Daf Ditty Eruvin 36: the Taxman

Tax his land,

Tax his bed,
Tax the table
At which he's fed.

Tax his tractor,

Tax his mule,
Teach him taxes
Are the rule.

Tax his work,

Tax his pay,
He works for peanuts ;
Anyway!

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 Tax his cow,
Tax his goat,
Tax his pants,
Tax his coat.

Tax his ties,

Tax his shirt,
Tax his work,
Tax his dirt.

Tax his tobacco,

Tax his drink,
Tax him if he
Tries to think.

Tax his cigars,

Tax his beers,
If he cries
Tax his tears.

Tax his car,

Tax his gas,
Find other ways
To tax his ass.

Tax all he has

Then let him know
That you won't be done
Till he has no dough.

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When he screams and hollers;
Then tax him some more,
Tax him till
He's good and sore.

Then tax his coffin,

Tax his grave,
Tax the sod in
Which he's laid.

Put these words

Upon his tomb,
'Taxes drove me
to my doom...'

When he's gone,

Do not relax,
Its time to apply
The inheritance tax.

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MISHNA: A person may make a condition with regard to his eiruv of Shabbat borders. In
other words, he need not decide in advance in which direction his eiruv should take effect. For
example, he may deposit an eiruv on each of two opposite sides of his town, and say: If gentiles
come from the east, my eiruv is in the west, so that I can escape in that direction; and if they come
from the west, my eiruv is in the east. If they come from here and from there, i.e., from both
directions, I will go wherever I wish, and my eiruv will retroactively take effect in that direction;
and if they do not come at all, neither from here nor from there, I will be like the rest of the
inhabitants of my town and give up both eiruvin that I deposited, leaving me with two thousand
cubits in all directions from the town.

RASHI

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Similarly, one may say: If a Sage comes from the east and he is spending Shabbat beyond the
boundaries of my town, my eiruv is in the east, so that I may go out to greet him there; and if he
comes from the west, my eiruv is in the west.

If one Sage comes from here, and another Sage comes from there, I will go wherever I wish; and
if no Sage comes, neither from here nor from there, I will be like the rest of the inhabitants of
my town.

Rabbi Yehuda says: If one of the Sages coming from opposite directions was his teacher, he
may go only to his teacher, as it is assumed that was his original intention. And if they were both
his teachers, so that there is no reason to suppose that he preferred one over the other, he may go
wherever he wishes.

RASHI

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Similarly, one may say: If a Sage comes from the east and he is spending Shabbat beyond the
boundaries of my town, my eiruv is in the east, so that I may go out to greet him there; and if he
comes from the west, my eiruv is in the west. If one Sage comes from here, and another Sage
comes from there, I will go wherever I wish; and if no Sage comes, neither from here nor from
there, I will be like the rest of the inhabitants of my town.

Rabbi Yehuda says: If one of the Sages coming from opposite directions was his teacher, he
may go only to his teacher, as it is assumed that was his original intention. And if they were both
his teachers, so that there is no reason to suppose that he preferred one over the other, he may go
wherever he wishes.

GEMARA: The Gemara relates that when Rabbi Yitzḥak came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia,
he taught all of the laws in the mishna in the opposite manner. That is to say, according to him,
if the gentiles came from the east, his eiruv would be to the east, and, conversely, if the Sage came
from the east, his eiruv would be to the west.

This is difficult because if this is correct, there is a contradiction between the ruling concerning
gentiles in the mishna and the ruling concerning gentiles in the baraita, and similarly there is a
contradiction between the ruling concerning a Sage in the mishna and the ruling concerning a
Sage in the baraita.

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The Gemara answers: The apparent contradiction between the ruling concerning gentiles in the
mishna and the ruling concerning gentiles in the baraita is not difficult: This case in the mishna
is referring to a tax collector [parhagabena], ( ּFrom the Iranian pāhragbān, meaning guard)
from whom one wishes to flee; whereas that case in the baraita is referring to the lord of the
town, with whom he wishes to speak. Therefore, there are times that one wants to go out toward
the gentile, while at other times one wants to flee from him.

Similarly, the apparent contradiction between the ruling concerning a Sage in the mishna and
the ruling concerning a Sage in the baraita is not difficult: This case in the mishna is referring
to a scholar who sits and delivers public Torah lectures, and one wishes to come and learn Torah
from him; whereas that case in the baraita is referring to one who teaches children how to
recite the Shema, i.e., one who teaches young children how to pray, of whom he has no need.

The baraita teaches that if a scholar came from one direction to deliver a public lecture and the
schoolteacher came from the opposite direction, his eiruv is in the direction of the scholar.

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We learned in the mishna that Rabbi Yehuda says: If one of the Sages was his teacher, he may
go only to his teacher, as we can assume that this was his original intention.

The Gemara asks: And what is the reason that the Rabbis do not accept this straightforward
argument? The Gemara answers: The Rabbis maintain that sometimes one prefers to meet the
Sage who is his colleague rather than the Sage who is his teacher, as sometimes one learns more
from his peers than from his teachers.

RASHI

A number of commentaries state that this is a case where the one establishing the eiruv wishes to
speak to the lord of the town with regard to the town’s needs. This justifies establishing an eiruv
because it is for the purpose of a mitzva.

Rav Ya’akov Emden explains that the lord of the town is its ruler and going out to greet him is
part of the mitzva to greet a king.

Summary

A person may place two sets of eruv, one in each of two directions of his city, and he makes a
condition that he will use the one which is desirable due to conditions that will develop as the
Shabbos day occurs. In the diagram below, he can use either the eruv to the east or the one to the
west, or neither, nor be as a member of his city. In the same diagram, he will want to use the eruv
to the west to escape the enemy army which approaches from the east.

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Conditional Eiruv

Our Mishna says that one can place an eiruv with a condition, deciding on Shabbos how or if it
should take effect.

The Mishna lists the following examples:

1. If non-Jews are coming to the city from an unknown direction, and he wants to escape, he can
place one eiruv in either direction, or stipulate:

a. If they are in the west, my eiruv to the east should take effect.
b. If they are in the east, my eiruv to the west should take effect.
c. If they came from both sides, I can choose which eiruv should take effect.
d. If they didn’t come at all, neither will take effect, and I will remain centered in my city.

2. If a sage is coming to the city from an unknown direction, and he wants to go to his lesson, he
can place one eiruv in either direction, or stipulate:

a. If he is in the west, my eiruv to the west should take effect.

b. If he is in the east, my eiruv to the east should take effect.
c. If two sages came, one in either direction, I can choose which eiruv should take effect.
d. If none came, neither will take effect, and I will remain centered in my city.

Rabbi Yehudah says that if one of the sages is his teacher, the eiruv in that direction takes effect,
while if both are his teachers, he can choose which one he wants.

