1. Gadrinab v. Salamanca GR No.

194560, 11 June 2014

Facts: Respondents, together with Adoracion Gadrinab and Arsenia Talao, are siblings and
heirs of the late Spouses Talao, Nicolas and Aurelia. The Spouses Talao died intestate,
leaving a parcel of land in Sta. Ana, Manila. The five Talao children divided the property
among themselves through an extrajudicial settlement. Subsequently, Arsenia Talao
waived her share over the property in favor of her siblings. Respondent Salamanca filed a
complaint for partition against her siblings, Antonio, Elena (deceased, now represented by
her husband, Jose Lopez), and Adoracion (deceased, now represented by heirs, petitioner
Nestor and Francisco Gadrinab) before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. All parties
claimed their respective shares in the property. They also claimed shares in the rentals
collected from one of the units of a duplex apartment on the property. The total amount of
rental collection in the possession... of Jose Lopez was P528,623.00. The amount, according
to Jose's counsel, was ready for distribution Upon being referred to mediation, the parties
entered into a compromise agreement. On April 10, 2003, the Regional Trial Court
approved the compromise agreement. Based on the entry of judgment, the case became
final and executory on April 10, 2003. Nestor Gadrinab filed a motion for execution of the
compromise agreement. He demanded his onefourth share in the accumulated rentals.
During the hearing on the motion for execution, the parties agreed that the rentals shall
be... divided only into 25 three since Nestor had already been occupying one of the duplex
units. The parties also agreed that Antonio Talao would shoulder Nestor's share, equivalent
to one-fourth of the rental amount. Because of the attitude of her co-heirs, respondent
Salamanca moved for the physical partition of the property before the Regional Trial Court
of Manila. She prayed for the physical partition of the property instead of having it sold.
Nestor and Francisco Gadrinab opposed the motion. They contended that the judgment on
the compromise agreement had already become final and executory and had the effect of
res judicata. Antonio Talao and Jose Lopez did not... object to the motion for physical
partition. The Regional Trial Court of Manila granted the motion for physical partition.
Nestor and Francisco Gadrinab appealed to the Court of Appeals. They assailed the grant of
Salamanca's motion for physical partition after the issuance of the judgment on,
compromise agreement. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal. The Court of Appeals
ruled that the exception to the immutability of judgments, that is, "whenever circumstances
transpire after the finality of the decision... rendering its execution unjust and inequitable,"
applies in this case. The Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the Regional Trial Court's
order granting respondent Salamanca's motion for physical partition. A judgment on the
compromise agreement had already been rendered and had attained finality. In their
separate comments, respondents Salamanca and Talao argued that this case fell under the
exception to the rule on immutability of judgments. The non-compliance of some of the
parties with the compromise agreement constituted an event that makes it difficult if not
totally impossible to enforce the compromise agreement.
Issue: Whether or not the doctrine of immutability of judgement is applicable in this case.
Ruling: No, in a compromise agreement, the parties freely enter into stipulations. "A
judgment based on a compromise agreement is a judgment on the merits" of the case. It has
the effect of res judicata. These principles are impressed both in our law and...
jurisprudence. There are two rules that embody the principle of res judicata. The first rule
refers to "bar by prior judgment," which means that actions on the same claim or cause of
action 26 cannot be relitigated. This rule is embodied... in Rule 39, Section 47, paragraph
(b) of the Rules of Court... The second rule refers to "conclusiveness of judgment." This
means that facts already tried and determined in another action involving a different claim
or cause of action cannot anymore be relitigated. This rule is embodied in Rule 39, Section
47, paragraph (c) of the Rules of Court. This case involves "bar by prior judgment."
Respondents cannot file another action for partition after final judgment on compromise
had already been rendered in a previous action for partition involving the same parties and
property. Courts cannot entertain actions involving the same cause of action, parties, and
subject matter without violating the doctrines on bar by prior judgment and immutability
of judgments, unless there is evidence that the agreement was void, obtained through
fraud,... mistake or any vice of consent, or would disrupt substantial justice. In this case,
there was no issue as to the fact that the parties freely entered into the compromise
agreement. There was also no dispute about the clarity of its terms. Some of the parties
simply do not wish to abide by the compromise agreement's terms. This court does not see
how substantial justice will be served by disturbing a previous final judgment on
compromise when failure of its execution was caused by the parties themselves. Likewise,
respondents' argument that a supervening event, i.e. disagreement among the parties, was
present to justify disturbance of the final judgment on compromise fails to persuade. A
supervening event may justify the disturbance of a final judgment on compromise if it
"brought about a material change in the situation" between the parties.
 2. NHA vs. CA G.R. No. 173802, 7 April 2014
Facts: On May 25, 1981, the NHA filed a case against respondents Bernabe Noble, et al.
(respondents-landowners) for the expropriation of their properties situated in Lapasan,
Cagayan de Oro City (subject properties), pursuant to Letter of Instructions No. (LOI) 555,
mandating a nationwide Slum Improvement and Resettlement Program, and LOI 557,
otherwise known as "Adopting Slum Improvement." The case was docketed as Civil Case
No. 7847 and originally raffled to Branch V of the then Court of First Instance of Misamis
Oriental, but was transferred to Branch 20 of the Misamis RTC (Branch 20), upon the
effectivity of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129.[5] Consequently, Branch 20 issued a writ of
possession placing the respondent-landowners' properties under the NHA's control.
