CIVIL PROCEDURE – RULE 40
Assigned cases for fourth exam
February 17, 2016
G.R. No. 218867
SPOUSES EDMOND LEE and HELEN HUANG, Petitoners,  that the lots within the vicinity of the subject property are
vs.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the
Decision2 dated January 28, 2015 and the Resolution3 dated
June 5, 2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
133533 finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Regional Trial Court of Balanga City, Bataan, Branch 1 (RTC),
sitting as a Special Agrarian Court (SAC) in Civil Case No.
7171, for dismissing the appeal filed by respondent Land Bank
of the Philippines (respondent) for failure to prosecute.
The Facts
Petitioners-spouses Edmond Lee and Helen Huang
(petitioners) are the registered owners of parcels of land with
an aggregate area of 5.4928 hectares (has.) situated in
Mambog, Hermosa, Bataan and covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-26257 of the Register of Deeds
of Bataan (subject property). The subject property was
compulsorily acquired by the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) in accordance with Republic Act No. (RA) 6657,4 as
amended, otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law of 1988."5
DAR offered the sum of ₱109,429.98 as just compensation for
the 1.5073-ha. portion of the subject property. Rejecting the
valuation, petitioners instead filed the present petition for
determination of just compensation against Provincial
Adjudicator Erasmo SP. Cruz of the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) and herein respondent
before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 7171.6
In defense, respondent claimed that its valuation was based
on DAR Administrative Order (AO) No. 11, series of 1994,7 as
amended by DAR AO No. 5, series of 1998.8 It also contended
that petitioners’ appraisal was biased.9
The RTC Ruling and Subsequent Proceedings
1
After due proceedings, the RTC, sitting as a SAC, rendered a appeal for failure to prosecute. Upon a meticulous inspection
Decision 10 dated January 17, 2002 rejecting the valuation of the records, the RTC found that respondent failed to pay
given by respondent and setting the just compensation for the prescribed appeal fees. While it is true that Postal Money
petitioners’ 1.5073 has. at ₱250.00 per square meter, or a Order No. J8353389-390 had been issued by respondent as
total amount of ₱3,768,250.00. It took judicial notice of the fact purported payment therefor, records show that the amount
pertaining thereto had not been remitted or credited to the
valued between ₱200.00 to ₱500.00 per square meter.11 account of the Office of the Clerk of Court of the RTC.
According to the Officer-in-Charge (OIC) Clerk of Court of the
RTC, Mr. Gelbert Argonza (Mr. Argonza), respondent’s failure
Respondent’s motion for reconsideration12 was denied in an
to pay the appeal fees was the reason why the records of the
Order13 dated June 14, 2002.
case were not transmitted to the CA, explaining that proof of
payment of the appeal fees is a required attachment that
Several years later, or sometime in September forms part of the records to be transmitted to the CA.23
2006,14 petitioners filed a motion for execution of the RTC’s
January 17, 2002 Decision, alleging that while they received a
As payment of docket and other legal fees within the
copy of respondent’s Notice of Appeal dated June 19, 2002,
prescribed period is both mandatory and jurisdictional, the
upon verification, no such appeal was actually filed before the
RTC, therefore, held that respondent’s appeal was not duly
RTC. Respondent denied petitioners’ claim and asserted that
perfected. As such, it did not lose jurisdiction over the case
it filed a Notice of Appeal in accordance with the rules and
and, accordingly, pursuant to Section 5,24 Rule 141 on Legal
has, therefore, perfected its appeal. As such, the RTC’s
Fees of the Rules of Court, dismissed respondent’s appeal for
January 17, 2002 Decision was not yet final and executory.15
failure to prosecute.25
Finding that respondent had perfected its appeal and based
Respondent’s motion for reconsideration26 was denied in an
on equitable considerations and the highest interest of justice,
Order dated December 11, 2013; hence, the matter was
the RTC, in an Order16 dated June 7, 2007, gave due course
elevated before the CA via a petition for certiorari, imputing
to respondent’s appeal and directed that the entire records
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in dismissing
thereof be transmitted to the CA.