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 Coming or Going?

When Rabbi Yitzchak came from Eretz Yisroel, his version of the Mishna reversed the relative
directions in the cases of the non-Jews and sages.

The Gemara explains that the cases of non-Jews and Sages are different ones. The non-Jews in our
Mishna are who are collecting taxes, and therefore people want to avoid them, while those in Rabbi
Yitzchak’s version are of the local government, who the residents want to greet.

The case of the sages is when the sage in one direction is teaching Torah lessons, while the one in
other direction is teaching children davening. People prefer to go to the sage who teaches Torah
lessons, and therefore he will choose his eiruv in that direction.

Our Mishna refers to the sage teaching Torah lessons, while Rabbi Yitzchak’s version refers to the
one teaching children.

Rabbi Jay Gelman writes:1

It is well accepted that enacting laws retroactively is most unfair, potentially throwing into chaos
that which was done under past laws. However, an action we take today often sheds light on
something we did yesterday.

While an eiruv techumim allows one to carry on Shabbat for an extra 2,000 amot (or cubits, a
distance of approximately 1 km) outside of the city limits, the extra distance one can walk in one
direction comes at the expense of the opposite direction. Hence, if one places
an eiruv 2,000 amot to the east of the city, one may walk up to a total of 4,000 amot to the east,
but one may not walk towards the west at all. If the eiruv is placed at 1,000 amot to the east of the
city, one could walk 3,000 amot towards the east, and 1,000 amot towards the west.

Our Daf discusses the case of one who can't predict in which direction he may want to walk on
Shabbat. In such a case, one may place two eiruvei techumim before Shabbat, in two opposite
directions. One then makes the following declaration: "If strangers will come from the east,
my eiruv is to the west; if from the west, my eiruv is to the east...If a scholar comes from the east,
my eiruv is to the east; if from the west, my eiruv is to the west; if they come from both directions,
I will go to the place to which I want to go".

What is most fascinating is the subsequent dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and the Sages. Rabbi
Yehuda claims that, if one of the people coming near the city is one's teacher, one must use
the eiruv to go greet the teacher, rendering the eiruv in the opposite direction invalid. Rabbi
Yehuda is making a value judgment as to the importance of visiting one's teacher, and one's
personal preference plays little role.

1
https://www.torahinmotion.org/discussions-and-blogs/eiruvin-36b-my-teacher-my-friend

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This seems consistent with the importance that Jewish law places upon visiting one's teacher (even
if not for formal learning). Doing such overrides other mitzvoth; for example, a student would be
exempt from eating in a sukkah on his travels to his teacher (the Talmud notes a specific mitzvah
to visit one's teacher on the yamim tovim, perhaps a substitute for the mitzvah of "visiting God" in
the Temple on the Shalosh Regalim). As the Talmud notes in a different context, "Your father
brings you into this world and your teacher brings you to the world to come". It is thus a given,
according to Rabbi Yehuda, that the eiruv must be used to visit one's teacher.

The Sages disagree, recognizing that, "at times, it is more pleasant to be with one's friends than
with one's teacher". Despite the importance of visiting one's teacher, the Sages understood that
people at times prefer being in the company of their friends (for some, it's all the time...J). One
can, the Sages assert, use one's eiruv to visit with whom one likes, enhancing one's own personal
enjoyment of Shabbat. Fortunate are those for whom visiting their teacher is the same as being in
the company of friends!

It is well accepted that enacting laws retroactively is most unfair, potentially throwing into chaos
rulings made under past laws. However, an action we take today often sheds light on something
we did yesterday. While an eiruv techumim allows one to carry on Shabbat for an extra 2,000 amot
(or cubits, adding up to a distance of approximately 1 km) outside of the city limits, the extra
distance one can walk in one direction comes at the expense of the opposite direction. Hence, if
one places an eiruv 2,000 amot to the east of the city, one may walk up to a total of 4,000 amot to
the east, but one may not walk towards the west at all. If the eiruv is placed at 1,000 amot to the
east of the city, one may walk 3,000 amot towards the east, and 1,000 amot towards the west.

Our Daf discusses the case of one who can’t predict in which direction he may want to walk on
Shabbat. In such a case, one may place two eiruvei techumim before Shabbat, in two opposite
directions (one to the west and one to the east of the city, or one to the north and one to the south
of the city).

One must then make the following declaration: “If strangers will come from the east, my eiruv is
to the west, if from the west, my eiruv is to the east…If a scholar comes from the east, my eiruv is
to the east, if from the west, my eiruv is to the west; if they come from both directions, I will go to
the place I want to go”.

What is most fascinating about this is the subsequent dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and the Sages.
Rabbi Yehuda claims that, if one of people coming near the city is one’s teacher, one must use the
eiruv to go greet the teacher, rendering the eiruv in the opposite direction invalid.

Rabbi Yehuda is making a value judgment as to the importance of visiting one’s teacher, and one’s
personal preference plays little role. This seems consistent with the importance that Jewish law
places upon visiting one’s teacher (even if not for formal learning).

Doing this is so necessary that it overrides other mitzvoth; for example, a student would be exempt
from eating in a sukkah on his travels to his teacher (the Talmud notes a specific mitzvah to visit

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one’s teacher on the yamim tovim, perhaps a substitute for the mitzvah of “visiting G-d” in the
Temple on the Shalosh Regalim).

As the Talmud notes in a different context, “Your father brings you into this world and your
teacher brings you to the world to come”. It is thus a given, according to Rabbi Yehuda, that the
eiruv must be used to visit one’s teacher.

The Sages disagree, recognizing that, “at times, it is more pleasant to be with one’s friends than
with one’s teacher”. Despite the importance of visiting one’s teacher, the Sages understood that
people prefer being in the company of their friends at times (for some, it’s all the time… ☺).

One can use one’s eiruv to visit with whom one would like, enhancing one’s own personal
enjoyment of Shabbat. Fortunate are those for whom visiting their teacher is the same as being in
the company of friends!

Sue Parker Gerson writes:2

Many synagogues today bring in scholars in residence, experts who come from out of town to
impart their wisdom by giving a d’var Torah or a public lecture over Shabbat. The Mishnah on
our Daf is not unfamiliar with this phenomenon, but it wants to know what happens if such a
scholar arrives on Shabbat itself. May one establish an eruv outside the town to permit one to go
greet them? And what happens if there are two scholars arriving from opposite directions?

In the latter case, the Mishnah tells us, you can hedge your bets.

If a sage comes from the east and he is spending Shabbat beyond the boundaries of my town,
my eruv is in the east, so that I may go out to greet him there; and if he comes from the west,
my eruv is in the west. If one sage comes from here, and another sage comes from there, I will
go wherever I wish; and if no sage comes, neither from here nor from there, I will be like the
rest of the inhabitants of my town.

