Daf Ditty Eruvin 60: Prophecy

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If a person was east of his hometown and asked his son to make an ‫ עירוב‬for him in the west, or
vice versa, if he is within 2000 ‫ אמות‬of either the ‫ עירוב‬or of his home, but not of both, the place
that is within 2000 ‫ אמות‬becomes his ‫שביתה מקום‬.

MISHNA: One who was to the east of his home when Shabbat began, and he had said to his
son before Shabbat: Establish an eiruv for me to the west; or, if he was to the west of his home
and he had said to his son: Establish an eiruv for me to the east, the halakha is as follows: If
there is a distance of two thousand cubits from his current location to his house, and the distance
to his eiruv is greater than this, he is permitted to walk to his house, and from there he may
walk two thousand cubits in every direction, but it is prohibited for him to walk to the spot where
his son had deposited his eiruv.

If the distance from one’s current location to his eiruv is two thousand cubits, and the distance
to his house is greater than this, he is prohibited from walking to his house, and he is permitted
to walk to the spot of his eiruv, and from there he may walk two thousand cubits in every direction.

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In other words, with regard to the Shabbat limit, one’s place of residence for Shabbat cannot be
more than two thousand cubits from his physical location when Shabbat begins.

MISHNAH: If a man who was in the east instructed his son, ‘prepare for me an eiruv in the west’,
or if he was in the west and he instructed his son ‘prepare for me an eiruv in the east’, if the distance
between him and his house was no more than two thousand cubits and that between him and his
eiruv was more than this, he is permitted to proceed to his house1 but forbidden to proceed to his
eiruv.2 If the distance to his eiruv was no more than two thousand cubits and that to his house more
than this, he is forbidden to proceed to his house but permitted to proceed to his eiruv. If a man

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Sc. his house, with whose Shabbos limit he was when the Shabbos had begun is regarded as the place of his Shabbos rest from
where he is entitled to walk distances of two thousand cubits in all directions.
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Because at the time the Shabbos had begun he was more than a Shabbos limit away from it. The place of an eiruv which one is
unable to reach during the Shabbos between this be regarded as one's place of Shabbos rest.

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deposits his eiruv within the [Shabbatic] extension of a town,3 his act is of no consequence.4 If he
deposited it even one cubit only beyond the limit, he loses in one direction of the town, what he
gains. In the other direction. (If the eiruv, for instance, was deposited at a distance of one thousand
cubits in an easterly direction of the town the man, since the eiruv entitles him to walk distances
of two thousand cubits from it in all directions, is entitled to walk a total distance of (1000 + 2000
= ) 3000 cubits from the town in an easterly direction but only one thousand cubits in the westerly
direction. The entire area of the town itself, as mentioned is, in this respect regarded as no bigger
than four cubits by four and, in consequence, is not to be deducted from the extent of the permitted
limits.)

3
I.e., within the area of seventy and two thirds cubits around the town from which the two thousand cubits of the Shabbos limit
are measured.
4
Lit., ‘he has not done anything’, since in the absence of the eiruv also he is permitted to move within that area as well as a Shabbos
limit of two thousand cubits beyond it in all directions on any side of the town; while all the town itself is in this respect regarded
as an area of no more than four cubits by four within which its inhabitants may freely move in addition to the limits mentioned.

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A person who places an Eruv outside his city extends his Techum in that direction, but he shortens
his Techum in the other direction.

For example, a person who places his Eruv 1,000 Amos to the east of the city gains 2,000 Amos
more to the east, while losing 1,000 Amos to the west.

GEMARA: It might enter your mind to say that when the Mishnah states that one was standing
to the east, it means that he was standing to the east of his house and that he had instructed his
son to establish an eiruv to the west of his house. Similarly, when it states that he was standing to
the west, it means that he was positioned to the west of his house and that he had instructed his
son to establish an eiruv to the east of his house. In such a case, the person’s house is located
between him and his eiruv.

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If so, the question arises: Granted, the Mishnah’s case where there is a distance of two thousand
cubits from his current location to his house, and the distance to his eiruv is greater than this,
you can find, as it is possible that he can reach his house without traveling two thousand cubits
and he cannot reach his eiruv. But where do you find a case where there is a distance of two
thousand cubits between him and his eiruv, and the distance to his house is greater than this?
The person’s house is located between him and his eiruv.

Rabbi Yitzhak said: Do you think that to the east means that he was standing to the east of
his house, and to the west means that he was standing to the west of his house? No, to the east
means to the east of his son, who is depositing his eiruv for him, and to the west means to the
west of his son.

The ‫ גמרא‬wonders how a man, who is standing to the east of his home, can be within 2000 ‫ אמות‬of
an ‫ עירוב‬that is placed to the west of his home, but not within 2000 ‫ אמות‬of his home?! The ‫גמרא‬
offers two suggestions:

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Rabbi Yitzchak says – when Mishnah said ‫ מזרח‬and ‫מערב‬, it did not mean east & west of his home,
but east & west of where his son was. If he is within 2000 ‫ אמות‬of either the ‫ עירוב‬or of his home,
but not of both, the place that is within 2000 ‫ מקום שביתה‬.‫ אמות‬his becomes his. ‫מקום שביתה‬

GEMARA: Assuming that ‘east’ means the east side of his house and that ‘west’ means the west
of his house,5 one can well understand how it is possible that the distance between him and his
house was no more than two thousand cubits and that between him and his eiruv was more than
this, since he would reach his house before he could reach his eiruv, but how is it possible that the
distance between him and his eiruv should be no more than two thousand cubits and that to his
house more than this? — Rabbi Yitzchak replied: Do you think that ‘east’ means east of his house
and ‘west’ the west of his house? The meaning in fact is not so; east denotes the east of the position
of his son and west denotes the west position of his son.6 Rava son of Rav Shila replied: one may
even explain east as the east of his house and west as the west of his house where, for instance, his
house stood in a diagonal direction.

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The house being situated between him on the one side of it and his son on the opposite side
6
The position of his house, however, may well have been much further away than that of his eiruv.

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Rava bar Rav Sheila said: Even if you say that to the east means to the east of his house and
to the west means to the west of his house, the Mishnah can be understood as referring to a case
where his house stood along a diagonal line in relation to the person and his eiruv. In that case,
although he is to the west of his house and the eiruv is located to its east, he can still be closer to
his eiruv than he is to his house.

