Class, study the following cases:

1. Laurel v. Misa, GR No. L-409, Jan. 30,1947

G.R. No. L-409 January 30, 1947
FACTS:
Anastacio Laurel filed a petition for habeas corpus based on a theory that a Filipino citizen who
adhered to the enemy giving the latter aid and comfort during the Japanese occupation cannot
be prosecuted for the crime of treason defined and penalized by article 114 of the Revised Penal
Code, for the reason (1) that the sovereignty of the legitimate government in the Philippines
and, consequently, the correlative allegiance of Filipino citizens thereto was then suspended;
and (2) that there was a change of sovereignty over these Islands upon the proclamation of the
Philippine Republic.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Anastacio Laurel can be prosecuted for the crime of treason?
RULING:
Yes, Anastacio Laurel can be prosecuted for the crime of treason.
Laurel’s contentions are without merit because (1) the absolute and permanent allegiance of
the inhabitants of a territory occupied by the enemy of their legitimate government or
sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the enemy occupation, because the sovereignty of the
government or sovereign de jure is not transferred thereby to the occupier; and (2) the change
of form of government does not affect the prosecution of those charged with the crime of
treason because it is an offense to the same government and same sovereign people.

2. People v. Rosas, GR No. L-2958, Mar. 16, 1951

SYLLABUS

1. TREASON EVIDENCE; TWO-WITNESS RULE; PROOF OF ADHERENCE TO

ENEMY. — The evidence on the charge that the appellant was a Makapili has not been proved
by the requisite two-witness rule. The witnesses have not corroborated each other on the
material points of this feature of the accusation. The trial judge himself states that the evidence
presented to show that the defendant joined and enlisted in the Makapili organization "falls short,
strictly speaking, of the necessary legal requirement." Held: The testimony is nevertheless
valid and sufficient proof of adherence to the enemy.

DECISION

TUASON, J.:

Patricio Rosas, the appellant at bar, was prosecuted for treason upon eight
counts but was found guilty on Counts 1, 3 and 5 only, for which he was
sentenced to life imprisonment, with the accessory penalties of the law, and to
pay a fine of P10,000 and costs. These three counts may still be reduced to one.
Counts 1 and 3 are general allegations of the same overt acts averred in count 5,
except as to the charge of looting and arson, which is laid in count 3 but not in
count 5. Counts 1 and 3 charged that the appellant was an agent and informer
for the Japanese and a Makapili and, as such informer and Makapili,
accompanied Japanese troops and participated in raids, patrols, arrests and
apprehensions, looting and arson. Of the same tenor, except as to one point,
noted above, and more specific is count 5 which reads as follows: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"On or about December 17, 1944, in the municipality of Calauan, Province of

Laguna, the herein accused, with the help of a group of armed Japanese soldiers
and Makapilis, who accompanying him, afforded him impunity, actually took part
in the apprehensions and arrests of Felipe Rivera, Francisco Lalongisip, Agapito
Lalongisip, Agapito Areda, Placido Flores, Ruperto Dimasapit and Facundo
Imperial, persons suspected of being guerrillas, and who on the strength of said
suspicion, were taken to the Japanese garrison of the said locality and therein
confined, tortured and then killed.

Two witnesses, Dionisia Igamin and Maria Empalmado, testified on this count,
the rest of the prosecution witnesses’ testimony having reference to counts 1
and 3.

Dionisia Igamin and Maria Empalmado testified that on December 17, 1944, the
appellant, with Proceso Delgado, Ambrosio Delgado, other Filipinos and Japanese
troops, arrested Facundo Imperial, Felipe Rivera, Agapito Lalongisip, Francisco
Lalongisip, Agapito Areda, Placido Flores, Ruperto Dimasapit, and Dionisia
Igamin’s husband, Silvino Baldolin, for being guerrillas, and bound their hands or
arms and herded them in front of one Jose Mapulong’s house whence they were
marched to town; that before leaving the barrio, the members of the raiding
party, one of them Rosas, set fire to several houses belonging to the prisoners;
and that after December 17 those persons had never been seen or heard of.
They also declared that the appellant and his Filipino and Japanese companions
were armed with pistols or rifles.

