BALT, AL-EMIR YUSOPH J.

LLB-3
SUCCESSION

CARMEN LINART Y PAVIA,  

vs.
MARIA JUANA UGARTE E ITURRALDE, 
G.R. No. L-2599

Facts: Ramon Iturralde y Gonzalez having died intestate on the 28th of December, 1900, Maria
Juana Ugarte e Iturralde asked that she be judicially declared the legitimate heir of the
deceased. There being no legitimate heirs to the estate either in the direct ascendant or
descendant line of succession, the petitioner presented herself as a collateral descendant, that
is to say, as the legitimate niece of the deceased. However, Carmen Linart, through her
guardian, Rafaela Pavia, claimed one-half of all of the estate of the deceased, Ramon Iturralde
y Gonzalez, and asked at the same time that Maria Juana Ugarte e Iturralde, who had been
declared the lawful heir of the deceased.The fa ther of the petitioner was in the same collateral
degree of succession as Maria Juana Ugarte e Iturralde. Pablo Linart, the father of Carmen
Linart, was the legitimate son of Maria Josefa Iturralde y Gonzalez, another sister of Ramon
Iturralde y Gonzalez. The court below on the 24th of February, 1905, entered judgment
declaring that the petitioner had the same right to participate in the inheritance as had Maria
Juana Ugarte e Iturralde, and ordered the latter to render an account of the estate, enjoining
her, at the same time, from disposing of any part thereof until such accounting had been made
and the estate distributed.

Issue: Who has better right over the estate of Ramon Iturralde y Gonzalez.

Ruling: The High Court reverse the decision of the lower court and held that Carmen
Linart has no right to succeed the deceased with said Maria Juana Ugarte e Iturralde, who was
once declared to be the lawful heir, and who is now in possession of the estate, as to whom we
hereby dissolve the injunction issued from the Court of First Instance, following the rule that the
relative nearest in degree excludes those more distant, with the exception of the right of
representation in proper cases; and that the right of representation in the collateral line shall
take place only in favor of children of brothers or sisters whether they be of whole or half blood.
The error which the appellant claims was committed in the court below is very clearly shown.
The court below held that the grandniece was entitled to the same share of the estate that the
niece was entitled to, when, as a matter of law, the right of representation in the collateral line
can only take place in favor of the children of brothers or sisters of the intestate, and the plaintiff
in this case is not a daughter of one of the sisters of the deceased.
BENITA SALAO, assisted by her husband, GREGORIO MARCELO; ALMARIO ALCURIZA,
ARTURO ALCURIZA, OSCAR ALCURIZA and ANITA ALCURIZA, the latter two being
minors are represented by guardian ad litem, ARTURO ALCURIZA, , 
vs.
JUAN S. SALAO, later substituted by PABLO P. SALAO, Administrator of the Intestate of
JUAN S. SALAO; now MERCEDES P. VDA. DE SALAO, ROBERTO P. SALAO, MARIA
SALAO VDA. DE SANTOS, LUCIANA P. SALAO, ISABEL SALAO DE SANTOS, and
PABLO P. SALAO, as successors-in-interest of the late JUAN S. SALAO, together with
PABLO P. SALAO, Administrator, 

G.R. No. L-26699

Facts: The spouses Manuel Salao and Valentina Ignacio of Barrio Dampalit, Malabon, Rizal
begot four children named Patricio, Alejandra, Juan (Banli) and Ambrosia. Manuel Salao died in
1885. His eldest son, Patricio, died in 1886 survived by his only child. Valentin Salao. After
Valentina’s death, her estate was administered by her daughter Ambrosia. The documentary
evidence proves that in 1911 or prior to the death of Valentina Ignacio her two children, Juan Y.
Salao, Sr. and Ambrosia Salao, secured a Torrens title, OCT No. 185 of the Registry of Deeds
of Pampanga, in their names The property in question is the forty-seven-hectare fishpond
located at Sitio Calunuran, Lubao, Pampanga, wherein Benita Salao-Marcelo daughter of
Valentin Salao claimed 1/3 interest on the said fishpond. The defendant Juan Y. Salao Jr.
inherited from his father Juan Y. Salao, Sr. ½ of the fishpond and the other half from the
donation of his auntie Ambrosia Salao. It was alleged in the said case that Juan Y. Salao, Sr
and Ambrosia Salao had engaged in the fishpond business. Where they obtained the capital
and that Valentin Salao and Alejandra Salao were included in that joint venture, that the funds
used were the earnings of the properties supposedly inherited from Manuel Salao, and that
those earnings were used in the acquisition of the Calunuran fishpond. There is no documentary
evidence to support that theory.