‫ – מר שילא בר רבא‬his house could have been on a diagonal from both him and his ‫עירוב‬.

We learned in the next clause of the Mishnah concerning one who places his eiruv even one cubit
beyond the city’s boundary: That which he gains on one side of the city he loses on the other.
The Gemara expresses surprise: Does that mean that only that which he gains on one side he loses
on the other, and no more? Wasn’t it taught in a baraita: With regard to one who places his
eiruv within the outskirts of the city, he has not done anything; if, however, he placed it
outside the outskirts of the city, even one cubit outside, he gains that cubit and loses the entire
city because the measure of the city is included in the measure of his Shabbat limit? If one’s

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Shabbat residence had been in the city, the two thousand cubits of his Shabbat limit would have
been measured from the edge of the city’s outskirts; now that he has established his Shabbat
residence outside the city, the city itself is included in the two thousand cubits, and he may lose
far more on that side than he will gain on the other side.

If he puts it even one ‫ אמה‬beyond the city limits, whatever he gains on the side of his ‫עירוב‬, he loses
in the distance he may travel in the other direction. The ‫ גמרא‬explains as follows; For example, if
one makes an ‫ עירוב‬one thousand ‫ אמות‬east of his town, he obviously can now go an additional
2000 ‫ אמות‬to the east of his ‫עירוב‬, for a total of 3000 ‫ אמות‬east of town, which is 1000 ‫ אמות‬more
than if he had not made an ‫עירוב‬.

And this is in accordance with the opinion stated by Rabbi Idi, as Rabbi Idi said that Rabbi
Yehoshua ben Levi said: If one was measuring the two thousand cubits of his Shabbat limit from
the location of his Shabbat residence outside the city, and his measure terminated in the middle
of the city, he has only half the city, i.e., he may walk only to the end of his two thousand cubits.
If, however, his measure terminated at the far end of the city, the entire city is regarded as
four cubits, and he completes the rest of the Shabbat limit on the other side of the city.

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‫ י רב‬quotes this very distinction in the name of ‫ בן יהושע 'ר לוי‬,and comments; – ‫אין אלו אלא דברי‬
‫ נביאות‬Rashi explains; ....‫ כמתנבא מפי הגבורה שאינו נותן טעם לדבריו‬This distinction is arbitrary as if it
were a prophecy.

He must have learned it from his Rebbe, for there is no logical reason to make this distinction
between the 2000 ‫ אמות‬ending in the middle of the city, or ending beyond the city. ‫ תוספות‬cites the
‫ י"ר‬who says that wherever this comment is mentioned, it is meant ‫ לשבח‬- in awe and praise - -
‫ כלומר אין חכמה כזו שמבין לחלק כל כך סברא מועטת וברוח הקודש אמר‬as if to say, it takes superhuman
wisdom to make such a fine distinction, which he must have said with the Divine Spirit.

IF A MAN DEPOSITS HIS EIRUV WITHIN THE [SHABBATIC] EXTENSION etc. How can
you possibly assume that an eiruv would be deposited ‘beyond the limit’? 7 — Rather read: Outside
the Shabbatic extension of seventy and two thirds cubits around the town.

HE LOSES WHAT HE GAINS. Only ‘what he gains’ and no more? Was it not in fact taught: If a
man deposits his eiruv within the [Shabbatic] extension of a town, his act is of no consequence. If
he deposited it even one cubit only beyond the [Shabbatic] extension of the town, he gains that
cubit8 and loses all the town9 because the extent of the town is included in the extent of the Shabbos
limit?10 — This is no difficulty, since the latter refers to a case where his measure terminated

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such an eiruv, which is unapproachable on the Shabbos, would surely be useless.
8
On the side of the town where the eiruv was deposited.
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When the Shabbos limit from the eiruv across the town in the opposite direction is measured, [the town is included until the extent
of the Shabbos limit].
10
And deducted from it. How then is this to be reconciled with our Mishnah?

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within the town,11 while the former deals with one where his measure terminated at the far end of
the town;12 this being in agreement with a ruling of Rabbi Idi who laid down in the name of Rabbi
Yehoshua ben Levi: If a man13 was measuring [the two thousand cubits distance from his acquired
Shabbos abode] and advancing towards a town, and his measure terminated in the middle of the
town he is allowed to proceed no further than half the town, but if his measure terminated at the
far end of the town, all the town, as far as he is concerned, is regarded as four cubits and the
remainder of the Shabbos limit14 may be made up for him.15 These, exclaimed Rabbi Idi, are
nothing but prophetic utterances; for what is the difference whether the measure terminated in the
middle of the town or at the end?

The meaning of this expression. Most commentaries, including the Rif and the Rosh, maintain
that this phrase indicates a difficulty, implying that this statement is like prophecy in that it
seems to have been decreed without reason. Sages are not Prophets, and they must support their
statements with logical argumentation. Therefore, this statement should be rejected.

Tosafos

‫ת וס פ ות ד " ה א ין א ל ו א ל א ד ב ר י נב יא ות‬
(Tosfos discusses whether this is a praise.)

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Either because the town was very big or because the eiruv lay at a considerable distance from it. In such a case only is the town
included in the extent of the Shabbos limit and the man is forbidden to move beyond the far side of the town.
12
In this case all the town is regarded as being no bigger than four cubits by four, and the Shabbos limit is extended beyond the
town to a distance of two thousand cubits minus the distance between the eiruv and the side of the town near it.
13
Who was overtaken by dusk underway and, being unaware of the proximity of a town, had acquired his Shabbos abode at the
spot where he happened to be at the time the Shabbos had set in; (and the same law applies to a man who deposited an eiruv outside
his own town).
14
The difference between two thousand cubits and the distance of the eiruv from the side of the town nearest to it.
15
By extending the Shabbos limit beyond the far side of the town.

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 ‫אומר ר''י דבכ''מ שאומר אין אלו אלא דברי נביאות הוי לשבח כלומר אין חכמה כזו שמבין לחלק כל כך סברא מועטת‬
‫וברוח הקדש אמר‬
(Ri): Wherever it says "these are only words of prophecy", it is a praise. I.e. there is no
Chachmah like this, who understands to distinguish so much through a small reasoning, and he
said it with Ru'ach ha'Kodesh.