The defendant was the lone witness on his behalf. He denied affiliation with the
Makapili or participation in the raids, arrests and arson mentioned by the
witnesses for the prosecution. He admitted having witnessed those events but
claimed that he was a mere bystander, being himself, he said, under the custody
of the Japanese. He stated that prior to December, 1944, he had been arrested
by Japanese soldiers on suspicion of being a guerrilla, and that on the day in
question, December 17, 1944, he was taken by his captors to the electric plant
to find out the cause of the plant’s unsatisfactory service and to warn its owners
that they would be held accountable if the service was not improved. It was on
their way from the electric plant, he said, that he saw the arrests, etc. in Prensa.

The court branded this testimony as childish and ridiculous and refused to give it
any credence. This is our opinion also.

The evidence on the charge that the appellant was a Makapili has not been
 proved by the requisite two-witness rule. The witnesses have not corroborated
each other on the material points of this feature of the accusation. The trial
judge himself states that the evidence presented to show that the defendant
joined and enlisted in the Makapili organization "falls short, strictly speaking, of
the necessary legal requirement." Nevertheless, the testimony is valid and
sufficient proof of adherence to the enemy.

Taken by and large, the trial court’s findings and judgment are in accordance
with law and the evidence, and the sentence is affirmed with costs.

Moran, C.J., Paras, Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes and

Jugo, JJ., concur.
3. People v. Tulin, GR No. 111709, Aug. 30, 2001
FACTS:

“M/T Tabangao,” a cargo vessel loaded fuel was sailing off the coast of Mindoro near Silonay
Island when it was suddenly boarded, by seven fully armed pirates. The pirates were armed with
M-16 rifles, .45 and .38 caliber handguns, and bolos. They detained the crew and took complete
control of the vessel. “M/T Tabangao” then sailed to and anchored about 10 to 18 nautical miles
from Singapore’s shoreline where another vessel called “Navi Pride” received the cargo under
the supervision of accused-appellant Cheong San Hiong.

Accused-appellants were arrested and charged with qualified piracy for violating Presidential
Decree No. 532 (Piracy in Philippine Waters) and were convicted as principals of the crime
charged, except for accused-appellant Hiong who was convicted as an accomplice. On appeal,
Hiong ratiocinates that he cannot be convicted of piracy in Philippine waters as defined and
penalized in Sections 2[d] and 3[a], respectively of PD 532 because Republic Act No. 7659 has
impliedly superseded PD 532. He reasons out that Presidential Decree No. 532 has been
rendered “superfluous or duplicitous” because both Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, and Presidential Decree No. 532 punish piracy committed in Philippine waters. He
maintains that in order to reconcile the two laws, the word “any person” mentioned in Section 1
[d] of Presidential Decree No. 532 must be omitted such that Presidential Decree No. 532 shall
only apply to offenders who are members of the complement or to passengers of the vessel,
whereas Republic Act No. 7659 shall apply to offenders who are neither members of the
complement or passengers of the vessel, hence, excluding him from the coverage of the law.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused-appellant Hiong was guilty of piracy?

RULING:

Yes, Hiong was guilty of piracy.

 Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, before its amendment, provided that piracy must be
committed on the high seas by any person not a member of its complement nor a passenger
thereof. Upon its amendment by Republic Act No. 7659, the coverage of the pertinent provision
was widened to include offenses committed “in Philippine waters.” On the other hand, under
Presidential Decree No. 532 (issued in 1974), the coverage of the law on piracy embraces any
person including “a passenger or member of the complement of said vessel in Philippine
waters.” Hence, passenger or not, a member of the complement or not, any person is covered
by the law.

Republic Act No. 7659 neither superseded nor amended the provisions on piracy under
Presidential Decree No. 532. There is no contradiction between the two laws. There is likewise
no ambiguity and hence, there is no need to construe or interpret the law. All the presidential
decree did was to widen the coverage of the law, in keeping with the intent to protect the
citizenry as well as neighboring states from crimes against the law of nations. As expressed in
one of the “whereas” clauses of Presidential Decree No. 532, piracy is “among the highest forms
of lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes of all countries.” For this reason, piracy under
the Article 122, as amended, and piracy under Presidential Decree No. 532 exist harmoniously as
separate laws.
4. Villavicencio v. Lukban, GR No. 14639, Mar. 25, 1919
Facts : One hundred and seventy women were isolated from society, and then at night, without
their consent and without any opportunity to consult with friends or to defend their rights, were
forcibly hustled on board steamers for transportation to regions unknown. Despite the feeble
attempt to prove that the women left voluntarily and gladly, that such was not the case is shown
by the mere fact that the presence of the police and the constabulary was deemed necessary and
that these officers of the law chose the shades of night to cloak their secret and stealthy acts.
Indeed, this is a fact impossible to refute and practically admitted by the respondents.