its appeal.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration,17 which the RTC denied
The CA Ruling
in an Order18 dated August 27, 2008. The RTC clarified that
respondent was able to file its Notice of Appeal within the
prescribed period and that a postal money order in the amount In a Decision27 dated January 28, 2015, the CA found grave
of ₱520.00 had been issued by respondent in favor of the abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in dismissing
Clerk of Court of the RTC of Balanga City, Bataan, respondent’s appeal for failure to prosecute, holding that the
representing the payment of the appeal fee.19 validity of the latter’s appeal had already been passed upon in
the RTC’s earlier Orders dated June 7, 2007 and August 27,
2008 that gave due course to the appeal and directed the
Almost five (5) years later, or on April 26, 2013, petitioners
transmittal of the records to the CA. It also ruled that upon the
filed a motion to dismiss 20 the appeal of respondent for failure
perfection of respondent’s appeal, the RTC had already lost
to prosecute, asseverating that from the time the RTC gave
jurisdiction over the case. Thus, any orders subsequently
due course to its appeal in 2008, respondent had not made
issued by the RTC after the filing of respondent’s Notice of
any further action on its appeal, particularly with regard to the
Appeal on June 19, 2002 were of no force and effect.28
payment of the prescribed appeal fees. In its defense,
respondent argued that the RTC no longer had jurisdiction to
entertain petitioners’ motion after its Notice of Appeal had Aggrieved, petitioners filed a motion for
been given due course. It maintained that petitioners’ motion reconsideration,29 which the CA denied in a Resolution30 dated
should have been filed not before the RTC, but before the June 5, 2015; hence, this petition.
CA.21
The Issue Before the Court
In its assailed Order22 dated July 5, 2013, the RTC, through
Judge Angelito I. Balderama (Judge Balderama), granted
The issue for the Court’s resolution is whether or not the CA
petitioners’ motion and accordingly, dismissed respondent’s
erred in finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
CIVIL PROCEDURE – RULE 40
Assigned cases for fourth exam
RTC when it dismissed respondent’s appeal for failure to
prosecute.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition has merit.
Section 4, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 4. Appellate court docket and other lawful fees. –
Within the period for taking an appeal, the appellant shall pay
to the clerk of court which rendered the judgment or final order
appealed from, the full amount of the appellate court docket
and other lawful fees. Proof of payment of said fees shall be
transmitted to the appellate court together with the original
record or the record on appeal.
In Gipa v. Southern Luzon Institute,31 citing Gonzales v.
Pe,32 the Court clarified the requirement of full payment of
docket and other lawful fees under the above-quoted rule in
this wise:
[T]he procedural requirement under Section 4 of Rule 41 is
not merely directory, as the payment of the docket and other
legal fees within the prescribed period is both mandatory and
jurisdictional. It bears stressing that an appeal is not a right,
but a mere statutory privilege. An ordinary appeal from a
decision or final order of the RTC to the CA must be made
within 15 days from notice. And within this period, the full
amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees
must be paid to the clerk of the court which rendered the
judgment or final order appealed from. The requirement of
paying the full amount of the appellate docket fees within
the prescribed period is not a mere technicality of law or
procedure. The payment of docket fees within the
prescribed period is mandatory for the perfection of an
appeal. Without such payment, the appeal is not
perfected. The appellate court does not acquire
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action and the
Decision sought to be appealed from becomes final and
executory. Further, under Section 1 (c), Rule 50, an appeal
may be dismissed by the CA, on its own motion or on that of
the appellee, on the ground of the non-payment of the docket
and other lawful fees within the reglementary period as
provided under Section 4 of Rule 41. The payment of the full
amount of the docket fee is an indispensable step for the
perfection of an appeal. In both original and appellate cases,
the court acquires jurisdiction over the case only upon the
payment of the prescribed docket fees. 33 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
2
In relation thereto, Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court
states:
Section 9. Perfection of appeal; effect thereof. – A party’s
appeal by notice of appeal is deemed perfected as to him
upon the filing of the notice of appeal in due time.
A party’s appeal by record on appeal is deemed perfected as
to him with respect to the subject matter thereof upon the
approval of the record on appeal filed in due time.1âwphi1
In appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction
over the case upon the perfection of appeals filed in due
time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other
parties.
