Dad Ditty Shabbes 150: Speech vs Thought

‫ָתִּשׁיב ִמַשָּׁבּת‬-‫יג ִאם‬

13 If thou turn away thy foot because of the
‫ ְבּיוֹם‬5‫ ֲעשׂוֹת ֲחָפֶצ‬,5‫ַר ְגֶל‬ sabbath, from pursuing thy business on My
,‫ָקְדִשׁי; ְוָקָראָת ַלַשָּׁבּת ֹעֶנג‬ holy day; and call the sabbath a delight, and
,‫ִלְקדוֹשׁ ְיהָוה ְמֻכָבּד‬ the holy of the LORD honorable; and shalt
honor it, not doing thy wonted ways, nor
,5‫ְוִכַבְּדתּוֹ ֵמֲעשׂוֹת ְדָּרֶכי‬ pursuing thy business, nor speaking thereof;
.‫ ְוַדֵבּר ָדָּבר‬5‫ִמְמּצוֹא ֶחְפְצ‬
ISA. 58:13

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 One Shabbat morning during morning prayers at synagogue,

Yankel whispers to his friend Mendel, “Nisht shabbes geret (not to speak of it
on Shabbat, but) I’m selling my car.”

Mendel asks, “Nisht shabbes geret, how much?” Yankel responds, “Nisht
shabbes geret, $3000.”

Mendel whispers back, “Nisht shabbes geret, let me think about it.” Later on,
the men meet again at mincha (afternoon) services.

Mendel nudges Yankel and whispers, “Nisht shabbes geret, I thought about it,
and I’ll take the car.”

Yankel shakes his head, “Nisht shabbes geret, I sold it at kiddush!”

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One's manner of speech and conversation must also conform to the restful character of Shabbos
and reflect its quiet serenity.

This primarily includes restrictions upon verbally expressing one's intentions to perform a melacha
after Shabbos (even if the discussion does not help achieve one's plans in any way).

Examples: One may not state his intention to repair an appliance, write a letter, drive a car, or
similar melacha activities after Shabbos.

Some specific examples: “I plan on writing a letter to my friend after Shabbos.” “I intend to drive
to the city tonight.” “I will repair the sink after Shabbos.”

Similarly, one may not discuss or plan business agreements on Shabbos.

Verbally implied intentions

From the verse in Isaiah above; "Hiluchecha" ("your walk"), "Mimtzo Cheftzecho" ("your
activities") and "Daber Davar" ("spoken word") each denotes a quality of explicitness, thereby
precluding ‫( מחשבה‬unrevealed intent).
Therefore, only an explicit verbalizing of intention to do a melacha (or other Rabbinic restriction)
after Shabbos is prohibited.

Verbal intentions that are subtly implied are not forbidden.

Example: For example, one may say that he intends to travel to another city as long as he does not
say that he intends to drive there.

Only "Dibur" (explicit verbal expression), is forbidden. Mere ‫(מחשבה‬implicit intent) is not
forbidden.

Hiring workers on Shabbat: source, Biblical or merely allusion?

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Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The halakha is in accordance with the
opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa. And Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan
said: What is the reason for Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa’s ruling? As it is written in the
verse from which we derive the prohibition to speak on Shabbat about activities that one may not
perform on that day:

‫ ֲﬠשׂוֹת‬,f‫ָתִּשׁיב ִמַשָּׁבּת ַרְגֶל‬-‫יג ִאם‬
‫ ְבּיוֹם ָקְדִשׁי; ְוָקָראָת ַלַשָּׁבּת‬f‫ֲחָפֶצ‬
‫ ְוִכַבְּדתּוֹ‬,‫ ִלְקדוֹשׁ ְיהָוה ְמֻכָבּד‬,‫ֹעֶנג‬
‫ ְוַדֵבּר‬f‫ ִמְמּצוֹא ֶחְפְצ‬,f‫ֵמֲﬠשׂוֹת ְדָּרֶכי‬
.‫ָדָּבר‬
13 If thou turn away thy foot because of the sabbath, from
pursuing thy business on My holy day; and call the sabbath a
delight, and the holy of the LORD honorable; and shalt honor
it, not doing thy wonted ways, nor pursuing thy business, nor
speaking thereof;

Isa 58:13

“And you shall honor it by not doing your ways, nor pursuing your business, nor speaking of
it” (Isaiah 58:13). We derive from this verse that speaking is prohibited, but merely
contemplating these matters is permitted.

Rav Aḥa bar Rav Huna raised a contradiction to Rava: Did Rabbi Yoḥanan really state as a
general principle that speaking is prohibited, but contemplating is permitted? Consequently,
we can derive from here that contemplation is not tantamount to speech.

But Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: It is permitted to think about Torah
in any place except for a bathhouse and a bathroom. This statement indicates that
contemplation is tantamount to speech, as even thought is prohibited in these locations.

The Gemara answers: It is different there, for with regard to Torah we need to fulfill the verse:
‫ ְבֶּקֶרב‬3‫ ִמְתַהֵלּ‬-‫ֶהי‬+‫טו ִכּי י ְהו ָה ֱא‬ 15 For the LORD thy God walketh in the midst of thy
‫ ו ְָהי ָה‬,-‫ ְלָפנֶי‬-‫ ו ְָלֵתת א ֹי ְֶבי‬-‫ ְלַהִצּיְל‬,-ֶ‫ַמֲחנ‬ camp, to deliver thee, and to give up thine enemies
‫ ֶעְרו ַת‬-‫י ְִרֶאה ְב‬-‫א‬+ְ ‫ ו‬:‫ ָקדוֹשׁ‬,-‫ַמֲחנֶי‬ before thee; therefore, shall thy camp be holy; that He
{‫ }ס‬.-‫שׁב ֵמאֲַחֶרי‬ ָ ְ ‫ ו‬,‫ָדָּבר‬ see no unseemly thing in thee, and turn away from
thee. {S}

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 Deut 23:15

“For the Lord your God walks in the midst of your camp to deliver you and to give your enemies
before you; therefore, your camp shall be sacred so that He see no unseemly thing in you and
turn away from you” (Deuteronomy 23:15); and the requirement to be sacred is not fulfilled if
one thinks about Torah while in the bathhouse or bathroom.

he Gemara challenges this: But here, too, with regard to a bathhouse and a bathroom, it is written:
“So that He see no unseemly thing [davar] in you” (Deuteronomy 23:15). We can infer that this
prohibits speech [dibbur] but not contemplation.

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The Gemara answers: That verse is not referring to speech. It is needed for the ruling of Rav
Yehuda, for Rav Yehuda said: Opposite a naked gentile, it is prohibited to recite Shema, as
this is included in the prohibition of unseemly things mentioned above.

