Part VII - ARTICLE VI (LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT - PART I)

Sec. 1 – The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which
shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved
to the people by the provision on initiative and referendum.

Garcia vs. Comelec, GR 111230, September 30, 1994

FACTS:
On May 24, 1993, petitioners filed a petition with the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong to
annul Pambansang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 which includes the Municipaloty of
Morong as part of the Subic Special Economic Zone in accord with the RA No. 7227.

The municipality did not take any action on the petition within 30 days after its
submission; so, they resorted to their power of initiative under the Local Government
Code of 1991. They solicited the required number of signatures to repeal the said
resolution.

However, the Vice Mayor, Hon. Edilberto de Leon, and the Presiding Office of the
Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong wrote a letter dated June 11, 1993 to deny the petition
for local initiative and/or referendum.

On July 6, 1993, the Comelec denied the petition for local initiative because its subject
is “merely a resolution and not an ordinance.”

ISSUE:
w/n the Pambansang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 is the proper subject of an
initiative?
Sub-issue: w/n the decision of the Comelec to deny the petition be set aside?

HELD:
The petition is granted and the decision of the Comelec on July 6, 1993 is annulled and
set aside.

RULING:
The 1987 Constitution installed back the power to the people regarding legislation
because of the event in February 1986. The new Constitution became “less trusting of
public officials.”

Through initiative, the people were given the power to amend the Constitution under
Sec. 2 Art. 17 which provides “amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly
proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least 12% of the total
number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at
least 3% of the registered voter therein.”

The Comelec was also empowered to enforce and administer all laws and regulations
relative to the conduct of an initiative and referendum.
On Aug. 4, 1989, the Congress approved RA No. 6735 entitled “An Act Providing for a
System of Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefor.”

YES. Sec. 32 of Art. 6 provides “ the Congress shall provide for a system of initiative
and referendum, and the exceptions therefrom, whereby the people can directly
propose
and enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or part thereof passed by the
Congress or local legislative body.
Under Sec. 32(a) of RA No. 6735 it provided the 3 systems of initiative, namely:
1. Initiative on the Constitution – petition to amend the Constitution
2. Initiative on statutes – petition proposing to enact a national legislation
3. Initiative on local legislation – petition proposing to enact a regional, provincial,
city, municipal, or barangay law, resolution or ordinance

Under its Sec.16(a), it provided the limitations on local initiatives, which is “the power of
local initiative shall not be exercised more than once a year.”

SBMA vs. Comelec, GR 125416, September 26, 1996

FACTS:
Congress enacted Republic Act No. 7227 (The Bases Conversion and Development Act
of 1992), which among others, provided for the creation of the Subic Special Economic
Zone. R.A. No. 7227 likewise created petitioner to implement the declared national
policy of converting the Subic military reservation into alternative productive uses.
2Petitioner was organized with an authorized capital stock of P20 billion which was fully
subscribed and fully paid up by the Republic of the Philippines with, among other
assets, “(a)ll lands embraced, covered and defined in Section 12 hereof, as well as
permanent improvements and fixtures upon proper inventory not otherwise alienated,
conveyed, or transferred to another government agency.”
On November 24, 1992, the American navy turned over the Subic military reservation to
the Philippine government. Immediately, petitioner commenced the implementation of
its task, particularly the preservation of the seaports, airports buildings, houses and
other installations left by the American navy.

The Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan passed Pambayang Kapasyahan Bilang

10, Serye 1993, expressing therein its absolute concurrence, as required by said Sec.
12 of R.A. No. 7227, to join the Subic Special Economic Zone. On September 5, 1993,
the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong submitted Pambayang Kapasyahan Bilang 10,
Serye 1993 to the Office of the President. respondents Garcia, Calimbas and their
companions filed a petition with the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong to annul
Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993.

The Sangguniang Bayan of Morong acted upon the petition of respondents Garcia, Not
satisfied, and within 30 days from submission of their petition, herein respondents
resorted to their power of initiative under the Local Government Code of 1991.
Respondent Comelec issued Resolution No. 2845, adopting therein a “Calendar of
Activities for local referendum on certain municipal ordinance passed by the
Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan,” and which indicated, among others, the
scheduled Referendum Day (July 27, 1996, Saturday). On June 27, 1996, the Comelec
promulgated the assailed Resolution No. 2848 providing for “the rules and guidelines to
govern the conduct of the referendum proposing to annul or repeal Kapasyahan Blg. 10,
Serye 1993 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan.”

ISSUE: whether the Comelec acted properly and juridically in promulgating and
implementing Resolution No. 2848.

HELD: NO. To begin with, the process started by private respondents was an
INITIATIVE but respondent Comelec made preparations for a REFERENDUM only. In
fact, in the body of the Resolution 11 as reproduced in the footnote below, the word
“referendum” is repeated at least 27 times, “initiative” is not mentioned at all.

The Comelec labeled the exercise as a “Referendum”; the counting of votes was
entrusted to a “Referendum Committee”; the documents were called “referendum
returns”; the canvassers, “Referendum Board of Canvassers” and the ballots
themselves bore the description “referendum.” To repeat, not once was the word
“initiative” used in said body of Resolution No. 2848. And yet, this exercise is
unquestionably an INITIATIVE.
There are statutory and conceptual demarcations between a referendum and an
initiative. In enacting the “Initiative and Referendum Act”, Congress differentiated one
term from the other, thus:

(a) ”Initiative” is the power of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution or
to propose and enact legislations through an election called for the purpose.

There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely:

a.1.Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments

to the Constitution;

a.2.Initiative on statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a national

legislation; and

a.3.Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to enact a

regional, provincial, city, municipal, or barangay law, resolution or ordinance.

(b) ”Indirect initiative” is exercise of initiative by the people through a proposition

sent to Congress or the local legislative body for action.

(c) ”Referendum” is the power of the electorate to approve or reject a legislation

through an election called for the purpose. It may be of two classes, namely:

c.1Referendum on statutes which refers to a petition to approve or reject an act

or law, or part thereof, passed by Congress; and

c.2Referendum on local law which refers to a petition to approve or reject a law,

resolution or ordinance enacted by regional assemblies and local legislative
bodies.

DIFFERENTIATED. — There are statutory and conceptual demarcations between a

referendum and an initiative. In enacting the “Initiative and Referendum Act”, Congress
differentiated one term from the other. Along these statutory definitions, Justice Isagani
A. Cruz defines initiative as the “power of the people to propose bills and laws, and to
enact or reject them at the polls independent of the legislative assembly.” On the other
hand, he explains that referendum “is the right reserved to the people to adopt or reject
any act or measure which has been passed by a legislative body and which in most
cases would without action on the part of electors become a law.” The foregoing
definitions, which are based on Black’s and other leading American authorities, are
echoed in the Local Government Code (R.A. 7160).

“SEC. 120. Local Initiative Defined. — Local initiative is the legal process whereby the
registered voters of a local government unit may directly propose, enact, or amend any
ordinance.

“SEC. 126.Local Referendum Defined. — Local referendum is the legal process

whereby the registered voters of the local government units may approve, amend or
reject any ordinance enacted by the sanggunian.

The local referendum shall be held under the control and direction of the Comelec within
sixty (60) days in case of provinces and cities, forty-five (45) days in case of
municipalities and thirty (30) days in case of barangays.

The Comelec shall certify and proclaim the results of the said referendum.”
Rescinding from these definitions, we gather that initiative is resorted to (or initiated) by
the people directly either because the law-making body fails or refuses to enact the law,
ordinance, resolution or act that they desire or because they want to amend or modify
one already existing. Under Sec. 13 of R.A. 6735, the local legislative body is given the
opportunity to enact the proposal. If it refuses/neglects to do so within thirty (30) days
from its presentation, the proponents through their duly-authorized and registered
representatives may invoke their power of initiative, giving notice thereof to the local
legislative body concerned. Should the proponents be able to collect the number of
signed conformities within the period granted by said statute, the Commission on
Elections “shall then set a date for the initiative (not referendum) at which the
proposition shall be submitted to the registered voters in the local government unit
concerned . . ..” On the other hand, in a local referendum, the law-making body submits
to the registered voters of its territorial jurisdiction, for approval or rejection, any
ordinance or resolution which is duly enacted or approved by such law-making
authority. Said referendum shall be conducted also under the control and direction of
the Commission on Elections. In other words, while initiative is entirely the work of the
electorate, referendum is begun and consented to by the law-making body. Initiative is a
process of law-making by the people themselves without the participation and against
the wishes of their elected representatives, while referendum consists merely of the
electorate approving or rejecting what has been drawn up or enacted by a legislative
body. Hence, the process and the voting in an initiative are understandably more
complex than in a referendum where expectedly the voters will simply write either “Yes”
or “No” in the ballot.

COMELEC EXERCISES ADMINISTRATION AND SUPERVISION ON THE CONDUCT

THEREOF. — From the above differentiation, it follows that there is need for the
Comelec to supervise an initiative more closely, its authority thereon extending not only
to the counting and canvassing of votes but also to seeing to it that the matter or act
submitted to the people is in the proper form and language so it may be easily
understood and voted upon by the electorate. This is especially true where the
proposed legislation is lengthy and complicated, and should thus be broken down into
several autonomous parts, each such part to be voted upon separately. Care must also
be exercised that “(n)o petition embracing more than one subject shall be submitted to
the electorate,” although “two or more propositions may be submitted in an initiative.” It
should be noted that under Sec. 13 (c) of R.A. 6735, the “Secretary of Local
Government or his designated representative shall extend assistance in the formulation
of the proposition.” In initiative and referendum, the Comelec exercises administration
and supervision of the process itself, akin to its powers over the conduct of elections.
These law-making powers belong to the people, hence the respondent Commission
cannot control or change the substance or the content of legislation. In the exercise of
its authority, it may (in fact it should have done so already) issue relevant and adequate
guidelines and rules for the orderly exercise of these “people-power” features of our
Constitution.