Thereafter, the 27 case was transferred to Branch 23 of the Misamis RTC (Branch 23),
which appointed commissioners who appraised the fair market value (FMV) of the subject
properties at P470.00 per square meter, as of 1984. Later on, the case was once more
transferred to the court a quo, which then issued an Order dated April 5, 1990, approving
the aforementioned amount as just compensation, and ordering the NHA to pay
respondents-landowners the same. Dissatisfied, the NHA appealed the commissioners'
valuation of the subject properties before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 33832. On
August 11, 1992, the CA rendered a decision remanding the case to the court a quo for
further proceedings on the issue of just compensation. On May 12, 1993, the CA issued an
Entry of Judgment which closed and terminated the said appeal proceeding. Accordingly,
the records were remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings, during which a new
set of commissioners was appointed to reappraise the FMV of the subject properties.
Eventually, the commissioners pegged the just compensation at P705.00 per square meter,
taking into consideration the value of the subject properties in 1984 and the accumulated
improvements thereon since then. On August 3, 1998, the court a quo issued the Assailed
Order, approving the commissioners' valuation of the subject properties at P705.00 per
square meter ordering the NHA to pay respondents-landowners the amounts due to them.
Claiming that it only received a copy of the Assailed Order on March 3, 1999, the NHA filed
a Manifestation and Motion for Reconsideration (motion) on March 11, 1999, arguing that
the FMV of the subject properties should have been determined at the time the
expropriation proceeding was instituted. For its part, respondents-landowners opposed
the NHA's motion on the ground that it was belatedly filed and thus, the said order already
became final and executory. In particular, respondents-landowners contended that
contrary to the NHA's claim, the registry return receipt on record shows that it received a
copy of the questioned Order on November 10, 1998. Finding respondents-landowners'
opposition to be well-taken, the court a quo denied the NHA's motion on May 21, 1990.
Aggrieved, the NHA appealed to the CA.In a Resolution, dated September 9, 2002, the CA
initially dismissed the NHA's appeal on the ground that it failed to file its appellant's brief
on time. The NHA moved for reconsideration, which was granted in a Resolution dated
September 10, 2003. As such, the CA ordered respondentslandowners to file their comment
to said appeal. However, instead of filing their comment as directed, respondents-
landowners moved for the resolution's reconsideration, contending that the appeal should
be dismissed 28 since the Assailed Order had long become final and executory due to the
NHA's failure to timely file a motion for reconsideration therefrom or perfect its appeal
within the prescribed reglementary period. In a Resolution dated June 30, 2006, the CA
dismissed the appeal and held that the Assailed Order had already become final and
executory. Accordingly, it ordered that the entire records of the case be remanded to the
court a quo for execution proceedings. The CA held that contrary to NHA's claim that it only
received a copy of the Assailed Order on March 3, 1999 and, thus, timely filed its motion for
reconsideration on March 11, 1999, the registry return receipt on record clearly shows that
it already received a copy of the same on November 10, 1998. It opined that the issuance of
the registry return receipt enjoys the presumption of regularity, and, hence, the entries on
said receipt should be given full evidentiary weight, including, among others, the date
indicated thereon. As a result, the Assailed Order had long become final and executory and
the outright dismissal of NHA's appeal was deemed to be proper. At odds with the CA's
ruling, the NHA filed the instant petition.
Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in finding that the Assailed Order had already become
final and executory considering the doctrine of immutability of judgment.
Ruling: No. It is well-settled that a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable
and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is
meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and whether it be made by the
court that rendered it or by the Highest Court of the land. This principle, commonly known
as the doctrine of immutability of judgment, has a two-fold purpose, namely: (a) to avoid
delay in the administration of justice and thus, procedurally, to make orderly the discharge
of judicial business; and (b) to put an end to judicial controversies, at the risk of occasional
errors, which is precisely why courts exist. Verily, it fosters the judicious perception that
the rights and obligations of every litigant must not hang in suspense for an indefinite
period of time. As such, it is not regarded as a mere technicality to be easily brushed aside,
but rather, a matter of public policy which must be faithfully complied in this case, the
Court concurs with the CA's view that the Assailed Order had already become final and
executory at the time when the NHA sought to have it reconsidered before the court a quo.
As evidenced by the registry return receipt on record, the NHA received a copy of the
Assailed Order on November 10, 1998. However, it moved for reconsideration therefrom
only on March 11, 1999, or more than four (4) months from notice. As the motion was filed
way beyond the 15-day reglementary period prescribed therefor, the 29 court a quos
judgment had already lapsed into finality. Consequently, the Assailed Order cannot be
made subject to further appellate review and now constitutes res judicata as to every
matter offered and received in the proceedings below as well as to any other matter
admissible therein and which might have been offered for that purpose. In an effort to
remove itself from this quandary, the NHA points out that as per the registry return receipt
on record, it received a copy of the Assailed Order on November 10, 1998 through a certain
Atty. Epifanio P. Recañ a (Atty. Recañ a). The NHA claims that as early as January 1997, Atty.
Recañ a ceased to be connected with it and thus, it contends that he could not have validly
received a copy of the Assailed Order in its behalf.
3. G.R. No. 183526, August 25, 2009
Violeta Lalican
vs The Insular Life Insurance Company
Ponente: Chico-Nazario