‫( גבי מנת בכרם אני מוכר לך סומכוס אומר לא יפחות לו מג' קבין א''ר יוסי אין‬.‫דהכי משמע בפ''ק דבבא בתרא )דף יב‬
‫אלו אלא דברי נביאות‬

Source: It connotes like this in Bava Basra (12a) regarding "I sell to you a portion in a vineyard.
Sumchus says, he may not give less than [the area to sow] three Kavim. R. Yosi says, these are
only words of prophecy."

‫ומייתי עלה מיום שחרב בית המקדש נטלה נבואה מן הנביאים ונתנה לחכמים משמע דלשבח קאמר‬

[The Gemara] brings regarding this that from the day of Churban Beis ha'Mikdash, prophecy
was taken from Nevi'im and given to Chachamim. This connotes that [R. Yosi] said so to praise
[Sumchus].

'‫( דאשכחן דלא הוי לשבח לא קאמר בהאי לישנא אלא עשו דבריהם כדברי נביאות פי‬.‫ובפ' אלו מומין )בכורות דף מה‬
‫לאומרם בלא טעם‬

In Bechoros (45a), we find that [a teaching] is called prophetic in a non-praiseworthy way, it

does not say like this, rather, "they made their words like words of prophecy", i.e. to say them
without a reason;

Rav Idi comments on a statement made by R’ Yehoshua ben Levi that it is nothing less than “words
of prophecy – divrei nevi’us.” Tosafos in the name of R”I explains that whenever one finds the
expression “this is nothing less than the words of prophecy” it expresses praise for the statement
and was not intended to be derogatory.

In other words, the wisdom necessary to generate the distinction is so fine that it must have come
from someone possessed with Divine Spirit – ruach hakodesh. This is also the implication from
the Gemara in Bava Basra (12a) in which R’ Yosi describes a statement of Sumchus as “words or
prophecy” and this leads the Gemara to comment that from the time the Beis Hamikdash was
destroyed prophecy was taken from the prophets and was given to Torah scholars. This implies
that Torah scholars being in possession of prophecy is a good thing.

Tosafos elsewhere relates that Rabbeinu Kalonimus

amended three things based on prophecy before he died. The annotator to Tosafos there cites
Teshuvos Min HaShamayim who references the comments of Tosafos to our Gemara and

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explains that describing something as coming from prophecy is praise. He does not mean that it
emanates from actual prophecy; the intent is that the wisdom is so deep that it is reminiscent of
prophecy.

Teshuvas Yad Eliyahu recounts an incident in which

someone well known for his piety had a treifah bird become intermingled with kosher birds. This
pious individual relied upon his Divine Spirit to recognize where tumah resides and based on that
identified which birds were kosher and which was the treifah.

This is not a violation of the principle that Torah is not in heaven since that applies when one seeks
to resolve a dispute with prophecy but it is permitted to use prophecy or Divine Spirit to reveal the
identity of things.

Tosafos, quoting the R”I states that whenever the Gemara uses this phrase it is not a criticism but
rather a praise. In other words, a distinction as fine and subtle as the one presented can not be
attributed to anything other than ruach hakodesh.

The Chasam Sofer (Teshuvos, O.C. #208) explains that the ruach hakodesh referred to is not the
type of ruach hakodesh experienced by Dovid HaMelech or other prophets. Rather it refers to a
special Divine Spirit that rests upon those people who diligently study Torah LiShmah.

People who exert themselves to study Torah in this fashion merit to arrive at the truth, sometimes
even beyond what their natural intellectual abilities would allow. HaKadosh Baruch Hu grants
select individuals special Divine Wisdom to help them discover the true meaning of the Torah they
are studying.

With this explanation the Chasam Sofer explains the Gemara in Bava Basra (.‫( ב"י‬which states:
“R’ Avdimi from Chaifa stated, from the day the Beis HaMikdash was destroyed … even though
prophecy was taken from the prophets it was not taken from the scholars.” What the Gemara
means is that this element of prophecy, understanding ideas and concepts beyond one’s natural
abilities, which one can achieve through the study of Torah LiShmah still exists.

It is this variety of prophecy that was given to scholars. With this explanation we can more fully
understand Tosafos’ comment. R’ Idi was commenting that the distinction made by R’ Yehoshua
ben Levi was so subtle that it could only have been made with the special Divine assistance called
ruach hakodesh.

The Gemara quotes Rav Avdimi d'Min Chaifah who said that "from the time that the Beis
ha'Mikdash was destroyed, Nevu'ah was taken from the prophets and given to the Chachamim."
The Gemara (Bava Basra 12) asks that the Chachamim certainly had Nevu'ah before the Churban.
The Gemara explains that Rav Avdimi meant that even though Nevu'ah was taken from the
prophets, it was not taken from the Chachamim.

RASHI explains that Nevu'ah was taken from the prophets who were not Chachamim, and it was
left with the prophets who were Chachamim.

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How can Rashi suggest that there were prophets who were not Chachamim? The Gemara in
Nedarim (38a) states clearly that one of the four qualifications of a prophet is that he must be a
Chacham (see also Shabbos 92a). (RAMBAN)16

ANSWERS:
RAMBAN cites some who answer that when the Gemara in Nedarim lists four characteristics
necessary for a person to be a prophet, it refers only to a prophet who receives Nevu'ah constantly,
with the Shechinah resting upon him without interruption. There are prophets, however, who
receive occasional visions of prophecy for limited purposes. Such Nevu'ah can come even to a
person who does not have the qualifications mentioned in the Gemara in Nedarim.
The Ramban himself, though, writes that he is not satisfied with this answer.

RAMBAN therefore gives a different explanation for the Gemara. He asserts that all Nevi'im
certainly were Chachamim, as the Gemara in Nedarim says. When the Gemara here says that
Nevu'ah was taken away from the prophets but not from the Chachamim, it means that the Nevu'ah
of the sort that comes to a person in a prophetic vision was taken away, but not the type of Nevu'ah
that a person has through Chochmah, wisdom.

Even though they no longer are able to have prophetic visions, the Chachamim are still able to
achieve knowledge of the truth through the Ru'ach ha'Kodesh that rests upon them. (I. Alsheich)

Eruvim on a Straight Line and at an Angle

Steinzaltz (OBM) writes:17

The Mishna on our daf teaches: One who was to the east of his home when Shabbat began, and
he had said to his son before Shabbat: Establish an eiruv for me to the west; or if he was to the
west of his home and he had said to his son: Establish an eiruv for me to the east, the halakha is
as follows: If there is a distance of two thousand cubits from his current location to his house,
and the distance to his eiruv is greater than this, he is permitted to walk to his house, and from
there he may walk two thousand cubits in every direction, but it is prohibited for him to walk to
the spot where his son had deposited his eiruv.

