Case title & GR. No.

& Date Subject Author

Papertech, Inc. vs. Josephine P. Whether the doctrine of strained Carandang, J.
Katando relations apply
G.R. No. 236020, January 8,
2020

Neren Villanueva Illegal Dismissal Caguioa, J.

vs. Ganco Resort And
Recreation, Inc., Peter
Marasigan, Benjie Marasigan,
Luz Marasigan, Bova Marasigan,
and Serge Bernabe,
G.R. No. 227175, January 8,
2020

Comscentre Phils., Inc., And Claim of employment bond Lazaro-Javier, J.

Patrick Boe
vs. Camille B. Rocio
G.R. No. 222212, January 22,
2020

Prime Stars International Money Claims Inting, J.

Promotion Corporation And
Richard U. Peralta
vs. Norly M. Baybayan And
Michelle V. Beltran
G.R. No. 213961, January 22,
2020
Seventh Fleet Security Services, Constructive Dismissal Caguioa, J.
Inc
vs. Rodolfo B. Loque
G.R. No. 230005, January 22,
2020

Separation Pay Perlas-Bernabe, J.

Herma Shipping And Transport
Corporation And Herminio S.
Esguerra
vs.
Calvin Jaballa Cordero
G.R. No. 244144, January 27,
2020
 Wilhelmsen Smith Bell Disability Benefits Reyes, J., J.
Manning, Inc., Wilhelmsen
Ship Management Ltd., And
Fausto R. Preysler, Jr.
vs.
Franklin J. Villaflor
G.R. No. 225425, January 29,
2020

PAPERTECH, INC.
vs.
JOSEPHINE P. KATANDO
G.R. No. 236020, January 8, 2020

FACTS:
Josephine Katando worked as Machine Operator in Papertech, Inc. In 2007, Katando and
other employees of Papertech filed a Petition for Certification Election. They conducted a picket
in the company. This prompted Papertech to file a Complaint for Illegal Strike against Katando
and the other participants in the picket. Papertech prayed that the participants be declared to have
lost their employment.
The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Papertech, but his ruling was reversed by the NLRC
which ordered the reinstatement of Katando and her fellow employees. The ruling of the NLRC
was upheld by the CA and the Supreme Court, and became final and executory. Upon motion of
Katando and the other employees, Labor Arbiter issued a Writ of Execution ordering their
reinstatement.
Papertech sent a notice to Katando and other employees ordering them to report to
various posts in Cagayan De Oro, Davao City, Cebu City, Iloilo City, and Pangasinan, under
pain of removal in case of non-compliance. They filed a Manifestation with Urgent Motion to
Cite Papertech in Contempt and to Order Payment of their Salaries. The Labor Arbiter denied
their manifestation with motion, so they filed a verified petition for extraordinary remedies
before the NLRC. The NLRC granted it in its Resolutions and declared the Order of Labor
Arbiter null and void. The NLRC ordered the Labor Arbiter to resolve the issues on the salaries
as contained in Katando and her co-respondents' manifestation with motion, and to proceed with
the execution of the NLRC Decision without delay. Papertech assailed the NLRC Resolutions
before the CA.
On December 14, 2013, Katando received a memorandum from Papertech stating that
due to urgency of business, she will be transferred to its Makati office. The memorandum states
that she will still be under the same employment terms and conditions but will be tasked to clean
the area. Three days later, Katando received another memorandum asking her to explain why she
should not be subjected to disciplinary action for failing to sign the memorandum, for her refusal
to transfer to the Makati office, and for shouting at Papertech's representative. Papertech sent
Katando a memorandum on December 26, 2013 imposing a seven-day suspension upon her for
her disrespectful behaviour to her fellow employees and officials of the company.
 Katando served her suspension. However, she was suspended yet again for one week for
her disobedience or refusal to transfer as directed. Katando then filed a complaint for illegal
suspension before the NLRC. Papertech issued a memorandum dated February 6, 2014 to
Katando reiterating her transfer to its Makati office. Thereafter, Papertech issued a notice to
Katando requiring her to explain within 48 hours why she refused to receive the February 6,
2014 memorandum. Katando submitted her explanation.
Papertech issued another notice to Katando directing her to explain why she should not
be administratively charged for refusing to transfer to its Makati office. Despite submitting her
explanation, Papertech issued a notice on February 24, 2014 dismissing Katando for her
insubordination.
Katando filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, moral and exemplary damages, and
attorney's fees against Papertech and its Chairman of the Board of Directors, Alexander Wong,
and Human Resource Manager Joan M. Balde.

