Chapter 2: Election Law I. Comelec: C L Rev Ew

CHAPTER 2: ELECTION LAW
I. Comelec
1. Comelec jurisdictions vis-à-vis HRET jurisdiction
a. Reyes v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 207264, June 25,2013
On 31 October 2012, respondent Joseph Socorro Tan, a registered voter and resident
of the Municipality of Torrijos, Marinduque, filed before the COMELEC an Amended
Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy (COC) of
petitioner on the ground that it contained material misrepresentations, specifically: (1)
that she is single when she is married to Congressman Herminaldo I. Mandanas of
Batangas; (2) that she is a resident of Brgy. Lupac, Boac, Marinduque when she is a
resident of Bauan, Batangas which is the residence of her husband, and at the same
time, when she is also a resident of 135 J.P. Rizal, Brgy. Milagrosa, Quezon City as
admitted in the Directory of Congressional Spouses of the House of Representatives;
(3) that her date of birth is 3 July 1964 when other documents show that her birthdate is
either 8 July 1959 or 3 July 1960;3 (4) that she is not a permanent resident of another
country when she is a permanent resident or an immigrant of the United States of
America; and (5) that she is a Filipino citizen when she is, in fact, an American citizen.
The COMELEC First Division found that, contrary to the declarations that she made
in her COC, petitioner is not a citizen of the Philippines because of her failure to
comply with the requirements of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or the Citizenship
Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003, namely: (1) to take an oath of allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippines; and (2) to make a personal and sworn
renunciation of her American citizenship before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath. In addition, the COMELEC First Division ruled that she did not
have the one-year residency requirement under Section 6, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution. Thus, she is ineligible to run for the position of Representative for the
lone district of Marinduque.
May 2013, the COMELEC En Banc, promulgated a Resolution denying petitioner’s

Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit.
Four days thereafter or on 18 May 2013, petitioner was proclaimed winner of the 13
May 2013 Elections.
On 5 June 2013, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Certificate of Finality declaring

the 14 May 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc final and executory,
considering that more than twenty-one (21) days have elapsed from the date of
promulgation with no order issued by this Court restraining its execution.
On same day, petitioner took her oath of office before Feliciano R. Belmonte Jr.,
Speaker of the House of Representatives.
Petitioner has yet to assume office, the term of which officially starts at noon of 30
June 2013.
ISSUE :Whether or not Respondent Comelec is without jurisdiction over Petitioner

who is a duly proclaimed winner and who has already taken her oath of office for
the position of Member of the House of Representatives for the lone congressional
district of Marinduque.
CONSTITUTIONALLAWRevIew
(ATTY. ENAN FLORES,LL.M.)
RULING:
From the foregoing, it is then clear that to be considered a Member of the House of
Representatives, there must be a concurrence of the following requisites: (1) a valid
proclamation, (2) a proper oath, and (3) assumption of office.
Indeed, in some cases, this Court has made the pronouncement that once a
proclamation has been made, COMELEC’s jurisdiction is already lost and, thus, its
jurisdiction over contests relating to elections, returns, and qualifications ends, and
the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins. However, it must be noted that in these cases,
the doctrinal pronouncement was made in the context of a proclaimed candidate
who had not only taken an oath of office, but who had also assumed office.
Here, the petitioner cannot be considered a Member of the House of

Representatives because, primarily, she has not yet assumed office. To repeat
what has earlier been said, the term of office of a Member of the House of
Representatives begins only “at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following
their election.”28 Thus, until such time, the COMELEC retains jurisdiction.
In her attempt to comply with the second requirement, petitioner attached a

purported Oath Of Office taken before Hon. Feliciano Belmonte Jr. on 5 June 2013.
However, this is not the oath of office which confers membership to the House of
Representatives.
Section 6, Rule II (Membership) of the Rules of the House of Representatives

provides:
Section 6. Oath or Affirmation of Members. – Members shall take their oath or

affirmation either collectively or individually before the Speaker in open session.
Consequently, before there is a valid or official taking of the oath it must be made
(1) before the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and (2) in open session.
Here, although she made the oath before Speaker Belmonte, there is no indication
that it was made during plenary or in open session and, thus, it remains unclear
whether the required oath of office was indeed complied with.
As to the issue of residency, proceeding from the finding that petitioner has lost her
natural-born status, we quote with approval the ruling of the COMELEC First
Division that petitioner cannot be considered a resident of Marinduque:
“Thus, a Filipino citizen who becomes naturalized elsewhere effectively abandons

his domicile of origin. Upon re-acquisition of Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA
9225, he must still show that he chose to establish his domicile in the Philippines
through positive acts, and the period of his residency shall be counted from the time
he made it his domicile of choice.
In this case, there is no showing whatsoever that [petitioner] had already re-
acquired her Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 so as to conclude that she
has regained her domicile in the Philippines. There being no proof that [petitioner]
had renounced her American citizenship, it follows that she has not abandoned her
domicile of choice in the USA.
The only proof presented by [petitioner] to show that she has met the one-year
residency requirement of the law and never abandoned her domicile of origin in
Boac, Marinduque is her claim that she served as Provincial Administrator of the
province from January 18, 2011 to July 13, 2011. But such fact alone is not
sufficient to prove her one-year residency. For, [petitioner] has never regained her
domicile in Marinduque as she remains to be an American citizen. No amount of
her stay in the said locality can substitute the fact that she has not abandoned her
domicile of choice in the USA.”
b. Velasco v. Speaker Belmonte, G.R. No. 211140, January 12, 2016

-Velasco filed a petition of Mandamus to compel Speaker Belmonte to administer
the oath. (continuation of the Reyes Case)
At noon of June 30, 2013, it would appear that Reyes assumed office and started
discharging the functions of a Member of the House of Representatives.
On July 9, 2013, in SPC No. 13-010, acting on the motion for reconsideration of
Velasco, the COMELEC En Banc reversed the June 19, 2013 denial of Velasco's
petition and declared null and void and without legal effect the proclamation of
Reyes. The dispositive part reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant motion for reconsideration is

hereby GRANTED. The assailed June 19, 2013 Resolution of the First Division is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Corollary thereto, the May 18, 2013 proclamation of respondent REGINA

ONGSIAKO REYES is declared NULL and VOID and without any legal force and
effect. Petitioner LORD ALLAN JAY Q. VELASCO is hereby proclaimed the winning
candidate for the position of representative in the House of Representatives for the
province of Marinduque.
On July 22, 2013, the 16th Congress of the Republic of the Philippines formally
convened in a joint session. On the same day, Reyes, as the recognized elected
Representative for the Lone District of Marinduque, along with the rest of the
Members of the House of Representatives, took their oaths in open session before
Speaker Belmonte, Jr.
On July 23, 2013, Reyes filed a Manifestation and Notice of Withdrawal of Petition
"without waiver of her arguments, positions, defenses/causes of action as will be
articulated in the HRET which is now the proper forum."
On October 22, 2013, Reyes's motion for reconsideration (of this Court's June 25,
2013 Resolution in GR. No. 207264) filed on July 15, 2013, was denied by this
Court, a second motion for reconsideration and was denied by this Court.
On December 5, 2013 and January 20, 2014, respectively, Velasco sent two letters
to Reyes essentially demanding that she vacate the office of Representative of the
Lone District of Marinduque and to relinquish the same in his favor.
On December 10, 2013, Velasco wrote a letter to Speaker Belmonte, Jr.

requesting, among others, that he be allowed to assume the position of
Representative of the Lone District of Marinduque.
The COMELEC issued an Orde r20 dated December 11, 2013 directing, inter alia,
that all copies of its Resolutions in SPA No. 13-053 (DC) and SPC No. 13-010, the
Certificate of Finality dated June 5, 2013, the Order dated July 10, 2013, and the
Certificate of Proclamation dated July 16, 2013 be forwarded and furnished to
Speaker Belmonte, Jr. for the latter's information and guidance.
On February 4, 2014, Velasco wrote another letter to Speaker Belmonte, Jr.

reiterating the above-mentioned request but to no avail.
On February 6, 2014, Velasco also wrote a letter to Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap
reiterating his earlier requests (July 12 and 18, 2013) to delete the name of Reyes
from the Roll of Members and register his name in her place as the duly elected
Representative of the Lone District of Marinduque.
However, Velasco relates that his efforts proved futile. He alleges that despite all
the letters and requests to Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap, they
refused to recognize him as the duly elected Representative of the Lone District of
Marinduque. Likewise, in the face of numerous written demands for Reyes to
vacate the position and office of the Representative of the Lone District of
Marinduque, she continues to discharge the duties of said position.
And this is precisely the basis for the HRET' s December. 14, 2015 Resolution
acknowledging and ruling that it has no jurisdiction over the twin petitions for quo
warranto filed against Reyes. Its finding was based on the existence of a final and
executory ruling of this Court in G.R. No. 207264 that Reyes is not a bona fide
member of the House of Representatives for lack of a valid proclamation. To
reiterate this Court's pronouncement in its Resolution, entitled Reyes v.
Commission on Elections45-
The averred proclamation is the critical pointer to the correctness of petitioner's

submission. The crucial question is whether or not petitioner [Reyes] could be
proclaimed on 18 May 2013. Differently stated, was there basis for the proclamation
of petitioner on 18 May 2013?
Dates and events indicate that there was no basis for the proclamation of petitioner
on 18 May 2013. Without the proclamation, the petitioner's oath of office is likewise
baseless, and without a precedent oath of office, there can be no valid and effective
assumption of office.
"More importantly, we cannot disregard a fact basic in this controversy - that before
the proclamation of petitioner on 18 May 2013, the COMELEC En Banc had
already finally disposed of the issue of petitioner's [Reyes] lack of Filipino
citizenship and residency via its Resolution dated 14 May 2013. After 14 May 2013,
there was, before the COMELEC, no longer any pending case on petitioner's
qualifications to run for the position of Member of the House of Representatives. x x
x."
As the point has obviously been missed by the petitioner [Reyes] who continues to
argue on the basis of her "due proclamation," the instant motion gives us the
opportunity to highlight the undeniable fact we here repeat that the proclamation
which petitioner secured on 18 May 2013 was WITHOUT ANY BASIS." (Emphasis
supplied.)
Put in another way, contrary to the view that the resort to the jurisdiction of the
HRET is a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, such recourse is not a legally
available remedy to any party, specially to Velasco, who should be the sitting
Member of the House of Representatives if it were not for the disregard by the
leadership of the latter of the binding decisions of a constitutional body, the
COMELEC, and the Supreme Court
Though the earlier existence of the twin quo warranto petitions filed against Reyes
before the HRET had actually no bearing on the status of finality of the decision of
the COMELEC in SPC No. 13-010. Nonetheless, their dismissal pursuant to the
HRET' s December 14, 2015 Resolution sustained Velasco's well-defined, clear
and certain right to the subject office.
The present Petition for Mandamus seeks the issuance of a writ of mandamus to
compel respondents Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap to
acknowledge and recognize the final and executory Decisions and Resolution of
this Court and of the COMELEC by administering the oath of office to Velasco and
entering the latter's name in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives.
In other words, the Court is called upon to determine whether or not the prayed for
acts, i.e., (i) the administration of the oath of office to Velasco; and (ii) the inclusion
of his name in the Roll of Members, are ministerial in character vis-a-vis the factual
and legal milieu of this case. As we have previously stated, the administration of
oath and the registration of Velasco in the Roll of Members of the House of
Representatives for the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque are no longer a
matter of discretion or judgment on the part of Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec.
Gen. Barua-Yap. They are legally duty-bound to recognize Velasco as the duly
elected Member of the House of Representatives for the Lone District of
Marinduque in view of the ruling rendered by this Court and the COMELEC'S
compliance with the said ruling, now both final and executory.
It will not be the first time that the Court will grant Mandamus to compel the
Speaker of the House of Representatives to administer the oath to the rightful
Representative of a legislative district and the Secretary-General to enter said
Representative's name in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives. In
Codilla, Sr. v. De Venecia,46 the Court decreed:
Under Rule 65, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, any person may file
a verified petition for mandamus "when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or
person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes
another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is
entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law." For a petition for mandamus to prosper, it must be shown that the
subject of the petition for mandamus is a ministerial act or duty, and not purely
discretionary on the part of the board, officer or person, and that the petitioner has
a well-defined, clear and certain right to warrant the grant thereof.
The distinction between a ministerial and discretionary act is well delineated. A

purely ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given
state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal
authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety
or impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and
gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is
discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of
the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion or judgment.
In the case at bar, the administration of oath and the registration of the petitioner in
the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives representing the 4th
legislative district of Leyte is no longer a matter of discretion on the part of the
public respondents. The facts are settled and beyond dispute: petitioner garnered
71,350 votes as against respondent Locsin who only got 53,447 votes in the May
14, 2001 elections. The COMELEC Second Division initially ordered the
proclamation of respondent Locsin; on Motion for Reconsideration the COMELEC
en banc set aside the order of its Second Division and ordered the proclamation of
the petitioner. The Decision of the COMELEC en banc has not been challenged
before this Court by respondent Locsin and said Decision has become final and
executory.
In sum, the issue of who is the rightful Representative of the 4th legislative district
of Leyte has been finally settled by the COMELEC en banc, the constitutional body
with jurisdiction on the matter. The rule of law demands that its Decision be obeyed
by all officials of the land There is no alternative to the rule of law except the reign
of chaos and confusion.
c. Reyes v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 221103, October

