Compania de Tabacos v.

City of Manila GR No L-16619

Facts:

Tabacalera filed an action before CFI Manila to recover the sum of P15, 280 supposedly overpaid by it as
charges on the wholesale and retail deals of alcohol for the amount from the 3rd quarter of 1954 to the
2nd quarter of 1957 pursuant to Ordinances Nos. 3634, 3301 and 381.

Tabacalera, a wholesale and retail liquor dealer and is paying the license fees prescribed by Ordinance
3358 from 1954-1957 and also a wholesale and retail dealer of general merchandise and is paying sales
taxes required by Ordinance 3634, 3301 and 3816. Tabacalera included its liquor sales in its sworn
statements of wholesale, retail and grocery sales of general merchandise.

In 1954, Treasurer addressed a letter, expressing the view that liquor dealers who pays the annual license
fees under Ordinance 3358 is exempted from wholesale and retailers’ taxes under City Ordinances 3634,
3301, and 3816.

Upon learning of said opinion, the Tabacalera stopped including its sales of liquor in its quarterly sworn
declarations submitted in accordance with Ordinances 3634, 3301, and 3816, and on 3 December 1957, it
addressed a letter to the Treasurer demanding refund of the alleged overpayment. Since the claim was
denied , the Tabacalera filed the action within the CFI Manila to City of Manila and its Treasurer,
Marcelino Sarmiento the sum of P15,280.00 allegedly overpaid by it as taxes on its wholesale and retail
sales of liquor for the amount from the third quarter of 1954 to the second quarter of 1957, inclusive,
under Ordinances 3634, 3301, and 3816. The CFI Manila ordered town Treasurer of Manila to refund the
sum of P15,280 to Compamia General de Tabacos de Filipinas.

Issue:

Whether or not Compania General de Tobacos de Filipinas is entitled to a refund?

Held:

No. Tax applies to all kinds of exactions which become public funds. The term is often loosely used to
include levies for revenue as well as levies for regulatory purposes. Tax is imposed under the taxing
power for the purpose of raising revenues. Thus, license fees are commonly called taxes. License fee is
imposed in the exercise of police power for purposes of regulation. The license fees imposed is
justified and is for its regulation because such fee is a license for the privilege of engaging in such
business because not anyone or anybody may freely engage in such and that the liquor is potentially
harmful to public health and morals, and must be subject to supervision or regulation by the state and by
cities and municipalities As for the sales taxes on general merchandise they are revenue measures by
respondents by virtue of its power to  tax dealers for the sale of such merchandise. Both a license fee and
tax may be imposed on the same business or occupation or for selling same article without violating rule
on double taxation

Questions

1. What is a license fee?

a) It is imposed for the purpose of revenue
b) It is imposed in the exercise of police power for the purposes of regulation
c) None of the above
2. What is a tax?
a) It is imposed for the purpose of revenue
b) It is imposed in the exercise of police power for the purposes of regulation
c) None of the above
3. Is Compania General de Tobacos de Filipinas subject to double taxation?
a) Yes, a license fee and a tax may not be imposed on the same subject matter.
b) No, a license fee and a tax may be imposed on the same subject matter.

Philippine Airlines v Edu GR No L-41383

Facts:

The Philippine Airlines (PAL) is engaged in the air transportation business under a legislative franchise
(Act No. 42739). Wherein its franchise, PAL is exempt from the payment of taxes.

Sometime in 1971, however, Land Transportation Commissioner Romeo F. Elevate (Elevate) issued a
regulation pursuant to Section 8, Republic Act 4136, otherwise known as the Land and Transportation
and Traffic Code, requiring all tax-exempt entities, among them PAL to pay motor vehicle registration
fees.