In appeals by record on appeal, the court loses jurisdiction
only over the subject matter thereof upon the approval of the
records on appeal filed in due time and the expiration of the
time to appeal of the other parties.
In either case, prior to the transmittal of the original record or
the record on appeal, the court may issue orders for the
protection and preservation of the rights of the parties which
do not involve any matter litigated by the appeal, approve
compromises, permit appeals of indigent litigants, order
execution pending appeal in accordance with section 2 of
Rule 39, and allow withdrawal of the appeal. (Emphasis
supplied)
After a punctilious review of the records of this case, the Court
finds that respondent failed to perfect its appeal before the
RTC by not paying the full amount of the prescribed appellate
docket fees. Consequently, the RTC did not lose jurisdiction
over the case and, as a matter of discretion, properly
dismissed the appeal for failure to prosecute.
The Court gives credence to the statement given by the OIC
Clerk of Court of the RTC, Mr. Argonza, who, upon meticulous
inspection of the records, found that while respondent had
indeed issued a postal money order in favor of the Office of
the Clerk of Court of the RTC, the amount pertaining thereto
was never remitted or received by the court. There being no
proof of payment of the required appellate fees, Mr. Argonza
explained that the case records cannot be transmitted to the
CA and therefore, remained with the RTC. This fact sheds
light and lends credibility to petitioners’ allegation that they
originally attempted to file their motion to dismiss appeal
before the CA, which was unsurprisingly rejected, there being
no case docket and court records pertaining to respondent’s
appeal.34
Further militating against respondent’s cause is the fact that
almost five (5) years had already lapsed from the time its
Notice of Appeal had been originally given due course by the
RTC up to the time the petitioners moved for its dismissal. And
yet, respondent failed to pursue its case. In fact, had
petitioners not taken any action, the instant case would have
continued to languish in the RTC dockets. Besides, even if it
were true that respondent had paid the required appellate
docket fees in this case, it still failed to exercise diligence and
prudence in ascertaining that the records of the case had
been transmitted to the CA and that its appeal had been given
due course. As it is, respondent miserably neglected its case
and may, thus, be considered to have abandoned its
appeal.35 Clearly, the RTC, through Judge Balderama, cannot
be faulted for dismissing the appeal for failure to prosecute.
That the RTC retained jurisdiction to dismiss the appeal is
beyond cavil, as provided under Section 9, Rule 41 above-
quoted. As a result of respondent’s failure to perfect an appeal
within the period fixed by law, no court could
exercise appellate jurisdiction to review the RTC
decision.36 To reiterate, perfection of an appeal within the
period and in the manner prescribed by law is jurisdictional
and non-compliance with such requirements is considered
fatal and has the effect of rendering the judgment final and
executory. 37 It bears to stress that the right to appeal is a
statutory right and the one who seeks to avail that right must
comply with the statute or rules.38
In the light of the foregoing, the CA erred when it found that
the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion when it
dismissed respondent’s appeal for failure to prosecute. While
it is true that the RTC previously gave due course to
respondent’s Notice of Appeal and declared that the latter had
issued a postal money order in payment of the required
appellate docket fees, the RTC, however, is not precluded
from perusing the records a second or a third time, if only to
ensure that all the requirements for perfecting an appeal have
been complied with. The Court further notes that if it were true
that respondent actually paid the appellate docket fees, it
could have easily produced proof of payment if only to dispel
any doubts thereon and consequently, prove compliance with
the rules on the perfection of appeals. Unfortunately, no such
evidence was forthcoming. Indubitably, the dismissal of
respondent’s appeal was in order, and the RTC’s January 17,
2002 Decision, as a result, had attained finality.
CIVIL PROCEDURE – RULE 40
Assigned cases for fourth exam
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated
January 28, 2015 and the Resolution dated June 5, 2015 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 133533 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Orders
dated July 5, 2013 and December 11, 2013 of the Regional
Trial Court of Balanga City, Bataan, Branch 1, sitting as a
Special Agrarian Court, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 166260               February 18, 2009
METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY, Petitioner,  for the postponement of the October 12 and 19, 1998
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and UNITED
OVERSEAS BANK (formerly known as WESTMONT
BANK), Respondents.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
The Court reviews in this Rule 45 petition the November 30,
2004 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA G.R. SP
No. 78796. In the said decision, the appellate court affirmed
the dismissal by the trial court of Civil Case No. 00-595, 2 a
petition for the review of Philippine Clearing House
Corporation (PCHC) Board Resolution No. 08-2000.3
The antecedent facts and proceedings follow.