 ISSUE : WON Mayor Lukban has the right to deport women with ill repute.

 HELD : Law defines power. No official, no matter how high, is above the law. Lukban committed
a grave abuse of discretion by deporting the prostitutes to a new domicile against their will.
There is no law expressly authorizing his action. On the contrary, there is a law punishing
public officials, not expressly authorized by law or regulation, who compels any person to
change his residence Furthermore, the prostitutes are still, as citizens of the Philippines, entitled
to the same rights, as stipulated in the Bill of Rights, as every other citizen. Thei rchoice of
profession should not be a cause for discrimination. It may make some, like Lukban, quite
uncomfortable but it does not authorize anyone to compel said prostitutes to isolate themselves
from the rest of the human race. These women have been deprived of their liberty by being exiled
to Davao without even being given the opportunity to collect their belongings or, worse, without
even consenting to being transported to Mindanao. For this, Lukban etal must be severely
punished

5. Lagman v. Medialdea, GR No. 231658, July 4, 2017

FACTS:
On September 4, 2016, Proclamation No. 55, declaring a state of national emergency on account
of lawless violence in Mindanao, was issued.

On May 23, 2017 at 10:00pm, after the ISIS-backed Maute Group took over a hospital in Marawi
City, established several checkpoints, set ablaze government and private facilities, inflicted
casualties on the part of the government forces, and hoisted the flag of the Islamic State of Iraq
and Syria (ISIS) in several areas;

President Rodrigo Roa Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216, “declaring a state of martial law
and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao,” in
pursuant to Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution:

“xxx in case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not
exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines
or any part thereof under martial law xxx”

On May 25, 2017, within the 60-days timeline set by Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution,
President Duterte submitted a written report on the factual basis of Proclamation No. 216. After
the submission of the report, the Senate issued P.S. Resolution No. 388 expressing full support
to the proclamation of martial law as they deemed it to be satisfactory, constitutional, and in
accordance with the law.The House of Representatives likewise issued House Resolution No.
1050 expressing their full support to the same.

Nevertheless, several persons filed a petition (Cullamat Petition, Mohamad Petition, and Lagman
Petition)under the Paragraph 3, Section 18 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, claiming that
the declaration of martial law has no sufficient factual basis because there is no rebellion or
invasion in Marawi City or in any part of Mindanao. It argues that acts of terrorism do not
constitute rebellion, since there is no proof that its purpose is to remove Mindanao or any part
thereof from its allegiance to the Philippines.

On June 12, 2017, respondents’ consolidated comment was filed as required by the Court.

ISSUES:

1.) Are the petitions (GR No. 231658, 231771, and 231774) the “appropriate proceeding
covered by Paragraph 3, Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution?

2.) Is the President, in declaring martial law and suspending the writ of habeas corpus,:

a. required to be factually correct or only not arbitrary in his appreciation of facts;

b. required to obtain favorable recommendation thereon of the Secretary of National

Defense; or
c. required to take into account only the situation at the time of the proclamation, even if
subsequent events prove the situation to have not been accurately reported;

3.) Is the power of the Court to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation
of martial law or the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus independent of the actual actions
that have been taken by Congress jointly or separately?

4.) Were there sufficient factual basis for the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus:

a. What are the parameters for review?

b. Who has the burden of proof?

c. What is the threshold of evidence?

5.) Is the exercise of the power of judicial review by the Court involves the calibration of
graduated powers granted the President as Commander-in-Chief, namely calling out powers,
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and declaration of martial law?

6.) Is the Proclamation No. 216 be considered, vague, and thus null and void:

a. with its inclusion of "other rebel groups; or

b. since it has no guidelines specifying its actual operational parameters within the entire
Mindanao region?

7.) Are the armed hostilities mentioned in Proclamation No. 216 and in the Report of the
President to Congress sufficient bases:

a. for the existence of actual rebellion; or

b. for a declaration of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus in the entire Mindanao region?

8.) Are terrorism or acts attributable to terrorism equivalent to actual rebellion and the
requirements of public safety sufficient to declare martial law or suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus?