Despite PAL's protestations, Elevate refused to register PAL's motor vehicles unless the amounts imposed
under Republic Act 4136 were paid. PAL thus paid, under protest, registration fees of its motor vehicles.
After paying under protest, PAL through counsel, wrote a letter dated May 19,1971, to Land
Transportation Commissioner Romeo Edu (Edu) demanding a refund of the amounts paid. Edu denied the
request for refund. Hence, PAL filed a complaint against Edu and National Treasurer Ubaldo Carbonell
(Carbonell).

The trial court dismissed PAL's complaint. PAL appealed to the Court of Appeals which in turn certified
the case to the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether or not the motor vehicle registration fees are taxes?

Held:

Yes, the Supreme Court ruled that motor vehicle registration fees are taxes. Fees may be regarded as taxes
even though they also serve as instruments of regulation because taxation may be made as an
implementation of the State’s police power. But if the purpose is primarily for revenue, or if revenue at
least, one of the real and substantial purposes, then the exaction is properly called a tax. Wherein, motor
vehicle registration fees are taxes intended for the revenue of the government.

Questions?

1. Fees may be properly regarded as taxes even though they also serve as an instrument of
regulation.
a) True
b) False
2. May the respondent administrative agency be required to refund the amounts stated in the
complaint of PAL?
a) Yes
b) No
3. What is the money for Motor vehicle Law intended for?
a) For the expenditures of the Motor Vehicles Office
b) For the construction and maintenance of public roads, streets and bridges
c) For the salary of the officers

CIR vs Yuseco GR No L-12518

Facts:

Yuseco did not file income tax returns for the calendar years 1945 and 1946. This fact having come to the
knowledge of revenue examiners, they accordingly made income tax returns for petitioner upon which
respondent on August 20, 1948, assessed against and demanded from petitioner the sums of P134.14 and
P7,563.28 representing alleged income taxes and corresponding surcharges for the years 1945 and 1946.
This incited the tax authorities to assess and hold Yuseco liable at risk for the inadequacy in payment.
Yuseco wrote the respondent, requesting that he be informed as to how the assessments were arrived at.
In reply thereto, respondent in a letter dated September 17, 1948 furnished the information sought and at
the same time demanded the payment of the aforesaid assessments. On October 4, 1948, petitioner asked
that he be given an opportunity to present his side of the matter. He requested for reconsideration of the
assessment and reiterated his demand upon petitioner for payment thereof which was followed with
another demand on June 29, 1949 which was likewise denied. On July 28, 1949, petitioner once more
requested for a reinvestigation of the case but the same was denied by respondent in his letter dated
February 7, 1951 wherein, he repeated his demand for payment. On April 3, 1951, petitioner renewed his
request for reinvestigation and nothing was heard of the matter for almost three years thereafter. Yuseco
then filed a petition for prohibition with the CTA, which the latter granted and now is being questioned by
the Commissioner.

Issue:

Whether or not the CTA has a jurisdiction over the petition of Yuseco?

Held:

No, the law does not expressly vest in the Court of Tax Appeals original jurisdiction to issue writs of
prohibition and injunction only in aid of its appellate jurisdiction in cases appealed to it and not to clothe
it with original jurisdiction to issue them.  The writ of prohibition or injunction that it may issue under the
provisions of section 11, Republic Act No. 1125, to suspend the collection of taxes, is merely ancillary to
and in furtherance of its appellate jurisdiction in the cases mentioned in section 7 of the Act. The power to
issue the writ exists only in cases appealed to it.

Questions:

1. A taxpayer who feels aggrieved by the decision or ruling handed down by a revenue officer and
appeals from his decision or ruling to the Court of Tax Appeals must pay the tax assessed.
a) True
b) False
2. Can Court of Tax Appeals have only appellate jurisdiction and no concurrent or original
jurisdiction?
a) It has exclusive jurisdiction with reference to matters or cases arising from the Internal
Revenue Code, the Customs Law and the Assessment Law.
b) There is no exclusive jurisdiction with reference to matters or cases arising from the
Internal Revenue Code, the Customs Law and the Assessment Law.
c) None of the above