So if he is within 2,000 amot of his house, but the eiruv is further away than 2,000 amot, he can
go to his house, but not to his eiruv. Similarly, if he is within 2,000 amot of his eiruv, but his house
is further away than 2,000 amot, he can go to his eiruv, but not to his house.

16
Rav Mordechai Kornefle, Daf Advancement Forum
17
https://www.steinsaltz-center.org/home/doc.aspx?mCatID=68446

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The Gemara opens with the assumption that the man, his house and his eiruv are in a straight line,
creating the situation where the man can walk to his house, but cannot continue past his house to
the eiruv. In effect, since he is not within 2,000 amot of the eiruv that was established on his behalf,
the eiruv cannot take effect at all. He is, therefore, limited to the 2,000-ama radius around him.
Since his house is within that radius, he can go there – but no further.

The difficulty with this interpretation of the Mishna is that the second case is hard to understand.
If the man, his house and his eiruv are on a straight line, how can he possibly be closer to his eiruv
than to his house? Rava bar Rav Sheila suggests a different way to understand this case: If the man
is to the east of his house and the eiruv is placed to the west of the house, but rather than being on
a straight line, they are at an angle from one another, we can have a situation where the man is
actually closer to his eiruv than to his house. In such a case the eiruv will take effect and the
individual will be able to walk to his eiruv, and, indeed, 2,000 amot beyond his eiruv, as well.

He's Only a Prophet

Rabbi Jay Gelman writes:18

To tell someone that his words are those of prophecy would seem to be the highest compliment
one can give. The prerequisites for being a prophet are tough indeed, and those who can meet them
are certainly most worthy of praise (see Maimonides, Laws of Foundations of Torah 7:1). Our
great prophets help inspire, teach, comfort, and lead the people. Their uplifting words laid the
vision for the Jewish nation, and even those who rejected the halachic system of Judaism embraced
much of the prophetic vision.

Yet, our Sages were apparently unimpressed with prophecy--at least when it comes to the area of
Jewish law. In fact, a prophet has no authority to rule on matters of Jewish law at all. That is the
sole domain of sages who, with years of diligent study and breadth of vision, are to be the
interpreters of Jewish law.

We have almost no development of Jewish law during the entire period of prophecy; only with the
formation of the Men of the Great Assembly (Anshei K'nesset HaG'dolah) at the beginning of the
Second Temple period--as prophecy came to a close--did Halacha begin to develop. As the Talmud
succinctly notes, a Sage is greater than a prophet (Bava Batra 12a). So much so that calling
someone a prophet was a polite way of rejecting someone's argument, a sweet-sounding insult.

As is well known, one may only walk up to 2,000 cubits (approximately 1km) beyond one's city
limits on Shabbat, something that can be extended by another 2,000 cubits by the placement of

18
https://www.torahinmotion.org/discussions-and-blogs/eiruvin-60b-hes-only-prophet

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an eiruv techumim in the direction in which one wants to travel on Shabbat (which would
disqualify one from travelling an equal distance in the opposite direction). The Talmud (Eiruvin
60b) quotes a ruling of Rav Iddi in the name of Rav Yehoshua ben Levi that if the area of
the techum (i.e. the 4,000 cubits) ends in the middle of an adjoining city, then one may walk only
up to that point in the city. However, if one's personal techumends beyond the city, then the entire
city is to be counted as only 4 cubits, allowing one to walk even further.

Rav Iddi then commented that, "These are only words of prophecy; what difference does it make
if it ends in the midst of the city or the end of the city?"

RASHI

Rashi explains that these words are "like one giving prophecy from the Almighty, that he does not
give a reason for his words. Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said these words, and had he not learned
them from his teacher, he would not have said this thing [which has] no reason".

In other words, using the authority of one's teachers to explain something that flies in the face of
logic is not a valid argument. Either a city should be counted like four cubits or it should not; why
should it depend on where the techum ends?

Only G-d Himself, in the Torah or through the words He tells the prophets, can issue rulings that
defy our understanding with the expectation that we will observe these words of prophecy. But the
application of Jewish law is not given to prophecy, and arguments must be sound--and judged on
their merits, not on who said them. Rava does offer an explanation of Rav Yehoshua ben Levi's
ruling, but it is an argument based on logical reasoning, not "words of prophecy".

Tosafot quotes the opinion of the Ri, who disagrees, arguing that the expression "these are only
words of prophecy" are actually meant as words of praise. Apparently, the Hebrew phrase ein eilu
eleh divrei neviutis to be translated as "these can only be words of prophecy", meaning that the
wisdom embedded in them is so profound that they must be divinely inspired. Rava then helps
elucidate this ruling inspired from above.

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Interestingly, Tosafot (Bava Batra 12a) agree with Rashi (against the Ri) that telling a Sage that
his are the words of prophecy is no praise at all, and that we are to reject his view.

Rashi, most of the Tosafists and the Ri all agree that Rav Yehoshua's words can only be "words of
prophecy", as they apparently defy logical argument.

For Rashi and the Tosafists, this is bad--demonstrating a weak argument with a call to authority--
whereas, for the Ri, this demonstrates the divine inspiration that our Talmudic sages had. Once
again, the Talmud offers fundamentally diverse views, leaving room for a multiplicity of
approaches.