HELD:
Yes. In the case of Globe-Mackay Cable and Radio Corp. v. National Labor Relations
Commission, the Supreme Court discussed the following considerations in applying the doctrine
of strained relations: (1) the employee must occupy a position where he or she enjoys the trust
and confidence of his or her employer; (2) it is likely that if reinstated, an atmosphere of
antipathy and antagonism may be generated as to adversely affect the efficiency and productivity
of the employee concerned; (3) it cannot be applied indiscriminately because some hostility is
invariably engendered between the parties as a result of litigation; and (4) it cannot arise from a
valid and legal act of asserting one's right.
Here, although Katando does not occupy a position of trust and confidence as a machine
operator, the circumstances of this case nonetheless calls for the application of the doctrine of
strained relations. It is true that litigation between the parties per se should not bar the
reinstatement of an employee. However, as observed by the NLRC, this is not the only case
involving Papertech and Katando. They have been in conflict since 2008, or for 11 years now.
In the case of Digital Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. v. Digitel Employees Union, the
Supreme Court held that the length of time from the occurrence of the incident to its resolution
and the demonstrated litigiousness of the parties showed that their relationship is strained.
Similarly, the protracted litigation between the parties here sufficiently demonstrate that their
relationship is strained. It is notable that Papertech has not even bothered to appeal the ruling of
the Labor Arbiter, and even stated that “in order not to prolong the proceedings, and for both
parties to peacefully move on from this unwanted situation, Papertech is willing to pay the
judgment award of separation pay." Clearly, Papertech does not want Katando back as its
employee.
 NEREN VILLANUEVA
vs.
GANCO RESORT AND RECREATION, INC., PETER MARASIGAN, BENJIE
MARASIGAN, LUZ MARASIGAN, BOVA MARASIGAN, and SERGE BERNABE,
G.R. No. 227175, January 8, 2020

FACTS:
In 2002, Ganco Resort and Recreation, Inc. (GRRI) hired Villanueva as a part-time
employee in its resort. She became a regular employee and was eventually promoted as head of
the Housekeeping Department in 2005 and as head of the Front Desk Department in 2008.
Sometime in 2013, Villanueva was charged with violating company policies, i.e., abuse of
authority, when she rejected walk-in guests without management approval, and threat to person
in authority, when she threatened the assistant resort manager with physical harm. After the
conduct of administrative investigation, GRRI found Villanueva guilty of both charges and was
meted the penalty of two days suspension without pay for abuse of authority and termination for
threat to person in authority. The penalty of termination was, however, reduced to a five-day
suspension without pay subject to the agreement that Villanueva would be under strict
performance monitoring and that any further violation which would warrant suspension would be
elevated to immediate dismissal.
In March 2014, GRRI implemented a reorganization and issued a Notice of Employees'
Lateral Transfer (Notice to Transfer) to five of its employees, including Villanueva. Villanueva
was transferred from the Reception Department to Storage Department without diminution in
rank and benefits. However, Villanueva refused to sign the Notice to Transfer. She also sent an
e-mail addressed to the management asking questions regarding her transfer.
On March 10, 2014, a Memorandum was issued to Villanueva directing her to explain
within 24 hours from notice why she should not be penalized for insubordination for her repeated
failure to sign the Notice to Transfer. In her handwritten letter, Villanueva explained that she
refused to sign pending answers to the questions she sent to the management via e-mail. GRRI
also issued Villanueva a Notice of Preventive Suspension on March 14, 2014 placing her under
preventive suspension until March 21, 2014 pending resolution of the charge against her.
Villanueva, however, failed to report back to work after the lapse of the period of her preventive
suspension on March 22, 2014 until March 26, 2014.
Thus, GRRI's Human Resource (HR) department issued Villanueva another
Memorandum directing her to report to the HR department within 24 hours and to explain her
absences without leave. Upon reporting thereat, Villanueva was handed the Termination Notice
dated March 21, 2014 advising her that the management found her guilty of "inhuman and
unbearable treatment to person in authority; abuse of authority; serious misconduct-
insubordination by not accepting her memorandum of re-assignment by the Executive
Committee; and gross and habitual neglect of duties – AWOL" and had decided to terminate her
from employment effective immediately.

