CIVIL PROCEDURE – RULE 2, SECTION 2; RULE 3, SECTION 12; and RULE 5 (SUMMARY PROCEDURE)
Assigned cases for first exam
G.R. No. 176709               May 8, 2009
FORT BONIFACIO DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, Petitioner,  A subsequent exchange of correspondence failed to settle
vs.
HON. EDWIN D. SORONGON and VALENTIN
FONG, Respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Petitioner Fort Bonifacio Development Corporation
(petitioner), a corporation registered under Philippine laws, is
engaged in the business of real estate development.
Respondent, Valentin Fong (respondent) doing business
under the name VF Industrial Sales is the assignee of L & M
Maxco Specialist Construction’s (Maxco) retention money
from the Bonifacio Ridge Condominium Phase 1 (BRCP 1).  detriment of respondent.
In this Petition for Review,1 petitioner assails the Decision2 of
the Court of Appeals dated November 30, 2006 which ruled
that it is the regional trial court and not the Construction
Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC) that has jurisdiction
over respondent’s claim.  assignee, it was the CIAC and not the regular courts that had
The facts are as follows:
On July 2000, Petitioner entered into a trade contract with
Maxco wherein Maxco would undertake the structural and
partial architectural package of the BRCP 1. Later petitioner
accused Maxco of delay in completion of its work and on
August 24, 2004 sent the latter a notice of termination.
Petitioner also instructed Maxco to perform remedial
measures prior to the contract expiration pursuant to Clause
23.1 of the contract. 
Subsequently, Maxco was sued by its creditors including
respondent for debts unrelated to BRCP 1. In order to settle
the collection suit, on February 28, 2005, Maxco assigned its
receivables representing its retention money from the BRCP
1 in the amount of one million five hundred seventy seven
thousand one hundred fifteen pesos and ninety centavos
(₱1,577,115.90). On April 18, 2005, respondent wrote to
petitioner, informing the latter of Maxco’s assignment in his
favor and asking the latter to confirm the validity of Maxco’s
receivables.3 Petitioner replied, informing the respondent that
Maxco did have receivables, however these were not due
1
and demandable until January of next year, moreover the
amount had to be ascertained and liquidated.
the matter. Specifically, on January 31, 2006,4 petitioner
through counsel, wrote to respondent informing the latter that
there is no more amount due to Maxco from petitioner after
the rectification of defect as well as the satisfaction of notices
of garnishment dated July 30, 20045 and January 26,
2006.6 On February 13, 2006, respondent filed a complaint
for a sum of money against petitioner and Maxco in the
Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City.7 Respondent
claimed that there were sufficient residual amounts to pay
the receivables of Maxco at the time he served notice of the
assignment. The subsequent notices of garnishment should
not adversely affect the receivables assigned to him. The
retention money was over due in January 2006 and despite
demand, petitioner did not pay the amount subject of the
deed of assignment. Petitioner however, paid out the
retention money to other garnishing creditors of Maxco to the
On March 16, 2006, instead of filing an Answer, petitioner
filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter.8 Petitioner argued that since
respondent merely stepped into the shoes of Maxco as its
jurisdiction over the dispute as provided in the Trade
Contract. Judge Edwin Sorongon issued an Order dated
June 27, 2006 denying the motion to dismiss.9Petitioner
moved for reconsideration but this was denied in an Order
dated August 15, 2006. 
On October 16, 2006, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari
and prohibition with the Court of Appeals. On November 30,
2006, the Court of Appeals denied the petition for lack of
merit. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is
hereby DENIED DUE COURSE and accordingly
DISMISSED for lack of merit. The assailed Orders dated
June 27, 2006 and August 15, 2006 of respondent Judge in
Civil Case No. MC-06-2928 are hereby AFFIRMED.
With costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.10
The appellate court held that it was the trial court and not the
Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC) that
had jurisdiction over the claims of Valentin Fong. The claim
could not be construed as related to the construction industry
as it is for enforcement of Maxco’s deed of assignment over
its retention money. 
Petitioner moved for reconsideration on December 22, 2006
but this was denied by the appellate court in a resolution
dated February 29, 2006. 
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioners sets forth four (4) errors committed by the
appellate court namely: (1) the original and exclusive
jurisdiction over respondent’s complaint is vested with the
CIAC; (2) Respondent’s complaint failed to state a cause of
action; (3) the claim of respondent has already been
extinguished; and (4) the conditions precedent for the
complaint have not been complied with.
