A N C I E N T FEB/MAR 2009

WARFARE
VOL III, ISSUE 1

War as a livelihood:
Mercenaries in the Ancient World
With:

• Putting invaders to use

• Soldiers of Ta-Sety
Also:
• The battle of the Bagradas
• Vegetius’ scholarship
And more € 7,10 £ 6,25

Ancient Warfare 1

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 A N C I E N T

WARFARE CONTENTS Feb/Mar 2009

4 NEWS 36 PUTTING THE
INVADERS TO USE
Publisher: Rolof van Hövell tot Westerflier, MA, MCL Mercenary tribes in Anatolia

THEME
Publisher’s assistant: Gabrielle Terlaak
Editor in chief: Jasper L. Oorthuys, MA
Sales and marketing: Tharin Clarijs
Website design: Christianne C. Beall
Art and layout consultant: Matthew C. Lanteigne
War as a livelihood
42 THE EMPEROR AS
PAYMASTER
Contributors: Paul Bardunias, Duncan B.Campbell,
6 INTRODUCTION Mercenaries and the Imperial
Ross Cowan, Murray Dahm, Ed Haines, Christian Roman Army
Koepfer, Bridget McDermott, Alberto Perez,
Joseph Pietrykowski, Ruben Post, Michael Taylor,
9 THE FIND
Michael Thomas
Mercenary’s helmet
Illustrations: Andrew Brozyna, Igor Dzis,
Brendan Keeley, Carlos de la Rocha, Johnny Shumate
Design & layout: © MeSa Design,
e-mail: layout@ancient-warfare.com
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10 THE SOURCE
Website: www.ancient-warfare.com
Theatre of War
48 BE A GENERAL
Vegetius’ scholarship
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14 GENERAL-FOR-HIRE
Condottieri of the Ancient World

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58 ON THE COVER
Articles and the opinions expressed herein do not
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23 MERCENARY
ARCHERS Cretan bowmen in
necessarily imply endorsement.
the Hellenistic era
Ancient Warfare is published every two months by
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Printed in the Netherlands
Ancient Warfare 3

AW nr11-2009.indd 3 11-02-2010 16:25:48

 NEWS

Reviewers wanted Ancient Warfare forum

We are fortunate in the num-
ber of books published every year
about warfare in the Ancient
World. Unfortunately, there
is simply not enough space on
these pages to give every book
its proper due. Half a page serves
as a proper announcement, but
not as a review and if we dedi-
cated an entire page or more,
we would never get through our
backlog. Therefore we are going
to publish the reviews in two
versions: a short announcement
in the magazine, as now, and a
long one on the website. To do so,
we need more reviewers. If you
are interested, knowledgeable
about (aspects of) warfare in the
Ancient world and would like to
contribute in exchange for a new
book, please contact the editor at
editor@ancient-warfare.com.
Since the end of last year, Ancient Warfare has had its own online forum. All
readers are invited to pose their questions there. All past and present authors
have been invited to join as well. This is the best way to continue to debate
ancient military history. The articles in the magazine can be a starting point
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gest topics for future issues. To access the forum, go to www.ancient-warfare.
com/forum. If you bought your copy in our shop, you are already registered for
the forum. Your shop username and password work for the forum as well.
River IJssel not Drusus’work?
The upper reaches of the Dutch IJssel river, which branches off from the Rhine
at Arnhem were thought to be the work of Drusus the Elder, dug during his
German campaigns between 12 and 9 BC. This tied in nicely with the epigrap-
hically attested dam in the Rhine which can be confidently dated to the same
period. However, newly published research by Dutch geologists now shows
that the river IJssel actually dates to the period between 600 and 950 AD. Did
the river change course after having been dug as a canal, or was it never there
and do we have to look for Drusus’ work elsewhere in the Netherlands?

Future themes
Ancient Warfare These are the planned themes for the coming issues of Ancient Warfare:
special - III.2 The Wars of the Successors
- III.3 Gods, kings and heroes
This May Ancient Warfare maga- - III.4 The Barcid family at War
zine will publish its first ‘special’ - III.5 Rome vs. Parthia
issue, outside of the normal volu- - III.6 Tactics, standards and military music
mes. This 76 page volume will be If you have any suggestions for future themes, or if you’d like to contribute,
fully dedicated to the ‘Varian disas- don’t hesitate to contact us.
ter’, the battle of the Teutoburg
forest 2000 years ago this year. It
will not include regular features,
be perfect bound (ie: no staples)
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News items
Additions for this section are very
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send them in by email to: editor@
ancient-warfare.com © Brendan Keeley

4 Ancient Warfare

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AW nr11-2009.indd 5 11-02-2010 16:25:55
 THEME INTRODUCTION

War as a livelihood
Historical introduction

IN 401 BC, CYRUS, THE BROTHER OF THE PERSIAN KING ARTAX-

ERES, ATTEMPTED A REBELLION TO CLAIM THE THRONE FOR
HIMSELF. HE RAISED A LARGE ARMY, COMPRISED MOSTLY OF
ANATOLIAN LEVIES FROM HIS PROVINCE. MOSTLY, BUT NOT
FULLY; EVER SINCE THE BATTLE OF MARATHON IN 490 BC, THE
PERSIANS HAD APPRECIATED THE SHOCK AND STEADINESS
OF GREEK HOPLITE INFANTRY. ACROSS THE AEGEAN, CONDI-
TIONS WERE PERFECT FOR MERCENARY RECRUITMENT. THE
PELOPONNESIAN WAR BADLY DISRUPTED THE ECONOMY OF
GREECE. THOUSANDS OF SOLDIERS FOUND THEMSELVES DE-
MOBILIZED WITHOUT PROSPECT OF EMPLOYMENT. GREECE
WAS FULL OF TOUGH, VIOLENT MEN WHO HAD FEW OTHER

© Karwansaray BV
OPPORTUNITIES BUT TO EARN THEIR LIVING BY THE SWORD.

By Michael Taylor

Cyrus, taking advantage of the situa-
tion, recruited an enormous band of
Greek mercenaries, over 10,000 men.
Many were from Sparta or allied Arca-
dian cities. The Spartan government
permitted their recruitment largely
out of gratitude for the aid Cyrus had
recently offered the Lakedaimonian
cause. This band included Xenophon,
a young Athenian cavalryman. Political
turmoil, and the rise of a new demo-
cratic government, prompted him to
leave his native land. For the aristocra-
tic Xenophon, mercenary service was a
lucrative form of self-exile. Cyrus’ Greek
mercenaries fought well for him; had
he not died in battle, they might have
made him king.
Rise of the mercenary
Indeed, the fourth century BC saw a
dramatic increase in the visibility of the
mercenary (Greek: xenos, misthophoros,
Galatian warrior fighting with blade and shield. The shield spine is clearly recog-
nizable, as is the fact that the soldier seems naked, apart from a simple belt. Dated
to the first half of the second century BC, now in the Louvre, Paris.
stratiotes) in ancient warfare. Mainland lied on mercenary bodyguards, but the
Greece was gripped by near constant fourth century produced tyrants with
violence. Greek poleis (city states) had full-blown mercenary armies. Jason of
always suffered from slim manpower Pherae relied on a force of 6,000 merce-
bases. Athens in the 4th century could naries to make himself Lord of Thessaly
field fewer than 9,000 hoplites, the (Thessalarch). Dionysius I of Syracuse
Boeotian League (centered on Thebes) campaigned heavily in the 400s and
some 10,000 infantry, while Sparta in 390s with mercenary troops, who pro-
371 BC had fewer than 1,500 full-grade ved more loyal and reliable than Syra-
Spartiates. Sparta, with rapidly dwind- cusian levies.
ling manpower, made heavy use of Meanwhile, Greek mercenary contin-
mercenaries, often relying on Persian gents, often with the explicit blessing of
subsidies to pay them. By the 380s, home governments, found themselves
Sparta was replacing the troop contri- drawn into a variety of conflicts out-
butions of the Peloponnesian League side the Greek mainland. An Egyptian
with monetary contributions in order rebellion against Persia was assisted
to hire more mercenaries. by a large force of mercenaries under
Tyrants since the Archaic age had re- the Athenian Chabrias, a force that was

6 Ancient Warfare

AW nr11-2009.indd 6 11-02-2010 16:25:57


only withdrawn after sharp protests
from the Great King in 380 BC. The Athe-
nian admiral Chares, short on money to
pay his fleet, funded his operations by
fighting for the rebel Persian governor
Artabazos in 357 BC. Thousands of mer-
cenaries joined the Corinthian expe-
ditionary force of Timoleon during his
campaign against the Carthaginians in
Sicily in the 340s BC. Greeks continued
in Persian service. Alexander the Great
would enslave some 2,000 Greek mer-
cenaries captured at the River Grani-
cus as punishment for fighting on the
wrong side.
The Hellenistic world
The death of Alexander the Great threw
the entire Eastern Mediterranean into
chaos that would not abate until after
the Battle of Corupedium in 281 BC. H.W.
Parke famously stated that every soldier
who fought in the wars of the Succes-
sors (diadochoi,) was essentially a mer-
cenary, as there were no longer recog-
nizable states to fight for as citizens or
subjects. Mass hiring was facilitated by
the capture of vast hoards of gold and
silver from the Persian treasury. While a
great deal of adventurism is detectable
in the era of the diadochoi, soldiers also
demanded symbols of legitimacy and
sovereignty from their masters, proof
that they fought for legitimate rulers
rather than mere warlord paymasters.
Both Eumenes of Cardia and Seleucus I
recounted dream visions of Alexander
the Great to inspire their troops. Eume-
nes went so far as to set up an empty
chair at his war council to seat the ghost
of Alexander. This ploy failed to work for
the hapless former royal secretary. He
was betrayed by his own troops to Anti-
gonus One-Eyed in exchange for booty
(see also Ancient Warfare I.3). It was a
craven act that epitomized the merce-
nary spirit of the age. The assumption
of the royal title by the Successors after
306 BC eliminated the basic problem of
sovereignty, as the diadochoi establis-
hed and affirmed that they were kings
with subject armies rather than war-
lords with mercenary hordes.
The violent aftermath of Corupe-
dium essentially created a tripartite
system in the Eastern Mediterranean.
Macedonia, ruled by the descendents
of Antigonus the One-Eyed (the Antigo-
AW nr11-2009.indd 7
nids), controlled parts of Thessaly and
Southern Greece. The Seleucid empire
centered on Anatolia (inland Turkey),
Syria and Mesopotamia (Iraq), but in
theory extended to modern-day Af-
ghanistan. The Ptolemaic empire ruled
Egypt, but also controlled much of the
Aegean Sea, with naval bases and alli-
ances on the coasts of Thrace, western
Asia Minor and Palestine. In the wes-
tern Mediterranean, Carthage had long
been the dominant mercantile and mi-
litary power, but by the 270s the Roman
republic had succeeded in conquering
and organizing much of peninsular
Italy. While five majors powers stood
in the early 3rd century, by 146 BC, after
massive wars, only one would domina-
te the whole Mediterranean basin.
Mercenary manpower
Massive wars require massive manpo-
wer. However, mercenaries played only
a subsidiary role in the wars of hege-
mony that wracked the Mediterranean.
For the most part, states relied either on
citizen manpower or on subject levies
and allied contingents. For example, at
the battle of Raphia, fought between
Antiochus III and Ptolemy IV in 217 BC,
roughly 25,000 mercenaries were de-
ployed on either side, out of combined
forces of approximately 143,000. The
army of Antigonus Doson at the Battle
of Sellasia in 222 BC consisted of about
29,000 soldiers, of which 6800 were
mercenaries: Greeks, Gauls and Illyrians
(see also Ancient Warfare II.2).
Thus mercenaries constituted only a
fraction of Hellenistic field armies. They
played a larger role in garrison duties.
At any given time, Macedonia needed
upwards of 20,000 full-time troops to
man its various outposts and fortifica-
tions, while the garrison requirements
of the far-flung Ptolemaic and Seleucid
empires were even larger. Such duties
would have provided regular pay with
relatively low risk – a perfect task for
mercenaries, but one inappropriate to
part-time citizen-soldiers. Regulations
for Phillip V’s mercenaries indicate that
they were strictly disciplined, although
punishments came in the form of fines
deducted from pay, rather than corpo-
ral or capital punishment.
Carthage was a state famous for
the use of mercenaries. However, Car-
THEME INTRODUCTION
thaginian dependence upon merce-
naries is often exaggerated. Carthagi-
nian land forces in Sicily in the fourth
century were mostly composed of
citizen soldiers, whose mutinous be-
havior may have prompted a shift in
manpower strategy away from citizen
deployments abroad. Carthage relied
on mercenary forces led by the Spartan
soldier-of-fortune Xanthippus to repel
a Roman invasion of Africa during the
1st Punic War (264-242 BC). The uprising
of mercenary forces that followed, the
so-called ‘Truceless war’, was a major
threat to Carthage mostly because the
mercenary contingents mobilized the
aide of various Libyan allies. Carthage
learned the lessons of the mercenary
war, and immediately sought out a new
empire in Spain that would provide re-
liable subject manpower and reduce
dependence on mercenary fighters. In
the 2nd Punic War (218-201 BC), Cartha-
ge relied mostly upon Spanish subjects,
Numidian, Gallic and Italian allies and
African levies. The only major employ-
ment of mercenaries came at the very
end, after Spain had been lost, and after
the main Numidian and Carthaginian
armies had been wiped out in ambush
and battle. A band of 4000 Celtiberian
mercenaries provided a cadre upon
which to rebuild the Carthaginian army
destroyed by Scipio’s incendiary attacks
in 204 BC. These mercenaries fought
to the death at the Battle of the Great
Plains in 203 BC, allowing the rest of the
army to escape. At Zama in 202 BC, mer-
cenaries constituted about one-third
of Hannibal’s force, the remainder con-
sisting of citizen levies and his veteran
cadre from Italy. Hannibal deployed his
mercenaries in his first rank, essentially
as cannon fodder to dull Roman swords
and exhaust Scipio’s soldiery.
The Roman Republic’s enormous
reserve of citizen manpower, coupled
with her ability to mobilize large num-
bers of Italian subjects, meant that she
was not dependent on foreign merce-
naries to bulk up her armies. Rome still
made limited use of mercenary speci-
alists: Cretan archers, Balearic slingers,
and in the late republican era, Germa-
nic cavalry. These specialists, however,
represented only a tiny fraction of over-
all Roman military potential. Roman
citizens were also not above serving
Ancient Warfare 7
11-02-2010 16:25:57
 THEME INTRODUCTION
© Karwansaray BV
Oscan warrior, recognizable from his
triple-disc cuirass and feathered hel-
met. Crater from Campania, painted
by the Astarita painter, mid fourth cen-
tury BC. Now in the Allard Pierson mu-
seum, Amsterdam
as mercenaries themselves. Two of the
murderers of Pompey the Great, Septi-
mus and Salvius, were Roman citizens
in Ptolemaic military service.
Mercenary origins
Where did these mercenaries come
from? The best mercenaries were re-
cruited from impoverished areas that
still retained a rich military heritage,
full of rough men ready to serve for
hire. Greek mercenaries, as mentioned
above, were in particular demand to
serve in Hellenistic armies, as their
fighting styles were easily to coordinate
with citizen hoplites and peltasts. Crete
was famous for its mercenaries, espe-
cially its archers. All three Hellenistic
powers recruited from Thrace, famous
for its warlike tribes. Macedonia em-
ployed Illyrian large contingents, and
also sponsored Illyrian privateers. Ita-
lian peoples, particularly Oscans and
Ligurians, served in Sicily and fought
for Carthage in the 3rd century. Gauls,
while much feared by the inhabitants
of the Mediterranean, were also heavily
employed as mercenaries. Many of the-
se violent peoples, when not serving as
mercenaries, made their living through
raiding and piracy. Illyria and Crete in
particular were at once prime locations
for mercenary recruitment as well as
notorious dens of pirates.
The definition of ‘mercenary’ was
not always clear however. A mercenary
is a foreigner who fights for pay. Yet
8 Ancient Warfare
AW nr11-2009.indd 8
subject levies and allied contingents
often received pay, as well as a share of
loot or allotments of land. Often times a
state’s suzerainty over given areas was
nominal or even fictitious – meaning
that the recruitment of these nomi-
nal subjects was limited to volunteers:
were these mercenaries or subjects?
Treaties often facilitated mercenary
recruitment. The Seleucids had treaties
of alliance (symmachia) with various
states in Crete, which allowed citizens
of various city-states to sign up in the
king’s service. Also, smaller states of-
ten aided allied powers by allowing
citizen bands to enter into foreign ser-
vice. Thus we find a large contingent of
Athenians in the 270s in Ptolemaic ser-
vice, when Ptolemy II was the primary
ally of Athens: should such soldiers be
considered mercenaries or allies? Fur-
thermore, many mercenaries were re-
warded with plots of land in military
settlements (katoikoi), so that they and
their descendants would continue ser-
ving the state. These soldiers made the
transition from mercenary to immi-
grant settler.
Advantages and disadvantages
The Greek historian Polybius had lit-
tle good to say about mercenaries; he
contrasted the citizen-soldiers of Rome,
fighting for homeland, to Carthaginian
mercenaries, fighting for pay. Polybius
has plenty of stories of mercenaries
behaving badly: the Oscan Mamerti-
nes, whose seizure of Messina sparked
the 1st Punic War, the Gallic mercenary
band which betrayed Epirus to the Illy-
rians, and the horrors of the Truceless
War. Yet the loyalty of mercenaries was
certainly no worse than that of subject
peoples, who frequently revolted (e.g.
Rome’s Social War) or allies who might
all too easily prove fickle. The arming of
some 20,000 native Egyptian subjects
to fight as hoplites at Raphia caused
the Ptolemies decades of revolt and
brutal guerilla warfare. Even citizen-
soldiers might mutiny, such as the re-
bellion of Roman troops in 206 BC to
protest the prolonged deployment in
Spain. Mercenaries seldom caused this
much trouble.
Indeed, there were many advantages
to the hiring of mercenaries. Citizen-
soldiers could be shockingly amateu-
rish. Scipio Africanus found it necessary
to instill a strict training regime to drill
his green soldiers in Spain. Mercenaries
were professionals; experienced from
long service, they needed no training.
Citizen-soldiers were also difficult to
deploy for extended periods. During his
campaign against Sparta, Antigonus
Doson needed to send his Macedonian
citizen-soldiers home for the winter to
tend their farms and families. The king
wintered with his mercenaries alone.
Finally, the loss of a citizen-soldier was
a permanent blow to the state, which
lost an economically productive farmer
and tax-payer. A dead mercenary was
hardly a loss at all: his salary could me-
rely be transferred to a new hire. Finally,
mercenaries were about as expensive
to field as citizens or subjects, who also
needed to be paid and supplied. Mer-
cenary pay was not high – usually little
more than 2-4 obols a day, roughly the
wages of a day laborer, and equivalent
to what other types of soldiery were
paid. Sometimes mercenaries worked
for rations alone, with the prospect of
booty as their only reward. For all these
reasons, the deployment of mercena-
ries was an attractive strategy for sup-
plementing military manpower in the
ancient world. n
Michael Taylor earned a BA in History
from Princeton University and is cur-
rently a graduate student in Ancient
History at UC Berkeley. He is also an offi-
cer in the California National Guard and
a veteran of the Iraq war.
Further reading:
- G.T.Griffith, The Mercenaries of
the Hellenistic World. Chicago
1984
- W.K. Prichett, The Greek State at
War. 5 volumes, Berkeley 1974-1991
- F.E. Adcock, The Greek and Mace-
donian Art of War. Berkeley 1957
- Matthew Trundle, Greek Mer-
cenaries from the Archaic Age to
Alexander. London and New York
2004
- H.W. Parke, Greek Mercenary Sol-
diers from the Earliest Times to the
Battle of Ipsus. Chicago 1933
11-02-2010 16:26:00

Mercenary’s helmet
THIS BEAUTIFUL AND GENERAL-
LY UNKNOWN BRONZE HELMET
FROM ANCIENT HERACLEA (MOD-
ERN POLICORO) AT THE GULF OF
TARANTO IN SOUTHERN ITALY IS
A FINE EXAMPLE OF A SOUTHERN-
ITALIAN CHALCIDIAN STYLE HEL-
MET WITH HINGED CHEEK PIECES.
IT WAS FOUND IN GRAVE #1188 IN
THE EASTERN NECROPOLIS OF THE
ANCIENT CITY AND WAS PART OF A
WARRIOR’S PANOPLY.
By Christian Koepfer
The grave dates to the later 4th century
BC. Helmets of this type or similar style
were quite fashionable in this area well
into the 3rd century BC. The helmet’s
skull is quite typical for this kind of
helmet, but it has several peculiarities
about it, which make it an extraordi-
nary piece. On each side the helmet
has two cheek pieces. What looks like
the actual cheek piece is ‘folded’ up-
wards in a manner which can be seen
on contemporary grave paintings from
ancient Paestum, thus creating a deco-
rative device similar to the wings which
are also often seen on helmets of this
type.
On each side small bronze rivets con-
nect the ‘wings’ right above the hinge
with the helmet’s skull. The lower edge
of the ‘wings’ is rolled over to create a
All photos © Christian Koepfer, courtesy of the Museo Nazionale Della Siritide.
AW nr11-2009.indd 9
THE FIND
hinge which holds the actual cheek pie-
ces. These cheek pieces are circular and
are decorated with a bronze appliqué in
the shape of a wheel with four spokes.
The appliqué is held in place with five
small bronze rivets, one at the end of
each spoke, and one in the centre of the
wheel. The identical decorative device
can be seen next to the hooks of the
wide bronze belt which was found to-
gether with the helmet. Similar round
cheek pieces in connection with the up-
ward pointing ‘wing’-style cheek pieces
were again found on depictions from
Paestum.
Unlike most helmets of this type,
this example does not show any tra-
ces of feather tubes or spiral feather
holders, or even a crest holder. Instead
it has a long bronze “crest” (Lophos) in
the shape of a snake - or rather a basi-
lisk - soldered to the top of the skull. The
basilisk is modelled in an aggressive
position suggesting readiness for swift
attack and bite. This impression is even
more intensified through the coiled-up
centre of the animal and the snaking
tail, which goes all the way down the
backside of the skull.
All the decorative elements – wings,
wheels, and the snake – suggest speed
and swiftness, which probably fits well
with the style of warfare of the sout-
hern Italian tribes of the time. Helmets
of the Southern-Italian Chalcidian type
most certainly were very prominent
among the Southern Italian merce-
naries working for King Agathokles of
Syracuse. After the king’s death in 289
BC, these troops came to be know as the
mamertini, sons of Mars. n
Ancient Warfare 9
11-02-2010 16:26:06
 THE SOURCE

Theatre of war
The Hellenistic mercenary in contemporary drama
THE ENDEMIC WARFARE OF THE HELLENISTIC WORLD BROUGHT AN INCREASE
IN THE NUMBER OF SOLDIERS FOR HIRE. THEIR HISTORY CAN BE PIECED
TOGETHER FROM THE WORKS OF DIODORUS SICULUS AND OTHERS. BUT
AN INTERESTING SIDELIGHT IS SHED BY AN UNEXPECTED SOURCE: THE COM-
EDIES OF THE ATHENIAN PLAYWRIGHT MENANDER.

