Professional Documents
Culture Documents
SN Governance Asia - Functional Assignment Vol I (2010)
SN Governance Asia - Functional Assignment Vol I (2010)
Published by:
Deutsche Gesellschaft für
Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) GmbH
Postfach 5180
65726 Eschborn/Germany
T + 4 9 61 96 79 - 0
F + 4 9 61 96 79 - 11 15
E info@gtz.de
I w ww.gtz.de
Responsible:
Rainer Rohdewohld
Authors:
Dr. Gabriele Ferrazzi & Rainer Rohdewohld
with contributions by David Edelmann, Catherine Fröhling,
Katharina Hübner and Thomas Taraschewski
Printed by:
Sharp Prints, New Delhi, India
raman@sharppr.net
Acknowledgements iii
Abbreviations iv
Glossary v
Index to Volume I vi
Introduction 1
2. Functional Assignment 5
2.1 What is a function? 5
2.2 Would a ‘function,’ by any other word, mean the same? 5
2.3 Understanding of functional assignment 6
2.4 Legal architecture/basis for functional assignment 7
2.5 Typologies in functional assignment 9
3. Features of FA Process 13
3.1 Stakeholders/actors involved 13
3.2 Approaches and specific processes 15
3.3 Criteria and principles for assignment 17
3.4 Phasing 18
3.5 Success factors and obstacles/constraints 19
3.6 Monitoring of FA processes 20
4. Open Issues 21
Appendices 23
APPENDIX 1: Typology of decentralised functions/ tasks 23
APPENDIX 2: Broad functions of the state 24
APPENDIX 3: Common functions of general purpose SNG 25
APPENDIX 4: 2007 UN guidelines on decentralisation 27
APPENDIX 5: Criteria for functional assignment 28
i
Text Boxes:
Box 1 East Timor’s choices: the need for clarity
Box 2 South Africa’s hybrid structure
Box 3 Nepal’s reconstitution as a federal nation
Box 4 Legal framework for SNG in Ghana
Box 5 General competence in Cambodia
Box 6 Minimum service standards in Indonesia
Box 7 Asymmetric FA in Nepal
Box 8 Teacher’s union and FA in Indonesia
Box 9 Organizing for decentralisation in Indonesia
Box 10 Organizing for decentralisation in Yemen
Box 11 Content of piloting work plan of the CLM
Box 12 Examples of appropriate use of ‘scale’/‘level’
Box 13 Principles adopted by India
Box 14 Criteria adopted by Indonesia
Box 15 A matter of emphasis: the German case
Box 16 Leading sectors in Yemen (2005/6)
Box 17 Leading sectors in Himachal Pradesh (2008/9)
Tables:
Table 1 Examples of terminology
Figures:
Figure 1 Legal architecture for functional assignment
Figure 2 Conceptual/legal view of devolution
Figure 3 Conceptual/legal view of agency tasks
Figure 4 Fully asymmetric decentralisation (horizontal)
Figure 5 Asymmetric treatment by rural and urban designation
Figure 6 Special autonomy as one form of asymmetry
Figure 7 Involvement of CLMs in Yemen’s National Decentralisation Strategy
Figure 8 Typical schedule for FA – with refinement round
Figure 9 Ways of unbundling a sector – case of education
Figure 10 Connecting actors with unbundled service functions
ii
Acknowledgements
GTZ support to decentralisation reforms involving The GTZ Governance Asia network has made exten-
functional assignment is currently provided in Cam- sive use of one of the consultants that has been part
bodia, Indonesia, and India. Nepal and the Philip- of several GTZ efforts in Asia (Dr. Gabriele Ferraz-
pines are likewise dealing with the issue in a slightly zi) to facilitate the preparation of this technical pa-
different context, where GTZ support is less direct. per. Substantial inputs and comments have been
Altogether, little substantial and conceptual debate provided by Thomas Taraschweski (Nepal), Katha-
has taken place on the various approaches adopt- rina Hübner (Cambodia), and Rainer Rohdewohld
ed by partner countries and on the advisory strate- (India). The facilitation from the GTZ Headquar-
gies pursued by GTZ teams. The preparation of this ters (Planning and Development Section) (Catherine
technical paper aims to fill this gap. Fröhling) has been invaluable in nurturing this ef-
fort from idea to realisation.
This two volume technical paper has been devel-
oped through the efforts of the Functional Assign-
ment sub-group of GTZ’s sector network Governance
Asia, established during the Bangkok meeting of the
sector network in October 2007.1 The members of
this group (GTZ advisors and consultants) have met
on several occasions to address this topic, sharing
their experiences and deepening their understand-
ing of functional assignment challenges and ways of
supporting counterparts. The group has inventoried
and disseminated relevant documents (legal texts, re-
ports, assessments). During a workshop in Bangkok
(February 2009) it was agreed to formulate a tech-
nical paper documenting current state-of-the-art, in
order to make the existing information and knowl-
edge stemming from the Asian experience available
to GTZ-supported interventions elsewhere.
iii
Abbreviations
iv
Glossary
Activity Mapping The equivalent process of functional assignment in the context of India’s efforts to ac-
celerate devolution from state level to the Panchayati Raj Institutions.
Local Government Flexible term, used interchangeably with subnational government or meaning the
lower tier(s) of subnational government; contextually determined.
Modes of decentralisation Ideal types of decentralisation denoting key features and relationships in the transfer,
execution and accountability of functions.
v
Index
activity mapping v, 6
Administrative Reform and Decentralisation Project
(ARDP) iii, iv
agency / agency task ii, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 12, 19, 23
Cambodia ii, iii, iv, 6, 9, 10, 11
central government iv, 3, 4, 11, 12, 13, 23
Central Line Ministry (CLM) ii, iv, 13, 14, 15
civil society 5, 20
criteria i, ii, 17, 18, 21, 28
decentralisation ii, iii, v, 1, 3, 4, 6, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 23, 27
deconcentration 3, 4, 5, 19
Deutsche Gesellschaft für
Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) iii, iv, 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 18, 19, 25, 40
development partner 1
devolution ii, v, 3, 4, 7, 8, 12, 19, 20
functional assignment i, ii, iii, v, 1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 17, 18, 19, 21, 28
Germany 18
Himachal Pradesh ii, iii, iv, 19
Indonesia ii, iii, iv, 4, 6, 10, 13, 14, 18
local government iv, 3, 4, 5, 7, 9, 10, 11, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 23
minimum service standards 10
Nepal ii, iii, 4, 6, 11
obligatory functions 10
subnational government (SNG) i, ii, iv, v, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 17, 18, 19, 20, 25
unbundling ii, v, 16
Yemen ii, 14, 15, 19
vi
Introduction
Functional assignment is a fundamental building block absent on the process side of FA. Moreover, few do-
of multi-level governance, affecting other key features nors have made this one of their systematic offerings in
of intergovernmental relations. It needs to be considered governance/decentralisation support, perhaps reflecting
in deciding the scale of subnational units, in calculating not just issues on the demand side, but also the ability of
intergovernmental financial transfers, setting organisa- development partners to discern demand (or need) and to
tional structures, devising planning roles and focusing su- recognize the centrality of FA. When compared to inter-
pervision. Because of the significant shift from central- governmental finances or development planning support,
ized to decentralized governance seen in many developing FA support is given short shrift – when in fact a sensible
countries, functional assignment ought to be the starting FA is a prerequisite to more sustainable progress on these
point of decentralisation, to ensure that other sub-systems related building blocks.
accord with it. The 2007 UN Guidelines on decentralisa-
GTZ is the one exception to the above observations on
tion2 stipulate that “legislative provisions and legal texts
development partner support. It has developed consider-
should clearly articulate the roles and responsibilities of
able expertise in Asia in particular. The Functional As-
local authorities vis-à-vis higher spheres of government”
signment sub-group of GTZ’s sector network Governance
(C.1.4) – in reality such clarity often does not exist. In
Asia is therefore seeking to systematize the experienc-
practice, because decentralisation tends to be politically
es and learning attained, and to disseminate this, in part
driven, it can be a rushed and messy affair, and functional
through this two-volume technical paper.
