1. G.R. No.

L-21783          November 29, 1969

PACIFIC FARMS, INC., plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
SIMPLICIO G. ESGUERRA, ET AL., defendants,
CARRIED LUMBER COMPANY, defendant-appellant.

Primicias, Del Castillo, Macaraeg and T. P. Regino for defendant-appellant.

Araneta and Araneta for plaintiff-appellee.

CASTRO, J.:

FACTS: Carried Lumber Company (Company) sold and delivered lumber and construction
materials to the Insular Farms Inc. for the construction of six buildings, with a total cost of
P15,000.00. The amount of P4,710.18 was not paid. The Company instituted a civil case to
recover the unpaid balance and the court sustained their claim, consequently, the Company
levied six buildings. Pacific Farms, Inc. filed a suit against the Company and the sheriff
asserting ownership over the levied buildings which it had acquired from the Insular Farms
by virtue of absolute sale executed. The Plaintiff prays that the judicial sale of the six
buildings be declared null and void. The trial court rendered judgment annulling the levy and
the certificate of sale. However, it denied the plaintiff's claim for actual and exemplary
damages.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Planitiff-Appellant has its right for reimbursement.

Ruling:
Yes, The Plaintiff-Appellant has right for reimbursement through the executin of the final
judgement it obtained for the six buildings. Article 447 of the Civil Code contemplates a
principal and an accessory; the land being considered the principal, and the plantings,
constructions or works, the accessory. The owner of the land who in good faith - whether
personally or through another -makes constructions or works thereon, using materials
belonging to somebody else, becomes the owner of the said materials with the obligation
however of paying for their value. While the owner of the materials is entitled to remove
them, provided no substantial injury is caused to the landowner. Otherwise, he has the right
to reimbursement for the value of his materials. Applying article 447 by analogy, the Court
consider the buildings as the principal and the lumber and construction materials that went
into their construction as the accessory. Thus the appellee, if it does own the six buildings,
must bear the obligation to pay for the values of the said materials; the appellant — which
apparently has no desire to remove the materials, and, even if it were minded to do so,
cannot remove them without necessarily damaging the buildings — has the corresponding
right to recover the value of the unpaid lumber and construction materials.

2. G.R. No. 193517               January 15, 2014

THE HEIRS OF VICTORINO SARILI, NAMELY: ISABEL A. SARILI,* MELENCIA** S.

MAXIMO, ALBERTO A. SARILI, IMELDA S. HIDALGO, all herein represented by CELSO A.
SARILI, Petitioners,
vs.
PEDRO F. LAGROSA, represented in this act by his Attorney-in-Fact LOURDES LABIOS
MOJICA, Respondent.

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

FACTS:
The Respondent Lagrosa was the owner of the subject parcel of land situated. He resided in
California, USA and when he went back in the Philippines, he found out that a new certificate of
title was issued by the Registry of Deeds (RD) in the name of Victorino Sarili by virtue of an
alleged falsified document by Sps. Sarili and the RD. Sps. Sarili maintained that they are
innocent buyers for value having purchased the property from Ramon B. Rodriguez who
possessed and presented a Special Power of Attorney to sell/dispose the property.

ISSUE: Whether or not the conveyance of the subject property to Sps. Sarili was valid.

RULING:
No, the sale between Victorino Sarili and Ramon Rodrigues was void because the notarized
Special Power of Attorney was defective. The land title in the name of Victorino married to Isabel
must be annulled and the name of Pedro Lagrosa be reinstated. As to the house built by Sps.
Sarili on the land, since he was aware of the irregularity in the Special Power of Attorney and that
the person he was dealing with was possibly not authorized, he was considered a builder in bad
faith.

