacy 146 graph method 123,133
coordinative(ly compound) argumenta- evading the burden of proof 158 group of premises see set of premises
burden of proof 36,39-40 ,48,102,107,
tion 101, Il7, 118, 121, 124, 132, 133
109- 110, 129, 158 exconcessis 15,157
critical discussion 30-31,157, 185- 187, hasty generalization 136,141,146
burden of proof rule 158 explanation 37,45
199, 209
expressed opinion 32,36,44 hypothetical statement 63,79
Critical Legal Studies 207
causal reasoning 83,85,87,88,92,93 external justification 208,210,214
cumulative argumentation 121,132,134 externalization, principle of 31 identification of standpoint 42-45
circular reasoning seepetitiio principii
circumstantial variant of argumentum extra dictionem see fallacy independent idia see specific topics 82
oflanguage idol 141-142

232 INDEX OF TERMS

INDEX OF TERMS 233
ignoratio elenchi 136,144,147,159
implicature 45,62
implicit premise/reason see unexpressed
premise
in dictione see fallacy dependent on lan-
guage
indicator 166,172-173,175,182,187,190
indirect speech act 169-170,173,175,186-
187
inductive argument( ation)/reasoning
84, 109,112,131,176
inductive fallacy 144-145,159
informal logic 13,179-183
informal logic, procedural 38-39,43-44
informal logic, structuralist 37-38,43
inherent argumentativity 174
instrumental argumentation 91
interaction principle 33,44
intermediate conclusion 64
internal justification 208,210,214
interpretation 165-199
interpretation oflegal rule 211,213
invention 82
irrelevancy 13,144
jurisprudence 201,207
koina see general topics
law see argumentation in law
Law and Literature movement 207
legal argumentation see argumentation
in law
legal philosophy 202
legal principle 205,206,209
legal theory 201,202
line of argumentlreasoning 112,115, ll6,
125
linguistic device 172-175
linked argumentation/reasoning 101,
102, 103,106,108, 1l0, Ill-I12, ll3, ll6,
119,120,121,122, 123, 124, 125,127,130,
131,133,134
literal analogy 91
logic 178-179,203,204,211,213
234 INDEX OF TERMS
logical analysis 211,215
logical approach 202,203,210
logical fallacy 144
logical form 178
logical minimum 56, 66, 79, 189
logical validity see formal validity
making an absolute of the success of the
defense 158
many questions 21,65,136,145-147,150,
159
marker of standpoint 43-45
material fallacy see nonlogical fallacy
maxinIe 83
measurement technique (direct, indi-
rect) 42
mental attitude 34
mental model 175-176
metaphoric analysis 184
missing premise see unexpressed
premise
mob appeal see argumentum ad popu-
lum
modal linkage 120
modern deductivism 57-59
moral argument/reasoning 105,106
multiple argumentation 101, ll7, ll7, 121,
122, 124,126,133,212
narrative analysis 184
needed premise 67-68
negative side in a debate 39
Neo-Aristotelean analysis 184
new dialectic 14-16
new rhetoric 84
non-assertive speech act as standpoint
33
non-cause as cause 136
nonlogical fallacy 144
non-monotoniclogic 179
non sequitur 147
normative pragmatics 70
obligation (to argue, defend, justify) 30,
32 ,33,34,35,38,41,44,45
opening stage 15
opinion 32,35-36,43,44
opponent 15,29-30
opposition 172,175
paralogism 136
pathetic fallacy 146
patterning 170-172
permutation 186
persuasion see socio-psychological persua-
sion research
petitio principii 21,136,144,146-147,150-151,
155,156,159,160
philosophical component 209,214
pluralism 55-57
point of view 17-18,27-50
policy for doubtful cases 125-126
polyphony 174
position 31,32,34,35,36,40,42
post hoc ergo propter hoc 136,147
practical component 213,215
pragma-dialectical approach/pragma -di-
alectics 15-16,157-158,185-190,199,209
pragmatic analysis offallacies 159-160
pragmatic argumentation 85,9 0 ,9 2
predicate logic 178,204
premise set see set of premises
premise structure 117,126,131
preparatory condition for standpoint 32,45
presentation of an assertive 45
presupposition 61,62,63,79
principle of charity 182-183,199
principle of cooperation see cooperative
principle
problem-sound/valid 15
proponent 15,29-30
proposition 39-40,44
protagonist 15
quasi-logical argument scheme 13,85
quasi-logical argumentation 85
radical argumentativism 14
rational discussion 209, 21 4