Issues: 1. Whether or not the Calunuran fishpond was held in trust for Valentin Salao by
Juan Y. Salao, Sr. and Ambrosia Salao.
2. Whether or not plaintiffs’ action for reconveyance had already prescribed.
Ruling: There was no resulting trust in this case because there never was any intention
on the part of Juan Y. Salao, Sr., Ambrosia Salao and Valentin Salao to create any trust. There
was no constructive trust because the registration of the two fishponds in the names of Juan
and Ambrosia was not vitiated by fraud or mistake. This is not a case where to satisfy the
demands of justice it is necessary to consider the Calunuran fishpond ” being held in trust by the
heirs of Juan Y. Salao, Sr. for the heirs of Valentin Salao. A Torrens Title is generally a
conclusive evidence of the ownership of the land referred to therein. A strong presumption
exists that Torrens titles were regularly issued and that they are valid. In order to maintain an
action for reconveyance, proof as to the fiduciary relation of the parties must be clear and
convincing. The plaintiffs utterly failed to prove by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence. It
cannot rest on vague and uncertain evidence or on loose, equivocal or indefinite declarations.
Where a trust is to be established by oral proof, the testimony supporting it must be sufficiently
strong to prove the right of the alleged beneficiary with as much certainty as if a document
proving the trust were shown. A trust cannot be established, contrary to the recitals of a Torrens
title, upon vague and inconclusive proof. Reconveyance had already prescribed. Plaintiffs’
action is clearly barred by prescription or laches. Under Act No. 190, whose statute of limitation
would apply if there were an implied trust in this case, the longest period of extinctive
prescription was only ten year. The Calunuran fishpond was registered in 1911. The written
extrajudicial demand for its reconveyance was made by the plaintiffs in 1951. Their action was
filed in 1952 or after the lapse of more than forty years from the date of registration. The
plaintiffs and their predecessor-in-interest, Valentin Salao, slept on their rights if they had any
rights at all. Even if the donation were declared void, the plaintiffs would not have any
successional rights to Ambrosia’s share. The sole legal heir of Ambrosia was her nephew, Juan,
Jr., her nearest relative within the third degree. Valentin Salao, if living in 1945 when Ambrosia
died, would have been also her legal heir, together with his first cousin, Juan, Jr. (Juani). Benita
Salao, the daughter of Valentin, could not represent him in the succession to the estate of
Ambrosia since in the collateral line, representation takes place only in favor of the children of
brothers or sisters whether they be of the full or half blood. The nephew excludes a grandniece
like Benita Salao or great-gandnephews like the plaintiffs Alcuriza.
LAURO G. VIZCONDE, 
vs.,
COURT OF APPEALS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Branch 120, Caloocan City, and
RAMON G. NICOLAS, 
G.R. No. 118449

Facts: Lauro Vizconde and his wife Estrellita has 2 daughters. On May 22, 1979, Estrellita
purchased from her father a parcel of land (Valenzuela property). Later on, she sold the
Valenzuela property Lim. On June 1990, she bought from Premier Homes a parcel of land with
improvements (Paranaque property) using the proceeds from the sale of the Valenzuela
property. On June 1991, the Vizconde massacre happened. Estrellita and her daughters were
killed thereafter leaving Lauro as t sole heir of their estate. Later on, Rafael (Estrellita’s father)
died intestate. The heirs of Rafael averred that their legitime should come from the collation of
all the properties distributed by Nicolas to his children during his lifetime, including the
Paranaque property.
Issue: Whether or not the collation is proper.
Ruling: The probate court made a reversible error in ordering collation of the Parañaque
property. It was the Valenzuela property that was transferred to Estrellita, by way of deed of
sale. The Parañaque property which Estrellita acquired by using the proceeds of the sale of the
Valenzuela property does not become collationable simply by reason thereof. Indeed, collation
of the Parañaque property has no statutory basis. The order of the probate court presupposes
that the Parañaque property was gratuitously conveyed by Rafael to Estrellita. Records indicate,
however, that the Parañaque property was conveyed for and in consideration of P900,000.00,
by Premier Homes, Inc., to Estrellita. Rafael, the decedent, has no participation therein, and
Lauro who inherited and is now the present owner of the Parañaque property is not one of
Rafael's heirs. Thus, the probate court's order of collation against Lauro is unwarranted for the
obligation to collate is lodged with Estrellita, the heir, and not to herein Lauro who does not have
any interest in Rafael's estate. As it stands, collation of the Parañaque property is improper for,
to repeat, collation covers only properties gratuitously given by the decedent during his lifetime
to his compulsory heirs which fact does not obtain anent the transfer of the Parañaque property.
Moreover, Rafael, in a public instrument, voluntarily and willfully waived any "claims, rights,
ownership and participation as heir" in the Parañaque property.
ANSELMA DIAZ, guardian of VICTOR, RODRIGO, ANSELMINA and MIGUEL, all surnamed
SANTERO, and FELIXBERTA PACURSA, guardian of FEDERICO SANTERO, et al
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and FELISA PAMUTI JARDIN, 
G.R. No. L-66574