The Malmesbury Bible

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Prof. Kenneth Seeskin writes:19

One unique feature of Moses as a prophet is that he receives revelation about laws and statutes
that Israel is bound to keep in the future, even after his death. As Moses reminds the Israelites,
after God gave them the Decalogue on Mount Horeb:

‫יד‬: ‫ד ב ר י ם ד‬
.‫שְׂתֶכם ֹאָתם ָבָּאֶרץ ֲאֶשׁר ַאֶתּם ֹעְב ִרים ָשָׁמּה ְל ִרְשָׁתּהּ‬
ֹ ‫ְוֹאִתי ִצָוּה ְי־הָוה ָבֵּﬠת ַהִהוא ְלַלֵמּד ֶאְתֶכם ֻחִקּים וִּמְשָׁפִּטים ַלֲﬠ‬

Deut 4:14
At the same time HASHEM commanded me to impart to you laws and statutes for you to
observe in the land that you are about to cross into and occupy.
Moreover, these statues must be kept continuously, throughout Israel’s sojourn in the land, and
cannot be changed or adjusted:

‫א‬: ‫ד ב ר ים ד‬
‫ְוַﬠָתּה ִיְשָׂרֵאל ְשַׁמע ֶאל ַהֻחִקּים ְוֶאל ַהִמְּשָׁפִּטים ֲאֶשׁר ָא ֹנִכי ְמַלֵמּד ֶאְתֶכם ַלֲﬠשׂוֹת ְלַמַﬠן ִתְּחיוּ וָּבאֶתם ִוי ִרְשֶׁתּם ֶאת‬
‫ב ל ֹא ֹתִספוּ ַﬠל ַהָדָּבר ֲאֶשׁר ָא ֹנִכי ְמַצֶוּה ֶאְתֶכם ְול ֹא ִתְג ְרעוּ ִמֶמּנּוּ ִלְשֹׁמר ֶאת‬:‫ ד‬.‫ֵהי ֲאֹבֵתיֶכם ֹנֵתן ָלֶכם‬¥‫ָהָאֶרץ ֲאֶשׁר ְי־הָוה ֱא‬
.‫ֵהיֶכם ֲאֶשׁר ָא ֹנִכי ְמַצֶוּה ֶאְתֶכם‬¥‫ִמְצוֹת ְי־הָוה ֱא‬

Deut 4:1
And now, O Israel, give heed to the laws and statutes that I am instructing you to observe,
so that you may live to enter and occupy the land that HASHEM, the God of your fathers, is
giving you. 4:2 You shall not add anything to what I command you or take anything away from it,
but keep the commandments of HASHEM your God that I enjoin upon you.

One way to understand this prohibition of neither adding to nor subtracting from the law is that it
applies only to regular people, but HASHEM himself may change the laws later and send a prophet
to inform the Israelites of this. Nevertheless, the traditional understanding of the passage is that
the commandments of the Torah are never to be altered. Yet such an interpretation seems to be in
tension with a different passage, dealing with post-Mosaic prophecy:

19
https://www.thetorah.com/author/kenneth-seeskin

19
 .‫ֶהי¨ ֵאָליו ִתְּשָׁמעוּן‬¥‫טו ָנִביא ִמִקּ ְרְבּ¨ ֵמַאֶחי¨ ָכֹּמ ִני ָיִקים ְל¨ ְי־הָוה ֱא‬:‫דברים יח‬

Deut 18:15
Hashem your God will raise up for you a prophet from among your own people, like
myself; him you shall heed.20
Already at Mount Horeb (vv. 16–17), when the Israelites express their fear of directly hearing the
divine voice, God confirms that a prophet like Moses will appear in the future, who will serve as
an intermediary between God and Israel:

‫יט‬: ‫יח‬
‫ְוָהָיה ָהִאישׁ ֲאֶשׁר‬ .‫יח ָנִביא ָאִקים ָלֶהם ִמֶקֶּרב ֲאֵחיֶהם ָכּמוֹ¨ ְוָנַתִתּי ְדָבַרי ְבִּפיו ְוִדֶבּר ֲאֵליֶהם ֵאת ָכּל ֲאֶשׁר ֲאַצֶוּנּוּ‬:‫דברים יח‬
.‫ל ֹא ִיְשַׁמע ֶאל ְדָּבַרי ֲאֶשׁר ְיַדֵבּר ִבְּשִׁמי ָא ֹנִכי ֶאְדֹרשׁ ֵמִﬠמּוֹ‬

Deut 18:18
I will raise up a prophet for them from among their own people, like yourself: I will put
My words in his mouth and he will speak to them all that I command him; 18:19 and if anybody fails
to heed the words he speaks in My name, I myself will call him to account.
But if the revelation at Horeb is unchangeable, what would the function of a “prophet like
Moses” be?

Like Moses but Not Like Moses

Moses is unique in the Bible in his level of his prophecy:

‫י‬: ‫ד ב ר י ם ל ד‬
.‫ְול ֹא ָקם ָנִביא עוֹד ְבּ ִיְשָׂרֵאל ְכֹּמֶשׁה ֲאֶשׁר ְיָדעוֹ ְי־הָוה ָפּ ִנים ֶאל ָפּ ִנים‬

Deut 34:10
Never again did there arise in Israel a prophet like Moses whom HASHEM singled out,
face to face.
Nevertheless, communicating God’s laws is not Moses’ only prophetic activity. Like other
prophets, he receives messages relevant only to his specific time and place, such as how to find

20
Although the text speaks about prophets in the masculine, it is noteworthy that the Bible refers to four female prophets: Miriam
(Exodus 15:20), Deborah (Judges 4:4), Huldah (2 Kings 22:14-20, 2 Chronicles 34:22-28), and Noadiah (Nehemiah 6:14). The
passage also implies that a future prophet will be an Israelite. But at Mishneh Torah, “Book of Knowledge,” Laws of Basic
Principles, 9.1, Maimonides recognizes the possibility of gentile prophets.

20
water in the wilderness and warning the Israelites that they have angered HASHEM. This is a kind
of prophecy about which we read in the books of the Prophets, who call for Israel to stop sinning
and turn back to God, and even offer political advice such as not to rebel against Babylonia.

The context of Deuteronomy 18 suggests that it is speaking of the future function of prophets:
rebuking Israel and predicting future events. Immediately before, Moses tells the Israelites:

.¨‫ֶהי‬¥‫יד ִכּי ַהגּוֹ ִים ָהֵאֶלּה ֲאֶשׁר ַאָתּה יוֵֹרשׁ אוָֹתם ֶאל ְמֹע ְנ ִנים ְוֶאל ֹקְסִמים ִיְשָׁמעוּ ְוַאָתּה ל ֹא ֵכן ָנַתן ְל¨ ְי־הָוה ֱא‬:‫דברים יח‬

Deut 18:14
Those nations that you are about to dispossess do indeed resort to soothsayers and
augurs; to you, however, HASHEM your God has not assigned the like.

In other words, the “prophet like Moses” replaces augurs, who typically tell people about the future
and give advice on contemporary problems. The prophet can tell the Israelites if God is angry or
happy with them, and if God will allow them to succeed in battle and other initiatives.