The Sugya of Hiring workers1

Rashi explains that the reason it is prohibited to speak to a worker on Shabbos and arrange to
hire him is that it is in violation of ‫—חפצך ממצוא‬pursuit of one’s personal business”.

Rambam concurs with this approach, as he writes (Commentary to Mishnayos) “It is prohibited
to speak and consult and pursue any matter which is to be done after Shabbos because it is
prohibited to be done on Shabbos.

This is learned from the verse (Isa 58): “[A person must refrain from] pursuit of personal
business, and to speak words [about it].” The verse continues to warn against being involved in
personal business and vocational pursuits on Hashem’s holy day.”

In another context (Beitza 37a), Rashi writes that the reason it is prohibited to speak about
hiring a worker is that it might lead to writing. Rabbi Aliva Eiger (‫ סי' י"ז‬,‫ )שו"ת קמא‬notes that
Rambam’s comments on that discussion also seem to suggest that the concern is that such verbal
plans might lead the people involved to record their arrangements.

Rambam writes (Hilchos Shabbos 23:12):

“Writing is one of the main categories of prohibited labor on Shabbos…It is similarly prohibited
to buy or sell, to rent or to hire, because these activities lead to writing.” It seems that, in fact,
speaking about hiring a worker should not be considered “pursuit of one’s personal business”,
other than the aspect of it leading to writing. After all, without writing, nothing has been done
which violates Shabbos. It is as if a person arranges with his friend and says, “If you watch my
garden, I will reciprocate, and I will watch yours.” Or it is as if he would ask his friend to kindly
move a pile of fruit from one corner of the room to another. This is permitted to ask as a favor. So

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Daf Digest

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too, even when asking a worker, if it is done without any written agreement, this should be
permitted. However, the issue of writing is real, and it is for this reason that it is not allowed.

"AMIRAH L'NOCHRI SHEVUS" -- TELLING A NOCHRI TO DO MELACHAH ON

SHABBOS2

The Mishnah states that on Shabbos one may not tell his friend to hire workers for him. The
Gemara says that the Mishnah does not refer to a Jewish friend, because it goes without saying
that one may not tell a Jew to do work for him on Shabbos.

Rather, the Mishnah refers to a non-Jewish friend. The Gemara asks that we already know that
Amirah l'Nochri is forbidden because of Shevus (Shevus refers to actions that the Rabanan
prohibited on Shabbos). Why does the Mishnah need to teach it again?

RASHI explains that the Mishnah earlier (121a) already teaches that Amirah l'Nochri is forbidden
when it says that one may not tell a Nochri to extinguish a fire on Shabbos.

Rav Mordechai Kornfeld writes:

What is the Gemara's question? The law of the Mishnah earlier is not comparable to the law of the
Mishnah here. The Mishnah earlier says that one may not tell a Nochri to do an act which is
forbidden mid'Oraisa (such as extinguishing a fire). We cannot derive from that law that one may
not tell a Nochri to do an act which is only prohibited mid'Rabanan. Accordingly, the teaching of
the Mishnah here is necessary!

‫ת וס פ ות ד " ה ו ד יב ור‬
‫פי' מן התורה דהא מדשרינן דיבור של מצוה מכלל דמדאורייתא שרי‬

Explanation: The Gemara means, is this forbidden according to Torah law? Since we permit this
type of talk if it is for a Mitzvah, it must be that it is permitted according to Torah law

‫תוספות ד"ה אין אומרים‬

Tosfos explains that it is even forbidden to ask a Nochri on Shabbos to perform a Rabbinic
prohibition.
‫אפי' באיסור דרבנן אמירה לנכרי שבות‬

Explanation: Telling a Nochri to perform a Melachah is forbidden according to Rabbinic law,

even if one tells him to perform a Melachah that is only forbidden according to Rabbinic law.

‫( לא יאמר אדם לחבירו שכור לי פועלים כו' דמוקי לה בחברו נכרי וכן מוכח‬.‫כדאמרינן לקמן בפרק שואל )דף קנ‬
‫( גבי נייתי חמימי מגו ביתא‬:‫בפרק הדר )דף סז‬

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Daf Advancement Forum

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Proof: This is as stated later our daf (150a), "A person should not say to his friend that he should
hire workers for him etc." The Gemara establishes that this is referring to a friend who is a Nochri.
There he explicitly says that the only source for the prohibition against telling a Nochri to do an
Isur d'Rabanan is from this Mishnah.

YA'AVETZ explains that it is Asur mid'Oraisa to tell a Nochri to do an act that is

Asur mid'Oraisa for a Jew to do on Shabbos; Amirah l'Nochri in such a case is not merely Asur
mid'Rabanan.

It is logical to assume that to tell a Nochri to do an Isur d'Rabanan should be forbidden

mid'Rabanan, and it is not necessary for the Mishnah to tell us this. (See also Rebbi Akiva Eiger.)

CHASAM SOFER cites the RAMBAN:

RAMBAN to Lev 23:24

who says that it is forbidden mid'Oraisa to treat Shabbos like a weekday, as we learn from the
term "Shabason." This term commands us to rest on Shabbos and not to treat the day like a normal
weekday. Telling a Nochri to hire a worker is a weekday activity and thus is prohibited by the
Torah to do on Shabbos.

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Rav Kornfeld ends:
Perhaps the Gemara does not mean to ask that we already know that Amirah l'Nochri is prohibited.
Rather, the Gemara means to ask that if the Mishnah's intention is to teach that this type of Amirah
l'Nochri is prohibited, then this law should have been included in the earlier Mishnah (121a) which
discusses what one may tell a Nochri to do on Shabbos. This may be what Rashi means as well.

SHITAH L'RAN quotes an opinion that presents a different understanding of the Sugya, which
the SEFAS EMES also discusses. When the Gemara asks that Amirah l'Nochri is prohibited
because of Shevus, it means that telling a Nochri to do an Isur d'Oraisa is prohibited.

Telling him to do an Isur d'Rabanan, such as hiring a worker, should be permitted. The Gemara
asks why the Mishnah prohibits such a form of Amirah l'Nochri.

THE REASON FOR THE PROHIBITION OF "AMIRAH L'NOCHRI"

The Gemara Bava Kama 80:3 discusses the law of "Amirah l'Nochri" -- telling a Nochri to
perform a Melacha on Shabbos.

Telling a Nochri to perform a Melachah for a Jew is one of the decrees of Shevus enacted by the
Rabanan. Although a Nochri transgresses no prohibition when he does a Melachah on Shabbos,
the Rabanan prohibited a Jew from telling a Nochri to do a Melachah for him on Shabbos.

Several reasons for this prohibition are suggested by the Rishonim.

RAMBAM (Hilchos Shabbos 6:1) writes that the Rabanan prohibited it "in order that Shabbos not
be taken lightly in one's eyes, lest one come to do the Melachah himself."