By Duncan B Campbell

316 BC was an eventful year across
the Mediterranean world. In the
east, the continuing struggles of the
Diadochoi (Alexander the Great’s ‘suc-
cessors’) found the aged Antigonus
Monophthalmus (“the one-eyed”)
embroiled in warfare against Eumenes,
in order to secure his hold on Asia
Minor, while in the south Ptolemy con-
These are just two lines from the
lengthy inscription, now frag-
mentary and partly mutilated,
that once stood on the island
of Paros. Looking back across
history, the stonecutter chro-
nicled an eclectic selection of
notable events, such as bat-
tles, festivals and the deaths of

tinued to consolidate his hold on Egypt.
In the west, Agathocles began his reign
of terror as tyrant of Syracuse, the pri-
mary city on Sicily. In the north, the
infant Pyrrhus was smuggled into Illyria
to avoid murder at the hands of his
Molossian opponents. And in Athens,
a haven of calm amidst these military
crises, Menander’s play Dyskolos (“The
Malcontent”) won first prize at the
Lenaia festival.
Some of these events appear on
the so-called Marmor Parium (“Parian
Marble”), erected in the year 264/3:
“52 years (ago), Cassander came
back into Macedonia, and Thebes
was resettled and Olympias died
and Cassandreia was founded
and Agathocles became tyrant of
Syracuse | when Democleides was
archon at Athens, and Menander
the comic dramatist first won
the prize at Athens then.”
Marmor Parium §14 (lines 117-
118)
kings. Although his testimony is
limited and lacks detail, he provides
a fascinating supplement to our usual
sources of evidence. But it is the play-
wright mentioned under the year 316
that interests us here.
The life and times of Menander
The dramatist Menander was born in
Athens in 343/2 BC (Athenian dates
are fixed according to the archonship,
which ran from summer to summer)
and died in 292/1 BC. His life spanned
an eventful period of history. Growing
up in a city that feared the rise of the
Macedonian state to the north, as a
child he must have heard the panic-
ked news of the Athenian defeat at
Chaeronea in August 338. An entire
generation were stunned into submis-
sion, but with the death of Alexander
the Great in the summer of 323, the
Athenians rose against their northern
overlords, only to suffer defeat again, in
the so-called Lamian War.
The peculiarly Athenian insti-
tution of the ephebeia obliged every
18-year old youth to spend two years
in military training. Physical exercise,
weapons drill, patrolling the country-
© Karwansaray BV
Statue of an actor, portray-
ing either a traveller or a mercenary
from the Hellenistic era. Now in the
British museum, London.
side and manning the outposts were
the order of the day. It seems that, in
return, each youth was issued with a
shield and spear (Constitution of the
Athenians 42.4). So it is quite likely that
Menander had earned his own panoply
around 323, and served his city-state as
a hoplite in the Lamian War, perhaps
even witnessing Athens’ final defeat at
Crannon.
Two centuries of Athenian democra-
cy came to an end with the imposition
of a garrison by Antipater, the 76-year
old regent of Macedon. However,
Antipater did not have long to live,
and his death in 319 sparked conflict
between his son, Cassander, and his

10 Ancient Warfare

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successor as Macedonian regent, the
veteran Polyperchon, himself now an
elderly 75 year-old. In the ensuing power
struggle, Athens fell under Cassander’s
authority, to be governed by a certain
Demetrius, an aristocrat from Phaleron,
who (in the words of Pausanias) “had
a reputation for wisdom” (Pausanias
1.25.6). And it was during his ten-year
regime that Menander rose to fame as
a comic playwright.
Fortunate survivals
It is a surprising fact that, prior to the
20th century, the plays of Menander
were almost entirely unknown. Most
ancient works that we read today have
come down to us as medieval copies of
the original texts, sometimes at several
removes, creating a complicated fami-
ly tree. For example, the Bibliotheca
Historica (“Library of History”) by
Diodorus Siculus is known from several
dozen manuscripts, mostly containing
only books 11-20. All derive from four
prototypes of tenth century date, pre-
served in Italian and Greek monaste-
ries and in the private collection of the
Medici, from where handwritten copies
were disseminated across Europe
during the Renaissance.
By contrast, none of Menander’s
plays survived the Middle Ages. Until
relatively recently, his words were pre-
served only in the brief quotations of
later authors. But, by good fortune,
archaeological work in Egypt has produ-
ced a steady stream of original papyrus
documents, reused in the manufacture
of mummy cases. Some of these were
recognised as the damaged remains of
handwritten ancient scrolls containing
fragments of Menander’s plays. Parts of
over a dozen plays are now known, and
one of them (the Dyskolos mentioned
above) is almost complete.
The mercenary captains
Several of the plays incorporate a mer-
cenary soldier as central character. In
the Perikeiromene (“The Girl who has
her Hair Cropped”), the aptly named
Polemon (the name means “War”)
returns to his home in Corinth from
mercenary service abroad, only to find
that his girlfriend has apparently been
seeing another man. In a jealous rage,
he shaves her head, before it is reve-
aled that the other man is really the
AW nr11-2009.indd 11
girl’s long lost brother and their liai-
sons have been quite innocent. In the
Misoumenos (“The Man She Hated”),
Thrasonides (literally, “Courageous”)
returns to Athens from soldiering on
Cyprus, where he has acquired a con-
cubine named Krateia. The girl hates
him, in the mistaken belief that he
killed her brother, but her father duly
turns up to absolve Thrasonides of any
blame, and the couple are married. In
the Sikyonios (“The Man from Sikyon”),
Stratophanes (a name which means
something like “Distinguished in the
army”) is engaged as a mercenary in
Caria when he hears that his mother
has died at home in Sikyon; but her
deathbed testimony reveals that she
was his foster parent and he is really an
Athenian. And in the badly fragmented
Kolax (“The Flatterer”), a mercenary sol-
dier named Bias (literally, “Strength”)
seems to be vying with another man
for the attentions of an expensive pros-
titute.
The prominence of mercenaries
as central characters, and Menander’s
sensitive portrayal of them, tells us two
things. First, mercenary service was a
widely recognised occupation at this
time. After all, 2,000 mercenaries had
served shoulder to shoulder with the
Athenians in the recent Lamian War
(Diodorus Siculus 18.11.3). The second
point is this: Menander’s contempo-
raries could readily identify with the
mercenary, and even sympathise with
him. In fact, many Athenians in his
audience would be anxiously awaiting
the return of husbands and sons from
foreign fields, in the service of the vari-
ous Diadochoi and their allies.
Interesting details pop up from time
to time in the plays. One of the few sur-
viving excerpts from the Kolax descri-
bes Bias as a “double-pay man (dimoir-
itês) carrying his own pack, lunch bag,
helmet, javelins, sheepskin, as heavy
a load as the poor old donkey carries”
(Act 1, lines 28-31). He has seen action in
Cappadocia, a territory that Antigonus
had wrested from Eumenes in 316, and
Cassander in turn attempted to wrest
from Antigonus. The unfolding drama
no doubt involved thousands of merce-
naries on both sides.
In the Misoumenos, Thrasonides
informs us that he had been entrusted
with the task of escorting the spoils
THE SOURCE
from Cyprus. But, along the way, a girl
has broken his heart. “I bought her,
treated her like a free girl, as the lady
of the house, gave her maids, gold trin-
kets, dresses, and thought of her as my
wife” (Act 1, lines 38-40). Interestingly, in
315, Ptolemy had transferred a force of
Athenian mercenaries to Cyprus, where
they later assisted in his total annexa-
tion of the island (Diod. Sic. 19.62.4;
20.21.1).
Echoes of Hellenistic warfare
One play in particular holds a wealth
of incidental detail. The Aspis (“The
Shield”), though incomplete and frag-
mentary, tells the story of a young
man named Kleostratos (“Glorious
army”) and his two uncles, the good
Khairestratos and the wicked Smikrines.
Kleostratos’ father is already dead, so
under Athenian law he acts as guar-
dian (kyrios) to his own sister. He has
elected to enter mercenary service in
order to make his fortune and provide
for his sister.
At the beginning of the play, we
meet Kleostratos’ faithful slave and
childhood tutor, Daos, who had until
recently served as armour-bearer and
general dogsbody. He brings the sad
tidings that his master has fallen in
battle:
“But now you’re gone, Kleostratos,
snatched away by death against
all expectation; and I, your tutor,
have come home with this shield,
which failed to save you, though
you often brought it safely back
from battle.”
Menander, Aspis Act 1 (lines
13-17)
Before the young man departed, he
entrusted his sister to the good uncle
Khairestratos, who has brought her
up in his own household, and who
plans to give her in marriage to his
stepson, Khaireas. Uncle Khairestratos
also has a daughter, and it is evident
that he planned to marry her off to
Kleostratos. So the young man’s death
would have two important repercus-
sions. First, Khairestratos would need
to find a new husband for his daughter.
But more importantly, Kleostratos’ sis-
ter was left in a difficult position, being
Ancient Warfare 11
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 THE SOURCE

without a guardian; under Athenian Antigonus now preoccupied in the

law, her deceased father’s nearest rela-
tive could now claim her as his wife.
Thus, wicked uncle Smikrines enters
the picture. As a mercenary soldier,
Kleostratos had accumulated consi-
derable wealth; wealth which, on his
death, would legally pass to his sister.
struggle for Central Asia with Seleucus,
his iron grip on Asia Minor slackened
sufficiently to permit Ptolemaic interfe-
rence. Not content with his naval lord-
ship of the isles, based on Cyprus and
Cos, Ptolemy decided to stake a claim
in the southwest of present-day Turkey.

Naturally, the wicked Smikrines is keen
to have his niece’s hand in marriage,
chiefly because of her inheritance.
It is often difficult to pin down
exactly what kind of remuneration a
mercenary could expect. We have seen
that, in the Misoumenos, Thrasonides
had obviously become a wealthy man.
And here, in Daos’s description of
Kleostratos, Menander again shows that
a mercenary could make a comfortable
living, if he survived long enough.
“My master had a collection of
some six hundred gold coins, and
a fair number of silver cups, and
that bunch of prisoners that you
see over there. He was sending
me over to Rhodes, and told me
to leave it all with a friend, and
come straight back to him.”
Menander, Aspis Act 1 (lines
34-39)
At the play’s opening, Daos sets the
general scene of the mercenary acti-
vity:
“There’s a river in Lycia called the
Xanthos, and we’d been lucky
there in a fair number of actions.
The natives had been routed,
and had abandoned the plain. …
Confidence made us careless, and
led us into a trap. Many men had
actually left the protection of the
camp, and were looting the vil-
lages, burning crops and selling
booty. Everyone came back with
his pockets full.”
Menander, Aspis Act 1 (lines
23-33)
Most commentators are content to
identify the warfare that Daos descri-
bes as nondescript small-scale free-
booting activity. However, we know
that the focus of Diadochan warfare
shifted briefly to Lycia in 309 BC. With
First capturing Phaselis, he moved on
to Xanthus, which he also captured
despite its Antigonid garrison. Last to
fall was Caunus, in neighbouring Caria,
before Ptolemy retired to Cos (Diodorus
Siculus 20.27.1-2).
Menander even gives us a flavour
of mercenary life, through the mout-
hpiece of Daos, who describes how his
master was involved in skirmishing
against the native Lycians.
“On that very day, the natives,
quite unbeknown to our scouts,
occupied a hill in front of us,
and dug themselves in: they
had heard from some deserters
that our forces were scattered.
Well, when evening came, and
all those in the camp were in
their tents, after returning from
a countryside that offered booty,
the inevitable happened – most
of them were celebrating. … There
was a surprise attack, I think.”
Menander, Aspis Act 1 (lines
40-48, 50)
Ptolemy’s lightning Lycian campaign
surely caused a stir in the Greek home-
land, and must have formed the pri-
mary topic of conversation around the
year 309. Menander’s audience would
certainly have made the connection
with Kleostratos’ adventures in Lycia.
We may even imagine the involvement
of the Rhodians, who had come out as
supporters of Ptolemy, for Daos was
intending to liaise with someone on
Rhodes on behalf of his master.
In 307/6, Antigonus’s son,
Demetrius Poliorcetes, finally over-
threw Cassander’s regime and decla-
red Athens a democracy once again.
However, the struggles between the
various Diadochoi continued, and the
opening years of the third century were
a time of persistent civil war at Athens.
Menander did not live long enough to
see peace restored to his city.
© Karwansaray BV
Bust of Menander as preserved in the
Glyptothek of Munich, Germany.
Many in Menander’s audiences
will have lived the mercenary life, and
shared the experiences of men like
Kleostratos in the Aspis. Others will
have heard at first hand from fathers,
uncles, cousins and brothers of their
adventures in mercenary service. With
their real-life settings and conversatio-
nal style, his plays are the nearest thing
to reportage for the life and fortunes of
the Hellenistic mercenary soldier. n
Dr Campbell would like to record
his thanks to Professor Glenn Bugh
(Virginia Tech) for a stimulating lecture
on “Menander’s Mercenaries”, delivered
at the First International Conference
on Hellenistic Warfare, held in Torún
(Poland) in October 2003.
Further Reading
Quotations from Menander are
taken from the Penguin edi-
tion: Plays and Fragments (ed.
N. Miller, 1987). There is also a
3-volume Loeb edition (Aspis
appears in volume 1, ed. W. G.
Arnott, 1979) and a 3-volume
Budé edition (Aspis appears in
volume 3, ed. J.-M. Jacques, 1963).
For Hellenistic warfare in gene-
ral, see A. Chaniotis, War in the
Hellenistic World, Oxford 2005.

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AW nr11-2009.indd 13 11-02-2010 16:26:15
 THEME: WAR AS A LIVELIHOOD

General-for-Hire
Condottieri of the Ancient World
THE POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT OF THE FOURTH CENTURY AND ITS CORRE- tually alone of the Persian army acquit-
ted themselves admirably. Maintaining
SPONDING OPPORTUNITIES LEAD TO THE REGULAR APPEARANCE OF THE
their formation through the panic that
MERCENARY GENERAL IN A NUMBER OF DIFFERENT FORMS. THE TRUE CON- swept Dareios’ men, the majority of the
DOTTIERE, A MERCENARY LEADER ENTIRELY FREE FROM STATE AFFILIATIONS king’s mercenaries were able to retreat
from the battlefield in good order. Du-
AND FOLLOWING ONLY HIS OWN SELF-INTEREST, HAD BEEN AND WOULD ring the retreat Amyntas realized that
CONTINUE TO BE A RELATIVELY RARE OCCURRENCE IN ANCIENT GREECE. his fortune would not be won in the
service of an arrogant emperor unwil-
By Joseph Pietrykowski ling to listen to reasoned counsel. He
therefore conceived of a daring scheme
to seize the whole of Persian Egypt for
The ties of citizenship, with all their ac- ning Athenian service and being gran- himself.
companying rights and rewards, were ted citizenship in the late 350’s. There- With 4,000 (some sources say 8,000) of
simply too deeply ingrained into the after Charidemos worked with Athens the mercenaries he had commanded at
Greek character. Nevertheless, condot- to stem the rising tide of Macedonian Issus, Amyntas proceeded to the Persian
tieri did appear from time to time, to influence, and was consequently des- naval centre of Tripolis where he com-
the almost universal criticism of their pised by Alexander, who upon assu- mandeered what ships he needed from
contemporaries, who loathed their ro- ming power ordered the condottiere’s the Persian fleet and burned the rest.
guish disregard for tradition and their arrest, but later consented to his mere He then sailed to Cyprus where he aug-
unorthodox methods. exile. The old mercenary nevertheless mented his forces and from there to his
resolved to keep up the fight and fled destination. Landing in Egypt the ge-
Fantasies of independence to Persia, where he was received by the neral brazenly proclaimed that Dareios
Perhaps the best example of the ancient Great King Dareios. Though he offered had appointed him as the new governor
Greek condottiere was Charidemos, a counsel in the aftermath of Alexander’s after the death of the previous gover-
Euboian mercenary leader of excee- success at the Granikos, his criticisms of nor at Issus. Though he met with some
dingly loose loyalties. Having fought Persia were too severe and he was orde- initial successes, Amyntas soon ran into
against Athens during his early career, red to be executed. resistance from the Persian lieutenant
which also included a stint as a pirate Although his actions at times bor- governor. He eventually met his death
preying on Athenian shipping, Chari- dered on the reckless, Charidemos was as the result of the disobedience of his
demos then took service with Athens neither the first nor the last mercenary men, who stopped to plunder while as-
during several campaigns in the 360’s. leader to harbor fantasies of setting saulting a city and were massacred by
By 362, Charidemos had separated from himself up as ruler of an independent a large force of natives who rallied to
Athens and taken himself to Anatolia realm. Within months of Charidemos’ repulse the invaders.
where he took service with the famed death, a mercenary commander by the Nearly a decade later North Af-
Rhodian mercenary brothers Memnon name of Amyntas found himself em- rica would prove to be the site of yet
and Mentor. During the campaign Cha- barked upon a similar enterprise. Pre- another attempt by a condottiere to
ridemos chanced upon a group of weak- viously Amyntas had been an officer at gain a private kingdom. The endeavor
ly-defended cities near the ancient site the Macedonian court until the death began when a Spartan officer named
of Troy and seized them, intent on set- of Philip II, at which point he fled the Thibron saw an opportunity to gain
ting himself up as sovereign of a private country. Taking service with the Persi- for himself the tools with which to
kingdom. When Artabazus, the Persian ans against his countrymen, Amyntas build an empire. Murdering Harpalos,
governor of the region and patron of and a strong force of Greek mercena- Alexander’s wayward Imperial Treasu-
Memnon and Mentor, regained control ries joined Dareios just prior to the bat- rer who had fled to Crete to avoid the
of the area, he turned the weight of his tle of Issus, which he warned the king to king’s wrath after a series of transgres-
forces against Charidemos’ enclave. avoid. Disregarding this advice, Dareios sions, Thibron took command of his
Fleeing to Thrace, Charidemos fought engaged Alexander in a titanic battle 6,000 mercenaries and the substantial
for and against various claimants to in which Amyntas commanded part of fortune that Harpalos had stolen from
the throne for some years before rejoi- the king’s Greek mercenaries, who vir- the royal treasury. Having gained an

14 Ancient Warfare

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army and a war chest virtually over-
night, Thibron was then approached by
exiles from the Greek city of Cyrene in
the hopes that he would intervene in
their civil conflict and restore them to
AW nr11-2009.indd 15
© Johnny Shumate
power. He immediately embarked on
the campaign, landing in Africa and sei-
zing control of Cyrene before attemp-
ting to expand his foothold. In this he
was stymied by the fierce resistance of
THEME: WAR AS A LIVELIHOOD
The Athenian Chabrias was a
mercenary general who served
in Egypt on several occasions.
He is here shown equipped
as an Athenian hoplite, bea-
ring the Athenian owl on his
shield.
a coalition of nearby cities as well as
by the defection of one of his own of-
ficers to the enemy, who succeeded in
stirring up local resistance against Thi-
bron. As a consequence the mercenary
Ancient Warfare 15
11-02-2010 16:26:27
 THEME: WAR AS A LIVELIHOOD
general was driven out of Cyrene and
after a poorly-documented campaign
of alternating successes and failures,
Thibron was forced to send agents to
the mercenary recruiting centers of the
Peloponnese to enlist further support.
Bolstered with new troops and resto-
red confidence, Thibron settled down
to a punishing siege of Cyrene. Intent
on regaining this prize, the Spartan’s
brutal operations instead triggered a
revolution within the city in which the
elites were ejected, fleeing to Egypt.
There they found a sympathetic ear in
Alexander’s general Ptolemy, who dis-
patched a large army and fleet which
neither Thibron nor his allies were able
to resist. For his gamble Thibron was
handed over to those he had warred
against for torture and ultimately, cru-
cifixion.
Dreams of wealth
Unlike the previous examples, not all
mercenary commanders were seeking
to conquer their own personal empi-
res. Most were motivated simply by the
desire to enrich themselves and in this
some were far more successful than
others.
When Phalaikos, the deposed ruler
of Phokis, gathered together his merce-
naries and set off on a long, rambling
journey through Greece seeking em-
ployment, he was shunned and bar-
red from one city after another before
finally deciding to seek engagement in
the conflict-rich west. Claiming that he
had been invited by prospective em-
ployers, Phalaikos embarked his men
on transports and was bound for Italy
or Sicily before his hard-bitten merce-
naries discovered the truth and forced
him at sword point to turn back. Ar-
riving back in Greece he was finally
afforded a piece of good luck when a
recruiting agent from the Cretan city
of Knossos hired him and his entire
army. Unfortunately for Phalaikos, his
campaign, which began successfully
with the rapid capture of an enemy city,
drew the attention of the Spartan king
Archidamos, who responded to the ap-
peals for help, inflicting a crushing de-
feat on the luckless Phokian. Phalaikos
thereafter sought to sustain himself
and his men by blackmailing cities for
protection money, but during the siege
16 Ancient Warfare
AW nr11-2009.indd 16
of a particularly intractable polis, the
general somehow became entrapped
in a siege machine and was burned to
death.
Unlike Phalaikos, Xanthippos of
Sparta has earned the well-deserved re-
putation as one of antiquity’s greatest
condottieri. In 256, during the depths
of the First Punic War, Carthage found
itself reeling under the weight of an
unforeseen Roman thrust into Africa.
Outclassed and outmaneuvered by the
commander Regulus, who sought to
bring his army before the walls of Car-
thage itself and force the acceptance
of a crippling peace treaty, the Cartha-
ginians in their despair turned to the
mercenary recruiting centres of Greece.
Soon a large force of mercenaries had
arrived in Africa, and so had even more
importantly, a condottiere with the skill
and discipline necessary to turn the
Carthaginian rabble into an effective
army capable of resisting the victorious
Romans. With his practiced eye, Xan-
thippos immediately saw the flawed
tactics of the Carthaginians in not ma-
king full use of their excellent elephant
and cavalry corps, both of which were
deployed extensively by the Hellenis-
tic armies then operating in the Greek
east.
Xanthippos then rushed to drill the
men in an effort to prepare them for
the looming battle. After some hurried
training Xanthippos moved his men
out to meet the advancing Romans, ca-
refully maneuvering the enemy onto an
open plain where he could best strike.
The celebrated result of Xanthippos’
judicious use of elephants and cavalry
was a crushing victory that bought
Carthage enough time to recover her
strength and renew the struggle in ear-
nest. Having secured his success (and
presumably his pay check), Xanthippos
abruptly left the service of Carthage; all
but disappearing from the pages of the
history he helped to write.
In the service of the state
While some mercenary generals en-
joyed the virtually unlimited freedom
of choice afforded to condottieri, by
far the most common type of hired
commander was the state-sanctioned
mercenary leader. These were generals
who were sent to earn revenues for the
state by lending military assistance to
a foreign power. This practice became
commonplace in the chaotic struggle
for power following the Peloponnesian
War. Given the perpetual struggle to
finance the incessant and increasingly
expensive warring, city-states required
employers with deep pockets and a
need for experienced generals at the
head of crack Greek mercenaries. These
two qualifications were to be found
in abundance in the nearby regions
of Persia, Egypt and to a lesser extent,
Thrace. Great wealth combined with a
relative military weakness made these
areas naturally attractive as arenas for
employment.
Though Persia was at that time the
largest and most powerful empire on
the planet, its vastness left it inherently
fragile. A message dispatched from the
empire’s fringes to the capitol often
took weeks or months to arrive. As a
consequence, a worrisome amount of
power had to be vested in the gover-
nors of certain provinces to ensure the
safety of the borders. This often led to
struggles between governors or even
open rebellion against the central go-
vernment.
Such was the case in 356 when Ar-
tabazus, the Persian governor of Hel-
lespontine Phrygia, decided to revolt.
Knowing that the emperor would dis-
patch a powerful force against him,
Artabazus appealed to the Athenian
general Chares, who was at that time
operating in the area with a large force
of mercenaries. Though Chares was ini-
tially hesitant, it is said that his merce-
naries got wind of Artabazus’ proposal
and, being then short of pay, demanded
that the general produce their wages or
else take service with Artabazus. After
first securing the blessing of Athens,
Chares agreed and crossed over to Asia,
where he lead his men to an astoun-
ding victory over a vastly superior Per-
sian force. Indeed Chares’ successes
were so complete that after but a short
campaign, there arrived in Athens an
embassy from Artaxerxes threatening
to declare war and give aid to Athens’
enemies if Chares was not immediately
recalled. Terrified, the people assented,
ordering their commander to abandon
Artabazus to his fate.
Though Chares had won a great vic-
11-02-2010 16:26:28

tory for the rebel before his recall, Arta-
bazus was still threatened by a coalition
of neighboring loyalist governors. With
Athens unwilling to help, Artabazus
turned to Thebes. Desperately short of
money, the Thebans decided to dispatch
Pammenes, their finest general, with a
force of 5,000 soldiers to aid the Persian
rebel. Waging an energetic campaign,
Pammenes intercepted two enemy ar-
mies, each of which he engaged and de-
feated in two great battles. Regardless
of this success, Artabazus soon grew
suspicious of Pammenes and eventu-
ally imprisoned or exiled the Theban,
effectively dashing his last hope for vic-
tory. Bereft of support, Artabazus was
forced to abandon his province and flee
to the Macedonian court.
It was not Anatolia alone that at-
tracted mercenary generals to the in-
ternal conflicts of Persia. After revol-
ting from Persia in 404, Egypt managed
to remain independent for much of the
fourth century before the Macedonian
conquest, despite Persia’s best efforts.
This was accomplished chiefly through
the support of various Greek states and
Greek mercenaries.
During the early 380’s the pharaoh
of Egypt, Achoris (Hakor), had been an-
tagonizing emperor Artaxerxes II by
supporting Euagoras, the leader of Cy-
prus, in his rebellion from Persia. Eua-
goras was also aided by Chabrias, a skil-
led Athenian general. In order to focus
on bringing the rebels back into the
imperial fold, the emperor brokered a
peace between the contending factions
of Greece that forbid them from med-
dling in Cyprus or Anatolia. Once the
treaty was concluded, however, Chabri-
as was invited by Achoris to continue
the struggle against the Persians, who
had now embarked on an invasion of
Egypt. With his veteran troops Chabri-
as helped to turn back the Persian as-
sault during a campaign about which
we know precious little. Chabrias and
his mercenaries must have been instru-
mental in the defense as soon after am-
bassadors from Persia arrived in Athens
to complain of a breach in the truce and
to demand the recall of Chabrias from
Egypt. Having just concluded peace
with the Persians, the Athenians were
in no mood to tempt fate and instead
ordered Chabrias to return. The strug-
AW nr11-2009.indd 17
gle for Egypt was far from over, howe-
ver, for the Athenians had no sooner
recalled Chabrias from the service of
the Egyptians than they dispatched Ip-
hicrates to fight on the side of Persia.
Nevertheless, despite Iphicrates’ formi-
dable skills and fearsome reputation,
the invasion faltered as the Egyptians
put up a ferocious resistance and the
Athenian general quarrelled with the
Persian commander. Plagued by stra-
tegic blunders and divisive infighting,
the invading Persian army was eventu-
ally forced to retreat, leaving its task of
reconquering Egypt unfulfilled.
More than a decade passed before
mercenary leaders came flocking back
to Egypt. By the year 360 a new pha-
raoh, Teos, launched a bold plan to re-
claim the glory of Egypt’s storied past.
Having again requested Chabrias, who
returned to command the pharaoh’s
fleet, Teos amassed a large army of
mercenaries with the intention of in-
vading Persian-held Phoenicia. His
army was placed under the command
of King Agesilaos of Sparta, who had
agreed to the expedition in order to re-
fill the coffers of his sagging state. In
his rush to war, however, Teos made the
fatal mistake of creating too expensive
an army. While he accompanied the
invasion into Phoenicia, the burden of
taxation and the dissent spread by a
group of disaffected priests sparked
an insurrection that quickly grew into
outright rebellion, with a rival pharaoh
being proclaimed. This development
struck the invasion force like a thun-
derbolt and before long loyalties were
split between Teos and the usurper
with Chabrias faithfully supporting
Teos while Agesilaos sided with the up-
start. When news of the growing crisis
reached Athens, Chabrias was recalled
to avoid any untoward incidents that
could damage Athens’ relations. Age-
silaos, meanwhile, was retained by the
new pharaoh to help secure his rule,
which he did with brutal efficiency, cru-
shing opposition forces and propping
up the weary state before taking his
leave of Egypt shortly thereafter with a
large sum for Sparta.
Conclusion
The stories of these mercenary generals
are but a sampling of the many and
THEME: WAR AS A LIVELIHOOD
multifaceted characters who over the
years assumed the role of mercenary
leader. From Clearchos, the failed ty-
rant of Byzantium and subsequent lea-
der of Cyrus’ 10,000 Greek mercenaries,
to Konon, the shamed Athenian general
who fled from Athens only to return as
commander of Persia’s entire fleet as
well as Archidamos III of Sparta who, in
search of riches for his kingdom, went
to the aid of the Greeks of Italy and pe-
rished there in fierce fighting against
native Italian forces. Mercenary gene-
rals of the ancient world were as va-
ried and unpredictable as the waves
that carried their armies to distant
shores. While some fought strictly for
themselves, others patriotically turned
over all gifts, goods and plunder to the
state for the benefit of their fellow ci-
tizens. Though some were loyal to the
highest degree, others acted as though
they alone enjoyed a monopoly on cun-
ning and duplicity. In the end, however,
they all shared the experience of selling
their military expertise in the service of
foreign states.
Reviled at the inception of the fourth
century, mercenary generals found
themselves in many cases respected by
the end of it. Unbound as they often
were by the normal rules and traditi-
ons of warfare, they were forced to cut
their own path through the tumultu-
ous events of their time and, hated or
loved, they laid claim to a unique role in
military history. n
Joseph Pietrykowski is an historian and
writer interested in exploring warfare
in the ancient world in all its forms. His
first book, Great Battles of the Hellenis-
tic World, is due out soon. He is currently
writing a companion volume entitled
Great Battles of the Classical Greek
World.
Further Reading:
G.T. Griffith, The Mercenaries of the
Hellenistic World. Chicago 1984.
W.H. Parke, Greek Mercenary Sol-
diers. Chicago 1981
W.K. Pritchett, The Greek State at
War. Volume II. Berkeley 1974.
Matthew Trundle, Greek Merce-
naries. New York 2004.
Ancient Warfare 17
11-02-2010 16:26:28
 THEME: WAR AS A LIVELIHOOD