(re)assignment is sometimes neglected or hastily conclud-
ed. In cases it is preceded by finances or organisational re- Volume I begins by setting functional assignment against
structuring, breaking the rules of “money follows func- the larger process of decentralisation (Chapter 1), as this
tions” or “form follows functions.” In OECD countries, is the predominant context for functional assignment in
functional assignment is an ongoing, if episodic, activity, developing countries. The opposite process, centralisation,
and while it is more incremental and bidirectional (decen- is not fundamentally different in terms of the FA process-
tralisation and centralisation) it nonetheless faces its own es at work, and centralisation is in any case often in play
challenges, such as maintaining promised financial neu- during “follow-up rounds” of FA; these may yield addi-
trality or corresponding financing adjustments. tional decentralized functions, but in some cases also (re)
centralized functions. Functional assignment is subse-
All functional assignment (FA) efforts have in common a
quently dissected in Chapter 2 to understand what it is
good deal of complexity and embody both technical and
about technically and legally. This is followed by a discus-
political dimensions. Capacity to undertake these efforts
sion (Chapter 3) of processes used to achieve changes in
is usually low, in part because the initiatives are episodic,
functional assignment. A final chapter lists the open is-
making individual and institutional expertise difficult to
sues that require greater documentation, reflection and re-
retain, but also because of the challenge of combining the
search.
technical and political dimensions. FA initiatives in devel-
oping countries experience the same pressures and short- The separate Volume II outlines past and ongoing efforts
comings noted for public policy development in gener- of GTZ in support of functional assignment processes.
al, along with greater difficulties in joining expertise and While it is not exactly an “How-to-do-Guide” for func-
stakeholder views and interests to what is (essentially) a tional assignment support (taking cognicance of the sin-
government (bureaucracy) driven process. gularity of each FA process), it highlights the various ap-
proaches and tools used in the different country settings,
With the spreading popularity of decentralisation initi-
thereby allowing the reader to understand the process and
atives throughout the world over the last two decades,
to helping him/her to design an advisory process (see e.g.
it might be expected that functional assignment would
Chapter 1.5 of Vol. II). It also places such support in the
find a prominent place not only in the scholarly literature
context of emerging aid modalities influenced by the Par-
on decentralisation reforms, but also in the document-
is Declaration and the Accra Action Plan.
ed knowledge and experiences of development partners.
It is somewhat puzzling to note that in fact the academ-
ic literature is scarce and superficial, and particularly
1
2
1. The Context of Decentralisation
‘Fiscal decentralisation’ refers to expenditure and revenue This brief overview is only partly useful, as the ramifica-
assignments and other forms of regulation (e.g., borrow- tions of these modes needs to be understood to appreciate
ing) that make available financial resources to subnational how functions are defined, assigned and applied. A more
government. This may fit within a context of low or wide elaborate typology for the above modes has been prepared
discretion, depending on the political structures of subna- by Ferrazzi,6 expressedly for this purpose (Appendix 1).
tional government and the conditions imposed on the as- It is important to differentiate functions in terms of the
signments. modes of decentralisation they are designed to serve.
These categories are partly helpful in understanding func- Deconcentration tasks are purely a central government
tional assignment. They indicate that there is both a tech- matter, though in complex multi-level systems central
nical/administrative dimension as well as a political di- government can designate subnational level officials to
mension. They indicate that performing functions raises represent the central government – and thus be part of a
the issues of discretion, accountability, and resources. deconcentration system. The way functions are generat-
ed and delegated within a deconcentration mode is very
1.2 Common modes of decentralisation different from devolution (e.g., they can be more dynam-
ic, and achieved with Ministerial regulations or adminis-
The basic modes of decentralisation within the govern- trative orders).
ment system have been set out some time ago by Cheema
and Rondinelli,4 providing practitioners with a common In systems where subnational institutions do not play a
and more detailed typology. This is reproduced below dual role (that has them serve also as representatives of
with adaptations to make them specific to an intergovern- the central government), the modes of decentralisation at
mental context (with respect to the simple case of central- play are devolution and agency. There are important dis-
local relations): tinctions between these two. Much misunderstanding oc-
curs when one mode is espoused, for instance devolution,
• Deconcentration
is the delegation of administrative but the specific formulation of the functions corresponds
tasks by a central government organisation’s head quar- to a different mode (e.g., they may be rather insignificant
ters to its representatives or branches dispersed over the
5 In most cases the assigning organisation would be from the cen-
3 The UN Guidelines describe “political decentralisation” as “an es- tral government, but there could also be cases of agency tasks as-
sential component of democratisation, good governance and citizen signed between different levels of SNGs.
engagement” (A.1). 6 Ferrazzi, G. (2008). Exploring Reform Options In Functional
4 Cheema, G. and Rondinelli, D. (1983) Decentralisation and de- Assignment (Final Report). Decentralisation Support Facility and
velopment. Newbury Park, CA, Sage. Deutsche Gesellschaft Für Technische Zusammenarbeit, March 28.
3
or tightly circumscribed – typical of agency tasks). More- level and the addition of a second house of Parliament
over, the procedures for accountability and reporting may that is elected based on the larger provincial jurisdictions
be inappropriately designed, undermining clarity and the and comes into play specifically on regional issues. Addi-
utility of this broad typology. tionally, special autonomy or special status has been giv-
en by special legislation to four provinces (Aceh, West Pa-
East Timor’s choices: the need for clarity Box 1
pua, Yogyakarta and Jakarta). The overall structure is still
Mr. Miguel de Carvalho, the Director for the National Direc- decidedly unitary, but it can no longer be considered a
torate of Local Development and Territorial Management, ex- pure unitary system.
plains that “… there are three options for how the Municipal-
ities can work at the local level. One option is devolution Some differences in the process and nature of function-
– or handing over the responsibility and decision-making al assignment are evident between unitary and feder-
ability … to the municipalities. Another option is delegation – al nations. In the typical approach to federal nationhood,
which keeps the decision-making power at the central level, formative units generally agree, through a constitution-
but hands over to the municipalities the authority to execute
al agreement, to yield a measure of sovereignty over some
service delivery at the local level through representatives of
the central government stationed at the local level – like a functions to the federal level. Reviews of this areal divi-
deconcentrated system. And the third option is to continue sion of power (another term for functional assignment)
working at the central level.” 7 do occur, but this is through a process of negotiation be-
It appears that East Timor’s system does not properly dif- tween the formative units and the federal government.
ferentiate between deconcentration and agency functions, or Box 3
Nepal’s reconstitution as a federal nation9
perhaps what is intended is a dual role - combining munici-
pal and state functions in the same municipal structures/of- Disappointed with the halting progress of decentralisation,
ficials. It will be important for East Timor to clarify the intent and seeking to contain centripetal forces, Nepal (a uni-
if the assignment is to be clear. tary state) has established a constitutional process to de-
sign a federal system. The focus, initially, is on identify-
ing the number and size of the ‘constituent units.’ This is to
1.3 Unitary and federal contexts be followed by a restructuring of the lower levels of gov-
ernment (district, village, municipalities). The basis for the
Unitary and federal nations have much in common when larger units has preoccupied stakeholders, and very little
it comes to functional assignment. This is all the more discussion has been held so far on the functions to be under-
true if nations adopt a blend of traditional federal or uni- taken in the new units or the local government beneath them.
tary characteristics (see Box 2 on South Africa’s hybrid Joining the functional assignment issue to the restructuring
governmental structure). would likely aid decision making for both scales.