ID.; ID.; ID.; THE COURT CANNOT PASS UPON A PROPOSED INITIATIVE UNTIL
THE PEOPLE HAVE VOTED FOR IT AND IT HAS BECOME AN APPROVED
ORDINANCE OR RESOLUTION. — Deliberating on this issue, the Court agrees with
private respondent Garcia that indeed, the municipal resolution is still in the proposal
stage. It is not yet an approved law. Should the people reject it, then there would be
nothing to contest and to adjudicate. It is only when the people have voted for it and it
has become an approved ordinance or resolution that rights and obligations can be
enforced or implemented thereunder. At this point, it is merely a proposal and the writ of
prohibition cannot issue upon a mere conjecture or possibility. Constitutionally speaking,
courts may decide only actual controversies, not hypothetical questions or cases. We
also note that the Initiative and Referendum Act itself provides that “(n)othing in this Act
shall prevent or preclude the proper courts from declaring null and void any proposition
approved pursuant to this Act . . ..” So too, the Supreme Court is basically a review
court. It passes upon errors of law (and sometimes of fact, as in the case of mandatory
appeals of capital offenses) of lower courts as well as determines whether there had
been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any “branch or instrumentality” of government. In the present case, it is quite clear that
the Court has authority to review Comelec Resolution No. 2848 to determine the
commission of grave abuse of discretion. However, it does not have the same authority
in regard to the proposed initiative since it has not been promulgated or approved, or
passed upon by any “branch or instrumentality” or lower court, for that matter. The
Commission on Elections itself has made no reviewable pronouncement about the
issues brought by the pleadings. The Comelec simply included verbatim the proposal in
its questioned Resolution No. 2848. Hence, there is really no decision or action made
by a branch, instrumentality or court which this Court could take cognizance of and
acquire jurisdiction over, in the exercise of its review powers.

ID.; ID.; ID.; THE COMELEC MAY PASS UPON SUCH PROPOSAL INSOFAR AS TO
ITS FORM AND LANGUAGE ARE CONCERNED AND WHETHER THE SAME IS
PATENTLY AND CLEARLY OUTSIDE THE CAPACITY OF THE LOCAL LEGISLATIVE
BODY TO ENACT. — Having said that, we are in no wise suggesting that the Comelec
itself has no power to pass upon proposed resolutions in an initiative. Quite the
contrary, we are ruling that these matters are in fact within the initiatory jurisdiction of
the Commission — to which then the herein basic questions ought to have been
addressed, and by which the same should have been decided in the first instance. In
other words, while regular courts may take jurisdiction over “approved propositions” per
said Sec. 18 of R.A. 6735, the Comelec in the exercise of its quasi-judicial and
administrative powers may adjudicate and pass upon such proposals insofar as their
form and language are concerned, as discussed earlier; and it may be added, even as
to content, where the proposals or parts thereof are patently and clearly outside the
“capacity of the local legislative body to enact.” Accordingly, the question of whether the
subject of this initiative is within the capacity of the Municipal Council of Morong to enact
may be ruled upon by the Comelec upon remand and after hearing the parties thereon.

Sec. 3 – No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural-born citizen of the

Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least thirty-five years of age, able to
read and write, a registered voter, and a resident of the Philippines for not less than two
years immediately preceding the day of the election.

Social Justice Society vs. Dangerous Drugs Board, GR 157870, Nov. 3, 2008

I.      THE FACTS

These consolidated petitions challenge the constitutionality of Sec. 36 of R.A. 9165,

the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, insofar as it requires mandatory drug testing of
(1) candidates for public office; (2) students of secondary and tertiary schools; (3) officers and
employees of public and private offices; and (4) persons charged before the prosecutor’s office of a
crime with an imposable penalty of imprisonment of not less than 6 years and 1 day.

The challenged section reads:

SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing. Authorized drug testing shall be done by any government
forensic laboratories or by any of the drug testing laboratories accredited and monitored by the DOH to
safeguard the quality of the test results.  x x x The drug testing shall employ, among others, two (2)
testing methods, the screening test which will determine the positive result as well as the type of drug
used and the confirmatory test which will confirm a positive screening test.  x x x The following shall be
subjected to undergo drug testing:

            xxx                   xxx                   xxx

 (c) Students of secondary and tertiary schools. Students of secondary and tertiary schools shall,
pursuant to the related rules and regulations as contained in the school's student handbook and with
notice to the parents, undergo a random drug testing x x x;

(d) Officers and employees of public and private offices. Officers and employees of public and
private offices, whether domestic or overseas, shall be subjected to undergo a random drug test as
contained in the company's work rules and regulations, x x x for purposes of reducing the risk in the
workplace.  Any officer or employee found positive for use of dangerous drugs shall be dealt with
administratively which shall be a ground for suspension or termination, subject to the provisions of Article
282 of the Labor Code and pertinent provisions of the Civil Service Law;

xxx                   xxx                   xxx

(f) All persons charged before the prosecutor's office with a criminal offense having an imposable
penalty of imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day shall undergo a mandatory drug
test;

(g) All candidates for public office whether appointed or elected both in the national or local
government shall undergo a mandatory drug test.

Sec. 36(g) is implemented by COMELEC Resolution No. 6486.

II.    THE ISSUES

1.    Do Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 impose an additional
qualification for candidates for senator? Corollarily, can Congress enact a law prescribing
qualifications for candidates for senator in addition to those laid down by the Constitution?

2.    Are paragraphs (c), (d), and (f) of Sec. 36, RA 9165 unconstitutional?

III.   THE RULING

[The Court GRANTED the petition in G.R. No. 161658 and declared Sec. 36(g) of RA

9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 as UNCONSTITUTIONAL. It also PARTIALLY
GRANTED the petition in G.R. Nos. 157870 and 158633 by declaring Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA
9165 CONSTITUTIONAL, but declaring its Sec. 36(f) UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Court thus
permanently enjoined all the concerned agencies from implementing Sec. 36(f) and (g) of RA 9165.]

1.    YES, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 impose an
additional qualification for candidates for senator; NO, Congress CANNOT enact a law
prescribing qualifications for candidates for senator in addition to those laid down by the
Constitution.

In essence, Pimentel claims that Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486
illegally impose an additional qualification on candidates for senator. He points out that, subject to
the provisions on nuisance candidates, a candidate for senator needs only to meet the qualifications
laid down in Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution, to wit: (1) citizenship, (2) voter registration, (3)
literacy, (4) age, and (5) residency.  Beyond these stated qualification requirements, candidates for
senator need not possess any other qualification to run for senator and be voted upon and elected
as member of the Senate. The Congress cannot validly amend or otherwise modify these
qualification standards, as it cannot disregard, evade, or weaken the force of a constitutional
mandate, or alter or enlarge the Constitution.

Pimentel’s contention is well-taken.  Accordingly, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 should be, as it is

hereby declared as, unconstitutional.

Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented by the assailed COMELEC resolution,

effectively enlarges the qualification requirements enumerated in the Sec. 3, Art. VI of the
Constitution.  As couched, said Sec. 36(g) unmistakably requires a candidate for senator to be
certified illegal-drug clean, obviously as a pre-condition to the validity of a certificate of candidacy for
senator or, with like effect, a condition sine qua non to be voted upon and, if proper, be proclaimed
as senator-elect. The COMELEC resolution completes the chain with the proviso that “[n]o person
elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has undergone
mandatory drug test.”  Viewed, therefore, in its proper context, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and the
implementing COMELEC Resolution add another qualification layer to what the 1987 Constitution, at
the minimum, requires for membership in the Senate. Whether or not the drug-free bar set up under
the challenged provision is to be hurdled before or after election is really of no moment, as getting
elected would be of little value if one cannot assume office for non-compliance with the drug-testing
requirement.

2. NO, paragraphs (c) and (d) of Sec. 36, RA 9165 are NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL; YES,
paragraphs (f) thereof is UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

As to paragraph (c), covering  students of secondary and tertiary schools

Citing the U.S. cases of Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton and Board of Education

of Independent School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie County, et al. v. Earls, et al., the Court
deduced and applied the following principles: (1) schools and their administrators stand in loco
parentis with respect to their students; (2) minor students have contextually fewer rights than an
adult, and are subject to the custody and supervision of their parents, guardians, and schools; (3)
schools, acting in loco parentis, have a duty to safeguard the health and well-being of their students
and may adopt such measures as may reasonably be necessary to discharge such duty; and (4)
schools have the right to impose conditions on applicants for admission that are fair, just, and non-
discriminatory.

Guided by Vernonia, supra, and Board of Education, supra, the Court is of the view and so

holds that the provisions of RA 9165 requiring mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing of
students are constitutional. Indeed, it is within the prerogative of educational institutions to require,
as a condition for admission, compliance with reasonable school rules and regulations and policies. 
To be sure, the right to enrol is not absolute; it is subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable
requirements.

As to paragraph (d), covering  officers and employees of public and private offices

As the warrantless clause of Sec. 2, Art III of the Constitution is couched and as has been
held, “reasonableness” is the touchstone of the validity of a government search or intrusion . And
whether a search at issue hews to the reasonableness standard is judged by the balancing of the
government-mandated intrusion on the individual's privacy interest against the promotion of some
compelling state interest. In the criminal context, reasonableness requires showing of probable
cause to be personally determined by a judge. Given that the drug-testing policy for employees—
and students for that matter—under RA 9165 is in the nature of administrative search needing what
was referred to in Vernonia as “swift and informal disciplinary procedures,” the probable-cause
standard is not required or even practicable. Be that as it may, the review should focus on the
reasonableness of the challenged administrative search in question.

The first factor to consider in the matter of reasonableness is the nature of the privacy
interest upon which the drug testing, which effects a search within the meaning of Sec. 2, Art. III of
the Constitution, intrudes. In this case, the office or workplace serves as the backdrop for the
analysis of the privacy expectation of the employees and the reasonableness of drug testing
requirement. The employees' privacy interest in an office is to a large extent circumscribed by the
company's work policies, the collective bargaining agreement, if any, entered into by management
and the bargaining unit, and the inherent right of the employer to maintain discipline and efficiency in
the workplace. Their privacy expectation in a regulated office environment is, in fine, reduced; and a
degree of impingement upon such privacy has been upheld.

Just as defining as the first factor is the character of the intrusion authorized by the
challenged law. Reduced to a question form, is the scope of the search or intrusion clearly set forth,
or, as formulated in Ople v. Torres, is the enabling law authorizing a search "narrowly drawn" or
"narrowly focused"?