Soldiers of Ta-Sety
Nubian archers of the pharaohs
NUBIA, NOW CLASSED AS THE MID-
DLE NILE VALLEY, IS SITUATED IN
THE NORTHERN AREA OF MODERN
SUDAN AND THE SOUTHERNMOST
PART OF EGYPT. IT WAS KNOWN AS
THE FIRST NOME (DISTRICT) OF UPPER
EGYPT. THE NAME ‘NUBIA’, MAY HAVE
BEEN DERIVED FROM THE EGYPTIAN
WORD, NB, WHICH MEANS GOLD,
THE LATTER BEING THE MOST VALU-
ABLE COMMODITY OF THE REGION.

© Bridget McDermott
NUBIA WAS ALSO CALLED TA-SETY,
“LAND OF THE BOWMEN.” IT IS OF-
TEN REFERRED TO AS WAWET BY THE
ANCIENT EGYPTIANS AND KUSH, BY
ARCHAEOLOGISTS. This New Kingdom relief shows a group of Nubians taking part in a procession.
Although they are placed among groups of foreign soldiers, they are easily identi-
fied by their short hair, heavy features and earrings.
By Bridget McDermott

Much information about the area has
been lost with the building of the As-
wan and Gamal Nasser Dams. However,
we know that the landscape of Nubia
was, in ancient times, a harsh contrast
of deserts and lush agricultural land,
providing vast hunting grounds where
nomadic people became skilled in ar-
chery. Nubia was densely wooded. Its
savannahs stretched to the Ethiopian
foothills and was populated with a vast
array of wildlife, including elephant, gi-
raffe, lions and leopards. This land, rich
in stone quarries and precious metals,
provided the Egyptians with a fine ar-
ray of luxury goods, these included ebo-
ny, ivory, animal skins, oils and incense.
Early contact with Nubia.
These earliest phases of ancient Egyp-
tian history are known respectively as
the Predynastic, (4500-3150 BC) and Old
Kingdom (2700-2190 BC) Periods. Egyp-
tologists divide the different stages of
ancient Egyptian history into Dynas-
ties and Intermediate periods enabling
them to categorise rulers and recognise
significant events. It was a time of great
cultural advancement that resulted in
the formation of city-states and pyra-
mid building. Egypt and Nubia were
recognised as a corridor that linked the
Mediterranean to Africa. The Egyptians
saw Nubia as an extension of their ter-
ritory – domination was necessary if
they were to control and monitor river
traffic, defend the oases and track the
desert nomads and trading caravans.
They quickly destabilized early settlers
and integrated with the native popula-
tions. While many Nubians conformed
to Egyptian supremacy others rebelled.
Therefore, from the second dynasty on-
wards, the Egyptians built strongholds
in Nubia employing Egyptian soldiers
and local conscripts to guard their forts.
Egyptians and Nubians intermarried
and many settled in Egypt.
We know little about the first expe-
ditions into Nubia. An inscribed tablet
commissioned by Aha (3125-3100 BC)
reveals that the Egyptians were quick
to launch successful campaigns in the
region. New evidence suggests that
Nubians had been living in Egypt from
early times. Recent archaeological work
identifies the ethnic characteristics of
the Nubians among skeletons dated to
the Predynastic Period, and some scho-
lars have suggested that the people of
the southern regions migrated to Egypt
during the unification of Upper and Lo-
wer Egypt, a phase that is sometimes
associated with civil unrest.
As Djer (3100-3055 BC) came to po-
wer, the Egyptians pushed forward in

18 Ancient Warfare

AW nr11-2009.indd 18 11-02-2010 16:26:29

 THEME: WAR AS A LIVELIHOOD

an attempt to extend their southern however, they were always portrayed Egyptian soldiers depicted on an equal
border. In order to accomplish such an with darker skin; while Egyptian sol- footing. In most tomb scenes the Egyp-
undertaking the Egyptians employed diers wore linen, the Nubians are de- tians placed foreigners in a secondary
Nubians to act as translators, guards picted in leather kilts decorated with position, emphasizing or exaggerating
and conscripts in their military or po- bright coloured lozenges. Their leader is their ethnic features. This model high-
lice forces. During the Old Kingdom identified by a distinctive band that is lights the extraordinary respect that
large-scale expeditions were underta- painted on his head. was awarded the Nubian archer corps,
ken. There were serious uprisings. One This type of tomb model was desig- it also indicates how important they
pharaoh records the capture of seven ned to function in the afterlife. Through were to the military factions at this
thousand Nubian rebels. These men magical intervention, the model could time.
were brought back to Egypt in shackles be animated and therefore had an im- A large number of Nubian merce-
and put into service. The Egyptians portant protective role. Paired with a naries came to live and work in Egypt.
were intent on exploiting Nubian stone second model, this time of Egyptian Many of them married, established
quarries. The famous funerary statue of infantrymen, it was designed to guard houses, servants and farms. Evidence
King Khephren was cut from Nubian di- the tomb owner in the afterlife. Here from Gebelein shows that Nubian mer-
orite, which was highly revered. In order we see the rare image of Nubian and cenaries adopted local religious be-
to enrich the king’s treasury, the Egypti-
ans created settlements in Nubia. Mar-
riage with foreigners was common-
place. During this time, the Egyptians
also made contact with the Medjay, the
name given to the people of the moun-
tain region that lay between the Nile
Valley and the hills of the red sea.
Military activity is richly documen-
ted during the Sixth Dynasty. The armies
of Pepy I and his son Merenre were ac-
tive in many foreign regions including
Nubia. The Nomach Weni tells of mag-
nificent expeditions and highlights the
military policies of these Sixth Dynasty
kings, who terrified local populations
by taking captives, sacking their land
and burning crops. He also records the
deployment of Nubian conscripts both
to fight in the army and to secure im-
portant materials such as wood and
stone – these commodities were essen-
tial for the funerary cult of the king.

Civil war
During the First Intermediate Period
(2200-2040 BC) Egypt’s prosperity fell
into decline. Civil disturbance weakened
her political objectives and economic
structure. A succession of Nomarchs,
or warlords, ruled various regions of
the Nile Valley. These men were able to
raise their own private armies. During
© Karwansaray BV

this time, the local chiefs employed a

large number of Nubian mercenaries
who are clearly depicted in the nu-
merous rock cut tombs of Middle Egypt.
Furthermore, the tomb of Meserheti at
Asyut yielded a fine wooden model that Archers were commonly depicted on funerary stele. Here a soldier is depicted with
depicts a troop of Nubian archers. The his archery equipment. His wife stands beside him with her arm placed protecti-
features of these men cannot be distin- vely around his shoulder. Now in the Rijksmuseum voor Oudheden, Leiden, The
guished from their Egyptian comrades, Netherlands

Ancient Warfare 19

AW nr11-2009.indd 19 11-02-2010 16:26:33

 THEME: WAR AS A LIVELIHOOD
© Bridget McDermott
Nubian soldiers were often associated with wrestling matches. In this New King-
dom fragment Nubian soldiers are engaged in a combat display.
liefs and were buried in the Egyptian
fashion. Steles show them dressed as
Egyptians. The Egyptians had a com-
plex attitude to foreigners; in texts and
imagery they treated their neighbours
with contempt and disdain. They refer-
red to the Nubians as ‘burnt faces,’ and
‘big noses’ and treated their southern
enemy with tremendous cruelty. Howe-
ver, they were surprisingly tolerant with
regards to foreign settlers who became
fully ‘Egyptianized.’
Mentuhotep II
During the Middle Kingdom, the coun-
try was unified once again under one
ruler. Mentuhotep II (2040-2009 BC) is
a little known, but fascinating figure.
The king began a massive building pro-
gramme in Nubia, establishing a magni-
ficent chain of forts within a forty mile
radius along the river. Now lost under
lake Nasser, these citadels were desig-
ned with barracks, kitchens, offices and
temples. Both Egyptian and Nubians
were stationed at the forts where they
were employed to control river traffic
and quell any local rebellions. Nubians
are often depicted with dogs, and we
may assume that they used their skills
as trackers to locate escaped prisoners
and other undesirables. The forts were
given names that emphasize Egypt’s
20 Ancient Warfare
AW nr11-2009.indd 20
determination to contain the area –
Semna fort was called the ‘Subduer of
Nubia,’ Kuma ‘Warding Off the bows’
and Serra East, ‘Repulser of the Medjay’.
The most magnificent of these forts
was Buhen. First established during the
Second Dynasty, the fort was designed
with crenulated walls, trap doors, tun-
nels and a drawbridge.
Our knowledge of Mentuhotep II
is derived primarily from his mortu-
ary temple. This unique structure (its
architecture acted as a prototype for
the well known funerary temple of the
female ruler Hatshepsut), was built in
the western hills at Thebes. Experts in
the field of Nubian history have raised
important questions about Mentuho-
tep’s portraiture. In statuary, the king
is painted black. Egyptologists suggest
that this practice links the king with Os-
iris, god of the dead – Osiris was often
painted green or black to emphasize his
role as a god of regeneration. However,
the heavy features of Mentuhotep are
unique – for pharaohs of the later pe-
riod are traditionally depicted with a
delicate bone structure. There is further
evidence to suggest a Nubian link. For
example, Kawit, a royal lady buried with
the king’s entourage, has strong Nubi-
an characteristics. A second concubine,
Sadhe, was also painted black. A third
wife, the lady Ashayet, is shown with at-
tendants who are described as “natives
of the land of the Medjay.” Could it be
possible that this pharaoh, a descen-
dant of a Middle Kingdom warlord, was
of mixed racial blood?
Yet another anomaly is found here.
In a small, claustrophobic tomb situ-
ated within the precincts of the royal
mortuary temple archaeologists dis-
covered a large group of soldier mum-
mies. It was a burial without precedent.
Honoured in death, these men were
described by early excavators as having
Nubian characteristics. The soldiers, ca-
refully retrieved from a foreign battle-
field, had been immersed in sand. The
mummies were well preserved. Indeed,
on their discovery, excavators could still
detect the smell of human decay. The
group was comprised of mercenary
archers who still wore wrist braces. Ar-
rowheads were found in the hair and
the chest cavities of some individuals;
others had broken skulls, their hair was
still matted with blood. The position of
the wounds suggest that the men had
been attacked from a precipice, arrows
and stones had clearly been dispatched
from above. Evidence suggests that
some had lain incapacitated on the
ground and had been ‘finished off’ with
bludgeons. Their bodies were clearly
retrieved at the end of the battle. The
muscle damage on arms and legs in-
dicates that they had been attacked by
birds of prey afterwards.
Invasion and innovation
Disaster struck with the invasion of
a group of foreigners known as the
Hyksos. They infiltrated Egypt and took
control of the country. The Hyksos brou-
ght with them new innovations in cha-
riotry, weapons and armour. This hiatus
strengthened Nubian reserve. At the
beginning of the New Kingdom, after
almost a century of foreign rule, Kamo-
se liberated Egypt (1578 BC) using the
Hyksos advances in military technology
to defeat the enemy and drive them
back into the lands of the Asiatics.
The Egyptians immediately turned
their attention to Nubia. During the
reign of Tuthmosis I, the Nubians at-
tempted to repulse the enemy and
were massacred.
11-02-2010 16:26:35

‘‘The Nubian archers have fallen,
there is mutilation on the plains.
Pharaoh has filled their valleys
with entrails, their blood falls like
rain. The vultures are on the bat-
tlefield, birds tear at their flesh;
the crocodile lies in wait.”
The sons of local chiefs were taken priso-
ner (they were described as Nhsyw htep
(w) which means “offered Nubians.”)
In effect, these children were regarded
as hostages and allied to the Theban
court. Here they were kept in illustri-
ous surroundings and were educated
with the children of the elite - therefore
they bonded with the youngsters who
were destined to become Egypt’s next
military leaders. Once Egyptianized, the
foreigners were returned to Nubia, but
were expected to remain loyal subjects
of pharaoh.
Economic policies continued to grow
in strength during the New Kingdom,
largely due to the copious amounts of
gold brought from Nubia to augment
pharaoh’s temples. Nubians continued
to act as conscripts in the army while
the New Kingdom rulers extended their
fortresses building temples and sanc-
tuaries within their walls. Hatshepsut,
who added a temple of Hathor to the
fortress of Buhen, also depicted soldiers
on the walls of her temple at Deir el
Bahri in southern Egypt. Nubian troops
Maheperi. The mummy of a Nubian soldier.
After G.Daressey (1902)
AW nr11-2009.indd 21
were shown in a victory parade - here,
the soldiers are armed with the tradi-
tional weapons of Egypt, namely bows,
spears, swords and axes. During the
34th year of the reign of her successor,
Tuthmosis III, the practice of hostage
taking continued and the Nubian sons
of the prince of Irem were sent to Egypt.
These princes took Egyptian names and
are shown in traditional scenes.
The great warrior pharaohs
The god Amun granted many numerous
victories for the king. He provided pha-
raoh with the mettle to crush the Nu-
bian rebellions. In the Poetical Stele of
Tuthmosis III, this deity tells him: ‘‘I live
to allow you to crush the Nubians, you
hold them in your grasp, I let them see
your majesty as your two brothers, who-
se hands I joined for you in victory.’’
Tuthmosis III (1479-1425 BC) was a
warmonger like no other. Driven by pri-
vate frustrations, his ambitions knew
no limits, he pushed further into Nubia
than any other king. He reached the
fourth cataract, claiming domination of
both Asia and Africa, expanding Egypt’s
borders to the “horn of the earth.”
Members of his entourage included
botanists, artists and scribes. The army
also employed priests, doctors, and ser-
ving women – it also attracted other
hangers on, namely, traders and foreign
caravans. There is little doubt that the
army would have included not only Nu-
THEME: WAR AS A LIVELIHOOD
bian mercenaries but also translators,
a specialised group of men who were
known as the “Aaw” which means fo-
reign speakers. Others worked as hun-
ters and trackers. From this period on-
wards, the term “Medjay” was also used
to describe Nubians who now policed
the western desert in Thebes. During
the New Kingdom the primary role of
these men, most probably soldiers that
had settled in the area, was to patrol
the Valley of the Kings and deter tomb
robberies. At one point there were 35
individuals who held the title ‘‘chiefs
of the Medjay of the tomb.” These men
are briefly referred to in an ancient wis-
dom text that describes them beating
peasants for non-payment of tax. The
Egyptians also appointed Nubians to
positions in the vice regal bureaucracy
where they made successful careers.
The next new kingdom pharaoh,
Amenhotep II, (1425-1401 BC) had a lot
to live up to. Sometimes seen as one of
Egypt’s most brutal kings, he claimed
large-scale victories and became a high-
ly accomplished ruler. Inscriptions show
a man eager to intimidate the enemy,
he was quick to burn and impale re-
bels. In the iconography of Amenhotep
II, Nubians are shown tied to the shafts
of pharaoh’s chariot. Furthermore, the
king went so far as to hang the rotting
corpses of rebels from the walls of Nubi-
an strongholds. The policy worked; Nu-
bians came to Egypt to pay homage to
the king, bringing with them thousands
of porters who carried precious gifts of
cattle, gold and fifty chariots made of
Nubian wood. At this time, five Nubian
soldiers are depicted in the tomb of the
army General, Tjaunny. Four soldiers
carry staves. A fifth member of the unit
carries a standard that bears the image
of wrestlers. During the later New King-
dom, Nubians are also shown wrestling
in the temple of Ramesses III. Nubians
in particular were associated with this
sport. Today studies of the Nuba, and
other modern tribes of Sudan, reveal
wrestling to be an intrinsic part of their
warrior culture.
Nubians in power
The chief of the Medjay, Neby, was a
favourite of Tuthmosis IV. He was ap-
pointed to high military office and
given the position of ‘‘overseer of the
Ancient Warfare 21
11-02-2010 16:26:37
 THEME: WAR AS A LIVELIHOOD
© Bridget McDermott
Howard Carter`s favourite piece from the Tomb of Tutankhamun. This fabulous
wooden box is decorated with numerous military images. Here we see both Nu-
bian and Egyptian soldiers fighting side by side.
forts of Wawet.’’ Along with two other
Medjay princes, Ruru and Neferabet, he
was given a fine burial in the Theban
Necropolis. However, it was the Nubian
Maheperi, (whose name means “Lion
on the Battlefield”) who seems to have
taken an unprecedented office. Mahe-
peri, who died at around twenty years
of age, was a highly respected warrior.
We know little of his life. It is believed
that he was a contemporary of Tuthmo-
sis IV; his titles included that of ‘‘child
of the kap” (which suggests he was one
of those child hostages educated in the
royal household), and ‘‘fanbearer at the
right hand of the king’’ most likely a
much trusted bodyguard. The remains
of the young soldier were discovered by
the excavator Victor Loret in the Valley
of the Kings in 1899. The mummy reve-
als that in life, Maheperi was a tall man,
his well preserved features are typically
Nubian, as is the style in which he wore
his hair. He was buried with military
regalia that included finely stitched
leather quivers, seventy five arrows and
several wrist braces. It is thought that
the Nubians were skilled trainers for
they were often depicted with dogs. The
theory is supported by the discovery of
several fine canine collars in the tomb
of Maheperi. Although the mummy
was damaged in antiquity (when rob-
bers used axes or daggers to rip away
22 Ancient Warfare
AW nr11-2009.indd 22
jewellery and precious metals), the
body is remarkably well preserved, sug-
gesting that Maheperi could afford the
best embalming techniques.
Throughout the New Kingdom Nu-
bian soldiers were employed in the army
and administration of both Amenhotep
IV and his son Tutankhamun. (1348-1327
BC) Tutankhamun’s burial goods pro-
vide us with many detailed images of
Nubians, most importantly, a group of
Nubian soldiers depicted on a magnifi-
cent wooden box – a favourite piece of
the excavator, Howard Carter. Nubians
employed during the reign of Sety I and
his son Ramesses II ( 1294-1212 BC), the
latter being one of Egypt’s most long
lived and well known warrior pharaohs,
bore the title of “Wer prince of the Med-
jay.”
Egypt’s rulers had now begun to
build magnificent temples in Nubia,
the largest being Abu Simbel which
traditionally depicted Nubians being
trampled under the hooves of pharaoh’s
chariot team. Finally, our last important
image of Nubian soldiers can be seen in
the 20th dynasty temple of Ramesses
III, where they are shown as wrestlers
in combat displays. Inscriptions, carved
around the images, allow us to hear the
voices of the crowds who shout at their
favourite contestant to bring his oppo-
nent to the ground.
The Late Period
We see the growing influence of the
Nubians during the reign of Ramesses
XI (1125-1107 BC). The king appointed the
position of Viceroy of Kush to a man cal-
led Panhesy whose name is translated
as “the Nubian.” In these desperately
troubled times, anarchy broke out in
Thebes allowing the local priests to rise
up and challenge the monarchy. Many
of the tombs in the Valley of the Kings
were robbed. The king summoned
Panhesy from his Nubian territory. To-
gether with his army Panhesy was able
to bring order to the city, capturing Me-
dinet Habu where the rebels were en-
camped. He remained in the area, with
his mercenaries, until at least year 12 of
the reign of Ramesses XI. However, to-
wards the end of his career he was sent
to the north to deal with further upri-
sings. While he was away, the old trou-
bles broke out and suddenly he fell into
disgrace. We do not know if the absence
of Panhesy acted as a catalyst for the
uprising or, as some suggest, there was
an attempt to take the throne. The mat-
ter is still highly speculative. However,
it is clear that Egypt’s civil disturbances
strengthened the position of the Nu-
bian forces, and by 747 BC they had be-
come so influential that they were able
to infiltrate Egypt and
found a dynasty of their own. The new
king of Egypt was a Nubian, his name
was Piankhy. n
Bridget McDermott studied Egyptology
at the Universities of Manchester and
Liverpool, England. She undertook her
Ph.D. thesis on the subject of ancient
Egyptian soldiers and their weapons.
She works as a freelance writer, military
historian and archaeological artist. She
is particularly interested in the soldiers,
arms and armour of the Amarna Pe-
riod.
Further reading
- R. Morkot, The Black Pharaohs.
London 2000
- Y. Yadin, The Art of Warfare in
Biblical Lands. London 1963
- D.Wildung (Ed.), Sudan. Ancient
Kingdoms of the Nile. Paris 1997
- B. McDermott, Ancient Egyptian
Warfare. Stroud 2004
11-02-2010 16:26:39
 THEME: WAR AS A LIVELIHOOD

Mercenary
archers
Cretan bowmen in
the Hellenistic era

WHEN ONE THINKS OF LIGHT

TROOPS IN GRAECO-ROMAN ARMIES
FROM THE CLASSICAL PERIOD UNTIL
THE RISE OF ROME, THE FIRST IM-
AGE TO COME TO MIND IS OFTEN
THAT OF THE UBIQUITOUS CRETAN
ARCHER. CRETANS SERVED FAR AND
WIDE AND WERE PERHAPS THE MOST
FAMOUS ARCHERS OF ANTIQUITY. IN
THAT AGE OF MERCENARY WARFARE
THE HELLENISTIC PERIOD, CRETANS
ARE FOUND FIGHTING FOR ALMOST
EVERY MILITARY IN THE MEDITERRA-
NEAN, AND IT IS NOT UNCOMMON
TO HEAR OF GROUPS OF CRETAN
MERCENARIES FIGHTING EACH OTH-
ER IN MAJOR BATTLES.

By Ruben Post

The tombstone of Hyperanor of the

Cohors I Sagittariorum (the first co-
hort of archers), a Cretan, shows that
these mercenaries had become regular
Roman auxiliary soldiers quite early
on in the Roman imperial period. He
is shown dressed as a conventional
© Karwansaray BV

Roman soldier, holding a (barely vis-

ible) bow in his right hand. Now in the
Schlossparkmuseum, Römerhalle, Bad
Kreuznach, Germany.