Facts: Petitioner Atty. Ferrer represented Comandante, daughter of spouses Diazes obtainloan
to petitioner. The loan was secured by a Real Estate Mortgage Contract. Petitioner further
claimed that prior to said loan, Comandante, for a valuable considerationof P600,000.00, which
amount formed part of the abovementioned secured loan,executed in his favor an instrument
entitled Waiver of Hereditary Rights and InterestsOver a Real Property (Still Undivided). The
Diazes, however, reneged on their obligation as the checks issued by Comandante were
dishonored uponpresentment. Despite repeated demands, said respondents still failed and
refused tosettle the loan. Thus, petitioner filed a Complaint for Collection of Sum of
MoneySecured by Real Estate Mortgage Contract against the Diazes and Comandante.

Issue: Whether or not a waiver of hereditary rights in favor of another executed by a future heir
while the parents are still living valid.
Ruling: Pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 1347 of the Civil Code, no contract
may beentered into upon a future inheritance except in cases expressly authorized by law. For
the inheritance to be considered “future”, the succession must not have been opened at the time
of the contract. A contract may be classified as a contract upon future inheritance,
prohibitedunder the second paragraph of Article 1347, where the following requisites concur: (1)
That the succession has not yet been opened. (2) That the object of the contract forms part of
the inheritance; and, (3) That the promissor has, with respect to the object, an expectancy of
aright which is purely hereditary in nature. In this case, there is no question that at the time of
execution of Comandante’s Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interest Over a Real Property (Still
Undivided), succession to either of her parent’s properties has not yet been opened since both
of them are still living. With respectto the other two requisites, both are likewise present
considering that the property subject matter of Comandante’s waiver concededly forms part of
the properties that she expect toinherit from her parents upon their death and, such expectancy
of a right, as shown by thefacts, is undoubtedly purely hereditary in nature. From the foregoing,
it is clear that Comandante and petitioner entered into a contract involving the former’s future
inheritance as embodied in the Waiver of Hereditary Rights andInterest Over a Real Property
(Still Undivided) executed by her in petitioner’s favor.
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF PEDRO SANTILLON, CLARO
SANTILLON, 
vs.
PERFECTA MIRANDA, BENITO U. MIRANDA and ROSARIO CORRALES, .
G.R. No. L-19281            

Facts: Pedro Santillon died without testament leaving his wife, Perfecta Miranda and one son,
Claro. Four years after Pedro’s death, Claro filed a petition for letters of administration which
was opposed by his mother and spouses Benito Miranda and Rosario Corrales. The court
appointed commissioners to draft a project of partition and distribution of all properties of Pedro.
Claro then filed a motion to declare share of heirs and to resolve conflicting claims of the parties
invoking Art.892 of the New Civil Code insisting that after deducting ½ from the conjugal
properties (conjugal share of Perfecta), the remaining ½ must be divided as follows: ¼ for her
and ¾ for him. On the other hand, Perfecta claimed besides her conjugal half, she was entitled
under Art. 996 of the NCC to another ½ of the remaining half. After due notice and hearing, the
court held that Perfecta is entitled to ½ shares and the remaining ½ share for Claro after
deducting the share of the widow as co-owner of the conjugal properties. Hence, this appeal.

Issue: Whether or not Perfecta is entitled to 1/2 of the other half.

Ruling: Intestate proceedings in the New Civil Code’s chapter on legal or intestate
succession, the only article applicable is Art. 996. Our conclusion (equal shares) seems a
logical inference from the circumstance that whereas Article 834 of the Spanish Civil Code form
which Art. 996 was taken, contained two paragraphs governing two contingencies, the first,
where the widow or widower survives with legitimate children (general rule), and the second,
where the widow or widower survives with only one child (exception), Art. 996 omitted to provide
for the second situation, thereby indicating the legislator’s desire to promulgate just one general
rule applicable to both situations. Surviving spouse concurring with a legitimate child entitled to
one-half of the intestate estate. When an intestacy occurs, a surviving spouse concurring with
only one legitimate child of the deceased is entitled to one-half of the estate of the deceased
spouse under Art. 996 of the Civil Code.
G.R. No. 94918
DANILO I. SUAREZ, EUFROCINA SUAREZ-ANDRES, MARCELO I. SUAREZ, JR., EVELYN
SUAREZ-DE LEON and REGINIO I. SUAREZ,
v. THE COURT OF APPEALS, VALENTE RAYMUNDO, VIOLETA RAYMUNDO, MA.
CONCEPCION VITO and VIRGINIA BANTA, 
G.R. No. 94918