The petition lacks merit.
In reference to the first error, Section 4 of Executive Order
No. 1008, Series of 1985 (E.O. No. 1008) sets forth the
jurisdiction of CIAC. To wit: 
SECTION 4. Jurisdiction.—The CIAC shall have original and
exclusive jurisdiction over disputes arising from, or
connected with, contracts entered into by parties involved in
construction in the Philippines, whether the dispute arises
before or after the completion of the contract, or after the
abandonment or breach thereof. These disputes may involve
government or private contracts. For the Board to acquire
jurisdiction, the parties to a dispute must agree to submit the
same to voluntary arbitration.
The jurisdiction of the CIAC may include but is not limited to
violation of specifications for materials and workmanship;
violation of the terms of agreement; interpretation and/or
application of contractual provisions; maintenance and
defects; payment default of employer or contractor and
changes in contract cost.
Excluded from the coverage of this law are disputes arising
from employer-employee relationships which shall continue
to be covered by the Labor Code of the Philippines. 
Jurisdiction is defined as the authority to try, hear and decide
a case.11 Moreover, that jurisdiction of the court over the
CIVIL PROCEDURE – RULE 2, SECTION 2; RULE 3, SECTION 12; and RULE 5 (SUMMARY PROCEDURE)
Assigned cases for first exam
subject matter is determined by the allegations of the
complaint without regard to whether or not the plaintiff is
entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted
therein is a well entrenched principle. 12 In this regard, the
jurisdiction of the court does not depend upon the defenses
pleaded in the answer or in the motion to dismiss, lest the
question of jurisdiction would almost entirely depend upon
the defendant.13
An examination of the allegations in Fong’s complaint
reveals that his cause of action springs not from a violation of
the provisions of the Trade Contract, but from the
assignment of Maxco’s retention money to him and failure of
petitioner to turn over the retention money. The allegations in
Fong’s Complaint are clear and simple: (1) That Maxco had
an outstanding obligation to respondent; (2) Maxco assigned
to Fong its retention from petitioner in payment of the said
obligation,; (3) Petitioner as early as April 18, 2005 was
notified of the assignment; (4) Despite due notice of such
assignment, petitioner still refused to deliver the amount
assigned to respondent, giving preference, instead, to the 2
other creditors of Maxco; (5) At the time petitioner was
notified of the assignment, there were only one other notice
of garnishment and there were sufficient residual amounts to
satisfy Fong’s claim; and (6) uncertain over which one
between Maxco and petitioner he may resort to for payment,
respondent named them both as defendants in Civil Case
No. 06-0200-CFM.
While it is true that respondent, as the assignee of the
receivables of Maxco from petitioner under the Trade
Contract, merely stepped into the shoes of Maxco. However,
the right of Maxco to the retention money from petitioner
under the trade contract is not even in dispute in Civil Case
No. 06-0200-CFM. Respondent raises as an issue before the
RTC is the petitioner’s alleged unjustified preference to the
claims of the other creditors of Maxco over the retention
money.1awphi1
Although the jurisdiction of the CIAC is not limited to the
instances enumerated in Section 4 of E. O. No. 1008, Fong’s
claim is not even construction-related at all. This court has
held that: "Construction is defined as referring to all on-site
works on buildings or altering structures, from land clearance
through completion including excavation, erection and
assembly and installation of components and
equipment."14 Thus, petitioner’s insistence on the application
of the arbitration clause of the Trade Contract to Fong is
clearly anchored on an erroneous premise that the latter is
seeking to enforce a right under the trade contract. This
premise cannot stand since the right to the retention money
2
of Maxco under the Trade Contract is not being impugned The final error raised by petitioner that the other judgment
herein. It bears mentioning that petitioner readily conceded creditors17 as well as the trial court that issued the writ of
the existence of the retention money. Fong’s demand that garnishment and CIAC should have been impleaded as
the portion of retention money should have been paid to him defendants in the case as they were indispensable parties is
before the other creditors of Maxco clearly, does not require likewise weak. Section 7, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of
the CIAC’s expertise and technical knowledge of Court provides for the compulsory joinder of indispensable
construction. parties without whom no final determination can be had of an
action. An indispensable party is defined as one who has
such an interest in the controversy or subject matter that a
The adjudication of Civil Case necessarily involves the
final adjudication cannot be made, in his absence, without
application of pertinent statutes and jurisprudence to matters
injuring or affecting that interest.18 The other judgment
of assignment and preference of credits. As this Court held in
creditors are entitled to the fruits of the final judgments
Fort Bonifacio Development Corporation v. Domingo,15 this
rendered in their favor. Their rights are distinct from the
task more suited for a trial court to carry out after a full-blown
rights acquired by the respondent over the portion of the
trial, than an arbitration body specifically devoted to
retention money assigned to the latter by Maxco. Their
construction contracts. 