Ancient Warfare 23

AW nr11-2009.indd 23 11-02-2010 16:26:44

 THEME: WAR AS A LIVELIHOOD

Cretan mercenaries appear time and

again in accounts of Hellenistic cam-
paigns and battles, and it is to those
that we should turn to interpret the de-
pictions of the soldiers on several sur-
viving stelae. The literary evidence for
Cretan mercenaries’ capacity for varied
combat has been discussed before in
detail (“Cretans” by Jim Webster, Sling-
shot vol. 219 and the response “Cretans”
by David McCann, Slingshot vol. 222),
and so for the purposes of this article I
will simply summarize it.

Cretans in literature
Cretan mercenaries were, of course, best
known as archers. Clinias the Cretan in
Plato’s Laws explains that because of
Crete’s rough terrain, Cretans were ac-
customed to running and were forced
to use light instead of heavy arms to
facilitate flexibility in combat, “so bows
and arrows were adopted as suitable
because of their lightness” (1.625d).
Cretan mercenaries are a few times
explicitly referred to as archers in the
histories of the Hellenistic period, as in
the Cretan contingent sent to fight for
Perseus (Livy 42.7.3-4).
Strangely, however, some of the
detailed descriptions of their perfor-
mance in this capacity give the impres-
sion that they were less effective than
their reputation implies. Livy describes
the difficulty faced by Philip V’s Cretan
mercenaries when fighting Roman cav-
alry, stating that “[the Cretans], could
only... direct their arrows against unpro-
tected horses and riders, as against the
Roman shields they lacked the power of
penetration, and there were left no un-
exposed parts at which they could aim”
(31.39.12), and so, “when they perceived
that weapons of this kind were ineffec-
tive, they harassed the enemy with the
stones” (31.39.13). Xenophon in the Ana-
basis describes Cretan mercenaries in
the early fourth century BC, stating that
they were outranged in archery by the
© Ruben Post

Persian archers and slingers they faced

(3.3.7, 15). Cretan bows were apparently
too weak to be very effective against ar-
mour and too short-ranged to be able to
engage Oriental light troops. This latter
deficiency was probably due at least in
“The painted funerary stele of Chaironides dating to the third century BC. Today part to the arrows they employed which
only the shield is clearly visible on the painted scene, but when first discovered a had distinctive heavy tanged heads;
helmet, javelins, a dagger, and a bow could all still be made out.” once the Cretans got a hold of Persian

24 Ancient Warfare

AW nr11-2009.indd 24 11-02-2010 16:26:45


arrows further on in Xenophon’s expe-
dition (3.4.17), they began practicing
long-distance shooting in an effort to
improve their effectiveness. These two
episodes, though only brief glimpses,
do not inspire much confidence in the
abilities of Cretan archery; taken in con-
junction with the explanation in Plato’s
Laws, it seems certain that Cretans
were archers due to the mobility it af-
forded them as warriors, and that they
did not show any particular excellence
in the skill itself.
Livy’s description of Philip V’s skir-
mishes with the Romans (from which
the episode against the Roman cavalry
mentioned above is taken) provides
us with an interesting examination
of Cretan mercenaries fighting in suc-
cessive engagements. We first hear of
the Cretans as grouped with the Tral-
lians (as they were in Antiochus III’s
line at the battle of Magnesia as well,
Livy 37.40.8), whom he describes as “a
people of Illyria” (31.35.1). He then notes,
© Ruben Post
AW nr11-2009.indd 25
that “the swift movements of the Illyr-
ians [the Trallians] would be useful for
sallies and sudden charges.” In 31.35.3-4
we hear that the Cretans, “being always
accustomed to fight with Greeks and
Illyrians,” expected to move into com-
bat with the cavalry and Trallians in the
familiar fashion, “[showering] arrows
upon the enemy and advancing in dis-
order,” but that they were thrown off
by the Roman tactics. The Roman cav-
alry and infantry, Livy writes, engaged
the Macedonian force quickly in close
combat, so that Philip’s Cretans and
Trallians, who were “trained to skirmish
in loose order and unprotected by ar-
mour, were at the mercy of the velites,
who with their swords and shields were
equally prepared for defence and at-
tack.” Being unprepared to fight in a
sustained melee, they fled, “relying on
nothing else than their swiftness of
foot” (31.35.7). Philip waited for a day
and in 31.36.8 we hear him setting out
with a force of cavalry and Cretans to
THEME: WAR AS A LIVELIHOOD
attack foraging Roman troops. His Cre-
tan soldiers are then described as run-
ning “at such a rapid pace that only the
fleetest of the infantrymen could keep
up with the cavalry” (31.36.8). How-
ever, when the Romans sallied out of
their camp to defend their comrades,
Livy states that “the Cretan auxiliaries
dealt many unexpected wounds, fight-
ing in close array and according to plan
against men who were scattered and
not in formation” (31.37.4-5). In Polybius
4.71.11, we also hear of Philip’s Cretans
engaging close combat troops:
“…the Cretans, attacking the mer-
cenaries who had sallied from
the upper gate, forced them to fly
in disorder, throwing away their
shields. Pressing close on their
heels and cutting them down,
they entered the gate together
with them, and thus the city was
taken from every side at once.”
“A marble block featur-
ing a weapons relief
from Perinthus dating
to the first century BC.
Note the shield, bow
and quiver, unusual
curved dagger, spear
or javelin and javelin
quiver (?), perhaps the
arms of a Cretan mer-
cenary”
Ancient Warfare 25
11-02-2010 16:26:49
 THEME: WAR AS A LIVELIHOOD

10.29 describes how, while campaign-

ing in Hyrcania, Antiochus III divided
his light troops into three groups before
executing an intricate plan to allow his
army to advance through a defile while
threatened by barbarians possessing
the higher ground. One of these groups
consisted of “about two thousand
shield-bearing Cretans under the com-
mand of Polyxenidas of Rhodes.” The
other two groups of light troops cleared
the high sides of the defile of enemies
“with the Cretans covering their move-
ments and marching parallel to them
close to the defile slowly and in good or-
der.” All of these descriptions go against
Polybius’ statement (4.8.11) that Cretans
“are cowardly and downhearted in the
massed face-to-face charge of the open
battle.”
Cretan mercenaries thus display a
distinct duality in their fighting capac-
ity, being able to operate both as swift
skirmishing archers and as closely-ar-
rayed melee combatants. This flexibility
is further exhibited in the accounts of
Philopoemen’s campaign of 192 BC, in
which he was general of the Achaean
army which fought against the Spar-
tan king Nabis. While serving in Crete,
he “devised a new kind of fighting”
(Livy 35.27.4) in which he composed his
force of lightly armed, flexible troops
capable of performing special opera-
© Ruben Post

tions such as amphibious landings and

fighting in mountainous terrain. He se-
lected peltasts, slingers, and other light
troops on foot, including, as one might
“Detail of the painted funerary stele of Thersagoras dating to the third century BC. expect, Cretans, for this ‘task force.’ Livy
While the carved silhouette and the now-faded paint make discerning details dif- describes how both Philopoemen and
ficult, the figure carries a bow and has some sort of object, probably a quiver, and his opponent in the campaign of 192
what seems to be a shield slung over his back.” BC employed Cretan mercenaries quite
prominently alongside Tarantine caval-
ry (35.28.8, 29.2). This pairing is particu-
larly worthy of note, as Tarantine cav-
alry were noted for their flexibility (e.g.
Light and heavy infantry description of the Seleucid rebel Mo- Asclepiodotus 1.3, where they are said to
How are we to make sense of these lon’s arrangement of troops for battle be intermediate between heavy close-
descriptions? The same body of mer- (5.53.3), and the opposing Ptolemaic combat cavalry and light skirmishing
cenaries is sometimes described as and Seleucid battle lines at the great cavalry). The Cretans and Tarantines of
swift-moving and light, being defeated battle of Raphia (5.82.4, 10, respective- both sides engaged one another in a
by velites armed for combat with only ly), Polybius states that Cretan soldiers battle on the banks of a river, and it is
shields and swords, and sometimes as were placed in important positions in noted that “for a time the battle was
holding their own in close array against the order of battle beside close-combat doubtful, since the troops on both sides
heavier opponents who were as heavily troops (in the former case, between the were of the same character and fought
armed as the Roman light troops, if not lancers, or xustophoroi, and the Gala- with similar equipment” (35.29.2-3). All
more so. Descriptions of Cretan merce- tians, and in the latter, between the this evidence describes events from the
naries operating as heavy troops are to cavalry and the phalanx and more cav- third and second centuries BC, and they
be found elsewhere as well. In both his alry and Greek mercenaries). Polybius paint a nuanced picture of the capabili-

26 Ancient Warfare

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ties of Cretan mercenaries at this time.
How Cretan soldiers were able to
display such flexibility in tactics is of
primary interest. Literary sources oc-
casionally mention an armament pecu-
liar to the Cretans, as in the catalogue
of auxiliaries who joined the Romans
in fighting Perseus in 171 BC. Livy states
that the Achaeans “contributed of their
young men, mostly with Cretan arma-
ment, about fifteen hundred” (42.55.10).
In their earlier campaign against Philip
V, the Romans fielded “five hundred
Gortynii from Crete under the com-
mand of Cydas,” while another “three
hundred from Apollonia, armed in the
same fashion,” joined them later (Livy
33.3.10). In a footnote to the Loeb edi-
tion of Livy, the translators add that
their distinctive armament was “as
slingers and other light troops,” but it
seems there is more to it than that. We
have seen in the previously mentioned
episode of Antiochus III crossing into
Hyrcania that his Cretan mercenaries
operated in a phalanx of sorts bearing
shields. In Plutarch’s The Life of Aemilius
Paulus, several different kinds of cap-
tured arms are listed as having been
displayed in the triumph of the epony-
mous general, including Cretan light
shields (peltai) and quivers from Per-
seus’ forces (32.4). We can thus discern
from the literary record that Cretans at
least regularly employed shields in the
Hellenistic period, as they did already in
the early fourth century: Xenophon re-
lates an episode in the Anabasis (5.2.28-
32) in which Cretan mercenaries, lying
in a position of ambuscade, purposely
gave away their position by showing
their gleaming peltai before running
away and firing arrows as they went.
The shield was not a regular part of the
archer’s panoply in this period, and so
Cretan archers are in this regard fairly
unique.
Archaeological evidence
Tthe literary evidence, however, can
only take us so far in ascertaining what
it was about the Cretan armament that
was so distinctive. If we examine the ar-
chaeological record we find more valu-
able information which fleshes out our
conception of the Cretan mercenary in
the Hellenistic period much more fully.
The site of the ancient city of Demetrias,
a foundation of Demetrius Poliorcetes,
AW nr11-2009.indd 27
has produced numerous painted fu-
nerary stelae dating to the third and
second centuries BC. These were, rather
ironically, preserved for over two mil-
lennia because they were used in a time
of emergency to reinforce the fortifica-
tions of the city. Many depict soldiers in
undress, but two show fully equipped
soldiers, both of whom happen to be
Cretan mercenaries.
The inscription on the first and
most notable stele is fragmentary and
a few separate restorations have been
suggested. Apostolos Arvanitopoulos,
the excavator and original publisher
of these stelae, amended it to read
“Cha[lkoked]es, son of Eik[ari]os, a Cre-
tan from Lyttus.” Nicholas Sekunda,
however, corrected both the name of
the deceased to Chaironides, in light
of another inscription from Demetrias
inscribed with the name of one An-
drokides, son of Chaironides, a Cretan
from Lyttus; and the name of his father
to Eikadios, which is a common Cretan
name. The consensus is that this stele
dates to the end of the third century BC.
Unfortunately, the paint on the stele
has faded and today all that remains
are little more than the main shapes
of Chaironides, his servant, and faint
traces of the weaponry and equipment
that they both carried. Thankfully, two
descriptions of this stele were made in
the early twentieth century which de-
scribe in detail the painting as it was
preserved soon after discovery.
The oldest is that of Arvanitopou-
los, written in 1909, which describes
the stele as it appeared two years after
its discovery. The other is that of Mar-
cel Launey, who seems to have drawn
his description at least in part from
that of Arvanitopoulos, but who may
have viewed the stele himself. Unfortu-
nately, the matter is complicated by the
fact that the latter’s description differs
slightly from the former’s. Needless to
say, we can accept the points they de-
scribe in common without issue. These
are that Chaironides bore a white short-
sleeved tunic; a very dark purplish-blue
cloak (Arvanitopoulos describes it as
black); a bronze helmet; and a bow, in
his right hand. His diminutive servant
standing behind him carried a small
oval shield and several javelins. A.J. Re-
inach, another author who observed
the stele shortly after its discovery, de-
THEME: WAR AS A LIVELIHOOD
scribed the helmet as having a “raised
dome” and “lower curved edges which
are reminiscent of the currency of the
Macedonians,” while Launey compared
it to that of another Cretan soldier
depicted on a painted funerary stele,
Diodotos, who served in the second
century garrison of Sidon in Phoenicia.
Diodotos’ helmet is of the type which is
usually called Thraco-Attic.
The shield carried by Chaironides
servant is of particular interest. It is
oval and reaches lengthwise from Chai-
ronides’ shoulder to his groin; the main
field of the shield is light blue-green
and it has a thin bronze rim. In the cen-
tre the motif of a heroic nude figure
with his back to the viewer, thrusting
to the left with a spear he holds in his
right hand and with something drap-
ing off of his outstretched left arm, has
been painted. Sekunda identified this
figure as being Poseidon and, in ac-
cordance with several aspects of early
Antigonid iconography, dated it on this
consideration to the early third century
BC. This exact same representation of
Poseidon, however, appears on coinage
from the third century BC of Priansus, a
city neighbouring Lyttus on Crete. This
may very well be, therefore, a Cretan de-
vice, and not an Antigonid one.
Both Arvanitopoulos and Launey
stated that a dagger was included in the
panoply of Chaironides (though Arvani-
topoulos called it a sword), but some
confusion is encountered in Launey’s
description of it. He wrote that the at-
tendant of Chaironides held a curved
dagger in his left hand and javelins in
his right, but even a brief examination
of the painting shows that this is impos-
sible, as the left side of the attendant is
entirely covered by the shield he is car-
rying. Unfortunately, no trace of the
dagger is to be seen on what remains
of the painting today, but Arvanitopou-
los’ description of the weapon as hang-
ing from Chaironides’ belt makes much
more sense than Launey’s, as the de-
ceased is shown pulling his cloak away
from his right side, his belt being thus
clearly exposed. As to the nature of the
weapon itself, Launey stated that Chai-
ronides had “a dagger with a curved
blade,” while Arvanitopoulos wrote
that “it can be seen that he bears … a
sword around his large belt,” the scab-
bard of which was dark reddish-purple
Ancient Warfare 27
11-02-2010 16:26:52
 THEME: WAR AS A LIVELIHOOD
in colour.
Curved daggers were not commonly
used by Greek warriors in the Hellenistic
period, so this is an unusual detail. Few
representations of curved daggers are
to be found in Hellenistic art, but two do
appear on late Hellenistic monuments
depicting weapons. The first appears
on a segment of the famous weapons
reliefs of Pergamon, dated to the 180’s
BC and thought to display many of
the arms captured from the defeated
Seleucid army after the battle of Mag-
nesia in 190 BC. The dagger represented
is quite intricately decorated, and it is
attached to a baldric, which is likewise
embellished. Antiochus III commanded
1500 Cretans at Magnesia (Livy 37.40.8),
and so this could perhaps be the dagger
of a Cretan mercenary taken as booty.
The second representation is on a frag-
ment of another weapons relief from
Perinthus dating to the first century BC.
It shows a small hoplite’s shield, which
lies on top of a quiver, a bow, a spear,
and an unidentified rectangular object
which seems to have two spear shafts
projecting from it. Sculpted beneath
this is a curved dagger in a simple scab-
bard with two suspension rings on the
inside of the curve of the blade. The
orientation of the rings suggests that
this dagger was suspended lengthwise
from a belt. The combination of arms
on this relief is very similar to Chai-
ronides’ panoply, and it is possible that
the equipment depicted came from a
Cretan.
The second stele from Demetrias
is that of Thersagoras, a Cretan from
Polyrrhenia, dating to the end of the
third or very early years of the second
century BC. The silhouette of Thersago-
ras is carved in relief, so that his figure is
raised but no details have been carved
into it; instead, they have been painted
on, and traces of them can still be dis-
cerned despite the poor preservation of
the paint. He stands facing to the right
and holds a bow in his outstretched
left hand, while it seems he holds his
left arm up to nock an arrow. Thersago-
ras’ tunic appears to be white, while a
cloak fastened at his right shoulder is
yellowish-brown; the rectangular ob-
ject, presumably a quiver, slung over his
back has been painted the same colour.
An irregularly-shaped patch of dark red
paint is visible on part of his left shoul-
28 Ancient Warfare
AW nr11-2009.indd 28
der and under his neck- it is perhaps a
differently-coloured portion of his cloak
or tunic. What is clearly delineated
in paint around his upper body is the
edge of a shield slung over his back; it
appears to be whitish in colour, which
may have been meant to represent an
iron rim. According to Launey and Ar-
vanitopoulos, he wore a helmet which
Launey describes as being “like a hat of
dog skin or ... [that of] another animal.”
This description is hard to interpret, and
the carved profile does not indicate any
details of the helmet, so the nature of
Thersagoras’ headgear remains a mys-
tery.
Versatile soldiers
It is fortuitous that two stelae of the
garrison of Demetrias which have sur-
vived depict Cretans who most likely
served as mercenaries during the last
years of the third century BC, probably
but a decade or two earlier than the
episode involving Philip V’s Cretans
described by Livy. In Thersagoras, car-
rying his shield slung on his back along
with his bow and quiver, we perhaps
see a Cretan mercenary prepared to ac-
tion as described in Anabasis 5.2.28-32,
skirmishing and fighting in guerrilla
fashion and thus prepared to change
roles quickly. As for Chaironides, it
would seem difficult for a soldier to
fight carrying all the equipment that
he possessed; when one examines his
non-archery equipment - a helmet, a
small oval shield, several javelins, and a
dagger - he appears to be only slightly
lighter in armament than a common
thureophoros, which would explain
why Cretans are described a few times
as being stationed in the battle line be-
side thureophoroi or similar units (e.g.
the Galatians mentioned in Polybius
5.82.4). It seems, therefore, that Cretans
such as himself must have selected only
the most appropriate of their arms for
the operation to follow before proceed-
ing into combat, perhaps leaving por-
tions of their armament behind the
lines with their baggage carriers. With
his shield and quiver slung across his
back and his dagger slung from his belt,
the Cretan mercenary could presumably
move quickly and skirmish effectively.
Indeed, if the panoply depicted on the
Perinthus relief is that of a Cretan, then
the large rectangular object with two
shafts projecting from it, which appears
to have been a large quiver for javelins,
could even have allowed the soldier
to easily carry those arms with him as
well. When challenged, then, with a
more formidable opponent, the Cretan
mercenaries could use their shields to
defend themselves and their daggers or
perhaps their javelins to fight in close
combat. The Cretans were thus incred-
ibly versatile warriors: though their
archery was perhaps lackluster, their
ability to at turns fight in close order,
competing with heavily-equipped op-
ponents, and skirmish made them
unique. When their famous affinity for
ambuscade is considered as well, it be-
comes obvious why Cretan mercenaries
were so highly valued. n
Ruben Post is a university student from
British Columbia, Canada who has been
researching ancient militaries from
Greece to Central Asia for three years.
The primary focus of his research is arms
and armour as indicators of cultural
transfer, especially in relation to Helle-
nistic militaries.
Further reading
- N. Sekunda, ‘The stele of Ther-
sagoras of Polyrrhenia from Dem-
etrias’, in Eulimene 4 (2003), 77-80.
- N. Sekunda, ‘Antigonid shield-
device on a stele of a Cretan from
Demetrias’, in Archeologia. Rocznik
Instytutu archeologii i etnologii
Polskiej akademii nauk 52 (2001),
19-22.
- M. Launey, Recherches sur les Ar-
mées Hellénistiques. Paris 1949.
- A.S. Arvanitopoullos, Perigraphe
ton en toi Athanasakeioi Mouseioi
Boaou grapton stelon ton pagason
meta suntomou istorias tes Helle-
nikes zoigraphikes. Athens 1909.
- J. Webster, ‘Cretans‘, Slingshot 219
(2001), 68-69.
- D. McCann, ‘Cretans’, Slingshot
222 (2002), 20.
11-02-2010 16:26:53
 THEME: WAR AS A LIVELIHOOD

Mercenary rescues Carthage

The battle of the Bagradas river

© Carlos de la Rocha
THE FATE OF NATIONS IS OFTEN DECIDED ON BATTLEFIELDS AND THE COURSE The general
OF BATTLES MAY BE DECIDED BEFORE THEY ARE FOUGHT BY THE TACTICAL We know nothing for certain about
Xanthippus beyond the events sur-
GENIUS OF GREAT GENERALS. HISTORY’S FOREMOST MILITARY COMMAND- rounding the battle of the Bagradas,
ERS LED THEIR PEOPLE TO CONQUEST OR FOUGHT TO STAVE OFF BEING also called the battle of Tunes, in 255
BC. Most ancient authors label him
CONQUERED. THEY FOUGHT AS USURPERS OR CHAMPIONED FREEDOM AND
simply as ‘Spartan’, but Polybius places
SPREAD IDEOLOGIES. RARELY IN HISTORY HAVE LEADERS ALTERED THE COURSE his origin as ‘Lacedaemon’ and states
OF HISTORY SOLELY FOR THAT PUREST OF MOTIVES: PROFIT. XANTHIPPUS OF that he was “brought up in the Spartan
discipline” (1.33.1). Lazenby suggested
SPARTA WAS ONE SUCH MAN. that Xanthippus not a Spartiate, but
Polybius’s wording merely emphasized
By Paul M. Bardunias a rigorous upbringing not found in
the Sparta of his day. Assuming he was
middle aged in 255 BC, Spartans of his
Fighting for foreigners on foreign soil, “And again Euripides words, so generation had seen much warfare. His
leading not his famed countrymen, but long recognized as just, that ‘one earliest childhood memories might in-
a polyglot mix of mercenaries and an wise council defeats many hands’ clude a narrowly avoided occupation
inexperienced local militia, he thwar- were confirmed by the actual of Sparta by Demetrius Poliorcetes. He
ted a burgeoning Roman republic in its facts. For one man and one mind may have been one of the young men
bid to eliminate Carthage and control laid low that host which seemed who fought to save Sparta from Pyr-
the western Mediterranean. Polybius so invincible and efficient, and rhus of Epirus and his elephants. A de-
is unequivocal in crediting Xanthip- restored the fortunes of a state cade before Bagradas the Spartan King
pus, as mercenary commander of the which in the eyes of all was ut- Areus I died in battle against Macedon
Carthaginian forces at the battle of the terly fallen and the deadened during the Chremonidean war and his
Bagradas, with the rescue of Carthage spirits of its soldiers.” heir Acrotatus II was killed by Mega-
and the humbling of Rome: lopolitans. Xanthippus may also have
Polybius 1.35.4-5 gained experience serving foreign po-

Ancient Warfare 29

AW nr11-2009.indd 29 11-02-2010 16:26:55

 THEME: WAR AS A LIVELIHOOD
© Igor Dzis

Surrounded by Carthaginian light troops, cavalry and elephants, the Romans broke
the line of pachyderms, only to be confronted by an unbroken, fresh Carthaginian
phalanx.

wers as a mercenary prior to heading to
Carthage.
In the century following the disso-
lution of the Macedonian empire into
squabbling kingdoms, many generals
(strategoi) for hire rose to great power.
The tradition of Spartans as mercenary
generals was an old one and within
Xanthippus’s lifetime Spartans were
employed by various Hellenistic kings.
Cleonymus served in Italy and may have
faced Roman troops before carving out
a kingdom for himself at Corcyra, and
becoming an officer of Pyrrhus. His
son Leonidas II spent his youth at the
Seleucid court before becoming a King
of Sparta. Droysen hypothesized Leoni-
das’s switch from pro-Ptolemy to pro-
Seleucid policy drove Xanthippus from
Sparta. Other Spartans, like Hippome-
don who governed Ptolemaic Thrace,

30 Ancient Warfare

AW nr11-2009.indd 30 11-02-2010 16:27:01


sought foreign employ due to political
infighting at Sparta.
A year before Xanthippus’s arrival
at Carthage, a debt was incurred in
Halicarnassus on behalf of a Xanthip-
pus, trierarch (captain) of a large Pto-
lemaic warship, who was at the time
AW nr11-2009.indd 31
in Alexandria (P.Cair. Zen. I 59036). It is
tempting to view Xanthippus as ha-
ving gone to Alexandria to muster out
of Ptolemaic service in preparation for
a Carthaginian contract. Whatever his
past, Xanthippus enters the pages of
history just in time for Carthaginians
who were on the verge of losing their
war with Rome.
War with Rome
The conflict that would come to be
known as the First Punic War was cau-
sed by mercenaries. Campanian merce-
naries (called Mamertines) from sou-
thern Italy, who served the Syracusan
tyrant Agathocles, occupied the city of
Messana in northeastern Sicily in 288
BC. By 270 BC, conflict with Syracuse led
them to appeal to Carthage, in modern
Tunisia, and Rome for protection. The
Carthaginians were a maritime empire
that controlled western Sicily, Sardinia,
Corsica, and parts of coastal Spain, and
had been in a military deadlock with
Syracuse and other Greek states for
control of Sicily and the western Medi-
terranean for centuries. At the end of
the fourth century the Sicilians under
Agathocles invaded African Carthage
won a battle at Tunes and plundered
some 200 towns, but the invasion en-
ded with Agathocles fleeing from his
own mutinous troops. The expanding
Roman republic, having absorbed the
cities of Magna Graecia (southern Italy)
in the wake of its victory over Pyrrhus,
saw the Mamertines, like their Campa-
nian forebears, as within their sphere of
influence. The Romans and Carthagini-
ans had battled for eight years in Sicily
and at sea, when the Romans decided
to transfer the war to Carthaginian Af-
rica.
In 256 BC, the Romans formed four
legions – two consular armies – from
men selected from their best troops
and set off for Africa in a flotilla of over
three hundred warships and transports.
The command of these forces was split
between two annually elected consuls,
Marcus Atilius Regulus and Lucius Man-
lius Vulso. After defeating a blockade at
Ecnomus, the Romans sailed to the Her-
maean promonitory. They consolidated
their forces and moved down the coast
to Aspis. The city fell to siege and from
this foothold they plundered the terri-
tory and enslaved twenty thousand.
THEME: WAR AS A LIVELIHOOD
It was decided in Rome that one
of the consuls should sail home with
his command and the plunder. Unlike
mercenaries, who mustered wherever
a paymaster paid them, the legion’s
core of citizen-soldiers expected not to
be sent away from home for long peri-
ods. Consequently, Regulus was left in
Africa with two legions and allied co-
horts, roughly fifteen thousand infan-
try and small force five hundred cavalry.
Not content to simply ravage the east,
Regulus moved west against the heart-
land of the Carthaginians. The siege of
Adys finally prompted the Carthagini-
ans to take the field.
When it became clear that the Ro-
mans planned a prolonged occupation,
the Carthaginians elected two generals,
Hasdrubal son of Hanno and Bostar,
and recalled Hamilcar with five hund-
red cavalry and five thousand infantry
from Sicily. These three generals set out
with infantry, including veteran mer-
cenaries, cavalry and elephants. They
encamped on a hill overlooking the Ro-
mans, but the security of this position
was illusory. Although it advantaged
their infantry, requiring the Romans
to fight up hill, the rough country ren-
dered cavalry and elephants useless.
Realizing the mistake, Regulus split his
forces and stormed the hilltop position
from opposite sides. The mercenaries
put the Romans against them to flight,
but as they pursued they were surroun-
ded by the force of Romans from the op-
posite side of the hill and driven back.
The whole Carthaginian force routed,
Adys surrendered, and the triumphant
Romans moved on to take Tunes, only
a dozen kilometers south of the city of
Carthage. When the situation seemed
it could get no worse, the Numidians,
uneasy inland neighbors of the Cartha-
ginians, began a campaign of raids that
was even more damaging than the Ro-
man occupation.
The Roman republic’s military sy-
stem hampered its success in foreign
campaigns. Just as the citizen-soldiers
aversion to extended warfare cost
Regulus half his army, the system of
annual appointments for consuls re-
quired him to turn over command to a
new consul-elect. Not wishing to share
the final triumph with his successor,
Regulus sought a quick and thorough
Carthaginian capitulation. The terms
Ancient Warfare 31
11-02-2010 16:27:04
 THEME: WAR AS A LIVELIHOOD

he demanded, the loss of Sicily and Sar-

dinia as well as payment of the Roman
war debt and annual tribute, were so
harsh that the Carthaginian senate felt
they would suffer no less if they fought
to the end.

