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Intel MEIO Inventory Optmization (Good)
Intel MEIO Inventory Optmization (Good)
Matthew P. Manary
Supply Chain Network Group, Intel Corporation, Hillsboro, Oregon 97124, matthew.manary@intel.com
Sean P. Willems
School of Management, Boston University, Boston, Massachusetts 02215, willems@bu.edu
Inventory target setting within Intel’s embedded devices group historically consisted of management-
determined inventory targets that were uniformly applied across product families. Achieving and maintaining
these inventory targets at the individual product level proved to be a difficult task. To better align inventory
resources and improve customer-service levels, Intel employed a multiechelon inventory optimization (MEIO)
model to set inventory targets. However, the company could not implement the model’s initial recommenda-
tions because of the presence of bias in the sales forecast data. Managing the forecast bias by directly modifying
the raw sales forecast data was not an option because Sales and Marketing controlled and loaded the data
into the manufacturing resource planning (MRP) system before the planning organization received it. There-
fore, the average forecast demand, with its bias present, was already in the system; the only adjustment that
the planning organization could make was to change the inventory target. This paper describes the inventory
optimization problem in Intel’s embedded devices group and the adjustment procedure that we developed to
produce appropriate inventory targets in the presence of forecast bias.
Key words: forecasting: applications; industries: computer/electronic; inventory/production: applications,
multiechelon safety-stock optimization.
History: This paper was refereed.
Management target Actual inventory level one product family. By echelon, the supply chain map
in Figure 2 has six stages in F/S, nine stages in SFG,
Figure 1: Product-family inventories were well above management-deter- 58 stages in A/T, and 41 stages in CW. The second
mined targets. product family’s supply chain is similar in both eche-
lon structure and number of stages. In all, the MEIO
model generated inventory targets for approximately
the forecast into the MRP system before the plan-
100 SKU locations.
ning organization sets inventory targets. Therefore,
The planning organization monitors inventory lev-
when considering how to parameterize the inventory
els weekly; a major reset, which is driven by a new
model, the planning organization needed to take into
account that it would not have control over the aver-
F/S SFG A/T CW
age demand loaded into the MRP system.
This paper presents the solution that Intel’s plan-
ning organization developed to determine SKU-level
inventory targets in the presence of forecast bias by
modifying the estimate of the standard deviation of
forecast errors.
forecast that the Sales and Marketing group provides, There are two common approaches to characterize
occurs on a monthly basis. Based on the new demand the and that populate (1). The first approach
information, the monthly planning process resets the relies entirely on the actual historical demand to cal-
forward-looking demand at the SKU-location level. culate an average and standard deviation of historical
This reset then modifies the current inventory target, demand. This approach works well when demand is
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which feeds an Intel-developed advanced-planning stationary or the forecast predicts future requirements
and scheduling (APS) optimizer that minimizes pro- less accurately than the demand history. The second
duction costs, lost-sales costs, and costs for deviating approach uses the forecast and actual demand history
from the inventory targets. The APS output is the con- to calculate how the forecast deviates from the actual
strained production and inventory plan, which con- demand. At Intel, products often have attributes, e.g.,
stitutes the finalized factory schedule. Planners can seasonality and product life cycles, which affect the
also make weekly adjustments to the factory schedule average demand. Therefore, the second method is
in cases where either the actual factory output or the almost always the correct one to use. A sales forecast
realized customer demand differs significantly from captures these deviations better than simply looking
the monthly plan. at past demand. This was true for the SKUs in this
paper.
Improving Intel’s Approach While statistics textbooks, including Brown (1959),
Although operating parameters, such as throughput define several methods for calculating the stan-
times and yields, are essentially identical within a dard deviation of forecast errors (SDFE), the MEIO
product family, customer demand and forecast accu- team used the standard formula in Equation (3) for
racy differ significantly by SKU. Coupled with blan- each SKU:
n
ket inventory targets assigned at the product-family
i=1 Fi − Di
2
level, it was common for some SKUs to regularly run SDFE = (3)
n−1
low on inventory, while others had an abundance of
inventory on hand. where n is the sample size, Fi denotes the forecast
for demand in period i and made in period i − 1,
Demand Characterization Di denotes the actual demand in period i, and SDFE
At Intel, the demand characterization is the most sig- denotes the estimated SDFE. To test for bias, we cal-
nificant input in determining safety-stock levels. In culated the relative forecast accuracy for each SKU by
fact, the required safety stock due to demand vari- computing the ratio in Equation (4) in each period:
ability alone typically accounts for the majority of
Fi
all on-hand inventory. Because the specifics of the
i = (4)
MEIO tool are not relevant to the impact of fore- Fi + Di
cast bias, we exclude a discussion of the specifics of For a given SKU, a time series of
s centered on
the tool’s functionality, and instead consider the sim- 0.5 indicates unbiased forecasting. Figure 3 shows the
plest demand characterization. At Intel, demand per results for 12 months of data for all 44 SKUs.