Facts: Herein petitioners are brothers and sisters. Their father died in 1955 and since then his
estate consisting of several valuable parcels of land in Pasig, Metro Manila has lot been
liquidated or partitioned. In 1977, petitioners’ widowed mother and Rizal Realty Corporation lost
in the consolidated cases for rescission of contract and for damages, and were ordered by
Branch 1 of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal (now Branch 151, RTC of Pasig) to pay,
jointly and severally, herein respondents the aggregate principal amount of about P70,000 as
damages. The judgment against petitioner’s mother and Rizal Realty Corporation having
become final and executory, five (5) valuable parcel of land in Pasig, Metro Manila, (worth to be
millions then) were levied and sold on execution on June 24, 1983 in favor of the private
respondents as the highest bidder for the amount of P94,170.000. Private respondents were
then issued a certificate of sale which was subsequently registered or August 1, 1983. On June
21, 1984 before the expiration of the redemption period, petitioners filed a reinvindicatory action
2 against private respondents and the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal, thereafter docketed as Civil
Case No. 51203, for the annulment of the auction sale and the recovery of the ownership of the
levied pieces of property. Therein, they alleged, among others, that being strangers to the case
decided against their mother, they cannot be held liable therefor and that the five (5) parcels of
land, of which they are co-owners, can neither be levied nor sold on execution.
Issue: Whether or not private respondents can validly acquire all the five (5) parcels of land co-
owned by petitioners and registered in the name of petitioner’s deceased father.
Ruling: The law in point is Article 777 of the Civil Code, the law applicable at the time of
the institution of the case. "The rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the
death of the decedent."
Article 888 further provides:
"The legitime of the legitimate children and descendants consists of one-half of the hereditary
estate of the father and of the mother.” The latter may freely dispose of the remaining half,
subject to the rights of illegitimate children and of the surviving spouse as hereinafter provided."
Article 892 par. 2 likewise provides:
"If there are two or more legitimate children or descendants, the surviving spouse shall be
entitled to a portion equal to the legitime of each of the legitimate children or descendants."
Thus, from the foregoing, the legitime of the surviving spouse is equal to the legitime of each
child. The proprietary interest of petitioners in the levied and auctioned property is different from
and adverse to that of their mother. Petitioners became co-owners of the property not because
of their mother but through their own right as children of their deceased father. Therefore,
petitioners are not barred in any way from instituting the action to annul the auction sale to
protect their own interest.
G.R. No. L-5343
CELESTINO RODRIGUEZ, administrator, ET AL., 
v.
LUISA RAVILAN,
Facts: On November 29, 1904, Jorgia Barte and Donato Mendoza, in representation of their
son, Nicolas Mendoza, filed a written amended complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cebu
against Luisa Ravilan, the guardian of their daughters Maximina, Paulina, Pelagia, and Maxima,
all surnamed Barte. The complaint recites, among other things, that many years ago Javier
Barte and Eulalia Seno died in the pueblo of Mandaue, leaving property and, as heirs,
Espiridion, Feliciana, Telesfora, Juana, Carmelo, Casimira, Jorgia, Matea, and Pedro,
surnamed Barte, and that, although five of them divided among themselves the said property,
consisting of lands situated in the said pueblo and several carabaos, the legal portions which
pertained to four of them, Epiridion, Jorgia, Matea, and Pedro, remained undivided, and these
latter continued to possess, in common, the property that fell to their shares, and were also
associated in business separately from their other coheirs. That the business of the said four
brothers and sisters was, by common accord, administered by one of them Espiridion Barte,
and, when he died, the three survivors remained united in their interest and the undivided
property was administered, until December, 1901, by Pedro Barte, who at his death four heirs,
the said Maximina, Paulina, Pelagia, and Maxima, represented by their mother, Luisa Ravilan,
the wife and widow of Pedro Barte and the defendant in this suit; that the said property, as
aforesaid, was administered by Espiridion Barte, in common accord with the others, and, he
having died without leaving heirs, by force of law the part that pertained to him passed to his
brother Pedro and his sisters Jorgia and Matea, as the heirs nearest of kin of the said
Espiridion, and, by common agreement, the said brother and sisters continued their partnership
organization and appointed the brother Pedro as administrator; that during the latter's
administration, Matea Barte also died, leaving as her heir Nicolas Mendoza, represented by his
father Donato, one of the plaintiffs; that at the death of Pedro Barte, Jorgia Barte and Donato
Mendoza, in the name of their son Nicolas decided upon the distribution of the property
mentioned and so stated, in February, 1902, to Luisa Ravilan, the guardian of the heirs of Pedro
Barte, but that Ravilan would not agree to the partition, on the pretext that, as the administratix
of that property, she had to pay debts of the deceased. That three years having elapsed, up to
the time of the complaint, and the debts having been settled, as admitted by the defendant
herself, the latter was requested to present the accounts, which she absolutely refused to do,
and that she continued in the possession and to enjoy the usufruct of the said property, without
the consent or intervention of the plaintiffs; that Jorgia Barte, Nicolas Mendoza, the heir of
Matea Barte, and the heirs of Pedro Barte, named Maximina, Paulina, Pelagia, and Maxima
Barte, were then entitled to the property in question, which should be divided among them in
three equal parts, one to be allotted to Jorgia Barte, another to Nicolas Mendoza, and the other
to the heirs of Pedro Barte. The demand further recites that the plaintiffs desire that a division
be made and therefore pray that a partition of the property, both real and personal, be decreed
and also of the profits that may have accrued thereto during the time that it was in the
possession of and usufruct enjoyed by the defendant, in accordance with the respective rights
of the parties, and that, in case that the distribution can not be made without detriment to such
rights, the property be ordered sold and the proceeds divided among the parties. The plaintiff
requested also that the costs of the suit be assessed against the defendant

