URDANETA CITY UNIVERSITY

ACTIVITY # 2: LABOR STANDARDS

(By: Atty. Herbert C. Navarro)

INSTRUCTIONS: Answer the following QUESTIONS AND DIGEST THE

LISTED CASES. You will be graded according to legal application (20%),
presentation (10%), grammar (20%), and logical answers and/or digest (50%).
Observe proper margin and single strike erasures. Quizzes and digested cases
should be handwritten in composition notebooks and record books respectively.
Once done, take clear (per page) photographs of your work and submit via direct
message through a single set of attachment. The activity should be accomplished
for three (3) hours maximum and no submissions will be accepted later than 9:00
PM. Deductions will be made in accordance with the stated percentage and failure
to comply with the foregoing instructions.

1. Fully distinguish between apprentices and learners base on the following

criteria:
A. As to Contents of the Agreement (10%)
a. For Apprentices
 Full name and address of the contracting parties
 Date and birth of the apprentice
 Name of trade, occupation or job in which the apprentice shall
be trained and the dates on which such training will begin and
will proximately end.
 Approximate number of OJT hours with compulsory theoretical
instructions which the apprentice shall undergo during his
training.
 Schedule of work processes and the approximate time to be
spent on the job in each process.
 Graduated scale of wages to be paid to the apprentice.
 Probationary period of the apprentice during which either party
may summarily terminate the agreement
  A clause that if the employer is unable to fulfill his training
obligation, he may transfer the agreement with apprentice’s
consent.
b. For Learners
 Names and addresses of the employer and the learner
 The occupation to be learned and the duration of the training
period which shall not exceed three months
 The wage of a learner which should be at least 75% of the
minimum wage
NOTE: Learners in piecework or incentive rate jobs are
to be paid in full for the work done during the training period
 A commitment to employ the learner upon completion of the
training if he so desires.
B. As to Duration (2.5%)
Not less than three months practical training on the job but not
more than six months for apprentices; in learnership, practical training
on the job should not exceed three months.
C. As to necessity for Theoretical Instructions (2.5%)
There is a necessity for theoretical instruction in apprenticeship;
while this is not so required in learnership.
D. As to Commitment to hire (2.5%)
There is no commitment to hire in apprenticeship agreement, but
this commitment to hire is required in learnership agreements
E. As to the Focus of Training (2.5%)
In apprenticeship agreements, the focus of training is on highly
skilled or technical industries and in industrial occupation such as
integrated circuit assembler, general maintenance mechanic, etc., while
the focus of training in learnership agreements is on semi-skilled or
industrial occupations such as candle making, office secretary, waiter,
etc.
F. As to DOLE approval (2.5%)
DOLE approval is required in apprenticeship agreements but this
is not so required in Learnership agreements
G. As to exhaustion of Administrative remedies (2.5%)
Exhaustion of Administrative remedies is required in
Apprenticeship but this is not a requirement in learnership.
 II

During the 15th day of his employment as an apprentice, Pedro was

dismissed due to false charges of malicious destruction of company property
fabricated by the employer himself. Is his dismissal legal? (5%)
Yes, the apprenticeship is still within the one-month period of probation.
Either party may summarily terminate the agreement without good cause shown.
Pedro’s recourse is for damages under the Civil Code provision on human relations
which states that every person, in the exercise of his right and in the performance
of his duties, act with justice, give anyone his due, and exercise honesty and good
faith.

III
After working for three months as an apprentice, Pedro had a quarrel with
his wife and this resulted in their separation. Since he could not concentrate on his
work, he terminated the apprenticeship agreement. Is Pedro liable for damages?
(5%)
No, among the valid causes for termination is personal problems which in
the opinion of the apprentice shall prevent him from satisfactory performance of his
job.

IV
In order to minimize immorality among its female employees, a call center
agency lays down a rule that any unmarried female employee who gets pregnant
shall be dismissed.
A. Is this rule valid? Why? (5%)
The rule is not valid. Under Article 137 of the Labor Code, it is
unlawful for an employer to discharge a woman employee on account of
her pregnancy. The rule is a mere subterfuge in order to circumvent the
provision of Article 137.
B. Will your answer remain the same if the line of business where the
company is involved is the manufacturing of contraceptives? Why? (5%)
No, the rule is reasonably necessary in order to preserve the name
and integrity of the business. A contraceptive company employing
 workers who become pregnant outside wedlock will not ring well to the
mind of its patrons and prospective consumers.