rational organisation 168-170
INDEX OF TERMS
rational reconstruction 210
rationality 201,203,208,209,210,214
reaction to an assertive 45
reason see premise
reasoning see argument( ation)
reconstruction 31,41,165-199
relevance 13,188,197-198
relevance rule 158
rhetoric 82,183-185
rhetorical analysis 211,215
rhetorical approach 16-17,203,204,206, 207,
208, 213
rhetorical situation 185
rightness claim 40-41
secundum quid see hasty generalization
serial argument/reasoning 101,103,108
setofpremises 112-ll3,115,131
shifting the burden of proof 158
sign argumentation 83,87
sincerity 36
sincerity condition for standpoint 32
slippery slope 148,160
snob appeal see argumentum ad populum
socialization, principle of 31
socio-psychological persuasion research 33-
34,42
sophism 136,141-142
speech act 167-170,185-189,197-198
speech act of advancing a standpoint 31-33,
44-45
speech event 167
stage of critical discussion 185-187
standard treatment of the fallacies 149- 153
standpoint (positive, negative) 11,27-50 ,175,
185,188-189,198- 199
status theory 207
stock issue 39
strategic device 169
strategy of maximally argumentative analy-
sis 126
strategy of maximally dialectical analysis
18 7
straw man 148,159
subordinate/subordinatively compound ar-
235
 gumentation lOl,lO3
substitution 186
sufficiency 13
supposition see unexpressed premise
syllogistic fallacy 144-145
syllogisticlogic 178
symptomatic argumentation 91
theoretical component 209,214
thesis 15,40-41
topica/topic(s) 82,206
topical potential 17
topos/topoi 14,20,73,174-175,206
Toulmin's model of analysis 12,78-79,
206
traditional logical approach to unex-
pressed premises 52-53
traditional rhetorical approach to unex-
pressed premises 53-54
transformation 211
tu quoque variant of argumentum ad
hominem 143
236 INDEX OF TERMS
(un)bound argumentation see free-
floating argumentation
unexpressed premise 18-19,51-79,151-
153,166,180-182,199
unexpressed premise rule 158
unexpressed standpoint 18
universal audience 12
used premise 67-68
using the force of threats see argumen-
tum ad baculum
validity claim 40-41,44
verbal reasoning 88
warrant 12,60
warrant -establishing argument(ation)
scheme 93
warrant -using argument( ation) scheme
93
wrongly-assumed premise 144
The Contributors
Frans H. van Eemeren is Professor of Speech Communication, Argumenta-
tion Theory, and Rhetoric at the University of Amsterdam, chair of the
Department, and director of the research program "Argumentation in Dis-
course" at the Amsterdam School for Cultural Analysis. With Rob Grooten-
dorst, he founded the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation; together
they co-authored Speech Acts in Argumentative Discussions (1984), Argumen-
tation, Communication, and Fallacies (1992), Reconstructing Argumentative
Discourse (1993, with Sally Jackson and Scott Jacobs), Studies in Pragma-
Dialectics (eds. 1994), Fundamentals of Argumentation Theory (1996, with
Francisca Snoeck Henkemans and an international group of argumentation
scholars), the textbook Argumentation (2001, with Francisca Snoeck Henke-
mans), and Critical Discussion (2001). Van Eemeren is a member qf the board
of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (ISSA), and se-
nior editor of the journal Argumentation and the book series "Argumentation
Library:'
Eveline T. Feteris is Associate Professor in the Department of Speech
Communication, Argumentation Theory, and Rhetoric at the University of
Amsterdam. She studied Dutch Language and Literature, specialising in
Speech Communication. In 1989, she received her Ph.D. from the University
of Amsterdam. Her thesis on discussion rules in law (written in Dutch) pro-
vides a pragma-dialectical analysis of the civil and criminal process. Feteris is
coordinator of the research project "Institutional Argumentation" that is part
of the research program "Argumentation in Discourse" at the Amsterdam
School for Cultural Analysis. Her specializations include argumentation the-
ory, legal argumentation, and legal communication. Among her most recent
publications is Fundamentals ofLegal Argumentation (1999)·