HELD:
No. In an illegal dismissal case, the onus probandi rests on the employer to prove that the
employee's dismissal was for a valid cause. A valid dismissal requires compliance with both
substantive and procedural due process – that is, the dismissal must be for any of the just or
authorized causes enumerated in Article 297 [282] and Article 298 [283], respectively, of the
Labor Code, and only after notice and hearing.
The records of the case show Villanueva was charged with two infractions, i.e., (1)
insubordination for her failure to sign the Notice to Transfer and (2) habitual neglect for her
absences without leave from March 22 to March 26, 2014, as shown by the two memoranda
served on her.
Insubordination or willful disobedience requires the concurrence of the following
requisites: (1) the employee's assailed conduct must have been willful or intentional, the
willfulness being characterized by a "wrongful and perverse attitude"; and (2) the order violated
must have been reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee and must pertain to the duties
which he had been engaged to discharge. Both requirements are not present in this case.
As stated by Villanueva, she withheld her signature on the Notice to Transfer because she was
awaiting answers to the questions she raised to the management via e-mail. She cannot be forced
to affix her signature thereon if she does not really fully understand the reasons behind and the
consequences of her transfer. While her action is willful and intentional, it is nonetheless far
from being "wrongful and perverse." In addition, GRRI failed to prove that there is indeed an
order or company procedure requiring a transferee's written conformity prior to the
implementation of the transfer, and that such order or procedure was made known to Villanueva.
Therefore, there is no basis to dismiss Villanueva on the ground of insubordination for her mere
failure to sign the Notice to Transfer.
Anent the charge of habitual neglect for Villanueva’s absences without leave,
jurisprudence provides that in order to constitute a valid cause for dismissal, the neglect of duties
must be both gross and habitual. Gross negligence has been defined as "the want or absence of or
failure to exercise slight care or diligence, or the entire absence of care. It evinces a thoughtless
disregard of consequences without exerting any effort to avoid them." On the other hand,
habitual neglect "imparts repeated failure to perform one's duties for a period of time, depending
on the circumstances." A single or isolated act of negligence does not constitute a just cause for
the dismissal of the employee.
Villanueva’s four-day absence without leave is not gross nor habitual. Even so,
Villanueva’s absences are still not justified. Villanueva alleged that she did not report back to
work after serving her preventive suspension because the management did not reply to her query
as to when she needed to report. This reasoning does not justify her absences. The Notice of
Preventive Suspension served on her clearly stated that the period of her preventive suspension
was from March 14 to March 21, 2014. Thus, she was expected to report back to work on her
next working day. Yet, she reported only on March 26, 2014. Therefore, while there may be no
basis to dismiss her on the ground of gross and habitual neglect, Villanueva is still guilty of
having committed a violation. It is here that totality of infractions may be considered to
determine the imposable sanction for her current infraction.
To be sure, the totality of an employee's infractions is considered and weighed in
determining the imposable sanction for the current infraction. It presupposes that the employee is
already found guilty of the new violation, as in this case. Apropos, it is also worth mentioning
that GRRI had already previously warned Villanueva that the penalty for her next infraction
would be elevated to dismissal. Thus, the dismissal of Villanueva, on the basis of the principle of
totality of infractions, is justified.
However, the Court notes that Villanueva’s dismissal is tainted with numerous procedural
lapses. The records show that GRRI failed to observe the foregoing requirements. First, while the
Termination Notice cited four grounds for Villanueva 's dismissal, the Memorandum dated
March 10, 2014 only charged Villanueva with insubordination for her refusal to sign the Notice
to Transfer. Second, Villanueva was only given 24 hours to submit an explanation. Third, no
administrative hearing was held, or even scheduled. Lastly, the Termination Notice already cited
Villanueva's absences without leave as a ground for her dismissal even before she was even
given any opportunity to be heard.
 COMSCENTRE PHILS., INC., AND PATRICK BOE
vs.
CAMILLE B. ROCIO
G.R. No. 222212, January 22, 2020