RASHI in Avodah Zarah (15a, DH Keivan) writes that the reason for the decree is the verse,
"Mimtzo Cheftzecha v'Daber Davar" -- "... and you honor it (Shabbos) by not engaging in your
own affairs, from pursuing your own needs and speaking [forbidden] speech" (Isa 58:13), which
establishes guidelines for speech on Shabbos.

One may not tell a Nochri to do a Melachah on Shabbos because such speech is forbidden on
Shabbos.

RASHI in Shabbos (153a, DH Mai Ta'ama) implies that the reason why one may not tell a Nochri
to do a Melachah on Shabbos is that when the Nochri does the Melachah, he acts as the Shali'ach
of the Jew and it is considered as though the Jew himself is doing the Melachah.

It seems that there is a practical difference between these explanations. According to Rashi in
Avodah Zarah, one should be permitted to tell a Nochri before Shabbos to do a Melachah for him
on Shabbos, since the Jew's "Dibur," speech, is not being done on Shabbos. According to the other
two explanations, the prohibition will apply regardless of when the Jew tells the Nochri to do the
Melachah, whether on a weekday or on Shabbos itself.

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 KOVETZ SHI'URIM, Beitzah #49. The Kovetz Shi'urim writes that there are two elements of
Isur involved with Amirah l'Nochri. The first is that the Jew makes the Nochri a Shali'ach to do
Melacha for him, and the second is that speaking such words itself is prohibited, either because of
"Mimtzo Cheftzecha" or because of the reason the Rambam gives.

Which brings us to the relative halachic weight between speech and thought (hirhur), for
instance, am I culpable for Hirhurim about sin?

Yoma 29a:1

Thoughts of transgression are worse than transgression itself, and your mnemonic is the odor
of meat. The smell of roasting meat is more appetizing than actually eating the meat. The heat of
the end of summer is more oppressive than the heat of the summer itself, and your mnemonic
is a heated oven. After an oven has been heated several times in the course of a day, lighting it
again, even slightly, will produce powerful heat. So too, at the end of the summer, since everything
is hot, the heat is more oppressive.

Avot D'Rabbi Natan 20:1

Rabbi Hananya, deputy of the priests, would say: Anyone who takes words of Torah to heart is no
longer troubled by thoughts of destruction, thoughts of hunger, foolish thoughts, lustful thoughts,
thoughts of temptation, thoughts of another man’s wife, thoughts of meaningless things, or
thoughts of human burden. So, it was written in the book of Psalms by King David

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 -‫ ְמַשְׂמֵּחי‬,‫ ט ִפּקּוֵּדי ְיהָוה ְיָשׁ ִרים‬9 The precepts of the LORD are right, rejoicing the heart; the
.‫ ְמִאיַרת ֵﬠיָנ ִים‬,‫ ֵלב; ִמְצַות ְיהָוה ָבָּרה‬commandment of the LORD is pure, enlightening the eyes.

Psalms 19:9

Sefer HaChinukh 213:1-5‫ה‬-‫א‬:‫ספר החינוך ריג‬

To not turn after the worship of idols - not in thought, not in speech and not in vision to not
turn after idolatry with thought or speech and not even only with sight; so that he not come from
this to serve it, as it is stated:

‫ ל ֹא‬,‫ֵהי ַמֵסָּכה‬š‫ ֵוא‬,‫ָהֱאִליִלם‬-‫ ֶאל‬,‫ִתְּפנוּ‬-‫ ד ַאל‬4 Turn ye not unto the idols, nor make to yourselves
.‫ֵהיֶכם‬š‫ ְיהָוה ֱא‬,‫ ֲא ִני‬:‫ ַתֲﬠשׂוּ ָלֶכם‬molten gods: I am the LORD your God.
Lev 19:4
.
And they, may their memory be blessed, said in Sifra, Kedoshim, Section 1:11,

"elilim": This is one of the ten pejorative names of idols: elilim — because they are hollow; pesel
— because they are sculpted; masechah — because they are molten; matzevah — because they are
stood up; atzabim — because they are made in sections; teraphim — because they rot; gilulim —

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because they are revolting; shikutzim — because they are detestable; chamanim — because they
stand in the sun; asherim — because they are supported by others. "Do not turn to the idols, and
molten gods do not make for yourselves." In the beginning, they are idols; if you turn to them, you
make them gods.

"If you turn after them, you make them gods"; meaning to say, if you involve yourself with their
matters - meaning to ponder after the follies that those that believe in them say about it…

RAMBAM also deals with the thought processes and its impact halachically, but holds no
consideration for anything but purity of mind and its halachic consequences:

Mishneh Torah, Sacrifices Rendered Unfit 18:1-2

Anyone who has in mind a wrong thought while dealing with sacrifices transgresses a negative
commandment. As it is written:

‫ֶזַבח‬-‫יח ְוִאם ֵהָאֹכל ֵיָאֵכל ִמְבַּשׂר‬ 18 And if any of the flesh of the sacrifice of his peace-
--‫ ל ֹא ֵיָרֶצה‬,‫ְשָׁלָמיו ַבּיּוֹם ַהְשִּׁליִשׁי‬ offerings be at all eaten on the third day, it shall not be
‫ ִפּגּוּל‬,‫ַהַמְּק ִריב ֹאתוֹ ל ֹא ֵיָחֵשׁב לוֹ‬ accepted, neither shall it be imputed unto him that offereth it;
‫ ֲﬠ ֹוָנהּ‬,‫ִיְהֶיה; ְוַהֶנֶּפשׁ ָהֹאֶכֶלת ִמֶמּנּוּ‬ it shall be an abhorred thing, and the soul that eateth of it
.‫ִתָּשּׂא‬ shall bear his iniquity.
Lev 7:18
"shall not be considered." Our tradition has taught that this also includes a prohibition to make
sacrifices invalid through one's thoughts, since this is like actively blemishing an a sacrificial
animal. Nonetheless, one does not receive corporal punishment for this, since thought is not an
action.

We will come back to this notion of speech vs thought and culpability.

In the gemoro below the non-culpability of thought is clearer:

The split between bringing a sacrifice materially and the invalidating thoughts that might
accompany them are fleshed out in the following midrash:

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Midrash Tanchuma, Lech Lecha 10:1-2

After these things, the word of the Lord came unto Abraham, in a vision, saying: “Fear not,
Abram!”

,‫ַאְב ָרם‬-‫ ְיהָוה ֶאל‬-‫ ָהָיה ְדַבר‬,‫א ַאַחר ַהְדָּב ִרים ָהֵאֶלּה‬ 1 After these things the word of the LORD
--‘‫ ָאֹנִכי ָמֵגן ָל‬,‫ִתּי ָרא ַאְב ָרם‬-‫ ַאל‬:‫ ֵלאֹמר‬,‫ַבַּמֲּחֶזה‬ came unto Abram in a vision, saying:
.‫ ַה ְרֵבּה ְמֹאד‬,“‫ְשָׂכ ְר‬ 'Fear not, Abram, I am thy shield, thy
reward shall be exceeding
Gen 51:1

May it please our master to teach us what (the) burnt offerings (prescribed in the Book of
Leviticus) atone for?