Xanthippus arrives
The Carthaginians were unaware of it
in their despair, but key to their victory
was at hand. A recruiting mission sent
to Greece, presumably to Taenarum,
an infamous den of mercenaries on
the isthmus south of Sparta, returned
with what Polybius describes as “a con-
siderable number of soldiers” (1.32.1).
Xanthippus was one of the condottieri
leading a force of one hundred merce-
naries. Upon hearing of the recent loss
at Adys and the disposition of forces
for the battle, he set out on an audaci-
ous course. To a man of his experience
and military acumen, the reason the
Carthaginians were losing the war had
little to do with the Romans and much
to do with the ineptitude of their ge-
nerals. He voiced this opinion amongst
friends and his seditious comments be-
came commonly known. It is a mark of
its desperation that the Carthaginian
senate summoned him to explain his
reasoning rather than punishing him.
He explained that the Carthaginians
had been wasting their advantage and
superiority in cavalry elephants, by allo-

wing themselves to be caught in rough
terrain. He assured them that if they
stayed on level ground, for marching,
camping and battle, they would defeat
the Romans. His force of personality
was such that, far from being punished
for the demoralizing effect that his ori-
ginal criticism had on the populace, he
was entrusted with the command of
their forces. He drilled the mercenaries
and the militia over the winter, then led
them outside the walls and put some
units through a series of maneuvers
using the orthodox terms of command.
The militia now had reason for confi-
dence, while the mercenaries cheered
Xanthippus’ proficiency. Rather than
belittle so obvious a proof of their own
ineptitude, the generals harnessed this
enthusiasm, and within a few days took
to the field with twelve thousand in-
fantry, four thousand cavalry and about
one hundred elephants. They moved
west, skirting a ridge of mountains that
© Carlos de la Rocha
1. Xanthippus planned to use his great advantage in cavalry, supported by light
mercenaries, in a double-envelopment. He expected the veteran mercenaries to
hold up their end of the line, but screened the whole front of the unsteady militia
phalanx with a line of elephants. Regulus deployed his velites forward to disperse
the elephants so that his close-ordered hastati, backed by maniples of princeps
and triarii, could punch through the Carthaginian line.
2. The Roman cavalry were swiftly defeated and the velites proved unable to deal
with the novel density of the elephant screen. The elephants charged into the
opened ranks of velites and routed them with horrific carnage. The Roman allies
on the left, avoiding the elephants, fell upon the mercenaries to the right of the
Carthaginian phalanx.
3. The elephants came up against the dense ranks of the hastati and settled into
a prolonged battle. The light mercenaries fell on the Roman flanks as the Cartha-
ginian cavalry broke off pursuit of the Roman horse. With envelopment looming
near, the desperate Roman allies on the left break the mercenaries before them.
4. The Carthaginian cavalry arrived in force, harassing the flanks and rear of the
Roman infantry. Desperate groups of Romans fight their way past the elephants
only to face the fresh and ordered militia phalanx. Roman discipline rapidly breaks
down and battle becomes slaughter.

32 Ancient Warfare

AW nr11-2009.indd 32 11-02-2010 16:27:07


rise south towards Tunes, then mar-
ched up the fertile Bagradas river ba-
sin. Regulus was at first alarmed to see
them camped on the plains, but flush
with his prior victories camped two ki-
lometers away. The Carthaginian troops
were eager to fight and “called out to
Xanthippus by name to lead them” (Po-
lybius 1.33.4), while Xanthippus urged
the generals not miss this chance of
catching the Romans on level ground.
The generals ordered the troops made
ready and gave Xanthippus “the autho-
rity to conduct operations as he himself
thought most advantageous” (Polybius
1.33.5).
The armies
The ensuing battle of the Bagradas oc-
curred in a period of rapid change in
arms and tactics throughout the Hel-
lenistic and Roman world. The Cartha-
ginians, possessing more money than
manpower, relied on mercenaries and
their vast trading empire let them re-
cruit from many lands. Libyan javelin-
men, Balearic slingers and Cretan ar-
chers, were specialized skirmishers.
Xanthippus’s countrymen were still
equipped as hoplites with a long spear
(doru) and a heavy, convex shield (as-
pis), but Greeks increasingly served as
thureophoroi, with a spear that could
be thrown or used in combat as needed
(longche), javelins, sword, and an ob-
long shield (thureos). Celts and Liguri-
ans, were armed with a slashing sword
or spear and oblong shield (scutum).
Iberians had yet to adopt the thureos
and used round shields, iron javelins
(saunion) and either in-curving, chop-
ping swords (machaira) or short cut-
and-thrust swords. As mercenaries they
could be expected to armor themselves
in what they could afford of their native
panoply. A phalanx made up of these
troops would be lighter than its classi-
cal forebear, but had a missile capability
that hoplites lacked. The Carthaginian
militia was armed with spears and the
round, bossed, single-gripped shields,
conical helmets and iron lamellar cor-
selets were of Phoenician derivation.
The Carthaginian horse was of high
quality, armed with spears and shields,
while the Liby-Phoenecian and merce-
nary horse, many local Libyans, were
used javelins. Their elephants were of
the now extinct north-west African va-
AW nr11-2009.indd 33
riety (Loxodonta cyclotis), which counter
to common portrayal is not substanti-
ally smaller than their Asian cousins.
They were large enough to carry towers
on their backs of the type developed by
Pyrrhus, but we do not if they did. Ma-
houts straddled their necks, while two
or three men armed with bows and ja-
velins fought from their backs.
The Roman legion consisted of four
to five thousand men in a line of ma-
niples which consisted of two centuries
of sixty men formed six ranks deep. The
troops were divided along both age and
wealth into four distinct lines. Before
battle the formation was very flexible,
the first century (<I>prior<I>) behind
the second (<I>posterior<I>) leaving
gaps in the line that were covered by
staggering the line behind them. As
battle commenced the rear century
moved up into the gap to present a
solid line. The youngest, poorest men
fought as skirmishers (velites) in front
of the army, armed with a brace of ja-
velins, sword, and a small shield and
helmet. The next two lines (hastati and
princepes) were armed much like the
Carthaginian mercenaries, with an ob-
long shield (scutum), two heavy javelins
(pila) with long iron tips and a cut-and-
thrust sword. Their armor consisted
of a single greave on the left leg and
simple metal plate to cover the center
of their chest (pectorale), though men
who could afford it might wear a mail
corselet (lorica) or even Greek breast
plates (Thorakes). Their helmets were of
the Montifortino or Apulo-Corinthian
type, topped with a tall crest of three
feathers. The last line (triarii) was com-
posed of the oldest, wealthiest men, li-
kely to be armored in the best fashion
and armed with a thrusting spear
instead of the pila formed a phalanx
behind which the lighter troops could
shelter. It was Roman practice to com-
bine a legion of Roman troops with an
equal number of men drawn from her
allies. These would have been armed in
a similar fashion, though with regional
variation in style. The small contingent
of cavalry was armed with spear, round
shield (parma), helmet and armor if
possible.
Deployment
Now de facto commander of the whole
force, Xanthippus had to prove his worth
THEME: WAR AS A LIVELIHOOD
as a strategos. Scouting reports showed
that he enjoyed an overwhelming supe-
riority in cavalry. Regulus either did not
seek or could not gain an alliance with
Libyans or Numidians who could have
provided horsemen. However, it was a
maxim of Greek warfare that cavalry
was ineffective in a head-on clash with
formed infantry. The Carthaginians had
attempted to use their cavalry in this
fashion against Agathocles with disas-
trous results. Linear infantry formati-
ons focused their lethality in a single
direction, so cavalry could cause a rout
by enveloping them on one side or both
and attacking the less guarded flanks
or rear, but the front ranks needed to
be engaged by a blocking force. If not,
they could simply evade the trap by pre-
senting a strong force in all directions,
a square or mass, and moving slowly to
safety.
Xanthippus faced a problem in that
the Romans enjoyed not only a nume-
rical advantage in infantry, but a quali-
tative one. Xanthippus’s veteran merce-
naries had proven against the Romans
at Adys, but they were only a fraction
of his force. If the Carthaginian militia
could not hold the Romans in check
long enough for the cavalry to defeat
the Roman horse and turn against their
flanks and rear the envelopment would
unravel.
Greeks such as Teleutias of Sparta
and Epameinondas of Thebes famously
made use of the asymmetry in troop
quality along their front to defeat a
section of enemy line or protect their
own weak units. A common way to do
this was to refuse the weaker section
and approach in echelon, trading space
for time, but this is not suitable for a
strategy of double envelopment. Xan-
thippus’s solution was to buy time not
with space, but with a delaying force of
elephants in front of the militia. Elep-
hants backed by light troops were a
standard, if unpredictable, component
of Hellenistic warfare. The successors
used them primarily to screen cavalry
from attack as at Paraetacene and Ip-
sus, though Pyrrhus set them to guard
his infantry’s flanks at Heraclea. Xan-
thippus decided to “screen” the whole
front of the militia troops. The veteran
mercenaries could stand on their own,
so he was able to mass his elephants in
front of the militia at a density not pre-
Ancient Warfare 33
11-02-2010 16:27:08
 THEME: WAR AS A LIVELIHOOD
viously seen.
We do not know the exact break-
down of the twelve thousand infantry
and four thousand cavalry that made
up the Carthaginian force. The four
thousand cavalry he split between the
wings. Hellenistic practice would have
been to form in five ranks for a frontage
of roughly four to five hundred meters.
Based on the mercenary contingent
brought over from Sicily prior to Adys,
adjusting for losses, and the impression
that Polybius gives that the mercenary
force was substantially smaller than
the militia phalanx, the Carthaginian
phalanx was about eight thousand and
the mercenary force numbered four
thousand. The Carthaginian phalanx
was arrayed in sixteen ranks in close or-
der or one meter spacing. Not only was
this standard Macedonian practice, but
a depth often used for overmatched
hoplites. This gives a frontage of five
hundred meters. The heavier mercena-
ries, three thousand, he placed to the
right of the phalanx in twelve ranks and
close order, a frontage of two hundred
and fifty meters. The elephants, placed
in front of the Carthaginian phalanx
at a spacing of only five meters, were
practically a wall of pachyderms. Poly-
bius does not mention a screen of light
infantry supporting the elephants, but
Frontinus records light infantry starting
the battle in front of the Carthaginians
that later move to attack the roman
flanks (Stratagemata 2.3.10). In this he
may be confusing two contingents, for
Polybius states that the “most active”
(1.33.7) mercenaries were attached to the
cavalry and placed ahead of the battle-
line. Xanthippus probably provided a
minimal screen of light infantry for the
elephants, because the greatest hazard
faced by the elephants was missile fire
and troops slipping between and be-
hind them. Supporting the cavalry with
contingents of light infantry, perhaps a
thousand men, split between the wings
in opened order, shows that the wily
Xanthippus was taking no chances.
Even though his cavalry outnumbered
that of the Romans by some eight to
one, the Roman cavalry may have been
of superior quality and Regulus could
have stiffened them with infantry. In
addition, great discipline was required
of cavalry to break off pursuit and fall
upon the flanks of the infantry. Should
34 Ancient Warfare
AW nr11-2009.indd 34
the bulk of the cavalry over-pursue, the
light troops, unable to keep up, would
be more likely to take the Romans in the
flank.
Regulus’ deployment has been wi-
dely criticized, but this is too harsh an
assessment. The basic tactics of both
armies were echoed in clashes bet-
ween Rome and Carthage for the next
half century at battles such as Ticinus,
Trebbia, Cannae, and Ibera. He was su-
rely aware that his force was likely to
be enveloped by the numerous cavalry.
As had been anticipated by Xanthip-
pus, his hope of victory was to pierce
the Carthaginian center as at Trebbia
and, more tellingly, Ibera, where rout
ensued after such a breakthrough. His
small contingent of cavalry must have
hugged the flanks of the infantry; five
ranks in close order gives only a fron-
tage of approximately fifty meters.
The two legions of Romans would
have formed the center of the battle-
line, with the allied infantry to the left
and right. Polybius tells us that they
were formed “many maniples deep”
(1.33.9), but there is no consensus on
what he meant. Given the opposing
goals of a breakthrough in the center
and a need to deal with the enveloping
cavalry the hastati would have formed
in the usual six ranks, but at a frontage
of only one meter per man. This resul-
ted in a frontage for the infantry force
of eight hundred meters, roughly equi-
valent to the Carthaginian phalanx and
heavy mercenaries combined. The tacti-
cal finesse of the manipular system was
traded for the brute force of a phalanx.
The princepes and triarii would have
initially formed in stacked prior and
posterior centuries. In this formation
they would be free to either move into a
contiguous line to directly support the
hastati and form an eighteen rank pha-
lanx or turn towards the flank or rear to
face oncoming cavalry.
This formation was appropriate to
face elephants (Polybius 1.33.10), but
it is common to read in modern com-
mentaries that the dense Roman for-
mation lined up the men to be bowled
over. These authors, who correctly liken
the elephant to a tank, then go on to
describe tactics more appropriate to
a bulldozer. Like a tank, an elephant is
essentially a mobile redoubt and mis-
sile platform. The primary advantage
of elephants is the protection provided
its passengers and the height advan-
tage imparted to the troops fighting
from its back. Elephants can and did
directly attack infantry with their feet,
tusks and trunk, but the type of pene-
tration into formed men envisioned by
many authors was not a viable tactic.
Not only does simple animal behavior
render a drive into formed and steady
infantry unlikely, but to do so would
be to expose the elephant’s vulnerable
flank and rear to the enemy. When they
battled steady, ordered infantry it was
along the front, not crashing deep into
the ranks.
Light troops were commonly em-
ployed against elephants. Skirmishers
can pick off the mahouts and riders or
blind and madden the beasts with mis-
sile fire, as well as gutting or hamstrin-
ging any elephants they can swarm
around. Regulus would have expected
his velites, formed in front of his army
at double the normal density, to chase
the elephants out of the way of his
hastati so that they could engage the
militia beyond.
Battle begins
The course of the battle described by Po-
lybius (1.33) is echoed by later authors.
Appian describes the battle, but his ac-
count is irreconcilable with the others
and must be discounted. The armies
deployed and awaited a favorable mo-
ment to attack. As the anticipation of
battle became unbearable, they advan-
ced. The Romans moved to the sound of
spear clashing against shield and shou-
ted battle cries. Xanthippus ordered his
cavalry and light infantry to converge
on the Roman horse, and the elephants
to charge the velites. The skirmishing
tactics of the velites were ineffective
against the high volume of plunging
fire from the riders of the close-packed
elephants and the light troops protec-
ting them. Formed loosely, their one de-
fense against the elephant charge was
to get out of the way, but this was cons-
trained by the density of the elephants
because moving laterally out of the way
of one put them in the path of another.
They were “pushed back…and trodden
underfoot” (Polybius 1.33.5), falling in
“heaps.” After crushing the velites the
elephants came up against the ordered
ranks of hastati and a prolonged battle
11-02-2010 16:27:08

ensued. This took the form of a mis-
sile duel punctuated by short, brutal
charges by the elephants, while small
groups of Romans tried to force their
way through gaps in the line of elep-
hants, whose spacing dissolved as they
clumped together in groups.
While this was occurring the Roman
cavalry was “speedily put to flight” (Po-
lybius 1.33.3) and the Carthaginians be-
gan to harass the flanks and rear of the
Roman infantry. The Roman left wing
“partly because they could avoid the
elephants and partly out of contempt
for the mercenaries” (Polybius1.33.4) ad-
vanced boldly against the right of the
Carthaginian line. The Roman allies de-
feated the mercenaries, but this cannot
have occurred swiftly. It is unlikely that
if the veteran mercenaries had broken
quickly the unseasoned militia would
not have routed with them. The tale of
Xanthippus haranguing the mercena-
ries (Diodorus 22, Fragment 10) appears
to be lifted from Xenophon, but per-
haps a kernel of truth behind it implies
a struggle of some length.
Once enveloped, the Roman flanks
and rear were obliged to turn to face
their attackers. Missile fire arching over
these hastily formed ranks into the
unshielded sides and backs of men dee-
per in the formation would have been
deadly and intermittent cavalry char-
ges would force the Romans into a tigh-
ter mass. The various Roman troops for-
med a single dense phalanx now trying
to break through the Carthaginian line.
It was now that the mercenaries were
overwhelmed as the desperate Romans
fell on them in great numbers. The ex-
ceptionally high number of casualties
among the mercenaries, eight hundred,
indicates the fierceness of this combat
rather than a rout and retreat to their
camp. A tragically ironic scene played
out as the Roman legions fought their
way through the elephants only to be
confronted by the masses spears of a
fresh and ordered Carthaginian pha-
lanx and slaughtered.
Roman discipline finally gave way
to panic. Their end was not quick: the
hopelessness of the men was captured
by Polybius in his description of the si-
milar end to the later battle of Cannae:
“The Romans…were gradually huddled
in and surrounded. They finally were
all killed where they stood.” (Polybius
AW nr11-2009.indd 35
3.116.10-11). Only two thousand men
from the Roman left who broke throu-
gh the mercenaries managed to escape
back to Aspis. Five hundred men, with
Regulus, managed to escape the enve-
lopment, but this small group could not
escape the cavalry on the open plain
and were captured.
Aftermath
The Carthaginians were elated at a suc-
cess, losing few beyond routed merce-
naries. Xanthippus showed political
foresight to match his tactical skill by
leaving at the peak of his popularity.
The stories of Carthaginian betrayal,
sending him off in a leaking ship or
throwing him overboard fit too well
with Roman prejudices to be credible.
Regulus probably died in captivity and
became an icon of <I>hubris<I>, but
was later mythologized by for an im-
probable series of events that end with
his self-sacrifice rather than allowing
himself to be traded for Carthaginian
prisoners. Most of the Romans who es-
caped to Aspis never made it home due
to shipwreck. The saddest fate was that
of the victorious elephant corps. Squan-
dered by the Carthaginians in an attack
on fortifications at Panormus, they
were captured and taken to Rome to
meet their end being “hunted” for the
pleasure of Roman crowds.
In the end Xanthippus’ victory
served no one. The war dragged on
until an exhausted Carthage sued for
peace. They barely survived a subse-
quent revolt of the mercenaries used
to fight the war. Two further ‘Punic’
wars would be fought, wreaking des-
truction on both Rome and Carthage.
At least the Carthaginian senators who
believed that no terms could be worse
than those offered by Regulus did not
live to see the city razed and its people
sold into slavery after the final Roman
triumph.
If not treacherously slain, what be-
came of Xanthippus? There is a men-
tion of a Xanthippus in Ptolemaic ser-
vice during the Laodicean war in 246
BC. He is the governor of all of the ter-
ritory that Ptolemy III took from the Se-
leucids east of the Euphrates (Jerome,
Commentary on Daniel 11. 7-9). Droysen
suggested this was the same man. A re-
cently transcribed Babylonian cuniform
tablet gives more details (“Ptolemy III
THEME: WAR AS A LIVELIHOOD
Chronicle”, BCHP 11). It was doubted
that Ptolemaic forces penetrated far
from the coast, but this new chronicle
shows that Xanthippus engineered the
conquest of Babylon. Whether this ren-
ders the statement of Polyaenus that
all of Asia “from the Taurus to India”
(Polybius 8.50) was subjugated without
combat, and presumably governed by
Xanthippus, more likely is debatable.
The victory was soon undone in any
case by the flight of Ptolemy back to
Egypt to quell rebellion and a Seleucid
reconquest. If Xanthippus was both of
these men, then he was one of the most
successful strategoi of his time and ar-
biter of the fate of the greatest empires
of his day. n
Paul M. Bardunias’ family came to the
USA from Sparta, so he was born to the
topic of ancient warfare and reared on
the Spartan stories of Xenophon and
Plutarch long before he knew who So-
crates was. This and his profession as an
entomologist studying group behavior
and the emergent properties of crowds
provide an idiosyncratic understanding
of ancient tactics. He is currently writing
a fictional history of Xanthippus and his
times. He currently resides in Hollywood,
Florida, and his study of hoplite combat
and othismos continues at http://hol-
low-lakedaimon.blogspot.com.
The author would like to thank Paul Mc-
Donnell-Staff for his commentary and
help with source material.
Further reading:
Ancient sources: Polybius, book
1; Diodorus, book 23; Cassius Dio,
book 11
- G. Daly, Cannae: The Experience
of Battle in the Second Punic War.
London and New York 2003
- J.G. Droysen, Geschichte des Hel-
lenismus. Gotha 1878
- D. Head and I. Heath, Armies of
the Macedonian and Punic wars
859 BC to 146 BC: Organisation,
Tactics, Dress and Weapons. De-
vizes, Wiltshire 1982
- J.F. Lazenby, The First Punic War.
Stanford 1996
- G.K. Tipps, ‘The Defeat of Re-
gulus’ The Classical World 96 ()
Ancient Warfare 35
11-02-2010 16:27:09
 THEME: WAR AS A LIVELIHOOD

Putting the invaders to use

Mercenary tribes in Anatolia
THE GALATIAN INVASION AND THE
ATTACK ON DELPHI IN 279 BC, PART
OF THE GREAT CELTIC EXPANSION OF
THE FOURTH AND THIRD CENTU-
RIES BC, SHOCKED THE HELLENISTIC
WORLD IN A WAY VERY SIMILAR TO
HOW THE TUMULTUS GALLICUS,
THE FEAR OF A GALLIC IN-
VASION, HAUNTED THE
HEARTS OF ROMANS
SINCE THE SACK OF
THEIR CITY IN 390 BC.
GALATIANS BECAME
THE EPITOME OF THE
BARBAROI, A ROLE
PLAYED TWO CENTU-
RIES BEFORE BY THE
PERSIANS, A THREAT TO
THE CIVILIZED WORLD
THAT ONLY PROVIDEN-
TIAL MEN – HELLENIS-
© Karwansaray BV
TIC BASILEIS (KINGS)
OF COURSE, AS
THEY THEMSELVES
WOULD QUICK-
LY PROCLAIM –
COULD DEAL WITH.
The ‘battle of the Elephants’ commemorated in a miniature elephant grabbing a
Galatian warrior,who seems to be naked, only equipped with his instantly recog-
By Alberto Pérez nizable shield and sword. Now in the Louvre, Paris.