period for each SKU is characterized by an average The histogram on the right side of Figure 3
and standard deviation, denoted as and , respec- demonstrates that SKU-level forecast error exhibits an
tively. For a given service level and net replenish- overall positive bias. We also refer to positive bias
ment time , the expected base-stock inventory level as overforecasting; it occurs when an SKU’s forecast
at a stage is then in a given period is greater than the actual demand
√ that materializes during that period. The x-axis on the
+ F −1 (1)
contour plot is a measure of the size of an SKU’s fore-
where F −1 ( ) is the inverse Normal cumulative distri- cast in a given period relative to the SKU’s maximum
bution function (CDF). The expected safety-stock tar- forecast. The contour shows that as forecasts grow rel-
get is then atively larger, a greater magnitude and likelihood for
√
F −1 (2) positive bias exists.
Manary and Willems: Setting Safety-Stock Targets at Intel in the Presence of Forecast Bias
Interfaces 38(2), pp. 112–122, © 2008 INFORMS 115
1.0
Standardized inventory
10
0.9
8
0.8
targets
6
0.7
Fcst/(Fcst + Act)
4
0.6 2
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0.5 0
SKU 1 SKU 2 SKU 3
0.4
Actual inventory Inventory target using SDFE
0.3
0.2
0.1 Figure 5: Inventory targets that the MEIO model generated using the SDFE
as computed in Equation (3) were significantly higher than those of the
0
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
products known to carry too much inventory.
Fcst /SKU max fcst
Prob
forecast bias at the root source was infeasible within 0.2
the project timeline.
In effect, the planning organization was left to set
0.1
safety-stock targets using (2) with knowledge that
the mean demand as specified in (1) exhibited bias.
This required that the group modify the parameter 0
inputs in (2) to remove the impact of the forecast
– 4,000
– 3,000
– 2,000
–1,000
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
bias without changing the mean demand produced by
the MRP-loaded forecast. While the planning group N(0, 1,000)
– 3,000
– 2,000
–1,000
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
mate for the SDFE that will serve as an input to (2),
producing an expected inventory level that covers the N(1,000, 1,000)
underforecast quantile.
As an example, consider a monthly forecasting pro- Figure 6: We plotted two normal distributions, N0 1000 and
cess, as Figure 6(a) depicts, with a distribution of N1000 1000, to demonstrate the point in each distribution where
forecast errors characterized as Normal(0 1000). We 95 percent of the probability lies to the right.
assume that the target service level is 95 percent. In
Figure 6(a), −1,645 corresponds to the point where the the forecast bias. In particular, we can calculate this
cumulative distribution function equals 0.05. modified SDFE, denoted Modified , as
Figure 6(b) graphs a Normal(1000 1000) dis-
tribution and −645 corresponds to the cumulative Modified = + (5)
distribution function of 0.05. If the distribution in F −1 1 −
Figure 6(b) is describing forecast error for an SKU where is calculated from Equation (3) and 1 − is
on a monthly basis, on average, the forecast is 1,000 the unfill rate of one minus the service-level target .
units too high with a 1,000-unit standard deviation. In the Normal(1000 1000) setting, the modified esti-
In this Normal(1000 1000) setting, the SKU’s actual mate of SDFE is
demand will exceed its forecast in a month by more
1000
than 645 units only 5 percent of the time. Modified = + 1000 ≈ 392
F −1 1 − 0 95
If we are confined to (2) to set the safety-stock target
and the forecast error profile is Figure 6(b), then we For a forecast that is, on average, biased 1,000 units
need to modify the calculation of SDFE to net out high and of a service level of = 95 percent, the
Manary and Willems: Setting Safety-Stock Targets at Intel in the Presence of Forecast Bias
Interfaces 38(2), pp. 112–122, © 2008 INFORMS 117
appropriate estimate of the SDFE to populate (2) is bias and uses the SDFE from Equation (3) to pop-
392, not 1,000. This foundation is the basis for Equa- ulate (2); this was the way Intel initially populated
tion (6), a revised approximation of the SDFE that is the MEIO tool, as defined in the Demand Characteriza-
based on the relative forecast accuracy from a prod- tion and Validating MEIO Results Without Forecast Bias
uct’s sample history: Compensation sections.