interests are in no way affected by any judgment to be
rendered in this case.1avvphi1
The second error raised also has not merit. Failure to state a
cause of action refers to the insufficiency of allegation in the
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition
pleading. In resolving a motion to dismiss based on the
is DENIED. The Decision dated November 30, 2006 and the
failure to state a cause of action only the facts alleged in the
Resolution dated February 19, 2007 of the Court of Appeals
complaint must be considered. The test is whether the court
in CA-G.R. SP No. 96532 are hereby AFFIRMED.
can render a valid judgment on the complaint based on the
facts alleged and the prayer asked for.
SO ORDERED.
In this case the complaint alleges that:
G.R. No. L-22909             January 28, 1925
x x x at the time he served notice of assignment to defendant
FBDC there was only one notice of garnishment that the VICTORIANO BORLASA, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants, 
latter had received and there were still sufficient residual vs.
amounts to pay that assigned by defendant Maxco to the VICENTE POLISTICO, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
plaintiff. Subsequent notices of garnishment received by
defendant FBDC could not adversely affect the amounts
Sumulong and Lavides for appellants.
already assigned to the plaintiff as they are already his
Ramon Diokno for appellees.
property, no longer that of defendant Maxco.16
STREET, J.:
From this statement alone, it is clear that a cause of action is
present in the complaint filed a quo. Respondent has
specifically alleged that the undue preference given to other This action was instituted in the Court of First Instance of
creditors of Maxco over the retention money by petitioner Laguna on July 25, 1917, by Victoriano Borlasa and others
was to the prejudice of his rights. against Vicente Polistico and others, chiefly for the purpose
of securing the dissolution of a voluntary association
named Turuhan Polistico & Co., and to compel the
Petitioner next asserts that the appellate court erred in not
defendants to account for and surrender the money and
ruling that the claim of respondent was extinguished by
property of the association in order that its affairs may be
payment to the other garnishing creditors of Maxco. The
liquidated and its assets applied according to law. The trial
assignment of this as an error is misleading as this is
judge having sustained a demurrer for defect of parties and
precisely one of the issues that need to be resolved in a full
the plaintiffs electing not to amend, the cause was
blown trial and one of the reasons that respondent
dismissed, and from this order an appeal was taken by the
impleaded Maxco and petitioner in the alternative. 
plaintiffs to this court.
CIVIL PROCEDURE – RULE 2, SECTION 2; RULE 3, SECTION 12; and RULE 5 (SUMMARY PROCEDURE)
Assigned cases for first exam
The material allegations of the complaint, so far as affects
the present appeal, are to the following effect: In the month
of April, 1911, the plaintiffs and defendants, together with
several hundred other persons, formed an association under
the name of Turuhan Polistico & Co. Vicente Polistico, the
principal defendant herein, was elected president and
treasurer of the association, and his house in Lilio, Laguna,
was made its principal place of business. The life of the
association was fixed at fifteen years, and under the by-laws
each member obligated himself to pay to Vicente Polistico,
as president-treasurer, before 3 o'clock in the afternoon of
every Sunday the sum of 50 centavos, except that on every
fifth Sunday the amount was P1, if the president elected to
call this amount, as he always did. It is alleged that from
April, 1911, until April, 1917, the sums of money mentioned
above were paid weekly by all of the members of the society
with few irregularities. The inducement to these weekly
contributions was found in provisions of the by-laws to the
effect that a lottery should be conducted weekly among the
members of the association and that the successful member
should be paid the amount collected each week, from which,
however, the president-treasurer of the society was to
receive the sum of P200, to be held by him as funds of the
society.