R. Ishmael taught us: Burnt offerings were introduced as an act of atonement for the violation of
both positive and negative commandments.

R. Simeon the son of Yohai said: They were introduced also as atonement for evil thoughts, as it
is said: And it was so, when the days of their feasting were gone about, that Job sent and
sanctified them…

The notion that sinful thoughts cannot be punished is the conclusion of the following gemoroh:

Kiddushin 39b:9-10

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The Gemara asks: But perhaps this incident never occurred? It is possible that everyone who
performs these mitzvot is rewarded in this world, and the situation described by Rabbi Ya’akov
never happened.

The Gemara answers: Rabbi Ya’akov himself saw an incident of this kind. The Gemara asks:
But perhaps that man was contemplating sin at the time, and he was punished for his thoughts?

The Gemara answers that there is a principle that the Holy One, blessed be He, does not link a
bad thought to an action, i.e., one is not punished for thoughts alone…

The RAMBAM is quite strict about foreign thoughts during prayer (which will bother the first
generation of Hassidic masters no end some 500 years later).

Guide for the Perplexed, Part 3 51:7-11

We must bear in mind that all such religious acts as reading the Law, praying, and the performance
of other precepts, serve exclusively as the means of causing us to occupy and fill our mind with
the precepts of God, and free it from worldly business; for we are thus, as it were, in
communication with God, and undisturbed by any other thing.

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If we, however, pray with the motion of our lips, and our face toward the wall, but at the same
time think of our business; if we read the Law with our tongue, whilst our heart is occupied with
the building of our house…

I was refreshingly surprised by Laura Shaw Frank’s take on our pericope, rather than the
influence of thought on speech she reversed it.3

In the Gemara, the rabbis explore the parameters of transgressing the prohibition against hiring
a worker on Shabbat. Rav Ashi states:

One may not say to another explicitly on Shabbat: Hire workers for me, but one may say to
another: Does it seem that you will join me this evening? This is permitted even though both
of them understand that the questioner intends to hire the other person to work for him.

In Rav Ashi’s opinion, it is the specificity of one’s language that makes the difference between
transgressing Shabbat and not. Even if one isn’t hiring workers on Shabbat for oneself, but
rather is asking another person to do the hiring, such speech is still prohibited on Shabbat.

However, if one uses more vague language — even if the subtext is clear — it does not violate
Shabbat.

But the rabbis have more to teach us here than simply how to emulate Yankel and Mendel’s
artful dodging of the laws of Shabbat. (my quote at the header).

They are pointing out an important lesson: our speech has the ability to influence our mindset.
The more specific we get in discussing business on Shabbat, the more our minds may actually
become occupied with that business, causing us to lose our focus on the holiness of Shabbat.
Paying attention to our language can help us remain in a special moment, appreciating the here
and now rather than allowing our focus to wander elsewhere.

Rebbe Nachman, like his grandfather the BESHT, claimed that thoughts are critical in our Avodas
Hashem:

Likutei Moharan 193:1:1-2

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My Jewish Learning

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Know! that thought has great power. If a person concentrates and focuses his thoughts on anything
in the world, he can make it happen. Even if he concentrates his thoughts on having money, he will
certainly have it. And so, it is with everything, provided the thought is with a negation of all the
senses.

Thought is so potent that a person is actually capable of self-sacrifice in thought. That is, he can
genuinely feel the anguish of death by consciously accepting upon himself a willingness to
sacrifice his soul to sanctify God’s Name by whatever form of death might occur…

Rabbi Chaim Luzatto also insists on the purity of mind/thought:

Mesilat Yesharim 16:1-3

Purity is the rectification of the heart and the thoughts. We find this term used by king David who
said:

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 ,‫ִהים; ְורוַּח ָנכוֹן‬š‫ִלי ֱא‬-‫ ְבָּרא‬,‫יב ֵלב ָטהוֹר‬ 12 Create me a clean heart, O God; and renew a stedfast
.‫ַחֵדּשׁ ְבִּק ְרִבּי‬ spirit within me.
Ps 51:12

Its matter is for a man to not leave any room in one's deeds for the evil inclination, but rather, that
all of his deeds be from the side of wisdom and fear of G-d, and not from the side of sin and lust.

This applies even to bodily and material deeds. For even after a person has accustomed himself in
Separation, namely, to not take from the world anything besides the essential, he must still purify
his heart and thought…

Knowing the duplicity of the heart and the split between words professed and the lustful heart
Rabbi Bachya ibn Pakuda advises:

Duties of the Heart, Eighth Treatise on Examining the Soul 3:64-65

And since the thoughts of the heart change rapidly, and these thoughts do not hold firmly due to
the swift arising of thoughts that flash through the mind, it is difficult for a person to arrange his
own prayer.

For this our Sages composed the prayer with fixed words, to place them on a man's tongue,
because the thoughts of the mind go after and follow the words he utters.

Turning the tables what about the validity of hirhur in fulfilling a mitzva?

Rav Moshe Taragin writes4

The gemara in Berakhot cites a debate surrounding the halakha of "hirhur."

4
https://www.etzion.org.il/en/hirhur-torah

17
Can someone merely "think" or internally articulate Shema, or must he actually verbalize the
words? The mishna in Berakhot (21b) suggests that a ba'al keri (someone who is impure and
cannot recite Torah) merely think the words of kriyat Shema since he may not actually recite
it. The gemara cites two opinions regarding the purpose of this suggestion.

According to Ravina, "hirhur" is "ke-dibbur" (equivalent to speech), and he has fulfilled kriyat
Shema through merely thinking the words. Since a ba'al keri is forbidden to actually recite Torah
words, the hirhur option is employed.

Rav Chisda claims that "hirhur lav ke'dibbur dami." Merely thinking kriyat Shema is insufficient;
it must be verbalized in spoken words. The mishna which suggested that a ba'al keri think the
words of kriyat Shema then, was merely describing a method for a ba'al keri to not completely
deviate from the congregation, which is actively reciting kriyat Shema. He cannot actually fulfill
his obligation of Shema through hirhur, but he should still "think" the Shema so that he can join
the congregation in "kabbalat malkhut shamayim" (acceptance of God's Kingship).