FACTS:
The controversy was rooted in Camille Rocio's resignation from the Conscentre Phils.,
Inc. within twenty-four (24) months from the time she got employed in violation of the
"Minimum Employment Length” clause of her employment contract. When Rocio informed
petitioners of her intention to resign merely five (5) months after she got hired, they reminded
Rocio of her obligation to pay the "employment bond” of Eighty Thousand Pesos (P80,000.00)
as indemnity for the expenses the company incurred in her training as Network Engineer. This
prompted Rocio to seek clarification by e-mail from Comscentre's Australian Human Resource
Manager Lianne Glass. But as it was, petitioners found Rocio's act of directly addressing her
query to Manager Glass to be in violation of company directives. For this supposed infraction,
she was suspended until September 9, 2011, the date her resignation was to take effect.
Consequently, Rocio sued petitioners for illegal suspension and money claims before the labor
arbiter. Petitioners, in turn, pursued their claim for payment of “employment bond” in the same
proceedings.

HELD:
According to Article 22 of the Labor Code clothes the labor tribunals with original and
exclusive jurisdiction over claims for damages arising from employer-employee relationship,
viz:
Art. 224. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission. — (a) Except as
otherwise provided under this Code, the Labor Arbiters shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide, within thirty (30) calendar days after the submission of
the case by the parties for decision without extension, even in the absence of stenographic
notes, the following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural:
1. Unfair labor practices;
2. Termination disputes;
3. If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, those cases that workers may
file involving wages, rates of pay, hours of work and other terms and conditions
of employment; .
4. Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from
the employer-employee relations;
XXX XXX XXX. (emphasis supplied)

In Bañez, v. Valdevilla, the Court elucidated that the jurisdiction of labor tribunals is
comprehensive enough to include claims for all forms of damages “arising from the employer-
employee relations.” Thus, the Court reliefs provided by labor laws, but also damages governed
by the Civil Code.
Further, in Supra Multi-Services, Inc. v. Labitigan, while we recognized that Article 224
of the Labor Code had been invariably applied to claims for damages filed by an employee
against the employer, we held that the law should also apply with equal force to an employer's
claim for damages against its dismissed employee, provided that the claim arises from or is
necessarily connected with the fact of termination and should be entered as a counterclaim in the
illegal dismissal case. Thus, the “reasonable causal connection with the employer-employee
relationship” is a requirement not only in employees' money claims against the employer but is,
likewise, a condition when the claimant is the employer.
It is clear that petitioners' claim for payment is inseparably intertwined with the parties'
employer-employee relationship. For it was Rocio's act of prematurely severing her employment
with the company which gave rise to the latter's cause of action for payment of "employment
bond.” As aptly found by the NLRC, petitioners' claim was “an offshoot of the resignation of
[respondent) and the complications arising therefrom and which eventually led to the filing of the
case before the Labor Arbiter." Verily, petitioners' claim falls within the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of the labor tribunals.
Surely, while petitioners are liable to Rocio for her illegal suspension and unpaid money
claims, Rocio, too, is liable to petitioners for payment of the “employment bond.” As such, the
NLRC correctly ordered the offsetting of their respective money claims against each other. To
rule otherwise would be “to sanction split jurisdiction, which is prejudicial to the orderly
administration of justice.
PRIME STARS INTERNATIONAL PROMOTION CORPORATION AND RICHARD U.
PERALTA
vs.
NORLY M. BAYBAYAN AND MICHELLE V. BELTRAN
G.R. No. 213961, January 22, 2020

FACTS:
Norly M. Baybayan (Baybayan) was deployed by Prime Stars to Wacoal on June 12,
2007 for a contract period of 24 months or two years, with a monthly salary of NT$15,840.00 per
month. However, he was only paid NT$9,000.00 a month and upon inquiry, was informed that
the amount of NT$4,000.00 was being deducted from his salary for expenses for his board and
lodging. Since he still had debts to pay back home, he finished the contract and returned to the
Philippines on May 19, 2009. He then instituted a complaint for underpayment of salaries and
the reimbursement of his transportation expenses against petitioners.
Petitioners denied that Baybayan was underpaid as his payslips for the months of March
and April 2009 indicated that he received a monthly salary of NT$17,280.00 during his
employment with Wacoal. Petitioners explained that Baybayan signed an Addendum to the
Employment Contract (Addendum), which authorized the deduction of the amount of
NT$4,000.00 as payment for his monthly food and accommodation. In the same Addendum,
Baybayan was apprised that the transportation expenses for his round trip tickets from the
Philippines to Taiwan shall be at his own expense.