It is further alleged that by virtue of these weekly lotteries
Vicente Polistico, as president-treasurer of the association,
received sums of money amounting to P74,000, more or
less, in the period stated, which he still retains in his power
or has applied to the purchase of real property largely in his
own name and partly in the names of others. The defendants
in the complaint are the members of the board of directors of
the association, including Vicente Polistico, as president-
treasurer, Alfonso Noble, secretary, Felix Garcia and
Vivencio Zulaybar, as promoter (propagandistas), and
Afroniano de la Peña and Tomas Orencia, as members
(vocales) of the board.
In an amended answer the defendants raised the question of
lack of parties and set out a list of some hundreds of persons
whom they alleged should be brought in as parties defendant
on the ground, among others, that they were in default in the
payment of their dues to the association. On November 28,
1922, the court made an order requiring the plaintiffs to
amend their complaint within a stated period so as to include
all of the members of the Turnuhan Polistico & Co. either as
plaintiffs or defendants. The plaintiffs excepted to this order,
but acquiesced to the extent of amending their complaint by
adding as additional parties plaintiff some hundreds of
persons, residents of Lilio, said to be members of the
association and desirous of being joined as plaintiffs. Some
of these new plaintiffs had not been named in the list
3
submitted by the defendants with their amended answer; and Smith vs. Swormstedt (16 How., 288; 14 Law. ed., 942),
on the other hand many names in said list were here omitted, where a limited number of individuals interested in a trust for
it being claimed by the plaintiffs that the persons omitted the benefit of superannuated preachers were permitted to
were not residents of Lilio but residents of other places and maintain an action in their own names and as
that their relation to the society, so far as the plaintiffs could representatives of all other persons in the same right.
discover, was fictitious. The defendants demurred to the
amended complaint on the ground that it showed on its face
His Honor, the trial judge, in sustaining this demurrer was
a lack of necessary parties and this demurrer was sustained,
possibly influenced to some extent by the case of Rallonza
with the ultimate result of the dismissal of the action, as
vs. Evangelista (15 Phil., 531); but we do not consider that
stated in the first paragraph of this opinion.
case controlling, inasmuch as that was an action for the
recovery of real property and the different parties in interest
The trial judge appears to have supposed that all the had determinable, though undivided interests, in the property
members of the Turnuhan Polistico & Co. should be brought there in question. In the present case, the controversy
in either plaintiffs or defendants. This notion is entirely involves an indivisible right affecting many individuals whose
mistaken. The situation involved is precisely the one particular interest is of indeterminate extent and is incapable
contemplated in section 118 of the Code of Civil Procedure, of separation.
where one or more may sue for the benefit of all. It is evident
from the showing made in the complaint, and from the
The addition of some hundreds of persons to the number of
proceedings in the court below, that it would be impossible to
the plaintiffs, made in the amendment to the complaint of
make all of the persons in interest parties to the cases and to
December 13, 1922, was unnecessary, and as the presence
require all of the members of the association to be joined as
of so many parties is bound to prove embarrassing to the
parties would be tantamount to a denial of justice.
litigation from death or removal, it is suggested that upon the
return of this record to the lower court for further
The general rule with reference to the making of parties in a proceedings, the plaintiff shall again amend their complaint
civil action requires, of course, the joinder of all necessary by dismissing as to unnecessary parties plaintiffs, but
parties wherever possible, and the joinder of all retaining a sufficient number of responsible persons to
indispensable parties under any and all conditions, the secure liability for costs and fairly to present all the members
presence of those latter being a sine qua non of the exercise of the association.
of judicial power. The class suit contemplates an exceptional
situation where there are numerous persons all in the same
There is another feature of the complaint which makes a
plight and all together constituting a constituency whose
slight amendment desirable, which is, that the complaint
presence in the litigation is absolutely indispensable to the
should be made to show on its face that the action is
administration of justice. Here the strict application of the rule
intended to be litigated as a class suit. We accordingly
as to indispensable parties would require that each and
recommend that the plaintiffs further amend by adding after
every individual in the class should be present. But at this
the names of the parties plaintiffs the words, "in their own
point the practice is so far relaxed as to permit the suit to
behalf and in behalf of other members of Turuhan Polistico &
proceed, when the class is sufficient represented to enable
Co."
the court to deal properly and justly with that interest and
with all other interest involved in the suit. In the class suit,
then, representation of a class interest which will be affected The order appealed from is reversed, the demurrer of the
by the judgment is indispensable; but it is not indispensable defendants based upon supposed lack of parties is
to make each member of the class an actual party. overruled, and the defendants are required to answer to the
amended complaint within the time allowed by law and the
rules of the court. The costs of this appeal will be paid by the
A common illustration in American procedure of the situation
defendants. So ordered.