This is confirmed later in the passage, in the discussion of how Israel will know whether a
prophet is legitimate or not:

‫כב‬:‫יח‬ ‫כא‬:‫דברים יח‬

‫ֲאֶשׁר ְיַדֵבּר ַהָנִּביא ְבֵּשׁם ְי־הָוה ְול ֹא ִיְהֶיה‬ .‫ ֵאיָכה ֵנַדע ֶאת ַהָדָּבר ֲאֶשׁר ל ֹא ִדְבּרוֹ ְי־הָוה‬2‫ְוִכי ת ֹאַמר ִבְּלָבֶב‬
.‫ַהָדָּבר ְול ֹא ָיבוֹא הוּא ַהָדָּבר ֲאֶשׁר ל ֹא ִדְבּרוֹ ְי־הָוה ְבָּזדוֹן ִדְּבּרוֹ ַהָנִּביא ל ֹא ָתגוּר ִמֶמּנּוּ‬

Deut 18:21
And should you ask yourselves, “How can we know that the oracle was not spoken by
18:22
HASHEM?” if the prophet speaks in the name of HASHEM and the oracle does not come true,

that oracle was not spoken by HASHEM; the prophet has uttered it presumptuously: do not stand in

dread of him.21

21
An earlier passage (Deuteronomy 13:2–6) makes clear that to test the people’s loyalty, God may send false prophets whose
predictions come true but who counsel obedience to other gods, which means that predictive accuracy is not decisive. Even augurs
and soothsayers get things right occasionally.

21
The focus here is on the fulfillment of oracles and predictions, not new laws.22

Torah Laws Are Perfect: Rabbinic Interpretation

The rabbis understood “prophets like Moses” to be predictors of the future, and rebukers, not
legislators. They even read this idea into other passages. For instance, the concluding verse of
Leviticus and its Holiness Collection reads:

‫לד‬:‫ויקרא כז‬
.‫ֵאֶלּה ַהִמְּצוֹת ֲאֶשׁר ִצָוּה ְי־הָוה ֶאת ֹמֶשׁה ֶאל ְבֵּני ִיְשָׂרֵאל ְבַּהר ִסיָני‬

Lev 27:34
These are the commandments that HASHEM gave Moses for the Israelite people on Mount

Sinai.

On this, the Babylonian Talmud comments (b. Shabbat 104a):

.‫אלה ה מצות — ש אין נביא רש אי לחדש דבר מעתה‬

“These are the commandments”—For from now on, a prophet is not permitted to add anything

new.23

This implies that God’s revelation to Moses is perfect just as it is. While Deuteronomy can be
understood to say that the revelation is to last only as long as Israel resides on HASHEM’s land,
the rabbis understood the Torah’s legislation to be permanently valid. Meaning, in all times and in
all places, the laws remains permanently in force.

22
Commentators have long noted that this criterion is impractical. How long must the people wait to see if a prediction is validated?
In a now famous passage, Isaiah (7:14–17) offers as a sign of his legitimacy that a young woman with child will give birth to a son
named Immanuel and that by the time the child can distinguish good from bad, the two foreign kings plotting against Ahaz will
have fallen and people will be eating curds and honey. It is unclear when the child will reach this point, and in any event, it is a
long time for a king in fear of assassination to wait. Relying on predictive accuracy also creates the problem of how to decide which
of two prophets to believe if the issue at stake requires immediate action, as we see in the stories of Ahab and the prophet Micaiah
(1 Kgs 22) or Jeremiah vs. Hananiah (Jer 28), in both of which the king must decide on war or peace, and the so-called prophets
are offering opposite predictions. In such cases, the king does not have the luxury of waiting to see whose predictions are validated
and whose prove to be false.

23
See also, b. Yoma 80a; b. Megillah 2b; b. Temurah 16a; j. Megillah 1:5.

22
Accordingly, the rabbis took the point to its logical conclusion: Not only is it impossible for a post-
Mosaic prophet to change any of the commandments—even God cannot. The rabbis supported
this argument with a homiletical reading of the inspirational speech of Moses toward the end of
Deuteronomy:

‫יב‬:‫ל‬ ‫יא‬:‫דברים ל‬
‫ל ֹא ַבָשַּׁמ ִים ִהוא ֵלאֹמר ִמי‬ .‫ ְול ֹא ְרֹחָקה ִהוא‬2‫ ַהיּוֹם ל ֹא ִנְפֵלאת ִהוא ִמְמּ‬2‫ִכּי ַהִמְּצָוה ַהזּ ֹאת ֲאֶשׁר ָא ֹנִכי ְמַצ ְוּ‬
.‫ַיֲﬠֶלה ָלּנוּ ַהָשַּׁמ ְיָמה ְו ִיָקֶּחָה ָלּנוּ ְוַיְשִׁמֵﬠנוּ ֹאָתהּ ְוַנֲﬠֶשָׂנּה‬

Deut 30:11
Surely, this Instruction which I enjoin upon you this day is not too baffling for you, nor is it

beyond your reach. It is not in the heavens, that you should say, “Who among us can go up to the
30:14
heavens and get it for us and impart it to us, that we may observe it?”… No, the thing is very close

to you, in your mouth and in your heart, to observe it.

This passage seems to mean that fulfillment of the Torah does not exceed the limits of human
capacity.24 Nevertheless, the rabbis read it differently (b. Baba Metzia 59b):

.‫מאי לא בשמים היא? א"ר ירמיה אין משגיחין בבת קול שכבר נתת לנו על הר סיני‬

What does “it is not in the heavens” mean? Rabbi Jeremiah said: “We do not pay attention to
heavenly voices, for [the Torah] was already given to us at Mount Sinai.”
In other words, there is no additional Torah in heaven that we await God to reveal.25This, too,
implies that the original revelation God gave to Moses is perfect as is, so that no amendments are
possible even if they come from God.

24
This makes the passage into an ancient expression of the Kantian dictum “Ought implies Can.” If I am obliged to do something,
then it must be possible for me to do it.

25
For an excellent presentation of the rabbinic view of Deuteronomy (30:11-12), see David Bleich, “’Lo Ba-Shamayim Hi:’ A
Philosophical Pilpul,” in Studies in Jewish Philosophy, ed. Norbert Samuelson (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1987),
463–488. Note, however, that there are times when the rabbis do listen to the voice from heaven (bat kol), e.g., b. Eruvin 13b, cf.
Megillah 32a.