V
Gracia was hired as a cashier on a probationary basis by Roheim
Corporation. In her job application form, she indicated that she was single
although she had contracted marriage a few months earlier. As Roheim
Incorporated had a policy of not hiring married women, Gracia was dismissed, just
as she was about to complete her probationary employment due to dishonesty in
concealing her true marital status.
A. Is the dismissal of Gracia lawful? Explain fully. (5%)
No, it is violative of Article 136 of the Labor Code which makes it
unlawful for an employer to require as a condition of employment or
continuation of employment that a woman not get married or to stipulate
expressly or tacitly that upon getting married, a woman employee shall
be deemed resigned, separated, or to actually dismiss, discharge,
discriminate, or otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by reason
of marriage. (PT&T vs. NLRC, May 23, 1997)
B. Would your answer remain the same if what Gracia concealed was not
her marriage status but the fact that she was previously convicted of
estafa? Why? (5%)
No, because the dishonesty was not brought about under the
compulsion of any unlawful imposition of the employer. This is plain
dishonesty coupled with deceit through omission. Thus, the employer has
every right to exercise their management prerogative to terminate her
employment status during the probationary period considering that the
position she occupies requires a high degree of trust and confidence.

VI

Your favorite relative, Tita Nilda, approaches you and seeks your advice on
her treatment of her kasambahay, Noray. Tita Nilda shows you a document called a
"Contract of Engagement" for your review. Under the Contract of Engagement,
Noray shall be entitled to a rest day every week, provided that she may be
requested to work on a rest day if Tita Nilda should need her services that day. Tita
Nilda also claims that this Contract of Engagement should embody all terms and
conditions of Noray's work as the engagement of a kasambahay is a private matter
and should not be regulated by the State.

A. Is Tita Nilda correct in saying that this is a private matter and should not
be regulated by the State? (5%)

Tita Nilda is not correct in saying that engagement of a

kasambahay is a private matter and should not be regulated by the
State. This is a valid subject matter of the exercise of police power to give
effect to thedeclared policy of the law such as the need to protect the
rights of domestic workers against abuse,harassment, violence, economic
exploitation and performance of work that is hazardous to their physical
and mental health; and in protecting domestic workers and recognizing
their special needs to ensure safe and healthful working conditions,
promotes gender-sensitive measures in the formulation and
implementation of policies and programs affecting the local domestic
work. (Section 2, Article I, Republic Act No. 10361) NOTE: The foregoing
answer can be found in page 759 of the book entitled Principles and
Cases Labor Standards and Social Legislation, Second Edition 2018. This
is the first time that this type of question was asked in the Bar
Examination.

B. Is the stipulation that she may be requested to work on a rest day legal?
(5%)

The stipulation that Nora may be requested to work on a rest day is legal.
The law provides that, “ Nothing in this provision shall deprive the
domestic worker and the employer from agreeing to the following:(a)
Offsetting a day of absence with a particular rest day;(b) Waiving a
particular rest day in return for an equivalent daily rate of pay;(c)
Accumulating rest days not exceeding five (5) days; or(d) Other similar
arrangements. (Section 21, Article IV, Republic Act No. 10361) NOTE:
The foregoing answer can be found in page 778 of the book entitled
Principles and Cases Labor Standards and Social Legislation, Second
Edition 2018. This is the first time that this type of question was asked in
the Bar Examination.c) Are stay-in family drivers included under the
Kasambahay Law?
 C. Are stay-in family drivers included under the Kasambahay Law? (5%)

Stay-in family drivers are not included under the Kasambahay Law. This
was very clear in the Rules Implementing the Kasambahay Law providing
as follows: The following are not covered:(a) Service providers;(b) Family
drivers;(c) Children under foster family arrangement; and(d) Any other
person who performs work occasionally or sporadically and not on an
occupational basis.(Section 2, Rule I, Implementing Rules and
Regulations of Republic Act 10361)

VII

Nena worked as an Executive Assistant for Nesting, CEO of Now

Corporation. One day, Nesting called Nena into his office and showed her lewd
pictures of women in seductive poses which Nena found offensive. Nena
complained before the General Manager who, in turn, investigated the matter and
recommended the dismissal of Nesting to the Board of Directors. Before the Board
of Directors, Nesting argued, that-since the Anti- Sexual Harassment Law requires
the existence of “sexual favors,” he should not be dismissed from the service since
he did not ask for any-sexual favor from Nena. Is Nesting correct? (5%)
Nesting is not correct. The law penalizing sexual harassment in our
jurisdiction is RA 7877. Section 3 thereof defines work-related sexual harassment
in this wise: Sec. 3. Work, Education or Training-related Sexual Harassment
Defined. — Work, education or training-related sexual harassment is committed by
an employer, manager, supervisor, agent of the employer, teacher, instructor,
professor, coach, trainor, or any other person who, having authority, influence or
moral ascendancy over another in a work or training or education environment,
demands, requests or otherwise requires any sexual favor from the other,
regardless of whether the demand, request or requirement for submission is
accepted by the object of said Act.(a) In a work-related or employment environment,
sexual harassment is committed when: xxx (3) The above acts would result in an
intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment for the employee. Contrary to
Nesting’s claim, it is enough that his acts result in creating an intimidating, hostile
or offensive environment for the employee.