Since the gemara makes an effort to defend Rav Chisda, evidently, we accept his position that
hirhur is not akin to dibbur. In addition, the Rabbenu Yona cites our daf which also suggests that
we rule "hirhur lav ke'dibbur." The gemara prohibits discussion of weekday events on Shabbat
(such as asking someone to hire workers for after Shabbat) based upon our verse in Isa 58:13,
"Mimtzo cheftzekha ve-dabber davar" (Nor look to your affairs, nor speak about them [on
Shabbat]). Since the pasuk specifies "dabber davar" (speaking words), only speaking about these
activities is forbidden, not thinking about them.

Subsequently, the gemara cites a prohibition for a person to even think about Torah while in the
bathroom. Ultimately, the gemara attributes this prohibition to the verse:
,f‫ ְבֶּקֶרב ַמֲחֶנ‬ª‫ ִמְתַהֵלּ‬f‫ֶהי‬š‫טו ִכּי ְיהָוה ֱא‬ 15 For the LORD thy God walketh in the midst of thy
,f‫ ְוָהָיה ַמֲחֶני‬,f‫ ְלָפֶני‬f‫ ְוָלֵתת ֹא ְיֶבי‬f‫ְלַהִצּיְל‬ camp, to deliver thee, and to give up thine enemies before
‫ ְוָשׁב‬,‫ ֶﬠ ְרַות ָדָּבר‬f‫ ִי ְרֶאה ְב‬-‫ ְול ֹא‬:‫ָקדוֹשׁ‬ thee; therefore, shall thy camp be holy; that He see no
{‫ }ס‬.f‫ֵמַאֲחֶרי‬ unseemly thing in thee, and turn away from thee.
Deut 23:15

"Ve-haya machanekha kadosh" suggesting that holiness requires that we not even think about
Torah in an impure area. As the gemara isolates this prohibition as an exception based upon a
special pasuk, it would seem that in general, hirhur is not equal to dibbur.

Based upon these two gemarot (berachot and shabbat), most Rishonim claim that we rule that
hirhur is not equal to dibbur.

Based upon this ruling, the Shulchan Arukh (OC 47:4) rules that birkhot ha-Torah are not recited
over hirhur of Torah. If a person awakes before davening to learn, he must recite birkhot ha-Torah
(based upon Berakhot 11b). If, however, he doesn't recite Torah but merely thinks Torah, he is
not obligated to recite birkhot ha-Torah.

18
The Vilna Gaon argues with this ruling and claims that unlike other areas of halakha, hirhur of
the Torah is, in fact, meaningful and would require birkhot ha-Torah (see the Bi'ur Ha-gra to
Shulchan Arukh). Though there are no explicit gemarot which define hirhur of Torah as a mitzva,
the Gaon bases his position on both inherent logic as well as the language by which Torah study
is described. Logically, it seems unlikely that thinking Torah should not be included in the mitzva
of studying Torah. In addition, several verses (such as Isa 1:18 and Psalm 1:2) refer to Torah study
with the term "higayon" – contemplation or meditation in Torah – suggesting that thought is just
as much part of the mitzva as actual recitation. How might we defend the position of the Shulchan
Arukh, which doesn't require a berakha upon hirhur of Torah?

Conceivably, the Shulchan Arukh might have agreed with the Vilna Gaon about the nature of
hirhur of Torah. Namely he might have agreed that thinking Torah is an exception to the general
rule that hirhur is meaningless; Hirhur of the Torah is included within the study of Torah. After
all, the gemara in Shabbat prohibited thinking Torah in an unclean location!! However, not all
Torah requires the recitation of a berakha. Even though hirhur is considered a fulfillment of the
mitzva to learn Torah, berakhot might only be obligated upon discernable and explicit acts of
studying Torah. The laws of berakhot might demand that a berakha only be recited upon a physical
and demonstrative act of a mitzva. An analog might be the situation of sitting in a
Sukka. Theoretically, anyone who enters a Sukka – even without eating - fulfills the mitzva of
sitting in a Sukka. Even so, only someone who eats substantive food recites a berakha. Though
the mitzva applies "universally," a berakha was only obligated in a situation of an explicit, palpable
act of eating.

19
The Secular Law: Mens Rea

Mens rea (/ˈmɛnz ˈreɪə/; Law Latin for "guilty mind") is the mental element of a person's intention
to commit a crime; or knowledge that one's action or lack of action would cause a crime to be
committed. It is a necessary element of many crimes.
The standard common law test of criminal liability is expressed in the Latin phrase
actus reus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea,

20
i.e. "the act is not culpable unless the mind is guilty". In jurisdictions with due process, there must
be both actus reus ("guilty act") and mens rea for a defendant to be guilty of a crime
(see concurrence).
As a general rule, someone who acted without mental fault is not liable in criminal law. Exceptions
are known as strict liability crimes. Moreover, when a person intends a harm, but because of bad
aim or other cause, the intent is transferred from an intended victim to an unintended victim, the
case is considered to be a matter of transferred intent.
In civil law, it is usually not necessary to prove a subjective mental element to establish liability
for breach of contract or tort, for example. But if a tort is intentionally committed or a contract is
intentionally breached, such intent may increase the scope of liability and the damages payable to
the plaintiff.
Malle and Nelson5 argue for an empirically based strategy of defining and using such mens rea
concepts.

The standard approach to issues of mens rea is theoretical argument. For decades, even centuries,
legal scholars, philosophers, and judges have debated the proper definition of mental concepts
such as intention and knowledge and their relation to responsibility, blame, and punishment (Duff,
1990; Hart, 1968; Kenny, 1973a; Mele & Sverdlik, 1996).

The assumption underlying this approach is that theoretical analysis will uncover an ultimate truth
about these concepts or at least lead to an optimal definition. In these discussions, a whole range
of specific positions can be found. For example, some consider the concept of intentionality and
its relatives defeasible, whereas others see it as indispensable. Some consider knowledge and
intention to be equivalent, such that known or believed consequences of one’s actions are ipso
facto intended, whereas others draw a sharp distinction between intention and knowledge.

These and other debates are difficult to settle so long as the debaters’ own intuitions are the
deciding criterion for the suitableness of a conceptual analysis of intention, intentionality, and
related concepts. Worse yet, if legal concepts change their meaning in response to opinion shifts
in the scholarly or judicial community (which has arguably happened many times over the last
century), ordinary people will have trouble understanding these concepts and using them
appropriately—be it as lay judges, jurors, or merely citizens who evaluate the system of justice
that their society provides.

They describe an alternative to the standard approach: an empirical, folk conceptual analysis that
uses social psychological research to determine the meaning and significance of folk concepts
concerning mens rea. A folk concept (e.g., agent, intentional, belief, desire) operates like a filter
that classifies certain perceptual input into significant categories and thus frames or interprets the
perceptual input in ways that facilitate subsequent processing, including prediction, explanation,
evaluation, and action.