Facts:
Violeta is the widow of the Eulogio Lalican. During his lifetime, Eulogio applied for an
insurance policy with Insular Life on April 24, 1997 which contained a 20-year endowment
variable income package flexi plan worth P500k with two riders worth P500k each. Violeta
was named the primary beneficiary.

Under the terms, Eulogio was to pay premiums on a quarterly basin in the amount of
P8,062  with a grace period of 31 days for the payment of each premium subsequent to the
first. If any premium was not paid on or before the due date, the policy would be in default,
and if the premium remained unpaid until the end of the grace period, the policy would
automatically lapse and become void.

Eulogio paid the premiums, however he failed to pay the premium due on January 24,
1998, even after the lapse of the grace period of 31 days. Therefore, lapsed and become
void. Eulogio submitted to the Cabanatuan District Office of Insular Life an application for
reinstatement together with the payment of the premium due on January 24. Insular Life
notified Eulogio that his application for reinstatement could not be fully processed because
of the unpaid interest thereon. Eulogio was likewise advised by Malaluan (insurance agent)
to pay the premiums that subsequently became due April 1998 and July 1998, plus interest.

September 17, 1998. Eulogio went to Malaluan's house and paid for the interest which was
received by Malaluan's husband. Later that day, Eulogio died. Without the knowledge of
Eulogio's death, Malaluan forwarded to the Insular Life the application for reinstatement
and the payment made by Eulogio. However, Insular Life did not act upon such
reinstatement for they knew already of Eulogio's death.

September 28, 1998, Violeta filed for the insurance claim. Insular Life then informed
Violeta in a letter that her claim could not be processed because the insurance policy had
lapsed already and that Eulogio failed to reinstate the same and the payment made done
thru Malaluan's husband was, under the insurance policy, was considered a deposit only
until approval of the said application. Enclosed to this letter was a check representing the
full refund of the past payments made by Eulogio, amounting to P25,417.

Violeta requested for a reconsideration of her claim and returned the check to Insular Life.
Insular Life agreed to conduct a re-evaluation of Violeta's claim. Without waiting for the
result of the re-evaluation, Violeta filed with the RTC a complaint for death claim benefit
alleging the Insular Life was engaged in unfair claim settlement practice and deliberately
failed to act with reasonable promptness on her insurance claim. Violeta claims for the
P1.5M insurance, plus interest, attorney's fees and cost of suit.

Insular Life filed with the RTC an answer with counterclaim saying that the insurance claim
was rendered void due to non-payment of the premium and countered that Violeta should
be ordered to pay attorney's fees and expenses of litigation incurred by Insular Life.