VIII
 Digest the following cases:
Atlanta Industries, Inc. vs. Sebolino, et. al. G.R. No. 187320, January 26,
2011 (10%)
The fact that Costales, Almoite, Sebolino and Sagun were already rendering
service to the company when they were made to undergo apprenticeship (as
established by the evidence) renders the apprenticeship agreements irrelevant as
far as the four are concerned. This reality is highlighted by the CA finding that the
respondents occupied positions such as machine operator, scaleman and extruder
operator - tasks that are usually necessary and desirable in Atlanta’s usual
business or trade as manufacturer of plastic building materials. These tasks and
their nature characterized the four as regular employees under Article 280 of the
Labor Code. Thus, when they were dismissed without just or authorized cause,
without notice, and without the opportunity to be heard, their dismissal was illegal
under the law. Even if we recognize the company’s need to train its employees
through apprenticeship, the Court can only consider the first apprenticeship
agreement for the purpose. With the expiration of the first agreement and the
retention of the employees, Atlanta had, to all intents and purposes, recognized the
completion of their training and their acquisition of a regular employee status. To
foist upon them the second apprenticeship agreement for a second skill which was
not even mentioned in the agreement itself, is a violation of the Labor Code’s
implementing rules and is an act manifestly unfair to the employees, to say the
least. This the Court cannot allow.
Atienza vs. Saluta, G.R. No. 233413, June 17, 2019 (10%)
Noel Sacramento Saluta filed a complaint against CRV Corp. and petitioner
Celia Atienza for illegal dismissal and money claims. He alleged that he was hired
as a company driver by CRV Corp. He was assigned to drive for the petitioner Celia
Atienza, one of the company’s top officials and received P9,000 monthly salary.
On the other hand, petitioner claimed that respondent was not an employee of CRV
Corp. but was hired as her personal/family driver. His duty was simply to drive for
her and her family to anywhere they wish to go. Aside from his monthly salary, he
enjoyed free board and lodging. The Supreme Court ruled that respondent is a
family driver. Issue: Which law governs his rights as such: the Labor Code or the
Civil Code?

Ruling: The Civil Code. Article 141, Chapter 3, Book III on Employment of
Househelpers of the Labor Code provides that family drivers are covered in the term
domestic or household service.Thus, under the Labor Code, the rules for indemnity
in case a family driver is terminated from the service shall be governed by Article
149 thereof. However, Section 44 of Republic Act 10361, otherwise known as the
“Domestic Workers Act” or “Batas Kasambahay” (Kasambahay Law), expressly
repealed Chapter III (Employment of Househelpers) of the Labor Code, which
includes Articles 141 and 149 mentioned above.

The Kasambahay Law, on the other hand, made no mention of family drivers in the
enumeration of those workers who are covered by the law. This is unlike Article
141 of the Labor Code. Thus, Section 4(d) of the Kasambahay Law pertaining to
who are included in the enumeration of domestic or household help cannot also be
interpreted to include family drivers because the latter category of worker is clearly
not included. It is a settled rule of statutory construction that the express mention
of one person, thing, or consequence implies the exclusion of all others—this is
expressed in the familiar maxim, expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Moreover,
Section 2 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of the Kasambahay Law
expressly provides that family drivers are not included.

The aforecited administrative rule clarified the status of family drivers as

among those not covered by the definition of domestic or household help as
contemplated in Section 4(d) of the Kasambahay Law. Such provision should be
respected by the courts, as the interpretation of an administrative government
agency, which is tasked to implement the statute, is accorded great respect and
ordinarily controls the construction of the courts. Moreover, the statutory validity of
the same administrative rule was never challenged. This Court has ruled time and
again that the constitutionality or validity of laws, orders, or such other rules with
the force of law cannot be attacked collaterally. There is a legal presumption of
validity of these laws and rules. Unless a law or rule is annulled in a direct
proceeding, the legal presumption of its validity stands. And while it is true that
constitutional provisions on social justice demand that doubts be resolved in favor
of labor, it is only applicable when there is doubt. Social justice principles cannot
be used to expand the coverage of the law to subjects not intended by the Congress
to be included.

Due to the express repeal of the Labor Code provisions pertaining to

househelpers, which includes family drivers, by the Kasambahay Law; and the
non-applicability of the Kasambahay Law to family drivers, there is a need to revert
back to the Civil Code provisions, particularly Articles 1689, 1697 and 1699,
Section 1, Chapter 3, Title VIII, Book IV thereof.

Duncan Association v. Glaxo Inc., G.R. No. 162994, September 17, 2004 (10%)

In this case, the prohibition against marriage embodied in the following

stipulation in the employment contract was held as valid:

“10. You agree to disclose to management any existing or future relationship you
may have, either by consanguinity or affinity with co-employees or employees of
competing drug companies. Should it pose a possible conflict of interest in
management discretion, you agree to resign voluntarily from the Company as a
matter of Company policy.”

The Supreme Court ruled that the dismissal based on this stipulation in the
employment contract is a valid exercise of management prerogative. The prohibition
against personal or marital relationships with employees of competitor companies
upon its employees was held reasonable under the circumstances because
relationships of that nature might compromise the interests of the company. In
laying down the assailed company policy, the employer only aims to protect its
interests against the possibility that a competitor company will gain access to its
secrets and procedures.