Bart Garssen studied Dutch Language and Literature at the University of
Amsterdam, specializing in Speech Communication. In 1997, he defended his
doctoral thesis (in Dutch) in which he presents a theoretical and empirical in-
vestigation of argument schemes from a pragma-dialectical perspective.
Garssen is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Speech Communica-
237
tion, Argumentation Theory, and Rhetoric at the University of Amsterdam A. Francisca Snoeck Henkemans is Assistant Professor in the Department of
and is a participant in the research project "Conceptions of Reasonableness" Speech Communication, Argumentation Theory, and Rhetoric at the Uni-
that is part of the research program "Argumentation in Discourse" at the Am- versity of Amsterdam and a participant in the research project "Characteris-
sterdam School for Cultural Analysis. He is coordinator of the argumentative tics of Argumentative Discourse" that is part of the research program "Argu-
writing skills program in the Humanities department. mentation in discourse" of tlIe Amsterdam School for Cultural Analysis. She
received her Ph.D. at the University of Amsterdam in 1992. Her thesis is enti-
Susanne Gerritsen studied Dutch Language and Literature at the University tled Analysing Complex Argumentation: The Reconstruction of Multiple and
of Amsterdam, specializing in Speech Communication. In 1999, she pub- Coordinatively Compound Argumentation in a Critical Discussion. TogetlIer
lished her doctoral thesis (in Dutch) on unexpressed premises and the effects with Frans H. van Eemeren,Rob Grootendorst,and an international group of
they can have on the understanding of a text. At present, Gerritsen is an Assis- other argumentation theorists, she wrote Fundamentals of Argumentation
tant Professor in the Economics Department at the University ofAmsterdam, Theory (199 6 ), a comprehensive survey of the various theoretical contribu-
where she is coordinator of the composition skills program. She is also active tions to the study of argumentation. Again with Frans van Eemeren and Rob
as a communication trainer and communication coach. Grootendorst, she co-authored the introductory textbook Argumentation
(2001). She has furtlIer published on complex argumentation and the prag-
Peter Houtlosser received his doctoral degree from the University of Amster- ma-linguistic aspects of argumentation.
dam in 1995. His dissertation (in Dutch) on standpoints in a critical discus-
sion provides a pragma-dialectical perspective on the identification and
reconstruction of standpoints. Upon his completion of a research project
concerning indicators of argumentative language use as a postdoctoral
researcher sponsored by the National Science Foundation of the Netherlands
(NWO), he became an Assistant Professor in the Department of Speech
Communication, Argumentation Theory, and Rhetoric at the University of
Amsterdam, and a participant in the research project "Rhetorical and Dialec-
tical Analysis" that is part of the research program "Argumentation in Dis-
course" at the Amsterdam School for Cultural Analysis. His research on
rhetorical and dialectical analysis is done in collaboration with Frans H. van
Eemeren. Houtlosser is book review editor for the journal Argumentation.

M. Agnes van Rees is Associate Professor in the Department of Speech

Communication, Argumentation Theory, and Rhetoric at the University of
Amsterdam. She studied General Linguistics and Dutch Language and Liter-
ature. In 1982, she received her Ph.D. from the University of Leiden. Her thesis
(written in Dutch) deals with the interpretation of illocutionary acts. Van
Rees is coordinator of the research project "Characteristics of Argumentative
Discourse" that is part of the research program "Argumentation in discourse"
at the Amsterdam School for Cultural Analysis. Her specializations include
speech act theory, conversation analysis, and the study of argumentation in
everyday conversation. One of her publications in English is The Use of Lan-
guage in Conversation: An Introduction to Research in Conversational Analysis
(1992). .

239
THE CONTRIBUTORS