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for the approach that uses the modified SDFE calcu- Actual demand – Forecast
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8 modified sigma
5
4 6 Actual inventory
F –1(α)√(σ2 +Bias2)
Inventory target using SDFE
3
4
2
1 2
0 0
–1
0 F (α)σ√τ = Bias SKU 1 SKU 2 SKU 3
Bias
Figure 10: For the SKUs referenced in Figure 4, MEIO targets using the
Figure 8: Even with a biased forecast, the modified sigma technique modified SDFE appropriately generated targets that were less than the cur-
can produce optimal inventory levels as long as the average bias is rent inventory levels but also covered the SKUs’ historical underforecast
√
≤F −1 . pattern.
Manary and Willems: Setting Safety-Stock Targets at Intel in the Presence of Forecast Bias
Interfaces 38(2), pp. 112–122, © 2008 INFORMS 119
5
els of 95 percent and above, the rule of thumb was
4
that safety stock held to cover forecast error should
3 roughly equal the worst underforecast in an SKU’s
history. This result made it easy for management to
2
interpret and understand inventory target setting.
1 In addition to making intuitive sense, the result also
makes it easy to tie inventory costs directly to the
0
accuracy of forecasting. This enabled project teams
Proposed vs. WOI to more accurately estimate the return on investment
(B) (ROI) of various efforts to improve the forecasting and
planning processes. However, a certain paradox exists
(Proposed – WOI)/(Proposed + WOI)
0.5
with an SKU that is systematically overforecasted:
as the average bias is eliminated (i.e., the average
forecast error converges to zero, independent of the
0 variability), on average, the likelihood and severity of
underforecasting increases; therefore, the safety-stock
target increases. This stems from how the modified
– 0.5 sigma approach effectively reallocates inventory in
the base-stock inventory equation in (1):
√
+ F −1 −→ + Biasimpact
–1.0
√
–7 –6 –5 –4 –3 –2 + F −1 − Biasimpact
ln(SKU % of total fcst)
Because safety stock target setting occurs with only
√
Figure 11: For CW stages, inventory targets that adjusted for forecast bias F −1 − Biasimpact in mind, a decrease in bias
were lower overall than the management-based WOI policy; however, impact increases the safety-stock target. A naive inter-
individual SKU targets ranged from ∼0% to >700% of the original uniform
WOI targets.
pretation would lead an inventory analyst to believe
that initiatives to improve average forecast accu-
racy would have negative ROI as safety-stock targets
required to hold almost no inventory. Figure 11(b) increase. For an analyst, this can be doubly confus-
demonstrates that reallocation of inventory tended ing because the inventory on hand will already be
to follow a pattern of increasing inventory on SKUs higher than the target set through the modified SDFE;
with lower relative forecasts, while SKUs accounting to see an indication that a higher safety-stock target
for a higher percent of the product-family forecast is necessary would seem contradictory. However, this
required less than the management-specified WOI will naturally be the result of the whole supply chain
policy. equilibrating through elimination of the bias:
The resulting MEIO inventory targets for the two √
product families at 95 percent customer-service lev- + Biasimpact + F −1 − Biasimpact
els were 17 percent lower in aggregate than the Bias→0 √
−→ + F −1
management-specified WOI policy and 71 percent
lower than the targets generated by using the unad- Second, management liked the fact that the plan-
justed SDFE estimate from Equation (3). ning organization could correctly treat forecast bias
Manary and Willems: Setting Safety-Stock Targets at Intel in the Presence of Forecast Bias
120 Interfaces 38(2), pp. 112–122, © 2008 INFORMS
without touching the raw sales forecast. In addition a proper foundation in statistical techniques before
to not changing significant organization roles and the planning organization can deploy the method
responsibilities, the raw forecast continued to drive widely.
the MEIO model’s work-in-process pipeline inventory Finally, planners still have difficulty setting inven-
rather than a demand-data stream that needed statis- tory targets to zero on a high-volume product that
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Fcst/(Fcst + Act)
8 500 550 0
48 0.6
3 1000 857 0
54
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0.5
9 1200 992 0
55
4 1000 718 0
58 0.4
2 1000 713 0
58 0.3
1 1000 681 0
59 0.2
11 2000 1349 0
60
0.1
7 800 485 0
62
10 1500 438 0
77 0
12 1539 406 0
79 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Fcst/SKU max fcst
Table A.2: This table shows the result of sorting the raw monthly data in
ascending order of forecast error. Figure B.1: This graph displays forecast accuracy density and spline fit.