16,2018
Reyes Questions the 2015 HRET Rules of procedure requiring the presence of a
Justice to constitute quorum
The last sentence of Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution also provides that
"[t]he senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman." This means that
only a Justice can chair the Electoral Tribunal. As such, there should always be one
member of the Tribunal who is a Justice. If all three Justice-members inhibit themselves
in a case, the Supreme Court will designate another Justice to chair the Electoral
Tribunal in accordance with Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
Contrary to petitioner's allegation, Rule 6(a) of the 2015 HRET Rules does not violate
the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
The Court has explained that the equal protection clause of the Constitution allows
classification. The Court stated:
A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of classification is that of
inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner
determines the matter of constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is
that it be reasonable, which means that the classification should be based on
substantial distinctions which make for real differences; that it must be germane to the
purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and that it
must apply equally to each member of the class. This Court has held that the standard
is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or
rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary.
In the case of the HRET, there is a substantial distinction between the Justices of the
Supreme Court and the members of the House of Representatives. There are only
three Justice-members while there are six Legislator-members of the HRET. Hence,
there is a valid classification. The classification is justified because it was placed to
ensure the presence of members from both the Judicial and Legislative branches of the
government to constitute a quorum. There is no violation of the equal protection clause
of the Constitution.
The reckoning event under Rule 15 of the 2015 HRET Rules, being dependent on the
taking of oath and the assumption of office of the winning candidate, is indeterminable. It is
difficult, if not impossible, for the losing candidate who intends to file an election protest or a
petition for quo warranto to keep track when the winning candidate took his oath of office or
when he assumed office. The date, time, and place of the taking of oath depend entirely
upon the winning candidate. The winning candidate may or may not publicize his taking of
oath and thus any candidate intending to file a protest will be in a dilemma when to file the
protest. The taking of oath can happen any day and any time after the proclamation. As to
the assumption of office, it is possible that, for one reason or another, the winning
candidate will not assume office at the end of the term of his predecessor but on a later
date that is unknown to the losing candidate.
However, the Court takes judicial notice that in its Resolution No. 16, Series of 2018, dated
20 September 2018,10 the HRET amended Rules 17 and 18 of the 2015 HRET Rules. As
amended, Rules 17 and 18 now read:
RULE 17. Election Protest. - A verified protest contesting the election or returns of any
Member of the House of Representatives shall be filed by any candidate who has duly filed
a certificate of candidacy and has been voted for the same office within fifteen (15) days
from June 30 of the election year, if the winning candidate was proclaimed on or before
said date. However, if the winning candidate was proclaimed after June 30 of the election
year, a verified election protest shall be filed within fifteen (15) days from the date of
proclamation.
RULE 18. Quo Warranto. - A verified petition for quo warranto on the ground of ineligibility
may be filed by any registered voter of the congressional district concerned, or any
registered voter in the case of party-list representatives, within fifteen (15) days from June
30 of the election year, if the winning candidate was proclaimed on or before said date.
However, if the winning candidate was proclaimed after June 30 of the election year, a
verified petition for quo warranto shall be filed within fifteen (15) days from the date of
proclamation. The party filing the petition shall be designated as the petitioner, while the
adverse party shall be known as the respondent.
The amendments to Rules 17 and 18 of the 2015 HRET Rules were made "with respect to
the reckoning point within which to file an election protest or a petition for quo warranto,
respectively, in order to further promote a just and expeditious determination and
disposition of every election contest brought before the Tribunal[.]" The recent
amendments, which were published in The Philippine Star on 26 September 2018 and took
effect on 11 October 2018, clarified and removed any doubt as to the reckoning date for the
filing of an election protest. The losing candidate can determine with certainty when to file
his election protest.
d. Abayon v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 189466, February 11,2010
Respondents Perfecto C. Lucaban, Jr., Ronyl S. Dela Cruz, and Agustin C. Doroga, all
registered voters, filed a petition for quo warranto with respondent HRET against Aangat
Tayo and its nominee, petitioner Abayon, in HRET Case 07-041. They claimed that Aangat
Tayo was not eligible for a party-list seat in the House of Representatives, since it did not
represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors.
Respondent Lucaban and the others with him further pointed out that petitioner Abayon
herself was not qualified to sit in the House as a party-list nominee since she did not
belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors, she being the wife of an
incumbent congressional district representative. She moreover lost her bid as party-list
representative of the party-list organization called An Waray in the immediately preceding
elections of May 10, 2004.
Petitioner Abayon countered that the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) had already
confirmed the status of Aangat Tayo as a national multi-sectoral party-list organization
representing the workers, women, youth, urban poor, and elderly and that she belonged to
the women sector. Abayon also claimed that although she was the second nominee of An
Waray party-list organization during the 2004 elections, she could not be regarded as
having lost a bid for an elective office.
Finally, petitioner Abayon pointed out that respondent HRET had no jurisdiction over the
petition for quo warranto since respondent Lucaban and the others with him collaterally
attacked the registration of Aangat Tayo as a party-list organization, a matter that fell within
the jurisdiction of the COMELEC. It was Aangat Tayo that was taking a seat in the House
of Representatives, and not Abayon who was just its nominee. All questions involving her
eligibility as first nominee, said Abayon, were internal concerns of Aangat Tayo.
On July 16, 2009 respondent HRET issued an order, dismissing the petition as against
Aangat Tayo but upholding its jurisdiction over the qualifications of petitioner Abayon.1 The
latter moved for reconsideration but the HRET denied the same on September 17, 2009,
prompting Abayon to file the present petition for special civil action of certiorari.
In G.R. 189506, petitioner Jovito S. Palparan, Jr. is the first nominee of the Bantay party-
list group that won a seat in the 2007 elections for the members of the House of
Representatives. Respondents Reynaldo Lesaca, Jr., Cristina Palabay, Renato M. Reyes,
Jr., Erlinda Cadapan, Antonio Flores, and Joselito Ustarez are members of some other
party-list groups.
Shortly after the elections, respondent Lesaca and the others with him filed with
respondent HRET a petition for quo warranto against Bantay and its nominee, petitioner
Palparan, in HRET Case 07-040. Lesaca and the others alleged that Palparan was
ineligible to sit in the House of Representatives as party-list nominee because he did not
belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors that Bantay represented,
namely, the victims of communist rebels, Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Units
(CAFGUs), former rebels, and security guards. Lesaca and the others said that Palparan
committed gross human rights violations against marginalized and underrepresented
sectors and organizations.
Petitioner Palparan countered that the HRET had no jurisdiction over his person since it
was actually the party-list Bantay, not he, that was elected to and assumed membership in
the House of Representatives. Palparan claimed that he was just Bantay’s nominee.
Consequently, any question involving his eligibility as first nominee was an internal
concern of Bantay. Such question must be brought, he said, before that party-list group,
not before the HRET.
On July 23, 2009 respondent HRET issued an order dismissing the petition against Bantay
for the reason that the issue of the ineligibility or qualification of the party-list group fell
within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC pursuant to the Party-List System Act. HRET,
however, defended its jurisdiction over the question of petitioner Palparan’s qualifications.3
Palparan moved for reconsideration but the HRET denied it by a resolution dated
September 10, 2009,4 hence, the recourse to this Court through this petition for special
civil action of certiorari and prohibition.
Since the two cases raise a common issue, the Court has caused their consolidation.
Issue: Whether or not respondent HRET has jurisdiction over the question of qualifications
of petitioners Abayon and Palparan as nominees of Aangat Tayo and Bantay party-list
organizations, respectively, who took the seats at the House of Representatives that such
organizations won in the 2007 elections.
Ruling:
Sec. 9. Qualification of Party-List Nominees. – No person shall be nominated as party-list
representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a
resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding
the day of the election, able to read and write, bona fide member of the party or
organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of
the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the
election.1avvphi1
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more
than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative
who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to continue until the
expiration of his term.
In the cases before the Court, those who challenged the qualifications of petitioners
Abayon and Palparan claim that the two do not belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors that they ought to represent. The Party-List System Act provides
that a nominee must be a "bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks
to represent."7
It is for the HRET to interpret the meaning of this particular qualification of a

nominee—the need for him or her to be a bona fide member or a representative of
his party-list organization—in the context of the facts that characterize petitioners
Abayon and Palparan’s relation to Aangat Tayo and Bantay, respectively, and the
marginalized and underrepresented interests that they presumably embody.
Petitioners Abayon and Palparan of course point out that the authority to determine the
qualifications of a party-list nominee belongs to the party or organization that nominated
him. This is true, initially. The right to examine the fitness of aspiring nominees and,
eventually, to choose five from among them after all belongs to the party or organization
that nominates them.8 But where an allegation is made that the party or organization had
chosen and allowed a disqualified nominee to become its party-list representative in the
lower House and enjoy the secured tenure that goes with the position, the resolution of the
dispute is taken out of its hand.
Parenthetically, although the Party-List System Act does not so state, the COMELEC
seems to believe, when it resolved the challenge to petitioner Abayon, that it has the power
to do so as an incident of its authority to approve the registration of party-list organizations.
But the Court need not resolve this question since it is not raised here and has not been
argued by the parties.
What is inevitable is that Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution provides that the
HRET shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to, among other things, the
qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives. Since, as pointed
out above, party-list nominees are "elected members" of the House of
Representatives no less than the district representatives are, the HRET has
jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their qualifications. By analogy with the cases of
district representatives, once the party or organization of the party-list nominee has
been proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath and assumed office as
member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election
contests relating to his qualifications ends and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins.
The Court holds that respondent HRET did not gravely abuse its discretion when it
dismissed the petitions for quo warranto against Aangat Tayo party-list and Bantay
party-list but upheld its jurisdiction over the question of the qualifications of
petitioners Abayon and Palparan.
II. Registration of Voters
1. Qualification and Disqualification of Voters
a. Kabataan Party List vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 221318, 16 December2015

- Essentially, the present petition is a constitutional challenge against the biometrics
validation requirement imposed under RA 10367, including COMELEC Resolution
Nos. 9721, 9863, and 10013. As non-compliance with the same results in the
penalty of deactivation, petitioners posit that it has risen to the level of an
unconstitutional substantive requirement in the exercise of the right of suffrage.64
They submit that the statutory requirement of biometric validation is no different
from the unconstitutional requirement of literacy and property because mere non-
validation already absolutely curtails the exercise of the right of suffrage through
deactivation.65 Further, they advance the argument that deactivation is not the
disqualification by law contemplated as a valid limitation to the exercise of suffrage
under the 1987 Constitution.
The contestation is untenable.
As early as the 1936 case of The People of the Philippine Islands v. Corral, it has
been recognized that "[t]he right to vote is not a natural right but is a right
created by law. Suffrage is a privilege granted by the State to such persons or
classes as are most likely to exercise it for the public good. In the early
10
stages of the evolution of the representative system of government, the
exercise of the right of suffrage was limited to a small portion of the
inhabitants. But with the spread of democratic ideas, the enjoyment of the
franchise in the modern states has come to embrace the mass of the audit
classes of persons are excluded from the franchise."
Section 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not

otherwise disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen years of age, and who
shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place
wherein they propose to vote for at least six months immediately preceding
the election. No literacy, property, or other substantive requirement shall be
imposed on the exercise of suffrage.
Dissecting the provision, one must meet the following qualifications in order to
exercise the right of suffrage: first, he must be a Filipino citizen; second, he must
not be disqualified by law; and third, he must have resided in the Philippines for at
least one (1) year and in the place wherein he proposes to vote for at least six (6)
months immediately preceding the election.
The second item more prominently reflects the franchised nature of the right of
suffrage. The State may therefore regulate said right by imposing statutory
disqualifications, with the restriction, however, that the same do not amount
to, as per the second sentence of the provision, a "literacy, property or other
substantive requirement." Based on its genesis, it may be gleaned that the
limitation is geared towards the elimination of irrelevant standards that are
purely based on socio-economic considerations that have no bearing on the
right of a citizen to intelligently cast his vote and to further the public good.
Section 118. Disqualifications. - The following shall be disqualified from voting:

(a) Any person who has been sentenced by final judgment to suffer imprisonment for
not less than one year, such disability not having been removed by plenary pardon
or granted amnesty: Provided, however, That any person disqualified to vote under
this paragraph shall automatically reacquire the right to vote upon expiration of five
years after service of sentence.
(b) Any person who has been adjudged by final judgment by competent court or
tribunal of having committed any crime involving disloyalty to the duly constituted
government such as rebellion, sedition, violation of the anti-subversion and firearms
laws, or any crime against national security, unless restored to his full civil and
political rights in accordance with law: Provided, That he shall regain his right to
vote automatically upon expiration of five years after service of sentence.
(c) Insane or incompetent persons as declared by competent authority.
Registration regulates the exercise of the right of suffrage. It is not a qualification for
such right.80 (Emphasis supplied)
As a form of regulation, compliance with the registration procedure is dutifully
enjoined. Section 115 of the Omnibus Election Code provides:
Section 115. Necessity of Registration. - In order that a qualified elector may vote in
any election, plebiscite or referendum, he must be registered in the permanent list
of voters for the city or municipality in which he resides. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, although one is deemed to be a "qualified elector," he must nonetheless still
comply with the registration procedure in order to vote.
As the deliberations on the 1973 Constitution made clear, registration is a mere

procedural requirement which does not fall under the limitation that "[n]o literacy,
property, or other substantive requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of
suffrage." This was echoed in AKBAYAN-Youth v. COMELEC81 (AKBAYAN-
11
Youth), wherein the Court pronounced that the process of registration is a
procedural limitation on the right to vote. Albeit procedural, the right of a citizen to
vote nevertheless remains conditioned upon it:
Needless to say, the exercise of the right of suffrage, as in the enjoyment of all
other rights, is subject to existing substantive and procedural requirements
embodied in our Constitution, statute books and other repositories of law. Thus, as
to the substantive aspect, Section 1, Article V of the Constitution provides:
xxxx
[T]he act of registration is an indispensable precondition to the right of suffrage. For
registration is part and parcel of the right to vote and an indispensable element in
the election process. Thus, contrary to petitioners' argument, registration cannot
and should not be denigrated to the lowly stature of a mere statutory requirement.
Proceeding from the significance of registration as a necessary requisite to the right
to vote, the State undoubtedly, in the exercise of its inherent police power, may
then enact laws to safeguard and regulate the act of voter's registration for the
ultimate purpose of conducting honest, orderly and peaceful election, to the
incidental yet generally important end, that even pre-election activities could be
performed by the duly constituted authorities in a realistic and orderly manner - one
which is not indifferent, and so far removed from the pressing order of the day and
the prevalent circumstances of the times.88 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Thus, unless it is shown that a registration requirement rises to the level of a
literacy, property or other substantive requirement as contemplated by the Framers
of the Constitution - that is, one which propagates a socio-economic standard which
is bereft of any rational basis to a person's ability to intelligently cast his vote and to
further the public good - the same cannot be struck down as unconstitutional, as in
this case.
A "qualification" is loosely defined as "the possession of qualities, properties (such

as fitness or capacity) inherently or legally necessary to make one eligible for a
position or office, or to perform a public duty or function."
That being said, the assailed regulation on the right to suffrage was sufficiently
justified as it was indeed narrowly tailored to achieve the compelling state interest
of establishing a clean, complete, permanent and updated list of voters, and was
demonstrably the least restrictive means in promoting that interest.
b. RA 10742, Sec. 4
SEC. 4. Katipunan ng Kabataan. – There shall be in every barangay a Katipunan
ng Kabataan to be composed of all citizens of the Philippines residing in the
barangay for at least six (6) months, who are at least fifteen (15) but not more than
thirty (30) years of age, and who are duly registered in the list of the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC) and/or the records of the Sangguniang Kabataan
secretary.
2. Inclusion and Exclusion Proceedings