justifying a class suit is that presented by the creditors' bill,
which is filed by one party interested in the estate of an
insolvent, to secure the distribution of the assets distributable A. M. No. MTJ-05-1610 September 26, 2005
among all the creditors. In such cases the common practice
is for one creditor to sue as plaintiff in behalf of himself and
DR. JOSE S. LUNA, Complainants, 
other creditors. (Johnson vs. Waters, 111 U.S., 640; 28 Law.
vs.
ed., 547.) Another illustration is found in the case of
CIVIL PROCEDURE – RULE 2, SECTION 2; RULE 3, SECTION 12; and RULE 5 (SUMMARY PROCEDURE)
Assigned cases for first exam
JUDGE EDUARDO H. MIRAFUENTE, Municipal Trial
Court, Buenavista, Marinduque, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Judge Eduardo H. Mirafuente of the Municipal Trial Court of
Buenavista, Marinduque, respondent, is charged with Grave
Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of
the Service, Violation of the Rules on Summary Procedure in
Special Cases and Gross Ignorance of the Law by Dr. Jose
S. Luna (Dr. Luna) arising from respondent’s act of giving
due course to the belatedly filed and unverified answer of the
defendants in a complaint for unlawful detainer.
In May 2003, Dr. Luna filed a complaint for unlawful detainer,
docketed as Civil Case No. Y2K3-01, against Florencio
Sadiwa and Alex Sadiwa (the defendants) with the Municipal
Trial Court of Buenavista, Marinduque presided by
respondent.
As adverted to above, the defendants filed an unverified
answer to the complaint, seven (7) days beyond the
reglementary period of ten (10) days from the service of the
summons on them.
In mid July 2003, Dr. Luna’s counsel filed a Motion for
Judgment,1 invoking Section 6 of the Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure, to which motion the defendants did not
file any opposition. By Order2 of August 28, 2003 respondent
denied the motion.
Dr. Luna later filed an Urgent Manifestation 3 relative to the
said order of respondent which the latter treated as a motion
for reconsideration and which he denied.
Hence, arose the present administrative complaint4 against
respondent, Dr. Luna asserting that as the defendants’
answer was unverified and belatedly filed, respondent should
have motu proprio or on motion of the plaintiffs rendered
judgment as warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint,
following Section 6 of the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure.
In his Comment5 dated April 16, 2004, respondent explains
that his admission of the defendants’ unverified, belatedly
filed answer was premised on "the spirit of justice and fair
4
play, which underlie[s] every court litigation and serves as
the bedrock to preserve the trust and faith of parties litigants
in the judicial system;" that the admission was proper
because the delay was negligible, it involving only four (4)
days as June 13 to 15, 2003 were non-working holidays (per
presidential proclamation in connection with the
Independence Day celebration); that the defendants might
have believed that the period to file answer was 15 days,
which is the usual or common period to file an answer; and
that the delay was also excusable as defendants acted pro
se, without the benefit of legal assistance, and not dilatory.
At any rate, respondent contends that,
assuming arguendo that he erred in denying Dr. Luna’s
Motion for Judgment, a judge may not be held
administratively liable for every erroneous order or decision,
for to hold otherwise would render judicial office untenable as
no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the
process of administering the law can be infallible in his
judgment. Besides, respondent adds, there is a judicial
remedy to correct the error.
For ignorance of the law, the Office of the Court
Administrator, by Report and Recommendation 6 dated
December 21, 2004, recommends that respondent be faulted
and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of ₱11,000.00, with
stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall
be dealt with more severely.
The office of a judge exists for one solemn end – to promote
the ends of justice by administering it speedily and
impartially. A judge is the visible representation of the law
and justice. These are self-evident dogmas which do not
even have to be emphasized, but to which this Court is wont
to advert when members of the judiciary commit legal faux
pas, hopefully only through unwitting error or inattention.7
Delay in the disposition of cases undermines the people’s
faith and confidence in the judiciary. Hence, judges are
enjoined to decide cases with dispatch. 8 Such a requirement
is especially demanded in forcible entry and unlawful
detainer cases.
For forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases involve
perturbation of social order, which must be restored as
promptly as possible, such that technicalities or details of
procedure which may cause unnecessary delays should
carefully be avoided.9 That explains why the Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure which governs ejectment, among other
cases, lays down procedural safeguards to guarantee
expediency and speedy resolution.
Sections 5 and 6 of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure provide:
Sec. 5. Answer. – Within ten (10) days from service of
summons, the defendant shall file his answer to the
complaint and serve a copy thereof on the plaintiff. xxx
Sec. 6. Effect of failure to answer. – Should the defendant
fail to answer the complaint within the period above
provided, the court, motu proprio, or on motion of the
plaintiff, shall render judgment as may be warranted by
the facts alleged in the complaint and limited to what is
prayed for therein: Provided, however, That the court may
in its discretion reduce the amount of damages and
attorney’s fees claimed for being excessive or otherwise
unconscionable. This is without prejudice to the applicability
of Section 4, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, if there are two or
more defendants. (Italics in the original, emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
The word "shall" in the above-quoted sections of the 1991
Revised Rule on Summary Procedure underscores their
mandatory character.10 Giving the provisions a directory
application would subvert the nature of the Rule and defeat
its objective of expediting the adjudication of the suits
covered thereby. To admit a late answer is to put a premium
on dilatory maneuvers – the very mischief that the Rule
seeks to redress.
In the present case, respondent gave a liberal interpretation
of the above-said Rule. Liberal interpretation or construction
of the law or rules, however, is not a free commodity that
may be availed of in all instances under the cloak of
rendering justice. Liberality in the interpretation and
application of Rules applies only in proper cases and under
justifiable causes and circumstances. While it is true that
litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally true that
every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the
prescribed procedure to insure an orderly and speedy
administration of justice.11
Respondent’s act, albeit a disregard of procedural rules,
does not, however, constitute grave misconduct.
Neither does it constitute gross ignorance of the law. Gross
ignorance transcends a simple error in the application of
CIVIL PROCEDURE – RULE 2, SECTION 2; RULE 3, SECTION 12; and RULE 5 (SUMMARY PROCEDURE)
Assigned cases for first exam
legal provisions. In the absence of fraud, dishonesty or that, as in the above-cited Ruperto case, the penalty may be
corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are as it is hereby mitigated to severe reprimand.
generally not subject to disciplinary action, even though such
acts are erroneous.12
WHEREFORE, for violation of Section 6 of the Revised Rule
on Summary Procedure, respondent Judge Eduardo H.
For liability for ignorance of the law to attach, the assailed Mirafuente is hereby SEVERELY REPRIMANDED19 with a
order, decision or actuation of the judge in the performance warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be
of official duties must not only be found to be erroneous but, dealt with more strictly.
most importantly, it must be established that the issuance
thereof was actuated by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred or
SO ORDERED.
some other like motive.13 Any of such circumstances does
not obtain in the instant case.

That respondent granted complainant’s motion for

inhibition14 just to erase any nagging doubts on his
impartiality and fairness negates malice or any like motive on
his part.

Respondent’s act of admitting the belated answer violated

Section 6 of the above-quoted Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure, however, which violation is classified as less
serious charge15 under Section 9 of Rule 140, as amended
by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC16 (Violation of Supreme Court rules,
directives and circulars).

In Ruperto v. Banquerigo17 wherein the therein respondent

Judge was charged also for violation of some provisions of
the Revised Rule on Summary Judgment, he was severely
reprimanded after taking into account the fact that he was
not only detailed to the court where the cases therein
involved were pending, but also to other courts. Such
multiple assignments were seen to affect his efficient
handling of cases. Additionally, lack of showing of malice,
corrupt motives or improper considerations on the part of the
judge was appreciated.

Respecting respondent’s admission of the unverified answer

of the defendants, while paragraph (B) of Section 3 of the
Revised Rule on Summary Procedure requires that "all
pleadings shall be verified," the requirement is formal, not
jurisdictional. The court may order the correction of the
pleading if the verification is lacking or act on the pleading
although it is not verified, if the attending circumstances are
such that strict compliance with the rules may be dispensed
with in order that the end of justice may thereby be served.18

After considering the appreciation by respondent of the fact

that the defendants filed a belated and unverified answer
without the assistance of counsel, and the lack of showing of
malice, corrupt motives or the like on his part, this Court finds
5