HELD:
No. Paragraph (i) of Article 34 of the Labor Code of the Philippines prohibits the
substitution or alteration of employment contracts approved and verified by the Department of
Labor and Employment (DOLE) from the time of the actual signing thereof by the parties up to
and including the period of expiration of the same without the approval of the DOLE.
Furthermore, Republic Act No. (RA) 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and
Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, explicitly prohibits the substitution or alteration to the prejudice
of the worker of employment contracts already approved and verified by the DOLE from the
time of actual signing thereof by the parties up to and including the period of the expiration of
the same without the approval of the DOLE.
The explicit provisions of the employment contracts of Baybayan, the same cannot be
altered or modified by the Addendum without the prior approval of the POEA. Indeed, while the
parties may stipulate on other terms and conditions of employment as well as other benefits, the
stipulations should not violate the minimum requirements required by law as these would be
disadvantageous to the employee. Section 3, Rule 1, Part V of the POEA Rules and Regulations
Governing the Recruitment and Employment of Land-based Overseas Workers is pertinent.
A careful and assiduous review of the record of the case would yield to no other conclusion than
that the Addendum is contrary to law and public policy considering that the minimum provisions
for employment of Baybayan were not met and that there was diminution of their benefits which
were already guaranteed by law and granted in their favor under their POEA-approved contracts
of employment.
The Addendum, absent the approval of the POEA, is not valid and executory as against
Baybayan. The clear and categorical language of the law likewise imposes upon foreign
principals minimum terms and conditions of employment for land-based overseas Filipino
workers, which include basic provisions for food, accommodation, and transportation. The
licensed recruitment agency shall also, prior to the signing of the employment contract, inform
the overseas Filipino workers of their rights and obligations, and disclose the full terms and
conditions of employment, and provided them with a copy of the POEA approved contract, to
give them ample opportunity to examine the same.
 SEVENTH FLEET SECURITY SERVICES, INC
vs.
RODOLFO B. LOQUE
G.R. No. 230005, January 22, 2020

FACTS:
Sometime in May 2006, Rodolfo B. Loque (Loque) was hired as a security guard by
Seventh Fleet Security Services, Inc. (Seventh Fleet) and its President, Medy Lastica (Lastica).
Loque alleged that he was treated with hostility after he filed a complaint for underpayment of
wages and other money claims against Seventh Fleet and Lastica in September 2013. Loque
claimed that on December 25, 2013, he was suddenly relieved from his post upon request of
Second Midland Offices Condominium Corp. (Second Midland), Seventh Fleet's client and
Loque's place of assignment. The next day, Loque received an order suspending him for 10 days.
After the lapse of his 10-day suspension, or on January 7, 2014, Loque allegedly reported for
work, but he was informed that he was placed on "floating status" and was advised to wait for a
call from Seventh Fleet.
On May 16, 2014, a Friday, Loque received a letter from Seventh Fleet directing him to
report to its office within 48 hours from receipt thereof. Loque went to Seventh Fleet's office on
May 19, 2014, a Monday, thereof. Loque went to Seventh Fleet's but was not allowed to enter
and was made to wait outside the office. Before leaving the premises, Loque handed a letter to
security guard Dario Amores, Jr. (Amores), informing Seventh Fleet that he was ready to report
for duty on the same day. Seventh Fleet wrote a second letter dated May 28, 2014, allegedly to
make it appear that Loque failed to report to work despite Seventh Fleet's return to work order.
In a letter dated July 11, 2014, Loque inquired with Seventh Fleet regarding the status of his
employment. Loque stressed that he was refused to return to work by Seventh Fleet even though
he obeyed the return to work order.
On July 28, 2014, Loque filed a complaint for constructive dismissal, and payment of
separation pay and full backwages. He argued that since he was placed on floating status from
January 7, 2014 to July 28, 2014, or a period of more than six months, he is deemed to have been
constructively dismissed.