23
Maimonides’ Codification: Additional Legislation Is a Sign of False Prophecy

Codifying rabbinic thinking, Maimonides argues that anyone who tries to amend Torah law is by
definition a false prophet (Mishneh Torah, “Book of Knowledge,” Laws of Basic Principles,
9.1):

‫דבר ברור ומפורש בתורה שהיא מצוה עומדת לעולם ולעולמי עולמים אין לה לא שינוי ולא גרעון ולא תוספת שנאמר‬
‫את כל הדבר אשר אנכי מצוה אתכם אותו תשמרון לעשות לא תוסף עליו ולא תגרע ממנו ונאמר והנגלות לנו ולבנינו‬
.‫עד עולם לעשות את כל דברי התורה הזאת‬

It is clear and explicit in the Torah that its laws remain valid for all time; they will never change,
be subtracted from, or added to, as it says (Deut 13:1), “Be careful to observe only that which I
enjoin upon you: neither add to it nor take away from it.” And it says (Deut 29:28), “Overt acts
are for us and our children ever to apply all the provisions of this Teaching.”

.‫ ונאמר לא בשמים היא‬,‫הא למדת שכל דברי תורה מצווין אנו לעשותן עד עולם וכן הוא אומר חוקת עולם לדורותיכם‬
.‫הא למדת שאין נביא רשאי לחדש דבר מעתה‬

From this you learn that we are commanded to keep all the words of the Torah forever. And thus
it says, “a permanent law throughout your generations.”26And it says (Deut 30:12), “It is not in
heaven.” From this you learn that no prophet is allowed to add anything new from now on.

‫לפיכך אם יעמוד איש בין מן האומות בין מישראל ויעשה אות ומופת ויאמר שה' שלחו להוסיף מצוה או לגרוע מצוה או‬
‫ או שאמר שאותן המצות שנצטוו בהן ישראל אינן לעולם ולדורי‬,‫לפרש במצוה מן המצות פירוש שלא שמענו ממשה‬
‫ ומיתתו בחנק על שהזיד לדבר‬,‫ הרי זה נביא שקר שהרי בא להכחיש נבואתו של משה‬,‫דורות אלא מצות לפי זמן היו‬
.‫ שהוא ברוך שמו צוה למשה שהמצוה הזאת לנו ולבנינו עד עולם ולא איש אל ויכזב‬,‫בשם ה' אשר לא צוהו‬

26
This phrase appears multiple times in the Torah in the context of sacrifices and Temple service: Lev 3:17, 10:9, 23:14, 31, 41,
24:3; Num 10:8, 15:15, 18:23. There are also many examples of slight variations on this phrase in the same context.

24
Therefore, if a person whether from the nations or from the Jews stands up and performs a miracle
or wonder, and says that God has sent him to add a commandment or to subtract a commandment,
or to explain a commandment in a way different from the interpretation we received from Moses,
or if he says that those commandments which Israel was commanded do not apply forever,
throughout the generations, but that they were applicable only for a certain time—this is a false
prophet, for he has come to contradict the prophecy of Moses. His execution should take place by
suffocation, for he has willfully spoken in God’s name without having been commanded to do so,
for the Blessed One commanded Moses that these commandments will be for us and our children
throughout time, and “God is not a man to be capricious” (Num 23:19).27
Maimonides continues by taking up the Deuteronomy 18 problem referenced above (law #2):

‫ לא לעשות דת הוא בא אלא לצוות על דברי התורה‬,‫א"כ למה נאמר בתורה נביא אקים להם מקרב אחיהם כמוך‬
‫ וכן אם צונו בדברי הרשות כגון לכו‬,‫ כמו שאמר האחרון שבהן זכרו תורת משה עבדי‬,‫ולהזהיר העם שלא יעברו עליה‬
‫ מצוה לשמוע לו והעובר על‬,‫ בנו חומה זו או אל תבנוה‬,‫ עשו מלחמה היום או אל תעשו‬,‫למקום פלוני או אל תלכו‬
.‫דבריו חייב מיתה בידי שמים שנאמר והיה האיש אשר לא ישמע אל דברי הנביא אשר ידבר בשמי אנכי אדרוש מעמו‬

If so, why does the Torah say (Deut 18:18), “I will raise up a prophet for them from among their
own people, like yourself”? [This prophet] is not coming to make law, but to reinforce the words
of the Torah and to warn the people not to violate them. Just as the final prophet says (Mal 3:22),
“remember the Torah of Moses my servant.” Also, [to tell us] if we are commanded about things
that are otherwise optional, such as going to a certain place or not going, making war today or
not making war, building a certain wall or not building it, it is a commandment to listen to him,
and one who violates his words is liable to execution by the heavenly court, as it says (Deut 18:19),
“and if anybody fails to heed the words he speaks in My name, I myself will call him to account.”

27
The import of this passage is that Jesus and Mohammed should not be regarded as prophets. This is consistent with his negative
opinion of Jesus and Mohammed as expressed in “Epistle to Yemen.” On the other hand, at the end of the Mishneh Torah (“Book
of Judges,” Laws of Kings and Wars, 11), in a passage that is often censored, Maimonides suggests that Jesus and Mohammed
could lead the gentile world to monotheism and thus prepare the way for the Messiah.

25
What About All the Jewish Practices not in the Torah?

If it is forbidden to add new legislation, how can we explain laws in rabbinic Judaism that do not
appear in the Torah, e.g., lighting candles on Friday night, putting up an eruvim, or celebrating
Chanukah and Purim? The traditional answer is that Moses received two Torahs on Mount Sinai,
one written and one oral (Sifrei Deuteronomy 351):

‫ מלמד ששתי תורות ניתנו לישראל אחת בפה ואחת בכתב‬.‫ותורתך לישראל‬

“And your teachings (lit. Torahs) to Israel” (Deut 33:10)—This teaches that two Torahs were
given to Israel: One was oral and one was written.
According to the rabbis, the Oral Torah contains knowledge of the social practices, legal
procedures, and interpretive principles needed to interpret and apply the written laws. As the rabbis
understood it, the two Torahs do not constitute two bodies of law but rather one body given by
God with the full weight of Mosaic authority behind it.