The poser should be answered in the affirmative. For one, Sec. 36 of RA 9165 and its
implementing rules and regulations (IRR), as couched, contain provisions specifically directed
towards preventing a situation that would unduly embarrass the employees or place them under a
humiliating experience. While every officer and employee in a private establishment is under the law
deemed forewarned that he or she may be a possible subject of a drug test, nobody is really singled
out in advance for drug testing. The goal is to discourage drug use by not telling in advance anyone
when and who is to be tested. And as may be observed, Sec. 36(d) of RA 9165 itself prescribes
what, in Ople, is a narrowing ingredient by providing that the employees concerned shall be
subjected to “random drug test as contained in the company’s work rules and regulations x x x for
purposes of reducing the risk in the work place.”
 For another, the random drug testing shall be undertaken under conditions calculated to
protect as much as possible the employee's privacy and dignity. As to the mechanics of the test, the
law specifies that the procedure shall employ two testing methods, i.e., the screening test and the
confirmatory test, doubtless to ensure as much as possible the trustworthiness of the results. But the
more important consideration lies in the fact that the test shall be conducted by trained professionals
in access-controlled laboratories monitored by the Department of Health (DOH) to safeguard against
results tampering and to ensure an accurate chain of custody. In addition, the IRR issued by the
DOH provides that access to the drug results shall be on the “need to know” basis; that the “drug
test result and the records shall be [kept] confidential subject to the usual accepted practices to
protect the confidentiality of the test results.”  Notably, RA 9165 does not oblige the employer
concerned to report to the prosecuting agencies any information or evidence relating to the violation
of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act received as a result of the operation of the drug
testing. All told, therefore, the intrusion into the employees’ privacy, under RA 9165, is accompanied
by proper safeguards, particularly against embarrassing leakages of test results, and is relatively
minimal.

Taking into account the foregoing factors, i.e., the reduced expectation of privacy on the part
of the employees, the compelling state concern likely to be met by the search, and the well-defined
limits set forth in the law to properly guide authorities in the conduct of the random testing, we hold
that the challenged drug test requirement is, under the limited context of the case, reasonable
and, ergo, constitutional.

Like their counterparts in the private sector, government officials and employees also labor
under reasonable supervision and restrictions imposed by the Civil Service law and other laws on
public officers, all enacted to promote a high standard of ethics in the public service.  And if RA 9165
passes the norm of reasonableness for private employees, the more reason that it should pass the
test for civil servants, who, by constitutional command, are required to be accountable at all times to
the people and to serve them with utmost responsibility and efficiency.

As to paragraph (f), covering   persons charged before the prosecutor’s office with a crime
with an imposable penalty of imprisonment of not less than 6 years and 1 day

Unlike the situation covered by Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165, the Court finds no valid
justification for mandatory drug testing for persons accused of crimes. In the case of students, the
constitutional viability of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing for
students emanates primarily from the waiver by the students of their right to privacy when they seek
entry to the school, and from their voluntarily submitting their persons to the parental authority of
school authorities. In the case of private and public employees, the constitutional soundness of the
mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing proceeds from the reasonableness of the drug
test policy and requirement.

We find the situation entirely different in the case of persons charged before the public
prosecutor's office with criminal offenses punishable with 6 years and 1 day imprisonment.  The
operative concepts in the mandatory drug testing are “randomness” and “suspicionless.”  In the case
of persons charged with a crime before the prosecutor's office, a mandatory drug testing can never
be random or suspicionless.  The ideas of randomness and being suspicionless are antithetical to
their being made defendants in a criminal complaint.  They are not randomly picked; neither are they
beyond suspicion.  When persons suspected of committing a crime are charged, they are singled out
and are impleaded against their will.  The persons thus charged, by the bare fact of being haled
before the prosecutor’s office and peaceably submitting themselves to drug testing, if that be the
case, do not necessarily consent to the procedure, let alone waive their right to privacy.  To impose
mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for
criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of RA 9165.  Drug testing in this case would
violate a person’s right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the
accused persons are veritably forced to incriminate themselves.

Sec. 4 – The term of office of the Senators shall be six years and shall commence,
unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following
their election. No Senator shall serve for more than two consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term of which he was elected.

Borja vs. Comelec, GR No. 133495, September 3, 1998

Facts: 
Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected as Vice-Mayor of Pateros on January 18, 1988 for a
term ending on June 30, 1992. On September 2, 1989, he became Mayor, by operation
of law, upon the death of the incumbent, Cesar Borja. Thereafter, Capco was elected
and served as Mayor for two more terms, from 1992 to 1998. On March 27, 1998,
Capco filed a Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Pateros in the May 11, 1998
elections. Petitioner Benjamin U. Borja, Jr., who was also a candidate for mayor, sought
Capco’s disqualification on the ground that Capco would have already served as Mayor
for 3 consecutive terms by June 30, 1998; hence, he would be ineligible to serve for
another term. The Second Division of the Comelec declared Capco disqualified but
the Comelec en banc reversed the decision and declared Capco eligible to run for
mayor. Capco was subsequently voted and proclaimed as mayor. 

Issue: 
Whether or not a vice-mayor who succeeds to the office of mayor by operation of law
and serves the remainder of the term is considered to have served a term in that office
for the purpose of the three-term limit. 

Held: 
No. The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be
elected as well as the right to serve the same elective position. Consequently, it is not
enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office,
he must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times
before the disqualification can apply. Capco was qualified to run again as mayor in the
next election because he was not elected to the office of mayor in the first term but
simply found himself thrust into it by operation of law. Neither had he served the full
term because he only continued the service, interrupted by the death, of the deceased
mayor. The vice-mayor’s assumption of the mayorship in the event of the vacancy is
more a matter of chance than of design. Hence, his service in that office should not be
counted in the application of any term limit.

The policy embodied in the constitutional provision (Art. X, §8) is not only to prevent the
establishment of political dynasties but also to enhance the freedom of choice of the
people. A consideration of the historical background of Art. X, §8 of the Constitution
reveals that the members of the Constitutional Commission were as much concerned
with preserving the freedom of choice of the people as they were with preventing the
monopolization of political power. In discussing term limits, the drafters of the
Constitution did so on the assumption that the officials concerned were serving by
reason of election. To consider Capco to have served the first term in full and therefore
ineligible to run a third time for reelection would be not only to falsify reality but also to
unduly restrict the right of the people to choose whom they wish to govern them. 

Sec. 5 – (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two
hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from
legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila
area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of
a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected
through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations.

(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number
of representatives including those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after
the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list
representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the
labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such
other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.

(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact,
and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand,
or each province, shall have at least one representative.

(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a
reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards provided in this section.

Banat vs. Comelec, GR No. 179271, April 21, 2009

Facts:
On 27 June 2002, BANAT filed a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List
Representatives Provided by the Constitution, docketed as NBC No. 07-041 (PL) before
the NBC. BANAT filed its petition because "the Chairman and the Members of the
COMELEC have recently been quoted in the national papers that the COMELEC is duty
bound to and shall implement the Veterans ruling, that is, would apply the Panganiban
formula in allocating party-list seats."

BANAT filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the ruling in NBC
Resolution No. 07-88. BANAT did not file a motion for reconsideration of NBC
Resolution No. 07-88.

On 9 July 2007, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher asked the COMELEC, acting as
NBC, to reconsider its decision to use the Veterans formula as stated in its NBC
Resolution No. 07-60 because the Veterans formula is violative of the Constitution and
of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941). On the same day, the COMELEC denied
reconsideration during the proceedings of the NBC.

Issue:
Considering the allegations in the petitions and the comments of the parties in these
cases, we defined the following issues in our advisory for the oral arguments set on 22
April 2008:
     1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives in Section 5(2), Article
VI of the Constitution mandatory or merely a ceiling?
     2. Is the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
     3. Is the two percent threshold prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 to qualify for
one seat constitutional?
     4. How shall the party-list representative seats be allocated?
     5. Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from participating in the
party-list elections? If not, can the major political parties be barred from participating in
the party-list elections?

Held:
 WHEREFORE we PARTIALLY GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the Resolution of
the COMELEC dated 3 August 2007 in NBC No. 07-041 (PL) as well as the Resolution
dated 9 July 2007 in NBC No. 07-60. We declare unconstitutional the two percent
threshold in the distribution of additional party-list seats.

Ratio: Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 mandates the filling-up of the entire
20% allocation of party-list representatives found in the Constitution. However, we
cannot allow the continued existence of a provision in the law which will systematically
prevent the constitutionally allocated 20% party-list representatives from being filled.
The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number of seats that a qualified party-list
organization may occupy, remains a valid statutory device that prevents any party from
dominating the party-list elections.

We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of
the two percent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the
second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds
that the two percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the
maximum number of available party list seats when the number of available party list
seats exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two percent threshold in the
distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling.

In declaring the two percent threshold unconstitutional, we do not limit our allocation of
additional seats to the two-percenters. The percentage of votes garnered by each party-
list candidate is arrived at by dividing the number of votes garnered by each party by
15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for party-list candidates. There are two steps
in the second round of seat allocation. First, the percentage is multiplied by the
remaining available seats, 38, which is the difference between the 55 maximum seats
reserved under the Party-List System and the 17 guaranteed seats of the two-
percenters. The whole integer of the product of the percentage and of the remaining
available seats corresponds to a party’s share in the remaining available seats. Second,
we assign one party-list seat to each of the parties next in rank until all available seats
are completely distributed. We distributed all of the remaining 38 seats in the second
round of seat allocation. Finally, we apply the three-seat cap to determine the number of
seats each qualified party-list candidate is entitled.

Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from
participating in the party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution
clearly intended the major political parties to participate in party-list elections through
their sectoral wings. In fact, the members of the Constitutional Commission voted down,
19-22, any permanent sectoral seats, and in the alternative the reservation of the party-
list system to the sectoral groups. In defining a "party" that participates in party-list
elections as either "a political party or a sectoral party," R.A. No. 7941 also clearly
intended that major political parties will participate in the party-list elections. Excluding
the major political parties in party-list elections is manifestly against the Constitution, the
intent of the Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot engage
in socio-political engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion of major political
parties from the party-list elections in patent violation of the Constitution and the law.

In view of the inclusion of major political parties (according to Puno, J.)

The Court today effectively reversed the ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani v. COMELEC with
regard to the computation of seat allotments and the participation of major political
parties in the party-list system. I vote for the formula propounded by the majority as it
benefits the party-list system but I regret that my interpretation of Article VI, Section 5 of
the Constitution with respect to the participation of the major political parties in the
election of party-list representatives is not in direct congruence with theirs, hence

There is no gainsaying the fact that the party-list parties are no match to our traditional
political parties in the political arena. This is borne out in the party-list elections held in
2001 where major political parties were initially allowed to campaign and be voted for.
The results confirmed the fear expressed by some commissioners in the Constitutional
Commission that major political parties would figure in the disproportionate distribution
of votes: of the 162 parties which participated, the seven major political parties made it
to the top 50. These seven parties garnered an accumulated 9.54% of the total number
of votes counted, yielding an average of 1.36% each, while the remaining 155 parties
(including those whose qualifications were contested) only obtained 90.45% or an
average of 0.58% each. Of these seven, three parties or 42.8% of the total number of
the major parties garnered more than 2% of the total number of votes each, a feat that
would have entitled them to seat their members as party-list representatives. In
contrast, only about 4% of the total number of the remaining parties, or only 8 out of the
155 parties garnered more than 2%.