Our Mishnah here tells us that it’s permissible to establish a conditional eruv — that is, you can
place an eruv on each side of town and, depending on which direction the sage arrives from, that’s
the eruv that becomes operable. In a case where two sages arrive on Shabbat from different
directions, one can choose which eruv to use.

It’s obvious from this teaching that the rabbis would go to great lengths to greet a sage coming to
town, even going so far as to create two eruvim to ensure they didn’t miss the opportunity. Rabbi
Yehuda takes the discussion a step further with this teaching:

If one of the sages coming from opposite directions was his teacher, he may go only to his
teacher, as it is assumed that was his original intention. And if they were both his teachers, so
that there is no reason to suppose that he preferred one over the other, he may go wherever he
wishes.

2
https://www.myjewishlearning.com/article/eruvin-36/

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 What a great problem to have. On such a fortunate Shabbat that multiple scholars are coming to
town, Rabbi Yehuda rules that you should prioritize going out to greet your own teacher. But if
both the scholars on this particular weekend are your teachers, you can pick whomever you like.

The Gemara disagrees, but with some beautiful reasoning:

The rabbis maintain that sometimes one prefers to meet the sage who is his colleague rather
than the sage who is his teacher, as sometimes one learns more from his peers than from his
teachers.

Anyone who has ever studied with a havruta, or study partner, will recognize the truth of this
statement. While one’s teacher is to be honored, it’s in the unvarnished, sometimes argumentative,
and potentially messy back and forth with peers that true learning often emerges. As we learn
in Pirkei Avot: “Who is wise? One who learns from every person.”

So next time you are blessed with multiple learning opportunities, keep in mind that the young
rabbi from the next town over might have just as much to offer (or even more) than the world-
renowned scholar from across the world.

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• ‫ברירה‬
Our Mishnah introduces the concept of ‫ברירה‬, of retroactive designation, and shows how it may
be used in the case of placing an eruv. A person may place two eruvin in opposite directions of
his makom shevisa, and say if a chochom comes from the east, my eruv is to the east, if he comes
from the west, my eruv is to the west. If one scholar comes from the west and the other from the
east, ‫ – למקום שארצה אלך‬I shall go to the place I choose on Shabbos. This means that the eruv which
is in the direction he chooses will be retroactively valid, and the other void.
Rebbe Yehudah said that in the case of two chochomim that come from different directions, if one
was his Rebbe he must go to his teacher. Rashi explains that according to Rebbe Yehudah we
assume that he wanted the eruv that was in the direction of his Rebbe to take effect.

Rav Yair Kahn writes:4

Questions:

1. What is the difference between bereira and tenai?

2. What is the idea behind the distinction between making something dependent on oneself
and making something dependent on others in relationship to the law of bereira?
3. How does the Ri (Tosafot, Eruvin) understand the view that bereira is untenable?

3
https://alldaf.org/p/77117
4
https:/kkkkahhhaaaa/www.etzion.org.il/en/understanding-bereira-25a-26a

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Our passage deals with the issue of bereira and the possibility to distinguish in this law between
dependence on one’s own prerogative and dependence on anothers’ prerogative. This passage
has many parallels in the Talmud, and a comprehensive and thorough analysis requires studying
all of them.

The passage of bereira relates to an ambiguous status which will become clear (barur) only at
some point in the future. According to the one who says that bereira is tenable, one may rely on
a future clarification, while the one who says that that bereira is untenable disputes this. We need
to understand why every stipulation which makes the effectuation dependent on something which
will happen in the future is not determined by this argument. There are many passages of
conditions and stipulations which are to be fulfilled only in the future, but the issue of bereira is
not raised. While the Ramban analyzes this question at length, his words are not sufficiently clear.

Bereira vs. Tenai — Basic Understanding

When we analyze the cases of bereira which are mentioned in the beginning of our passage, we
may find a certain common denominator which differentiates it from stipulation (tenai). For
example, the Mishna (Gittin 25a) deals with a get ordered by the husband so that “I will divorce
whomever I choose.” Marking the identity of the woman being divorced is part of the body of
the get, and no stipulation is relevant. The idea of stipulation is the ability to base the effectuation
on a side matter. However, marking the identity of the woman who is being divorced is an essential
part of the divorce. “You are hereby divorced on the condition that rain will fall tomorrow” or “on
the condition that you will give me two hundred zuz” are examples of stipulations — the rain and
the money are not basic elements of the accounting of matters included in the get, and they are not
part of the definition of the divorce taking effect. The law of stipulation, derived from the
conditions of the tribes of Reuven and Gad receiving their territory in
Transjordan (((Bamidbar, (ch. 32), is innovative: it is possible to stipulate that a certain action will
take effect depending on another act or external event. However, the identity of the woman being
divorced is not ancillary to the writing of the get; the name of the woman is part of the text of
the get, and without it, an essential ingredient of the get’s content, which expresses the divorce of
man and wife, is missing.

We also find this in the continuation of the passage, concerning the slaughter of the paschal
offering for its registrants: “I hereby slaughter the paschal offering on behalf of whoever comes to

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Jerusalem first from among you.” The paschal offering may only be eaten by those who had been
registered at the time of the slaughtering, so the identity of the registrant is an integral part of the
process which begins at the time of slaughter; without it, registration has no content or meaning. If
one says to a certain son of his, “I hereby slaughter the paschal offering on your behalf, on the
condition that you reach Jerusalem first,” this would not be considered bereira: a formulation such
as this is considered a stipulation because the registrant is mentioned explicitly, and the condition
of arriving in Jerusalem first is something external. However, in our formulation, “on behalf of
whoever comes to Jerusalem first from among you,” the slaughtering of the paschal offering is
performed for an undefined, unknown registrant, whose identity will become clear only in the
future, “whoever comes to Jerusalem first from among you.”

In light of all of this, it makes sense that the question of bereira focuses on the present. So that
there will be meaning to writing the get in the present, at the time of the writing, there is a need to
write the get on behalf of a specific woman. The same applies to slaughtering the paschal offering:
the registration is brought into effect at the time that the lamb is slaughtered, and therefore, we
require the registrants to be in existence at that time. Similarly, when it comes to allocating tithes,
it is clear that we require an object of wine at the time that the priestly portion and tithes are
effectively named, for if one does not name a certain “object” of wine, the rest of the wine cannot
be released from its untithed status, and one who drinks from it is liable. Thus, it appears that
according to the one who says that bereira is tenable, one may define the present based on the
future. Therefore, if we maintain that bereira is tenable, those pints will be identified retroactively,
and in the future, when one allocates them, it becomes clear that the previous act of naming took
effect upon these pints which one has now allocated.