RTC declared that Violeta failed to establish by preponderance of evidence her cause of
action against the defendant. Violeta failed to establish that the receipt of payment by
Malaluan amounted to the reinstatement of the insurance policy. Violeta filed for motion
for reconsideration but was denied as well; hence she elevated her case for review on
Certiorari.

Issues: (a) Whether the decision of the court can still be reviewed despite having allegedly
attained finality and despite the mode of appeal of Violeta erroneous. (b) Whether the RTC
has decided the case on a question of law not in accord with law and applicable decisions of
the Supreme Court.

Ruling:
Petition lacks merit.

RTC's decision has long acquired finality for Violeta failed to file a notice of appeal more
than five months after the decision was rendered.

As to the substantial claim of whether there is insurable interest, the Court says that the
matter of insurable interest is entirely irrelevant and the real point of contention herein is
whether Eulogio was able to reinstate the lapsed insurance policy on his life before his
death.

The Court rules in the negative, for the insurance policy is clear on the procedure of the
reinstatement of the insurance contract, of which Eulogio has failed to accomplish before
his death. As provided by the policy, insurance shall be deemed reinstated upon the
approval of the insurance policy of the application for reinstatement. The approval should
be made during the lifetime of the insured, in the case at bar, it wasn’t.
 4. G.R. No. 191526, October 05, 2015 - SPOUSES FLORENTINO AND CONSOLACION
TABALNO, Petitioners, v. PAULINO T. DINGAL, SR. AND JUANITA GALOLA VDA. DE
DINGAL, Respondents.

FACTS:

On August 5, 2004, former Solicitor General Francisco Chavez, filed an instant petition
raising constitutional issues on the JVA entered by National Housing Authority and R-II
Builders, Inc.

On March 1, 1988, then-President Cory Aquino issued Memorandum order No. (MO) 161
approving and directing implementation of the Comprehensive and Integrated
Metropolitan Manila Waste Management Plan.  During this time, Smokey Mountain, a
wasteland in Tondo, Manila, are being made residence of many Filipinos living in a
subhuman state.

As presented in MO 161, NHA prepared feasibility studies to turn the dumpsite into low-
cost housing project, thus, Smokey Mountain Development and Reclamation Project
(SMDRP), came into place.  RA 6957 (Build-Operate-Transfer Law) was passed on July
1990 declaring the importance of private sectors as contractors in government projects. 
Thereafter, Aquino proclaimed MO 415 applying RA 6957 to SMDRP, among others.  The
same MO also established EXECOM and TECHCOM in the execution and evaluation of the
plan, respectively, to be assisted by the Public Estates Authority (PEA).

Notices of public bidding to become NHA’s venture partner for SMDRP were published in
newspapers in 1992, from which R-II Builders, Inc. (RBI) won the bidding process.  Then-
President Ramos authorized NHA to enter into a Joint Venture Agreement with RBI.

Under the JVA, the project involves the clearing of Smokey Mountain for eventual
development into a low cost housing complex and industrial/commercial site.  RBI is
expected to fully finance the development of Smokey Mountain and reclaim 40 hectares of
the land at the Manila Bay Area.  The latter together with the commercial area to be built on
Smokey Mountain will be owned by RBI as enabling components.  If the project is revoked
or terminated by the Government through no fault of RBI or by mutual agreement, the
Government shall compensate RBI for its actual expenses incurred in the Project plus a
reasonable rate of return not exceeding that stated in the feasibility study and in the
contract as of the date of such revocation, cancellation, or termination on a schedule to be
agreed upon by both parties.

To summarize, the SMDRP shall consist of Phase I and Phase II.  Phase I of the project
involves clearing, levelling-off the dumpsite, and construction of temporary housing units
for the current residents on the cleared and levelled site.  Phase II involves the construction
of a fenced incineration area for the on-site disposal of the garbage at the dumpsite.

Due to the recommendations done by the DENR after evaluations done, the JVA was
amended and restated (now ARJVA) to accommodate the design changes and additional
work to be done to successfully implement the project.  The original 3,500 units of
temporary housing were decreased to 2,992.  The reclaimed land as enabling component
was increased from 40 hectares to 79 hectares, which was supported by the issuance of
Proclamation No. 465 by President Ramos.  The revision also provided for the 119-hectare
land as an enabling component for Phase II of the project.

Subsequently, the Clean Air Act was passed by the legislature which made the
establishment of an incinerator illegal, making the off-site dumpsite at Smokey Mountain
necessary.   On August 1, 1998, the project was suspended, to be later reconstituted by
President Estrada in MO No. 33.

