Mercado vs Manzano (1999)

Summary Cases:

● Mercado vs Manzano 307 SCRA 630

Subject: Legal standing of Mercado, as rival candidate, to intervene in the disqualification case of
Manazano when no winner is proclaimed yet; Dual citizenship vs. Dual allegiance; Dual citizenship, as a
ground for disqualification, refers to dual allegiance; Manzano effectively elected Philippine citizenship
and renounced his American citizenship, not by his act of voting in prior elections, by by his filing of
certificate of candidacy

Facts:

Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and private respondent Eduardo Manzano were candidates for vice mayor of
the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. The other one was Gabriel V. Daza III.

Respondent Eduardo Manzano obtained the highest number of votes. However, his proclamation was
suspended in view of a pending petition for disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril who
alleged that Manzano is an American citizen based on the record of the Bureau of Immigration and
misrepresented himself as a natural-born Filipino citizen.

Manzano admitted that he is registered as a foreigner with the Bureau of Immigration under Alien
Certificate of Registration No. B-31632 and alleged that he is a Filipino citizen because he was born in
1955 of a Filipino father and a Filipino mother. He was born in the United States, San Francisco,
California and is considered an American citizen under US Laws. But notwithstanding his registration as
an American citizen, he did not lose his Filipino citizenship.

The Second Division of the COMELEC granted the petition and ordered the cancellation of the certificate
of candidacy of Manzano on the ground that he is a dual citizen and, under Sec 40(d) of the Local
Government Code, persons with dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective positions.

The COMELEC en banc reversed the ruling of its Second Division and declared Manzano qualified to
run for vice mayor of the City of Makati. Pursuant to the resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the board
of canvassers proclaimed Manzano as vice mayor of the City of Makati.

Hence, the present petition for certiorari seeking to set aside the resolution of the COMELEC en banc
and to declare Manzano disqualified to hold the office of vice mayor of Makati City. Manzano, in turn,
questions the legal standing of Mercado to bring this suit considering that he was not an original party in
the case for disqualification filed by Ernesto Mamaril.
Held:

Legal standing of Mercado, as rival candidate, to intervene in the disqualification case of

Manazano when no winner is proclaimed yet.

1. Manzano argues that petitioner Mercado has neither legal interest in the matter in litigation nor an
interest to protect because he is a defeated candidate for the vice-mayoralty post of Makati City who
cannot be proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City even if [Manzano] be ultimately disqualified by
final and executory judgment.

2. The flaw in this argument is it assumes that, at the time Mercado sought to intervene in the
proceedings before the COMELEC, there had already been a proclamation of the results of the election
| Page 1 of 3
for the vice mayoralty contest for Makati City, on the basis of which Mercado came out only second to
Manzano. The fact, however, is that there had been no proclamation at that time. Certainly, Mercado had,
and still has, an interest in ousting Manzano from the race at the time he sought to intervene.

3. The rule in Labo v. COMELEC, only applies to cases in which the election of the respondent is
contested, and the question is whether one who placed second to the disqualified candidate may be
declared the winner. In the present case, at the time Mercado filed a "Motion for Leave to File
Intervention", there had been no proclamation of the winner, and his purpose was precisely to have
private respondent disqualified. If Ernesto Mamaril (who originally instituted the disqualification
proceedings), a registered voter of Makati City, was competent to bring the action, so was Mercado
since the latter was a rival candidate for vice mayor of Makati City.

4. Nor is Mercado's interest in the matter in litigation any less because he filed a motion for intervention
only on May 20, 1998, after private respondent had been shown to have garnered the highest number of
votes among the candidates for vice mayor. Under Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 (Electoral Reforms Law of
1987), intervention may be allowed in proceedings for disqualification even after election if there has yet
been no final judgment rendered.
Dual citizenship vs. Dual allegiance

5. To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of
the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously
considered a national by the said states. For instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose
parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which
follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is
concurrently considered a citizen of both states.

6. Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of
citizens of the Philippines to possess dual citizenship:

(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle of
jus soli;

(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their fathers'
country such children are citizens of that country;

(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter's country the former are considered citizens,
unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship.

7. There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Philippines may, without performing any act, be
also a citizen of another state; but the above cases are clearly possible given the constitutional
provisions on citizenship.

8. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individual's volition.

Dual citizenship, as a ground for disqualification, refers to dual allegiance

9. The disqualification of Manzano is being sought under Sec 40 of the Local Government Code of 1991
(R.A. No. 7160), which declares as "disqualified from running for any elective local position: . . . (d)
Those with dual citizenship." This provision is incorporated in the Charter of the City of Makati

10. Article IV, Section 5 of the Constitution provides: "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the
| Page 2 of 3
national interest and shall be dealt with by law." In including such provision, the concern of the
Constitutional Commission was not with dual citizens per se but with naturalized citizens who maintain
their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase "dual
citizenship" in R.A. No. 7160, Sec 40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854, Sec 20 must be understood as referring to
"dual allegiance."

11. Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those
with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the termination of
their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their
certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons
with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws
of different states.

12. By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to the other
country of which they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens. It may be that,
from the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has not effectively
renounced his foreign citizenship.
Manzano effectively elected Philippine citizenship and renounced his American citizenship, not
by his act of voting in prior elections, by by his filing of certificate of candidacy

13. Manzano was born in San Francisco, California on September 4, 1955, of Filipino parents. Since the
Philippines adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis, while the United States follows the doctrine of jus
soli, at birth, he was a national both of the Philippines and of the United States.

14. The COMELEC en banc held that, by participating in Philippine elections in 1992, 1995, and 1998,
Manzano "effectively renounced his U.S. citizenship under American law," so that now he is solely a
Philippine national. In holding that by voting in Philippine elections, Manzano renounced his American
citizenship, the COMELEC must have in mind Sec 349 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of the
United States, which provided that "A person who is a national of the United States, whether by birth or
naturalization, shall lose his nationality by: . . . (e) Voting in a political election in a foreign state or
participating in an election or plebiscite to determine the sovereignty over foreign territory." This provision
was declared unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court in Afroyim v. Rusk as beyond the power given
to the U.S. Congress to regulate foreign relations.

15. However, by filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present post, Manzano elected
Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his American citizenship. By declaring under oath in his
certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of
another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith
and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, Manzano has, as far as the laws
of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and effectively removing
any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen.
16. Equally without merit is the contention that, to be effective, such renunciation should have been
made upon private respondent reaching the age of majority since no law requires the election of
Philippine citizenship to be made upon majority age.

17. Much is made of the fact that private respondent admitted that he is registered as an American
citizen in the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation and that he holds an American passport which he
used in his last travel to the United States on April 22, 1997. There is no merit in this. Until the filing of
his certificate of candidacy on March 21, 1998, he had dual citizenship. The acts attributed to him can be
considered simply as the assertion of his American nationality before the termination of his American
citizenship.
| Page 3 of 3