3. Sad
4. Pleasantville Development Corporation v. Court of AppealsG.R. No. 79688,
February 1, 1996, Panganiban, J.

FACTS: On March 26, 1974, Wilson Kee on installment Lot 8 from C.T.
TorresEnterprises Inc. the exclusive real estate agent of petitioner. Under the Contract to
Sell on installment. Kee can exercise possession over the parcel of land even before
thecompletion of installment payments. On January 20, 1975, Kee paid CTTEI relocationfee
of Php 50.00 and another on January 27, 1975 for the preparation of lot plan. Theseamounts
were paid by Kee before he took possession of Lot 8. After the preparation ofthe lot plan and
a copy was presented to Kee, Zenaida Octaviano, employee of CTTEIaccompanied
Donnabelle Kee the wife of Wilson Kee to inspect Lot 8. Unfortuantely,Octaviano pointed Lot
9. Thereafter, Kee constructed his residence on the said Lot 9together a store, repair shop
and other improvements.Edith Robillo purchased from Pleasantville Development
Corporation Lot 9. Sometimein 1975, she sold the said parcel of land, Lot 9, to Eldred
Jardinico which at that time isvacant. Upon paying completely to Robillo, Jardinico secured
from the Register ofDeeds of Bacolod City on December 19, 1978 Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 106367 inhis name. It was only that time that he discovered that Wilson Kee take
possession ofthat lot and that the same have introduced improvements to the same lot.
Jardinicoconfronted Kee and tried to reach for an amicable settlement, but failed.On January
30, 1981, Jardinico, through his lawyer, demanded that Kee vacate Lot 9and remove all the
improvements introduced by the latter. Kee refused which madeJardinico filed with the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 3, Bacolod City acomplaint for ejectment
with damages against Kee. Kee, in turn filed a third-partycomplaint against Pleasantville
Development Corporation and CTTEI.The MTCC held that the erroneous delivery was
attributable to CTTEI and the Kee hasno rights to Lot 9 because of the rescission made by
CTTEI of their contract due toKee’s failure to pay the installment. MTCC also held that Kee
must pay reasonablerental for the use of Lot 9 and furthermore he cannot claim
reimbursement for theimprovements introduced by him. On appeal, the Regional
Trial Court held thatPleasantville and CTTEI were not negligent and that Kee was in bad
faith.Kee appealed directly to the Supreme Court which referred the matter to the Court
ofAppeals. The Appellate Court overturned the ruling of the RTC and held the Kee was
abuilder in good faith and the erroneous delivery was attributable to the negligence ofCTTEI.
Hence the instant petition filed by Pleasantville.
 ISSUES: 1.) Whether or not, Wilson Kee is a builder in good faith.2.) Whether or not
petitioner is liable for the acts of its agent CTTEI.

HELD: 1.) Petitioner fails to persuade the Court to abandon the findings
andconclusions of the Court of Appeals that Kee was a builder in good faith. Good
faithconsists in the belief of the builder that the land he is building on is his and
hisignorance of any defect or flaw in his title. And as good faith is presumed, petitioner
hasthe burden of proving bad faith on the part of Kee. At the time he built improvements
onLot 8, Kee believed that said lot was what he bought from petitioner. He was not
awarethat the lot delivered to him was not Lot 8. Thus, Kee is in good faith. Petitioner failed
toprove otherwise.To demonstrate Kee's bad faith, petitioner points to Kee's violation of
paragraphs 22and 26 of the Contract of Sale on Installment. It has no merit. Such violations
have nobearing whatsoever on whether Kee was a builder in good faith, that is, on his state
ofmind at the time he built the improvements on Lot 9. These alleged violations may giverise
to petitioner's cause of action against Kee under the said contract (contractual breach), but
may not be the basis to negate the presumption that Kee was a builder ingood faith.

2.) Yes. The rule is that the principal is responsible for the acts of the agent done withinthe
scope of his authority, and should bear the damage caused to third persons. On theother
hand, the agent who exceeds his authority is personally liable for the damage.But CTTEI was
acting within its authority as the sole real estate representative ofpetitioner when it made
the delivery to Kee, only that in so acting, it was negligent. It isthis negligence that is the
basis of petitioner's liability, as principal of CTTEI, per Articles1909 and 1910 of the Civil
Code. For such negligence, the petitioner should be heldliable for damages. The rights of
Kee and Jardinico vis-a-vis each other, as builder ingood faith and owner in good faith,
respectively, are regulated by law (i.e., Arts. 448,546 and 548 of the Civil Code). It was error
for the Court of Appeals to make a "slightmodification" in the application of such law [by
holding petitioner and CTTEI solidarilyliable], on the ground of "equity".

5. Asd
6. Asd

7. Sarmiento v. Agana; 129 SCRA 122

FACTS:
While one Ernesto was still courting his wife, the latter's mother had told him the couple
could build a residential house on a certain lot. They constructed a residential house.

Subsequently, the land was sold to petitioner Sarmiento, who asked Ernesto and his wife to
vacate. Sarmiento filed an Ejectment suit against them.