The same mechanism applies to writing a get and slaughtering a paschal offering. According to
the one who says that bereira is tenable, both the woman, whom the husband will in the future
want to divorce, as well as the son who in the future will reach Jerusalem first, exist in the
present. Granted, their identity becomes clear to us only in the future, but in any case, this is only
a subjective lack of knowledge on our part at this point in time; on the objective level, even now
there is a certain woman who may be defined as “whomever I choose,” and her identity will be
clarified when the mists of time clear.

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Understanding of the Ramban

We must investigate this idea in light of the passage of bereira found in our Daf

A person may make a stipulation concerning his eruv and say, "If foreigners come from the
east, let my eruv be that of the west; if from the west, let my eruv be that of the east; if they come
from both directions, I will go in whatever direction I desire; and if they come from neither
direction, I will be like the people of my town."

"If a sage comes from the east let my eruv be that of the east; if from the west, let my eruv be
that of the west; if he comes from either direction, I will go in whatever direction I desire; and
if no one comes from either direction, I will be like the people of my town."

Rabbi Yehuda says: “If one of them was his teacher, he may go only to his teacher, but if both
were his teachers, he may go in whatever direction he prefers.”

According to the Gemara, the idea of bereira lies at the core of this. Presumably, it would have
been possible to argue that only the latter case, “I will go in whatever direction I desire” depends
on the law of bereira, and this is what we have said above, because the placement of the eruv is a
characteristic part of the eruv which takes effect at the commencement of Shabbat, and therefore
it is impossible to mark it based on the future without the law of bereira. However, in the former
part, “If foreigners come from the east, let my eruv be that of the west; if from the west, let
my eruv be that of the east,” there is only the conjunction of two stipulations. The first stipulation
is “Let my eruv be that of the west if foreigners come from the east” and this is dependent on an
outside factor, and therefore the eruv is valid even if one believes that bereira is untenable. There
is also an additional valid stipulation, “Let my eruv be that of the east, if they come from the west.”

However, in the continuation of the passage, the Gemara writes:

Rav stated: Set aside our Mishna, for we have Ayo’s Mishna. Ayo’s Mishna reads as follows:
“Rabbi Yehuda says, ‘A man cannot make simultaneous conditions in connection with two
possible events. He can only say, “If a sage comes from the east, let my merger be that of the east;
if from the west, let my merger be that of the west,” but not “If he comes from either direction.”’”

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Why does it not work if one says, "If he comes from either direction?" Obviously because the rule
of imputation is not tenable, but then for “from the east” and “from the west”, imputation is
untenable as well!

The Gemara determines that in the version of Ayo, who believes that bereira is not tenable, one
should take issue with the former case.

The Ramban in our passage relates to this problem and claims that if one makes the stipulation
concerning one matter, then this is considered a stipulation, and is valid according to
everyone. However, if one stipulates concerning two things, this is dependent on the law
of bereira. Unfortunately, he does not offer an explanation of this distinction.

It makes sense that according to the Ramban, the former case of the Mishna is not defined as two
independent conditions. If we separate the conditions one from the other, it is possible to validate
each condition separately, because each is dependent on one external factor. From the fact that
the Talmud validates this case based on bereira, we have no choice but to say that we are talking
about one complex condition; if so, the problem of bereira resurfaces: at the time of the
effectuation of the eruv, the location of the eruv — an intrinsic characteristic part of the
effectuation — depends on the future occurrence: will the invaders come, and from which direction
will they do so? Therefore, the eruv can be binding only according to the one who holds
that bereira is tenable, because according to him, we may define the present based on the future. If
so, the words of the Ramban dovetail with what we have explained above.

The view which holds that bereira is untenable believes, of course, that the future does not clarify
what came before; rather, as the future unfolds a new reality comes into being. According to this,
the present cannot be elucidated by the future, and in the present, at the time of the writing of
the get, it is not written on behalf of a specific woman; similarly, at the time of slaughtering the
paschal offering, the registration does not apply to anyone; finally, at the time that the teruma is
named, there is no specific portion of the barrel of wine.

However, in Our Daf, the Gemara assumes that Rabbi Shimon believes that bereira is untenable,
because he forbids one to drink the wine even after one designates “whatever I allocate in the
future is teruma” Rava there rejects this idea and explains that Rabbi Shimon really believes
that bereira is tenable, and even if bereira is tenable, in any case at the time of allocation, there is

17
a problem: the remnants of the wine, the remainders after the separation of the tithes, are not
distinguishable. Teruma is defined as “premier”, the prime, first part of the produce, implying that
there must be something recognizable left over. (This is a local teruma consideration and is
unrelated to bereira which is a universal halakhic issue).

Rava replied: “This is different, because we require it to be ‘premier’ (((Devarim( 18:4) — the
remnants must be distinguishable.”
Abaye said to him: “Now then, if a man has before him two untithed pomegranates and declares:
‘If rain will fall today, the one shall be the priestly portion for the other, and if no rain will fall
today, the other shall be the priestly portion for the first,’ would his assertion here also be null and
void, whether there was rain that day or not?

The Tosafists note that Abaye’s question is not only difficult for those who hold Rava’s
view! Even if we will say that Rabbi Shimon does not require distinguishable remnants but
believes that bereira is untenable, it is impossible to allocate one of two pomegranates.

Summary

It appears that the question of bereira reflects two conceptions of the future. The view which
believes that bereira is tenable accepts a deterministic view concerning the future. Therefore, in
the present as well, there are only two certain pints which will be allocated in the future, and our
sole problem is a lack of knowledge concerning their identity. Therefore, there is meaning in the
present to marking a certain object on the basis of future events.

Those who dispute this do not accept this view. According to their position, as long as one does
not allocate the wine, it is impossible to speak about certain pints which will be allocated in the
future, because the situation in the present is open to all future possibilities. Therefore, one cannot
say that two pints now exist which may be labeled as “whatever I allocate in the future.” On the
other hand, one may say that all pints in the barrel at the time of naming the teruma correspond to
this definition at that time, and therefore the status of safek teruma will apply to every drop.

18
David Brodsky writes:5

During the Talmudic and medieval periods, the rabbis were clear that taxes that would benefit the
people (as opposed to supporting a foreign military occupation) were just and obligatory. Thus,
the rabbis mandated that Jews pay taxes for infrastructural maintenance of the city — specifically,
for the upkeep of the walls and gates of the city (Mishnah Bava Batra 1:5 and BT Bava Batra 7b–
11a) — and for the maintenance of the poor. (Bava Batra 7b–11a) While some have viewed such
taxes as intended for Jews alone, the upkeep of the town is clearly beneficial to all residents, and
not all towns were comprised of a single ethnic group. And while charity for the poor was
particularly geared toward poor people within the Jewish community, poor gentiles seem not to
have been excluded. (Mishnah Gittin 5:8)

Moreover, when it came to taxes owed to the Persian Empire, the Babylonian Talmud
undermined (and, one might even argue, countermanded) the Mishnah’s apparently permissive
stance toward tax evasion, with the prominent third-century Babylonian Rabbi Shmuel
declaring, “dina d’malchuta dina,” “the law of the land is binding.”
(BT Nedarim 28a, Gittin 10b, Bava Qamma 113a–b, and Bava Batra 54b–55a)

When it came to governments that were not putting down Jewish rebellions, killing tens of
thousands of inhabitants, or collecting taxes in a manner the rabbis associated with highway
robbery, it would seem that the rabbis of this period were less lenient toward tax evasion.