5
Judging Mens Rea: The Tension between Folk Concepts and Legal Concepts of Intentionality Bertram F. Malle, Ph.D.,* and
Sarah E. Nelson, Ph.D.: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.570.8447&rep=rep1&type=pdf

21
Their specific argument for the inclusion of folk concepts into the law runs as follows. If people
already have and consistently use a concept for a given phenomenon (e.g., the folk concept of
intention) but are forced to learn a slightly different concept for this phenomenon (e.g., the legal
definition of intent), their folk concept will interfere with the legal concept. This interference and
confusion will yield unreliable decisions among jurors (Smith, 1993) and foster unfavorable
perceptions of the justice system, because the system will seem to violate people’s moral intuitions.
By contrast, if people do not already have or do not consistently use a concept for a given
phenomenon, they will be content to learn a new (technical) concept and will not experience
interference with a preexisting folk concept.

THE FOLK CONCEPT OF INTENTIONALITY

In philosophy, the study of intentionality has usually centered on the question ‘‘What are the
conditions for an action to be intentional?’’ This question is, of course, another way of asking how
intentionality should be defined. In the last 30 years or so, philosophers’ answers have converged
on a multi-component model of intentionality. This model roughly describes an action as
intentional if it is caused by the agent’s intention, which is itself based on the agent’s beliefs and
desires. Thus, it is the configuration of mental states (intention, belief, desire) that confers
intentionality upon a behavior. The problem with a philosophical model of intentionality, however,
is that it defines an idealized concept. We do not know whether this concept is sufficiently similar
to the one that ordinary people use when making judgments of intentionality in court or in daily
interactions. Surprisingly little empirical research has been devoted to the folk concept of
intentionality—to the question of how people, not legal scholars or philosophers, define
intentionality.

I am thinking that the issue of intentionality and thought vis a vis halacha fits better with the folk
concept of mens rea than the empirical model.

22
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Neurology of Speech vs Thought
BROCA’S AREA, WERNICKE’S AREA, AND OTHER
LANGUAGE-PROCESSING AREAS IN THE BRAIN

The process of identifying the parts of the brain that are involved in language began in 1861, when
Paul Broca, a French neurosurgeon, examined the brain of a recently deceased patient who had
had an unusual disorder. Though he had been able to understand spoken language and did not have
any motor impairments of the mouth or tongue that might have affected his ability to speak, he
could neither speak a complete sentence nor express his thoughts in writing. The only articulate
sound he could make was the syllable “tan”, which had come to be used as his name.

Paul Broca Tan’s brain

When Broca autopsied Tan’s brain, he found a sizable lesion in the left inferior frontal cortex.
Subsequently, Broca studied eight other patients, all of whom had similar language deficits along
with lesions in their left frontal hemisphere. This led him to make his famous statement that “we
speak with the left hemisphere” and to identify, for the first time, the existence of a “language
centre” in the posterior portion of the frontal lobe of this hemisphere. Now known as Broca’s area,
this was in fact the first area of the brain to be associated with a specific function—in this case,
language.

Ten years later, Carl Wernicke, a German neurologist, discovered another part of the brain, this
one involved in understanding language, in the posterior portion of the left temporal lobe. People
who had a lesion at this location could speak, but their speech was often incoherent and made no
sense.

23
Carl Wernicke Brain with a lesion causing Wernicke’s aphasia

Wernicke's observations have been confirmed many times since. Neuroscientists now agree that
running around the lateral sulcus (also known as the fissure of Sylvius) in the left hemisphere of
the brain, there is a sort of neural loop that is involved both in understanding and in producing
spoken language. At the frontal end of this loop lies Broca's area, which is usually associated with
the production of language, or language outputs. At the other end (more specifically, in the superior
posterior temporal lobe), lies Wernicke's area, which is associated with the processing of words
that we hear being spoken, or language inputs. Broca's area and Wernicke's area are connected by
a large bundle of nerve fibres called the arcuate fasciculus.

This language loop is found in the left hemisphere in about 90% of right-handed persons and 70%
of left-handed persons, language being one of the functions that is performed asymmetrically in
the brain. Surprisingly, this loop is also found at the same location in deaf persons who use sign
language. This loop would therefore not appear to be specific to heard or spoken language, but

24
rather to be more broadly associated with whatever the individual’s primary language modality
happens to be.

New ideas about the language center

The main brain region Sahin and his colleagues looked at is called the Broca's area,
located in the cerebral cortex. This region was discovered to be involved in language
processing by the French physician Pierre Paul Broca in 1865.

Paul Broca

But beyond knowing that the area is important to language production, "we still have
been troublingly unable to pin it down," Sahin said. Whether or not the steps of the
language production process happen in parallel or sequentially has been one
particularly puzzling question about the brain.

The new electrode study, detailed in the Oct. 16 issue of the journal Science, has set
scientists one step closer to understanding the steps of language production in the
brain, specifically word recall, the application of grammar (changing tense or number),
and actually speaking the word.

By monitoring the brains of three patients while they performed a simple language
task (looking at a word, then either using it in a sentence as is or changing its tense
or number, and finally articulating it silently), Sahin and his colleagues found three
distinct periods of activity in Broca's area at 200 milliseconds (after first being
presented with the word), 320 milliseconds and 450 milliseconds.

These three spikes corresponded to the three basic components of language: words,
grammar and phonology (the organization of sound). All three also fit within the
roughly 600 milliseconds required for the onset of speech.

25
The finding shows that Broca's area is involved in all three of these language
production steps and shows that they happen at distinct points in time, not all at
once in parallel, Sahin said.

While the research answers some questions about how the brain generates
language, "this is just one piece in the puzzle," Sahin told LiveScience. It will take
more study to further detail all the points of language in the brain: when they occur
and what parts of the brain, they happen in.

But the finding "may be the nail in the coffin" for one persistent, though long-
discredited theory that Broca's area processes the speech part of language, while
another area of the brain, called the Werneke's area, processes reading and
learning words.

"It's not so simple as Broca's speaks and Werneke's listens," Sahin said.

What comes first?

26
 This is a brain scan showing electrodes that surgeons use to find and
remove the source of seizures (to cure epilepsy) while sparing the
source of mental functions like language.
(Image: © Illustration: Ned T. Sahin, Ph.D.. Brain Image Reconstruction:
Sean McInerney.)

In just 600 milliseconds, the human brain can think of a word, apply the rules of grammar to it and
send it to the mouth to be spoken. For the first time, researchers have traced this lightning-fast
sequence and broken it down into distinct steps.

Researchers got this rare glimpse into the fine-tuned workings of the brain from the signals sent
by electrodes implanted in the brains of epileptics. The electrodes help surgeons locate the parts
of the brain that cause epileptic seizures so they can be removed, and also help keep surgeons from
removing critical parts of the brain:

"If you go a few millimeters to the right or left, you might delete their piano lessons or language
ability, and that would be sorely missed," said Ned Sahin6 of Harvard University, one of the
researchers who studied the language network.