In the evidentiary hearing, Sarmiento submitted the deed of sale of the land which showed
the price to be PHP15,000. On the otherhand, Ernesto testified that the residential house
then cost PHP30,000-40,000, which was not questioned.

The MTC found that Ernesto was a builder in good faith and the house had a value of
PHP20,000. When the case was elevated, the CFI of Pasay ordered Sarmiento to exercise his
option, to reimburse Ernesto for the sum of the house or allow them to purchase the land,
within sixty days. Upon expiration of the period, Ernesto was allowed to deposit the sum of
PHP25,000 with the Court as the purchase price for the land.
 ISSUE:
WON private respondents are builders in good faith. -- YES

HELD:
Ernesto and his wife were builders in good faith in view of the peculiar circumstance under
which they had constructed the residential house. As far as they knew, the land was owned
by Ernesto's mother-in-law, and could reasonably be expected to later on give them the
land.

The owner of the building erected in good faith on a land owned by another, is entitled to
retain the possession of the land until he is paid the value of his building. The owner of the
land, has the option either to pay for the building or to sell his land to the owner of the
building. But he cannot, as Sarmiento did, refuse both to pay for the building and to sell the
land and compel the owner of the building to remove it from the land where it is erected.

8. Pershing Tan Queto v. Court of AppealsG.R. No. L-35648, March 27, 1987, 148 SCRA
54Paras, J.

FACTS: Herein private respondent Restituta Tacalinar Guangco de Pombuena receivedthe

questioned lot from her mother Basilides Tacalinar either as a purported donation orby way
of purchase with P50 as the alleged consideration thereof. The donation or salewas
consummated while Restituta was already married to her husband
JuanPombuena. Juan then filed for himself and his supposed co-owner Resitituta
anapplication for a Torrens Title over the land which was later on granted pronouncing
him(‘married to Resitiuta’) as the owner of the land. A contract of lease over the lot was
entered into between petitioner, Pershing TanQueto and Restituta with the consent of her
husband for a period of 10 years. The leaseof contract having expired, Restituta filed for
unlawful detainer against Tan Queto. Theunlawful detainer case was won by the spouses in
the Municipal Court but on appeal inthe CFI the entire case was dismissed because of a
barter agreement whereby TanQueto became the owner of the disputed lot and the spouses
became the owners of aparcel of land with the house thereon previously owned before the
barter by Tan Queto.After the barter agreement, Tan Queto constructed on the disputed
land a concretebuilding without any objection from Restituta. Afterwards Restituta sued
both Juan andTan Queto for reconveyance of the title over the registered but
disputed lot, forannulment of the barter, and for recovery of the land with damages. The
respondent court’s decision which later on was affirmed by the Supreme court ledto the
reformation of the Contract of Sale of the disputed lot from Basilides to Restitutafrom a sale
to a conveyance of the share of Restituta in the future hereditary estate ofher parents.
Hence, this petition for a motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE: Whether or not the conveyance of the share of Restituta in the future
hereditaryestate of her parents was valid hence a paraphernal property.

HELD: No. The court ruled that the land is conjugal, not paraphernal. The oral donationof the
lot cannot be a valid donation intervivos because it was not executed in a publicinstrument
(Art. 749, Civil Code), nor as a valid donation mortis causa for the formalitiesof a will were
not complied with. The allegation that the transfer was a conveyance toRESTITUTA of her
hereditary share in the estate of her mother (or parents) cannot besustained for the
contractual transmission of future inheritance is generally prohibited. The fact is
ownership was acquired by both JUAN and RESTITUTA by tradition(delivery) as a
 consequence of the contract of sale (See Art. 712, Civil Code) withP50.00 (then a
considerable amount) as the cause or consideration of the transaction.The lot is therefore
conjugal, having been acquired by the spouses thru onerous title(the money used being
presumably conjugal there being no proof that RESTITUTA hadparaphernal funds of her
own).

9. Asd
10. Technogas Philippines Manufacturing Corporation v. Court of AppealsG.R. No.
108894, February, 10, 1997, 268 SCRA 5Panganiban, J.

FACTS: Technogas purchased a parcel of land from Pariz Industries, Inc. In the sameyear,
Eduardo Uy purchased the land adjacent to it. The following year, Uy boughtanother lot
adjoining the lot of Technogas. Portions of the buildings and wall bought byTechnogas
together with the land from Pariz Industries are occupying a portion of Uy’sadjoining land.
The knowledge of some encroachment was only made known to bothparties after their
parties of their respective parcels of land.