HELD:
The instant controversy centers on the legality of Loque's "floating status.” In security
services, the “floating status” or temporary "off-detail” of an employee may take place when
there are no available posts to which the employee may be assigned — which may be due to the
non-renewal of contracts with existing clients of the agency, or from a client's request for
replacement of guards assigned to it.
While there is no specific provision in the Labor Code governing the “floating status" or
temporary "off-detail” of employees, the Court, applying Article 301 [286] of the Labor Code by
analogy, considers this situation as a form of temporary retrenchment or lay-off. Article 301
[286] of the Labor Code reads: ART. 301. [286] When Employment not Deemed Terminated. —
The bona fide suspension of the operation of a business or undertaking for a period not
exceeding six (6) months, or the fulfillment by the employee of a military or civic duty shall not
terminate employment. In all such cases, the employer shall reinstate the employee to his former
position without loss of seniority rights if he indicates his desire to resume his work not later
than one (1) month from the resumption of operations of his employer or from his relief from the
military or civic duty.
Conformably with the above provision, the placement of an employee on "floating status"
must not exceed six months. Otherwise, the employee may be considered constructively
dismissed. Furthermore, the burden of proving that there are no posts available to which the
security guard can be assigned rests on the employer. However, the mere lapse of six months in
"floating status” should not automatically result to constructive dismissal. The peculiar
circumstances of the employee's failure to assume another post must still be inquired upon.
In this case, it is undisputed that Loque was placed on floating status beginning on the lapse of
his 10-day suspension on January 7, 2014. Thus, at the time he filed the complaint for
constructive dismissal and money claims on July 28, 2014, he has been on “floating status” for
six months and 21 days.
In Tatel v. JLFP Investigation ([JLFP] Investigation), the Court held that: [1] an
employer must assign the security guard to another posting within six (6) months from his last
deployment, otherwise, he would be considered constructively dismissed; and [2] the security
guard must be assigned to a specific or particular client. A general return-to-work order does not
suffice.
Considering that Loque was placed on floating status for more than six months without
being deployed to a specific assignment, and that the letters dated May 14, 2014 and May 28,
2014 are bereft of any reference to any specific client or indication that he would be assigned to a
specific client, Loque is therefore deemed constructively dismissed.
 HERMA SHIPPING AND TRANSPORT CORPORATION AND HERMINIO S.
ESGUERRA
vs.
CALVIN JABALLA CORDERO
G.R. No. 244144, January 27, 2020

FACTS:
Cordero was employed on March 31, 1992 as Able Seaman by HSTC. Sometime in 2015,
HSTC discovered significant losses of the oil and petroleum products. Consequently, HSTC
conducted an investigation and sent a Notice to Explain/Show Cause Memo to five (5) crew
members, including Cordero, requiring them to submit a written explanation for allegedly
committing: (a) violation of HSTC's Code of Discipline; (b) Serious Misconduct; and (c) Willful
Breach of Trust and Confidence. Pending the investigation, the five (5) crew members were
placed on preventive suspension.

In his defense, Cordero denied the allegations against him and claimed that he did not see
anything unusual or suspicious during the voyages, and that if there were any such case, he did
not see them due to his poor eyesight. After HSTC found Cordero's explanation insufficient, he
was dismissed from employment through a Notice of Termination dated March 8, 2016. This
prompted Cordero to file a complaint for illegal dismissal and payment of 13th month pay,
separation pay, damages, and attorney's fees.

HELD:
In the cases of Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company v. NLRC and
subsequently, Toyota Motor Phils. Corp. Workers Association v. NLRC, the Court stressed that
"separation pay shall be allowed as a measure of social justice only in the instances where the
employee is validly dismissed for causes other than serious misconduct or those reflecting on his
moral character.”
Further, the Court, in the case of Daabay v. Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils., Inc., disallowed
the grant of separation pay to an employee who was found guilty of stealing the company's
property. Likewise, in Manila Water Company, the Court similarly denied the award of
separation pay to the employee who was found responsible for the loss of the water meters in
flagrant violation of the company's policy. Indeed, equity as an exceptional extenuating
circumstance does not favor, nor may it be used to reward, the indolent or the wrongdoer for that
matter. This Court will not allow a party, in guise of equity, to benefit from his own fault.
Here, that Cordero had been employed with HSTC for twenty-four (24) years does not
serve to mitigate his offense nor should it be considered in meting out the appropriate penalty
therefor. In fact, it may be reasonably argued that the infraction that he committed against HSTC,
i.e., theft of invaluable company property, demonstrates the highest degree of ingratitude to an
institution that has been the source of his livelihood for twenty-four (24) years, constitutive of
disloyalty and betrayal of the trust and confidence reposed upon him. Indeed, HSTC's full trust
and confidence in him, coupled with the fact that he occupied a position that allowed him full
access to HSTC's property, aggravated the offense.
The infractions he committed against HSTC involve moral turpitude and constitute
Serious Misconduct, the award of separation pay in his favor is devoid of basis in fact and in law.
 WILHELMSEN SMITH BELL MANNING, INC., WILHELMSEN SHIP
MANAGEMENT LTD., AND FAUSTO R. PREYSLER, JR.
VS.
FRANKLIN J. VILLAFLOR
G.R. No. 225425, January 29, 2020