Issue: Whether or not the properties should be parttioned against the claim of Luisa Ravilan.
Ruling: It is true that the defendant Luisa Ravilan stated in her sworn testimony that, as
the guardian of her children, she had an interest in the lands situated in Mandaue and that the
parcels of land situated in Tabogon did not belong to her, nor to her deceased husband, Pedro
Barte; but she positively affirmed that the seven parcels of land situated in Bogo were acquired
by her said husband during his lifetime and during his marriage with her, and she exhibited five
documents, one of them the original of a possessory information, as titles proving the ownership
of her said husband. Against the averment of the plaintiffs appear that of the defendant, in the
name of her four daughters, the heirs of Pedro Barte, and while the plaintiff party exhibited no
title of ownership whatever, not even of the lands situated in the pueblo of Bogo and which the
defendant affirmed were acquired by her deceased husband, Pedro Barte, during his lifetime, it
is an indisputable fact that the latter's widow, who in her own behalf and in the name of her four
daughters claims the exclusive ownership of the lands in Bogo, is at the present time in
possession thereof, and moreover showed documents which prove the acquisition of some of
them. The testimony of the defendant to the effect that she only had a share in the lands of
Mandaue, but not in those situated in Tabogon, is worthy of serious consideration, although she
positively affirmed that those situated in Bogo belonged to her husband and to herself. As she is
in possession of these lands, and as the record of the trial shows no proof that they belonged to
the joint association or partnership existing between the said four brothers and sisters, there are
no legal provisions that would support the issuance of an order for the partition of the said lands
in Bogo, of which the widow of their alleged former owner is now in possession. In actions for
the partition of property held in common it is assumed that the parties are all coowners or
coproprietors of the undivided property to be partitioned. The question of common ownership
need not be gone into at the time of the trial, but only how, in what manner, and in what
proportion the said property of common ownership shall be distributed among the interested
parties by order of court. Moreover, for the purposes of the partition demanded, it must be
remembered that the hereditary succession of the deceased Espiridion Barte, who it is said left
no legitimate descendants at his death, should be divided among his eight brothers and sisters
who may have survived him, and in case any of these have died, the children of his deceased
brother or sister, that is, his nephews and nieces per stirpes, are entitled to share in his
inheritance, according to the provisions of articles 946, 947, and 948 of the Civil Code, the last
cited of which prescribes: "Should brothers survive with nephews, children of brothers of the
whole blood, the former shall inherit per capita and the latter per stirpes," representing their
respective fathers or mothers, brothers or sisters of the deceased. The record does not show
whether Jorgia Barte left any legitimate heir at her death, and if she did not, her collateral
relatives succeed her in the manner provided by law. It is to be noted that the partnership
contract entered into by the four brothers and sisters can not affect the hereditary rights which
belong to the relatives of the deceased predecessor in interest successions. (Arts. 744, 763,
806, 808, 913, 946, Civil Code.)