a. InclusionandExclusionProceedingsvs.DenialofDueCoursetoorCancellationofCOC
Proceedings - Velasco v. Comelec, G.R. No. 180051, December 24,2008
The Proceedings Compared.
In terms of purpose, voters' inclusion/exclusion and COC denial/cancellation are

different proceedings; one refers to the application to be registered as a voter to
be eligible to vote, while the other refers to the application to be a candidate.
Because of their differing purposes, they also involve different issues and entail
12
different reliefs although the facts on which they rest may have commonalities
where they may be said to converge or interface. One such commonality is on
the matter of residence. Section 9 of Republic Act 8189, otherwise known as the
Voters' Registration Act (VRA), requires that voters "shall have resided in the
Philippines for at least one (1) year, and in the place wherein they propose to
vote, at least six (6) months immediately preceding the election." The OEC, on
the other hand, requires under its Section 74 that the would-be candidate state
material facts such as, among others, his residence. Under the combined
application of Section 65 of the OEC and Section 39 of the Local Government
Code (LGC), a local official must - among others - have the same residency
requirement as required under the VRA. Another point of convergence is on the
candidate's status as a registered voter; a candidate for a local government
position must be a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, province, or
city where he or she intends to run for office.
The remedies available in the two proceedings likewise differ. Velasco's remedy
from the adverse decision in his petition for inclusion as voter is as provided
under Section 138 of the OEC quoted above. From the MTC, the recourse is to
the RTC whose decision is final and executory, correctible by the Court of
Appeals only by a writ of certiorari based on grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. On the other hand, the approval of a certificate
of candidacy or its denial is a matter directly cognizable by the COMELEC, with
the decision of its Division reviewable by the COMELEC en banc whose decision
is in turn reviewable by this Court under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court and
Section 7, of Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution.
That the COMELEC relied on the RTC ruling in canceling the COC of Velasco cannot
likewise be a legal error as Section 138 of the OEC is clear and categorical in its terms:
"Decisions of the Municipal or Metropolitan Trial Courts may be appealed by the aggrieved
party to the Regional Trial Courts within five (5) days from receipt of notice thereof.
Otherwise, said decision shall become final and executory. The regional trial court shall
decide the appeal within ten days from the time the appeal was received and its decision
shall be final and executory." We note that when Velasco sought recourse with the Court of
Appeals, he did so by way of appeal under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court - a recourse that
was not available to him because an RTC ruling in an inclusion/exclusion is final and
executory. This led the appellate court to recognize in its Amended Decision of August 19,
2008, albeit on motion for reconsideration, that it had no jurisdiction to entertain Velasco's
appeal.
The Right to Vote
The above discussions, particularly on the distinctions between inclusion/exclusion

proceedings and COC denial/cancellation proceedings, refute and belie Velasco's position
that the COMELEC improperly ruled on his right to vote when it cancelled his COC. The
tribunals given authority by law and who actually ruled on whether Velasco should have the
right to vote in Sasmuan, Pampanga were the ERB, the MTC, and subsequently, the
RTC. The COMELEC did not so rule; it merely recognized the RTC's final and
executory ruling on the matter.
This conclusion is not a hairsplitting sophistry, but one based on clear distinctions drawn by
the law. As above pointed out, inclusion/exclusion and COC denial/cancellation
proceedings, while they may ultimately have common factual bases, are still proceedings
poles apart in terms of the issues, reliefs, and remedies involved. That at some point they
may converge (as in this case, where the COC denial/cancellation proceeding relied on and
used the results of the voters' inclusion/exclusion proceeding) does not erase the
distinctions between them. In the context of this case, it does not mean that the COMELEC
13
- commonly with the ERB, the MTC and the RTC -ruled on Velasco's right to vote because
the COMELEC relied on the latter's ruling.
Velasco's Qualifications/Disqualifications as a Voter
Whether Velasco possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications to
register as a voter of Sasmuan, Pampanga is a matter that is not directly before us as his
inclusion as a Sasmuan voter is not before us. As the COMELEC did, we rely on the final
and executory RTC ruling excluding Velasco from the Sasmuan voters' list. We observe,
however, that at the time he filed his application for registration with the COMELEC local
office on October 13, 2006, Velasco was a dual citizen. The records show that Velasco
renounced his American citizenship only on March 28, 2007, although he secured his dual
citizenship status as early as July 31, 2006 at the Philippine Consulate in San Francisco,
California. Under his dual citizenship status, he possessed the right to vote in Philippine
elections through the absentee voting scheme under Republic Act No. 9189 (the Oversees
Absentee Voting Law or the OAVL) as we ruled in Nicolas-Lewis v.
COMELEC. In Macalintal v. COMELEC, we significantly said that absentee voters are
exempted from the constitutional residency requirement for regular Philippine voters. Thus,
the residency requirements we cited above under the VRA and the LGC do not apply to
Velasco, assuming he registered as a dual citizen/absentee voter.
By law, however, the right of dual citizens who vote as absentee voters pertains only to the
election of national officials, specifically: the president, the vice-president, the senators, and
party-list representatives. Thus, Velasco was not eligible to vote as an absentee voter in the
local election of 2007. In fact, the records do not show that Velasco ever registered as an
absentee voter for the 2007 election.
On the other hand, Velasco could not have registered as a regular voter because he did not
possess the residency requirement of one-year stay in the Philippines and six-months stay
in the municipality where he proposed to vote at the time of the election. The records show
that he arrived in the Philippines only on September 14, 2006 and applied for registration on
October 13 of that year20 for the election to be held in May of the following year (2007). To
hark back and compare his case to a similar case, Coquilla v. COMELEC,21 Velasco, before
acquiring his dual citizenship status, was an American citizen who had lost his residency
and domiciliary status in the Philippines; whose sojourn in the Philippines was via a visitor's
visa; and who never established permanent residence in the Philippines.
Like Coquilla before him, Velasco could not have therefore validly registered as a regular
voter eight months before the May 2007 local elections.
The Due Process Issue.
Finally, we see no merit in Velasco's argument that the COMELEC annulled his
proclamation as Mayor without due process. The nullification of his proclamation as a
winning candidate was an outcome - a necessary legal consequence - of the cancellation of
his COC pursuant to Section 78 of the OEC. A COC cancellation proceeding essentially
partakes of the nature of a disqualification case. In the present case, Velasco filed an
Answer to Panlaqui's petition to cancel or deny due course to his (Velasco's) COC; hence,
he was afforded the opportunity to be heard in the cancellation of his COC.
Under the combined application of Sections 6 and 7 of Republic Act No. 6646, candidates
who are disqualified by final judgment before the election shall not be voted for and the
votes cast for them shall not be counted. If the disqualification or COC cancellation/denial
case is not resolved before election day, the proceedings shall continue even after the
election and the proclamation of the winner. In the meanwhile, the candidate may be voted
for and be proclaimed if he or she wins, but the COMELEC's jurisdiction to deny due course
and cancel his or her COC continues. This rule applies even if the candidate facing
disqualification is voted for and receives the highest number of votes, and even if the
candidate is proclaimed and has taken his oath of office. The only exception to this rule is in
the case of congressional or senatorial candidates with unresolved disqualification or COC
denial/cancellation cases after the elections. Pursuant to Section 17 of Article VI of the
14
Constitution, the COMELEC ipso jure loses jurisdiction over these unfinished cases in favor
of the respective Senate or the House of Representatives electoral tribunals after the
candidates take their oath of office.
Under these circumstances, Velasco's claim of denial of due process is misplaced since he
was given the opportunity to be heard in a proceeding that would result in the annulment of
his proclamation; due process was duly served because its essence is the opportunity to be
heard and this was fully given to Velasco.
In sum, the COMELEC resolutions canceling Velasco's COC are procedurally and
substantively correct, thus negating the grave abuse of discretion that Velasco alleges.
As our final point, we are aware that Velasco won the May 14, 2007 mayoralty election in
Sasmuan. We recognize, too, that we have ruled in the past that a candidate's victory in the
election may be considered a sufficient basis to rule in favor of the candidate sought to be
disqualified if the main issue involves defects in the candidate's certificate of candidacy. We
said that while provisions relating to certificates of candidacy are mandatory in terms, it is
an established rule of interpretation as regards election laws, that mandatory provisions
requiring certain steps before elections will be construed as directory after the elections, to
give effect to the will of the people. We so ruled in Quizon v. COMELEC and Saya-ang v.
COMELEC.31
The present case perhaps presents the proper time and opportunity to fine-tune our above
ruling. We say this with the realization that a blanket and unqualified reading and
application of this ruling can be fraught with dangerous significance for the rule of law and
the integrity of our elections. For one, such blanket/unqualified reading may provide a way
around the law that effectively negates election requirements aimed at providing the
electorate with the basic information to make an informed choice about a candidate's
eligibility and fitness for office.
The first requirement that may fall when an unqualified reading is made is Section 39 of the
LGC which specifies the basic qualifications of local government officials. Equally
susceptive of being rendered toothless is Section 74 of the OEC that sets out what should
be stated in a COC. Section 78 may likewise be emasculated as mere delay in the
resolution of the petition to cancel or deny due course to a COC can render a Section 78
petition useless if a candidate with false COC data wins. To state the obvious, candidates
may risk falsifying their COC qualifications if they know that an election victory will cure any
defect that their COCs may have. Election victory then becomes a magic formula to bypass
election eligibility requirements.
In the process, the rule of law suffers; the clear and unequivocal legal command, framed by
a Congress representing the national will, is rendered inutile because the people of a given
locality has decided to vote a candidate into office despite his or her lack of the
qualifications Congress has determined to be necessary.
In the present case, Velasco is not only going around the law by his claim that he is
registered voter when he is not, as has been determined by a court in a final judgment.
Equally important is that he has made a material misrepresentation under oath in his COC
regarding his qualification. For these violations, he must pay the ultimate price - the
nullification of his election victory. He may also have to account in a criminal court for
making a false statement under oath, but this is a matter for the proper authorities to decide
upon.
We distinguish our ruling in this case from others that we have made in the past by the
clarification that COC defects beyond matters of form and that involve material
misrepresentations cannot avail of the benefit of our ruling that COC mandatory
requirements before elections are considered merely directory after the people shall have
spoken. A mandatory and material election law requirement involves more than the will of
the people in any given locality. Where a material COC misrepresentation under oath is
made, thereby violating both our election and criminal laws, we are faced as well with an
15
assault on the will of the people of the Philippines as expressed in our laws. In a choice
between provisions on material qualifications of elected officials, on the one hand, and the
will of the electorate in any given locality, on the other, we believe and so hold that we
cannot choose the electorate will. The balance must always tilt in favor of upholding and
enforcing the law. To rule otherwise is to slowly gnaw at the rule of law.
III. Political Parties and Party-lists
1. Political Parties to Candidates – Sec. 70,OEC

Sec. 70. Guest candidacy. - A political party may nominate and/or support candidates not
belonging to it.
2. The Party-list System

-the only one that a party is elected instead of a name of a person
a. The four parameters in the Party-List election

-The 20% allocation
-The 2% threshold
-The 3-seat limit rule
-The proportional representation rule
b. Cases:
i. Veterans Federation Party vs. COMELEC, GR No. 136781, 6
October2000
In sum, we hold that the Comelec gravely abused its discretion in ruling that the
thirty-eight (38) herein respondent parties, organizations and coalitions are each
entitled to a party-list seat, because it glaringly violated two requirements of RA
7941: the two percent threshold and proportional representation.
In disregarding, rejecting and circumventing these statutory provisions, the Comelec

effectively arrogated unto itself what the Constitution expressly and wholly vested in
the legislature: the power and the discretion to define the mechanics for the
enforcement of the system. The wisdom and the propriety of these impositions,
absent any clear transgression of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, are beyond judicial review.28
Indeed, the Comelec and the other parties in these cases - both petitioners and
respondents - have failed to demonstrate that our lawmakers gravely abused their
discretion in prescribing such requirements. By grave abuse of discretion is meant
such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.29
The Comelec, which is tasked merely to enforce and administer election-related

laws,30 cannot simply disregard an act of Congress exercised within the bounds of
its authority. As a mere implementing body, it cannot judge the wisdom, propriety or
rationality of such act. Its recourse is to draft an amendment to the law and lobby for
its approval and enactment by the legislature.
Furthermore, a reading of the entire Constitution reveals no violation of any of its

provisions by the strict enforcement of RA 7941. It is basic that to strike down a law
or any of its provisions as unconstitutional, there must be a clear and unequivocal
showing that what the Constitution prohibits, the statute permits.31
Neither can we grant petitioners’ prayer that they each be given additional seats (for
16
a total of three each), because granting such plea would plainly and simply violate
the "proportional representation" mandated by Section 11 (b) of RA 7941.
The low turnout of the party-list votes during the 1998 elections should not be
interpreted as a total failure of the law in fulfilling the object of this new system of
representation. It should not be deemed a conclusive indication that the
requirements imposed by RA 7941 wholly defeated the implementation of the
system. Be it remembered that the party-list system, though already popular in
parliamentary democracies, is still quite new in our presidential system. We should
allow it some time to take root in the consciousness of our people and in the heart of
our tripartite form of republicanism. Indeed, the Comelec and the defeated litigants
should not despair.
Quite the contrary, the dismal result of the first election for party-list representatives
should serve as a challenge to our sectoral parties and organizations. It should stir
them to be more active and vigilant in their campaign for representation in the
State's lawmaking body. It should also serve as a clarion call for innovation and
creativity in adopting this novel system of popular democracy.
With adequate information dissemination to the public and more active sectoral
parties, we are confident our people will be more responsive to future party-list
elections. Armed with patience, perseverance and perspicacity, our marginalized
sectors, in time, will fulfill the Filipino dream of full representation in Congress under
the aegis of the party-list system, Philippine style.
WHEREFORE, the Petitions are hereby partially GRANTED. The assailed