FACTS:

Wilhelmsen Smith Bell Manning Inc. on behalf of its principal Wilhelmsen Ship
Management Ltd., hired respondent Franklin J. Villaflor as third engineer on board their vessel
M/V NOCC Puebla on a seven-month contract dated Aug. 22, 2012. Respondent underwent the
required pre-employment medical examinations (PEME) and was pronounced fit to work. On
Sept. 5, 2012, he boarded the vessel. Sometime in March 2013, while conducting maintenance
works on the vessel and lifting heavy engine and generator spare parts with his crewmates,
respondent felt severe back pain which caused him to fall on his knees. Upon advice of the
Master he was medically repatriated on March 28, 2013.

In Manila, petitioners referred respondent to Marine Medical Services for examination.

Dr. William Chuasuan, Jr. gave respondent a disability grading of eight or 2/3 loss of lifting
power of the trunk. Upon the other hand, Dr. Manuel C. Jacinto, Jr. whom respondent consulted
issued a medical certificate stating that respondent’s disability is total and the cause of the injury
is work-related/work-aggravated, thus, declaring him unfit to work as a seafarer. Hence, he filed
a complaint for total permanent disability against petitioners. In defense, petitioners alleged that
respondent’s condition was merely brought about by the recurrence of his lumbar problem from
his previous employment, for which he had already claimed total and permanent disability from
his previous employer.

HELD:
For disability to be compensable under Section 20(A) of the 2010 Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration-Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC), the two elements
must concur: (1) the injury or illness must be work-related; and (2) the work-related injury or
illness must have existed during the term of the seafarer’s contract. The POEA-SEC defines
work-related injury as one “arising out of and in the course of employment.” Jurisprudence is to
the effect that compensable illness or injury cannot be confined to the strict interpretation of said
provision in the POEA-SEC as even pre-existing conditions may be compensable if aggravated
by the seafarer’s working condition. It is not necessary that the nature of the employment be the
sole and only reason for the illness or injury suffered by the seafarer. It is sufficient that there is a
reasonable linkage between the disease suffered by the employee and his work to lead a rational
mind to conclude that his work may have contributed to the establishment or, at the very least,
aggravation of any pre-existing condition he might have had (Dohle-Philmn Manning Agency
Inc v. Heirs of Andres G. Gazzingan, 760 Phil. 861, 878 (2015).
Thus, the CA correctly ruled that petitioners could not harp on the fact of respondent’s previous
disability benefits complaint against his former employer to support their argument that
respondent’s condition is not work-related as it is pre-existing. It is noteworthy that despite such
back injury history, respondent was able to pass all the required tests in the PEME. It should also
be pointed out that petitioners were aware of such history as respondent disclosed the same in his
PEME. Nevertheless, petitioners engaged his services. Hence, while it may be true that
respondent’s back injury is a recurrence of his previous condition, still, such recurrence can be
attributed to the nature of his work on board petitioner’s vessel. As found by the CA, the normal
duties of a Third Engineer include daily maintenance and operation of the engine room, which
entail activities such as lifting of heavy materials and spare parts. It was also established that
respondent felt pain in his back while lifting some heavy spare engine parts during maintenance
operations with his co-workers. That respondent’s condition is work-aggravated and as such,
compensable, cannot be denied. (Wilhelmsen Smith Bell Manning Inc., et al. vs. Franklin J.
Villaflor, G.R. 225425, Jan. 29, 2020).