ISSUES: 1.) Whether or not petitioner Technogas Philippines is a possessor in bad faith.2.)
Whether or not petitioner Technogas Philippines has stepped into the shoes of theseller.

HELD: 1.) No. Unless one is versed in the science of surveying, no one can determinethe
precise extent or location of his property by merely examining his paper title. Thereis no
question in that when Technogas purchased the land from Pariz Industries, thebuildings and
other structures were already in existence. Furthermore, it is not clear asto who actually
built these structures but it can be assumed that the predecessor-in-interest of Technogas,
Pariz Industries, did so. An article 527 of the New Civil Codepresumes good faith. Since
no proof exists to show that the builder built theencroaching structures in bad
faith, the structures should be presumed to have beenbuilt in good faith. Good faith
consists in the belief of the builder that the land he isbuilding on is his, and his ignorance of
any defect or flaw in his title. Furthermore,possession acquired in good faith does not lose
this character except in case and fromthe moment facts exist which show that the possessor
is not aware that he possessesthe thing improperly or wrongfully. The good faith ceases
from the moment the defectsin the title are made known to the possessor, by extraneous
evidence or by suit forrecovery of the property of the true owner.

2.) Yes. Has been shown, contrary as to the good faith of Technogas has not
beenoverthrown. Similarly, upon delivery of the property to Pariz Industries, as seller,
toTechnogas, as buyer, the latter acquired ownership of the property.
Consequently,Technogas is deemed to have stepped into the shoes of the seller with regard
to all therights of ownership of the property over the immovable sold, including the right
tocompel Uy to exercise either of the two options under Article 448 of the New Civil
Code.Thus, the landowner’s exercise of his option can only take place after the builder
shallhave to know the intrusion – in short, when both parties shall have become aware of
it.Only then will the occasion for exercising the option arise, for it is only then that
bothparties will have been aware that a problem exists with regard to their property rights.

11. G.R. No. 149295          September 23, 2003

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner,

vs.
GENEROSO DE JESUS, represented by his Attorney-in-Fact, CHRISTIAN DE
JESUS, respondent.
VITUG, J.:

FACTS:
Respondent de Jesus filed a complaint against the PNB before the RTC for recovery of
ownership and possession, with damages, over the questioned property. A verification survey of
the property discovered that the northern portion of the lot was being encroached upon by a
building of the Petitioner. Despite two letters of demand sent by the Respondent, the Petitioner
refused to vacate the area. The Petitioner asserted that when it acquired the lot and the building
the previous owner, the encroachment was already in existence and to remedy the situation, it
was sold to the Petitioner at P100.00 per square meter. The sale, however, did not materialize
when, without the knowledge and consent of the Petitioner, it was later mortgaged the lot to the
Development Bank of the Philippines. The trial court decided the case in favor of respondent
declaring him to be the rightful owner. The CA sustained the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Petitioner is a builder in good faith.

RULING:
No, the issue of builder in good faith or bad faith is irrelevant in this case. The building
constructed on the subject land is part of the property transferred to the Petitioner. Article 448 of
the Civil Code refers to a piece of land whose ownership is claimed by two or more parties, one
of whom has built some works (or sown or planted something) and not to a case where the
owner of the land is the builder, sower, or planter who then later loses ownership of the land by
sale or otherwise for, elsewise stated, where the true owner himself is the builder of works on his
own land.

12. G.R. No. 125683 March 2, 1999

EDEN BALLATAN and SPS. BETTY MARTINEZ and CHONG CHY LING, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, GONZALO GO, WINSTON GO, LI CHING YAO, ARANETA
INSTITUTE OF AGRICULTURE and JOSE N. QUEDDING, respondents. 

PUNO, J.:

FACTS: This case was about the 42 sq.m. residential land which belongs to Ballatan, Martinez and
Ling. They are the owners of lot (lot24) wherein there are adjacent lots (lots25 and 26) registered in
the name of respondent Gonzalo Go, Sr. On one of the lots (lot25) of the Respondent Winston Go,
son of Gonzalo Go, Sr., constructed his house. Beside it is the lot (lot27) registered in the name of
respondent Li Ching Yao. Petitioner Ballatan constructed her house on and during the construction,
she noticed that the concrete fence and side pathway of the adjoining house of respondent Winston
Go encroached on the entire length of the eastern side of her property. She was informed that the
area of her lot was actually less than that described in the title. Go claimed that his house, including
its fence and pathway, were built within the parameters of his father's lot; and that this lot was
surveyed by Engineer Jose Quedding, the authorized surveyor of the AIA, the owner-developer of
the subdivision project. Verification was made consequently and found that the lot area of petitioner
Ballatan was less by few meters and that of respondent Li Ching Yao, which was three lots away,
increased by two meters. Engineer Quedding declared that he made a verification survey of Lots 25
and 26 of respondents Go allegedly found the boundaries to have been in their proper position.
However, he could not explain the reduction in Ballatan's area since he was not present at the time
respondents Go constructed their boundary walls. Ballatan made a written demand on respondents
Go to remove and dismantle their improvements on Lot No. 24 but Go refused. So Ballatan
instituted against Go a civil case for recovery of possession the RTC, ordering the Go's to vacate the
subject portion, demolish their improvements and pay petitioner Ballatan actual damages,
attorney's fees and the costs of the suit. Go appealed.

ISSUE: Whether or not private respondent Go was a builder in good faith.

RULING:
Yes, not only the private respondent, but all the parties have acted in good faith, hence, Article 448
must apply. It was established in the case that the parties had no knowledge of the encroachment
until Ballatan noticed it there all of them were builders in good faith. They have two options for
remedy. First is that the land owner will buy the improvements and the second is to oblige the
builders to buy the land given that the value of the land is not considerably more than the buildings
or tree; otherwise the owner may remove the improvements thereon. Petitioners are ordered to
exercise within thirty (30) days from finality of the decision of their chosen their option.

13. G.R. No. 98045 June 26, 1996

DESAMPARADO VDA. DE NAZARENO and LETICIA NAZARENO TAPIA, petitioners,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, MR. & MRS. JOSE SALASALAN, MR. & MRS. LEO RABAYA,
AVELINO LABIS, HON. ROBERTO G. HILARIO, ROLLEO I. IGNACIO, ALBERTO M.
GILLERA and HON. ABELARDO G. PALAD, JR., in their official and/or private
capacities, respondents. 

ROMERO, J.:

FACTS:
The private respondents Salasalan and Rabaya leased the subject landowned by Antonio Nazareno.
The land was formed as a result of sawdust dumped into the dried-up Balacanas creek. When the
private Respondents stopped paying rentals, Nazareno filed ejectment suit. The MTC ruled in favor
of Nazareno and was affirmed by the RTC. Before Nazareno died, he filed an application with the
Bureau of Lands to perfect his title over the accretion area he was claiming. However, it was
protested by the private Respondents. Respondent Director of lands Abelardo Palad ordered
Nazareno tovvacate the portions adjudicated to private Respondents and remove whatever
improvements they have made and ordered that private Respondents be placed in possession
thereof. Cases for annulment of the previous decisions with the RTC but was dismissed and was
affirmed by the CA that the approved survey plan belongs exclusively to the Director of Lands and
shall be conclusive when approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Petitioners can claim ownership of the subject land.

RULING:
No, accretion as a mode of acquiring property under Art 457 of the Civil Code requires the
concurrence of the requisites mentioned in the Article. These are called rules on alluvion:
1. That the deposition of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible;
2. That it be the result of the action of the waters of the river (or sea); and
3. That the land where the accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers (or sea
coast).

If these are present in a case, the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers or streams belong the
accretion gradually received from the effects of the current of waters. The word “current” indicates
the participation of the body of water in the flow of waters due to high and low tide. Petitioners,
however, admit that the accretion was formed by the dumping of boulders, soil and other filling
materials on portions of the Balacanas creek and the Cagayan River. The Bureau of Lands classified
the subject land as an accretion area which was formed by deposits of sawdust. Petitioner’s
submission not having met the first and second requirements of the rules of alluvion, they cannot
claim the rights of a riparian owner. The subject being public land is under the jurisdiction of the
Bureau of Lands, respondent Palad is authorized to exercise executive control over any form of
concession, disposition and management of the lands of public dominion.

14. G.R. No. L-61647 October 12, 1984

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (DIRECTOR OF LANDS), petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, BENJAMIN TANCINCO, AZUCENA TANCINCO REYES,
MARINA TANCINCO IMPERIAL and MARIO C. TANCINCO, respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

DOCTRINE: Article 457 of the New Civil Code states that, “To the owners of lands adjoining the banks
of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the
waters.”