Check No. 08012663814 dated January 13, 1997, payable to
cash, and drawn against the account of Bienvenido C. Tan
with petitioner Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company
(Metrobank) was deposited with respondent United Overseas
Bank (UOB). The check was then forwarded for clearing on
January 14, 1997 through the PCHC, and, on the same date,
Metrobank cleared the check.5 In its January 27, 1997
Letter,6 however, Metrobank informed UOB that it was
returning the check on account of material alteration—the date
was changed from "January 23, 1997" to "January 13, 1997,"
and the amount was altered from "₱1,000.00" to
"₱91,000.00."7
3
Because UOB refused to accept the return and to reimburse On February 28, 2000, the Arbitration Committee denied
Metrobank the amount it paid on the check, the latter, on July Metrobank’s motion.22 Unrelenting, Metrobank filed its Second
18, 1997, filed a Complaint8 (Arbicom Case No. 97-093) Motion for Reconsideration23 on March 20, 2000.
before the PCHC Arbitration Committee, contending in the
main that UOB had the duty to examine the deposited check
On April 14, 2000, the PCHC Board of Directors issued
for any material alteration; but since UOB failed to exercise
Resolution No. 08-2000,24 denying the second motion for
due diligence in determining that the check had been altered,
reconsideration. Metrobank again moved for the
UOB should bear the loss.9 In its Answer with
reconsideration of this resolution. On May 5, 2000, however, it
Counterclaim,10 UOB interposed the defenses that it exercised
received communication from the PCHC Executive Secretary
due diligence, and that Metrobank failed to comply with the
informing it that the proper remedy following Section 13 of the
24-hour clearing house rule, and, with gross negligence,
PCHC Rules of Procedure for Arbitration (PCHC Rules) was
cleared the check.11
for it to file a notice of appeal with the PCHC and a petition for
review with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) within a non-
On November 11, 1997, the Arbitration Committee directed extendible period of fifteen (15) days counted from the receipt
Metrobank to submit the check to the Philippine National of the PCHC board resolution.25
Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory for examination.12
Hence, on May 9, 2000, Metrobank filed its Petition for Review
After almost a year or on October 9, 1998, Metrobank moved (Civil Case No. 00-595) with the RTC of Makati City. On July
25, 2003, the trial court rendered its Decision 26 dismissing the
hearings and their resetting to November 16, 1998, on the petition. It ruled that it had no jurisdiction over the petition, the
ground that the PNP Crime Laboratory document examination same having been filed out of time. The trial court further ruled
results were not yet available. 13 On November 14, 1998, that the Arbitration Committee correctly dismissed the original
however, Metrobank again moved for the cancellation of the case on account of Metrobank’s failure to prosecute, and that
November 16, 1998 hearing and its resetting on December Metrobank’s claim could not be sustained considering that
10, 1998, on the same ground that the said results were not under prevailing jurisprudence the drawee-bank should bear
yet available for release.14 the loss if it had mistakenly cleared a forged or an altered
check.27
In the scheduled December 10, 1998 hearing, Metrobank’s
counsel failed to appear.15 UOB thus moved for the dismissal Dissatisfied, Metrobank appealed the case to the CA. In the
of the case, which the Arbitration Committee granted.16 assailed November 30, 2004 Decision, 28 the appellate court
affirmed the ruling of the trial court. The CA ratiocinated,
however, that the petition for review before the trial court was
On March 9, 1999, following its receipt of the Transcript of
filed on time—its filing was in accordance with the PCHC
Stenographic Notes17 of the December 10, 1998 hearing,
Rules. The CA nevertheless ruled that the case was correctly
Metrobank filed a Motion for Reconsideration18 of the
dismissed on account of Metrobank’s lack of interest to
dismissal order, attaching thereto a copy of the Medical
prosecute and of its violation of the 24-hour clearing house
Certificate19 declaring that its counsel had been afflicted with
rule.29
influenza during the December 10, 1998 hearing, and a copy
of PNP Crime Laboratory Document Examination Report No.