Resolutions of the Comelec are SET ASIDE and NULLIFIED. The proclamations of
the fourteen (14) sitting party-list representatives - two for APEC and one each for
the remaining twelve (12) qualified parties - are AFFIRMED.
ii. BANAT vs. COMELEC, GR No. 179271, 21 April 2009
Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 mandates the filling-up of the entire 20%
allocation of party-list representatives found in the Constitution. The Constitution, in
paragraph 1, Section 5 of Article VI, left the determination of the number of the members of
the House of Representatives to Congress: "The House of Representatives shall be
composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, x
x x." The 20% allocation of party-list representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list
representatives cannot be more than 20% of the members of the House of Representatives.
However, we cannot allow the continued existence of a provision in the law which will
systematically prevent the constitutionally allocated 20% party-list representatives from being
filled. The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number of seats that a qualified party-list
organization may occupy, remains a valid statutory device that prevents any party from
dominating the party-list elections. Seats for party-list representatives shall thus be allocated
in accordance with the procedure used in Table 3 above.
However, by a vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing
major political parties from participating in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly. Those
who voted to continue disallowing major political parties from the party-list elections joined
Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno in his separate opinion. On the formula to allocate party-list
seats, the Court is unanimous in concurring with this ponencia.
iii. Atong Paglaum vs. COMELEC, GR No. 203766, 02 April 2013
The Court’s Ruling
17
We hold that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in following
prevailing decisions of this Court in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the
coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections. However, since the Court adopts in this
Decision new parameters in the qualification of national, regional, and sectoral
parties under the party-list system, thereby abandoning the rulings in the decisions
applied by the COMELEC in disqualifying petitioners, we remand to the COMELEC
all the present petitions for the COMELEC to determine who are qualified to register
under the party-list system, and to participate in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list
elections, under the new parameters prescribed in this Decision.
The Party-List System
The 1987 Constitution provides the basis for the party-list system of representation.
Simply put, the party-list system is intended to democratize political power by giving
political parties that cannot win in legislative district elections a chance to win seats
in the House of Representatives.50 The voter elects two representatives in the
House of Representatives: one for his or her legislative district, and another for his
or her party-list group or organization of choice. The 1987 Constitution provides:
Section 5, Article VI
(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred
and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from
legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who,
as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total
number of representatives including those under the party list. For three
consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats
allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by
selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law,
except the religious sector.
Sections 7 and 8, Article IX-C
Sec. 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or coalition shall be

valid, except for those registered under the party-list system as provided in this
Constitution.
Sec. 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered under the party-list

system, shall not be represented in the voters’ registration boards, boards of
election inspectors, boards of canvassers, or other similar bodies. However, they
shall be entitled to appoint poll watchers in accordance with law.
Commissioner Christian S. Monsod, the main sponsor of the party-list system,

stressed that "the party-list system is not synonymous with that of the sectoral
representation."
The COMELEC may look into the truth of whether or not a political party is really
organized along a specific sectoral line. If such is verified or confirmed, the
political party may submit a list of individuals who are actually members of such
sectors. The lists are to be published to give individuals or organizations
belonging to such sector the chance to present evidence contradicting claims of
18
membership in the said sector or to question the claims of the existence of such
sectoral organizations or parties. This proceeding shall be conducted by the
COMELEC and shall be summary in character. In other words, COMELEC
decisions on this matter are final and unappealable.
Indisputably, the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended the party-list system to
include not only sectoral parties but also non-sectoral parties. The framers intended the
sectoral parties to constitute a part, but not the entirety, of the party-list system. As
explained by Commissioner Wilfredo Villacorta, political parties can participate in
the party-list system "For as long as they field candidates who come from the
different marginalized sectors that we shall designate in this Constitution."
In disqualifying petitioners, the COMELEC used the criteria prescribed in Ang Bagong
Bayani and BANAT. Ang Bagong Bayani laid down the guidelines for qualifying those
who desire to participate in the party-list system:
First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must represent the
marginalized and underrepresented groups identified in Section 5 of RA 7941. x x x
Second, while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the
Constitution to participate in the party-list system, they must comply with the declared
statutory policy of enabling "Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors x x x to be elected to the House of Representatives." x x x.
xxxx
Third, x x x the religious sector may not be represented in the party-list system. x x x.
xxxx
Fourth, a party or an organization must not be disqualified under Section 6 of RA 7941,

which enumerates the grounds for disqualification as follows:
"(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association, organized for

religious purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;
(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party,
foundation, organization, whether directly or through any of its officers or members
or indirectly through third parties for partisan election purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least
two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2)
preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered."
Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project organized or an
entity funded or assisted by, the government. x x x.
19
xxxx
Sixth, the party must not only comply with the requirements of the law; its nominees
must likewise do so. Section 9 of RA 7941 reads as follows:
"SEC 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. - No person shall be nominated as party-

list representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered
voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1)year immediately
preceding the day of the election, able to read and write, a bona fide member of the
party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding
the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the
election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not
more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral
representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to
continue in office until the expiration of his term."
Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization must represent marginalized and
underrepresented sectors; so also must its nominees. x x x.
Eighth, x x x the nominee must likewise be able to contribute to the formulation and
enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole. (Emphasis
supplied)
In 2009, by a vote of 8-7 in BANAT, this Court stretched the Ang Bagong Bayani ruling
further. In BANAT, the majority officially excluded major political parties from
participating in party-list elections, abandoning even the lip-service that Ang Bagong
Bayani accorded to the 1987 Constitution and R.A.No. 7941 that major political parties
can participate in party-list elections.
The minority in BANAT, however, believed that major political parties can participate in
the party-list system through their sectoral wings. The minority expressed that
"[e]xcluding the major political parties in party-list elections is manifestly against the
Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. This Court
cannot engage in socio-political engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion of
major political parties from the party-list elections in patent violation of the Constitution
and the law." The experimentations in socio-political engineering have only resulted in
confusion and absurdity in the party-list system. Such experimentations, in clear
contravention of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941, must now come to an end.
We cannot, however, fault the COMELEC for following prevailing jurisprudence in

disqualifying petitioners. In following prevailing jurisprudence, the COMELEC could not
have committed grave abuse of discretion. However, for the coming 13 May 2013 party-
list elections, we must now impose and mandate the party-list system actually
envisioned and authorized under the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941. In BANAT,
this Court devised a new formula in the allocation of party-list seats, reversing the
COMELEC's allocation which followed the then prevailing formula in Ang Bagong
Bayani. In BANAT, however, the Court did not declare that the COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion. Similarly, even as we acknowledge here that the COMELEC
did not commit grave abuse of discretion, we declare that it would not be in accord with
the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 to apply the criteria in Ang Bagong Bayani and
BANAT in determining who are qualified to participate in the coming 13 May 2013 party-
list elections. For this purpose, we suspend our rule62 that a party may appeal to this
Court from decisions or orders of the COMELEC only if the COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion.
Thus, we remand all the present petitions to the COMELEC. In determining who may
20
participate in the coming 13 May 2013 and subsequent party-list elections, the
COMELEC shall adhere to the following parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or
organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or
organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to

organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any "marginalized and
underrepresented" sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the
party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A
political party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district
elections can participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that can
separately register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an
independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and underrepresented"

or lacking in "well-defined political constituencies." It is enough that their principal
advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors
that are "marginalized and underrepresented" include labor, peasant, fisherfolk,
urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas
workers. The sectors that lack "well-defined political constituencies" include
professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the

"marginalized and underrepresented" must belong to the "marginalized and
underrepresented" sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of
sectoral parties or organizations that lack "well-defined political constituencies" must
belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or
organizations that represent the "marginalized and underrepresented," or that
represent those who lack "well-defined political constituencies," either must belong
to their respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their
respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or organizations
must be bona-fide members of such parties or organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if

some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one
nominee who remains qualified.
The COMELEC excluded from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections
those that did not satisfy these two criteria: (1) all national, regional, and sectoral
groups or organizations must represent the "marginalized and underrepresented"
sectors, and (2) all nominees must belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented"
sector they represent. Petitioners may have been disqualified by the COMELEC
because as political or regional parties they are not organized along sectoral lines and
do not represent the "marginalized and underrepresented." Also, petitioners' nominees
who do not belong to the sectors they represent may have been disqualified, although
they may have a track record of advocacy for their sectors. Likewise, nominees of non-
sectoral parties may have been disqualified because they do not belong to any sector.
Moreover, a party may have been disqualified because one or more of its nominees
failed to qualify, even if the party has at least one remaining qualified nominee. As
discussed above, the disqualification of petitioners, and their nominees, under such
circumstances is contrary to the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941.
iv. Lokin vs. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 179431-32, 22 June 2010
21
Section 8. Nomination of Party-List Representatives.-Each registered party,
organization or coalition shall submit to the COMELEC not later that forty-five
(45) days before the election a list of names, not less than five (5), from which
party-list representatives shall be chosen in case it obtains the required number
of votes.
A person may be nominated in one (1) list only. Only persons who have given
their consent in writing may be named in the list. The list shall not include any
candidate of any elective office or a person who has lost his bid for an elective
office in the immediately preceding election. No change of names or alteration
of the order of nominees shall be allowed after the same shall have been
submitted to the COMELEC except in cases where the nominee dies, or
withdraws in writing his nomination, becomes incapacitated in which case the
name of the substitute nominee shall be placed last in the list. Incumbent
sectoral representatives in the House of Representatives who are nominated in
the party-list system shall not be considered resigned.
The provision is daylight clear. The Legislature thereby deprived the party-list
organization of the right to change its nominees or to alter the order of
nominees once the list is submitted to the COMELEC, except when: (a) the
nominee dies; (b) the nominee withdraws in writing his nomination; or (c) the
nominee becomes incapacitated. The provision must be read literally because
its language is plain and free from ambiguity, and expresses a single, definite,
and sensible meaning. Such meaning is conclusively presumed to be the
meaning that the Legislature has intended to convey. Even where the courts
should be convinced that the Legislature really intended some other meaning,
and even where the literal interpretation should defeat the very purposes of the
enactment, the explicit declaration of the Legislature is still the law, from which
the courts must not depart.34 When the law speaks in clear and categorical
language, there is no reason for interpretation or construction, but only for
application.35 Accordingly, an administrative agency tasked to implement a
statute may not construe it by expanding its meaning where its provisions are
clear and unambiguous
IV. Candidacy
1. Qualifications/Eligibilities of Candidates
a. General Guiding Principles in Candidates’ Qualifications

i. Qualifications for Public Office are Continuing Requirements - Frivaldo v.
Comelec, 174 SCRA 245(1989)
-This Court will not permit the anomaly of a person sitting as provincial
governor in this country while owing exclusive allegiance to another country.
The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this
patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and employment only
to the citizens of this country. The qualifications prescribed for elective office
cannot be erased by the electorate alone. The will of the people as expressed
through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they
mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate was qualified.
Obviously, this rule requires strict application when the deficiency is lack of
citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he
must owe his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all
fealty and fidelity to any other state.
It is true as the petitioner points out that the status of the natural-born citizen is
favored by the Constitution and our laws, which is all the more reason why it
should be treasured like a pearl of great price. But once it is surrendered and
22
renounced, the gift is gone and cannot be lightly restored. This country of ours,
for all its difficulties and limitations, is like a jealous and possessive mother.
Once rejected, it is not quick to welcome back with eager arms its prodigal if
repentant children. The returning renegade must show, by an express and
unequivocal act, the renewal of his loyalty and love.
ii. Vice of Ineligibility Cannot be Cured by Election-Hayudini

v.Comelec,G.R.No. 207900, April 22, 2014
On October 5, 2012, Hayudini filed his Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) for

the position of Municipal Mayor of South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi in the May 13,
2013 National and Local Elections held in the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao. Ten days after, or on October 15, 2012, Mustapha J.
Omar (Omar) filed a Petition to Deny Due Course or Cancel Hayudini’s
CoC, entitled Mustapha J. Omar v. Gamal S. Hayudini, docketed as SPA
No. 13-106(DC)(F).5 Omar basically asserted that Hayudini should be
disqualified for making false representation regarding his residence. He
claimed that Hayudini declared in his CoC that he is a resident of the
Municipality of South Ubian when, in fact, he resides in Zamboanga City.
On May 13, 2013, Hayudini won the mayoralty race in South Ubian, Tawi-
Tawi. He was proclaimed and, consequently, took his oath of office.
On June 20, 2013, the COMELEC Second Division issued a Resolution

granting Omar’s second petition to cancel Hayudini’s CoC. The dispositive
portion of the COMELEC Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby

GRANTED. Accordingly, the Certificate of Candidacy filed by Gamal S.
Hayudini as Mayor of South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, in the 13 May 2013 elections,
is hereby CANCELLED.
The Office of the Deputy Executive Director for Operations is hereby

directed to constitute a Special Board of Canvassers for the purpose of
proclaiming the lawful winner for mayoralty position in South Ubian, Tawi-
Tawi during the 13 May 2013 elections
The false representation mentioned in these provisions must pertain to a

material fact, not to a mere innocuous mistake. A candidate who falsifies a
material fact cannot run; if he runs and is elected, cannot serve; in both cases,
he or she can be prosecuted for violation of the election laws. These facts
pertain to a candidate's qualification for elective office, such as his or her
citizenship and residence. Similarly, the candidate's status as a registered voter
falls under this classification as it is a legal requirement which must be reflected
in the CoC. The reason for this is obvious: the candidate, if he or she wins, will
work for and represent the local government under which he or she is running.
Even the will of the people, as expressed through the ballot, cannot cure the
vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in the instant case,
that the candidate was qualified.
Aside from the requirement of materiality, a false representation under Section