Article 457 requires the concurrence of three requisites before an accretion is said to have taken
place: (1) That the deposit be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be made through the effects of
the current of the water; and (3) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks
of the rivers.

FACTS:
The private Respondents Tancinco (the “Tancincos”) were the registered owners of a parcel of land
situated at Meycauayan, Bulacan bordering on the Meycauayan and Bocaue Rivers. They filed an
application for the registration of three lots adjacent to their fishpond property (Lots 1, 2 and 3 of
plan Psu-131892). However, Assistant Provincial Fiscal Amando C. Vicente, representing the Bureau
of Lands filed a written opposition to the said application for registration. The private Respondents
based their claim on accretions to their fishponds witnessed by their overseer. The Bureau of Lands
argue that the lands in dispute were not accretions and were man-made. The RTC and CA granted
the petition despite the opposition of the Bureau of Lands.

ISSUE:
Whether or not it was accretion that happened in property of the Tancincos.

HELD:
No, the Court agreed with the Bureau of Lands’ contention that there was no accretion happened
under Article 457 of the New Civil Code.

The Court ruled that the alluvion must be the exclusive work of nature. There was no evidence that
the addition to said property was made gradually through the effects of the currents of the two
rivers. The lands in question total almost 4 hectares of land, which were highly doubtful to have
been caused by accretion. The overseer testified that she observed an increase in the area in 1939,
but the lots in question were not included in the survey of their adjacent property conducted in
1940. They were also not included in the Cadastral Survey of the entire Municipality of Meycauayan
between the years 1958-1960. If the overseer was indeed telling the truth, the accretion was
sudden, not gradual. When the respondents transferred their dikes towards the river beds, the dikes
were meant for reclamation purposes and not to protect their property from the destructive force of
the waters of the river. The lots in question were portions of the bed of the Meycauayan River and
are therefore classified as public property.

15. G.R. No. 68166 February 12, 1997

HEIRS OF EMILIANO NAVARRO, petitioner,

vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT & HEIRS OF SINFOROSO PASCUAL, respondents.

HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:

FACTS: Sinforoso Pascual, filed an application for foreshore lease, covering a tract of foreshore land
of approximately 17 hectares. Petitioner, predecessors-in-interest, Emiliano Navarro, filed a fishpond
application with the Bureau of Fisheries covering 25 hectares of foreshore land, however, such
application was denied by the Director of Fisheries on the ground that the property is formed part of
the public domain. Pascual filed an application to register and confirm his title to a parcel of land,
situated in Bataan, claimed that this land is an accretion to his property. It is bounded on the eastern
side by the Talisay River, on the western side by the Bulacan River, and on the northern side by the
Manila Bay. The Talisay River as well as the Bulacan River flow downstream and meet at the Manila
Bay thereby depositing sand and silt on Pascual's property resulting in an accretion thereon.
Sinforoso Pascual claimed the accretion as the riparian owner. The Director of Lands filed an
opposition stating that neither Pascual nor his predecessors-in-interest possessed sufficient title to
the subject property, the same being a portion of the public domain and, therefore, it belongs to the
Republic of the Philippines.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accretion sought to be registered adjacent to the sea can be registered.

HELD:
No, the accretion adjacent to the sea is a land of Public domain and cannot be registered under their
names. Accretion as a mode of acquiring property under said Article 457:
1. That the deposition of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible;
2. That it be the result of the action of the waters of the river (or sea); and
3. That the land where the accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers (or sea
coast).

If there’s any land to be claimed, it should be land ADJACENT to the rivers Talisay and Bulacan. The
law is clear on this. Accretion of land along the river bank may be registered. This is not the case of
accretion of land on the property adjacent to Manila Bay.

16. G.R. No. L-43346             March 20, 1991

MARIO C. RONQUILLO, petitioner
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, DIRECTOR OF LANDS, DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES, ROSENDO DEL ROSARIO, AMPARO DEL ROSARIO and FLORENCIA DEL
ROSARIO, respondents.*

REGALADO, J.:

FACTS:
This case sought for the review of the decision rendered by the CA, entitled Rosendo del Rosario, et
al., vs Mario Ronquillo, affirming the judgement of the RTC.

