Chapter 7

4
R ati on a l C h o i c e Th e o ry : Why
Ir r ati on a l i t y M a ke s M o re S e n s e
for Comparative Politics
J. D. J. Nakaska

Introduction
Rational Choice Theory (RCT) has emerged as one of the leading
methodologies in political science. RCT studies have permeated
the field since the 1950s. With the increasing quantification of the
social sciences, RCT provided the way in which economic models
and approaches were transferred to political science in an attempt
to improve consistency and analysis. Economic theories prior to this
were generally applied to the economic policies and behaviors of
countries related to trade and commerce.
RCT is a utility-maximization methodology, by which choices are
made on the basis of the “best interest” of the actor making the selec-
tion. Gerardo L. Munck summarizes RCT quite nicely. He states that
“it bears stressing that RCT is first and foremost a theory of decision-
making that rests on the expected utility principle, which states that
individuals make decisions that maximize the utility they expect to
derive from making choices.”1 Simply put, RCT presupposes that given
the option between two choices, one of which will maximize potential
gains and the other of which will produce a suboptimal gain, individu-
als will choose the option that serves their individual needs best.
The two main features of rational choice theory are that it is a theory
of decision-making based on expected utility and that it is an (actor)

H. J. Wiarda (ed.), Grand Theories and Ideologies in the Social Sciences

© Howard J. Wiarda 2010
128 J . D. J . N a k a s k a

agent-based theory. There are two main branches of RCT: decision

theory and game theory, which is generally considered the most appro-
priate for politics. In this context, true rationality occurs when actors,
be they individuals or nation-states, make choices based on expected
utility. Simply put, RCT posits that choices will be made that bring the
greatest return and the least cost.

Background of Rational Choice Theory

RCT has a multitude of definitions that tend to confuse the issue.
I will address these and then attempt to develop one, consistent
set of definitions for use throughout this chapter. Anthony Downs
described politics in the following way: “Parties are analogous to
entrepreneurs in a profit-seeking economy. So as to attain their pri-
vate ends, they formulate whatever policies they believe will gain the
most votes, just as entrepreneurs produce whatever products they
believe will gain the most profits for the same reason.”2 Political par-
ties, in this case, are like any other business. They seek out the largest
number of customers by offering the best available product. Political
parties’ “customers” are voters and their “business” is being elected.
The party with the best policies—in the minds of the voters—will win
the election.
George Tsebelis, on the other hand, stated that: “Rationality . . .
is nothing more than an optimal correspondence between ends and
means.”3 David Collier and Deborah Norden offer: “Rational choice
analysis may be understood as a broad label for approaches which
assume that actors make choices in light of an assessment of costs and
benefits.”4 Ian Green and Donald Shapiro offer that rational choice
“explains politics by assuming that both voters and politicians are ratio-
nal maximizers of interest or utility.”5
Rational choice will be defined in this chapter as the following:
“political decisions made using expected utility maximization under
conditions of imperfect information in which gains are maximized
and costs minimized.” It is important to note that this is a general
definition and will not account for every possible variation or devia-
tion. Such instances are addressed throughout the chapter.

Development of the Concept of Rational

Choice Theory
In the case of comparative politics, the 1960s and 1970s were domi-
nated by sociological theory. RCT emerged as a dominant approach in