South Africa’s hybrid structure Box 2 When unitary nations shift their structures to a feder-
A bicameral parliament, National Assembly and the Nation- al form, the process differs from what is described above.
al Council of Provinces, and a division of functions embed- In this transformation, political forces/mass movements,
ded in the constitution, gives South Africa the appearance of which may have a regional basis, act at national level to
a federal structure. But the constitution calls for “spheres of construct the new territorial structures and the areal di-
government which are distinctive, interdependent and inter- vision of power (see Box 3 for the case of Nepal). In some
related.” Yet provinces have both exclusive and concurrent
sense this is also a bottom up process, particularly if the
competences. Furthermore, they have some say over munici-
pal government. The constitution allows national level to set
new structure has to be ratified by referendum.
the legislative framework for concurrent functions it shares In contrast to the federal case, assigning functions in a
with the provinces, and for municipal functions. Taken as a unitary state is generally a more top-down affair. The ar-
whole, South Africa is an interesting hybrid of federal and
eal division of power is only vaguely specified, if at all, in
unitary features.
the constitution, and any ensuing functional assignment
It is not unusual to see unitary governments seek to ac- must then flow from subsidiary legislation (like ministe-
commodate regional political demands by reconstruct- rial regulations or government notifications). As a result,
ing governmental structures to have a more federal char- the stability of the assignment might be expected to be
acter. Indonesia, where federalism has been taboo since lower than for the federal case. Logically, the degree of in-
the short lived post-world War II Dutch imposed feder- fluence of subnational government over the assignment is
al government,8 has tempered its unitary structure with a also more limited in unitary states.
heavy dose of decentralisation to the district (county/city)
7 Ministry of State Administration and Territorial Management
(2009). Devolution or Delegation: Eight Ministries Discuss how to
Transfer Functions to Municipalities, Local Governance Monthly Bul-
letin, Volume II, Edition 3, March, pg. 1. 9 Taraschewski, Thomas and Mumenthaler, Marielle (2009). Func-
8 Ferrazzi, G. (2000). Using the “F” Word: Federalism in the De- tional Assignment in Nepal, for presentation at GTZ Technical
centralisation Discourse in Indonesia, Publius - The Journal of Feder- Workshop on Functional Assignment and Performance Assessment
alism, Volume 30 (2), (Spring). Systems for Local Government, Bangkok, February 11.
4
2. Functional Assignment
5
Table 1: Examples of terminology
The term authority is also used in functional assignment, 2.3 Understanding of functional assignment
and often as an additional and complementary term, dis-
tinct from ‘responsibility’ (a term it is most often attached Functional assignment is generally understood in two
to). It appears that the meaning accorded to it is similar ways;
to that associated with ‘powers,’ relating to the scope giv- 1. the process of assigning functions to different level of
en to SNG to decide and act within a particular area of government, and
responsibility. Sometimes the assertion is seen that “re-
sponsibility ought to be accompanied by the requisite au- 2. the result of that process – the actual location of func-
thority.” If functions are properly formulated, in a co- tions.
herent architecture and construction, then this linkage Both views are useful, and context clues must be used to
should be assured, and the distinction probably does not discern which meaning is intended. In some countries, re-
need to be explicitly made. lated terms to FA are employed, as with ‘expenditure as-
On a final note, the term ‘function’ (as well as some of its signment’ or ‘activity mapping.’ These related terms can
synonyms above) has the advantage of flexible use with have somewhat different meanings or connotations, there-
respect to the scope of the activity or subject matter it en- fore it is important to understand their scope and context.
compasses. The term melds with ‘sector’ at one extreme, Governmental functions can be sub-divided in a number
and can be as fine grained as needed at the other end. of ways, or typologies. We have noted the division in
Sectors are normally sub-divided in a kind of hierarchy. terms of modes of decentralisation. There is also the di-
For instance, to use the example of the water sector:12 vision in terms of expenditure vs. revenue; obligatory vs.
• Sector (water) discretionary; concurrent vs. exclusive; and differences in
• sub-sector (irrigation) ‘construction’ (general competence or ‘ultra vires’). These
• field (small-scale irrigation) typologies will be examined in subsequent sections.
All of the above divisions can be referred to as ‘functions’ There is also an issue of scale in working with functions,
though they are of very different scope/scale. But the term and here the link with other features of subnational gov-
function has the additional advantage that it can refer ernment begins to emerge. It is possible to think, at a
to the joining of the above sectoral ‘subject matter’ with high level of abstraction, in terms of roles assigned to lev-
the particular authority (discretion) associated with it in els of government. In multi-level government there may
terms of generic management functions (e.g., planning, be an intermediary level of subnational government that
monitoring). To continue with the above example, a well is assigned the roles of guidance, support or supervision
formulated function would be framed as ‘Maintenance of toward lower levels of government. Or the subnation-
small scale irrigation’ or ‘Management of irrigation.’ al levels may have certain linkages (e.g., coordination in
planning) but otherwise not have a strictly (or compre-
While it would be useful to have internationally stand- hensive) hierarchical relationship.
ardized terminology, this is unlikely to be achieved, and
the use of different terms can serve to flag certain per- To continue the functions-structure link, it is appropriate
spectives or intentions. Oftentimes however, these inten- to think about matching functions (functional load) to
tions can only be discerned by noting the larger frame territorial structures, i.e., their capacity or scale (in terms
within which these terms are used, as well as the actual of population for instance). This aspect also raises the is-
pattern of practice. For the purpose of supporting FA ef- sue of the conceptual need for, and practical feasibility of,
forts, it is best to make explicit what the intentions are, asymmetric functional assignment between same-level ju-
and to use those terms, categories and constructions that risdictions.
best realize the intentions. And, as intimated earlier, it is also common to assert that
“funds follows functions”, and that “form (= organisa-
12 Ferrazzi G. (2001). Assignment of Functions for Cambodian
tional structures) follows functions.” Viewed from all of
Communes: A Preliminary Framework, Prepared for the Ministry of
Interior-Royal Government of Cambodia and Gesellschaft für Tech- the above perspective it is understandable if functional
nische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), May 31, Phnom Penh.
6
Constitution
(structure of multi-level government/roles;
principles and general FA)
State
(executive, legislative, judicial)
Laws
Organic local government law,
sectoral laws, planning law etc.
Regulations
Cutting across government
Government
(executive)
Ministerial Regulations
Sector specific
assignment is seen to be rather complex. But the other Legal framework for SNG in Ghana13 Box 4
side of this view is that FA is a powerful organising prin-
•• Constitution
ciple, and its proper foundational use can simplify and •• Local Government Act 1993
keep coherent the overall structure of multi-level govern- •• Local Government (Urban, Zonal and Town Councils and
ance. Unit Committees) Establishment Instrument 1994
•• Financial Memoranda for District Assemblies (2004)
2.4 Legal architecture/basis for functional •• Local Government District Tender Board Regulations (LI 1606)
assignment •• National Development Planning (System) Act 1994
•• National Development Planning Commission Act 1994
It is not unusual to see the roles and functions of subna- •• District Assemblies Common Fund Act 1993
tional government listed in the foundational (organic) law •• Local Government Service Act 2003
of subnational government. But often the assignment of •• Financial Administration Act 2003
functions is also evident, or even more so, in the range of •• Public Procurement Act 2003
•• Internal Audit Agency Act 2003
laws pertaining to individual sectors, as well as laws that
•• Institute of Local Government Studies Act 2003
deal with planning, budgeting, personnel and other ele- •• Individual Acts to establish District Assemblies
ments of decentralized governance (see case of Ghana in •• Sectoral Acts and subsidiary instruments.
Box 4).
When functions are assigned through devolution, the
A solid base for these laws would be provisions in the
government level in question (executive and legislative
highest law of the land, the constitution; setting out the
combined) is made responsible. Nevertheless, ultimate-
basic structure of multi-level government, basic principles
ly the state retains overall responsibility, and for that rea-
of functional assignment, and generally framed functions.
son subnational functions, even when received through
Through these laws, the state empowers its executive or-
devolution, are often accompanied by some legal and ad-
gan to carry out certain functions, and it does the same
ministrative framework that sets out performance expec-
toward subnational government. It can also empower the
tations, and a corresponding measure of upward account-
national executive organ to pass on agency tasks to sub-
ability. The state cannot easily shed this responsibility as
national government, or to further regulate state devolved
it relates to fundamental obligations taken on by the state
functions to subnational government (see Figure 1).
– as evinced in the constitution, laws or international
Subnational government can also shape the functions to
some extent, and they do so through their own legal in- 13 Ferrazzi G. (2006). Ghana Local Government Act - A Compara-
struments (variously called laws, regulations, by-laws, tive Analysis in the Context of the Review of the Act, Local Govern-
ance and Poverty Reduction Support Programme (LGPRSP), Min-
rules, decrees), but this discretion is constrained by the
istry of Local Government, Rural Development and Environment/
above legal framework, even in the case of ‘devolved’ Deutsche Gesellschaft Für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), Oc-
functions. tober.