Because the electrodes are already monitoring language ability in these patients, Sahin and his
colleagues can conduct simple language experiments with willing participants and see language
processing in real time; essentially, the electrodes offer a more fine-grained look at neural
processes than other traditional brain-monitoring technologies, such as MRIs.

Language precedes thought?

The notion that language influences thought has a long history in a variety of fields. There are two
bodies of thought forming around this debate. One body of thought stems from linguistics and is
known as the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. There is a strong and a weak version of the hypothesis
which argue for more or less influence of language on thought. The strong version, linguistic
determinism, argues that without language there is and can be no thought while the weak
version, linguistic relativity, supports the idea that there are some influences from language on
thought.7 And on the opposing side, there are 'language of thought' theories (LOTH) which believe
that public language is inessential to private thought. LOTH theories address the debate of whether
thought is possible without language which is related to the question of whether language

6
https://www.livescience.com/5780-speed-thought-speech-traced-brain.html
7
The Sapir–Whorf hypothesis in linguistics states that the grammatical structure of a mother language influences the way we
perceive the world. The hypothesis has been largely abandoned by linguists as it has found very limited experimental support, at
least in its strong form, linguistic determinism. For instance, a study showing that speakers of languages lacking a subjunctive mood
such as Chinese experience difficulty with hypothetical problems has been discredited. Another study did show that subjects in
memory tests are more likely to remember a given color if their mother language includes a word for that color; however, these
findings do not necessarily support this hypothesis specifically. Other studies concerning the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis can be found
in the "studies" section below.

27
evolved for thought. These ideas are difficult to study because it proves challenging to parse the
effects of culture versus thought versus language in all academic fields.
The main use of language is to transfer thoughts from one mind, to another mind. The bits of
linguistic information that enter into one person's mind, from another, cause people to entertain a
new thought with profound effects on his world knowledge, inferencing, and subsequent behavior.
Language neither creates nor distorts conceptual life. Thought comes first, while language is an
expression. There are certain limitations among language, and humans cannot express all that they
think.

LOTH hinges on the belief that the mind works like a computer, always in computational
processes. The theory believes that mental representation has both a combinatorial syntax
and compositional semantics. The claim is that mental representations possess combinatorial
syntax and compositional semantic—that is, mental representations are sentences in a mental
language. Alan Turing's work on physical machines implementation of causal processes that
require formal procedures was modeled after these beliefs.8

Piaget's cognitive determinism exhibits the belief that infants integrate experience into
progressively higher-level representations. He calls this belief constructivism, which supports that
infants progress from simple to sophisticated models of the world through a change mechanism
that allows an infant to build on their lower-level representations to create higher-level ones. This
view opposes nativist theories about cognition being composed of innate knowledge and abilities.

Maybe it’s the other way around: Language influences thought?

Humans communicate with one another using a dazzling array of languages, each differing from
the next in innumerable ways. Do the languages we speak shape the way we see the world, the
way we think, and the way we live our lives? Do people who speak different languages think
differently simply because they speak different languages? Does learning new languages change
the way you think? Do polyglots think differently when speaking different languages?
These questions touch on nearly all of the major controversies in the study of mind. They have
engaged scores of philosophers, anthropologists, linguists, and psychologists, and they have
important implications for politics, law, and religion. Yet despite nearly constant attention and
debate, very little empirical work was done on these questions until recently. For a long time, the
idea that language might shape thought was considered at best untestable and more often simply
wrong. Research in my labs at Stanford University and at MIT has helped reopen this question.
We have collected data around the world: from China, Greece, Chile, Indonesia, Russia, and
Aboriginal Australia. What we have learned is that people who speak different languages do indeed
think differently and that even flukes of grammar can profoundly affect how we see the world.
Language is a uniquely human gift, central to our experience of being human. Appreciating its role
in constructing our mental lives brings us one step closer to understanding the very nature of
humanity.9
8
Chomsky's independent theory, founded by Noam Chomsky, considers language as one aspect of cognition. Chomsky's theory
states that a number of cognitive systems exist, which seem to possess distinct specific properties. These cognitive systems lay the
groundwork for cognitive capacities, like language faculty
9
HOW DOES OUR LANGUAGE SHAPE THE WAY WE THINK?, Lera Boroditsky:
https://www.edge.org/memberbio/lera_boroditsky

28
Boroditsky explains: For a long time, the idea that language might shape thought was considered
at best untestable and more often simply wrong. Research in my labs at Stanford University and
at MIT has helped reopen this question. We have collected data around the world: from China,
Greece, Chile, Indonesia, Russia, and Aboriginal Australia. What we have learned is that people
who speak different languages do indeed think differently and that even flukes of grammar can
profoundly affect how we see the world. Language is a uniquely human gift, central to our
experience of being human. Appreciating its role in constructing our mental lives brings us one
step closer to understanding the very nature of humanity.

Clearly, languages require different things of their speakers. Does this mean that the speakers think
differently about the world? Do English, Indonesian, Russian, and Turkish speakers end up
attending to, partitioning, and remembering their experiences differently just because they speak
different languages? For some scholars, the answer to these questions has been an obvious yes.
Just look at the way people talk, they might say. Certainly, speakers of different languages must
attend to and encode strikingly different aspects of the world just so they can use their language
properly.

Scholars on the other side of the debate don't find the differences in how people talk convincing.
All our linguistic utterances are sparse, encoding only a small part of the information we have
available. Just because English speakers don't include the same information in their verbs that
Russian and Turkish speakers do doesn't mean that English speakers aren't paying attention to the
same things; all it means is that they're not talking about them. It's possible that everyone thinks
the same way, notices the same things, but just talks differently.

Believers in cross-linguistic differences counter that everyone does not pay attention to the same
things: if everyone did, one might think it would be easy to learn to speak other languages.
Unfortunately, learning a new language (especially one not closely related to those you know) is
never easy; it seems to require paying attention to a new set of distinctions. Whether it's
distinguishing modes of being in Spanish, evidentiality in Turkish, or aspect in Russian, learning
to speak these languages requires something more than just learning vocabulary: it requires paying
attention to the right things in the world so that you have the correct information to include in what
you say.

Such a priori arguments about whether or not language shapes thought have gone in circles for
centuries, with some arguing that it's impossible for language to shape thought and others arguing
that it's impossible for language not to shape thought. Recently my group and others have figured
out ways to empirically test some of the key questions in this ancient debate, with fascinating
results. So instead of arguing about what must be true or what can't be true, let's find out what is
true.

In fact, you don't even need to go into the lab to see these effects of language; you can see them
with your own eyes in an art gallery. Look at some famous examples of personification in art —

29
the ways in which abstract entities such as death, sin, victory, or time are given human form. How
does an artist decide whether death, say, or time should be painted as a man or a woman? It turns
out that in 85 percent of such personifications, whether a male or female figure is chosen is
predicted by the grammatical gender of the word in the artist's native language. So, for example,
German painters are more likely to paint death as a man, whereas Russian painters are more likely
to paint death as a woman.