102-9820 stating that the subject check had been altered. Undaunted, petitioner instituted the instant petition for review
on certiorari before this Court.
As expected, UOB opposed the motion and argued that
Metrobank was not serious in prosecuting the case The petition is denied. 
considering the numerous postponements of hearings made
by its counsel; and that the said counsel was trifling with the
processes of the Arbitration Committee because, upon
verification with his secretary, he was not really sick on
December 10, 1998. Further, the examination by the PNP
Crime Laboratory of the check had already been completed
on July 6, 1998.21
CIVIL PROCEDURE – RULE 40
Assigned cases for fourth exam
The Court notes that, after the PCHC Board of Directors
issued Resolution No. 08-2000 denying petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration, petitioner moved for reconsideration of that
resolution. Following the incorrect advice of the PCHC
Executive Secretary that the proper remedy under Section 13
of the PCHC Rules was for petitioner to file a notice of appeal
with the PCHC and a petition for review with the RTC,
petitioner consequently filed the petition for review with the
trial court.lawphil.net
This erroneous move of the petitioner was fatal to its cause.
The Court has already explained in Insular Savings Bank v.
Far East Bank and Trust Company,30 that the PCHC Rules
cannot confer jurisdiction on the RTC to review arbitral
awards, thus—
Furthermore, petitioner had several judicial remedies available
at its disposal after the Arbitration Committee denied its
Motion for Reconsideration. It may petition the proper RTC to
issue an order vacating the award on the grounds provided for
under Section 24 of the Arbitration Law. Petitioner likewise
has the option to file a petition for review under Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court with the Court of Appeals on questions of fact,
of law, or mixed questions of fact and law. Lastly, petitioner
may file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court on the ground that the Arbitrator Committee acted
without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Since
this case involves acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency,
the petition should be filed in and cognizable only by the Court
of Appeals.  As in Insular, the trial court, in this case, properly dismissed
In this instance, petitioner did not avail of any of the
abovementioned remedies available to it. Instead it filed a
petition for review with the RTC where Civil Case No. 92-145
is pending pursuant to Section 13 of the PCHC Rules to
sustain its action. Clearly, it erred in the procedure it chose for
judicial review of the arbitral award.
Having established that petitioner failed to avail of the
abovementioned remedies, we now discuss the issue of the
jurisdiction of the trial court with respect to the petition for
review filed by petitioner.  WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review
Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine a cause -
the right to act in a case. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is
the power to hear and determine the general class to which
the proceedings in question belong. Jurisdiction over the
subject matter is conferred by law and not by the consent or
acquiescence of any or all of the parties or by erroneous belief
of the court that it exists.
4
In the instant case, petitioner and respondent have agreed
that the PCHC Rules would govern in case of controversy.
However, since the PCHC Rules came about only as a result
of an agreement between and among member banks of
PCHC and not by law, it cannot confer jurisdiction to the RTC.
Thus, the portion of the PCHC Rules granting jurisdiction to
the RTC to review arbitral awards, only on questions of law,
cannot be given effect.  BRION, J.:
Consequently, the proper recourse of petitioner from the
denial of its motion for reconsideration by the Arbitration
Committee is to file either a motion to vacate the arbitral
award with the RTC, a petition for review with the Court of
Appeals under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, or a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. In the case at
bar, petitioner filed a petition for review with the RTC when the
same should have been filed with the Court of Appeals under
Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. Thus, the RTC of Makati did not
err in dismissing the petition for review for lack of jurisdiction
but not on the ground that petitioner should have filed a
separate case from Civil Case No. 92-145 but on the
necessity of filing the correct petition in the proper court. It is
immaterial whether petitioner filed the petition for review in
Civil Case No. 92-145 as an appeal of the arbitral award or
whether it filed a separate case in the RTC, considering that
the RTC will only have jurisdiction over an arbitral award in
cases of motions to vacate the same. Otherwise, as
elucidated herein, the Court of Appeals retains jurisdiction in
petitions for review or in petitions for certiorari. x x x.31
Civil Case No. 00-595 for lack of jurisdiction, not because the
petition had been filed out of time, but because the court had
no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the petition.