7
Executive Legislative National level
Devolution: function is transferred by the
State (includes executive and legislative)
to subnational government (meaning
combined executive and legislative)
conventions to which the state has become a signatory. financing is on-budget/on-treasury, which organ of the
If devolution is properly pursued, the state will therefore state is empowered to supervise implementation of func-
seek to impress upon the receiving subnational govern- tions given to subnational levels of government, and how
ment the importance of achieving the nationally set ex- performance is reported and made accountable to the
pectations (results), making the functions in some sense source of the function or, horizontally, to the represent-
‘obligatory.’ The setting of expectations for performance ative/legislative side of a particular subnational level that
is a challenging aspect of FA and one that has several so- has received the function.
lutions, none easy to apply, particularly in a developing
The conceptual and legal forms of functions are not
country context where support mechanisms, incentives
standardized internationally. But good practice would in-
and sanctions are difficult to fashion and apply with con-
dicate that the devolution (see Figure 2) has a particular
sistency (see also the section on function typology).
derivation and receiving entity that is quite distinct from
Figure 1 not only lays out legal instruments relevant for agency tasks (Figure 3).
FA, but also is an aid to understanding the accountabil-
The conceptual views shown in the figures need to be
ity dimension in functional assignment. It is important
consistently carried forth in shaping other features of de-
to understand the derivation of functions (who transfers
centralized governance. For instance, in the case of de-
or delegates), as some measure of reporting and account-
volved functions, the conceptual/legal view put forward
ability is directed to that entity. It is equally important
in Figure 2 would work against a heavy (or heavy handed)
to be clear about the entity that receives the function, as
role of the national executive in the supervision of legal
the assessment of performance will bear on all actors that
products and actions of the SNG, as the latter has its own
are part of this entity. The earlier mentioned Appendix 1
political legitimacy and has received the devolved func-
seeks to provide clarity on these issues for the three key
tions from the state, not the executive alone.
modes of decentralisation. For instance, in the matrix of
this appendix a distinction is made between the executive
and the combined executive and representative/legisla-
tive side of subnational government. Understanding these
distinctions is important as they will influence whether
8
2.5 Typologies in functional assignment General competence in Cambodia Box 5
9
Obligatory versus discretionary functions “may” be done will be deemed possible. Furthermore, the
term “may” could be intended as a polite way of indicat-
Many countries have policy/legal frameworks that em-
ing what must be done by SNG, rather than as a choice.
phasize or make obligatory some functions of SNG. For
To avoid these pitfalls, it is preferable to have a right of
this class of functions, particularly introduced in the
initiative provision, or a general competence formulation
context of basic services, norms/standards are set (of-
(though this is usually only proper for only one level of
ten through sectoral instruments; laws and regulations)
subnational government having a general purpose nature,
to specify the performance expected of SNG (see Box 6
where most basic services are provided). A committed and
for the Indonesian case). The standing and enforceabili-
open approach to discretionary functions is a necessity for
ty of these standards vary considerably in legal and prac-
any FA construction that is to be characterized as ‘gener-
tical terms. One concern in instituting minimum service
al competence.’
standards is financial adequacy to meet them – avoiding
unfunded mandates.16 Different degrees of ‘discretion’ are found in practice.
Cambodia allows, in principle, communes to undertake
A related concern with the introduction of obligatory
functions not set out in regulations. However, these must
functions is that local government not be unduly denied
be proposed by the communes, and approved by a central
discretion – that it retains a significant degree of autono-
level body. This is a rather constrained form of local level
my. This can be attained by carefully structuring the per-
discretion and undermines the general competence con-
formance expectations on the obligatory functions (e.g.,
struction of commune functions.
as much as possible being outputs/outcomes oriented
rather than input-oriented or stipulating spending levels). The Philippines is one country with a ‘right of initiative.’
Such a right may be particularly helpful to complement
Another way that local autonomy can be safeguarded is
a positive list that is obligatory, which might induce an
by allowing for a class of functions that SNG can identi-
unduly self-restricting stance on the part of the LG. The
fy and take up of its own initiative and with ‘full auton-
‘right of initiative’ provision encourages the LG to take on
omy’ within the larger bounds of the legal framework of
activities that are not spelled out in the positive list.
the country (health and safety regulations, human rights,
treatment of labour etc.). These discretionary or voluntary In a multilevel sub-national government context, discre-
functions ought to be of a local nature, and be taken up tionary functions/right of initiative provisions are ideal-
in accordance with available resources. ly accompanied with rules to adjudicate who in fact has
the right to move forward in a particular activity if two
Minimum service standards in Indonesia17 Box 6
levels are vying to do so. There may be rules that allow
Obligatory functions that relate to basic services are accom- both to do so for particular kinds of activities. It is diffi-
panied by performance expectations in the form of minimum cult to find information on such arrangements, but some
service standards (MSS). These are defined as minimum form
good practices could be imagined. For instance, if parallel
and quality of basic services that regional government must
deliver, and citizens can claim. The government hopes to see
or joint approaches (concurrence) are not practical then
these woven into the planning and budgeting of regional gov- the ‘first to initiate’ may be given preference, or if activi-
ernment, and to adapt intergovernmental finances, and su- ties have yet to be launched a particular level may be giv-
pervision, to support and enforce compliance. So far only a en blanket precedence (e.g., the level designated to be the
few ministries have formulated adequate MSS, and the re- general local purpose local government).
gional governments are still tentative in working with these
standards. Expenditure norms associated with the MSS have A good argument can be made that SNG ought to give
yet to be agreed upon, and therefore national transfer mech- first priority to the obligatory functions that are embed-
anisms do not yet incorporate these. ded in the legal framework that guides SNG, as these are
the core functions of SNG and relate in particular to ba-
In principle, there is no need for discretionary functions sic service provision.
to be coded a priori, but some countries do make a list
of these functions, as a kind of menu to inspire local ac- Concurrent versus exclusive functions
tion. The danger is that the list is seen as part and parcel
The notion of concurrent functions is often loosely used,
of the ultra vires construction – nothing else beyond what
and in some cases the usage seems to simply point out
16 For a discussion of these issues, with a focus on the Indonesian that broad sectors are assigned not in block but as unbun-
context, see Ferrazzi, G. (2005). Obligatory Functions and Mini- dled functions that are placed at different levels; the lev-
mum Service Standards for Indonesian Regional Government: els of government involved can be said to be sharing the
Searching for a Model, Public Administration and Development, Vol- ‘sector.’
ume 25 (3): 227-238.
17 Widiastuti, Dwi (2009). Progress and Challenges in Formulation More rigorous and meaningful ways of using the concept
and Application of Minimum Service Standards (MSS) in Indonesia, of concurrency is evident in the following distinct situa-
for presentation at GTZ Technical Workshop on Functional Assign- tions:
ment and Performance Assessment Systems for Local Government,
Bangkok, February 11.
10
1. A particular function can be carried out by more Uniform versus asymmetric functional assignment
than one level of government, simultaneously.
In the last decade, the term ‘asymmetric decentralisation’
2. A particular function can be taken up by a level of
(also termed differential or tailored decentralisation) has
government if it has yet to be taken up by another
been used to denote situations where (in the context of a
level of government or does not infringe on another
unitary state) the central government decentralizes to a
level of government (usually higher level).
different extent among units of SNG for a particular tier
The first case is one of ‘joint occupation,’ and is a fairly of SNG. This differential treatment acknowledges and
common approach that encompasses a sub-set of all gov- formalizes some unique or special characteristics of one or
ernmental functions, usually a small to modest propor- more units of SNG, often in terms of the role/functions it
tion. Too much concurrence is thought to lead to difficul- can undertake and the revenues it receives. The different
ties in determining roles and accountability. functions assigned to certain SNG allow them to address
In the second case, concurrency means the ‘opportunity’ its particular political, socio-cultural, or economic char-
to take on a function rather than joint occupation. Usual- acter or aspirations. The most common ways that func-
ly a lower level will be allowed to take on a function if the tions can be transferred asymmetrically are shown in Fig-
higher level has yet to regulate it in a way that would pre- ures 4-6.20
vent lower level take up. It is debatable whether this pro-
visional and sequential occupation of a function should
Central government
be called “concurrent.” When this mechanism gives pro-
tection to lower level government to hold its ground if
first in, then it is essentially a strong version of the ‘right
of initiative.’
SNG tier
Connected with the concept of concurrent functions is …
that of ‘exclusive’ functions. This is also not a straightfor-
ward concept, as any function devolved to SNG is still to
Each SNG receives specific level of autonomy/decentralization
some extent accountable to the national state, and the lat-
ter can set standards and norms for these functions; to Figure 4: Fully asymmetric decentralization (horizontal)
say that they are exclusively held by the SNG is therefore
somewhat erroneous.