78 must consist of a "deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact
which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible." Simply put, it must be
made with a malicious intent to deceive the electorate as to the potential
candidate's qualifications for public office.
23
Section 74 requires the candidate to state under oath in his CoC "that he is
eligible for said office." A candidate is eligible if he has a right to run for the
public office. If a candidate is not actually eligible because he is not a registered
voter in the municipality where he intends to be elected, but still he states under
oath in his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to run for public office, then
the candidate clearly makes a false material representation, a ground to support
a petition under Section 78. It is interesting to note that Hayudini was, in fact,
initially excluded by the ERB as a voter. On November 30, 2012, the ERB
issued a certificate confirming the disapproval of Hayudini’s petition for
registration. This is precisely the reason why he needed to file a Petition for
Inclusion in the Permanent List of Voters in Barangay Bintawlan before the
MCTC. Thus, when he stated in his CoC that "he is eligible for said office,"
Hayudini made a clear and material misrepresentation as to his eligibility,
because he was not, in fact, registered as a voter in Barangay Bintawlan.
Had the COMELEC not given due course to Omar’s petition solely based on
procedural deficiencies, South Ubian would have a mayor who is not even a
registered voter in the locality he is supposed to govern, thereby creating a
ridiculously absurd and outrageous situation. Hence, the COMELEC was
accurate in cancelling Hayudini’s certificate of candidacy. Hayudini likewise
protests that it was a grave error on the part of the COMELEC to have declared
his proclamation null and void when no petition for annulment of his
proclamation was ever filed. What petitioner seems to miss, however, is that the
nullification of his proclamation as a winning candidate is also a legitimate
outcome − a necessary legal consequence − of the cancellation of his CoC
pursuant to Section 78. A CoC cancellation proceeding essentially partakes of
the nature of a disqualification case. The cancellation of a CoC essentially
renders the votes cast for the candidate whose certificate of candidacy has
been cancelled as stray votes. If the disqualification or CoC cancellation or
denial case is not resolved before the election day, the proceedings shall
continue even after the election and the proclamation of the winner. Meanwhile,
the candidate may be voted for and even be proclaimed as the winner, but the
COMELEC's jurisdiction to deny due course and cancel his or her CoC
continues. This rule likewise applies even if the candidate facing disqualification
has already taken his oath of office. The only exception to this rule is in the case
of congressional and senatorial candidates where the COMELEC ipso jure
loses jurisdiction in favor of either the Senate or the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal after the candidates have been proclaimed, taken the proper
oath, and also assumed office.
Since Hayudini was never a valid candidate for the position of the Municipal
Mayor of South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, the votes cast for him should be considered
stray votes, Consequently, the COMELEC properly proclaimed Salma Omar,
who garnered the highest number of votes in the remaining qualified candidates
for the mayoralty post, as the duly-elected Mayor of South Ubian, Tawi Tawi.
iii. Qualifications of Candidates Specified in the Constitution Cannot be

Expanded by a Statute - Social Justice Society vs. Dangerous Drug
Board, et al., GR No. 157870, 3 November2008
NOW THEREFORE, The [COMELEC], pursuant to the authority vested in it

under the Constitution, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code),
[RA] 9165 and other election laws, RESOLVED to promulgate, as it hereby
promulgates, the following rules and regulations on the conduct of mandatory
drug testing to candidates for public office[:]
24
SECTION 1. Coverage. - All candidates for public office, both national and
local, in the May 10, 2004 Synchronized National and Local Elections shall
undergo mandatory drug test in government forensic laboratories or any drug
testing laboratories monitored and accredited by the Department of Health.
SEC. 3. x x x
On March 25, 2004, in addition to the drug certificates filed with their
respective offices, the Comelec Offices and employees concerned shall
submit to the Law Department two (2) separate lists of candidates. The first
list shall consist of those candidates who complied with the mandatory drug
test while the second list shall consist of those candidates who failed to
comply x x x.
SEC. 4. Preparation and publication of names of candidates. - Before the

start of the campaign period, the [COMELEC] shall prepare two separate lists
of candidates. The first list shall consist of those candidates who complied
with the mandatory drug test while the second list shall consist of those
candidates who failed to comply with said drug test. x x x
SEC. 5. Effect of failure to undergo mandatory drug test and file drug test
certificate. - No person elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties
of his office until he has undergone mandatory drug test and filed with the
offices enumerated under Section 2 hereof the drug test certificate herein
required. (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., a senator of the Republic and a candidate

for re - election in the May 10, 2004 elections,1 filed a Petition for Certiorari
and Prohibition under Rule 65. In it, he seeks (1) to nullify Sec. 36(g) of RA
9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 dated December 23, 2003 for
being unconstitutional in that they impose a qualification for candidates for
senators in addition to those already provided for in the 1987 Constitution;
and (2) to enjoin the COMELEC from implementing Resolution No. 6486.
Pimentel invokes as legal basis for his petition Sec. 3, Article VI of the
Constitution, which states:
SECTION 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural - born

citizen of the Philippines, and, on the day of the election, is at least thirty - five
years of age, able to read and write, a registered voter, and a resident of the
Philippines for not less than two years immediately preceding the day of the
election.
According to Pimentel, the Constitution only prescribes a maximum of five (5)

qualifications for one to be a candidate for, elected to, and be a member of
the Senate. He says that both the Congress and COMELEC, by requiring, via
RA 9165 and Resolution No. 6486, a senatorial aspirant, among other
candidates, to undergo a mandatory drug test, create an additional
qualification that all candidates for senator must first be certified as drug free.
He adds that there is no provision in the Constitution authorizing the
Congress or COMELEC to expand the qualification requirements of
candidates for senator.
b. Constitutional and Statutory Qualifications of

Candidates
25
i. Update on SK qualifications: RA 10742,
Sec.10
SEC. 10. Qualifications. – An official of the Sangguniang Kabataan, either elective or

appointee, must be a citizen of the Philippines, a qualified voter of the Katipunan ng
Kabataan, a resident of the barangay for not less than one (1) year immediately
preceding the day of the elections, at least eighteen (18) years but not more than
twenty-four (24) years of age on the day of the elections, able to read and write
Filipino, English, or the local dialect, must not be related within the second civil
degree of consanguinity or affinity to any incumbent elected national official or
to any incumbent elected regional, provincial, city, municipal, or barangay
official, in the locality where he or she seeks to be elected, and must not have
been convicted by final judgment of any crime involving moral turpitude.
c. Citizenship
Who are Filipino citizens?
i. Who are Filipino Citizens - Art. IV, Secs.1-5

1. Tecson v. Comelec, G.R. No. 161434. March 3,2004
In Sum –
(1) The Court, in the exercise of its power of judicial review, possesses
jurisdiction over the petition in G. R. No. 161824, filed under Rule 64, in
relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. G.R. No.
161824 assails the resolution of the COMELEC for alleged grave abuse
of discretion in dismissing, for lack of merit, the petition in SPA No. 04-
003 which has prayed for the disqualification of respondent FPJ from
running for the position of President in the 10th May 2004 national
elections on the contention that FPJ has committed material
representation in his certificate of candidacy by representing himself to
be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.
(2) The Court must dismiss, for lack of jurisdiction and prematurity, the
petitions in G. R. No. 161434 and No. 161634 both having been directly
elevated to this Court in the latter’s capacity as the only tribunal to
resolve a presidential and vice-presidential election contest under the
Constitution. Evidently, the primary jurisdiction of the Court can directly
be invoked only after, not before, the elections are held.
(3) In ascertaining, in G.R. No. 161824, whether grave abuse of discretion

has been committed by the COMELEC, it is necessary to take on the
matter of whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which,
in turn, depended on whether or not the father of respondent, Allan F.
Poe, would have himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative,
whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from
taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion
on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the
presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would
have been born sometime in the year 1870, when the Philippines was
under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of
residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence,
could have well been his place of residence before death, such that
Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the "en masse Filipinization"
that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo
Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of
respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime respondent
26
FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers
are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate or
illegitimate.
(4) But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that
respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence
on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he
cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his
certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section
74, of the Omnibus Election Code. Petitioner has utterly failed to
substantiate his case before the Court, notwithstanding the ample
opportunity given to the parties to present their position and evidence,
and to prove whether or not there has been material misrepresentation,
which, as so ruled in Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC, must not only
be material, but also deliberate and willful.
WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to DISMISS –
1. G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson and Felix B.

Desiderio, Jr., Petitioners, versus Commission on Elections, Ronald
Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. "Fernando Poe, Jr.,) and Victorino X. Fornier,
Respondents," and G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio Velez,
Petitioner, versus Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.,
Respondent," for want of jurisdiction.
2. G. R. No. 161824, entitled "Victorino X. Fornier, Petitioner, versus Hon.

Commission on Elections and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also known as
Fernando Poe, Jr.," for failure to show grave abuse of discretion on the
part of respondent Commission on Elections in dismissing the petition in
SPA No. 04-003.
No Costs.
2. Poe-Llamanzares v. Comelec, G.R. Nos. 221697, March 8,2016

-Foundling
-What is the policy of international law about foundling?
-the country or the state where the foundling is found, it is assumed
it is its citizenship.
3. David v. SET, G.R. No. 221538, September 20, 2016
To hold, as petitioner suggests, that private respondent is stateless265 is not

only to set a dangerous and callous precedent. It is to make this Court an
accomplice to injustice.
Equality, the recognition of the humanity of every individual, and social

justice are the bedrocks of our constitutional order. By the unfortunate
fortuity of the inability or outright irresponsibility of those gave them life,
foundlings are compelled to begin their very existence at a disadvantage.
Theirs is a continuing destitution that can never be truly remedied by any
economic relief.
If we are to make the motives of our Constitution true, then we an never

tolerate an interpretation that condemns foundlings to an even greater
misfortune because of their being abandoned. The Constitution cannot be
27
rendered inert and meaningless for them by mechanical judicial fiat.
Dura lex sed lex is not a callous and unthinking maxim to be deployed
against other reasonable interpretations of our basic law. It does command
us to consider legal text, but always with justice in mind.
It is the empowering and ennobling interpretation of the Constitution that we

must always sustain. Not only will this manner of interpretation edify the less
fortunate; it establishes us, as Filipinos, as a humane and civilized people.
The Senate Electoral Tribunal acted well within the bounds of its
constitutional competence when it ruled that private respondent is a natural-
born citizen qualified to sit as Senator of the Republic. Contrary to
petitioner's arguments, there is no basis for annulling its assailed Decision
and Resolution.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED. Public respondent

Senate Electoral Tribunal did not act without or in excess of its jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
rendering its assailed November 17, 2015 Decision and December 3, 2015
Resolution.
Private respondent Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares is a natural-born Filipino

citizen qualified to hold office as Senator of the Republic.
ii. Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship to Run for PublicOffice

1. “Twin requirements” now Three Requirements - David v. SET,
G.R. No. 221538, September 20, 2016
Requirements for a former Filipino who wants to run for public Office
after repatration: (for purposes of running an office)
-oath of allegiance
-Personal Sworn renunciation of any foreign citizenship
-Compliance with the requirements as a voter (third requirement)
2. Dual Citizen from Birth - Cordora v. Comelec, G.R. No.

176947,February 19, 2009;
We deem it necessary to reiterate our previous ruling in Mercado v.

Manzano, wherein we ruled that dual citizenship is not a ground for
disqualification from running for any elective local position.
To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former
arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of
two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the
said states. For instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose
parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis
is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso
facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a
citizen of both states. Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our
Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of citizens of the
Philippines to possess dual citizenship:
(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which
follow the principle of jus soli;
28
(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by
the laws of their fathers' country such children are citizens of that country;
(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter's country the former
are considered citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed
to have renounced Philippine citizenship.
There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Philippines may,

without performing any act, be also a citizen of another state; but the above
cases are clearly possible given the constitutional provisions on citizenship.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person
simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states.
While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an
individual's volition.
In the present case, Tambunting, a natural-born Filipino, did not

subsequently become a naturalized citizen of another country. Hence, the
twin requirements in R.A. No. 9225 do not apply to him.
Valles v. Comelec, G.R. No. 137000, August 9,2000
Thus, the mere fact that private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was
a holder of an Australian passport and had an alien certificate of
registration are not acts constituting an effective renunciation of
citizenship and do not militate against her claim of Filipino citizenship. For
renunciation to effectively result in the loss of citizenship, the same must
be express. 8 As held by this court in the aforecited case of Aznar, an
application for an alien certificate of registration does not amount to an
express renunciation or repudiation of one’s citizenship. The application
of the herein private respondent for an alien certificate of registration, and
her holding of an Australian passport, as in the case of Mercado v.
Manzano, were mere acts of assertion of her Australian citizenship before
she effectively renounced the same. Thus, at the most, private
respondent had dual citizenship — she was an Australian and a Filipino,
as well.
Moreover, under Commonwealth Act 63, the fact that a child of Filipino
parents was born in another country has not been included as a ground
for losing one’s Philippine citizenship. Since private respondent did not
lose or renounce her Philippine citizenship, petitioner’s claim that
respondent must go through the process of repatriation does not hold
water.
Petitioner also maintains that even on the assumption that the private
respondent had dual citizenship, still, she is disqualified to run for
governor of Davao Oriental; citing Section 40 of Republic Act 7160
otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, which states:
"SEC. 40. Disqualifications. — The following persons are disqualified

from running for any elective local position:
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
29
Again, petitioner’s contention is untenable.
In the aforecited case of Mercado v. Manzano, the Court clarified "dual

citizenship" as used in the Local Government Code and reconciled the
same with Article IV, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution on dual
allegiance. 9 Recognizing situations in which a Filipino citizen may,
without performing any act, and as an involuntary consequence of the
conflicting laws of different countries, be also a citizen of another state,
the Court explained that dual citizenship as a disqualification must refer
to citizens with dual allegiance. The Court succinctly pronounced:
". . . the phrase ‘dual citizenship’ in R.A. No. 7160, ... 40 (d) and in R.A.
No. 7854, . . . 20 must be understood as referring to ‘dual allegiance’.
Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under
this disqualification."
Thus, the fact that the private respondent had dual citizenship did not
automatically disqualify her from running for a public office. Furthermore,
it was ruled that for candidates with dual citizenship, it is enough that they
elect Philippine citizenship upon the filing of their certificate of candidacy,
to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship. The filing of a
certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce foreign citizenship,
effectively removing any disqualification as a dual citizen. This is so
because in the certificate of candidacy, one declares that he/she is a
Filipino citizen and that he/she will support and defend the Constitution of
the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto. Such
declaration, which is under oath, operates as an effective renunciation of
foreign citizenship. Therefore, when the herein private respondent filed
her certificate of candidacy in 1992, such fact alone terminated her
Australian citizenship:
Then, too, it is significant to note that on January 15, 1992, private

respondent executed a Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship,
duly registered in the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of
Australia on May 12, 1992. And, as a result, on February 11, 1992, the
Australian passport of private respondent was cancelled, as certified to by
Second Secretary Richard F. Munro of the Embassy of Australia in Manila.
As aptly appreciated by the COMELEC, the aforesaid acts were enough to
settle the issue of the alleged dual citizenship of Rosalind Ybasco Lopez.
Since her renunciation was effective, petitioner’s claim that private
respondent must go through the whole process of repatriation holds no
water.
Petitioner maintains further that when citizenship is raised as an issue in

judicial or administrative proceedings, the resolution or decision thereon is
generally not considered res judicata in any subsequent proceeding
challenging the same; citing the case of Moy Ya Lim Yao v. Commissioner of
Immigration. He insists that the same issue of citizenship may be threshed
out anew.
Petitioner is correct insofar as the general rule is concerned, i.e. the principle
of res judicata generally does not apply in cases hinging on the issue of
citizenship. However, in the case of Burca v. Republic, an exception to this
general rule was recognized. The Court ruled in that case that in order that
the doctrine of res judicata may be applied in cases of citizenship, the
30
following must be present:
1) a person’s citizenship be raised as a material issue in a controversy where

said person is a party;
2) the Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active part in

the resolution thereof; and
3) the finding on citizenship is affirmed by this Court.
Although the general rule was set forth in the case of Moy Ya Lim Yao, the
case did not foreclose the weight of prior rulings on citizenship. It elucidated
that reliance may somehow be placed on these antecedent official findings,
though not really binding, to make the effort easier or simpler. Indeed, there
appears sufficient basis to rely on the prior rulings of the Commission on
Elections in SPA.-No. 95-066 and EPC 92-54 which resolved the issue of
citizenship in favor of the herein private Respondent. The evidence adduced
by petitioner is substantially the same evidence presented in these two prior
cases. Petitioner failed to show any new evidence or supervening event to
warrant a reversal of such prior resolutions. However, the procedural issue
notwithstanding, considered on the merits, the petition cannot prosper.
3. Dual Citizenship Obtained through Naturalization - Sobejana-