In the Medieval period, particularly in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, sages such as Rabbi
Solomon b. Abraham Adret (known as the Rashba) instituted a complex scheme of taxation
modeled loosely on the more rudimentary system delineated in the Babylonian Talmud.

The new system, which held Jews liable if they evaded paying taxes, went well beyond the
Talmud’s more basic provisions for maintaining the city’s walls and gates and feeding the poverty
stricken. It included “anything that is for the need of the city.” (Rosh, Responsa, 6:22, cf.
Mordechai, Bava Batra 478 [on Bava Batra 7b])

In a responsum, Adret asserts that tax laws are a civil matter based on local customs, and, in
matters of taxes, “custom nullifies the halacha.” (Responsa, 4:260) His point is that the system of
taxation instituted by the Babylonian Talmud is meant as a historical example of the kind of
obligation owed by citizens, rather than a declaration that defines or limits the purposes for which
taxes may be levied.

5
http://shma.com/files/2013/03/fooling-the-tax-collector-why-the-rabbis-once-approved/

19
Taxation and Dina Demalchusa

Rabbi Jay Gelman writes on Nedarim 286

Dina demalchuta Dina, the law of the land is the law, is one of the most famous teachings of Jewish
jurisprudence. While ostensibly a law relating to the paying of taxes, it reflects the deep loyalty
Jews are to have to their countries of residence. This idea was initially formulated by the prophet
Yirmiyahu (see chapter 29), when the Jewish people were about to go into exile for the first
time following the Babylonian conquest of Israel.

It was Shmuel, a first generation Babylonian Amora, who formulated the law in its current
form ((Nedarim 28a). He was a student of Rabbi Yehuda HaNassi who, realizing that Jewish life
in Israel was in irreversible decline, edited the Mishnah. Two of his primary students, Rav and
Shmuel, laid the foundation of 800 years of Jewish scholarship in Bavel, and it was Shmuel who
taught this fundamental principle of Jewish law.

Most interestingly, this law is not mentioned in the Mishnah but emerges from the Gemara's
questioning of the Mishnah regarding the payment (or non-payment) of taxes. "One may take a
vow to murderers, robbers, and tax collectors that it is terumah even though it is not terumah, that
it is from the royal palace even though it is not from the royal palace" ((Nedarim 27b).

Human beings are full of all kinds of unbelievable inconsistencies and contradictions. Our
Mishnah advises how we may deal with those who would murder but would never eat "non-
kosher" food; in this instance terumah, which was only allowed to be eaten by a kohen. A zar, non-
kohen, who eats terumah is punished with "death at the hands of heaven" (a much more serious
punishment than that received for eating non-kosher meat), and even Jewish murderers would

6
https://www.torahinmotion.org/discussions-and-blogs/nedarim-28-murderer-and-tax-collector

20
refrain from eating such. Whether this was out of a warped degree of respect for the "clergy" or a
reflection of a warped system of priorities in general matters little.

Based on this premise, one being held up at "gunpoint" for his food was allowed to take a vow that
the food before him was terumah, thereby thwarting the thief. (Presumably, the thief is unaware
of this Mishnah in Nedarim, but is aware of the severity of both eating terumah and lying under
oath). Even if there is no fear of being killed by the robber, one may take such a (false) vow to
safeguard his food.

Alternatively, one could take an oath that the food belonged to the royal family; while one may
steal and even kill commoners, starting up with the royal family was likely a career and life-ending
move. To these rulings, the Gemara is silent, finding them non-surprising[1].

What the Gemara does question is why one can lie to a tax-collector and claim one's assets are not
really his own. After all, Dina Demalchuta Dina obligates one to pay taxes. To this, the Gemara
explains that we are dealing either with someone collecting much more than he should and
pocketing the difference, or with a non-licensed tax collector who has no right to collect the monies
in the first place. Jews must pay their taxes, but only their "fair share".

In Talmudic times, "fair share" meant it was authorized by the monarch. It might be extraordinarily
high and not truly fair but, if it is authorized by the government, it must be paid.

It hardly needs reminding that Dina Demalchuta Dina was formulated in a non-democratic
society, where tax monies did not go to serve the people but to enrich the king. Nonetheless, we
were obligated to pay despite receiving little or no benefit from our tax dollar.

Rabbi Hershel Shachter writes:7

In the days of the Talmud taxes were collected for the purpose of enriching the king. Based
on the parshas hamelech in Sefer Shmuel (Shmuel I 8:11), the Rabbis formulated the principle
of dina demalchusa dina (Nedarim 28a), literally, the "law of the land is binding": everyone
must pay taxes. In Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 369:8), the Rishonim are quoted as
having pointed out that if the taxes are unfair, or discriminatory (which is also unfair,) this
would not constitute "dina" demalchusa - "the law of the land," but rather
"gazlanusa" demalchusa - "the embezzlement of the land," and such tax laws are not binding
(see Nefesh Harav p. 269). A system of graduated income tax is considered fair and
reasonable (see LeTorah Velemoadim by Rav Zevin, p. 118).

There was a theory among some of the Baalei HaTosfos that the idea behind paying taxes is
the principle of rent. The land of each country belongs to the ruler (or the government) of that

7
Einayim L'Torah, Volume 20, Number 9.

21
particular country, and the owner of any real estate is entitled to charge rent from all those
who want to live on their property.

The one exception to this rule (according to this view) is Eretz Yisroel, which the Torah
declares belongs to Hashem (Vayikra 25:23). Since Hashem is the true property owner, and
He has encouraged all of Bnei Yisroel to live in Eretz Yisroel, no government in control there
ever has the right to charge taxes (rent) because they are not the rightful landlord. The
Landlord (with a capital "L") has granted permission for all of Bnei Yisroel to live in His
country (what is called the "paltin shel melech" - "the palace of the king".)

This view is quoted by the Ran in his commentary to Nedarim (28a). There are many religious
people who are not that knowledgeable of any other comments made by the Ran on Nedarim,
either before or after page 28 and are only familiar with this one position of the Ran. The truth
of the matter is that not only has this view not been accepted in Shulchan Aruch (Chosehn
Mishpat 369:6), it didn't even gain honorable mention. The Shulchan Aruch quotes verbatim
from the Rambam that one is obligated to pay taxes both in Eretz Yisroel as well as in other
countries.