We are aware that the Supreme Court has ample authority to
go beyond the pleadings when, in the interest of justice and
the promotion of public policy, there is a need to make its own
finding to support its conclusion.32 In this case, however, we
find no compelling reason to resolve the other issues raised in
the petition.
on certiorari is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 159915               March 12, 2009
BACHRACH CORPORATION, Petitioner, 
vs.
PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY, Respondent.
DECISION
We have before us the Petition for Review on Certiorari1 filed
by the petitioner, Bachrach Corporation (petitioner), that seeks
to reverse the Court of Appeal (CA) rulings dismissing the
petitioner’s appeal for failure to file an appeal brief.2
ANTECEDENTS
The respondent Philippine Ports Authority (respondent), as
lessor, entered into a 99-year contract of lease with the
petitioner over its properties denominated as Blocks 180 and
185. The lease will expire in the years 2017 and 2018,
respectively. Since the rentals for these properties were based
on the rates prevailing in the previous decades, the
respondent imposed rate increases. Separately from these
properties, the respondent owned another property – Lot 8,
Block 101 – covered by its own lease contract that expired in
1992. This lease has not been renewed, but the petitioner
refused to vacate the premises. The respondent thus filed,
and prevailed in, an ejectment case involving this property
against the petitioner.
The parties tried to extrajudicially settle their differences. A
Compromise Agreement was drafted in 1994, but was not fully
executed by the parties.3 Only the petitioner, its counsel, and
the respondent’s counsel signed; the respondent’s Board of
Directors was not satisfied with the terms and refused to sign
the agreement.
To compel the respondent to implement the terms of the
Compromise Agreement, the petitioner filed a complaint for
specific performance with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila, Branch 42. The case was docketed as Civil Case No.
95-73399 and covered only the subjects of the Compromise
Agreement – Blocks 180 and 185.4 Seeking to include Lot 8,
Block 101 in the complaint, the petitioner filed a Motion for
Leave to File and for Admission of Attached Supplemental
and/or Amended Complaint. In an Order dated June 26,
2000,5 the trial court denied this motion, stating that:
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The amendment/supplement sought in the instant motion
seeks the inclusion of Lot 8, Block 101 as one of the real
properties subject matter of this case.
Granting for the sake of argument, but not in any way
insinuating that plaintiff has a right to demand performance of
the "Compromise Agreement," this Court can only mandate
performance of its provisions. And considering that the
"Compromise Agreement" speaks only of Block Nos. 185 and
180, this Court can only direct actual performance by
defendant Philippine Ports Authority of its terms and
conditions, and that is with respect to the lease of these
blocks (185 and 180) and no other. It would therefore be a
mistake for this court to grant the motion and allow inclusion of
Lot 8, Block 101, as one of the subject matters of the
"compromise agreement." If ever the plaintiff has any legal
right over Lot 8, Block 101 as one of the subject matters of the
"compromise agreement," it has to be a subject matter of
another case but certainly not in this case.6
On December 5, 2000, the petitioner filed a complaint for
Specific Performance against the same respondent, Philippine
Ports Authority, this time involving Lot 8, Block 101. This case
was docketed as Civil Case No. 00-99431.7The petitioner also
sought the consolidation of this case with the earlier Civil Case
No. 95-73399.8
On September 26, 2001, the RTC of Manila, Branch 42
dismissed the Civil Case No. 00-99431 complaint on the
grounds of res judicata, forum shopping, and failure of the
complaint to state a cause of action. 9
The petitioner elevated the dismissal to the CA. On February
20, 2002, the petitioner received the February 13, 2002 notice
of the court requiring it to file its Brief within a period of 45
days from receipt of the Order, which was to expire on April 6,
2002. Two days prior to the expiration of this period, the
petitioner filed a motion for a 45-day extension of time to file
the brief. No brief was filed within the extended period. On
November 11, 2002, the CA dismissed the appeal via a
resolution whose pertinent portion reads:
For failure of the plaintiff-appellant, Bachrach Corporation to
file the required brief, the appeal is hereby considered
DISMISSED pursuant to Section 1 (e), Rule 50 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.