In sum, the evils that faced our marginalized and underrepresented people at the time
of the framing of the 1987 Constitution still haunt them today. It is through the party-list
system that the Constitution sought to address this systemic dilemma. In ratifying the
Constitution, our people recognized how the interests of our poor and powerless
sectoral groups can be frustrated by the traditional political parties who have the
machinery and chicanery to dominate our political institutions. If we allow major political
parties to participate in the party-list system electoral process, we will surely suffocate
the voice of the marginalized, frustrate their sovereignty and betray the democratic spirit
of the Constitution. That opinion will serve as the graveyard of the party-list system.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, I dissent on the ruling allowing the entry of major political parties
into the party-list system.
 
In view of 2% being unconstitutional (according to Nachura, J.)
     However, I wish to add a few words to support the proposition that the inflexible 2%
threshold vote required for entitlement by a party-list group to a seat in the House of
Representatives in Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7941 is unconstitutional. This minimum vote
requirement ─ fixed at 2% of the total number of votes cast for the party list system ─
presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5 (2), Article VI,
of the Philippine Constitution. As such, it effectively defeats the declared constitutional
policy, as well as the legislative objective expressed in the enabling law, to allow the
people’s broadest representation in Congress the raison d’etre for the adoption of the
party-list system.
     Today, a little over eight (8) years after this Court’s decision in Veterans Federation
Party, we see that in the 14th Congress, 55 seats are allocated to party-list
representatives, using the Veterans formula. But that figure (of 55) can never be
realized, because the 2% threshold vote requirement makes it mathematically
impossible to have more than 50 seats. After all, the total number of votes cast for the
party-list system can never exceed 100%.
    Lest I be misunderstood, I do not advocate doing away completely with a threshold
vote requirement. The need for such a minimum vote requirement was explained in
careful and elaborate detail by Chief Justice Puno in his separate concurring opinion in
Veterans Federation Party. I fully agree with him that a minimum vote requirement is
needed –

1. to avoid a situation where the candidate will just use the party-list system as a
fall-back position;
2. to discourage nuisance candidates or parties, who are not ready and whose
chances are very low, from participating in the elections;
3. to avoid the reserve seat system by opening up the system;
4. to encourage the marginalized sectors to organize, work hard, and earn their
seats within the system;
5. to enable sectoral representatives to rise to the same majesty as that of the
elected representatives in the legislative body, rather than owing to some degree
their seats in the legislative body either to an outright constitutional gift or to an
appointment by the President of the Philippines;
6. if no threshold is imposed, this will actually proliferate political party groups
and those who have not really been given by the people sufficient basis for them
to represent their constituents and, in turn, they will be able to get to the
Parliament through the backdoor under the name of the party-list system; and
7. to ensure that only those with a more or less substantial following can be
represented.9
     
However, with the burgeoning of the population, the steady increase in the party-
list seat allotment as it keeps pace with the creation of additional legislative districts,
and the foreseeable growth of party-list groups, the fixed 2% vote requirement is no
longer viable. It does not adequately respond to the inevitable changes that come with
time; and it is, in fact, inconsistent with the Constitution, because it prevents the
fundamental law from ever being fully operative.

   It is correct to say, and I completely agree with Veterans Federation Party, that
Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution, is not mandatory, that it merely provides a
ceiling for the number of party-list seats in Congress. But when the enabling law, R.A.
7941, enacted by Congress for the precise purpose of implementing the constitutional
provision, contains a condition that places the constitutional ceiling completely beyond
reach, totally impossible of realization, then we must strike down the offending condition
as an affront to the fundamental law. This is not simply an inquiry into the wisdom of the
legislative measure; rather it involves the duty of this Court to ensure that constitutional
provisions remain effective at all times. No rule of statutory construction can save a
particular legislative enactment that renders a constitutional provision inoperative and
ineffectual.

Paglaum vs. Comelec, GR 203766, April 2, 2013

FACTS: 
In line with the then upcoming national elections in May 2013, approximately 280
groups and organizations manifested their desire to participate in the party-list elections.
However, 52 of these groups were subsequently disqualified by COMELEC, including
some that were duly registered and accredited as political parties. The reasons for their
exclusion were based on the contention that said groups failed to establish they were
representatives of marginalized and underrepresented sectors and that their nominees
were indeed members of the sectors they were seeking to represent. 

ISSUE: 
Whether or not COMELEC erred in disqualifying 52 party list groups from participating
in the May 2013 elections. 

HELD:
No, what COMELEC did was merely follow existing jurisprudence set forth by the SC in
its earlier rulings. So for purposes of setting uniform standards and understanding of the
party-list system in the Philippines, the Court provides a lengthy account of the history
and dynamics of the party-list system as embodied in the 1987 Constitution and as
envisioned by the Framers, and institutes new guidelines to be used in resolving issues
of similar nature in the future. 

Q: Where can the party-list system be found in the 1987 Constitution? 

A: Section 5, Art. VI; Sections 7 and 8, Art. IX-C

Q: What is the rationale behind the party-list system?

A: To democratize political power by giving political parties that cannot win in legislative
district elections a chance to win seats in the House of Representatives.

Q: Is the party-list system synonymous with sectoral representation?

A: No. Under the party-list system, all voters get to have two votes: one for their choice
of legislative district representative, and another for their choice of party-list
representative. But under sectoral representation, majority of the electorate will only
have one vote, which is for their choice of legislative district representative. In contrast,
members of sectoral communities (e.g. farmers, laborers, indigenous cultural
communitoes, etc.) will have two votes: one for their district representative and another
for their choice of sectoral representative. In other words, sectoral representation is
discriminatory.

Q: Is the party-list system exclusive to sectoral parties?

A: No. The party-list system is open to both sectoral and non-sectoral groups. The
framers intended sectoral groups to constitute a part, but not the entirety, of the party-
list system.

Q: Who can participate in party-list elections?

A: As per Section 5(1) of Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution, any of the following can take
part in party-list elections: national parties and organizations, regional parties and
organizations, and sectoral parties and organizations.  

Q: What is the enabling law of the party-list system?

A: RA No. 7941, or the Party-List System Act.

Q: Do party-list groups need to represent the marginalized and underrepresented

sectors?
A: No. Art. 6 of RA No. 7941 identifies six grounds for disqualification of a party-list
group, and none of these grounds touches on the failure of a party to represent the
marginalized and underrepresented. For non-sectoral groups, it is enough that its
members are united in their cause or ideology. But for sectoral groups, a majority of
their members must come from marginalized and underrepresented sectors.

Q: What are the marginalized and underrepresented sectors?

A: Section 5 of RA No. 7941 lists the following as marginalized and underrepresented
sectors: labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other similar sectors. 

Q: Can major political parties join in party-list elections?

A: Yes, but only through their sectoral wings. The initial impression is that: (a) major
political parties do not represent marginalized and underrepresented sectors, and (b)
major political parties have well-defined constituencies. However, the 1987 Constitution
and RA No. 7941 allow them to participate in party-list elections so as to encourage
them to work assiduously in extending their constituencies to the marginalized and
underrepresented and those who lack well-defined constituencies. The creation of
sectoral wings is allowed as per Section 3 of RA No. 7941.

Q: Should party-list nominees be part of the sector they seek to represent?

A: In BANAT v. COMELEC, the Court held that party-list nominees must come from the
sector they seek to represent. Thus, a party-list representing farmers should have
farmer nominees, too. This was one of COMELEC's bases in disqualifying the 52
petitioners. However, the Court reverses its ruling in BANAT v. COMELEC by instituting
new parameters, including the guidelines for the choice of nominees. Under the new
parameters, a nominee may either be a member of the sector he seeks to represent or
at the very least, should have a track record of advocacy for such sector.

Q: What are the new parameters that party-list groups should adhere to according to the
Court in the instant case?
A: The Court enumerated six parameters. See last sections of the Court ruling for the
list.

Q: What is the final ruling of the Court in this case?

A: The Court remands the cases back to COMELEC to determine whether or not the 52
petitioners are qualified to participate in the May 2013 elections using the six
parameters laid down by the Court. 
Sema vs. Comelec, GR Not. 177597, July 16, 2008

Facts:
      On 28 August 2006, the ARMM’s legislature, the ARMM Regional Assembly,
exercising its power to create provinces under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054,
enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act 201) creating the Province
of Shariff Kabunsuan composed of the eight municipalities in the first district of
Maguindanao.  MMA Act 201 provides:

        Later, three new municipalities were carved out of the original nine municipalities
constituting Shariff Kabunsuan, bringing its total number of municipalities to 11. Thus,
what was left of Maguindanao were the municipalities constituting its second legislative
district. Cotabato City, although part of Maguindanao’s first legislative district, is not part
of the Province of Maguindanao.
     On 6 February 2007, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cotabato City passed
Resolution No. 3999 requesting the COMELEC to “clarify the status of Cotabato City in
view of the conversion of the First District of Maguindanao into a regular province”
under MMA Act 201.

     Resolution No. 07-0407, which adopted the recommendation of the COMELEC’s
Law Department under a Memorandum dated 27 February 2007, provides in pertinent
parts:

     Considering the foregoing, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby resolves, to

adopt the recommendation of the Law Department that pending the enactment of the
appropriate law by Congress, to maintain the status quo with Cotabato City as part of
Shariff Kabunsuan in the First Legislative District of Maguindanao.
 
     On 10 May 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7902, subject of these
petitions, amending Resolution No. 07-0407 by renaming the legislative district in
question as “Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City (formerly First District of
Maguindanao with Cotabato City).”

Issue:
The petitions raise the following issues:
     I. In G.R. No. 177597:
         (A) Preliminarily –
           (1) whether the writs of Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus are proper to test
the constitutionality of COMELEC Resolution No. 7902; and
           (2) whether the proclamation of respondent Dilangalen as representative of
Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City mooted the petition in G.R. No. 177597.
   
   (B) On the merits –
           (1)  whether Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, delegating to the ARMM Regional
Assembly the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, is
constitutional; and
           (2) if in the affirmative, whether a province created by the ARMM Regional
Assembly under MMA Act 201 pursuant to Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is entitled
to one representative in the House of Representatives without need of a national law
creating a legislative district for such province.
     II. In G.R No.  177597 and G.R No.  178628, whether COMELEC Resolution No.
7902 is valid for maintaining the status quo in the first legislative district of Maguindanao
(as “Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City [formerly First District of
Maguindanao with Cotabato City]”), despite the creation of the Province of Shariff
Kabunsuan out of such district (excluding Cotabato City).

Held:
WHEREFORE, we declare Section 19, Article VI of Republic Act No. 9054
UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it grants to the Regional Assembly of the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao the power to create provinces and cities.   Thus, we declare
VOID Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 creating the Province of Shariff
Kabunsuan. Consequently, we rule that COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is VALID.