Condonv. Comelec, G.R. No. 198742, August 10,2012
Hence, in De Guzman v. COMELEC, we declared petitioner therein to be disqualified

from running for the position of vice-mayor for his failure to make a personal and
sworn renunciation of his American citizenship.
We find no reason to depart from the mandatory nature infused by the above rulings
to the phrase "sworn renunciation". The language of the provision is plain and
unambiguous. It expresses a single, definite, and sensible meaning and must thus be
read literally.The foreign citizenship must be formally rejected through an affidavit
duly sworn before an officer authorized to administer oath.
In fine, R.A. No. 9225 categorically demands natural-born Filipinos who re-acquire
their citizenship and seek elective office, to execute a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships before an authorized public officer
prior to or simultaneous to the filing of their certificates of candidacy, to qualify as
candidates in Philippine elections. The rule applies to all those who have re-acquired
their Filipino citizenship, like petitioner, without regard as to whether they are still dual
citizens or not. It is a pre-requisite imposed for the exercise of the right to run for
public office.
Stated differently, it is an additional qualification for elective office specific only to

Filipino citizens who re-acquire their citizenship under Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225. It
is the operative act that restores their right to run for public office. The petitioner's
failure to comply therewith in accordance with the exact tenor of the law, rendered
ineffectual the Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship she executed on
September 18, 2006. As such, she is yet to regain her political right to seek elective
office. Unless she executes a sworn renunciation of her Australian citizenship, she is
ineligible to run for and hold any elective office in the Philippines
31
-Private respondent is a natural born Filipino, who applied for an
Australian citizenship. He applied for reacquisition of her
citizenship in order to run for public office. However, she did not
renounce her allegiance to other citizenship of another country.
Contention: it is not necessary for the personal renunciation

simply because in her COC he is already taking an oath of
allegiance in the Philippines and renounced any foreign
citizenship. According to her it is already a compliance the
requirements of renunciation.
-SC- personal renunciation is required. Signing the COC is not

enough because it is only applicable to dual citizenship by
operation of law. Application of COC is a manner for which a
dual citizen by operation of law can elect his citizenship.
However, those who acquired citizenship from foreign country by
their act requires another act to renounce hit. Hence, the signing
of the COC is not enough.
-The third requirement as to renunciation is not necessary when

the person obtained his dual citizenship by operation of law but
not to those persons who has dual citizenship obtained through
naturalization.
4. Recantation of Oath of Renunciation - Maquiling vs. Comelec,

G.R.No. 195649, April 16, 2013
Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 provides:
Section 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has

been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted
for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a
candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be
disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of
votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the
trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of
the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof
order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever
the evidence of his guilt is strong.
There was no chance for Arnado’s proclamation to be suspended under

this rule because Arnado failed to file his answer to the petition seeking
his disqualification. Arnado only filed his Answer on 15 June 2010, long
after the elections and after he was already proclaimed as the winner.
The disqualifying circumstance surrounding Arnado’s candidacy

involves his citizenship. It does not involve the commission of election
offenses as provided for in the first sentence of Section 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code, the effect of which is to disqualify the
individual from continuing as a candidate, or if he has already been
elected, from holding the office.
The disqualifying circumstance affecting Arnado is his citizenship. As

earlier discussed, Arnado was both a Filipino and an American citizen
when he filed his certificate of candidacy. He was a dual citizen
disqualified to run for public office based on Section 40(d) of the Local
32
Government Code.
Section 40 starts with the statement "The following persons are

disqualified from running for any elective local position." The prohibition
serves as a bar against the individuals who fall under any of the
enumeration from participating as candidates in the election.
With Arnado being barred from even becoming a candidate, his

certificate of candidacy is thus rendered void from the beginning. It
could not have produced any other legal effect except that Arnado
rendered it impossible to effect his disqualification prior to the elections
because he filed his answer to the petition when the elections were
conducted already and he was already proclaimed the winner.
To hold that such proclamation is valid is to negate the prohibitory

character of the disqualification which Arnado possessed even prior to
the filing of the certificate of candidacy. The affirmation of Arnado's
disqualification, although made long after the elections, reaches back to
the filing of the certificate of candidacy. Arnado is declared to be not a
candidate at all in the May 201 0 elections.
Arnado being a non-candidate, the votes cast in his favor should not
have been counted. This leaves Maquiling as the qualified candidate
who obtained the highest number of votes. Therefore, the rule on
succession under the Local Government Code will not apply.
d. Residency
i. Change of Domicile
1. Sabili vs. COMELEC, 670 SCRA 664(2012)
The Constitution and the law requires residence as a qualification for

seeking and holding elective public office, in order to give candidates the
opportunity to be familiar with the needs, difficulties, aspirations, potentials
for growth and all matters vital to the welfare of their constituencies; likewise,
it enables the electorate to evaluate the office seekers’ qualifications and
fitness for the job they aspire for xxx. 94
Considering all of the foregoing discussion, it is clear that while separately,

each evidence presented by petitioner might fail to convincingly show the
fact of his residence at Pinagtong-ulan since 2007, collectively, these pieces
of evidence tend to sufficiently establish the said fact.
Petitioner’s actual physical presence in Lipa City is established not only by

the presence of a place (Pinagtong-ulan house and lot) he can actually live
in, but also the affidavits of various persons in Pinagtong-ulan, and the
Certification of its barangay captain. Petitioner’s substantial and real interest
in establishing his domicile of choice in Lipa City is also sufficiently shown
not only by the acquisition of additional property in the area and the transfer
of his voter registration, but also his participation in the community’s socio-
civic and religious life, as well as his declaration in his ITR that he is a
resident thereof.
We therefore rule that petitioner has been able to adduce substantial

evidence to demonstrate compliance with the one-year residency
requirement for local elective officials under the law.
In view of this Court’s finding that petitioner has not misrepresented his
33
residence at Pinagtong-ulan and the duration thereof, there is no need to
further discuss whether there was material and deliberate misrepresentation
of the residency qualification in his COC.
As a final note, we do not lose sight of the fact that Lipa City voters
manifested their own judgment regarding the qualifications of petitioner
when they voted for him, notwithstanding that the issue of his residency
qualification had been raised prior to the elections. Petitioner has garnered
the highest number of votes (55,268 votes as opposed to the 48,825 votes in
favor of his opponent, Oscar Gozos)95 legally cast for the position of Mayor
of Lipa City and has consequently been proclaimed duly elected municipal
Mayor of Lipa City during the last May 2010 elections96
In this regard, we reiterate our ruling in Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections

that "(t)o successfully challenge a winning candidate's qualifications, the
petitioner must clearly demonstrate that the ineligibility is so patently
antagonistic to constitutional and legal principles that overriding such
ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the apparent will of the people, would
ultimately create greater prejudice to the very democratic institutions and
juristic traditions that our Constitution and laws so zealously protect and
promote."
Similarly, in Japzon v. Commission on Elections,98 we concluded that "when

the evidence of the alleged lack of residence qualification of a candidate for
an elective position is weak or inconclusive and it clearly appears that the
purpose of the law would not be thwarted by upholding the victor's right to
the office, the will of the electorate should be respected. For the purpose of
election laws is to give effect to, rather than frustrate, the will of the voters."
In sum, we grant the Petition not only because petitioner sufficiently

established his compliance with the one-year residency requirement for local
elective officials under the law. We also recognize that "(a)bove and beyond
all, the determination of the true will of the electorate should be paramount. It
is their voice, not ours or of anyone else, that must prevail. This, in essence,
is the democracy we continue to hold sacred."
ii. The Law Treats Citizenship Independently of Domicile; However:

1. Caballero vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 209835, September 22,2015
The COMELEC found that petitioner failed to present competent

evidence to prove that he was able to reestablish his residence in
Uyugan within a period of one year immediately preceding the May 13,
2013 elections. It found that it was only after reacquiring his Filipino
citizenship by virtue of RA No. 9225 on September 13, 2012 that
petitioner can rightfully claim that he re-established his domicile in
Uyugan, Batanes, if such was accompanied by physical presence
thereat, coupled with an actual intent to reestablish his domicile there.
However, the period from September 13, 2012 to May 12, 2013 was
even less than the one year residency required by law
e. Age
i. Garvida v. Sales, G.R. No. 124893, April 18,1997
June 11, 1974 – 22 on June 11 1996
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is dismissed and petitioner Lynette G. Garvida

is declared ineligible for being over the age qualification for candidacy in the
May 6, 1996 elections of the Sangguniang Kabataan, and is ordered to vacate
34
her position as Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan of Barangay San
Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte. The Sangguniang Kabataan member voted by
simple majority by and from among the incumbent Sangguniang Kabataan
members of Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte shall assume the
office of Sangguniang Kabataan Chairman of Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui,
Ilocos Norte for the unexpired portion of the term.
f. Other Eligibilities of Candidates

i. Non-suffering from Any Term Limitation
1. Albania v. Comelec, G.R. No. 226792, June 7,2017
"three-term limit rule" to apply, two conditions must concur: first, that the
official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the
same local government post; and second, that he has fully served three
consecutive terms.
While it is undisputed that respondent was duly elected as Governor of

Camarines Norte for three consecutive terms, the issue lies on whether
he is deemed to have fully served his first term, specifically, whether the
service by an elected official of a term less than the full three years
arising from his being declared as the duly elected official in an election
contest is considered full service of the term for purposes of counting the
three-term threshold.
The facts involved in the present case are similar to those involved
in Abundo v. COMELEC, where the Court declared:
There can be no quibbling that, during the term 2004-2007, and with the
enforcement of the decision of the election protest in his favor, Abundo
assumed the mayoralty post only on May 9, 2006 and served the term
until June 30, 2007 or for a period of a little over one year and one
month. xxx It cannot be said that Mayor Abundo was able to serve fully
the entire 2004-2007 term to which he was otherwise entitled.
Xxx
Needless to stress, the almost two-year period during which Abundo 's
opponent actually served as Mayor is and ought to be considered an
involuntary interruption of Abundo 's continuity of service. An involuntary
interrupted term,
cannot, in the context of the disqualification rule, be considered as one

term for purposes of counting the three term threshold.
Xxx
As previously stated, the declaration of being the winner in an election

protest grants the local elected official the right to serve the unexpired
portion of the term. Verily, while he was declared the winner in the
protest for the mayoralty seat for the 2004-2007 term, Abundo's full term
has been substantially reduced by the actual service rendered by his
dpponent (Torres). Hence, there was actual involuntary interruption in
the term of Abundo and he cannot be considered to have served the full
2004-2007 term.
35
Applying the foregoing in the instant case, since Respondent did not
serve the full 2007-2010 term, it cannot be considered as one term for
purposes of counting the three-term threshold. Consequently,
Respondent cannot be said to have continuously served as Governor for
three consecutive terms prior to the 2016 elections.
2. Summary of prevailing jurisprudence on issues affecting

consecutiveness of terms and involuntary interruption - Abundo v.
Commission onElections,
G.R. No. 201716, 8 January 2013
To summarize, hereunder are the prevailing jurisprudence on issues

affecting consecutiveness of terms and/or involuntary interruption, viz:
1. When a permanent vacancy occurs in an elective position and the

official merely assumed the position pursuant to the rules on
succession under the LGC, then his service for the unexpired portion
of the term of the replaced official cannot be treated as one full term
as contemplated under the subject constitutional and statutory
provision that service cannot be counted in the application of any
term limit (Borja, Jr.). If the official runs again for the same position he
held prior to his assumption of the higher office, then his succession
to said position is by operation of law and is considered an
involuntary severance or interruption (Montebon).
2. An elective official, who has served for three consecutive terms and
who did not seek the elective position for what could be his fourth
term, but later won in a recall election, had an interruption in the
continuity of the official’s service. For, he had become in the interim,
i.e., from the end of the 3rd term up to the recall election, a private
citizen (Adormeo and Socrates).
3. The abolition of an elective local office due to the conversion of a

municipality to a city does not, by itself, work to interrupt the
incumbent official’s continuity of service (Latasa).
4. Preventive suspension is not a term-interrupting event as the elective

officer’s continued stay and entitlement to the office remain
unaffected during the period of suspension, although he is barred
from exercising the functions of his office during this period (Aldovino,
Jr.).
5. When a candidate is proclaimed as winner for an elective position and

assumes office, his term is interrupted when he loses in an election
protest and is ousted from office, thus disenabling him from serving
what would otherwise be the unexpired portion of his term of office
had the protest been dismissed (Lonzanida and Dizon). The break or
interruption need not be for a full term of three years or for the major
part of the 3-year term; an interruption for any length of time,
provided the cause is involuntary, is sufficient to break the continuity
of service (Socrates, citing Lonzanida).
6. When an official is defeated in an election protest and said decision

becomes final after said official had served the full term for said
office, then his loss in the election contest does not constitute an
interruption since he has managed to serve the term from start to
finish. His full service, despite the defeat, should be counted in the
application of term limits because the nullification of his proclamation
36
came after the expiration of the term (Ong and Rivera).
The Case of Abundo
Abundo argues that the RTC and the COMELEC erred in uniformly ruling
that he had already served three consecutive terms and is, thus, barred
by the constitutional three-term limit rule to run for the current 2010-2013
term. In gist, Abundo arguments run thusly:
1. Aldovino, Jr. is not on all fours with the present case as the former
dealt with preventive suspension which does not interrupt the
continuity of service of a term;
2. Aldovino, Jr. recognizes that the term of an elected official can be

interrupted so as to remove him from the reach of the constitutional
three-term limitation;
3. The COMELEC misinterpreted the meaning of "term" in Aldovino, Jr.