The variability in administrative capacities is also put
Asymmetric FA in Nepal Box 7 forward in some countries as the reason for attempting
The Local Self-governance Act (LSGA) of 1999 provides for asymmetric FA. But this desire is generally frustrated by
a two-tier system of local governance with Village Develop- the reality that the national level itself does not usual-
ment Committees (VDCs) and Municipalities as the lower tier ly have the capacity to manage a highly asymmetric set of
and District Development Committees as the higher tier. VDC relationships with SNG.
is a rural focused local body while the Municipality is urban
focused. Currently, municipalities, VDCs and DDCs have dif-
ferent functions, powers and responsibilities assigned. Mu-
Central government
nicipalities are entitled to collect own source revenues from
different taxes, whereas VDCs rely on financial resources
transferred from the DDC. Government grants for municipali-
ties are disbursed directly while transfers for VDCs are chan-
neled through DDCs. SNG tier
… …
The concept of exclusive functions is deemed to be more
relevant for functions that are entirely in the hands of the
national state/government. It is frequently opined that the Rural units Urban units
national state/government is solely responsible for some Figure 5: Asymmetric treatment by rural and urban designation
functions.18 The three functions of government as de-
scribed by Musgrave are widely cited in this regard: allo-
cation, distribution, and stabilisation.19 As a gross simpli- A common limited form of asymmetry is that seen be-
fication, this is tenable, but in fact there are many cases tween rural and urban local government (Figure 5). This
where SNG plays some role, formally or otherwise, in is seen in several countries in Asia, among them Cambo-
these broad functions. dia, India, and Nepal (see Box 7 for case of Nepal). In
18 A good example for this approach was the Indonesian Govern- 20 Ferrazzi, G. and Mas’udi, W. (2008). Special Autonomy - A
ment Regulation 25/2000 listing exclusive functions of the national Common Form of Asymmetric Decentralisation, presented to the
and the provincial government level. Workshop on Implementation of Governance in Aceh According to
19 See for instance Musgrave, 1964, Ibid. Law 11/2006: Progress and challenges, Banda Aceh, 19 November.
11
this case, the size and density of jurisdictions differ, pro- This provision-production split is generally perceived to
viding some basis for tailored functional assignment. be at work when government engages non-government
actors in the implementation of a governmental function.
The case for extensive asymmetry is also weakened by
But as indicated above it can also be seen in the agency
the view that decentralisation is not just something to be
mode of decentralisation (between levels of government).
meted out to capable SNG, but is rather a means of devel-
oping capacity. Conceptually, the provision-production split is not in op-
eration in the devolved mode of decentralisation (Option
3) as it is the receiving level of government that is giv-
Central government en responsibility for provision, with a much lighter hand
(than in agency mode) of the entrusting state in subse-
quent guidance and control.
SNG tier
…
12
3. Features of FA Process
13
Figure 7: Involvement of CLMs in Yemen’s National Decentralization Strategy
found in the CLM itself. If the CLMs understand how reform may be well placed to facilitate this dialogue and
they are the central actors in the process, able to under- joint policy development (or a combination of ministries);
take the analysis and set the pace of decentralisation, they the choice may rest on past relations of trust and on ca-
are more likely to join in the effort in a constructive way. pacity.
Figure 7 shows how, in Yemen, the CLMs were brought
Within the CLM itself, it may be helpful to establish
into the exploration for which functions could be includ-
some form of organisation to undertake functional as-
ed in a decentralisation effort to be designed in a National
signment on a temporary or permanent basis. Several op-
Decentralisation Strategy (NDS) .
tions can be considered (see Box 9 and 10 for examples
Organising for decentralisation in Indonesia Box 9 of choices), and the chosen option must be suited to the
The Ministry of Health in Indonesia established a Decentral- CLM in question with respect to achieving the following:
isation Unit under the Secretary General of the Ministry (the • Cross-unit analysis and dialogue within the CLM.
administrator directly under the Minister, and through whom
all line managers must report through). The Decentralisation • Flow of information from technical to political level in
Unit was composed of several senior and mid-level officials the CLM.
with previous line and staff function experience. This unit un-
dertook research and linked with the line managers. It also • Engagement with the coordinating ministries and any
linked with the Ministry of Home Affairs in efforts that were inter-ministerial coordinating committee.
cross-sectoral in nature.
The CLM may choose any, or a combination, of the fol-
The Decentralisation Unit was generally found to be a good lowing:
platform for communication, but it did face some difficulties
at times in gaining line management (Director General) coop- • A
focal point; a person with overall responsibility to fa-
eration. Also, some of the costing and budgeting work related cilitate internal activities and to be the technical link to
to decentralisation continued to be done rather independent- cross-sectoral dialogue/policy platforms and stakehold-
ly in other units also under the Secretary General (e.g. Plan- ers. The individual should be senior, in a deputy min-
ning and Budgeting Bureau), and the coordination between ister or secretary general role, or an advisory/staff posi-
the work of these units with the Decentralisation Unit was
tion that requires technical and political expertise.
at times lacking.
• Existing ministry policy unit that is established as a
CLMs may be allowed to proceed at different speeds, but staff function and draws in part from line units for in-
somebody is needed to ensure cross-CLM coherence, and formation and views on decentralisation.
an eventual strategy that has common time frames. Also,
some functions cross CLM boundaries and it is impor- • New decentralisation policy group that is established
tant that the receiving SNG receives functions in a uni- as a staff function and draws in part from line units for
fied fashion (e.g., water and sanitation often go well to- information and views.
gether, though different CLMs may be involved). This • Sectoral stakeholder forum; a formal or informal or-
cross-cutting entity can be established early in the func- ganisation that brings together the CLM with relevant
tional assignment process, establishing a dialogue/policy stakeholders.
development platform cutting across CLMs. The ministry
concerned with LG, planning, finance, or administrative
14
Organising for decentralisation in Yemen Box 10 Content of piloting work plan of the CLM Box 11
In Yemen, several CLMs engaged in the UNDP/UNCDF sup- •• Confirming or establishing the internal organisational set
ported effort to prepare a government wide decentralisation up of CLM to boost/guide decentralisation/piloting.
strategy agreed to assign one person to be the focal point •• Diagnostic work to be undertaken; including desk work and
for facilitating internal and external decentralisation discus- field work.
sions. In this case, the diagnostic research was done by line •• Key internal meetings to gain support and launch key ac-
managers or by consultants specifically hired for the purpose. tivities.
The focal points were generally committed, but they faced •• Participation in cross-sectoral CD activities.
some difficulties in gaining the attention of line managers at •• Progress meetings in the CLM.
times. The good connection of the focal points to their Min-
isters or high level officials was helpful however in gaining It may not be possible for the CLMs or the coordinating
CLM wide attention at crucial points. ministries themselves to point to a clear timetable for sec-
tor decentralisation. Policies may be made in an ad hoc
There is no best way to set internal organisational struc- way, as political pressures make themselves felt. A real-
tures for decentralisation, but having well respected indi- istic time frame needs to be set, usually spanning one or
viduals in these positions/structures is certainly advanta- two years, giving enough time to explore current arrange-
geous. ments, develop and explore options, and make decisions.
The internal and external dialogue can be enhanced It may be necessary to undertake some pilot activities, or
through a number of measures that together form a Com- to phase the transfer of functions, starting with a few sec-
munication Strategy on decentralisation for the CLM, tors in the first round, or starting with selected functions
for example: in each sector in the first round.
• Pamphlets explaining the CLM task structure for de-
3.2 Approaches and specific processes
centralisation or specific initiatives.
Overall process and timing
• Web site or a devoted page in the CLM website to in-
dicate the organisation, work plan, initiatives, progress, Functional assignment ideally requires good analysis and
and events. consensus. The process can take considerable amount of
time, if done with care. It can also take considerable time
• A feedback mechanism (e.g., telephone, email) linked
if not done well, and conflict arises that stalls the process.
to the organisation/focal person charged with decen-
Figure 8 shows what a typical process might entail, with
tralisation.