Ratio: 
      The creation of any of the four local government units – province, city, municipality
or barangay – must comply with three conditions. First, the creation of a local
government unit must follow the criteria fixed in the Local Government Code.   Second,
such creation must not conflict with any provision of the Constitution.  Third, there must
be a plebiscite in the political units affected.
     There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the
Constitution for Congress to delegate to regional or local legislative bodies the power to
create local government units. However, under its plenary legislative powers, Congress
can delegate to local legislative bodies the power to create local government units,
subject to reasonable standards and provided no conflict arises with any provision of the
Constitution.  In fact, Congress has delegated to provincial boards, and city and
municipal councils, the power to create barangays within their jurisdiction, subject to
compliance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code, and the
plebiscite requirement in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.   However, under the
Local Government Code, “only x x x an Act of Congress” can create provinces, cities or
municipalities.

     However, the creation of provinces and cities is another matter.  Section 5 (3), Article
VI of the Constitution provides, “Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty
thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative” in the House of
Representatives. Similarly, Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution
provides, “Any province that may hereafter be created, or any city whose population
may hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in the
immediately following election to at least one Member x x x.” 

     Clearly, a province cannot be created without a legislative district because it will
violate Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance
appended to the Constitution. For the same reason, a city with a population of 250,000
or more cannot also be created without a legislative district.
     This textual commitment to Congress of the exclusive power to create or reapportion
legislative districts is logical. Congress is a national legislature and any increase in its
allowable membership or in its incumbent membership through the creation of
legislative districts must be embodied in a national law. Only Congress can enact such
a law.  It would be anomalous for regional or local legislative bodies to create or
reapportion legislative districts for a national legislature like Congress. An inferior
legislative body, created by a superior legislative body, cannot change the membership
of the superior legislative body. 

In view of certiorari and mandamus

     The purpose of the writ of Certiorari is to correct grave abuse of discretion by “any
tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.” On the other
hand, the writ of Mandamus will issue to compel a tribunal, corporation, board, officer,
or person to perform an act “which the law specifically enjoins as a duty.”
In view of mootness
     There is also no merit in the claim that respondent Dilangalen’s proclamation as
winner in the 14 May 2007 elections for representative of “Shariff Kabunsuan Province
with Cotabato City” mooted this petition. This case does not concern respondent
Dilangalen’s election. Rather, it involves an inquiry into the validity of COMELEC
Resolution No. 7902, as well as the constitutionality of MMA Act 201 and Section 19,
Article VI of RA 9054.  Admittedly, the outcome of this petition, one way or another,
determines whether the votes cast in Cotabato City for representative of the district of
“Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City” will be included in the canvassing of
ballots.   However, this incidental consequence is no reason for us not to proceed with
the resolution of the novel issues raised here.  The Court’s ruling in these petitions
affects not only the recently concluded elections but also all the other succeeding
elections for the office in question, as well as the power of the ARMM Regional
Assembly to create in the future additional provinces.

In view of the Felwa case

As further support for her stance, petitioner invokes the statement in Felwa that “when a
province is created by statute, the corresponding representative district comes into
existence neither by authority of that statute — which cannot provide otherwise — nor
by apportionment, but by operation of the Constitution, without a reapportionment.” 
    
First. The issue in Felwa, among others, was whether Republic Act No. 4695 (RA
4695), creating the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, and Kalinga-
Apayao and providing for congressional representation in the old and new provinces,
was unconstitutional for “creating congressional districts without the apportionment
provided in the Constitution.”

     Thus, the Court sustained the constitutionality of RA 4695 because  (1) it validly
created legislative districts “indirectly” through a special law enacted by Congress
creating a province and (2) the creation of the legislative districts will not result in
breaching the maximum number of legislative districts provided under the 1935
Constitution.   Felwa does not apply to the present case because in Felwa the new
provinces were created by a national law enacted by Congress itself.  Here, the new
province was created merely by a regional law enacted by the ARMM Regional
Assembly. 

     What Felwa teaches is that the creation of a legislative district by Congress does not
emanate alone from Congress’ power to reapportion legislative districts, but also from
Congress’ power to create provinces which cannot be created without a legislative
district. Thus, when a province is created, a legislative district is created by operation of
the Constitution because the Constitution provides that “each province shall have at
least one representative” in the House of Representatives.

     Moreover, if as Sema claims MMA Act 201 apportioned a legislative district to Shariff
Kabunsuan upon its creation, this will leave Cotabato City as the lone component of the
first legislative district of Maguindanao.  However, Cotabato City cannot constitute a
legislative district by itself because as of the census taken in 2000, it had a population of
only 163,849. 

     Second. Sema’s theory also undermines the composition and independence of the
House of Representatives. Under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, the ARMM
Regional Assembly can create provinces and cities within the ARMM with or without
regard to the criteria fixed in Section 461 of RA 7160, namely:  minimum annual income
of P20,000,000, and minimum contiguous territory of 2,000 square kilometers or
minimum population of 250,000.  The following scenarios thus become distinct
possibilities:

     It is axiomatic that organic acts of autonomous regions cannot prevail over the
Constitution.  Section 20, Article X of the Constitution expressly provides that the
legislative powers of regional assemblies are limited “[w]ithin its territorial jurisdiction
and subject to the provisions of the Constitution and national laws, x x x.”   The
Preamble of the ARMM Organic Act (RA 9054) itself states that the ARMM Government
is established “within the framework of the Constitution.”   This follows Section 15,
Article X of the Constitution which mandates that the ARMM “shall be created x x x
within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as
territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.”  

Aquino III vs. Melo, GR 189793, April 7, 2010

FACTS: Republic Act No. 9716 was signed into law by President Arroyo on 12 October
2009. It took effect on 31 October 2009, or fifteen (15) days following its publication in
the Manila Standard, a newspaper of general circulation. In substance, the said law
created an additional legislative district for the Province of Camarines Sur by
reconfiguring the existing first and second legislative districts of the province.

Prior to Republic Act No. 9716, the Province of Camarines Sur was estimated to have a
population of 1,693,821, distributed among four (4) legislative districts.

Following the enactment of Republic Act No. 9716, the first and second districts of
Camarines Sur were reconfigured in order to create an additional legislative district for
the province. Hence, the first district municipalities of Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona,
Pasacao, and San Fernando were combined with the second district municipalities of
Milaor and Gainza to form a new second legislative district.

Petitioners contend that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716, runs
afoul of the explicit constitutional standard that requires a minimum population of two
hundred fifty thousand (250,000) for the creation of a legislative district.The petitioners
claim that the reconfiguration by Republic Act No. 9716 of the first and second districts
of Camarines Sur is unconstitutional, because the proposed first district will end up with
a population of less than 250,000 or only 176,383.

Petitioners rely on Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution as basis for the cited
250,000 minimum population standard.

ISSUE: Is the population of 250,000 an indispensable constitutional requirement

for the creation of a new legislative district in a province?
HELD: Yes, it is an indispensable constitutional requirement. The second sentence of
Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution, succinctly provides: "Each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least
one representative."

The provision draws a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city to a
district on one hand, and the entitlement of a province to a district on the other. For
while a province is entitled to at least a representative, with nothing mentioned about
population, a city must first meet a population minimum of 250,000 in order to be
similarly entitled.

The use by the subject provision of a comma to separate the phrase "each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand" from the phrase "or each province"
point to no other conclusion than that the 250,000 minimum population is only required
for a city, but not for a province.

Plainly read, Section 5(3) of the Constitution requires a250,000 minimum population
only for a city to be entitled to a representative, but not so for a province. DISMISSED.

Sec. 6 – No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a

natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-
five years of age, able to read and write, and, except the party-list representatives, a
registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a
period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election.
Marcos vs. Comelec, GR No. 119976, Sept. 18, 1995
Facts: 
Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position
of Representative of the First District of Leyte in 1995, providing that her residence in
the place was seven (7) months.

On March 23, 1995, Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First
District of Leyte and also a candidate for the same position filed a petition for
cancellation and disqualification with the COMELEC charging Marcos as she did not
comply with the constitutional requirement for residency as she lacked the Constitution’s
one-year residency requirement for candidates for the House of Representative.

In her Amended Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, the petitioner changed seven

months to since childhood under residency. Thus, the petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration was denied.

On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing petitioner’s proclamation
showing that she obtained the highest number of votes in the congressional elections in
the First District of Leyte. The COMELEC reversed itself and issued a second
Resolution directing that the proclamation of petitioner be suspended in the event that
she obtains the highest number of votes.

In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May 1995, Marcos claimed that she was the
overwhelming winner of the elections based on the canvass completed by the Provincial
Board of Canvassers.

Issue: 
Whether or not Imelda Marcos was a resident of the First District of Leyte to satisfy the
one-year residency requirement to be eligible in running as representative.

Held:
Yes. The court is in favor of a conclusion supporting petitioner’s claim of legal residence
or domicile in the First District of Leyte.

Residence is synonymous with domicile which reveals a tendency or mistake the

concept of domicile for actual residence, a conception not intended for the purpose of
determining a candidate’s qualifications for the election to the House of Representatives
as required by the 1987 Constitution.

An individual does not lose her domicile even if she has lived and maintained
residences in different places. In the case at bench, the evidence adduced by Motejo
lacks the degree of persuasiveness as required to convince the court that an
abandonment of domicile of origin in favor of a domicile of choice indeed incurred. It
cannot be correctly argued that Marcos lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as
a result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos.

It can be concluded that the facts supporting its proposition that petitioner was ineligible
to run for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC was
obviously referring to petitioner’s various places of (actual) residence, not her domicile.
Having determined that Marcos possessed the necessary residence qualifications to run
for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC’s
questioned resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May11, and May 25 are set aside.
Provincial Board of Canvassers is directed to proclaim Marcos as the duly elected
Representative of the First District of Leyte.

Aquino vs. Comelec, GR No. 120265, Sept. 18, 1995

Ponente: KAPUNAN, J.:
The sanctity of the people's will must be observed at all times if our nascent democracy
is to be preserved. In any challenge having the effect of reversing a democratic choice,
expressed through the ballot, this Court should be ever so vigilant in finding solutions
which would give effect to the will of the majority, for sound public policy dictates that all
elective offices are filled by those who have received the highest number of votes cast
in an election. When a challenge to a winning candidate's qualifications however
becomes inevitable, the ineligibility ought to be so noxious to the Constitution that giving
effect to the apparent will of the people would ultimately do harm to our democratic
institutions.