At the same time these rulers immedi-
ately saw the military advantage that
these Celtic tribesmen could provide,
and began to employ them as merce-
nary soldiers as quickly as two years
after their sack of the sacred sanctuary,
when they were recruited by the kings
of Macedon and Epirus. Stopped by a
Pan-Hellenic coalition after the sack of
Delphi, some of the Galatians would
create the ephemeral kingdom of Tylys
in Thrace, and others, the three tribes of
the Trocmi, Tectosages, and Tolistobogii,
would cross the Hellespont in 278 BC.
They had been invited by the king of
Bithynia, Nicomedes I, to help him in a
feud against his brother.
After sacking and looting the coastal

36 Ancient Warfare

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 THEME: WAR AS A LIVELIHOOD

cities of Asia Minor they were defeated

by Antiochus I in the so-called ‘Battle
of the Elephants’ – 275 or 268 BC, there
is no unanimity about the exact date
– where the Seleucid army employed
their elephants to rout the Celtic tribe-
smen. As a result they moved into the
Anatolian plateau, a territory subse-
quently known as Galatia, forming the
Koinon Galation, the “Community of
Galatians”, a perfect recruiting ground
for Hellenistic armies. Armies far remo-
ved from the old hoplite model, they
relied heavily on the use of mercenary
soldiers.

Warrior ethos
Celtic mercenaries had already been
employed by Carthage, and also by Di-
onysius I of Syracuse, who sent 2000
Celts and Iberians to help Spartans
against Thebes in 369 BC, almost a cen-
tury before the Galatian invasion. They
were reputed for their bravery rooted in
their heroic and warlike ethos, an opi-
nion that classical authors have trans-
mitted. Strabo, for example, stated that
(Geography 4.4.2):

“The whole race which is now
called both Gallic and Galatic is
war-mad, and both high-spirited
and quick for battle”
In fact it has been suggested that the
etymology of Galatai is related with
‘war band’, something that suits with
the nature of these wandering tribes,
who had in war their only way of life.
The nature of Galatian mercenary
service was different from that of other
soldiers of fortune that filled Helle-
nistic armies. Unlike others, they were
usually – at least until their settlement
in the Anatolian plateau - recruited en
masse as a whole tribe, warriors travel-
ling with their families. Alongside the
10,000 warriors who crossed the Hel-
lespont under the guidance of the chief-
tains Leonnorios and Luturios we find
10,000 non combatants. Similarly in
277 BC, the 9,000 Galatians enlisted by
Antigonus Gonatas were accompanied
by their families numbering 30,000
people in total. Sixty years after the first
crossing of the Hellespont, in 218 BC, the
tribe of the Aegosages – men, women,
children – would be called by Attalus I
of Pergamum to face renewed Seleucid
Relief showing a horned helmet, thureos and chariot yoke.
pressure. The recruitment of Galatian
warriors, with or without their families,
was probably arranged through pacts
with their chieftains, and not individu-
ally.
Galatians would have preserved
warrior rituals and customs familiar
to the European Celts, but complete-
ly alien to the Greek world and that
doubtless contributed to their savage
image. They probably practiced head
hunting, as suffered by Macedonian
king Ptolemy Keraunos who overcon-
fidently faced the Galatian invasion of
Macedon in 279 BC and was soundly de-
feated. Between the remains of human
sacrifices found at Gordion, a skull was
found with traces of wood in its base,
something that matches the exposition
of severed enemy heads recounted by
Posidonius and confirmed by archaeo-
logy in Western Europe:
© Karwansaray BV
“Ptolemy, after receiving several
wounds, was taken, and his head,
cut off and stuck on a lance, was
carried round the whole army to
strike terror into the enemy.”
Justin, Epitome of the Philip-
pic History of Pompeius Trogus
24.4.5
Galatians, as the Gaesatae at the battle
of Telamon, fought naked as reported by
Livy in the battle of Mount Olympus in
189 BC, where they were routed by the
legions of Manlius Vulso, or as attested
by the famous Pergamum sculptures
of dying Gauls. The sacrifice of chosen
captives seems to have also been prac-
ticed, as reported by Diodorus, who tells
how after defeating Eumenes I in 166 a
Galatian chieftain garlanded and sacri-

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 THEME: WAR AS A LIVELIHOOD
Relief showing a Galatian thureos, carnyx and mail armor.
ficed the most handsome prisoners.
War for the Galatians, as for their
European counterparts, had a strong
religious component, and being killed
in battle or committing suicide after
the defeat was regarded as a glorious
death. Brennus for example, who com-
manded the attack against Delphi, com-
mitted suicide after his defeat – drin-
king pure wine, according to Pausanias,
who echoed the cliché of Celts immode-
rate passion for wine. This disdain for
death was reflected in a frenzied beha-
vior in combat, that shocked and awed
their enemies, and that was depicted
as hubris (pride often resulting in retri-
bution) by the Greek authors, or furor
(rage or madness) by the Roman ones.
Who would not be frightened by men
who feared only that sky might fall on
them as Galatian ambassadors boasted
before the young Alexander the Great?
“They rushed at their adversar-
ies like wild beasts, full of rage
and temperament, with no kind
of reasoning at all; they were
chopped down with axes and
38 Ancient Warfare
AW nr11-2009.indd 38
swords but the blind fury never
left them while there was breath
in their bodies; even with arrows
and javelins sticking through
them they were carried on by
sheer spirit while their life lasted.
Some of them even pulled the
spears they were hit by out of
their wounds and threw them or
stabbed with them.”
Pausanias, Description of Greece
10.21.3
Mercenaries
During the third century BC the presen-
ce of Galatians as mercenaries seemed
ubiquitous in the eastern Mediterra-
nean. As a result of the power vacuum
created in Macedon and Thrace by the
death of Ptolemy Keraunos, bands of
Galatians wandered freely in those ter-
ritories, some crossing to Asia as we
have seen, some others extorting Greek
cities like Byzantium, and others proba-
bly took up service to ‘tyrants’, such as
Apollodoros.
In 277 BC, two years after the sack of
© Karwansaray BV
Delphi, Antigonus Gonatas defeated a
group of Galatians at Lysymacheia, and
immediately recruited the survivors,
paying them a Macedonian gold coin
each. After defeating his opponent An-
tipater, the Galatians demanded a gold
coin not for each warrior, as had been
agreed, but a coin for each member of
the tribe, combatant or non-combatant.
Fickleness and greed were going to be
characteristics of Galatian mercenaries.
They could be a double-edged sword for
their employers as well. For example, in
274 BC Antigonus sent his ally Ptolemy
II Philadelphus 4,000 Galatians to help
him crush the revolt of Magas, governor
of Cyrene, but this daring band, proba-
bly astonished by the wealth of Egypt,
tried to seize the country. Ptolemy pre-
vented their bold attempt by sequeste-
ring them on a desert island in the Nile
delta, where they perished from hunger
and killing each other.
Both Antigonus Gonatas and Pto-
lemy II Philadelphus, as well as later
Attalid and Seleucid monarchs, had no
qualms about employing Galatians in
their armies and at the same time using
11-02-2010 16:27:23
 THEME: WAR AS A LIVELIHOOD

their victories against them as perfect

propaganda to reaffirm the legitimacy
of their monarchies and their role as
saviors of Hellenic civilization against a
foe that represented the same danger
as Titans, Amazons, or Persians of past
generations. The best-known example
of this propaganda is the group of
bronze sculptures that Attalus I erected
in the acropolis of Pergamum comme-
morating his victory over the Tolistobo-
gii. Roman marble copies have survived:
the famous ‘Dying Gaul’ in the Capito-
line Museum in Rome, or the Ludovisi
‘Gaul Killing Himself and His Wife.’
Antigonus Gonatas and Pyrrhus of
Epirus would continue to fight over Ma-
cedon, both with a contingent of Gala-
tians in their armies. When the former
was defeated, his Celtic mercenaries
fought until the last man covering his
retreat, showing a courage that mat-
ched their reputation:

“Pyrrhus, among all these kind-

© Karwansaray BV
nesses of fortune, thinking what
he had effected against the Gauls
the most advantageous for his
glory, hung up their richest and
goodliest spoils in the temple of
Minerva Itonis”

Plutarch, Pyrrhus 26.5
Galatians seem to have had an impor-
tant place in Pyrrhus’ army after his re-
turn from Italy. They garrisoned towns
such as Aigai, where they sacked the
tombs of the Macedonian royal family
- sacrilegious behavior, which Bren-
nus exemplified by laughing at divine
images in Delphi, was another cliché
applied to Galatians – and joined his ill-
fated expedition against Sparta.
The warriors of the three tribes that
crossed the Hellespont, besides their
pillage raids and the extortion of tri-
butes to the cities of Asia Minor, would
rent their sword to the local powers,
acting here with the same indiscipline
as in Europe, not always fulfilling their
duties and ready to revolt against their
payer if it suited their interests. We
have already seen that Nikomedes I of
Bithynia was responsible for the cros-
sing of the Galatian tribes, and after his
death the Tolistobogii were recruited
by one of his sons to defend his rights
to the throne. Frustrated by a peaceful
One of the Roman copies of the bronzes set up in Pergamon by Attalus I: a Galatian
warrior killing himself, having evidently already stabbed his wife. Now in the Lud-
ovisi collection in the Palazzo Altemps, Rome.
agreement between the pretenders, the tial part of the cities he was already
Galatians sacked the territory of their taxing. So employing Galatians was a
former master. Mithridates I of Pontus double-edged sword, they had a great
and Ariobarzanes II of Cappadocia em- military value, but there was always the
ployed a Galatian contingent to repeal risk that they tried to take advantage of
a Ptolemaic naval incursion in the Black their position on their own behalf.
Sea, but Galatians would sack the king- The Attalids of Pergamum were
dom of Pontus taking advantage of the going to be the more stubborn oppo-
death of the son and successor of Mi- nents of the Galatians, although they
thridates, Mithridates II, his grandson, were not immune to the attraction of
was still a child. hiring such reputed warriors. We have
They were also hired by the preten- seen how Attalus I recruited the entire
der to the Seleucid throne Antiochus tribe of the Aegosages in 218 BC, alt-
Hierax for service against his brother hough he could not profit from their
Seleucos II. Galatians were crucial in the services because they mutinied with
defeat of Seleucos at Ancyra in 238 BC, the excuse of a moon eclipse. More pro-
but they immediately revolted against bably they were tired of an exhausting
Antiochus, who had to treat them as al- campaign. He had to settle them in the
lies, ceding them part of the war spoils Troad, where they were exterminated
and probably the tributes of a substan- by Prusias I of Bithynia.

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 THEME: WAR AS A LIVELIHOOD
© Karwansaray BV
The façade of the Athene Nikephoros (Athena the bearer of Victory) showing the
original placement of the reliefs mentioned in the article. Now in the Pergamon
museum, Berlin.
Galatians fought in the Seleucid ar-
mies until the battle of Magnesia – 3,000
infantry and 2,500 horsemen – and also
in the ranks of the Lagids. At the battle
of Raphia, where both powers clashed
over the disputed region of Coele Sy-
ria, Galatians are not mentioned in the
Seleucid army – apart from an officer.
However according to Polybius 4,000
Gauls and Thracians served among the
Ptolemaic troops, some already esta-
blished in Egypt – probably as cleruchs
– and some freshly recruited. Funerary
steles have been found in Alexandria
depicting these Galatian mercenaries,
although only the characteristic shield
40 Ancient Warfare
AW nr11-2009.indd 40
With the arrival of Rome and the de-
feats suffered at the hands of Manlius
Vulso, the power of the Galatians star-
ted to decline. The progressive helleni-
zation of their elites and the evolution
towards monarchical forms of govern-
ment changed the way they rented their
services, and their war potential verged
towards a more sophisticated political
play, shifting alliances and trying to
maintain their independence in the
tumultuous last century of the Roman
Republic. Nevertheless we continue to
find Galatians enrolled in the Helle-
nistic armies – for example a Galatian
bodyguard killed Mithridates the Great
when he requested him to do so – and
taking part in almost all major conflicts
until Pharsalus, where a detachment of
Galatian horsemen guided by their king
Deiotarus fought alongside Pompey.
Tactics and panoply
The success of Galatian mercenaries
in the third century BC rested on se-
veral factors. First of all, there was the
demand for skilled troops by Hellenis-
tic rulers, who continually needed new
forces in the wars they waged against
each other. In the first decades of the
century, the Galatians became a kind of
‘secret weapon’ that Hellenistic powers
employed in search of victory. This had
to do not only with their military pro-
wess, but also with their savage aspect
and their physical appearance, unfami-
liar to their enemies. Galatians them-
selves were aware of this psychological
impact and keenly cultivated that ima-
ge, augmented by the noise they made
when entering in combat, sounding
trumpets – carnyxes, as represented in
Pergamum reliefs - and yelling:
remains of the Celtic panoply, the rest
of their weapons and their attire was
now of Greek origins (see Ancient War- “Their tall stature, their long red
fare I.1). hair, their huge shields, their ex-
traordinarily long swords; still
“And they had also collected a more, their songs as they enter
force of Thracians and Gauls, into battle, their war-whoops
about four thousand of them and dances, and the horrible
from among settlers in Egypt clash of arms as they shake their
and their descendants, and two shields in the way their fathers
thousand lately raised elsewhere. did before them - all these things
These were commanded by Dio- are intended to terrify and ap-
nysius the Thracian” pal.”
Polybius 5.65, Livy 38.17
11-02-2010 16:27:27

Regarding the purely military aspects,
the Galatian way of war was in accor-
dance with the heroic ethos that we
have described, and still far from the
more sophisticated battle tactics pre-
sent in the Hellenistic world. With their
arrival at the Mediterranean basin they
had to confront the ranks of heavy ar-
med infantry that formed the core of
Hellenistic armies, the fearsome pha-
lanxes, whose sight shocked the Roman
consul Aemilius Paulus in the battle of
Pydna:
When he saw this, and observed
that the rest of the Macedonians
took the shields that hung on
their left shoulders, and brought
them round before them, and
all at once stooped their pikes
against their enemies’ shields,
and considered the great strength
of this wall of shields, and the
formidable appearance of a
front thus bristling with arms, he
was seized with amazement and
alarm; nothing he had ever seen
before had been equal to it”
Plutarch, Aemilius Paulus 19.2
To face this kind of formation the Ga-
latians relied on a brutal charge, when
their fury and enthusiasm could prevail
over the ordered ranks of the phalangi-
tes, a violent clash that could lead to the
disorganization of the enemy forma-
tion. This brutal assault was expensive
in energy and casualties, and difficult
to repeat if it failed, thence the fre-
quent mention by classical authors of
the dismay of the Gaul warriors if their
initial impact was not successful.
“For they had observed from for-
mer battles that Gauls in general
are most formidable and spirited
in their first onslaught, while still
fresh”
Polybius 2.33
As we have seen, Hellenistic generals
were quickly going to realize the possi-
bilities that this kind of warrior had to
unbalance a battle, and their first em-
ployers had success with their choice.
Galatians were mainly infantry-
men, although we also find mounted
AW nr11-2009.indd 41
THEME: WAR AS A LIVELIHOOD
troops, composed of aristocrats and La Tène panoply that have come forth
their dependants in a peculiar insti- from the archaeological record, seem
tution known as trimarkisia. A noble to have been conceived by the need of
cavalryman was accompanied by two facing heavier armed enemies. The sus-
attendants, also mounted but who per- pension chain was improved to ensure
haps dismounted for battle. This readi- that the scabbard remained firmly at-
ness to fight on foot was characteristic tached to the right thigh of the warrior
of Celtic and German cavalry, as for when running, perfectly adapted for a
example when Galatians dismounted sudden charge. The boss of the shield,
at the battle of Mount Magaba because the umbo, was developed to provide
of the rugged nature of the terrain. Ac- a better protection for the hand that
cording to Lucian Galatian armies also handles it, as well as making the shield
contained chariots. This is confirmed a weapon in itself. It seems that both
by the reliefs in Pergamum commemo- innovations were developed by eastern
rating Attalus I’s victories over the To- Celts, later travelling westwards, and so
listobogii, in which chariot wheels can it is plausible that they were adapted
be seen. Probably they were employed because of the new needs of warriors
to carry chieftains to battle, where they who were required to break an impreg-
descended to fight, and perhaps also to nable wall of sarissae. n
harass enemy on level ground. Caesar
has famously described the latter du- Alberto Pérez Rubio would like to dedi-
ring his campaigns in Britannia. cate this article to his father, who taught
When recruited as mercenaries the him to love history, and to Dr. Eduardo
Galatians fought in their own way and Sánchez-Moreno, for his encourage-
employed their own panoply. What ment.
that consisted of is known from con-
temporary representations that match
archaeological discoveries from Eastern
Europe from the middle La Tène period.
The Galatian warrior was primarily a
swordsman, carrying a long slashing
sword that was suspended on his right
side and a characteristic long oval
shield with spina and boss which was
known as a thureos in the Hellenistic
world. The thureos or scutum was later
adopted by Hellenistic armies, and its
diffusion has been linked with the arri-
val of Galatians and their employment
as mercenaries. This shield would in
fact give its name to a new kind of in-
fantry, the thureophoroi, the ones who
carry a thureos. The Galatians also used
Further reading:
- S. Mitchell, Anatolia land, men,
spears, but no ranged weapons accor-
and Gods in Asia Minor. Oxford
ding to the descriptions of Livy of the
1995.
campaign of Manlius Vulso. That is so-
- M. Launey, Recherches sur les
mething that can be understood if we
Armées Hellénistiques Paris 1987.
consider a warrior ethos that probably
- V. Kruta, Les Celtes. Histoire et
saw no honor in killing at a distance
Dictionnaire. Des Origines à la Ro-
similarly to the ethos portrayed in Ho-
manisation et au Christianisme.
mer.
Paris 2000.
As we have seen warriors normally
fought naked, but the aristocrats also
The author also heartily recom-
employed chain mail - an innovation
mens paying a visit to the Berlin
probably created by Celtic smiths at the
Pergamon Museum and watching
end of the fourth or start of the 3rd cen-
in situ the reliefs showing captu-
turies BC – and helmets, both represen-
red Galatian weapons.
ted in the Pergamum reliefs.
Some of the developments of the
Ancient Warfare 41
11-02-2010 16:27:28
 THEME: WAR AS A LIVELIHOOD

The emperor as paymaster

Mercenaries and the Imperial Roman Army

his Parthian War. The war was halted by

IN THE EARLY IMPERIAL ERA, DID THE ROMAN EMPERORS EVER EMPLOY MERCE-
Trajan’s death in AD 117 and the archers
NARIES, THAT IS PROFESSIONAL WARRIORS FROM OUTSIDE THE BOUNDS OF were redeployed to the new and trou-
THE EMPIRE HIRED ON (RELATIVELY) SHORT-TERM AND POSSIBLY LUCRATIVE blesome province of Dacia. Only three
years later, the Palmyrenes were gran-
CONTRACTS, TO FULFIL SPECIALIST FUNCTIONS IN WHICH THE ROMAN ARMY ted Roman citizenship and presumably
WAS DEFICIENT, OR TO BOLSTER THE STRENGTH OF FIELD ARMIES DURING discharged, as is demonstrated by a
number of bronze diplomas (e.g. CIL XVI
PARTICULAR CAMPAIGNS OR WARS? IT HAS BEEN NOTED BY MANY SCHOLARS
68, RMD 17). Other diplomas show that
THAT THE MERCENARIES AND ALLIES THAT PROVIDED VARIOUS TYPES OF CAV- a second batch of Palmyrene archers
ALRY, ARCHERS AND JAVELIN MEN TO THE LEGIONARY ARMIES OF THE LATE were granted citizenship in AD 126.
It has been suggested that the origi-
ROMAN REPUBLIC, WERE REGULARISED INTO AUXILIARY REGIMENTS BY THE nal numerus (unit) was so effective
FIRST EMPEROR, AUGUSTUS (REIGNED 27 BC – AD 14). HOWEVER, THERE IS in Dacia, that the emperor Hadrian
followed Trajan’s example and enrol-
SOME EVIDENCE FOR MERCENARIES SERVING IN THE IMPERIAL ROMAN ARMY
led replacements in AD 119 (the diplo-
IN THE FIRST THREE CENTURIES AD. mas are dated January or February AD
120 and 126, hence recruitment in 113
or 119 to achieve six full years of ser-
By Ross Cowan vice). Regular auxiliaries had to serve
for 25 years or more before they were
discharged and rewarded with Roman
The historian Josephus twice refers to that these were not the mercenaries citizenship. It appears that Trajan and
mercenaries in the army of Vespasian / kings’ contingents at all, but lixae, a Hadrian persuaded Palmyra to supply
and Titus during the Jewish War. In very mixed group of civilians hired or a contingent of troops for a relatively
AD 67, Vespasian’s field army inclu- contracted to perform various services short period of time and for a parti-
ded a “great multitude of mercena- (hence their description as ‘mercena- cular reward, but were these archers
ries” (Jewish War 3.126). Some of these ries’) – carrying the army’s baggage, mercenaries or allies, or even regu-
men may well have been mercenaries, holding markets for the troops, provi- lar auxiliaries? It is difficult to decide,
but they were not soldiers of fortune ding various entertainments, and over- especially when the diplomas refer only
employed by the emperor Nero or his seeing the transportation and sale of to special grants of citizenship after six
general. They were the contingents captives. Slavery had always been a years’ service, but do not mention actu-
supplied by the client kings Antiochus profitable aspect of Roman warfare, al honourable discharge from the army
IV of Commagene, Iulius Agrippa II of but the most prominent captives were and because some of the Palmyrenes
Palestine and Sohaemus of Emesa. Each retained for display in Titus’ triumph. are known to have remained in Dacia.
contingent comprised one thousand
cavalry and one thousand foot archers. Problematical Palmyrenes Parthian archers
A larger force, of five thousand infan- The status of the desert city Palmyra In AD 234, the emperor Severus
try (mostly archers) and a thousand is hotly debated. Some scholars assert Alexander established his field army at
cavalry, was sent by Malichus II, king of that it was integrated into the province Moguntiacum (Mainz) in advance of a
the Nabataean Arabs (Jewish War 3.8, of Syria during the reign of Tiberius campaign against the Alamanni:
29 and 67-68). (AD 14-37), but others maintain it was
Josephus’ second reference to mer- an independent city-state, hence why it
cenaries is more problematical. As Titus had its own armed forces and retained
advanced on Jerusalem in AD 69, in all of the massive revenues from the Classic eastern archer, probably origi-
the order of march “the mercenaries tolls it levied on trade caravans, and nally from one of Rome’s client king-
came last, and those that guarded so should be considered as an ally of doms, wearing a mixture of Roman
them brought up the rear” (Jewish War Rome. equipment, such as his belt, belt deco-
5.49). Why would the mercenaries now During AD 113, the emperor Trajan rations and sword, as well as eastern
require guards? It has been suggested enlisted Palmyrene archers to serve in dress and helmet.