FA linked to the other necessary elements of decentralized
• Internal orientation sessions should be provided for the governance. A two-year cycle from design to implemen-
CLM staff to understand the approach and work plan tation is reasonable, and that would need to be doubled
and other matters relating to the decentralisation efforts if a further round of refinement is necessary. Rushing
of the CLM. In particular, the sessions should clarify through the process, to avoid some thorny issues and dif-
what is expected from each relevant unit in the CLM ficult negotiations, will result in messy consequences as
and the opportunities provided to make a contribution implementation runs into snags – the hard work is merely
or to gain skills and knowledge. shifted to a later date.
The dialogue should at some point extend beyond the Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4
CLM officials, encompassing local governments and their
associations, relevant professional associations and trade Design and initial implementation Refinement
unions (e.g., teachers, health workers), experts from re- Review of functions
search and higher education organisations, non-govern- in the sector
ment and private sector organisations involved in service
delivery or in advocacy. Review of standards, Further
reporting adjustment
Great care must be taken in explaining how external ac-
tors will participate in the implementation of the secto- Decision on functions Further functions
ral decentralisation work plan. Identifying stakeholders decentralized decentralized
is a useful step, and there will be differences of opinion
More discussions or piloting of additional
regarding who should participate, or at what point they
functions that may be decentralized
should participate.
It is exceedingly difficult in a complex undertaking of this Costing, financing ar- Further
rangements adjusted adjustment
kind to set out a work plan that will hold for the period
in question. Nevertheless, an adaptable work plan can be Personnel and organi- Further
zational structures adjustment
useful to keep the focus on key milestones (Box 11).
Figure 8: Typical schedule for FA – with refinement round
15
Unbundle the sector horizontally Unbundle the management functions
•• Tertiary education •• Policy
•• Secondary education •• Regulation
•• Primary school •• Planning
•• Vocational schools •• Financing
•• Early childhood education •• Staffing/organizing
•• Informal or adult schooling/literacy/numeracy •• Implementation
•• Reporting
•• …
Central Ministry
Regional government
Local goverment
Users
Private firms, NGOs
16
• nonetheless, keep the function whole if possible (inject Examples of appropriate use of ‘scale’/‘level’ Box 12
some exceptions in the global formulation if that helps
•• “Fishing within the jurisdiction of the district government”
to avoid listing all the possible pieces that could be cov- where the boundaries of the district are well stipulated
ered under the global formulation); elsewhere.
• avoid framing functions as projects or schemes – func- •• “Provision of airports of municipal scale” where a previ-
ous determination has already been made of which airports
tions are the underlying and stable mandates that give
are of such scale (based on location of facility and desti-
rise to projects/programs that change considerably over nations/status).
time; •• “Roads of provincial scale” where there is an existing
• avoid limiting jurisdiction by value of projects/activi- and widely understood technical designation (e.g., arterial
roads joining district capitals).
ties; procurement should be wrapped with its substan-
tive function;
3.3 Criteria and principles for assignment
• management functions should be implicit or mentioned
as a global reference; In unitary countries (or where formative units of federal
nations have responsibility for local government) it is not
• avoid the use of the term “scale” or even “level” as ex-
uncommon to have reviews of FA and adjustments made.
planatory terms as they lead to multiple interpretations
The need for a well laid-out process for such adjustments
or simply do not add any information;
is more likely in countries that have chosen to use an ultra
• functions should not rigidly flow from pre-existing or- vires construction. The need is more obvious for facilitat-
ganisational mandates (remember: “form follows func- ing decentralisation, but there is sometimes the need to re-
tion”, not vice versa!). centralize functions or to acknowledge functions that had
Keeping the functions whole makes government more not been anticipated in earlier times.
easily accountable and efficient (e.g., capital and oper- In contrast to the ultra vires construction, the broad man-
ational/maintenance expenditures are matched), and date of general competence allows for initiative by the
makes the lists a lot more readable. Readability is also SNG, although this may be limited by any subsequent
enhanced when norms/standards and supervision roles laws/regulations of higher levels (which can also be im-
are stated in a blanket fashion for all of the functions to posed to stop SNG from carrying out tasks they have
which they pertain – rather than listing them for each been doing for some time, presumably if they are been
and every small substantive function. done badly). But as mentioned earlier, in most cases ‘gen-
Differentiating functions between levels of government eral competence’ in the local government stream of law is
on the basis of ‘scale’ only works well when the scale di- complemented with laws of a sectoral nature that contain
mension is already standardized (see Box 12 below). Scale provisions or lists that are more ultra vires in structure;
should not be the term or concept used to differentiate creating a hybrid form of FA overall.
functions that relate to different target groups. For in- In either the ultra vires or hybrid constructions, it is good
stance, if the placement of specialized staff is to be a pro- practice to indicate how adjustments are to be made,
vincial level function - with the scope being ‘provincial specifying the legal instrument and key procedures (e.g.,
scale’- this may result in two possible interpretations; that consultation mechanism).
it pertains to all staff at all levels up to provincial level,
Principles adopted by India Box 13
or that it pertains only to staff of the provincial establish-
ment. Such ambiguity should obviously be avoided. Principles of Public Finance
•• Economies of scale
Functions and organisation are often conflated or con- •• Externalities
fused. Organisations should follow functions; reflecting •• Equity
practical/efficient ways of discharging functions. It is not •• Heterogeneity of demands
a good idea to begin functional assignment from the ref- Principles of Accountability
erent of existing central level structures. This tends to •• Discretionary
freeze into place organisational structures and current •• Intensity of transactions
mandates – and too often the subsequent activity is that •• Performance assessment
of finding corresponding functions for the SNG that con- Principle of Subsidiarity
nect with this ‘given’ – usually some aspect of implemen-
tation, sometimes quite trivial. This approach may result For whatever direction of movement of functions, some
in sensible assignment on occasions, but will surely run countries undergoing decentralisation have seen fit to
the risk of locking in inefficiencies, through bloated cen- specify the criteria that will govern “who does what”
tral-level structures and a proliferation of overlapping or (Box 12-14). The general principle applied in Europe that
questionable SNG roles/functions. of subsidiarity, is increasingly finding its way into inter-
national guidelines (see Appendix 4)22 and is being tak-
22 See para B.1.1 of the 2007 UN Guidelines.
17
en up by the legal framework of countries pursuing de- government. Expensive and sophisticated technical skills
centralisation reforms.23 This principle dictates that the are generally scarce and therefore point to placement at
function/tasks in question should be undertaken by the units covering larger areas/populations.
smallest jurisdiction that can do so effectively and effi-
Efficiencies can also be expressed in terms of affordabili-
ciently. The latter terms are quite broad of course and
ty or logistical placement of scarce administrative/techni-
need further specification.
cal staff. But this is not a rigid measure (more people with
Criteria adopted by Indonesia Box 14 the right skills can be distributed or hired in most cas-
•• Efficiency: through economies of scale or availability of es) and should be used carefully for ‘screening’ purposes
technical staff –> tends to centralisation (which levels of government is ready to undertake a func-
•• Externalities: significant impact is felt beyond the bounda- tion) and as the ‘objective;’ raising the capacity of the lev-
ries of the regions –> tends to centralisation el of government that has been deemed to be the focus of
•• Accountability: functions should be placed where they can decentralized service delivery, by transferring functions
receive the most scrutiny and control by citizens –> tends with requisite resources, and giving any needed support
to decentralisation to ensure successful discharge of the functions.
Efficiency is often referred to in FA. It is a broad concept, It is much easier to find actual lists of functions employed
sometimes made more specific, when ‘economies of scale’ by countries, or advised by consultants and academics,
is indicated. Efficiency can also come from economies of than it is to find lists of criteria used for assigning func-
agglomeration (general purpose local government is made tions. When the latter are found, they are generally rath-
efficient by having a critical mass of functions adminis- er poorly explained, and information on the way they are
tered from the same body). applied is even more difficult to obtain. In particular, it is
Scale efficiencies are often associated with population. rare to see documentation of who sits at the table and how
For instance, it is often more economical to obtain text criteria are weighed, or how trade-offs are made.24
books, drugs, or vehicles in bulk and through one buying From what can be gleaned from the literature and GTZ
organisation. Economies of scale tend to exist up to a cer- supported practice, the most frequently cited criteria are
tain point, after which they plateau, and sometimes even externalities (spillovers) and efficiency/economy,25 but
reverse when settlements are so large as to impede the effi- capacity of local government has also been a recurring
cient delivery of some services. It is also important to rec- theme. Appendix 5 provides some examples of sets of cri-
ognize that economies of scale can accrue from inter-ju- teria promoted/applied. It is important to point out that
risdictional cooperation (e.g. several SNG establishing the use of criteria is far from a mechanical exercise; there
a special-purpose association for providing a particular is much room for interpretation of how these are best ap-
service jointly) or shifting production to entities that can plied. Lists prepared in a particular country by interested
attain the requisite scale on behalf of the SNG. or disinterested parties using the same criteria could vary
considerably.