FACTS:
Petitioner Agapito Aquino filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of
Representative for the Second District of Makati City. Private respondents Move Makati,
a duly registered political party, and Mateo Bedon,Chairman of LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of
Brgy.Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify petitioner on the ground that the
latter lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for congressman which, under
Sec. 6, Art. VI of the Constitution, should be for a period not less than 1 year
immediately preceding the elections.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for
congressman as mandated by Sec. 6, Art.VI of the Constitution.

HELD:
In order that petitioner could qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second
District of Makati City, he must prove that he has established not just residence but
domicile of choice.

Petitioner, in his certificate of candidacy for the 1992 elections, indicated not only that
he was a resident of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac in 1992 but that he was a resident of
the same for 52 years immediately preceding that elections. At that time, his certificate
indicated that he was also a registered voter of the same district. His birth certificate
places Concepcion, Tarlac as the birthplace of his parents. What stands consistently
clear and unassailable is that his domicile of origin of record up to the time of filing of his
most recent certificate of candidacy for the 1995 elections was Concepcion, Tarlac.

The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident in his leasing
a condominium unit instead of buying one. While a lease contract maybe indicative of
petitioner’s intention to reside in Makati City, it does notengender the kind of
permanency required to prove abandonment of one’soriginal domicile.

Petitioner’s assertion that he has transferred his domicile from Tarlac to Makatiis a bare
assertion which is hardly supported by the facts. To successfully effecta change of
domicile, petitioner must prove an actual removal or an actualchange of domicile; a
bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new
one and definite acts which correspond withthe purpose. In the absence of clear and
positive proof, the domicile of originshould be deemed to continue.

Sec. 9 – In case of vacancy in the Senate or in the House of Representatives, a special

election may be called to fill such vacancy in the manner prescribed by law, but the
Senator or Member of the House of Representatives thus elected shall serve only for
the unexpired term.

Borja vs. Comelec, GR No. 133495, September 3, 1998

Facts: Private respondent Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected vice-mayor of Pateros on
January 18, 1988 for a term ending June 30, 1992.  On September 2, 1989, he became
mayor, by operation of law, upon the death of the incumbent, Cesar Borja.  For the next
two succeeding elections in 1992 and 1995, he was again re-elected as Mayor.
On March 27, 1998, private respondent Capco filed a certificate of candidacy for mayor
of Pateros relative to the May 11, 1998 elections.  Petitioner Benjamin U. Borja, Jr., who
was also a candidate for mayor, sought Capco’s disqualification on the theory that the
latter would have already served as mayor for three consecutive terms by June 30,
1998 and would therefore be ineligible to serve for another term after that.

The Second Division of the Commission on Elections ruled in favor of petitioner and
declared private respondent Capco disqualified from running for reelection as mayor of
Pateros but in the motion for reconsideration, majority overturned the original decision.

Issue: WON Capco has served for three consecutive terms as Mayor?

Held: No.  Article X, Sec. 8 of the Constitution provides that  “…the term of office of
elective local officials… …shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more
than three consecutive terms.  Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time
shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term
for which he was elected.”
This provision is restated in par. 43(b) of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 71)
which states that “…no local elective official shall serve for more than three (3)
consecutive terms in the same position.  Voluntary renunciation of the office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for
the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected….”

The term served must therefore be one “for which [the official concerned] was elected.”  
The purpose of this provision is to prevent a circumvention of the limitation on the
number of terms an elective official may serve.  Conversely, if he is not serving a term
for which he was elected because he is simply continuing the service of the official he
succeeds, such official cannot be considered to have fully served the term
not withstanding his voluntary renunciation of office prior to its expiration.

The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected
as well as the right to serve in the same elective position.  Consequently, it is not
enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office,
he must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times
before the disqualification can apply.

Sec. 11- A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall, in all offenses
punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the
Congress is in session. No Member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other
place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof

People vs. Jalosjos, GR No. 132875, Feb. 3, 2000

Facts: The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of Congress
who is confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and
acts of lasciviousness is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed a motion asking
that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance
at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the
first instance of a non-bailable offense on the basis of popular sovereignty and the need
for his constituents to be represented.

Issue: Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed to discharge mandate as

member of House of Representatives
Held: Election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. However, inspite
of its importance, the privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be
enlarged or restricted by law.

The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of
Representatives arises from a provision of the Constitution. The privilege has always
been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption as a special
privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be
extended by intendment, implication or equitable considerations.

The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the
operation of Sec. 11, Art. VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot
compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate
one. The confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by
imprisonment of more than six years is not merely authorized by law, it has
constitutional foundations. To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions
and committee meetings for 5 days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man
with all the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only
elevates accused-appellant’s status to that of a special class, it also would be a
mockery of the purposes of the correction system.

Trillanes vs. Judge Pimentel, GR No. 179817, June 27, 2008

FACTS:

 July 27, 2003, a group of more than 300 heavily armed soldiers led by junior
officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) stormed into the Oakwood
Premier Apartments in Makati City and publicly demanded the resignation of the
President and key national officials.
 On the same day, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued Proclamation No.
427 and General Order No. 4 declaring a state of rebellion and calling out the Armed
Forces to suppress the rebellion. 
 Petitioner Antonio F. Trillanes IV was charged, along with his comrades, with
coup d’etat defined under Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code before the RTC of
Makati.
 4 years later, petitioner, who has remained in detention, threw his hat in the
political arena and won a seat in the Senate with a 6-year term commencing at noon on
June 30, 2007.
 Petitioner filed with the RTC, Makati City, Branch 148, an "Omnibus Motion for
Leave of Court to be Allowed to Attend Senate Sessions and Related Requests".
 The trial court denied all the requests in the Omnibus Motion.

ISSUE:

 Whether or not membership in Congress exempt an accused from statutes and

rules which apply to validly incarcerated persons in general

HELD:
 No, it is impractical to draw a line between convicted prisoners and pre-trial
detainees for the purpose of maintaining jail security; and while pre-trial
detainees do not forfeit their constitutional rights upon confinement, the fact of
their detention makes their rights more limited than those of the public.
 When a person indicted for an offense is arrested, he is deemed placed under
the custody of the law. He is placed in actual restraint of liberty in jail so that he
 may be bound to answer for the commission of the offense. He must be detained
in jail during the pendency of the case against him, unless he is authorized by the
court to be released on bail or on recognizance.
 Presumption of innocence does not carry with it the full enjoyment of civil and
political rights.
 Allowing accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee
meetings for 5 days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all
the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only
elevates accused-appellant’s status to that of a special class, it also would be a
mockery of the purposes of the correction system.

Sec. 13 – No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other
office or employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or
their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat. Neither shall he be
appointed to any office which may have been created or the emoluments thereof
increased during the term for which he was elected.

Liban vs. Gordon, GR 175352 – En Banc (July 15, 2009)

FACTS:
Dante V. Liban, Reynaldo M. Bernardo, and Salvador M. Viari (petitioners) filed with this
Court a Petition to Declare Richard J. Gordon as having forfeited his seat in the Senate.
Petitioners are officers of the Board of Directors of the Quezon City Red Cross Chapter
while respondent is Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of
Governors.
During respondent’s incumbency as a member of the Senate of the Philippines, he was
elected Chairman of the PNRC. Petitioners allege that by accepting the chairmanship of
the PNRC Board of Governors, respondent has ceased to be a member of the Senate
as provided in the Constitution.
Petitioner filed this instant petition.

ISSUE:
Whether the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) is a government- owned or
controlled corporation.

RULING:
The PNRC is not government-owned but privately owned. The vast majority of the
thousands of PNRC members are private individuals, including students. Under the
PNRC Charter, those who contribute to the annual fund campaign of the PNRC are
entitled to membership in the PNRC for one year. PNRC is, thus, a privately owned,
privately funded, and privately run charitable organization.
The office of the PNRC Chairman is not a government office or an office in a
government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in the 1987
Constitution. However, since the PNRC Charter is void insofar as it creates the PNRC
as a private corporation, the PNRC should incorporate under the Corporation Code and
register with the Securities and Exchange Commission if it wants to be a private
corporation.

Resolution (Jan. 18, 2011)

RESOLUTION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
I.          THE FACTS

Petitioners Liban, et al., who were officers of the Board of Directors of the Quezon City Red
Cross Chapter, filed with the Supreme Court what they styled as “Petition to Declare Richard J.
Gordon as Having Forfeited His Seat in the Senate” against respondent Gordon, who was elected
Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of Governors during his incumbency
as Senator.

Petitioners alleged that by accepting the chairmanship of the PNRC Board of Governors,
respondent Gordon ceased to be a member of the Senate pursuant to Sec. 13, Article VI of the
Constitution, which provides that “[n]o Senator . . . may hold any other office or employment in the
Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat.” Petitioners
cited the case of Camporedondo vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 129049, decided August 6, 1999, which
held that the PNRC is a GOCC, in supporting their argument that respondent Gordon automatically
forfeited his seat in the Senate when he accepted and held the position of Chairman of the PNRC
Board of Governors.

Formerly, in its Decision dated July 15, 2009, the Court, voting 7-5, [1] held that the office of
the PNRC Chairman is NOT a government office or an office in a GOCC for purposes of the
prohibition in Sec. 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. The PNRC Chairman is elected by the
PNRC Board of Governors; he is not appointed by the President or by any subordinate government
official. Moreover, the PNRC is NOT a GOCC because it is a privately-owned, privately-funded, and
privately-run charitable organization and because it is controlled by a Board of Governors four-fifths
of which are private sector individuals. Therefore, respondent Gordon did not forfeit his legislative
seat when he was elected as PNRC Chairman during his incumbency as Senator.

The Court however held further that the PNRC Charter, R.A. 95, as amended by PD 1264
and 1643, is void insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private corporation since Section 7, Article XIV
of the 1935 Constitution states that “[t]he Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the
formation, organization, or regulation of private corporations, unless such corporations are owned or
controlled by the Government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof.” The Court thus directed
the PNRC to incorporate under the Corporation Code and register with the Securities and Exchange
Commission if it wants to be a private corporation. The fallo of the Decision read:

WHEREFORE, we declare that the office of the Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross is
not a government office or an office in a government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the
prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. We also declare that Sections 1, 2, 3, 4(a), 5,
6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13 of the Charter of the Philippine National Red Cross, or Republic Act No. 95,
as amended by Presidential Decree Nos. 1264 and 1643, are VOID because they create the PNRC as a
private corporation or grant it corporate powers.

Respondent Gordon filed a Motion for Clarification and/or for Reconsideration of

the Decision. The PNRC likewise moved to intervene and filed its own Motion for Partial
Reconsideration. They basically questioned the second part of the Decision with regard to the
pronouncement on the nature of the PNRC and the constitutionality of some provisions of the
PNRC Charter.