Plaintiff Rosendo del Rosario was a registered owner of a certain Lot No. 34. Adjoining said lot is a
dried-up portion of the old Estero Calubcub occupied by the defendant since 1945.It was already
dried up due to the dumping of garbage by the surrounding neighborhood and not by any natural
causes. Defendant now occupies said dried up land until Del Rosario, claiming ownership over the
same, required him to vacate on the basis of Article 370 of the Civil Code which provides that
riparian owner owns the dried up river bed abandoned by natural changes.

ISSUE:
Whether the Article 370 (Art. 461) of the Old Civil Code applies on the dried-up portion of Estero
Calubcub being claimed by the Petitioner.

RULING:
No, Art. 370 (Art. 461) clearly states the natural change in the course of the water, which in this case,
the change in course of water was made by man. The evidence presented by both parties in the case
at bar revealed that the change in the course of Estero Calubcub was caused, not by natural forces,
but due to the dumping of garbage therein by the people of the surrounding neighborhood. The
dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub should thus be considered as forming part of the land of the
public domain which cannot be subject to acquisition by private ownership.

The rules of accretion do not apply where the drying-up of river is not due to a “natural” change in
the course of the waters. Herein, the change was man-made (pollution). The dried-up portion
belongs to the State as land of public domain.

17. G.R. No. L-43346             March 20, 1991

RACHEL C. CELESTIAL, petitioner
vs.
JESSE CACHOPERO, respondent.

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

FACTS:
The Petitioner Celestial is the sister of the Respondent Cachopero, who have a dispute over a
piece of land happened to be a dried-up creek. Cachopero was processing the Miscellaneous
Sales Application to the DENR, alleging that he had been the owner of the land in dispute where
he built a house. Celestial’s contention was she has the better right to the dispute land because it
is adjacent to her property and the only access from her house. But the Bureau of Lands decision
was that, the land in dispute was a creek and it is outside the commerce of man.

ISSUE: Whether or not the land in dispute land is inalienable.

RULING:
Yes, the dispute land that happened to be a creek, cannot be sold and outside the commerce of man
because it is a property of public dominion. Since property of public dominion is outside the
commerce of man and not susceptible to private appropriation and acquisitive prescription, the
adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant of title in the confirmation of an imperfect title
refers only to alienable or disposable portions of the public domain. It is only after the Government
has declared the land to be alienable and disposable agricultural land that the year of entry,
cultivation and exclusive and adverse possession can be counted for purposes of an imperfect title.

18. G.R. No. 94283             March 4, 1991

MAXIMO JAGUALING, ANUNCITA JAGUALING and MISAMIS ORIENTAL CONCRETE

PRODUCTS, INC., petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS (FIFTEENTH DIVISION), JANITA F. EDUAVE and RUDYGONDO
EDUAVE, respondents.

GANCAYCO, J.:

FACTS:
Private Respondent Janita Eduave has the actual possession of the dispute land in Mindoro
and claimed that she inherited it from her father. She included the land underwater that
eroded during typhoon in the total area reflected in the tax declaration. Eduave also made a
loan with Luzon Surety in consideration of said land for P6000. Eventually, because of the
sudden increase in size of said lot from 4,937 sq.m. to 16,452 sq.m. and the formation of an
island, she permitted petitioners to occupy land in support of her endeavors warding away
informal settlers as well as planting corn and bananas in duration of their stay.

The land was the subject of a reconveyance case between Janita Eduave vs. Heirs of Antonio
Factura which was the subject of judgment by compromise in view of the amicable
settlement of the parties. In the amicable settlement the heirs of Antonio Factura
(Jagualing), ceded a portion of the land with an area of 1,289 square meters more or less to
Eduave. Afterwhich, Jagualing denied the claim of ownership of Eduave, and asserted that
they are the real owners of the land in litigation containing an area of 18,000 square meters
more or less. According to them, they acquired the land by acquisitive prescription since
they have occupied the land since 1969. They presented tax declarations and photos of
actual occupation to prove claim of prescription.

The CA found that the island was formed by the branching off of the river and subsequent
thereto the accumulation of alluvial deposits. Basing its ruling on Articles 463 and 465 of the
Civil Code the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC – dismissed the complaint,
and declared private respondents as the lawful and true owners of the land subject of this
case and ordered petitioners to vacate the premises and deliver possession of the land to
private respondents.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Janita has the better right.