It is important to note that today the basis for taxation is totally different from what it was in
Talmudic times. Today, all modern countries provide a variety of services: They provide
streets and highways and maintain forests and museums. They provide fire, police, and
military protection. They collect garbage and deliver mail. They do medical research to
discover cures for diseases, etc. The taxes are collected for the purpose of covering the annual
budget, which pays for all of these projects.

The halacha views all of the people living in the same neighborhood as "shutfim" - "partners,"
sharing a common need for a shul, yeshiva, mikveh and an eruv, and therefore, the "partners"
can force each other to put up the needed amount to further their partnership. So too, all people
who live in the same city, state, and country are considered "shutfim" with respect to the
services provided by that city, state, and country.

The purpose behind the taxes is no longer "to enrich the king" in the slightest. In addition to
all the other expenses, the government officials have to be paid as well, but it is because they
serve as the employees of all the citizens for the purpose of looking after all these services
and seeing to it that they are properly taken care of. In our modern world, one who does not
pay his proper share of taxes is no longer viewed as cheating the king (or the ruler) of the
country, but rather as cheating (i.e. stealing from) his partners.

The amount of money not paid by the one who cheats will have to be taken care of by having
the rest of the "partners" put up more money from their pockets to cover all the expenses of
the partnership. And even if much of the tax money goes towards expenditures that are not to
one's personal liking and that one gets nothing out of, such is the halacha of any partnership:
the majority of the partners have the right to determine what are the reasonable needs of the
partnership (Choshen Mishpat 163:1).

22
 Therefore, this majority has the legitimate right to force the minority to contribute their share
towards properly furthering the partnership.

Fiscus Judaicus

The fiscus Iudaicus (Latin for "Jewish tax") or fiscus Judaicus was a tax-collecting agency
instituted to collect the tax imposed on Jews in the Roman Empire after the destruction of
Jerusalem and its Temple in AD 70. Revenues were directed to the Temple of Jupiter Optimus
Maximus in Rome.

23
In Jewish history in the period of Roman rule two categories should be distinguished under this
heading: (1) mokhesim, farmers-general (see publicani), by preference of the equestrian order, and
(2) gabba'im, their agents employed in collecting the taxes (sometimes also called publicani, as in
the New Testament).

The first Roman organization of taxes in Syria and Palestine was begun by Pompey (c. 65 B.C.E.).
Under Gabinius' administration there was almost no place for the publicani in Judea, as Gabinius
was their bitter enemy and tried in every way to eliminate them from the tax gathering in his
province.

However, during the Herodian period, Julius Caesar made the rulers of the new Jewish state
responsible for the taxes (Jos., Ant., 14: 163ff., et al.).

The Herodian rulers farmed the taxes out to individual farmers or to associations. In the period of
the Roman principate poll taxes and land taxes were collected directly by officials (cf. Tosef.,
Dem. 6:3) and only customs, tolls, and similar taxes were farmed out to publicani.

In the second and third centuries the bouleutai (= curiales), and the decemprimi of the towns and
villages, and notable persons of the strategiae had to answer for the full payment of taxes imposed
on their districts (see BB 143a). Often, to evade these duties, they took to flight. R. *Johanan even
advised crossing the Jordan and leaving Ereẓ Israel rather than assuming such duties (TJ, MK 2:3,
81b).

As the burdens of taxation became ever more intolerable, so did the tax farmer or collector become
a more hateful and dreaded personality (cf., Sanh. 92b, where a gabbai is likened to the bear in
Amos 5:19). At times they even contrived to extract payments by torture (see Num. R. 17:5; cf.
Philo, Spec. 3, 153–63).

24
Being so unpopular, the collector's job was no easy one; indeed, at times he ran great
personal risk, as an enraged populace was quite likely to lynch him (Gen, R. 42:4). Since
both mokhesim and gabba'im were classed with "robbers," Talmudic law disqualified them
from acting as witnesses (Sanh. 25b).

Neither was their money accepted for charity (BK 10:1). Sometimes however, tax collectors were
unwilling agents of the publicani. Thus, Tosefta Demai (3:4, et al.) reads: "At first [the sages] said,
'A ḥaver who becomes a gabbai is expelled from the order.' Subsequently they declared, 'As long
as he is a gabbai he is not trusted, but if he withdraws from being a gabbai he is [again] trusted.'"
A number of Jewish tax collectors and farmers are mentioned, e.g., Johannes from Caesarea (Jos.,
Wars, 2:287), Zechariah on the Jordan near Jericho (Luke 19:2), the tax gatherers at Capernaum
on Lake Tiberias, probably responsible for customs, port duties, and fishing tolls (Matt. 9:9), etc.

Tax collectors formed themselves into companies (societas publicanorum), each member taking a
share (a quarter or less) of the collection and its profits, according to the capital invested.

Imposition

The tax was initially imposed by Roman Emperor Vespasian as one of the measures against
Jews as a result of the First Roman-Jewish War of 66–73 AD (first Jewish revolt) (Josephus BJ 7.
218; Dio Cassius 66.7.2).
The tax was imposed on all Jews throughout the empire, not just on those who took part in the
revolt against Rome. The tax was imposed after the destruction of the Second Temple in 70 AD in
place of the levy (or Tithe) payable by Jews towards the upkeep of the Temple.
The amount levied was two denarii, equivalent to the one-half of a shekel that observant Jews had
previously paid for the upkeep of the Temple of Jerusalem (Exodus 30:13). The tax was to go
instead to the Temple of Capitoline Jupiter, the major center of ancient Roman religion. The fiscus
Iudaicus was a humiliation for the Jews. In Rome, a special procurator known as procurator ad
capitularia Iudaeorum was responsible for the collection of the tax. Only those who had
abandoned Judaism were exempt from paying it.
While the tax paid for the Temple of Jerusalem was payable only by adult men between the ages
of 20 and 50, the fiscus Iudaicus was imposed on all Jews, including women, children, and
elderly—and even Jewish slaves.
In Egypt, the documentary evidence (in the form of receipts) confirms the payment of the tax by
women and children. The oldest person known from these receipts to have paid the fiscus
Iudaicus was a 61-year-old woman, which led Sherman LeRoy Wallace to conjecture that the tax
was levied only until the age of 62, as was the regular Roman poll tax paid by individuals
throughout the Empire.
The tax was continued even after the completion of the reconstruction of the Capitoline temple for
its upkeep.