The fact that even quirks of grammar, such as grammatical gender, can affect our thinking is
profound. Such quirks are pervasive in language; gender, for example, applies to all nouns, which
means that it is affecting how people think about anything that can be designated by a noun. That's
a lot of stuff!

I have described how languages shape the way we think about space, time, colors, and objects.
Other studies have found effects of language on how people construe events, reason about
causality, keep track of number, understand material substance, perceive and experience emotion,
reason about other people's minds, choose to take risks, and even in the way they choose
professions and spouses. Taken together, these results show that linguistic processes are pervasive
in most fundamental domains of thought, unconsciously shaping us from the nuts and bolts of
cognition and perception to our loftiest abstract notions and major life decisions. Language is
central to our experience of being human, and the languages we speak profoundly shape the way
we think, the way we see the world, the way we live our lives.

30
Language and thought are not the same thing: evidence from neuroimaging
and neurological patients:

Is thought possible without language? Individuals with global aphasia, who have almost no ability
to understand or produce language, provide a powerful opportunity to find out. Astonishingly,
despite their near-total loss of language, these individuals are nonetheless able to add and subtract,
solve logic problems, think about another person’s thoughts, appreciate music, and successfully
navigate their environments.

Further, neuroimaging studies show that healthy adults strongly engage the brain’s language areas
when they understand a sentence, but not when they perform other nonlinguistic tasks like
arithmetic, storing information in working memory, inhibiting prepotent responses, or listening to
music. Taken together, these two complementary lines of evidence provide a clear answer to the

31
classic question: many aspects of thought engage distinct brain regions from, and do not depend
on, language.10

What thinking person has not wondered about the relationship between thought and language?
When we express a thought in language, do we start with a fully formed idea and then “translate”
it into a string of words? Or is the thought not fully formed until the string of words is assembled?
In the former view, it should be possible to think even if we did not have language. In the latter
view, thought completely depends on, and is not distinct from, language. Here we argue that data
from human cognitive neuroscience provide a crisp and clear answer to this age-old question about
the relationship between thought and language.

Functional response profiles of language-selective and domain-general regions within Broca’s area.
Language-selective regions were defined by intersecting the anatomical parcel for BA45 with the individual
activation maps for the language-localizer contrast (sentences > non-word lists). Domain-general regions
were defined by intersecting the same parcel with the individual activation maps for the non-word lists >
sentences contrast. All magnitudes shown are estimated from data independent of those used to define the
regions; responses to the sentences and non-words are estimated using a left-out run.

One might argue that we already know the answer, from the simple fact that myriad forms of
complex cognition and behavior are evident in nonhuman animals who lack language,a from
chimpanzees2–7 and bonobos8,9 to marine mammals10–12 and birds.13,14 On the other hand, intuition
and evidence suggest that human thought encompasses many cognitive abilities that are not present

10
Evelina Fedorenko1,2,3 and Rosemary Varley4 Ann N Y Acad Sci. 2016 Apr; 1369(1): 132–153.
2016 Apr 20.

32
in animals (in anything like their human form), from arithmetic to music to the ability to infer what
another person is thinking. Are these sophisticated cognitive abilities, then, dependent on
language? Here we use two methods from cognitive neuroscience to ask whether complex
quintessentially human thought is distinct from, and possible without, language.

The first method is functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), which can be used to ask
whether language and thought are distinct in the brain. If a brain region supports both linguistic
processing, and, say, musical processing, then it should be active during both. If, on the other hand,
a brain region selectively supports linguistic processing, then it should be active when people
process language, and much less so, or not at all, when they listen to music. The second method
relies on individuals with global aphasia due to brain damage, enabling us to ask whether damage
to the language system affects performance on various kinds of thought. If the language system—
or some of its components—are critical for performing arithmetic or appreciating music, then
damage to these brain regions should lead to deficits in these abilities. If, on the other hand, the
language system is not necessary for nonlinguistic forms of thought, then focal damage to the
language system should only affect language comprehension and/or production, leaving intact
performance on nonlinguistic tasks.

Functional response profiles of two high-level language processing brain regions. (A) Two
functional “parcels” derived from a group-level representation of language activations, the LIFG
and the LMidPostTemp parcels from and used to constrain the selection of subject-specific
regions of interest (ROIs). Individual ROIs were functionally defined: each parcel was intersected
with the individual activation map for the language-localizer contrast (sentences > non-word
lists), and the top 10% of voxels were taken to be that participant’s ROI. (B) Responses to the
language-localizer conditions and a broad range of nonlinguistic tasks. Responses to the sentences
and non-word conditions were estimated using across-runs cross validation, so that the data to
define the ROIs and to estimate their responses were independent. The data for the arithmetic,
working memory (WM) and cognitive control.

Recent research in social neuroscience has identified a set of brain regions that appear to play a
role in representing others’ internal states, including thoughts, preferences, and feelings.
These regions include the right and left temporoparietal junction (TPJ), the precuneus, and regions
in the medial prefrontal cortex. The right TPJ, in particular, is highly selective for thinking about
someone else’s thoughts and beliefs, in line with both (1) early patient studies showing that damage
to this region led to deficits in ToM reasoning and (2) recent “virtual lesion” TMS experiments.

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The similarity between activations for violations of musical structure and low-level unexpected events. (A)
The fMRI activation map for a contrast of structural violation versus no structural violations in music from
(B) The results of a meta-analysis of brain imaging studies examining low-level unexpected events.

Conclusions

Evidence from brain imaging investigations and studies of patients with severe aphasia show that
language processing relies on a set of specialized brain regions, located in the frontal and temporal
lobes of the left hemisphere. These regions are not active when we engage in many forms of
complex thought, including arithmetic, solving complex problems, listening to music, thinking
about other people’s mental states, or navigating in the world. Furthermore, all these nonlinguistic
abilities further appear to remain intact following damage to the language system, suggesting that
linguistic representations are not critical for much of human thought.
We may someday discover aspects of thought that do in fact depend critically on the language
system, but repeated efforts to test the candidates that seemed most likely have shown that none
of these produce much activation of the language system, and none of these abilities are absent in
people who are globally aphasic.
The evidence that the language regions are selectively engaged in language per se suggests that
these regions store domain-specific knowledge representations that mediate our linguistic
comprehension and production abilities. The specificity of these regions further makes it possible
to use their activity as a functional marker of the activation of linguistic representations, thus
enabling us to test the role of language processing in a broader space of cognitive tasks. Most
importantly, the research reviewed here provides a definitive answer to the age-old question:
language and thought are not the same thing.

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