On August 27, 2003, the NHA and RBI executed a Memorandum of Agreement whereby
both parties agreed to terminate the JVA and subsequent agreements.  During this time,
NHA reported that 34 temporary housing structures and 21 permanent housing structures
had been turned over by RBI. 

ISSUES:

1. Whether respondents NHA and RBI have been granted the power and authority to
reclaim lands of the public domain as this power is vested exclusively in PEA as
claimed by petitioner

2. Whether respondents NHA and RBI were given the power and authority by DENR to
reclaim foreshore and submerged lands

3. Whether respondent RBI can acquire reclaimed foreshore and submerged lands
considered as alienable and outside the commerce of man

4. Whether respondent RBI can acquire reclaimed lands when there was no
declaration that said lands are no longer needed for public use

5. Whether there is a law authorizing sale of reclaimed lands

6. Whether the transfer of reclaimed lands to RBI was done by public bidding

7. Whether RBI, being a private corporation, is barred by the Constitution to acquire

lands of public domain

8. Whether respondents can be compelled to disclose all information related to the

SMDRP

9. Whether the operative fact doctrine applies to the instant position

HELD:

1. Executive Order 525 reads that the PEA shall be primarily responsible for
integrating, directing, and coordinating all reclamation projects for and on behalf
of the National Government.  This does not mean that it shall be responsible for
all.  The requisites for a valid and legal reclamation project are approval by the
 President (which were provided for by MOs), favourable recommendation of PEA
(which were seen as a part of its recommendations to the EXECOM), and
undertaken either by PEA or entity under contract of PEA or by the National
Government Agency (NHA is a government agency whose authority to reclaim
lands under consultation with PEA is derived under PD 727 and RA 7279).

2. Notwithstanding the need for DENR permission, the DENR is deemed to have
granted the authority to reclaim in the Smokey Mountain Project for the DENR is
one of the members of the EXECOM which provides reviews for the project.  ECCs
and Special Patent Orders were given by the DENR which are exercises of its
power of supervision over the project.  Furthermore, it was the President via the
abovementioned MOs that originally authorized the reclamation.  It must be noted
that the reclamation of lands of public domain is reposed first in the Philippine
President.

3. The reclaimed lands were classified alienable and disposable via MO 415 issued by
President Aquino and Proclamation Nos. 39 and 465 by President Ramos.

4. Despite not having an explicit declaration, the lands have been deemed to be no
longer needed for public use as stated in Proclamation No. 39 that these are to be
“disposed to qualified beneficiaries.”  Furthermore, these lands have already been
necessarily reclassified as alienable and disposable lands under the BOT law.

5. Letter I of Sec. 6 of PD 757 clearly states that the NHA can acquire property rights
and interests and encumber or otherwise dispose of them as it may deem
appropriate.

6. There is no doubt that respondent NHA conducted a public bidding of the right to
become its joint venture partner in the Smokey Mountain Project.  It was noted
that notices were published in national newspapers.  The bidding proper was done
by the Bids and Awards Committee on May 18, 1992.

7. RA 6957 as amended by RA 7718 explicitly states that a contractor can be paid “a

portion as percentage of the reclaimed land” subject to the constitutional
requirement that only Filipino citizens or corporation with at least 60% Filipino
equity can acquire the same.  In addition, when the lands were transferred to the
NHA, these were considered Patrimonial lands of the state, by which it has the
power to sell the same to any qualified person.

8. This relief must be granted.  It is the right of the Filipino people to information on
matters of public concerned as stated in Article II, Sec. 28, and Article III, Sec. 7 of
the 1987 Constitution.

9. When the petitioner filed the case, the JVA had already been terminated by virtue of
MOA between RBI and NHA.  The properties and rights in question after the
passage of around 10 years from the start of the project’s implementation cannot
be disturbed or questioned.  The petitioner, being the Solicitor General at the time
 SMDRP was formulated, had ample opportunity to question the said project, but
did not do so.  The moment to challenge has passed.

5. PASEO REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORP. vs. CA

(G.R. No. 119286; 13 October 2004)

Facts:

Petitioner filed a its Income Tax Return (ITR) for the calendar year 1989. He later filed with
respondent CTA for a refund of excess creditable taxes withholding (CTW) and income
taxes for the years 1989 and 1990 in the aggregate amount of 147, 036.15.