HELD:
No, the property of Eduave existed and identified prior to the branching off of the river. The
Court supported the decision of the CA that the latter properly applied Art. 463 and 465 of
the Civil Code. Article 463, which allows the ownership over a portion of land separated or
isolated by river movement to be retained by the owner thereof prior to such separation or
isolation. And Article 465, the island belongs to the owner of the land along the nearer
margin as sole owner thereof; or more accurately, because the island is longer than the
property of private respondents, they are deemed ipso jure to be the owners of that portion
which corresponds to the length of their property along the margin of the river.
19. G.R. No. 94283             March 4, 1991

HEIRS OF DATU DALANDAG KULI, represented by DATU CULOT DALANDAG, petitioners,

vs.
DANIEL R. PIA, FILOMINA FOLLOSCO, and JOSE FOLLOSCO, respondents.

SERENO, C.J.:

FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:

20. G.R. No. 201248               March 11, 2015

LETICIA NAGUIT AQUINO, MELVIN NAGUIT, ROMMEL NAGUIT, ELMA NAGUIT TAYAG,
YSSEL L. NAGUIT, ROSALINA NAGUIT AUMENTADO, RIZEL NAGUIT CUNANAN,
CARIDAD NAGUIT PARAJAS, MILLIE NAGUIT FLORENDO, MARNEL NAGUIT, EDUARDO
NAGUIT, JOSE NAGUIT, ZOILO NAGUIT, AND AMELIA NAGUIT DIZON, represented by
YSSEL L. NAGUIT, Petitioners,
vs.
CESAR B. QUIAZON, AMANDA QUIAZON, JOSE B. QUIAZON AND REYNALDO B.
QUIAZON, represented by JAIME B. QUIAZON, Respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:

FACTS:
This case was about the petition for review assailing the decision of the CA that which affirmed
the decision of the RTC – dismissing the complaint filed by the Petitioners. A complaint for
Annulment and Quieting of Title was filed before the RTC by the petitioners, alleged as the heirs
of the late Epifanio Makam and Severina Bautista, who acquired a house and lot situated in
Magalang, Pampanga by virtue of a Deed of Sale. Since then, they and their predecessors-in-
interest had been in open, continuous, adverse, and notorious possession for more than a
hundred years, constructing houses and paying real estate taxes on the property. That sometime
in June 2005, they received various demand letters from the Respondents, claiming ownership
over the subject property and demanding that they vacate the subject land. The Register of
Deeds (ROD) confirmed that the property had been titled in the name of the Respondents and
declared that the said title was invalid, ineffective, voidable or unenforceable.

The Petitioners claim that they were the true owners of the said property. Thus, they prayed that
the title be cancelled and a new title be issued in their favor. In their answer, the Respondents
asserted that they were the absolute owners of the subject and denied the allegations in the
complaint and proffered affirmative defenses with counterclaims.

ISSUE: Whether or not the decision by the CA, dismissing the Petitioners’ complaint on ground
of lack of cause of action or failure to state a cause of action is valid.

RULING:
No, the Court notes that respondents' arguments made no assertion that the complaint failed to
state a cause of action. The Court discussed that ground of "lack of cause of action" has been
frequently confused with the ground of "failure to state a cause of action," and this is the situation
prevailing in the present case. The terms were, in fact, used interchangeably by both the
respondents and the lower courts. The distinction between the grounds of "failure to state a
cause of action" and "lack of cause of action" was discussed in Dabuco vs. Court of Appeals.
Although the two grounds were used interchangeably, it can be gleaned from the decisions of
both the trial court and the CA that respondents' defense of "lack of cause of action" was actually
treated as a "failure to state a cause of action," which is a ground for a motion to dismiss under
Rule 16.

In the case at bench, petitioners' cause of action relates to an action to quiet title under Article
476 of the Civil Code. In order that an action for quieting of title may prosper, two requisites must
concur: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or equitable title or interest in the real property
subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting
cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie
appearance of validity or legal efficacy. The issue submitted to the court was, therefore, the
determination of the sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint to constitute a cause of action
and not whether those allegations of fact were true, as there was a hypothetical admission of
facts alleged in the complaint. An affirmative defense, raising the ground that there is no cause of
action as against the defendants poses a question of fact that should be resolved after the
conduct of the trial on the merits. The lower courts also relied on the exception that external
evidence may be considered when received "in the course of hearings related to the case.

In sum, the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint on the ground of failure to state a cause
of action. Evidence should have been received not during a preliminary hearing under Section 6
of Rule 16, but should have been presented during the course of the trial.

21.
22.