42 Ancient Warfare

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 © Johnny Shumate

Ancient Warfare 43

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 THEME: WAR AS A LIVELIHOOD
“Alexander had brought with him
many Moorish javelin men and a
huge force of archers from the
East and from the Osrhoenian
country, together with Parthian
deserters and mercenaries who
had offered their help; with
these he prepared to battle the
Germans.”
Herodian 6.7.8
The Parthian deserters and mercena-
ries were heavily armed and armou-
red cataphract cavalry (cf. Herodian
8.1.3). Some were perhaps light horse
archers (cf. 6.5.4), but Herodian refers
only to Osrhoenian and Armenian
horse archers (7.2.1). We may presume
that some of the mercenaries were
recruited in advance of Alexander’s
Persian war of AD 231-233; the empe-
ror’s generals would have been keen
to gather a strong force of heavy caval-
ry to counter the Sassanian Persians’
famed cataphracts. The Romans had
fought Parthian cataphracts at Nisibis
in AD 217, and had recently encountered
Ardashir’s heavy cavalry when he inva-
ded Roman Mesopotamia in circa AD
230 (Herodian 6.2.5; see Dio 80.4.1. for
Roman troops in Mesopotamia deser-
ting to the charismatic and militarily
successful Ardashir). Parthian nobles
and their retinues exiled in the Roman
Empire or Armenia since Ardashir had
defeated Artabanus V, his nominal
overlord and the last Parthian king, in
about AD 224 and proceeded to take-
over the Parthian Empire (cf. Dio 80.3-
4), would be suitable candidates for
Herodian’s mercenaries. The deserters
probably came from the Persian forces
that the Romans defeated in Media
in AD 232 (Herodian 6.5.5-6). So keen
were the Roman commanders for more
cataphracts, that the armour stripped
from dead and captive Persians was
used transform Roman cavalryman,
perhaps most suitably contarii lancers,
into cataphracts (Historia Augusta,
Severus Alexander 56.6). But all the
mercenaries, willing deserters and
newly equipped Romans did not satis-
fy demand, and unwilling ‘Parthians’
(probably a cover-all term for various
Iranian peoples) were compelled to
44 Ancient Warfare
AW nr11-2009.indd 44
serve Rome. Herodian calls these sol-
diers ‘slaves’ (7.2.1).
In AD 235, instead of leading his
army of regulars, allies and merce-
naries into Free Germany, Alexander
chose to open negotiations with the
Alamanni and offer them a subsidy. The
intention was probably to enrol them
as foederati (allies) of the empire; the
payments (stipendia or munera) were,
to an extent, bribes to halt their incur-
sions into Roman territory for booty
and slaves, but also made the Alamanni
liable to contribute substantial military
contingents to Roman field armies if
they wished to keep on receiving such
subsidies. This was a regular practice.
The emperor Caracalla entered into an
alliance with Mauri chiefs from beyond
the frontiers of Rome’s African provin-
ces, and they supplied contingents of
cavalry and javelin men to supplement
regular light troops in the Roman army
for the emperor’s Parthian War (Dio
78.32). It was better for the emperor
to utilise their fighting skill than have
them make costly incursions into the
Roman provinces (cf. Herodian 7.9.1).
Mauri, including regular units, protec-
ted the flanks of the Roman field army
at the epic battle of Nisibis (Herodian
4.15.1), but the allied / free Mauri are
noted as the most effective fighters
loyal to the new emperor Macrinus,
himself a Moor and the praetorian pre-
fect of Caracalla, until he persuaded an
embittered praetorian evocatus to mur-
der the emperor in AD 217. When legio
III Gallica rebelled against Macrinus
and recognised Elagabalus as empe-
ror in AD 218, the allied Mauri attacked
the legion’s fortress at Raphanaea and
broke through some of its gates, but
were recalled before they could capture
it (Dio 78.32).
Severus Alexander was deeply unpo-
pular with the soldiers on account of
his poor leadership in the Persian War,
his attempts to cap military pay, and
because he was considered to be effe-
minate and dominated by his mother,
the empress Julia Mamaea, and as a
consequence the legionaries and auxi-
liaries were in no mood for negotia-
ting with the Alamanni. The general
Maximinus, who had risen through the
ranks and was idolised by his recruits as
a real fighting commander, was decla-
red emperor and Alexander, his mother
and ministers were lynched (probably
in March AD 235). Maximinus promptly
embarked on the campaign Alexander
had sought to avoid. The Parthian mer-
cenaries were prominent in the war
against the Alamanni and the invasion
of Italy in AD 238 (Herodian 7.2.1, 8.1.3;
Historia Augusta, Severus Alexander
61.8 and The Two Maximini 11.7).
From mercenary to auxiliary?
Herodian emphasises that the Parthians
brought from the East to serve in the
German War were mercenaries, distin-
guishing them from the allied troops
in the field army, for example the
Armenians (7.2.1), but once in Roman
military system, were these men able
to remain mercenaries, complete their
contract and seek employment else-
where? Consider the Parthian auxiliary
regiments present in the Roman army
since the reign of Augustus. Probably
formed around the retinues of horse
archers of noble Parthians exiled in
Rome and raised to fight in Dalmatia
and the great Illyrian Revolt of AD 6-9,
the horse archers had little choice but
to remain in the army as their ad hoc
regiments were formalised into alae.
Note Tiridates, “from Rome”, a decurion
(commander of 30 troopers) of the ala
Parthorum, who died in Dalmatia aged
26 (ILS 2532). Of course, although these
units retained the title ‘Parthian’, they
received few Parthian recruits after
their original complement had either
died in service or achieved discharge.
The Parthian mercenaries recruited
for Severus Alexander’s Persian War in
AD 231/2, were still in Roman service
in AD 238 – about the same length
of time as the Palmyrenes discussed
above, but there is no indication that
the Parthians were discharged. In fact,
as hostilities with Persia resumed in
AD 238/9, and a major Roman expe-
dition was launched to defend Syria
and recover Mesopotamia in AD 242,
it is most unlikely that the Romans
allowed the Parthians to offer their
services elsewhere. It seems probable
that like the Parthian regiments of the
early first century AD, the mercenaries
were organised into a distinct unit (or
units), or distributed among existing
cataphract regiments, or units with
contingents of cataphracts. Such men
were listed on unit records of the third
11-02-2010 16:27:35

© Karwansaray BV
century AD as salarati peregrini, that is
“salaried foreigners”, simply to indicate
that they did not begin their military
careers in the Roman army, but it is my
belief that they ended their careers in
the service of Rome. Being salarati may
have meant somewhat better pay and
privileges, but otherwise these men
were regular Roman soldiers.
Alexander’s and Maximinus’
Parthians would have found them-
selves fighting alongside, or perhaps
even serving in, the Ala Nova Firma
Catafractaria (“New and steadfast caval-
ry regiment of cataphracts”), most pro-
bably formed for service in the German
war and recruited in Mesopotamia, and
quite possibly equipped with captu-
red Persian armour. One of its decuri-
ons, Biribam Absei, was killed in action
during Maximinus’ campaign in AD
235 and was buried near Frankfurt (ILS
9148). Another two members of the
ala, the brothers Aurelius Saluda and
Aurelius Regretho were commemora-
ted at Stuttgart (AE 1931, 68). Their gra-
vestone was set up by a third brother
(frater), Aurelius Abdetathus. However,
this frater may not have been a family
member, but a comrade. Frater was
used also to express comradeship and
to emphasise the close bonds between
soldiers.
On account of its specialist fighting
skill, the ala fought in the ultimately
disastrous Persian War of the teenaged
emperor Gordian III (AD 242-244), and
it was probably for this war that the
unit was increased in strength to one
AW nr11-2009.indd 45
thousand men (ILS 2772). The war, ini-
tially directed by the capable praeto-
rian prefect Furius Timesitheus, started
with a victory. Shapur I, the successor
of Ardashir, was soundly defeated at
Rhesaina in AD 243, and driven out
of Roman Mesopotamia (Ammianus
Marcellinus 23.5.17; Historia Augusta,
The Three Gordians 26.5-6). It is most
unfortunate that we know nothing
about this important battle, except that
it ended in a Roman victory. However, we
can presume that units of contarii (lan-
cers) and cataphracts, like the Ala Nova
Firma and the Parthian mercenaries,
played a crucial role by countering the
Persian heavy cavalry. Timesitheus died
of natural causes some months after
the battle, and Gordian came under the
domination of the new praetorian pre-
fect, the Arab Iulius Philippus. In AD 244
the Roman army marched on Ctesiphon,
but Shapur had learned from his defeat
at Rhesaina; the Romans were routed,
and Gordian was either killed in the
battle or murdered soon afterwards by
his own men. Philip(pus) was proclai-
med emperor and extricated the bat-
tered army by agreeing to pay Shapur
a massive indemnity.
Germans and Goths
Large contingents of Germans and
Goths augmented the Roman army in
this war. It is not known if they fou-
ght at Rhesaina, but Shapur boasted
of having “annihilated” them, along-
side the regular Roman regiments, in
the battle at Meshike (Res Gestae Divi
THEME: WAR AS A LIVELIHOOD
Fresco showing a Palmyrene horse
archer hunting onagers, dated to the
late 2nd century AD. Now in the Louvre,
Paris.
Saporis, line 7-8.) It has been suggested
by some scholars that these warriors
were mercenaries, but they were in fact
allies. The Germans probably included
federates created by Maximinus fol-
lowing his successful campaigns in AD
235-236, and who had followed him to
Aquileia in AD 238:
“Quite a considerable number
of Germans were under his com-
mand as well, people he had
defeated in battle or whom he
had persuaded to make a friend-
ly treaty of alliance.”
Herodian 7.8.10
Herodian goes on to assert that
Maximinus planned to use the
Germans as “cannon fodder”; they were
fierce and brave and so most useful for
taking the initial force of enemy attac-
ks, but they were expendable because
they were indisciplined and barbarians
(8.1.3). Other German allies would have
been enrolled by Timesitheus in AD
241.
The Goths were initially enrolled as
well-paid federates in AD 239-240 when
the Roman general Tullius Monophilus
was unable to defeat them, but some
promptly reneged on their treaties, and
Timesitheus defeated them while mar-
ching along the Lower Danube towards
the East in AD 242, and cancelled the
munera paid to other groups. Like a
proportion of Maximinus’ Germans,
Timesitheus may have compelled some
of the defeated Gothic (and perhaps
also Carpic and Sarmatian) groups to
provide contingents, but other Goths
maintained their treaties and mar-
ched East as foederati. However, Philip
cancelled the Goths’ munera in order
to pay Shapur, though some sub-
sidies may have continued until AD
247 when Philip’s army defeated the
Carpi and he felt in a position to put a
stop to all subsidies paid in the lower
Danube region. This turned the Goths
Ancient Warfare 45
11-02-2010 16:27:40
 THEME: WAR AS A LIVELIHOOD
against the Romans (Jordanes, Getica
16 (89)), and the various Gothic grou-
pings wreaked havoc on the Roman
empire in the middle years of the cen-
tury. Following defeats by the emper-
ors Diocletian and Galerius in the AD
290s, they were re-enrolled as allies,
and fought alongside Roman regulars
in Galerius’ second and successful cam-
paign against the Persian king Narses
(AD 297), and they were frequently
employed by Constantine (Getica 21
(110-112), reporting that Constantine
employed no less than 40,000 Goths in
various campaigns).
Mercenary or ally?
Frankish mercenaries (mercennarii) are
reported as serving the British usurper
Allectus. In AD 296, they were defeated
somewhere in the south of England
by Iulius Asclepiodotus, the praetorian
prefect of the legitimate Caesar (junior
emperor), Constantius. The surviving
Franks retreated to London, which
they plundered, but they were caught
there by Constantius and massacred
(Panegyrici Latini 8.16-17). However,
despite the description of the Franks
by the victors as mercannarii, we can-
not be sure that they were not tech-
nically allies of Allectus. The problem
with distinguishing mercenary from
ally is hampered because the Romans,
with their long heritage of serving their
state as citizen soldiers, had little res-
pect for foreign soldiers of fortune. Just
like today, ‘mercenary’ was used as a
disparaging term, and actual merce-
naries were known as metalli, literally
“miners”, in the sense of ‘gold diggers’
(Festus 146). In AD 143, the orator Aelius
Aristides praised Antoninus Pius for
not employing mercenaries, but later
in his reign the emperor did utilise
Mauri from beyond the frontiers for
his wars in Africa and Dacia, and some
may have been granted Roman citizen-
ship after six years like the Palmyrenes
of Trajan and Hadrian (CIL XVI 108,
with Mann 1985; in this context note
also Dio 68.32, for the force of free
Mauri that Lusius Quietus gathered
on his own initiative, then offered to
Trajan for service in the Dacian Wars).
Enrolling a tribe as ‘allies’ and paying
its leaders stipendia (just like Roman
soldiers received) can be seen as a neat
way of avoiding the unsavoury practi-
46 Ancient Warfare
AW nr11-2009.indd 46
RMD 17, preserved in a wooden frame. This diploma, normally attesting to honou-
rable discharge for auxiliary soldiers after 25 years of service, is instead a special
grant of citizenship to a certain Baricus from Palmyra, formerly a soldier in a
cohort of Palmyrian archers. Now in the Museo Terme di Diocleziano, Rome.
ces of using them a mercenaries, but
Vegetius stressed that it was far che-
aper to levy and train Roman troops
than to employ foreign mercennarii, by
which he meant Germanic federates/
allies (Epitome of Military Science 1.28).
To sum up, the evidence for merce-
naries in the Imperial Roman army is
slight. The army simply had little need
for them, except in wars, for example
against the Sasanian Persians, where
the fighting skills and armament of
regular Roman units was not appro-
priate. In such circumstances, the army
would seek out skilled mercenaries, but
then retain them as regulars to per-
manently plug a particular hole in the
Roman panoply. If an emperor needed
more troops, he would usually follow
Vegetius’ advice and conscript men of
military age from the Roman provinces
(dilectus); any number of mercenaries
hired would be tiny in comparison.
Sometimes individual specialists were
brought in to teach particular skills,
for example archery (cf. the Parthian
archers noted by Herodian 1.15.2), but
once the skill was mastered, it could
be passed on to future generations of
recruits by Roman training instructors
(doctores, e.g. CIL VI 37262, a legiona-
ry archery instructor). The distinction
between foreign allies, like the Mauri
or Goths, and mercenaries is slight.
Quite often the enrolment of foederati
was motivated by the need to end an
expensive war (subsidies were cheaper
© Karwansaray BV
than the costs of a field army), to pre-
vent raids on the Roman provinces, and
when these ‘allies’ sent large military
contingents, it seems that the Romans
purposefully put them in the vanguard,
so that they would bear the brunt of
the fighting (cf. Maximinus and the
Germans). This would, of course, limit
their ability to attack the empire when,
not if, they broke their treaties. n
Ross Cowan is a regular contributor.
Further Reading
- D. L. Kennedy, ‘Parthian regi-
ments in the Roman Army’ in
J. Fitz (ed.) Limes: Akten des XI.
Internationalen Limeskongresses.
Budapest 1977, 521-531.
- F. Lammert, ‘Mercennarii’, RE 15.1
(1931), cols 972-974.
- J. C. Mann, ‘The Palmyrene
Diplomas’ in M. M. Roxan, Roman
Military Diplomas, 1978-1984.
London 1985, 217-219.
- M. P. Speidel, ‘The Rise of the
Mercenaries in the Third Century’,
Tyche 2 (1987), 191-201. Reprinted in
M. P. Speidel, Roman Army Studies
II. Stuttgart 1992, 71-81.
11-02-2010 16:27:41
AW nr11-2009.indd 47 11-02-2010 16:27:45
 BE A GENERAL

Vegetius’ scholarship
The Epitoma Rei Militaris and its Sources
VEGETIUS’ EPITOMA REI MILITARIS IS
THE ONLY SURVIVING WORK FROM
ANTIQUITY OF A LATIN ‘SCIENCE
OF WAR’ BETTER KNOWN AS DE RE
MILITARI. THIS GENRE HAD A LONG
HISTORY STRETCHING BACK TO
CATO THE ELDER IN THE SECOND
CENTURY BC. FOUR EARLIER TREA-
TISES, NONE OF WHICH SURVIVE,
WERE USED BY VEGETIUS. WHICH
WERE THESE AND HOW DID HE USE

© By Andrew Brozyna, after engravings from John Sadler’s 1572 edition.

THEM?

By Murray Dahm

Vegetius’ work was immensely popular

in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance
as a practical handbook but is usu-
ally only examined today as a histori-
cal source. The focus of scholarship on
the Epitoma has been to date it pre-
cisely and to try to disentangle which
of Vegetius’ sources provide particu-
lar information. In this two-part arti-
cle we will examine the intricacies of
Vegetius scholarship and then, in the
next Ancient Warfare, examine what
Vegetius actually says.
tise, arguments have been made as to
The author “I claim no authority to myself, Vegetius’ being a breeder of horses and
Vegetius, or to give him his full name, but merely write up the dispersed ‘Count of the Sacred Stables’, travel-
Publius Flavius Vegetius Renatus, was material of those who I have ling widely and having a knowledge of
a member of the highest ranks of the listed above, summarising as if barbarian, and especially Hunnic, tribes
imperial bureaucracy, possibly a vir to form an orderly sequence.” and their horses. The extension of these
illustris and Count. Nothing is known arguments is that Vegetius ‘knew’ his
of him other than what can be gleaned barbarians, a factor which becomes
from his writings and such arguments Some argue that Vegetius had in important for one of the main purpo-
seem to be deduced from them in order fact been a soldier and had therefore ses of the Epitoma. Another possibility,
that we can know something about the experienced first-hand the military based on Vegetius’ financial suggesti-
author. These arguments often raise problems he seeks to redress in his ons, is that he was ‘Count of the Sacred
more questions than they answer. treatise. Vegetius may also be the aut- Largess’. He was also a Christian and
Vegetius does not seem to have hor of a veterinary treatise, Digesta places great emphasis on the oath of
been a soldier since he tells us (1.8.12): Artis Mulomedicinae. Using this trea- soldiers as a Christian vow.

48 Ancient Warfare

AW nr11-2009.indd 48 11-02-2010 16:27:47


Arguments have been put forward
as to Vegetius’ coming from Spain
because of an interest in Quintus
Sertorius, and of Vegetius’ being a fol-
lower of Theodosius I. He may also have
come from Gallia Narbonnensis. Such
arguments are linked to the most con-
troversial topic regarding Vegetius, and
that is the date of the treatise. The deci-
sive factor here is the question which
emperor the Epitoma was dedicated
to.
The date
There are several imperial candidates
and dates proposed for Vegetius’ work.
You will find many modern authors
arguing strongly for one or another.
Unfortunately, no argument is conclu-
sive and so virtually all possibilities are some gap of time between the writing
open between the dates of 383 and 450.
These are set because Vegetius calls
Gratian divus (1.20) and so the text was
written after his death,
and in 450 the text was
edited in Constantinople
by a certain Flavius
Eutropius who dated
his work. Within these
dates many candidates
have their modern sup-
porters: Theodosius I
(379-395), Valentinian III
(425-455), Honorius (393-
423), Arcadius (383-408),
Theodosius II (408-450),
Valentinian II (375-392).
The most popular can-
didates are Theodosius
I and Valentinian III.
Arguments vary in
complexity but cen-
tre around the way the
emperor is addressed,
the military situation at
the time and military
reforms. Unfortunately,
our understanding of
the military situation
and the exact military
reforms of the various
emperors is also incom- © By Andrew Brozyna, after engravings from John Sadler’s 1572 edition.
plete and therefore,
debate about the exact
dedicatee is unlikely to ever be set-
tled. It is worth noting, however, that
Vegetius wrote Book 1 separately first
and then followed it with Books 2-4. In
the Preface to Book 2 he states:
AW nr11-2009.indd 49
“when I was commanded to col-
lect this written material in a
written epitome for Your Majesty
... for what could be more auda-
cious than to address some state-
ment about the practice and sys-
tem of warfare to the Lord and
Emperor of the human race ... I
offered earlier in all humility a
booklet on the levying and train-
ing of recruits, and yet escaped
without blame.”
Therefore, it seems that Book 1 is more
important for intricate arguments
about dating than the later books.
Another possibility is that there was
of Book 1 and the remaining books.
Vegetius does not mention any such
gap but it is possible that his booklet
was read and he was approached for
further material some time after he
‘escaped without blame’. This is of inte-
rest since Book 2 contains the other
controversial aspect of Vegetius; the
BE A GENERAL
‘Ancient Legion’ and Vegetius’ calls for
a return to the legion of old. Debate
about whether this reflects a real insti-
tution or a compilation of sources from
different times has raged, literally,
for centuries. In the Preface to Book 1,
however, we find several interesting
comments. The book was written:
“to put into the public domain
for the benefit of Rome matters
which lay scattered and hidden
in the pages of various historians
and teachers of military science.
We attempt to show then, by
a number of stages and head-
ings, the ancient system of levy-
ing and training recruits. ... so
that you may recognise in your
spontaneous dispositions for the
safety of the State the principles
which the builders of the Roman
Empire long ago observed, and in
this little book find whatever you
think needful to affairs of State,
which are ever pressing.”
This un-commissioned booklet of
advice places Vegetius within a 4th
century AD trend of works offering
advice – we have already examined the
anonymous De Rebus Bellicis in Ancient
Warfare II.6 and there are other works
which fit this model. As such, much of
Vegetius’ advice can be seen in the light
of his ideas of how to restore what he
saw as the decline of the Roman army.
For Vegetius, the cure for Rome’s mili-
tary ills was a return to the practices
and discipline of the past. Rather than
view this as an unrealistic and literary
vision as some have done, it is better
to acknowledge Vegetius’ context and
genre and consider that his advice was
a serious attempt to encourage the res-
toration of the practices he describes.
Vegetius’ Purpose
We have already seen a brief ana-
lysis of Vegetius in Ancient Warfare
(I.3). There, Michael B. Charles argued
that the Epitoma Rei Militaris was, in
part, a polemic against the barbarisa-
tion of the army in Vegetius’ time and
the move towards relying on cavalry
and away from heavy infantry. As such,
not only is Vegetius’ work a compila-
Ancient Warfare 49
11-02-2010 16:27:49
 BE A GENERAL
tion of earlier practical manuals, his
treatise is also a recommendation of
what might be done to remedy the pro-
blems as he sees them. Vegetius’ theme
of the barbarisation of the Roman army
can also be found in Synesius (De Regno
(19) 23 B) from AD 399, so it was clearly
a concern in the late fourth century. It
would seem a little surprising, howe-
ver, to find an expert on horses expli-
citly rejecting that arm of the Roman
armed forces.
The Epitoma combined the infor-
mation from different ages about the
Roman legion and it therefore is by
some not considered to represent a rea-
lity but an ideal. Others argue that his
description is a disjointed compilation
of descriptions of the practices of the
Roman military at various times and is,
therefore, only useful when historical
information is extracted from it.
In the realm of didactic military lite-
rature, however, the nature of Vegetius’
text in combining earlier sources could
not help but reflect the different time
periods in which his sources were writ-
ten. As we have seen in our examina-
tion of the Tactica (AW I.1) this was itself
a standard way of writing such litera-
ture; it is probable that the lost sources
of the Epitoma followed the same pat-
tern of borrowing from earlier treati-
ses. What Vegetius’ use of this method
reveals, however, is that the Roman
legion was not a static institution but
that it underwent frequent fundamen-
tal change. Complaining about what
Vegetius did not write is pointless (as it
is to complain about any of our sources’
omissions) and in fact misunderstands
his genre. Indeed there has been lit-
tle work on Vegetius as the heir to an
entire genre of Roman didactic military
literature.
Vegetius’ sources
Unlike many other authors in the didac-
tic military literature genre, Vegetius
lists the works which he used at vari-
ous occasions. At 1.8 he refers to the
work Cato the Censor wrote on the
“system of war” (de disciplina militari),
Cornelius Celsus, Frontinus and, “that
zealous champion of military law”,
Paternus. He also refers to the constitu-
tions of Augustus, Trajan and Hadrian
(1.8, 1.27). At 2.3 he again mentions Cato,
Frontinus and Trajan. Vegetius also read
50 Ancient Warfare
AW nr11-2009.indd 50
widely outside his own genre; there are
references to Sallust, Varro, Virgil and
Homer in his pages.
Although Vegetius mentions sour-
ces, however, he seldom specifies where
particular information has come from
(see 1.13 and 1.15). This has led to end-
less speculation and scholarly recon-
structions of exactly what has come
from each of Vegetius’ sources. Such
a task is impossible since we do not
have the originals (or any idea of their
contents). The assumption in Vegetius’
plundering of earlier material was that
there was very little original input by
Vegetius himself. It is clear, however,
that Vegetius did have substantial
input since he collected the material
together for it to be presented with a
specific purpose and he mentions late
fourth century military practices which
his sources would have known nothing
about. These are combined with the
practices of earlier times taken from
Vegetius’ sources. This has led to criti-
cisms that Vegetius has misreported
the legion. Rather than this, however, it
seems that Vegetius strove to combine
what he considered the best practices
from the days of the disciplined ancient
legion with contemporary military
practice. This combination of material
emphasises once again Vegetius’ model
of reform, which, regardless of modern
opinion as to its practicality, was pre-
sented as a serious programme.
Another theory regarding Vegetius’
sources is that he had, in fact, not read
any of them in their original form,
but that they were already abbreviated
and that Vegetius only read them in
their truncated form. Again, we can
never know because very little of Cato,
Frontinus or Celsus’ works survives
independently. Passages of Paternus’
work do survive but they do not corres-
pond to Vegetius’ material. Nonetheless,
Vegetius’ sources are important since
they reveal a genre that stretched back
to the second century BC.
It is very likely that Cato’s work was,
at least in part, used by Celsus and
Frontinus and also that Frontinus used
Celsus as well. The de Disciplina Militari
of Cato the Censor (234-149 BC) pro-
bably ranks as the first Latin military
treatise and it is most likely that it was
written after Cato’s own military career
(therefore after 191 BC). One concern
Cato had shown earlier in his career
was over the relaxation of military dis-
cipline by Scipio Africanus in Sicily and
it is possible Cato’s treatise emphasised
strict military discipline. This topic may
have led Vegetius to read Cato. One
Cato passage from Vegetius (1.13) does
indeed come from a discipline context:
“in other matters, as Cato says,
mistakes can be corrected after-
wards; errors in war do not admit
of amendment, because the pen-
alty follows immediately on the
slip. For those who fight without
courage or expertise either per-
ish immediately, or turn to flight
and do not dare to stand up
again to their victors.”
Cato is referred to again at 1.15 to show
the usefulness of archers.
Cornelius Celsus wrote under the
emperor Tiberius and we know he wrote
an encyclopaedia of agriculture, rheto-
ric, philosophy, jurisprudence as well as
his military treatise. The only writing of
his to survive is the De Medicina (“On
Medicine”) in eight books.
Sextus Julius Frontinus has already
been examined in Ancient Warfare II.3
and he tells us in his Strategemata that:
“I alone of those interested in military
science (rei militaris scientiam) have
undertaken to reduce its rules system.”
We can probably reject this claim; ear-
lier treatises must have attempted
something similar. One thing to note
is that Frontinus’ treatise was written
before the Strategemata, and possibly
after his return from Britain, therefore
between AD 78 and 82.
Tarruntenus Paternus wrote a De
Re Militari under Marcus Aurelius and/
or Commodus and may be the same
Paternus who, as Praetorian Prefect,
was executed for treason by Commodus
(Dio 72.5). The brief passages which do
survive are legal in nature and come to
us in Johannes Lydus De Magistratibus
(1.8 and 1.47) and the Digests of Justinian
(49.16.12 and 50.6.7). He was also possi-
bly Vegetius’ source for the constituti-
ons of Augustus, Trajan and Hadrian.
There are other authors of De Re
11-02-2010 16:27:50