It follows that normative practices not mentioned in the written Torah were given to Moses and
passed on by word of mouth to post-Mosaic prophets, and eventually to the rabbis of the
Talmud.28 Thus, for the rabbis, practices not mentioned in the written Torah do not constitute
additions to the original revelation that Moses received from God.

28
1. for example, m. Avot 1:1 (Kaufmann MS):

.‫משה קיבל תורה מסיני ומסרה ליהושע ויהושע לזקנים וזקנים לנביאים ונביאים מסרוה לאנשי כנסת הגדולה‬

Moses received the Torah on Sinai and handed it down to Joshua; Joshua to the elders; the elders to the

prophets; and the prophets handed it down to the Men of the Great Assembly.

26
Rabbinic Laws

This explanation, however, cannot justify all rabbinic laws. Take Chanukah, for example. Not only
does the Torah never mention Chanukah, but it cannot, since this holiday commemorates events
that occurred many centuries after the Torah was written. Even so, rabbinic tradition requires the
lighting of candles on Chanukah with a blessing, noting that this constitutes a divine
commandment. This bothered the rabbis (b. Shabbat 23a):

‫ רב נחמן בר יצחק‬.‫ מלא תסור‬:‫ היכן צונו? רב אויא אמר‬.‫מאי מברך? אשר קדשנו במצותיו וצונו להדליק נר של חנוכה‬
.‫ שאל אביך ויגדך‬:‫אמר‬

What is the blessing? “Who has sanctified us with His commandments, and commanded us to
kindle the Chanukah light.” Where were we commanded? Rabbi Avya says: “From ‘Do not
deviate’ (Deut 17:11).” Rav Nahman bar Yitzhak says: “‘Ask your father and he will tell you’
(Deut 32:7).”
The rabbis, knowing that to suggest that Moses was aware of the events commemorated by
Chanukah strains credulity,29 explained this commandment in reference to the Torah
commandment that the Israelites must listen to their leaders.30

Maimonides makes this point explicitly:

‫ הנה איני‬,‫היות משה נאמר לו בסיני שיצונו כי כשיהיה באחרית ממלכתנו ויקרה לנו עם היונים כך וכך יתחייב לנו שנדליק נר חנוכה‬

.‫רואה שאחד ידמה זה או שיעלהו במחשבתו‬

That Moses was told at Sinai the command that in the future, after the period of our sovereignty, there will

occur such and such a thing with the Greeks, and we will be required to light Chanukah candles—I don’t think

that anybody would imagine this or consider it a possibility.

See, Maimonides, Book of Commandments, Principle One.

30
See also, b. Berakhot 19b; b. Sukkah 46a; Sifrei Deuteronomy 154.

27
In making this claim, the rabbis distinguish between:

1. New commandments originating in a new revelation;

2. New commandments adopted by a rabbinic court.

Only the former constitutes a forbidden “addition” to the Torah, because such laws claim to derive
their authority from a divine revelation. This leads to what some may consider a paradox: it is the
person who claims to be a prophet and to have heard the voice of God is illegitimate, while the
person who does not claim prophetic authority and defends his view on the basis of a reasoned
argument is within their rights.

What about Prophecy?

Legislation after Moses is in the hands of the rabbis rather than the prophets, but shouldn’t
prophecy itself continue throughout the generations? According to the rabbis, the age of prophecy
came to an end in the early Second Temple Period, with Malachi as the final prophet.31 While the
rabbis are aware of claims to prophecy that post-date this period, they respond to it with contempt
(b. Baba Batra 12b):

.‫ מיום שחרב בית המקדש נטלה נבואה מן הנביאים וניתנה לשוטים ולתינוקות‬:‫אמר רבה בר בר חנה א'ר יוחנן‬

Rabbah bar bar Chana said in the name of R. Yohanan: “From the day that the Temple was
destroyed, all prophecy has been taken away from prophets and given to fools and children.”

31
There is a vigorous scholarly debate on whether this assessment is really true. For a well-argued defense of the traditional position
and review of the scholarly literature that questions it, see Benjamin D. Sommer, “Did Prophecy Cease? Evaluating a Re valuation,”
Journal of Biblical Literature 115 (1996): 31–47. For a more recent discussion of this issue, see James Kugel, The Great Shift,
Chapter 13.

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According to this, since the destruction of the Second Temple in 70 C.E., God no longer reveals
anything to people. 32Simply put: we have everything we are ever going to get. All that matters
now is how we understand what we have.

Postscript: But Aren’t There Still Prophets of a Sort?

While the claim that prophecy ended long ago reflects the rabbinic view, any number of Jewish
luminaries in the medieval period believed that they received mystical or esoteric knowledge
from God. For example, ecstatic kabbalists such as Abraham Abulafia (1240-1291) claimed to
have prophetic knowledge.

This alternative view, according to which God continues to communicate with people, was adopted
and defended by the modern Jewish philosopher from the Jewish Theological Seminary, Abraham
Joshua Heschel (1907–1972).33 In fact, Heschel regarded Maimonides as a prophet, while some
have suggested that Heschel himself should be regarded as a prophet.

Heschel argues that people still experience the voice of God and communicate it. To eliminate
prophecy would be to rob Judaism of the spontaneity and vitality that were prevalent in ancient
times. Needless to say, modern prophets both experience and communicate their revelations
differently than their biblical predecessors, since in this day and age, few people would pay heed
to someone who defended their position by proclaiming: “Thus says the LORD.”

Heschel’s position is appealing, but it comes with a price. At a fundamental level, it jeopardizes
Mosaic supremacy and the guaranteed stability of Judaism based on Torah law. By claiming that
the age of prophecy is over, the rabbis sought to uphold the supremacy of Moses’ prophecy and

32
The prophet Malachi (5th cent. B.C.E.) lived hundreds of years before the destruction of the Temple (70 C.E.). Thus, the
distinction between “after Malachi” and “after the destruction of the Temple” may reflect a debate about when exactly prophecy
ended.

33
Abraham Joshua Heschel, Prophetic Inspiration After the Prophets: Maimonides and other Medieval Authorities (Hoboken:
KTAV Publishing, 1996).

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avoid all the problems associated with God’s promise to raise up other prophets—most especially
the prospect of the Torah being amended.

The price the rabbis pay for this view is that for anyone living after the destruction of the Second
Temple, the voice of God can only be heard as part of a historical narrative and no longer as a
living force. Which approach is preferable religiously speaking remains an open question.

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