by its reliance on a mere portion of the Decision and not on the
unified logic in the disquisition;
4. Of appropriate governance in this case is the holding in Lonzanida and

Rivera III v. Commission on Elections.
5. The COMELEC missed the point when it ruled that there was no
interruption in the service of Abundo since what he considered as an
"interruption" of his 2004-2007 term occurred before his term started;
and
6. To rule that the term of the protestee (Torres) whose proclamation

was adjudged invalid was interrupted while that of the protestant
(Abundo) who was eventually proclaimed winner was not so
interrupted is at once absurd as it is illogical.
Both respondents Vega and the COMELEC counter that the ratio
decidendi of Aldovino, Jr. finds application in the instant case. The
COMELEC ruled that Abundo did not lose title to the office as his victory
in the protest case confirmed his entitlement to said office and he was
only unable to temporarily discharge the functions of the office during the
pendency of the election protest.
We note that this present case of Abundo deals with the effects of an
election protest, for which the rulings in Lonzanida, Ong, Rivera and
Dizon appear to be more attuned than the case of Aldovino Jr., the
interrupting effects of the imposition of a preventive suspension being the
very lis mota in the Aldovino, Jr. case. But just the same, We find that
Abundo’s case presents a different factual backdrop.
Unlike in the abovementioned election protest cases wherein the

individuals subject of disqualification were candidates who lost in the
election protest and each declared loser during the elections, Abundo
was the winner during the election protest and was declared the rightful
holder of the mayoralty post. Unlike Mayor Lonzanida and Mayor
Morales, who were both unseated toward the end of their respective
terms, Abundo was the protestant who ousted his opponent and had
assumed the remainder of the term.
Notwithstanding, We still find this Court’s pronouncements in the past as
37
instructive, and consider several doctrines established from the 1998
case of Borja, Jr. up to the most recent case of Aldovino Jr. in 2009, as
potent aids in arriving at this Court’s conclusion.
The intention behind the three-term limit rule was not only to abrogate
the "monopolization of political power" and prevent elected officials from
breeding "proprietary interest in their position" but also to "enhance the
people’s freedom of choice." In the words of Justice Vicente V. Mendoza,
"while people should be protected from the evils that a monopoly of
power may bring about, care should be taken that their freedom of
choice is not unduly curtailed."
In the present case, the Court finds Abundo’s case meritorious and
declares that the two-year period during which his opponent, Torres, was
serving as mayor should be considered as an interruption, which
effectively removed Abundo’s case from the ambit of the three-term limit
rule.
It bears to stress at this juncture that Abundo, for the 2004 election for
the term starting July 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007, was the duly elected
mayor. Otherwise how explain his victory in his election protest against
Torres and his consequent proclamation as duly elected mayor.
Accordingly, the first requisite for the application of the disqualification
rule based on the three-term limit that the official has been elected is
satisfied.
This thus brings us to the second requisite of whether or not Abundo had
served for "three consecutive terms," as the phrase is juridically
understood, as mayor of Viga, Catanduanes immediately before the
2010 national and local elections. Subsumed to this issue is of course
the question of whether or not there was an effective involuntary
interruption during the three three-year periods, resulting in the disruption
of the continuity of Abundo’s mayoralty.
The facts of the case clearly point to an involuntary interruption during

the July 2004-June 2007 term.
There can be no quibbling that, during the term 2004-2007, and with the
enforcement of the decision of the election protest in his favor, Abundo
assumed the mayoralty post only on May 9, 2006 and served the term
until June 30, 2007 or for a period of a little over one year and one
month. Consequently, unlike Mayor Ong in Ong and Mayor Morales in
Rivera, it cannot be said that Mayor Abundo was able to serve fully the
entire 2004-2007 term to which he was otherwise entitled.
A "term," as defined in Appari v. Court of Appeals, means, in a legal

sense, "a fixed and definite period of time which the law describes that
an officer may hold an office." It also means the "time during which the
officer may claim to hold office as a matter of right, and fixes the interval
after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another."65 It is
the period of time during which a duly elected official has title to and can
serve the functions of an elective office. From paragraph (a) of Sec. 43,
RA 7160,66 the term for local elected officials is three (3) years starting
from noon of June 30 of the first year of said term.
In the present case, during the period of one year and ten months, or
from June 30, 2004 until May 8, 2006, Abundo cannot plausibly claim,
even if he wanted to, that he could hold office of the mayor as a matter of
38
right. Neither can he assert title to the same nor serve the functions of
the said elective office. The reason is simple: during that period, title to
hold such office and the corresponding right to assume the functions
thereof still belonged to his opponent, as proclaimed election winner.
Accordingly, Abundo actually held the office and exercised the functions
as mayor only upon his declaration, following the resolution of the
protest, as duly elected candidate in the May 2004 elections or for only a
little over one year and one month. Consequently, since the legally
contemplated full term for local elected officials is three (3) years, it
cannot be said that Abundo fully served the term 2004-2007. The reality
on the ground is that Abundo actually served less.
Needless to stress, the almost two-year period during which Abundo’s

opponent actually served as Mayor is and ought to be considered an
involuntary interruption of Abundo’s continuity of service. An involuntary
interrupted term, cannot, in the context of the disqualification rule, be
considered as one term for purposes of counting the three-term
threshold.
The notion of full service of three consecutive terms is related to the

concepts of interruption of service and voluntary renunciation of service.
The word interruption means temporary cessation, intermission or
suspension.68 To interrupt is to obstruct, thwart or prevent.69 When the
Constitution and the LGC of 1991 speak of interruption, the reference is
to the obstruction to the continuance of the service by the concerned
elected official by effectively cutting short the service of a term or giving a
hiatus in the occupation of the elective office. On the other hand, the
word "renunciation" connotes the idea of waiver or abandonment of a
known right. To renounce is to give up, abandon, decline or resign.70
Voluntary renunciation of the office by an elective local official would thus
mean to give up or abandon the title to the office and to cut short the
service of the term the concerned elected official is entitled to.
In its assailed Resolution, the COMELEC en banc, applying Aldovino,

Jr., held:
It must be stressed that involuntary interruption of service which

jurisprudence deems an exception to the three-term limit rule, implies
that the service of the term has begun before it was interrupted. Here,
the respondent did not lose title to the office. As the assailed Resolution
states:
In the case at bar, respondent cannot be said to have lost his title to the
office. On the contrary, he actively sought entitlement to the office when
he lodged the election protest case. And respondent-appellant’s victory
in the said case is a final confirmation that he was validly elected for the
mayoralty post of Viga, Catanduanes in 2004-2007. At most, respondent-
appellant was only unable to temporarily discharge the functions of the
office to which he was validly elected during the pendency of the election
protest, but he never lost title to the said office.72 (Emphasis added.)
The COMELEC’s Second Division, on the other hand, pronounced that

the actual length of service by the public official in a given term is
immaterial by reckoning said service for the term in the application of the
three-term limit rule, thus:
As emphasized in the case of Aldovino, "this formulation—no more than

three consecutive terms—is a clear command suggesting the existence
39
of an inflexible rule." Therefore we cannot subscribe to the argument that
since respondent Abundo served only a portion of the term, his 2004-
2007 "term" should not be considered for purposes of the application of
the three term limit rule. When the framers of the Constitution drafted
and incorporated the three term limit rule, it is clear that reference is to
the term, not the actual length of the service the public official may
render. Therefore, one’s actual service of term no matter how long or
how short is immaterial.
In fine, the COMELEC ruled against Abundo on the theory that the length
of the actual service of the term is immaterial in his case as he was only
temporarily unable to discharge his functions as mayor.
The COMELEC’s case disposition and its heavy reliance on Aldovino, Jr.
do not commend themselves for concurrence. The Court cannot simply
find its way clear to understand the poll body’s determination that
Abundo was only temporarily unable to discharge his functions as mayor
during the pendency of the election protest.
As previously stated, the declaration of being the winner in an election

protest grants the local elected official the right to serve the unexpired
portion of the term. Verily, while he was declared winner in the protest for
the mayoralty seat for the 2004-2007 term, Abundo’s full term has been
substantially reduced by the actual service rendered by his opponent
(Torres). Hence, there was actual involuntary interruption in the term of
Abundo and he cannot be considered to have served the full 2004-2007
term.
This is what happened in the instant case. It cannot be overemphasized

that pending the favorable resolution of his election protest, Abundo was
relegated to being an ordinary constituent since his opponent, as
presumptive victor in the 2004 elections, was occupying the mayoralty
seat. In other words, for almost two years or from July 1, 2004—the start
of the term—until May 9, 2006 or during which his opponent actually
assumed the mayoralty office, Abundo was a private citizen warming his
heels while awaiting the outcome of his protest. Hence, even if declared
later as having the right to serve the elective position from July 1, 2004,
such declaration would not erase the fact that prior to the finality of the
election protest, Abundo did not serve in the mayor’s office and, in fact,
had no legal right to said position.
Aldovino Jr. cannot possibly lend support to respondent’s cause of

action, or to COMELEC’s resolution against Abundo. In Aldovino Jr., the
Court succinctly defines what temporary inability or disqualification to
exercise the functions of an elective office means, thus:
On the other hand, temporary inability or disqualification to exercise the

functions of an elective post, even if involuntary, should not be
considered an effective interruption of a term because it does not involve
the loss of title to office or at least an effective break from holding office;
the office holder, while retaining title, is simply barred from exercising the
functions of his office for a reason provided by law.
We rule that the above pronouncement on preventive suspension does

not apply to the instant case. Verily, it is erroneous to say that Abundo
merely was temporarily unable or disqualified to exercise the functions of
an elective post. For one, during the intervening period of almost two
years, reckoned from the start of the 2004-2007 term, Abundo cannot be
40
said to have retained title to the mayoralty office as he was at that time
not the duly proclaimed winner who would have the legal right to assume
and serve such elective office. For another, not having been declared
winner yet, Abundo cannot be said to have lost title to the office since
one cannot plausibly lose a title which, in the first place, he did not have.
Thus, for all intents and purposes, even if the belated declaration in the
election protest accords him title to the elective office from the start of the
term, Abundo was not entitled to the elective office until the election
protest was finally resolved in his favor.1âwphi1
Consequently, there was a hiatus of almost two years, consisting of a

break and effective interruption of his service, until he assumed the office
and served barely over a year of the remaining term. At this juncture, We
observe the apparent similarities of Mayor Abundo’s case with the cases
of Mayor Talaga in Adormeo and Mayor Hagedorn in Socrates as
Mayors Talaga and Hagedorn were not proclaimed winners since they
were non-candidates in the regularelections. They were proclaimed
winners during the recall elections and clearly were not able to fully serve
the terms of the deposed incumbent officials. Similar to their cases
where the Court deemed their terms as involuntarily interrupted, Abundo
also became or was a private citizen during the period over which his
opponent was serving as mayor. If in Lonzanida, the Court ruled that
there was interruption in Lonzanida’s service because of his subsequent
defeat in the election protest, then with more reason, Abundo’s term for
2004-2007 should be declared interrupted since he was not proclaimed
winner after the 2004 elections and was able to assume the office and
serve only for a little more than a year after winning the protest.
As aptly stated in Latasa, to be considered as interruption of service, the

"law contemplates a rest period during which the local elective official
steps down from office and ceases to exercise power or authority over
the inhabitants of the territorial jurisdiction of a particular local
government unit."75 Applying the said principle in the present case,
there is no question that during the pendency of the election protest,
Abundo ceased from exercising power or authority over the good people
of Viga, Catanduanes.
Consequently, the period during which Abundo was not serving as mayor
should be considered as a rest period or break in his service because, as
earlier stated, prior to the judgment in the election protest, it was
Abundo’s opponent, Torres, who was exercising such powers by virtue of
the still then valid proclamation.
As a final note, We reiterate that Abundo’s case differs from other cases
involving the effects of an election protest because while Abundo was, in
the final reckoning, the winning candidate, he was the one deprived of
his right and opportunity to serve his constituents. To a certain extent,
Abundo was a victim of an imperfect election system. While admittedly
the Court does not possess the mandate to remedy such imperfections,
the Constitution has clothed it with enough authority to establish a
fortress against the injustices it may bring.
In this regard, We find that a contrary ruling would work damage and
cause grave injustice to Abundo––an elected official who was belatedly
declared as the winner and assumed office for only a short period of the
term. If in the cases of Lonzanida and Dizon, this Court ruled in favor of a
losing candidate––or the person who was adjudged not legally entitled to
hold the contested public office but held it anyway––We find more
reason to rule in favor of a winning candidate-protestant who, by popular
41
vote, deserves title to the public office but whose opportunity to hold the
same was halted by an invalid proclamation.
Also, more than the injustice that may be committed against Abundo is
the injustice that may likewise be committed against the people of Viga,
Catanduanes by depriving them of their right to choose their leaders.
Like the framers of the Constitution, We bear in mind that We "cannot
arrogate unto ourselves the right to decide what the people want"76 and
hence, should, as much as possible, "allow the people to exercise their
own sense of proportion and rely on their own strength to curtail the
power when it overreaches itself." For democracy draws strength from
the choice the people make which is the same choice We are likewise
bound to protect.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTLY GRANTED. Accordingly,

the assailed February 8, 2012 Resolution of the Commission on
Elections Second Division and May 10, 2012 Resolution of the
Commission on Elections en banc in EAC (AE) No. A-25-2010 and the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Virac, Catanduanes,
Branch 43, dated August 9, 2010, in Election Case No. 55, are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Petitioner Abelardo Abundo, Sr. is DECLARED ELIGIBLE for the position

of Mayor of Viga, Catanduanes to which he was duly elected in the May
2010 elections and is accordingly ordered IMMEDIATELY REINSTATED
to said position. Withal, Emeterio M. Tarin and Cesar O. Cervantes are
ordered to immediately vacate the positions of Mayor and Vice-Mayor of
Viga, Catanduanes, respectively, and shall revert to their original
positions of Vice-Mayor and First Councilor, respectively, upon receipt of
this Decision.
This Decision is immediately executory
ii. Non-Suffering from Any Accessory Penalty of Disqualification