Solution to ‘Paddlewheels
and scythed chariots’
In the last issue you were set the
problem of where to position some
of the Anonymous’ inventions
during the battle of Adrianople in
order to possibly change the out-
come - here is the deployment we
would have chosen
Militari known to us. Cincius pro-
bably wrote under Augustus and is
mentioned by Aulus Gellius (Noctium
Atticarum 16.4). The passages quoted
by Aulus Gellius refer to the military
oath of levies and cavalry wings.
The use of Vegetius
The Epitoma was immensely popular
(although we do not know if the remai-
ning books were ever read by their
intended imperial audience). There are
at least 320 surviving manuscripts, the
earliest of which date to the seven-
th century (and 18 of which date to
before the twelfth century). It was the
most copied, referenced and translated
secular text of the Middle Ages and
Vegetius’ advice was eagerly sought by
various princes.
The encyclopaedist monk, Rabanus
Maurus (c. 780-856), extracted Vegetius
and updated it to 9th century warfare
for the Carolingian Emperor Lothair II.
Charles the Bald had also been provi-
ded with a revised version of Vegetius
AW nr11-2009.indd 51
© Andrew Brozyna, ajbdesign.
by Freculph of Lisieux. This edition was
in turn handed to king Odo of the
Franks. Both Henry II (1133-1189) and his
son Richard I (1157-1199) of England car-
ried Vegetius with them on campaign.
Vegetius was possibly an influence on
the strategies and tactics employed by
the Angevin Count, Fulk Nera, during
the period 987-1040 and it is possible
that he influenced the tactics of the
Angevin victory at the battle of Tours
in 1044. Geoffrey Plantagenet also used
his book in his siege of Montreuil-Berlay
in 1150.
Vegetius’ work was updated in Jean
de Meun’s L’Art de Chevalerie in 1284
and was translated before the inven-
tion of printing into several langua-
ges and appeared in a printed edition
in 1473. An English translation, prin-
ted by Caxton, appeared as early 1489
and translations continued regularly
(see illustration). Historians like Henri
Delpech have seen Vegetius as of fun-
damental importance for the history
of Medieval warfare although this view
has been challenged and rejected by
some. Nonetheless, Vegetius remained
widely read.
The work was read and used by
Bartolomeo d’Alviano (1455-1515) and by
Niccolò Machiavelli in his 1521 Art of War.
In 1770 the Austrian Field Marshall, the
Prince de Ligne (1735-1814), called the
Epitoma Rei Militaris a “golden book”
and claimed that “a god, said Vegetius,
inspired the legion, but for myself, I find
BE A GENERAL
that a god inspired Vegetius.” On the
other hand, the seventeenth century
Hapsburg commander Raimondo di
Montecuccoli complained that:
“there are spirits bold enough
to believe themselves great cap-
tains as soon as they know how
to handle a horse, carry a lance
at charge in a tournament, or
as soon as they have read the
precepts of Vegetius.”
This complaint repeats those of the
ancient world made by Socrates and
Marius for example, which we have
already examined (Ancient Warfare I.1,
II.5).
Interest started to wane in the
seventeenth century and, although
Vegetius was translated into English
in 1767 by Lt. John Clarke of the Royal
Navy, this remained the most recent
attempt until the 1990s when two (by
Leo Stelten and N. P. Milner respecti-
vely) followed in quick succession.
As this not-so-brief introduction
has shown, the study of Vegetius is
complex and, at times, controversial.
In most cases, definitive answers to
scholars’ many questions will never be
found. In the next Ancient Warfare we
will examine the contents of Vegetius’
Epitoma in detail and see what it reve-
als. n
Murray Dahm is a regular contributor.
Further Reading
- B. Bachrach ‘The Practical uses of
Vegetius’ De Re Militari during the
Early Middle Ages’, The Historian
47 (1985), pp. 239-255.
- M. B. Charles Vegetius in Context.
Stuttgart 2007
- N. Milner Vegetius: Epitome of
Military Science. Liverpool 1993
- M. Reeve Vegetius’ Epitoma Rei
Militaris. Oxford 2004
- D. Schenk Flavius Vegetius
Renatus: die Quellen der Epitoma
Rei Militaris, Klio (1930)
- L. Stelten Flavius Vegetius
Renatus Epitoma Rei Militaris.
New York 1990
Ancient Warfare 51
11-02-2010 16:27:51
 REVIEWS
Roman officers, 9 AD
Given that 2009 is the ‘bi-millennium’ for the defeat of
the Roman Army under Publius Quinctilius Varus in the
Teutoburgerwald by the German tribes led by Arminius
(Herman to our German readers), these two models are
very topical subjects. I’m going to review them together
(same firm, sculptor and area/time).
The figures are slightly smaller than perhaps we have
become used to within the 54mm size. Of the two, that
of Varus is somewhat ‘chunkier’. It also has fewer compo-
nents than its companion (five as opposed to nine). Both
kits include a cast base and a cast nameplate (included in
the parts tally, above). All the parts have been crisply cast
with good detail. Only a minimum of cleaning up was re-
quired before assembly. With one relatively minor excep-
tion (see below), the fit of the parts was good, the various
pieces being joined by substantial lugs.
Both figures include a cloak but while for Varus this is
the (largely) ceremonial paludamentum (carried over the
left arm), the senior officer has a more substantial gar-
ment. As is often the case when this route is chosen, there
are issues to do with the assembly sequence and acces-
sibility for the paintbrush and this is certainly true here
for the figure of the senior officer. It will be much easier to
paint the rear of the figure and inside of the cloak if the
addition of the latter is made the final step. Unfortuna-
tely, I found that the fit of the cloak to the body was not
particularly good in that some filling will be required at
the rear. This is not a serious problem but some care will
be needed with the paint job while this remedial work is
undertaken. The same is true for the Varus figure, althou-
5252 Ancient
AncientWarfare
Warfare
AW nr11-2009.indd 52
Order code:
54-002 & 54-009
Scale:
54mm
Designer:
Alan Ball
Manufacturer:
Thorsberg
Address of Manufacturer:
www.thorsberg-miniatures.de
Reviewer:
Dr. Mike Thomas
gh here the problem is much less serious as the model can
be completely assembled before painting starts.
For me, the most interesting feature is the helmet
worn by the legate / tribune. This fascinating item was
unearthed in France and is now displayed in the Musée
Rolin at Autun. It has a unique shape and certainly does
not fit into the accepted development sequence for Ro-
man military helmets. The helmet bowl is elongated and
in addition has a metal laurel wreath around the crown.
On the exaggerated peak, there is a representation of a
human face (not unlike that seen on the Heddernheim ca-
valry helmet). The helmet is made of gilded bronze. Robin-
son likens it to a type of helmet seen on Etruscan repre-
sentations and comments that it is clearly a parade item
and not really intended for wear on campaign. Given its
unwieldy shape, one cannot quarrel with this deduction.
So far as I know, no other manufacturer has attempted
this particular extravagance in military headgear. If you
don’t want to use it, a spare bare head has been thought-
fully included in the kit.
Both kits include a brief historical introduction (in
English as well as German) together with a colour guide
and box art photograph of the finished models. In both
cases, the source material for the various items of dress
or weapons is given. The features of Varus, for example,
are based on his likeness taken from coins issued when he
was governor of Roman Africa.
These are two interesting models, made to a high
standard. They can be painted individually or they could
be displayed together to advantage. Recommended.
11-02-2010 16:28:00
 REVIEWS

3rd century Romans

It is difficult to know exactly where these figures fit into the scheme of things. They
arrive fully assembled and painted, so would not suit those who build and paint
their own models. Besides which, the quality of these models in respect of both the
casting and the painting, is not of the highest standard. I suppose they could be
used for (skirmish) wargaming but they seem rather large for that to my eye. The
clue may be on the box, for it says there ‘Collector’s Models’. Perhaps the nearest
equivalent would be the Del Prado or King and Country type collectible figures. If
this is their intended market, then the quality and finish of these figures is per-
fectly acceptable.
Two figures were sent for review, that of an infantry soldier and of a vexillarius.
They appear to be in the style of the 3rd century AD. Details are somewhat exag-
gerated and the castings are very simplistic compared to the finesse seen on other
54mm model kits. On the other hand, there are some quite detailed things. The
design on the shield of the infantryman is perfectly clear to the eye (comprising Order code:
the trident and dolphin motif, known from sculpture), while the painting on the SI-MR 002 & 005
<I>vexillum<I> standard is obviously that known from the item discovered in Egypt Scale:
and presently in a Moscow museum. 60mm
How accurate are they? It’s difficult to say. The general appearance of the fi- Manufacturer:
gures is fine; anatomically they are quite good. The infantryman’s helmet is more Sol Invictvs
generally accepted (following Robinson) as being a cavalry type and the shield is on Address of Manufacturer:
the small side. Having said that, if your ‘thing’ were collecting ready-painted figures www.solinvictus.com
of this type, then they would not be a bad addition to such a collection, especially Reviewer:
considering the rarity of this subject among collectibles. Dr. Mike Thomas

Gaesati
The Xyston Gaesatae packs sent for review are fairly straight forward to
review – there is, after all, little equipment on the naked Celts to comment
upon! The nobles pack includes eight very actively posed miniatures. At
15mm the more extreme poses can be bent to look more natural fairly easily,
though with less force than I just applied to one ankle...
Three have lime spiked hair – this is done very flamboyantly and would
put many eighties rock bands to shame. The fourth wears a plumed Monte-
fortino helmet. All are armed with long Celtic swords. The pack includes eight
different shields and eight extra sheathed swords, which could be cut down
for use as scabbards. A mix of belts, armbands and torcs give them a strong
Gallic feel, and the distinctive features of Gaesatae are as prominent as one
could wish for in 15mm.
The four musicians and four standard bearers are less energetic. They
have the same mix of spiked hair and helmets and magnificent moustaches.
No staffs are included for the standards, which are a bit of a letdown, and
the detail of the casting on the flags and cockerel emblem doesn’t match the
rest of the set, and will be easily snapped once mounted on wire. The carnyx
Order code: is enormous in proportion to its bearer, something which all manufacturers
ANC20173, ANC20174 seem to do. Again, separate sprues of shields and sheathed swords are inclu-
Scale: 15mm ded.
Manufacturer: The proportions of the miniatures is excellent for this scale, though the
Xyston Miniatures hairstyles make the heads looks, as intended originally no doubt, look larger
Address of Manufacturer: and out of proportion. The casting quality, as always with Xyston is superb.
www.xyston.com The do not, by the way, have to serve as the southern French Gaesatae only.
Reviewer: Their ‘dress’ makes them well suited as Galatian mercenaries.
Ed Haines
Ancient Warfare 53

AW nr11-2009.indd 53 11-02-2010 16:28:06

 REVIEWS

Chariots and artillery

The Warlord Games Roman artillery
set consists of a large ballista and
two smaller scorpions these are
multi piece resin kits that will
require a degree of modelling
skill to assemble. They’re
fantastically fine and detailed
replicas of the war machines,
though will be fragile for gaming.
To add to the diorama effect each
scorpion comes with a barrel of
bolts, and the ballista comes with a
mound of stones.
The scorpions are two-piece, with
the torsions springs, housing and
arms making up one segment, and
the rest being the frames. In the ballista wit the arms and
springs are separate from the housing. It’s a bit of a fiddle to
get these to fit closely, and requires a little filling.
The crews are cast in white metal, and match the quality of the rest of Warlords Order code:
range, reviewed in previous issues. There are four crewmen for the scorpios in a Roman war machines boxed set,
mixture of aiming and loading poses, clad in a mixture of lorica hamata and lorica Celtic chariot squadron boxed set
segmentata and imperial Gallic helmets. Two have crosspieces on their helmets, Scale:
which gives the set a more Trajanic period feel than the other legionaries. Manufacturer:
The ballista crew includes an optio commanding, two legionaries in tunics and Address of Manufacturer:
cingulum (Roman military belt) working the winches, and a legionary in segmen- Reviewer:
tata loading the piece – a little strange given that there’s a missile already on the Ed Haines
resin casting. The key is the large engine, a beautiful piece when assembled. Their
delicacy will mean care will be needed if they are actively used for gaming, but as
display pieces they’re magnificent.
The chariot set includes three chariots with ponies, driver and noble. They are
all white metal, in six parts that will again require a good degree of modelling skill
to make the most of. The horses come in three poses allowing for plenty of variety.
The horses are small, but perhaps a bit finely built for Northern European horses of
the period. Their tack is cast on and looks like a reasonable reconstruction.
The chariot assembly, while fiddly is fundamentally straightforward, wheels
mount on the axle pins and chariot rails mount on to
the floor plate. A simple jig or some tack should
hold things steady enough.
There are two variant chariot bodies, one tim-
ber floor with open span rails, the other broad
straps interwoven to form the floor plate and
sides.
The crews are a mix of clothed and unclo-
thed nobles and crouching or sitting drivers. There
is good dynamism in the poses. Two of the nobles
have a split at the torso to enable more re-
alistic posing in the close confines of the
chariot, including one piece where the
legs are cast with the driver. It certainly
helps to give the pieces the look of being
actively part of the chariot rather than simply war-
games figures on it. Warlord Games’ metal Celts are a good
deal less caricatured than their plastic ones, making these a great set
all round.

54 AncientWarfare
54 Ancient Warfare

AW nr11-2009.indd 54 11-02-2010 16:28:14

 REVIEWS

Hittites, Berbers and Sea People

The MDS miniatures provided for review are an eclectic reflecting
in the varied range produced. The casting quality is superb and the
sculpting style simple and crisp. These are not miniatures burdened
with huge amounts of detail, but are clean and well designed, al-
lowing them to be painted up swiftly and easily.
The two Sea Peoples miniatures come in kilts and the distinc-
tive fringed caps as seen in Egyptian sculpture. The poses are rather
flat and the torsos quite skinny, with the result that the arms look
very (too?) muscular. Each comes armed with a round buckler and
two small javelins; one bears a short sword, the other a separate
javelin.
The two Hittites show an evolution in sculpting style. The thin
nature of the torsos works to good effect on robed figures, making
these appear very well proportioned miniatures – they certainly
don’t suffer from the overly heroic physiques of so many ranges. Long-haired and Order code:
with simply sculpted faces under round skull caps helmets with cheeks pieces and SE08022, HE08003, BE08010
long fringed robes. Spears are included. Both these miniatures have rather static Scale:
poses. 28mm
The Berbers are a further improvement in sculpting style and look as if they’ll Manufacturer:
mix well with the Artizan and Gripping Beast ranges. The robes are simple but Miniature Design Studio
cleanly cast, and the poses, while again limited will certainly rank up well. They’ll Address of Manufacturer:
do good service across a number of Arab and North African settings, and the sim- www.miniaturedesignstudio.co.uk
plicity of the sculpts makes them flexible for a number of periods right down the Reviewer:
relatively modern age. Ed Haines

Thracian warriors
Crusader’s Thracians match their typically chunky style. They’re a good
match for the Wargames Foundry range of Thracians in terms of style
and height but are slightly heavier set. The two packs sent for review
included the rather curiously titled ‘Thracian tribes men with spears’.
In fact, as with pretty much all manufacturers you must, in reality, fa-
shion your own wire spears. Some of the hands will also need drilling
out with a pin vice to take weapons.
The pack has four variant poses, one bare headed, the rest in the
ubiquitous Thracian fox-skin cap. They have very nicely cast separate
pelta type shields, with clear wickers on the back and strong mounting
points to attach them to the miniatures arms. All the miniatures wear
the Thracian cloaks that will challenge painters in this scale so much, as
well as tunics and high boots.
The poses are active without being extreme, and for wargaming
Order code: purposes they’ll rank up neatly. The second pack sent for review consisted of four pel-
ANT001, ANT004 tasts armed with the rhompaia. The long thin nature of the weapons means that in
Scale: white metal they bend easily, but this is easily remedied. As you’d expect the costume
28mm is very similar to the first pack. The poses are again active without being extreme.
Manufacturer: The casting quality of the samples is superb with no flash and only minimal mould-
Crusader Miniatures lines. The early packs in this range are appropriate for Thracians fighting for and
Address of Manufacturer: against the Greek city-states and the Macedonians in the fifth and fourth centuries BC.
www.crusaderminiatures.com The addition of archers in one of the packs covers one of the major gaps in the equi-
Reviewer: valent Wargames Foundry range and allows a much more complete representation of
Ed Haines the armies of these ferocious tribesmen. The range extends to include later Hellenistic
period tribesmen.

Ancient Warfare 55

AW nr11-2009.indd 55 11-02-2010 16:28:22

 firstcorpsuk@aol.com curteysminuk@aol.com

25/28mm Pewter Figures.

MSS 01. Thureophoros attacking overarm MSS 08. Antigonid Phalangites Command
x 8 figs @ £7.50 x 4 figs @ £4.00
MSS 09. Seleucid Phalangites x 8 @ £7.50
MSS 02. Thureophoros advancing x 8 figs @
£7.50 MSS 10. Seleucid Phalangites Command
x 4 figs @ £4.00
MSS 03. Thureophoros Command x 4 figs @
£4.00 MSS 11. Bactrian Phalangites x 8 @ £7.50

MSS 04. Thorakites attacking overarm MSS 12. Bactrian Phalangites Command
x 8 figs @ £7.50 x 4 figs @ £4.00

MSS05. Thorakites Advancing x 8 figs @ £7.50
MSS 07. Antigonid Phalangites x 8 @ £7.50
New this month we have the first release of
what will be a very extensive range of
25mm Macedonian Successors.
MSS 13. Ptolemeaic Egyptian Phalangites
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MSS 14. Ptolemeaic Egyptian Phalangites
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Units
MSSU 01. Thureophoros attacking MSSU 18 Bactrian Phalangites X 32 inc
overarm X 16 inc Command @ £14.00 Command @ £28.00

MSSU 02. Thureophoros attacking MSSU 19 Bactrian Phalangites X 40

overarm X 24 inc Command @ £21.00 inc Command @ £34.00

MSSU 03. Thureophoros advancing MSSU 20 Bactrian Phalangites X 48

X 16 inc Command @ £14.00 inc Command @ £40.00

MSSU 04. Thureophoros advancing MSSU 13 Seleucid Phalangites x 24 inc MSSU 21 Ptolemeaic Egyptian
X 24 inc Command @ £21.00 Command @ £21.00 Phalangites X 24 inc Command @ £21.00

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x 32 inc Command @ £28.00 Command @ £34.00 X 40 inc Command @ £34.00

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x 40 inc Command @ £34.00 Command @ £40.00 X 48 inc Command @ £40.00

MSSU 12 Antigonid Phalangites MSSU 17 Bactrian Phalangites X 24 inc

x 48 inc Command @ £40.00 Command @ £21.00

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AW nr11-2009.indd 56 11-02-2010 16:28:24

 REVIEWS

War elephants
Osprey’s New Vanguard series, focused on the machinery of warfare, has very few
‘ancient’ titles, but War Elephants will be a welcome addition. Nossov provides a
clear introduction to the use of the usually gentle-hearted pachyderms on the
battlefield. The book consists of a note about elephants – species, how they were
caught and trained – followed by sections about elephants at war in India, among
the Successors, in Pyrrhus’ army, in Rome, Southeast Asia and a catch-all chapter of
their use anywhere else. The final chapter deals with the tasks of elephants on the
battlefield, tactics and countermeasures deployed against them.
The historical section – the first part of every chapter – provides details on elep-
hants at war, followed by a paragraph on the equipment and, if sufficient informa-
tion is available, crews, towers and howdahs. Of particular interest is Nossov’s ar-
gument that the Roman army used elephants a lot more than it is usually credited
with, especially in the 2nd century BC. Following Polyaenus, he
proposes that Caesar took an elephant with him on his expeditions to Britain, per-
haps a bit more confidently than is warranted by the evidence (see also ‘Be a gene-
ral’, Ancient Warfare II.4).
Unlike most Osprey’s, books in the New Vanguard series are in full-color, which
is a nice bonus in this case, as both the artwork and the additional photography are ISBN:
of high quality. Recommended. 978-1-84603-268-4
Pages:
50
Author/editor:
Konstantin Nossov
Publisher:
Osprey Publishing
Address of Publisher:
www.ospreypublishing.com

The art of war. Great commanders

of the Ancient and Medieval world
Let’s face it, ‘coffee-table’ sized books and scholarly quality are not always synonymous.
Most books of this kind seem to have been cobbled together to make a quick buck and
usually quickly end up in the discount section of the bookstore, and with good reason. The
art of war certainly has the looks of this type of book: quality paper, nicely laid out, well
reproduced images and heft. Unlike most books of this kind however, the images are usu-
ally appropriate for the subject and, though common, do not seem overdone. The selection
ISBN: of authors too is impressive. Among the writers for the Ancient world we find Martin van
978-1-84724-259-4 Creveld, Adrian Goldsworthy, Robin Lane Fox and Adrian Murdoch.
Pages: So what’s not to like about this book? Not very much, apart from the disadvantage of all
434 such all-encompassing collections: if you’re well versed in the period, then you’re unlikely
Author/editor: to be surprised by the information contained in the chapters. Eight pages with illustrati-
Andrew Roberts (ed.) ons about, say, Pompey or Caesar is simply not very much. Of course, that is the nature of
Publisher: this kind of book and it can be an advantage too. Here are rich pickings and unless you are
Quercus very knowledgeable about world military history, there are certainly new generals to learn
Address of Publisher: about. The only other slight quibble, and an unavoidable one, is the choice of subjects. This
www.quercusbooks.co.uk is of course extremely subjective, but I wonder whether Trajan really is the best choice for
early Imperial generals. Would, for instance, Corbulo not have been a more interesting and
slightly less predictable choice? That being said, this book is recommended for the, well,
coffee-table

AncientWarfare
Ancient Warfare 57
57

AW nr11-2009.indd 57 11-02-2010 16:28:38

 ON THE COVER

The mercenary
THE GRIZZLED SOLDIER GRACING OUR COVER THIS ISSUE
DATES TO THE VERY START OF THE HEYDAY OF THE
MERCENARIES. HIS EQUIPMENT MARKS HIM AS A
CLASSICAL GREEK HOPLITE, ALTHOUGH THE
PARTICULARS MIGHT PLACE HIM OUTSIDE OF GREECE.
PERHAPS HE CAN BEST BE IMAGINED AS A SOLDIER IN
THE SERVICE OF ONE OF SICILY’S TYRANTS DURING
THEIR INTERMINABLE WARS WITH CARTHAGE, OR EVEN
© Karwansaray BV

HELPING DEFEAT THE ATHENIAN EXPEDITION TO SYRACUSE.

Clearly this mercenary has heastern Italy (Apulia) and now resides sibly with metal reinforcements as well.
done fairly well for himself, as in the British Museum, London. Unlike the left-hand soldier and like the
he’s well equipped with a Chalcidian A later type of this helmet had majority of painted hoplites, he does
helmet, metal-reinforced linothorax hinged cheek-pieces, as on the helmet not seem to have a sword as secondary
(glued or quilted linen body armor) depicted in ‘The Find’ in this issue, and weapon. A detailed, albeit small, repre-
and the traditional aspis (shield) of as worn by the left-hand hoplite on the sentation of a hoplite’s sword can be
the Greek hoplite. The Chalcidian type crater from the Louvre, Paris, shown seen on this oil bottle from the Chicago
of helmet seems to have originated in here. The central figure wears a nicely Museum of Art, dated to the very late
southern Italy in the 6th century BC. In painted example of the linothorax, pos- 5th century BC. n
contrast to the dominating Corinthian
helmet of that era, the new type allo-
wed to wearer to see and hear much
better. The open faced nature of the
helmet was increased even more in
later types, such as this mercenary is
wearing, where the nasal protector has
almost completely disappeared. The
helmet shown here comes from sout-

© Karwansaray BV © Karwansaray BV
58 Ancient Warfare

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AW nr11-2009.indd 59 11-02-2010 16:28:59
AW nr11-2009.indd 60 11-02-2010 16:29:03