II.        THE ISSUE

Was it correct for the Court to have passed upon and decided on the issue of the
constitutionality of the PNRC charter? Corollarily: What is the nature of the PNRC?

III.       THE RULING

[The Court GRANTED reconsideration and MODIFIED the dispositive portion of the

Decision by deleting the second sentence thereof.]

NO, it was not correct for the Court to have decided on the constitutional issue
because it was not the very lis mota of the case. The PNRC is sui generis in nature; it is
neither strictly a GOCC nor a private corporation.
        
The issue of constitutionality of R.A. No. 95 was not raised by the parties, and was not
among the issues defined in the body of the Decision; thus, it was not the very  lis mota of the
case.  We have reiterated the rule as to when the Court will consider the issue of constitutionality
in Alvarez v. PICOP Resources, Inc., thus:

This Court will not touch the issue of unconstitutionality unless it is the very lis mota. It is a well-
established rule that a court should not pass upon a constitutional question and decide a law to be
unconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is raised by the parties and that when it is raised, if the
record also presents some other ground upon which the court may [rest] its judgment, that course will be
adopted and the constitutional question will be left for consideration until such question will be
unavoidable.

[T]his Court should not have declared void certain sections of . . . the PNRC
Charter.  Instead, the Court should have exercised judicial restraint on this matter, especially since
there was some other ground upon which the Court could have based its judgment.  Furthermore,
the PNRC, the entity most adversely affected by this declaration of unconstitutionality, which was not
even originally a party to this case, was being compelled, as a consequence of the Decision, to
suddenly reorganize and incorporate under the Corporation Code, after more than sixty (60) years
of existence in this country.

Since its enactment, the PNRC Charter was amended several times, particularly on June 11,
1953, August 16, 1971, December 15, 1977, and October 1, 1979, by virtue of R.A. No. 855, R.A.
No. 6373, P.D. No. 1264, and P.D. No. 1643, respectively.  The passage of several laws relating to
the PNRC’s corporate existence notwithstanding the effectivity of the constitutional proscription on
the creation of private corporations by law is a recognition that the PNRC is not strictly in the nature
of a private corporation contemplated by the aforesaid constitutional ban. 

A closer look at the nature of the PNRC would show that there is none like it[,] not just in
terms of structure, but also in terms of history, public service and official status accorded to it by the
State and the international community.  There is merit in PNRC’s contention that its structure is sui
generis. It is in recognition of this sui generis character of the PNRC that R.A. No. 95 has remained
valid and effective from the time of its enactment in March 22, 1947 under the 1935 Constitution and
during the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and the 1987 Constitution. The PNRC Charter and its
amendatory laws have not been questioned or challenged on constitutional grounds, not even in this
case before the Court now.

[T]his Court [must] recognize the country’s adherence to the Geneva Convention and respect
the unique status of the PNRC in consonance with its treaty obligations.  The Geneva Convention
has the force and effect of law. Under the Constitution, the Philippines adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land. This constitutional provision must be
reconciled and harmonized with Article XII, Section 16 of the Constitution, instead of using the latter
to negate the former. By requiring the PNRC to organize under the Corporation Code just like any
other private corporation, the Decision of July 15, 2009 lost sight of the PNRC’s special status under
international humanitarian law and as an auxiliary of the State, designated to assist it in discharging
its obligations under the Geneva Conventions.
  
The PNRC, as a National Society of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent
Movement, can neither “be classified as an instrumentality of the State, so as not to lose its
character of neutrality” as well as its independence, nor strictly as a private corporation since it is
regulated by international humanitarian law and is treated as an auxiliary of the State.

Although [the PNRC] is neither a subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of the government,

nor a GOCC or a subsidiary thereof . . . so much so that respondent, under the Decision, was
correctly allowed to hold his position as Chairman thereof concurrently while he served as a
Senator, such a conclusion does not ipso facto imply that the PNRC is a “private corporation” within
the contemplation of the provision of the Constitution, that must be organized under the Corporation
Code.  [T]he sui generis character of PNRC requires us to approach controversies involving the
PNRC on a case-to-case basis.

In sum, the PNRC enjoys a special status as an important ally and auxiliary of the
government in the humanitarian field in accordance with its commitments under international
law.  This Court cannot all of a sudden refuse to recognize its existence, especially since the issue of
the constitutionality of the PNRC Charter was never raised by the parties.  It bears emphasizing that
the PNRC has responded to almost all national disasters since 1947, and is widely known to provide
a substantial portion of the country’s blood requirements.  Its humanitarian work is unparalleled.  The
Court should not shake its existence to the core in an untimely and drastic manner that would not
only have negative consequences to those who depend on it in times of disaster and armed
hostilities but also have adverse effects on the image of the Philippines in the international
community. The sections of the PNRC Charter that were declared void must therefore stay.

[Thus, R.A. No. 95 remains valid and constitutional in its entirety. The Court MODIFIED the
dispositive portion of the Decision by deleting the second sentence, to now read as follows:

WHEREFORE, we declare that the office of the Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross is
not a government office or an office in a government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the
prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution .]

Adaza vs. Pacana, GR No. L-68159, March 18, 1985

FACTS: Adaza was elected governor of the province of Misamis Oriental in the January
30, 1980 elections. He took his oath of office and started discharging his duties as
provincial governor on March 3, 1980. Pacana was elected vice-governor for same
province in the same elections. Under the law, their respective terms of office would
expire on March 3, 1986. On March 27, 1984, Pacana filed his certificate of candidacy
for the May 14, 1984 BP elections; petitioner Adaza followed suit on April 27, 1984. In
the ensuing elections, petitioner won by placing first among the candidates, while
Pacana lost. Adaza took his oath of office as Mambabatas Pambansa on July 19, 1984
and since then he has discharged the functions of said office. On July 23, 1984, Pacana
took his oath of office as governor of Misamis Oriental before President Marcos, and
started to perform the duties of governor on July 25, 1984. Claiming to be the lawful
occupant of the governor’s office, Adaza has brought this petition to exclude Pacana
therefrom. He argues that he was elected to said office for a term of six years, that he
remains to be the governor of the province until his term expires on March 3, 1986 as
provided by law, and that within the context of the parliamentary system, as in France,
Great Britain and New Zealand, a local elective official can hold the position to which he
had been elected and simultaneously be an elected member of Parliament.

ISSUE: Whether or not Adaza can serve as a member of the Batasan and as a

governor of the province simultaneously. Whether or not a vice governor who ran for
Congress and lost can assume his original position and as such can, by virtue of
succession, taeke the vacated seat of the governor.

HELD: Section 10, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution provides as follows:

“Section 10. A member of the National Assembly [now Batasan Pambansa] shall not
hold any other office or employment in the government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations, during
his tenure, except that of prime minister or member of the cabinet . . .”
The Philippine Constitution is clear and unambiguous. Hence Adaza cannot invoke
common law practices abroad. He cannot complain of any restrictions which public
policy may dictate on his holding of more than one office. Adaza further contends that
when Pacana filed his candidacy for the Batasan he became a private citizen because
he vacated his office. Pacana, as a mere private citizen, had no right to assume the
governorship left vacant by petitioner’s election to the BP. This is not tenable and it runs
afoul against BP. 697, the law governing the election of members of the BP on May 14,
1984, Section 13[2] of which specifically provides that “governors, mayors, members of
the various sangguniang or barangay officials shall, upon filing a certificate of
candidacy, be considered on forced leave of absence from office.” Indubitably,
respondent falls within the coverage of this provision, considering that at the time he
filed his certificate of candidacy for the 1984 BP election he was a member of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan as provided in Sections 204 and 205 of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 337, 5 otherwise known as the Local Government Code.
Sec. 14 – No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may personally
appear as counsel before any court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-
judicial and other administrative bodies. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be
interested financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted
by the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any
government-owned or controlled corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of office.
He shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the Government for his
pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to act on account of his office.

Puyat vs. De Guzman, GR No. L-51122 March 25, 1982

Facts: After an election for the Directors of the International Pipe Industries Corporation
(IPI) was held, one group, the respondent Acero group, instituted at the SEC quo
warranto proceedings, questioning the election. Justice Estanislao Fernandez, then a
member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa, entered his appearance as counsel for
respondent Acero to which the petitioner, Puyat group, objected on Constitutional
ground that no Assemblyman could “appear as counsel before any administrative body,”
and SEC was an administrative body. Assemblyman Fernandez did not continue his
appearance for respondent Acero.

Assemblyman Fernandez had purchased 10 shares of IPI for P200.00 upon request of
respondent Acero. Following the notarization of Assemblyman Fernandez’ purchase, he
filed a motion for intervention in the SEC case as the owner of 10 IPI shares alleging
legal interest in the matter in litigation. The SEC granted leave to intervene on the basis
of Fernandez’ ownership of the said 10 shares.

Issue: Whether or not Assemblyman Fernandez, as a stockholder of IPI, may intervene

in the SEC case without violating Sec. 11, Art. VIII (now Sec. 14, Art. VI) of the
Constitution

Held: Ordinarily, by virtue of the motion for intervention, Assemblyman Fernandez

cannot be said to be appearing as counsel. Ostensibly, he is not appearing on behalf of
another, although he is joining the cause of the private respondents. His appearance
could theoretically be for the protection of his ownership of 10 shares of IPI in respect of
the matter in litigation.

However, certain salient circumstances militate against the intervention of

Assemblyman Fernandez in the SEC case. He had acquired a mere P200.00 worth of
stock in IPI, representing 10 shares out of 262,843 outstanding shares. He acquired
them “after the fact” that is, after the contested election of directors, after the quo
warranto suit had been filed before the SEC and 1 day before the scheduled hearing of
the case before the SEC. And what is more, before he moved to intervene, he had
signified his intention to appear as counsel for respondent Acero, but which was
objected to by petitioners. Realizing, perhaps, the validity of the objection, he decided,
instead, to intervene on the ground of legal interest in the matter under litigation.

Under those facts and circumstances, the Court is constrained to find that there has
been an indirect appearance as counsel before an administrative body. In the opinion of
the Court, that is a circumvention of the Constitutional prohibition contained in Sec. 11,
Art. VIII (now Sec. 14, Art. VI). The intervention was an afterthought to enable him to
appear actively in the proceedings in some other capacity.

Sec. 16 – 1) The Senate shall elect its President and the House of Representatives its
Speaker, by a majority vote of all its respective Members.

Each House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary.

(2) A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business, but a smaller
number may adjourn from day to day and may compel the attendance of absent
Members in such manner, and under such penalties, as such House may provide.