1. Jalosjos vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 205033, June 18,2013
The accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification takes effect immediately

once the judgment of conviction becomes final. The effectivity of this accessory
penalty does not depend on the duration of the principal penalty, or on whether the
convict serves his jail sentence or not. The last sentence of Article 32 states that
"the offender shall not be permitted to hold any public office during the period of his
[perpetual special] disqualification." Once the judgment of conviction becomes final,
it is immediately executory. Any public office that the convict may be holding at the
time of his conviction becomes vacant upon finality of the judgment, and the convict
becomes ineligible to run for any elective public office perpetually. (Emphasis
underscoring supplied)
All told, applying the established principles of statutory construction, and more
significantly, considering the higher interests of preserving the sanctity of our
elections, the Court holds that Section 40(a) of the LGC has not removed the
penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification which petitioner continues to
suffer.1âwphi1 Thereby, he remains disqualified to run for any elective office
pursuant to Article 30 of the RPC.
2. Disqualification of Candidates
a. Grounds for Disqualification
i. To All Candidates – Omnibus Election Code, Secs. 68 and 12
SECTION 12. Disqualifications. – Any person who has been declared by competent
42
authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for
subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for which he has been
sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime involving moral
turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he
has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.
This disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed

upon the declaration by competent authority that said insanity or incompetence had
been removed or after the expiration of a period of five years from his service of
sentence, unless within the same period he again becomes disqualified.
SECTION 68. Disqualifications. – Any candidate who, in an action or protest in

which he is a party is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or
found by the Commission of having (a) given money or other material consideration
to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral
functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his
election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited,
received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104;
or (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc,
sub-paragraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has
been elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or
an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office
under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or
immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement
provided for in the election laws. (Sec. 25, 1971 EC)
ii. To Local Candidates – LGC, Sec.40

SECTION 40. Disqualifications. – The following persons are disqualified from
running for any elective local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for
an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2)
years after serving sentence;
(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;
(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the
Republic;
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad;
(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to
reside abroad and continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this
Code; and
(g) The insane or feeble-minded.
iii. To SK Candidates – RA 10742, Sec.27

SEC. 27. Mandatory and Continuing Training Programs. – For the purpose of
emphasizing the role of the youth in nation-building and molding them to
become better citizens with the values of patriotism, nationalism and honor as a
Filipino, any Sangguniang Kabataan official, whether elected or appointed, or
any member of the LYDC must undergo the mandatory training programs before
43
he or she can assume office. During their incumbency, they must attend the
continuing training programs to be undertaken by the Commission in
coordination with the DILG. Deliberate failure to attend the said training
programs shall constitute sufficient ground to disqualify said Sangguniang
Kabataan official or LYDC member or subject them to disciplinary actions.
iv. To Candidates of a Special Election – RA9285
v. Candidate Subject to Disqualification is Eligible but Committed Infraction or

Placed in a Disqualifying Situation - Tagolino v. HRET, G.R. No. 202202,
March 19,2013
Records clearly show that: (1) Richard was held ineligible as a congressional
candidate for the Fourth District of Leyte due to his failure to comply with the one
year residency requirement; (2) Juntilla’s petition prayed for the denial of due course
to and/or cancellation of his CoC; and (3) the COMELEC First Division granted the
foregoing petition without any qualification. By these undisputed and essential facts
alone, the HRET should not have adopted the COMELEC En Banc’s erroneous
finding that the COMELEC First Division’s February 17, 2010 Resolution "speaks
only of "disqualification and not of cancellation of Richard’s CoC"36 and thereby,
sanctioned the substitution of private respondent.
Lest it be misunderstood, the HRET is not bound by previous COMELEC

pronouncements relative to the qualifications of the Members of the House. Being
the sole judge57 of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
its respective members, the HRET cannot be tied down by COMELEC resolutions,
else its constitutional mandate58 be circumvented and rendered nugatory. Instructive
on this point is the Court’s disquisition in Fernandez v. HRET, 59 to wit:
Private respondent concludes from the above that petitioner had no legal basis to
claim that the HRET, when reference to the qualification/s of Members of the House
of Representatives is concerned, is "co-equal", to the COMELEC respecting the
matter of eligibility and qualification of a member of the House of Representatives.
The truth is the other way around, because the COMELEC is subservient to the
HRET when the dispute or contest at issue refers to the eligibility and/or qualification
of a Member of the House of Representatives. A petition for quo warranto is within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the HRET as sole judge, and cannot be considered
forum shopping even if another body may have passed upon in administrative or
quasi-judicial proceedings the issue of the Member’s qualification while the Member
was still a candidate. There is forum-shopping only where two cases involve the
same parties and the same cause of action. The two cases here are distinct and
dissimilar in their nature and character. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Notably, the phrase "election, returns, and qualifications" should be interpreted in its
totality as referring to all matters affecting the validity of the contestee’s title. More
particularly, the term "qualifications" refers to matters that could be raised in a quo
warranto proceeding against the pro-claimed winner, such as his disloyalty or
ineligibility, or the inadequacy of his certificate of candidacy. 60 As used in Section 74
of the OEC, the word "eligible" means having the right to run for elective public
office, that is, having all the qualifications and none of the ineligibilities to run for the
public office.61 In this relation, private respondent’s own qualification to run for public
office – which was inextricably linked to her husband’s own qualifications due to her
substitution – was the proper subject of quo warranto proceedings falling within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the HRET and independent from any previous proceedings
before the COMELEC, lest the jurisdiction divide between the two be blurred.
44
Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that the HRET’s independence is not without
limitation. As earlier mentioned, the Court retains certiorari jurisdiction over the
HRET if only to check whether or not it has gravely abused its discretion. In this
regard, the Court does not endeavor to denigrate nor undermine the HRET’s
independence; rather, it merely fulfills its duty to ensure that the Constitution and the
laws are upheld through the exercise of its power of judicial review.
In fine, the Court observes that the HRET wantonly disregarded the law by
deliberately adopting the COMELEC En Banc’s flawed findings regarding private
respondent’s eligibility to run for public office which essentially stemmed from her
substitution. In this light, it cannot be gainsaid that the HRET gravely abused its
discretion.
Owing to the lack of proper substitution in its case, private respondent was therefore
not a bona fide candidate for the position of Representative for the Fourth District of
Leyte when she ran for office, which means that she could not have been elected.
Considering this pronouncement, there exists no cogent reason to further dwell on
the other issues respecting private respondent’s own qualification to office.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the March 22, 2012 Decision
rendered by the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal in HRET Case No. 10-
031 (QW) is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
vi. Prior court judgment required? Francisco

v.Comelec,G.R.No.230249,April24, 2018
There being substantial evidence to support Nieto's defense that the
construction procurement for t he project was aboveboard, there is then no
reason to disturb public respondent's rulings. No abuse of discretion, let alone
one that is grave, can be attributed to the COMELEC Second Division in
dismissing the Petition for Disqualification, nor to the COMELEC En Banc in
denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack

of merit. The Court declares that in a Petition for Disqualification under Section
68 of the Omnibus Election Code, a prior judgment by a competent court that the
candidate is guilty of an election offense is not required before the said petition
can be entertained or given due course by the Commission on Elections.
vii. Restoration of Pardonee’s Right to Run for Public Office - Risos-Vidal

vs.Comelec,
Former President Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored
allhis civil and political rights, which naturally includes the right to seek public
elective office, the focal point of this controversy. The wording of the pardon
extended to former President Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and
unqualified. It is likewise unfettered by Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal
Code. The only reasonable, objective, and constitutional interpretation of the
language of the pardon is that the same in fact conforms to Articles 36 and 41 of
the Revised Penal Code. Recall that the petition for disqualification filed by
Risos-Vidal against former President Estrada, docketed as SPA No. 13-211
(DC), was anchored on Section 40 of the LGC, in relation to Section 12 of the
OEC, that is, having been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment of
one year or more, and involving moral turpitude, former President Estrada must
be disqualified to run for and hold public elective office notwithstanding the fact
that he is a grantee of a pardon that includes a statement expressing "[h]e is
hereby restored to his civil and political rights." Risos-Vidal theorizes that former
45
President Estrada is disqualified from running for Mayor of Manila inthe May 13,
2013 Elections, and remains disqualified to hold any local elective post despite
the presidential pardon extended to him in 2007 by former President Arroyo for
the reason that it (pardon) did not expressly provide for the remission of the
penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification, particularly the restoration of his
(former President Estrada) right to vote and bevoted upon for public office. She
invokes Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code as the foundations of her
theory.
It is insisted that, since a textual examination of the pardon given to and

accepted by former President Estrada does not actually specify which political
right is restored, it could be inferred that former President Arroyo did not
deliberately intend to restore former President Estrada’s rights of suffrage and
to hold public office, orto otherwise remit the penalty of perpetual absolute
disqualification. Even if her intention was the contrary, the same cannot be
upheld based on the pardon’s text.
The pardoning power of the President cannot be limited by legislative action.
The 1987 Constitution, specifically Section 19 of Article VII and Section 5 of

Article IX-C, provides that the President of the Philippines possesses the power
to grant pardons, along with other acts of executive clemency, to wit:
Section 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this

Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons,
and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.
He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a
majority of all the Members of the Congress.
viii. Effect of Penal Provision to the LGC Provision Which Allows Prior
Convict to Run After Two (2) Years - Jalosjos vs. Comelec, G.R. No.
205033, June 18,2013
ix. Administratively‘RemovedfromOffice’Defined-
Albaniavs.Comelec,G.R.No. 226792, June 7,2017
x. Doctrine of Condonation - Morales vs. CA, G.R. Nos. 217126-27,

November10, 2015
First, it would be a violation of the Court's own duty to uphold and defend the Constitution if it
were not to abandon the condonation doctrine now that its infirmities have become apparent.
As extensively discussed, the continued application of the condonation doctrine is simply
impermissible under the auspices of the present Constitution which explicitly mandates that
public office is a public trust and that public officials shall be accountable to the people at all
times.
Second, the condonation doctrine is a peculiar jurisprudential creation that has persisted as
a defense of elective officials to escape administrative liability. It is the first time that the legal
intricacies of this doctrine have been brought to light; thus, this is a situation of exceptional
character which this Court must ultimately resolve. Further, since the doctrine has served as
a perennial obstacle against exacting public accountability from the multitude of elective local
officials throughout the years, it is indubitable that paramount public interest is involved.
Third, the issue on the validity of the condonation doctrine clearly requires the formulation of
controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public. The issue does not only
involve an in-depth exegesis of administrative law principles, but also puts to the forefront of
legal discourse the potency of the accountability provisions of the 1987 Constitution. The
Court owes it to the bench, the bar, and the public to explain how this controversial doctrine
came about, and now, its reasons for abandoning the same in view of its relevance on the
46
parameters of public office.
And fourth, the defense of condonation has been consistently invoked by elective local
officials against the administrative charges filed against them. To provide a sample size, the
Ombudsman has informed the Court that "for the period of July 2013 to December 2014
alone, 85 cases from the Luzon Office and 24 cases from the Central Office were dismissed
on the ground of condonation. Thus, in just one and a half years, over a hundred cases of
alleged misconduct - involving infractions such as dishonesty, oppression, gross neglect of
duty and grave misconduct - were placed beyond the reach of the Ombudsman's
investigatory and prosecutorial powers."[315] Evidently, this fortifies the finding that the case is
capable of repetition and must therefore, not evade review.
In any event, the abandonment of a doctrine is wholly within the prerogative of the Court. As
mentioned, it is its own jurisprudential creation and may therefore, pursuant to its mandate to
uphold and defend the Constitution, revoke it notwithstanding supervening events that render
the subject of discussion moot.

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Chapter 2: Election Law I. Comelec: C L Rev Ew

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CHAPTER 2: ELECTION LAW

1. Comelec jurisdictions vis-à-vis HRET jurisdiction

a. Reyes v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 207264, June 25,2013

May 2013, the COMELEC En Banc, promulgated a Resolution denying petitioner’s

On 5 June 2013, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Certificate of Finality declaring

ISSUE :Whether or not Respondent Comelec is without jurisdiction over Petitioner

Here, the petitioner cannot be considered a Member of the House of

In her attempt to comply with the second requirement, petitioner attached a

Section 6, Rule II (Membership) of the Rules of the House of Representatives

Section 6. Oath or Affirmation of Members. – Members shall take their oath or

“Thus, a Filipino citizen who becomes naturalized elsewhere effectively abandons

b. Velasco v. Speaker Belmonte, G.R. No. 211140, January 12, 2016

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant motion for reconsideration is

Corollary thereto, the May 18, 2013 proclamation of respondent REGINA

On December 10, 2013, Velasco wrote a letter to Speaker Belmonte, Jr.

On February 4, 2014, Velasco wrote another letter to Speaker Belmonte, Jr.

The averred proclamation is the critical pointer to the correctness of petitioner's

The distinction between a ministerial and discretionary act is well delineated. A

c. Reyes v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 221103, October

d. Abayon v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 189466, February 11,2010

It is for the HRET to interpret the meaning of this particular qualification of a

II. Registration of Voters

1. Qualification and Disqualification of Voters

a. Kabataan Party List vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 221318, 16 December2015

The contestation is untenable.

Section 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not

Section 118. Disqualifications. - The following shall be disqualified from voting:

(c) Insane or incompetent persons as declared by competent authority.

As the deliberations on the 1973 Constitution made clear, registration is a mere

A "qualification" is loosely defined as "the possession of qualities, properties (such

2. Inclusion and Exclusion Proceedings

The Proceedings Compared.

In terms of purpose, voters' inclusion/exclusion and COC denial/cancellation are

The Right to Vote

The above discussions, particularly on the distinctions between inclusion/exclusion

Velasco's Qualifications/Disqualifications as a Voter

The Due Process Issue.

III. Political Parties and Party-lists

1. Political Parties to Candidates – Sec. 70,OEC

2. The Party-list System

a. The four parameters in the Party-List election

In disregarding, rejecting and circumventing these statutory provisions, the Comelec

The Comelec, which is tasked merely to enforce and administer election-related

Furthermore, a reading of the entire Constitution reveals no violation of any of its

WHEREFORE, the Petitions are hereby partially GRANTED. The assailed

ii. BANAT vs. COMELEC, GR No. 179271, 21 April 2009

iii. Atong Paglaum vs. COMELEC, GR No. 203766, 02 April 2013

The Court’s Ruling

The Party-List System

Sections 7 and 8, Article IX-C

Sec. 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or coalition shall be

Sec. 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered under the party-list

Commissioner Christian S. Monsod, the main sponsor of the party-list system,

Fourth, a party or an organization must not be disqualified under Section 6 of RA 7941,

"(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association, organized for

(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;

(3) It is a foreign party or organization;