Respondent Commissioner (CIR) filed an Answer stating some defenses. The Court
rendered decision in favor of the petitioner. However, CIR filed a Motion for
Reconsideration (MFR) alleging that the amount sought to be refunded “has already been
included in the 172, 447 which the petitioner applied as tax credit for the succeeding
taxable year 1990.

Upon the respondent Court (RC) dismissed the petition, the petitioner filed MFR which was
denied by the RC. Thus, petitioner filed a petition for Review before the CA. The appellate
court held that petitioner is not entitled to a refund because it appears that the latter did
not specify the amount to be refunded and the amount to be applied as tax credit to the
succeeding taxable year, but only marked an “X” to the box indicating “to be applied as tax
credit to the succeeding taxable year” when the latter filed its income tax return for the
year 1989.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Comment that the claimed refund was to be
applied against its tax liability for 1990.

Petitioner filed a Reply that the issue is not whether the 54,104 was included as tax credit
to be applied against its 1990 income tax liability but whether the same amount was
actually applied as tax credit for 1990.

The OSG filed a Rejoinder that petitioner’s 1989 tax return shows that the latter included
1988 excess credit which had already been segregated for refund and specified that the full
amount of Php 172, 479.00 be considered as its tax credit for 1990. The OSG further
contended that the remaining tax credit for 1989 should be the excess credit to be applied
against its 1990 tax liability. Hence, petitioner ask for a refund of its CTW in 1989 because
it had been applied against its 1990 tax due.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner should be refunded.

Ruling:

No. The grant of refund is founded on the assumption that the tax return is valid. Without
the tax return, it is error to grant a refund since it would be impossible to determine
whether the proper taxes have been assessed and paid.

In this case, petitioner did not present evidence to prove that its claimed refund had
already been automatically credited against its 1990 tax liability. The burden of proof to
establish the factual basis of claim for tax credit or refund lies on the claimant. Tax refunds
are construed strictly against the taxpayer.

Under the provision, the taxpayer is allowed three (3) options if the sum of its quarterly tax
payments made during the taxable year is not equal to the total tax due for that year:

 pay the balance of the tax still due;

 carry-over the excess credit; or
 be credited or refunded the amount period.

Tax Case Digest: People V. Mallari, G.R. No. 197164, December 4, 2019

Mallari
G.R. No. 197164, December 4, 2019

SC Second Division
Hernando, J.

Lessons Applicable: Doctrine of  Immutability

Laws Applicable:

FACTS:

 October 23, 2007: Revenue Delegation Authority Order (RDAO) No. 202007,
Regional Director Alfredo V. Misajon (Misajon) of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR), Revenue Region No. 6 of Manila (BIR Manila) filed a criminal
complaint against respondens Benedicta Mallari (Mallari) and Chi Wei-Neng
(Wei-Neng), President and General Manager of Topsun Int’l (Topsun) for
violation of Section 255 in relation to Sections 253 and 256 of the 1997 National
Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) before the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of
Manila before the Office of the City Prosecutor. 
  August 7, 2009: Assistant City Prosecutor of Manila Gideon C. Mendoza (ACP
Mendora) found probable cause to indict Mallari and Wei-neng and Information
was subsequently filed before the CTA 1st Division.
 CTA 1st Division dismissed the criminal complaint for failure of ACP Mendorza
to obey a lawful order of the court to submit a certified true copy of the
Memorandum of the CIR authorizing Misajon to prosecute.
 January 18, 2010 (out of time): Special counsels/prosecutors of the BIR Manila
filed their Entry of Appearance with Leave to Admit Attached Motion for
Reconsideration maintaining that RD Misajon can sign approval and referral
letters to authorize the institution of criminal actions/cases from the regional
office with the courts, government agencies, or quasi-judicial bodies under
Section 220 of the NIRC in accordance with the delegated authority vested by
the CIR to RD under RDAO No. 2-2007.  Further, March 27, 2007 Memorandum
issued by the CIR gives authority to specific BIR legal offices to prosecute and
conduct criminal proceedings with respect to violation of tax laws like in the
instant case.
 CTA En Banc dismissed Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court affirming CTA 1st Division decision which has already become
final.
ISSUE: W/N CTA 1st Division decision which has already become final

HELD: YES. By Doctrine of Immutability, the resolution can no longer be reviewed nor
modified even if it is meant to correct an erroneous conclusion of law and facts of the said
tax court. 

 Alleged negligence of special counsel ACP Mendoza bind petitioner.