As a product’s forecast approaches its maximum, the likelihood of over-
forecasting increases.
out of 12 occurred in month eight, and has a relative
forecast accuracy of ∼0.48.
Using Equation (6), the estimate of the SDFE is The relationship between forecast magnitude and the
heterogeneity of forecast error is a continuing topic of
Modified 1 − 0 476/0 476 − 1
= 1000 ≈ 145 research at Intel.
0 7
The original SDFE, Equation (3), produces SDFE = Acknowledgments
546, an estimate almost four times that produced by We thank the editors and referees for their very helpful and
the modified SDFE. constructive feedback on earlier versions of this paper.
Appendix B References
Relative Volume Problem Brown, R. G. 1959. Statistical Forecasting for Inventory Control.
McGraw Hill, New York.
Although we used the modified SDFE based on a Crum, C., G. E. Palmatier. 2003. Demand Management Best Practices
standardized forecast accuracy measurement, there Process, Principles and Collaboration. J. Ross Publishing, Inc.,
were still situations in which inventory targets were Boca Raton, FL.
unrealistically high. This occurred because, on aver- Franses, P. H. 1998. Time Series Models for Business and Economic
Forecasting. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
age, forecasts were biased to be high; however, the Makridakis, S., S. C. Wheelwright, R. J. Hyndman. 1998. Forecasting
larger the SKU’s historical forecast, the more likely it Methods and Applications, 3rd ed. John Wiley & Sons, Inc.,
was to be overforecasted; and the smaller the SKU’s Hoboken, NJ.
historical forecast, the more likely it was to be under- Montgomery, D. C., L. A. Johnson, J. S. Gardiner. 1990. Forecasting
and Time Series Analysis, 2nd ed. McGraw-Hill, New York.
forecasted (Figure B.1). This meant that if a prod-
uct was approaching the high-volume stage of its life
David Ploudre, CIG Supply Network Planning
cycle, the SDFE was overstated because the likelihood
Manager, writes: “I am the Communications Infras-
and size of overforecasting was dependent on both
tructure Group (CIG) Supply Network Planning Man-
the SKU itself and on its stage in the life cycle.
ager at Intel Corporation, 5000 W. Chandler Blvd.,
To correct for this, we modified Equation (6) to con-
Chandler, AZ 85226. As is referenced below, the
sider just the magnitude of past underforecasts, not
‘Embedded Intel Architecture Division’ (EIA) Plan-
the relative size as is the case when we use the distri-
bution of
s in Equation (6). Equation (B1) illustrates ning department reports directly to me.
this: “I write this to verify that the authors did con-
Modified
Di − Fi duct the work reported in ‘Setting Safety-Stock Tar-
= max 0 (B1)
t df gets at Intel in the Presence of Forecast Bias.’ Given
Manary and Willems: Setting Safety-Stock Targets at Intel in the Presence of Forecast Bias
122 Interfaces 38(2), pp. 112–122, © 2008 INFORMS
the breadth and depth of Intel’s product portfolio, accommodated the data that exist in Intel’s planning
addressing the matter of forecast bias is critical in systems. The approach outlined in this paper allowed
order to implement tools that can be deployed across us for the first time to address the impact of fore-
the organization. cast bias in a scientific, quantitative, and practical
“Prior to this work, we had a standardized manner.
Additional information, including rights and permission policies, is available at http://journals.informs.org/.
INFORMS holds copyright to this article and distributed this copy as a courtesy to the author(s).
approach for setting inventory targets at the product- “The ‘Embedded Intel Architecture Division’ was
family level that was based on management objec- the first product group at Intel to develop and use
tives. Our planning process did not consider the these techniques to adjust inventory targets in the
impact that SKU-level forecast bias and variability presence of forecast bias. Since then, this idea con-
was having on our ability to set accurate inventory tinues to be developed and integrated into our Plan-
targets and reach/maintain those goals. The correc- ning system and product portfolio and is becoming a
tion for bias outlined in this paper allowed us to use standard and highly desired practice in our business
scientifically derived inventory targets that directly model.”