A matter of emphasis: the German case Box 15
While there is a great deal of commonality in criteria applied
for FA among countries, there are some differences in stress. 3.4 Phasing
A recent ruling of the state supreme court of Mecklenburg- Decentralisation rarely happens all at once; even the “Big
Vorpommern, Germany, emphasizes democratic principles and Bang” in Indonesia has turned out to require subsequent
connectedness to citizens, rejecting a reform that would have
rounds of functional assignment adjustments. A key de-
seen larger and more efficient municipalities. This value sys-
tem is likely to also be felt in functional assignment trade-
cision at the outset then is “how big” the first step should
offs between the desire to enhance local participation and be. This decision is generally a function of the “readiness”
accountability versus pure economic efficiency. of the national level actors to embark on orderly decen-
tralisation, and of the SNG to handle new responsibili-
Functions held by the SNG should show benefits and ties. With respect to the latter, the scope for FA changes
costs that fall largely within the SNG jurisdiction. When depends on scale (population and area size), existing ad-
SNG expenditures (e.g., a hospital) spill over to neigh- ministrative offices and capacity, and natural/economic
bours, the SNG will tend to under-invest in the service as endowments.
a result of this leakage. When this is the case (i.e., when
externalities are high) then decisions may be more appro-
24 This is in particular apparent with the “Activity Maps” prepared
priately made at a higher level that better encompasses the
by the state governments in India (e.g. from Kerala or Assam), which
costs and benefits involved. present in tabular form the allocation of activities, but do not explain
There is a link between increasing size and administra- on which basis allocative decisions have been made.
25 See Ferrazzi, G. (1998). Criteria for Transferring Functions to
tive capabilities, at least in the small to medium scale of Sub-national Governments: Selection and Application in Indonesian
Decentralisation Initiatives, unpublished doctoral thesis, University
23 See Box 13: In India, it is mentioned as one of the underlying of Guelph.
principles for the FA process.
18
Within any one wave of decentralisation, the simplest ap- Leading sectors in Himachal Pradesh (2008/9) Box 17
proach, if workable in terms of capacity, is to have a syn-
•• Irrigation and Public Health Dept.
chronized approach across sectors and across all SNG of a •• Health Department
particular level/tier. Where this approach is not possible, •• Education Department
other options could be to phase FA as follows: •• Rural Development Department
1. partial set of sectors
A
2. A partial set of functions within sectors 3.5 Success factors and obstacles/constraints27
3. Partial set of SNG
The earlier discussion and examples reveal both promising
4. Confirm/decentralize functions ad hoc as sectoral
avenues and obstacles to effective functional assignment.
ministries see fit.
Some of the discussion has dealt with ideal situations, and
The central/regional/local level ability to work with a these are probably not achieved across the board in any
great deal of asymmetry must be considered, and weighed country. OECD or otherwise. There is a lot of muddling
against the simplicity of uniform assignment that may through in functional assignment, but some short cuts
tend to outstrip SNG capacity. Generally, it is best to tend can be fatal to the exercise.
toward uniform assignment, while compensating for low
A key success factor appears to be the existence of secto-
SNG capacity by accelerating capacity development for
ral ministers or senior level officials (in one or two signif-
the weakest SNG.26
icant sectors at least) who are willing to take some risk to
Leading sectors in Yemen (2005/6) Box 16 explore new institutional arrangements. It may be ask-
•• Ministry of Education: ing too much to call them champions, but they need to
–– Primary education be sufficiently interested to give room for a discussion and
–– Non-formal education possibly some piloting. They also have to show some will-
•• Ministry of Health: ingness to be coordinated (and relate to other ministries)
–– Maternal health to achieve some coherency in decentralisation across sec-
–– Communicable diseases tors.
•• Ministry of Water and the Environment:
–– Urban water supply and sanitation The advantage of gaining the participation of several key
–– Rural water supply and sanitation sectors is that overlapping mandates that can be addressed
–– Water resources management as part of an inter-ministerial coordination process. For
•• Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation instance, health programs operated in schools often in-
–– Extension services
volve or relate to budgets of the education and health
–– Veterinary services
ministries. Similarly, drinking water or sanitation may in-
The decision on how to phase FA (or decentralisation re- volve the health and public works ministries (and others
forms generally) has much to do with the political situa- in some countries). Where a ‘rural development’ ministry
tion in the country; whether decentralisation has become is found, it is common to see many mandates or assumed
a political necessity to curb centrifugal forces for in- activities between this ministry overlapping with those of
stance. But it also has to do with leadership, particularly more narrowly defined sectoral ministries (e.g., agricul-
at the top and in the ministerial posts. Where there is lit- ture, irrigation, roads).
tle pressure for decentralisation, it is best to proceed with Having the ‘local government’ ministry mediate the over-
sectors that are interested and willing to explore, using lapping mandates can be helpful, if the latter is seen as an
these as examples for the more wary ministries. The Yem- honest broker. Additionally, the LG ministry can ensure
en (UNCDF) approach was to use several lead ministries, that the overall initiative has coherence, e.g. that all min-
covering the bulk of local expenditures; beginning with a istries truly engage in devolution rather than delegation
limited set of well delineated services as the starting point (agency or deconcentration). If intimately connected, the
for the preparation of a national decentralisation strate- LG ministry, with the ministry responsible for finance,
gy (see Box 16). A somewhat similar approach was used in can also guide efforts to cost the functions being consid-
Himachal Pradesh (Box 17). Here the units involved in- ered and estimate what magnitude of financial resources
itially were more numerous, and the functions were not may be necessary to address in the reconfigured transfers
limited a-priori. In the course of the process however, sev- or revenue assignments that accompany FA.
eral departments’ progress slowed considerably, yielding a
smaller number of truly lead sectors. The performance of inter-ministerial bodies as a platform
to coordinate policies in a multi-level/multi-actor set-
ting (as is the case with decentralisation reforms) has been
26 As outlined in the UN Guidelines, an “increase in the functions 27 Drawn from points made in GTZ (2009). Technical Workshop
allocated to local authorities should be accompanied by measures to on Functional Assignment and Performance Assessment Systems for
build up their capacities to exercise those functions.” ( Para C.2.1) Local Governments. Bangkok. 9-11 February, pg. 12.
19
rather mixed. However, often there are few alternatives, as 3.6 Monitoring of FA processes
the organisations affected by the reforms need to establish
directive and non-directive patterns of interaction. Ensur- To be successful, a FA process needs political backing. It
ing the timely availability of information, establishing an is important therefore for senior political figures to have
“infrastructure of interaction”, facilitation of the coopera- regular reporting on how the FA is unfolding. State leg-
tion process and segregating the policy process into small- islature/officials and sector ministers should expect re-
er units can help to increase coordination and coopera- porting of the progress of the exercise. At key points, the
tion of the organisations involved.28 interim results of FA will need to obtain political reassur-
ance or decisions that are rightly of the political level to
Proponents of FA must recognize that even one round take (e.g., which sectors/functions should be up for dis-
of FA can entail two or more years from preparation to cussion; which institutional arrangements should be pi-
implementation of new arrangements. Giving room for loted; how to bring other stakeholders on board in the
proper design and consultation can have a good return discussion).
down the road.
Ideally, SNG involved will also be monitoring the proc-
The public is interested in some aspects of service deliv- ess, noting whether there is coherence across sectors, and
ery, but will rarely enter into the technical dimensions of whether the overall effort will yield meaningful devolu-
FA. Local government is more interested and aware, but tion (weighty functions, requisite resources, appropriate
may emphasize certain services (e.g., those with revenue supervision and support). CSOs, in particular universi-
raising potential) and be wary of lack of funding or per- ties/research centres, should be following and supporting,
formance expectations. Central governments are some- adding expertise and taking government to task when
times not comfortable to invite the SNG associations to necessary. It is these organisations that are most likely to
the table, choosing instead to cherry pick favoured SNG package the experiences and disseminate them effectively
units in their consultations and analysis. National-level (though government could do so as well if it has the will
actors need to recognize that engaging communities and and capacity).
local government in appropriate ways (not simply at the
tail end in ‘socialisation’ efforts) can have a bearing on the
workability and acceptance of resulting arrangements.