25
Domitian
Domitian, who ruled between 81 and 96 AD, expanded the fiscus Iudaicus to include not only born
Jews and converts to Judaism, but also those who concealed the fact that they were Jews or
observed Jewish customs. Suetonius relates that when he was young, an old man of 90 was
examined to see whether he was circumcised, which shows that during this period the tax was
levied even on those above the age of 62. Louis Feldman argues that the increased harshness was
caused by the success of the Jewish (and possibly Christian) proselytism.
Domitian applied the tax even to those who merely "lived like Jews":
Besides other taxes, that on the Jews [A tax of two drachmas a head, imposed by Vespasian; see
Josephus, Bell. Jud. 7.218] was levied with the utmost rigor, and those were prosecuted who,
without publicly acknowledging that faith, yet lived as Jews, as well as those who concealed their
origin and did not pay the tribute levied upon their people [These may have been Christians, whom
the Romans commonly assumed were Jews]. I recall being present in my youth when the person
of a man ninety years old was examined before the procurator and a very crowded court, to see
whether he was circumcised. [c. 90].

Domitian's ruling opened the door to possibilities of blackmail in Rome and in all Italy. Charges
of following Judaism were easily made, but difficult to disprove, not least because the practices of
certain philosophical sects resembled some Jewish customs. As a result, many people chose to
settle with the accusers out of court rather than risk the uncertainties of judicial hearings, thus
effectively encouraging the blackmailers. Titus Flavius Clemens was put to death for "living a
Jewish life" or "drifting into Jewish ways" in the year 95 AD, which may well have been related
to the administration of the fiscus Judaicus under Domitian.

26
Schism between Judaism and Christianity
The fiscus Iudaicus was originally imposed on Jews. At the time neither the Romans nor, probably,
the Early Christians considered Christianity to be a separate religion from Judaism. If anything
they would have considered themselves as a sect within Judaism, which historians refer to
as Jewish Christianity. However, whether that was the intention or not, it did not take long for
Christians to petition the Emperor to distinguish the Christians for the purpose of the payment of
the fiscus Iudaicus. As the tax only applied to practising Jews, if they could be recognised as a
separate religion, they would escape the impost.
After the murder of Domitian in 96 AD, Nerva relaxed the rules of collection, limiting the tax to
those who openly practiced Judaism. By this measure, the Christians (and perhaps Jewish
Christians) escaped the tax, but they were not officially recognized as a legal religion until the
much later Edict of Milan in 313.

The coins of Nerva bear the legend fisci Iudaici calumnia sublata "abolition of malicious
prosecution in connection with the Jewish tax," in reference to his reform of the harsh policies
of Domitian.

Taxing during medieval Period

The tax was revived in the Middle Ages in 1342 under the name of Opferpfennig by the Holy
Roman Emperors. The Opferpfennig (originally Guldenpfennig) tax was introduced in 1342 by
Emperor Louis IV the Bavarian, who ordered all Jews above the age of 12 and possessing 20
gulden to pay one gulden annually for protection.
The practice was justified on the grounds that the emperor, as the legal successor of the Roman
emperors, was the rightful recipient of the Temple tax which Jews paid to the Romans after the
destruction of the Second Temple. The Opferpfennig was collected on Christmas day.

27
Emperor Charles IV later ordered the income of the Opferpfennig tax to be delivered to the
archbishop of Trier. This tax was at some places replaced by an overall communal tax.
The original name was Guldenpfennig, changed in later generations to Opferpfennig. The practice
was motivated by sheer economic necessity and justified by Christian chroniclers on the grounds
that the German emperor, as the legal successor of the Roman emperors, was the rightful recipient
of the traditional Temple tax which Jews paid after the destruction of the Second Temple.
The Opferpfennig (called donatio by the exchequer) was collected on Christmas day, giving the
levy the ignominy of a degrading poll tax.

By 1346 the emperor was already disposing of

the Opferpfennig of *Frankfurt , *Friedberg , *Gelnhausen , and *Wetzlar . *Charles IV ordered
the income of the 1348 tax to be delivered to the archbishop of Triers. The Opferpfennig, like
other taxes, was a readily transferable source of income but never grew to sizable proportions.
This poll tax was sometimes replaced by an overall fixed communal tax. Rich and powerful Jews
often succeeded in buying or obtaining exemption from the tax, a symbol of servitude.

28
From 1584 to 1639, as in the Middle Ages, the Jews of Altona paid taxes specific to the Jews, but
no further taxes. Each Jewish family was required to pay 6 Reichstaler per year. Under Danish rule
this changed: the Jews continued to pay the specifically Jewish taxes plus the same taxes as all
other residents. From 1641 every Jewish family was required to pay 5 Reichstaler in Jewish taxes;
in the year when Altona became a town the contribution rose to 6 Reichstaler. With the ordinance
of 1641 the Danish king had permitted the Jews shechita.
This privilege too was not cost-free. For the years 1667–1669 we have records of taxes paid by
Jewish butchers. According to these the rates were 1 Mark and 8 Schillinge for an ox, 4 Schillinge
for a calf and 2 Schillinge for a lamb. These taxes were twice as high as those paid by Christian
butchers.[28] From 1681 Individual taxes on the Jews (6 Reichstaler plus the payments made by the
Jewish butchers), were replaced by lump-sum payments by the Jewish community.
From the year 1712 onwards, it is possible to calculate the amount of the lump-sum payments
made by the Jews. During the period 1712–1818 this amounted to 6 Reichstaler for each Jewish
family; 6 Reichstaler was the level that had already been set in 1584. Assuming that a Jewish
family consisted of approximately 6 persons, 6 Reichstaler corresponded to 1 Reichstaler for each
individual Jew. On top of this 1 Reichstaler, also paid by the other residents, had to be paid.
The tax burden on the members of the Jewish community was twice as heavy as that on the other
residents. The influence of this on business practice constituted an obstacle to the granting of civil
rights. In the year 1818 the Jewish Elders declared to the community of Altona that they could not,
’on the one hand, levy specifically Jewish taxes on the members of their community and, on the
other hand, encourage our co-religionaries, especially the younger ones, to pursue useful activity.
In short: so to improve our condition that we might not seem unworthy to acquire civil rights. The
extension – against our wishes - of the taxes on the Jews would be incompatible with the granting
of civil rights.’’ This marks the beginning of the struggle of the Jewish community for
emancipation. The Jewish community secured the abolition of taxes on the Jews in the year 1842.

29
 NAZI Taxes on Jews8

Albrecht Ritschl writes:9

The Nazis got to power in 1933 with the explicitly stated goal of destroying the livelihood of
Germany’s Jews. According to Fremdling (2016), Nazi officials believed that Germany’s Jewish
minority – some 500 000 people in 1933, or 0.77% of the population – owned up to 20% of
Germany’s wealth at the time. Such beliefs seem to have informed policy decisions by the Nazi
regime in 1936 to stop subsidizing Jewish emigration and instead embark on a strategy of
expropriation, hoping to use the spoils to help finance war preparation. Similar beliefs have
induced later scholars to interpret the Holocaust as economically motivated (Aly 2007).