The Motion for Extension of Time to File Appellant’s Brief is
NOTED.
5
SO ORDERED.10
On December 11, 2002, the petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration (with Motion to Admit Attached Brief).11The
CA denied the motion in its September 8, 2003 resolution,
paving the way for the filing of the present petition.
THE PETITION
The petition asks the Court to liberally apply the rules of
procedure, grant its appeal, and thereby require the CA to
entertain the appeal it dismissed. The petitioner raises the
following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
NOT GIVING A LIBERAL APPLICATION OF SECTION 1(E)
RULE 50 OF THE RULES OF COURT TO THE PRESENT
CASE CONSISTENT WITH SECTION 6, RULE 1 OF THE
SAME RULES[;]
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
NOT REVERSING THE RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT
THAT RES JUDICATA BARS THE FILING OF CIVIL CASE
NO. 00-99431[;]
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
NOT REVERSING THE RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT
DISMISSING CIVIL CASE NO. 00-99431.
The threshold issue the case presents is whether the CA erred
in dismissing the petitioner’s appeal on the ground that no
brief was timely filed.
OUR RULING
The petition is devoid of merit.
Rule 50, Section 1 of the Rules of Court enumerates the
grounds for the dismissal of appeals; paragraph (e) thereof
provides that an appeal shall be dismissed upon –
[f]ailure of the appellant to serve and file the required number
of copies of his brief or memorandum within the time provided
by these Rules.
In a long line of cases, this Court has held that the CA’s
authority to dismiss an appeal for failure to file the appellant’s
brief is a matter of judicial discretion. 12 Thus, a dismissal
based on this ground is neither mandatory nor ministerial; the
fundamentals of justice and fairness must be observed,
bearing in mind the background and web of circumstances
surrounding the case.13
In the present case, the petitioner blames its former handling
lawyer for failing to file the appellant’s brief on time. This
lawyer was allegedly transferring to another law office at the
time the appellant’s brief was due to be filed. 14 In his
excitement to transfer to his new firm, he forgot about the
appeal and the scheduled deadline; he likewise forgot his
responsibility to endorse the case to another lawyer in the law
office.15
Under the circumstances of this case, we find the failure to file
the appeal brief inexcusable; thus, we uphold the CA’s
ruling.1avvphi1
The handling lawyer was undoubtedly at fault. The records
show that even the filing of a motion for reconsideration from
the Regional Trial Court’s ruling was late. In this case, he even
had the benefit of an extended period for the filing of the brief,
but nevertheless failed to comply with the requirements. If the
present counsel were to be believed, the former counsel did
not even make a proper turnover of his cases – a basic matter
for a lawyer and his law office to attend to before a lawyer
leaves.
But while fault can be attributed to the handling lawyer, we
find that the law firm was no less at fault. The departure of a
lawyer actively handling cases for a law firm is a major
concern; the impact of a departure, in terms of the assignment
of cases to new lawyers alone, is obvious. Incidents of
mishandled cases due to failures in the turnover of files are
well-known within professional circles. For some reason, the
law firm merely attributes the failure to file the appeal brief to
the handling lawyer. This is not true and is a buck-passing that
we cannot accept. The law firm itself was grossly remiss in its
duties to care for the interests of its client.
We note as a last point that the original 45-day period for the
appellant to submit its brief expired on April 6, 2002. Petitioner
seasonably filed its motion for extension on April 4, 2002. It
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Assigned cases for fourth exam
was only on November 11, 2002, about seven (7) months
later, that the CA dismissed the appeal. Absolutely nothing
appeared to have been done in the interim, not even in terms
of noting that no appeal brief had been filed. Thus, the
petitioner simply took too long to rectify its mistake; by the
time that it acted, it was simply too late.

From these perspectives, the CA cannot in any way be said to

have erred in dismissing the appeal.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for review and,

consequently, AFFIRM the Court of Appeals’ Resolutions
dated November 11, 2002 and September 8, 2003.

SO ORDERED.