Because of concerns of the CLMs and SNG both, it is
important that FA is closely accompanied with delibera-
tion and analysis on the financing and staffing requisites
to successfully discharge the decentralized functions. It
may only take one round of mismatched decentralisation
to make SNG cynical and reluctant to engage in another
round of reform initiatives.
Support for FA from development partners is extreme-
ly important – many newly decentralising countries have
little experience in the process and can benefit from ex-
posure to international practice. But DPs must target the
right players with capacity development, mindful of the
longer term capacities needed, and the short term pres-
sures politicians are under; understanding how the tech-
nical and political dimensions come together is important
for making external support effective.
Central government and SNG are rarely keen to reach
out to civil society in the process of decentralisation – the
process tends to be entirely an intergovernmental affair. It
is then up to the DPs to raise awareness of the benefits of
early involvement of civil society, to be woven into serv-
ice management and implementation, and in service scru-
tiny/improvement.
20
4. Open Issues
Functional assignment has not received the attention in It is unlikely that answers to the above can come through
the literature and among practitioners that development a better scan of the literature. If the documentation ex-
planning or financing mechanisms have received. The ists then it is most likely ‘grey literature’ and will be dif-
increasing concern for local government performance ficult to access. The best way of revealing experience and
however is forcing a retracing of steps to this foundational reflections on the above and other important aspects of
element. Performance assessment requires clarity on re- FA is to make available some starting points, such as this
sponsibility/degree of control. As part of this re-examina- technical note. This can provide a conceptual framework
tion, the linkages between elements (or building blocks) that makes it easier for others to respond in kind, add-
of decentralized governance is also coming to the fore. ing depth, variety or contrasting information and views.
To have a proper understanding of FA, and its relation- At some point, a more rigorous examination of support
ships to other key elements of decentralized governance, efforts undertaken by development partners would be
additional depth needs to be added to the following is- helpful, and at that point the conceptual and analytical
sues: framework will be sufficiently robust to make the cross
country/donor review valuable.
• Why does functional assignment so often get shunt-
ed aside in favour of planning, financing, and organi-
sational approaches that badly subsume or ignore FA?
Political economy and institutional analysis may be
productive here, including why donors themselves have
had difficulty recognising the need/demand for FA sup-
port.
• Which criteria of functional assignment have actual-
ly been applied in practice (and how)? Which ones are
truly helpful, and which are in principle helpful but in
practice too difficult to apply?
• What are the conditions that lead to strong and coher-
ent legal framework (with no conflicts between organic
laws and sectoral laws in particular)?
• What is the best way of ensuring a good functions-
finance match in the process of decentralisation (e.g.,
costing approaches)? Under which conditions is it sen-
sible to proceed with funds for local government with-
out specifying functions for which they are ‘fully’ re-
sponsible?
• What are workable ways of setting performance “obli-
gations” and of aligning financing and incentives/sanc-
tions to ensure compliance?
21
22
Appendices
23
APPENDIX 2: Broad functions of the state29
A. Getting Money
1. By current financing, e.g. tax collection, sale of public property, etc.
2. By deferred financing, e.g. borrowing
B. Spending Money
1. On external affairs, e.g. military and diplomatic affairs
2. On activities related to internal order
a. Maintenance of public safety, e.g., enforcement of criminal law
b. Supervision of property rights, e.g., defining and protecting ownership of realty and personalty
c. Supervision of civic rights and liberty, e.g. defining and protecting the right to vote
d. Supervision of public and private morality, e.g. censorship,
e. Supervision of marriage
f. Inculcation of patriotism, e.g. provision of national holidays
3. On activities related to trade:
a. Provision and supervision of money and credit, e.g. central banking
b. Provision and supervision of facilities for transportation and communication,
e.g. management of the post office
c. Provision and supervision of utilities, e.g. management of wells and atomic energy plants
d. Provision and regulation of production and distribution of goods and services,
e.g. supervision of labour-management relations
e. Encouragement of economic development, e.g. granting subsidies
f. Supervision of irreplaceable resources, e.g. conservation and management of forests
4. On activities related to citizens’ welfare:
a. Provision and supervision of education
b. Provision of aid to the indigent or handicapped
c. Provision for recreation and culture, e.g. maintenance of parks, musical societies, etc.
d. Provision of public health services, e.g. supervision of drug manufacturing
e. Encouragement of the acquisition of new knowledge, e.g.
granting patents and copyrights, supporting exploration, encouraging scientific societies.
24
APPENDIX 3: Common functions of general purpose SNG30
30 Reported in Ferrazzi, G. (2004). Note on Typology for Governmental Functions, GTZ – Administration Reform and Decentralisation
Project.
25
Orphanage
Lodging Social lodging
Sports and leisure Stadium
Swimming pool
Arena
Area of games
Organisation of competitions
Culture Library
Museum
Culture Center
Historic monuments
Orchestra, ballet or theater troops
Fairs
Economic development Markets
Slaughterhouses
Bus/Taxi station
Tourism Tourism office
Guesthouse, Hotel
Handicraft centers
Forestry License for local use
Reforestation
Agriculture Irrigation system
License for fishery
Mineral resources Exploitation of sandpits
26
APPENDIX 4: 2007 UN guidelines on decentralisation
A. Governance and democracy at the local level 60. Local authorities’ financial resources should be com-
mensurate with their tasks and responsibilities and ensure
12. Political decentralisation to the local level is an essen-
financial sustainability and self-reliance. Any transfer or
tial component of democratisation, good governance and
delegation of tasks or responsibilities by the State shall be
civil engagement; it should involve an appropriate combi-
accompanied by corresponding and adequate financial re-
nation of representative and participatory democracy.
sources, preferably guaranteed by the constitution or na-
B. Powers and responsibilities of local authorities
tional legislation and decided upon after consultations be-
tween concerned spheres of government on the basis of
26. The principle of subsidiarity constitutes the rationale objective cost assessments.
underlying the process of decentralisation. According to
that principle, public responsibilities should be exercised 61. Where central or regional governments delegate pow-
by those elected authorities which are closest to the citi- ers to them, local authorities should be guaranteed the ad-
zens. equate resources necessary to exercise these powers as well
as discretion in adapting the execution of their tasks to lo-
28. In many areas powers should be shared or exercised cal conditions and priorities.
concurrently among different spheres of government.
These should not lead to a diminution of local autono-
my or prevent the development of local authorities as full
partners.
31. National, regional and local responsibilities should be
differentiated by the constitution or by legislation, in or-
der to clarify the respective powers and to guarantee ac-
cess to the resources necessary for the decentralized insti-
tutions to carry out the functions allocated to them.
32. An increase in the functions allocated to local author-
ities should be accompanied by measures to build their
capacity to exercise those functions.
37. As far as possible, nationally determined standards of
local service provision should take into account the prin-
ciple of subsidiarity when they are being drawn up and
should involve consultation with local authorities and
their associations.
27
APPENDIX 5: Criteria for functional assignment
Criteria Reviewed by ACIR (USA) Criteria Proposed by Advisory Committee in Ontario (Canada)
General Criteria: 1. National unity Source: Government of Ontario, Report of the Advisory Committee
to the Minister of Municipal Affairs on the Provincial-Municipal Fi-
2. Co-ordination nancial Relationship, 1991.
3. Overriding importance
4. Multi-functionality
Responsiveness: 5. Responsiveness Criteria Formulated Under Auspices of World Bank
6. Community
7. Accessibility 1. Economies of scale
Equity and Equality: 8. Social justice 2. Economies of scope (bundling of public services
that brings other consequences)
9. Redistribution
3. Benefit/cost spillovers
10. Equalisation
4. Proximity to beneficiaries
11. Uniformity
5. Consumer preferences
12. Portability
6. Economic evaluation of sectoral choices
Efficiency: 13. Mobility
14. Stabilisation
Source: Shah, A. (1994). The Reform of Intergovernmental Fiscal
15. Internalisation Relations in Developing and Emerging Market Economies, Policy
and Research Series # 23, The World Bank, Washington D. C.
16. Economies of scale
17. Regional unity
28
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