(3) Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for
disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend
or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty
days.

(4) Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish
the same, excepting such parts as may, in its judgment, affect national security; and the
yeas and nays on any question shall, at the request of one-fifth of the Members present,
be entered in the Journal.

Each House shall also keep a Record of its proceedings.

(5) Neither House during the sessions of the Congress shall, without the consent of the
other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other place than that in which the
two Houses shall be sitting.

Defensor vs. Guingona GR 134577, Nov. 18, 1998

While the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected by a
number constituting more than one half of all the members thereof, it does not provide
that the members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the “minority,” who
could thereby elect the minority leader. No law or regulation states that the defeated
candidate shall automatically become the minority leader.

Constitution silent on the manner of selecting officers in Congress other than Senate
President and House Speaker

Separation of powers: Courts may not intervene in the internal affairs of legislature

Legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, are matters of procedure and are subject to
revocation, modification and waiver by the body adopting them

FACTS:

During the election of officers in the Senate, Sen. Marcelo Fernan and Sen. Tatad were
both nominated to the position of Senate President. By a vote of 20 to 2, Sen. Fernan
was declared the duly elected Senate President. Thereafter, Sen. Tatad manifested
that, with the agreement of Sen. Santiago, allegedly the only other member of the
minority, he was assuming position of minority leader. He explained that those who had
voted for Sen. Fernan comprised the “majority,” while only those who had voted for him,
the losing nominee, belonged to the “minority.” However, senators belonging to the
 Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party – number 7 and, thus, also a minority – had chosen Sen.
Guingona as the minority leader. Thus, Petitioners filed this case for quo warranto.

ISSUE:

o Whether or not there was an actual violation of the Constitution in the

selection of respondent as Senate minority leader
o Whether or not courts have the power to intervene in matters of legislative
procedure

RULING:

The petition fails.

The meaning of majority vis-a-vis minority

The term “majority” has been judicially defined a number of times. When referring to a
certain number out of a total or aggregate, it simply “means the number greater than
half or more than half of any total.” The plain and unambiguous words of the subject
constitutional clause simply mean that the Senate President must obtain the votes of
more than one half of all the senators. Not by any construal does it thereby delineate
who comprise the “majority,” much less the “minority,” in the said body. And there is no
showing that the framers of our Constitution had in mind other than the usual meanings
of these terms.

In effect, while the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be
elected by a number constituting more than one half of all the members thereof, it does
not provide that the members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the
“minority,” who could thereby elect the minority leader. Verily, no law or regulation
states that the defeated candidate shall automatically become the minority leader.

xxx

Majority may also refer to “the group, party, or faction with the larger number of votes,”
not necessarily more than one half. This is sometimes referred to as plurality. In
contrast, minority is “a group, party, or faction with a smaller number of votes or
adherents than the majority.” Between two unequal parts or numbers comprising a
whole or totality, the greater number would obviously be the majority, while the lesser
would be the minority. But where there are more than two unequal groupings, it is not as
easy to say which is the minority entitled to select the leader representing all the
minorities. In a government with a multi-party system such as in the Philippines (as
pointed out by petitioners themselves), there could be several minority parties, one of
which has to be identified by the Comelec as the “dominant minority party” for purposes
of the general elections. In the prevailing composition of the present Senate, members
either belong to different political parties or are independent. No constitutional or
statutory provision prescribe which of the many minority groups or the independents or
a combination thereof has the right to select the minority leader.

Constitution silent on the manner of selecting officers in Congress other than Senate
President and House Speaker

While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a Senate President and a
House Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers
in both chambers of Congress. All that the Charter says is that “[e]ach House shall
choose such other officers as it may deem necessary.” To our mind, the method of
choosing who will be such other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the
prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision. Therefore, such
method must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by this Court.

In this regard, the Constitution vests in each house of Congress the power “to determine
the rules of its proceedings.”

xxx

Separation of powers: Courts may not intervene in the internal affairs of legislature

Notably, the Rules of the Senate do not provide for the positions of majority and minority
leaders. Neither is there an open clause providing specifically for such offices and
prescribing the manner of creating them or of choosing the holders thereof. At any rate,
such offices, by tradition and long practice, are actually extant. But, in the absence of
constitutional or statutory guidelines or specific rules, this Court is devoid of any basis
upon which to determine the legality of the acts of the Senate relative thereto. On
grounds of respect for the basic concept of separation of powers, courts may not
intervene in the internal affairs of the legislature; it is not within the province of courts to
direct Congress how to do its work. Paraphrasing the words of Justice Florentino P.
Feliciano, this Court is of the opinion that where no specific, operable norms and
standards are shown to exist, then the legislature must be given a real and effective
opportunity to fashion and promulgate as well as to implement them, before the courts
may intervene.

Legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, are matters of procedure and are subject to
revocation, modification and waiver by the body adopting them

Needless to state, legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, do not have the imprints of
permanence and obligatoriness during their effectivity. In fact, they “are subject to
revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them.” Being
merely matters of procedure, their observance are of no concern to the courts, for said
rules may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body at will, upon the concurrence
of a majority.

In view of the foregoing, Congress verily has the power and prerogative to provide for
such officers as it may deem. And it is certainly within its own jurisdiction and discretion
to prescribe the parameters for the exercise of this prerogative. This Court has no
authority to interfere and unilaterally intrude into that exclusive realm, without running
afoul of constitutional principles that it is bound to protect and uphold -- the very duty
that justifies the Court’s being. Constitutional respect and a becoming regard for the
sovereign acts of a coequal branch prevents this Court from prying into the internal
workings of the Senate. To repeat, this Court will be neither a tyrant nor a wimp; rather,
it will remain steadfast and judicious in upholding the rule and majesty of the law.

To accede, then, to the interpretation of petitioners would practically amount to judicial

legislation, a clear breach of the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. If for
this argument alone, the petition would easily fail.

Avelino vs. Cuenco, GR No. L-2821, March 4, 1949

FACTS: The petitioners, Senator Jose Avelino, in a quo warranto proceeding, asked the
court to declare him the rightful Senate President and oust the respondent, Mariano
Cuenco. In a session of the Senate, Tanada’s request to deliver a speech in order to
formulate charges against then Senate President Avelino was approved. With the
leadership of the Senate President followed by his supporters, they deliberately tried to
delay and prevent Tanada from delivering his speech. The SP with his supporters
employed delaying tactics, the tried to adjourn the session then walked out. Only 12
 Senators were left in the hall. The members of the senate left continued the session and
Senator Cuenco was appointed as the Acting President of the Senate and was
recognized the next day by the President of the Philippines.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the court has jurisdiction of the case.
2. Whether or not Resolutions 67 & 68 was validly approved.

HELD:
1. The Court has no jurisdiction of the case because the subject matter is political in
nature and in doing so, the court will be against the doctrine of separation of powers. To
the first question, the answer is in the negative, in view of the separation of powers, the
political nature of the controversy (Alejandrino vs. Quezon, 46 Phil. 83; Vera vs. Avelino,
77 Phil. 192; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1) and the constitutional grant to the
Senate of the power to elect its own president, which power should not be interfered
with, nor taken over, by the judiciary. We refused to take cognizance of the Vera case
even if the rights of the electors of the suspended senators were alleged affected
without any immediate remedy. A fortiori we should abstain in this case because the
selection of the presiding officer affect only the Senators themselves who are at liberty
at any time to choose their officers, change or reinstate them. Anyway, if, as the petition
must imply to be acceptable, the majority of the Senators want petitioner to preside, his
remedy lies in the Senate Session Hall — not in the Supreme Court.

2. It was held that there is a quorum that 12 being the majority of 23. In fine, all the four
justice agree that the Court being confronted with the practical situation that of the
twenty three senators who may participate in the Senate deliberations in the days
immediately after this decision, twelve senators will support Senator Cuenco and, at
most, eleven will side with Senator Avelino, it would be most injudicious to declare the
latter as the rightful President of the Senate, that office being essentially one that
depends exclusively upon the will of the majority of the senators, the rule of the Senate
about tenure of the President of that body being amenable at any time by that majority.
And at any session hereafter held with thirteen or more senators, in order to avoid all
controversy arising from the divergence of opinion here about quorum and for the
benefit of all concerned, the said twelve senators who approved the resolutions herein
involved could ratify all their acts and thereby place them beyond the shadow of a doubt

Santiago vs. Sandiganbayan, GR No. 128055. April 18, 2001

o Power of Sandiganbayan to suspend members of Congress vis-a-vis Congress'
prerogative to discipline its own members: the former is not punitive, the latter is

FACTS:
A group of employees of the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID) filed a
complaint for violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act against then CID
Commissioner Miriam Defensor-Santiago. It was alleged that petitioner, with evident
bad faith and manifest partiality in the exercise of her official functions, approved the
application for legalization of the stay of several disqualified aliens. The Sandiganbayan
then issued an order for her suspension effective for 90 days.

ISSUE:

o Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has authority to decree a 90-day

preventive suspension against a Senator of the Republic of the Philippines

RULING:
The authority of the Sandiganbayan to order the preventive suspension of an incumbent
public official charged with violation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 has both
legal and jurisprudential support. Xxx
It would appear, indeed, to be a ministerial duty of the court to issue an order of
suspension upon determination of the validity of the information filed before it. Once the
information is found to be sufficient in form and substance, the court is bound to issue
an order of suspension as a matter of course, and there seems to be “no ifs and buts
about it.” Explaining the nature of the preventive suspension, the Court in the case of
Bayot vs. Sandiganbayan observed:

“x x x It is not a penalty because it is not imposed as a result of judicial proceedings. In

fact, if acquitted, the official concerned shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the
salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension.”

In issuing the preventive suspension of petitioner, the Sandiganbayan merely adhered

to the clear an unequivocal mandate of the law, as well as the jurisprudence in which
the Court has, more than once, upheld Sandiganbayan’s authority to decree the
suspension of public officials and employees indicted before it.

Power of Sandiganbayan to Decree Preventive Suspension vis-à-vis Congress’

Prerogative to Discipline its Members

The pronouncement, upholding the validity of the information filed against petitioner,
behooved Sandiganbayan to discharge its mandated duty to forthwith issue the order of
preventive suspension.

The order of suspension prescribed by Republic Act No. 3019 is distinct from the power
of Congress to discipline its own ranks under the Constitution which provides that each-
“x x x house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for
disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend
or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty
days.”

The suspension contemplated in the above constitutional provision is a punitive

measure that is imposed upon determination by the Senate or the house of
Representatives, as the case may be, upon an erring member.

xxx
Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members of Congress
and that, therefore, the Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing the assailed
preventive suspension order.