In this column, I use information from a collection of tax data on the proceeds of confiscation put
together by former ministry officials for the Allied occupation authorities in 1947.

The source provides an overview of the fiscal instruments used in the confiscatory taxation of
Germany’s Jews since the Nazis got to power in 1933. It suggests that the spoils were actually
very limited and fell short of expectations.

Three forms of confiscatory taxation

Confiscatory taxation of Jewish property took mainly three forms. The first was a tax on migration.

Introduced already before 1933 to stem capital flight, it was changed in 1933 to impose a 25%
wealth tax on all wealth transfers out of Germany beyond a lowered threshold. Furthermore, large
parts of a migrant’s remaining domestic assets were credited to a blocked account at an affiliate of
the Reichsbank, Germany’s central bank at the time, and only a fraction would be converted into
foreign exchange (e.g. Drecoll 2011).

Jews applying to emigrate would automatically be treated as being suspicious of attempted tax
avoidance, creating the strongest incentives not to understate declared asset values (Bajohr 2001).

This could also imply that assets sold to non-Jews under duress at below-market prices were still
assessed at book values for the purpose of calculating the migration tax.

Table 1 collects the data and calculates an effective tax rate on migration, which combines the
nominal tax rate and the transfer quota until March 1938.

8
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/100727/1/WP297.pdf
9
https://voxeu.org/article/confiscatory-taxation-jewish-property-and-income-nazi-germany

30
Table 1 Fiscal dispossession of migrants, 1933/34-1937/38 (millions of Reichsmarks)

Note: Revenue from emigration tax is for fiscal years from 1 April 1933 to 31 March 1938.
Source: Ritschl (2019).

The second form of confiscatory taxation was a capital levy on Jewish wealth imposed in 1938
after the annexation of Austria. Earlier the same year, all Jewish assets had been registered with
the local tax office. As with the migration tax, assessment was at book values according to the tax
code to prevent undervaluation. The capital levy was first set at 20% and later increased
retroactively to 25%, as the intended revenue target was originally not met. Based on its revenue,
the implied net value of Jewish assets in 1938 would be 4.5 billion Reichsmarks, a value also cited

31
in the 1947 source underlying Table 1. In a study of Jewish dispossession in Austria, Junz (2002)
finds a slightly lower value of 4.3 billion Reichsmarks.

A third form of confiscatory taxation consisted two further levies. The first targeted the proceeds
from the foreclosure of remaining Jewish businesses, imposed after the Kristallnacht pogroms of
November 1938. The second consisted in the final transfer of all previously confiscated liquid
assets to the central government budget under an executive order of November 1941. Table 2 lists
all fiscal dispossession in Germany excluding Austria after March 1938.

Table 2 Fiscal dispossession, 1938-1944 (billions of Reichsmarks)

Source: Ritschl (2019)

Of the 4.5 billion Reichsmarks registered as Jewish owned assets in early 1938, the Nazis directed
2.65 billion Reichsmarks, or 58%, into the state coffers. This is less than the estimated 78%
confiscation rate we obtain for Jewish emigrants before 1938. Largely this is due to the destruction
of the economic livelihood of Germany’s Jewish minority in mid-1938, with most of Germany’s
Jews reduced to receiving welfare support financed out of confiscated assets (see the contributions
in Kreutzmüller and Zatlin 2019).

Estimating the Jewish wealth share

The implied asset values in the previous tables sum up to 5.5 billion Reichsmarks. The 1947 source
underlying the above tables adds a roughly guessed 1 billion Reichsmarks in wild confiscations of
Jewish property before 1938 and arrives at a total of 6.5 billion Reichsmarks. Fremdling (2016)
cites internal guesstimates from Germany’s Statistical Office in 1936 that put Jewish wealth
anywhere between 2.2 and 8 billion RM Reichsmarks with a midpoint estimate of 4-4.5 billion
Reichsmarks. In her study of Jewish dispossession after the German occupation of Austria, Junz
(2002) ventures a guess rising to 8-16 billion Reichsmarks.

How much is much? Fremdling (2016) cites a contemporary estimate of taxable wealth in the
German economy of 100 billion Reichsmarks for 1928. Calculating the above asset totals into that,
one would easily arrive at Jewish wealth shares of 7-8%, or perhaps even 16% if Junz’s (2002)
upper-bound guesstimate is to be believed.

However, the taxable wealth estimate must be seriously flawed. Nominal GDP was 89 billion
Reichsmarks in 1928 and 79 billion Reichsmarks in 1936. According to the Kaldor stylized facts,

32
an economy’s real capital stock should be about five times its GDP. Even allowing for shortfalls
in capital stock levels due to postwar hyperinflation and the Great Depression after 1929, the
aggregate capital stock should be expected to be upwards of 300-400 billion Reichsmarks, not 100
billion Reichsmarks.

Estimates by Gehrig (1961) and Hoffmann (1965) indeed value Germany’s capital stock in 1936
at around 400 billion Reichsmarks. Private-sector real capital stock in the mid-1930s would be
roughly 300 billion Reichsmarks.

Using the shares of real capital among Jewish 1938 assets in Junz (2002), Table 3 calculates a
range of estimated Jewish shares in German private-sector real capital.

Table 3 Real capital stock and the Jewish population share (billions of Reichsmarks)

Source: Real capital: I: Gehrig (1961: 56 and 35), II: Hoffmann (1965: 256). Estimates A-C: own calculations using
share of real capital in 1938 census of Jewish wealth, Junz (2002: 79), applied to alternative total wealth estimates
(A) 5.5 billion Reichsmarks, (B) 6.5 billion Reichsmarks, and (C) 8 billion Reichsmarks.

Estimate A is a lower bound, assuming 5.5 billion Reichsmarks of Jewish assets, of which 2.99
billion Reichsmarks were real capital. Estimate B follows the 1947 document in adding 1 billion
Reichsmarks for wild confiscations before 1938, assuming a total 6.5 billion Reichsmarks, of
which 3.54 billion Reichsmarks would be real capital. Estimate C follows the upper-bound
estimate of the Statistical Office cited in Fremdling (2016), which coincides with the lower-bound
guess in Junz (2002), assuming 8 billion Reichsmarks of Jewish assets. Of these, 4.36 billion
Reichsmarks would have been real capital.

33
Over the range of estimates going into Table 3, we find the Jewish share in German real capital to
have been well in line with the Jewish population share, not disproportionately higher. All
estimates lie in a band between 0.9% and 1.6% of private sector capital, with a plausible midpoint
around 1.2%. Germany’s Jews in the 1930s were better educated than the average German, but not
massively richer. 10

10
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