9.) Will nullifying Proclamation No. 216:

a. have the effect of recalling Proclamation No. 55 s. 2016; or

b. also nullify the acts of the President in calling out the armed forces to quell lawless
violence in Marawi and other parts of the Mindanao region.

HELD:

1.) YES. The unique features of the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII clearly indicate
that it should be treated as sui generis separate and different from those enumerated in Article
VIII of the 1987 Constitution. Under the said paragraph, a petition filed pursuant therewith will
follow a different rule on standing as any citizen may file it. Said provision of the Constitution
also limits the issue to the sufficiency of the factual basis of the exercise by the Chief Executive
of his emergency powers. The usual period for filing pleadings in Petition for Certiorari is
likewise not applicable under the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII considering the
limited period within which this Court has to promulgate its decision.

The Supreme Court is the reviewing tribunal to examine, in an appropriate proceeding, the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Likewise, any action commenced by any citizen to
demand the factual basis of the said proclamation should be denominated as a petition to be
resolved by the Supreme Court.

“The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the extension thereof xxx”

2.)

a. NO. Due to the urgency of the situation, the President cannot be able to verify the
accuracy and veracity of all the facts and information reported to him. In case of actual invasion
or rebellion, there is a need for immediate response and time is paramount in situations
necessitating the proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus.

The Court does not need to satisfy itself that the President's decision is correct, accurate, and
precise, rather it only needs to determine whether the President's decision had sufficient factual
basis. Court's review is confined to the sufficiency, not accuracy, of the information at hand
during the declaration or suspension.

b. NO. According to Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, the President is not
subject to any condition to obtain a recommendation of, or consultation with, the Secretary of
National Defense or other high-ranking officials. The President can declare martial law as long as
the following requirements are present: invasion or rebellion, and when public safety requires
it. The power to impose martial law is vested solely on the President as the Commander-in-
Chief, subject to the revocation of Congress and the review of the Court. Therefore, lack of
recommendation even from the Secretary of National Defense will not compromise the
sufficiency of the declaration’s factual basis.

c. YES. The President is required to take into account only the situation at the time of the
proclamation. In reviewing the sufficiency of the proclamation’s factual basis, the Court
considers only the information and data available to the President prior to or at the time of
declaration, which can be found in the proclamation as well as the written Report submitted by
him to Congress. Past events may be considered as justifications for the declaration and/or
suspension as long as these are connected or related to the current situation existing at the time
of the declaration.

3.) YES. The power to review by the Court and the power to revoke by Congress are not only
totally different, but likewise independent from each other although concededly, they have the
same trajectory, which is, the nullification of the presidential proclamation. Needless to say, the
power of the Court to review can be exercised independently from the power of revocation of
Congress.

4.) YES. The series of violent attacks committed by the ISIS-backed Maute Group, their brazen
display of DAESH flags, and their attempt to establish a DAESH wilayat or province in Marawi
constitute a clear and open attempt to remove from the allegiance of the Philippine
Government, the city of Marawi, a part of Mindanao, and deprive the Chief Executive of his
power, authority, and prerogatives to enforce laws of the land and to maintain public order and
safety in Mindanao, constituting the crime of rebellion. Hence, the factual basis for the
Proclamation No. 216 is sufficient.

a. Based on Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, the parameters for the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus are
invasion or rebellion, and when public safety requires it.

b. The basic rule is that he who alleges must prove his case. The burden lies with the
petitioners to prove that the Proclamation No. 216 lacks factual basis. (Rule No. 131: Burden of
proof and presumptions, Rules of the Court) Otherwise, the President’s actions are presumed to
be valid and constitutional.

c. The President just need to satisfy the given parameters for a valid proclamation of martial
law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, beyond reasonable doubt.

5.) NO. Judicial review does not include the calibration of the President's decision of which of
his graduated powers be availed of in a given situation. To do so would be tantamount to an
incursion into the exclusive domain of the Executive and an infringement on the prerogative
that solely, at least initially, lies with the President.
“"Graduation" of powers refers to hierarchy based on scope and effect; it does not refer to a
sequence, order, or arrangement by which the Commander-in-Chief must adhere to.”

6.)

a. NO. Inclusion of "other rebel groups" does not make Proclamation No.216 vague when
viewed in the context of the words that accompany it. Verily, the text of Proclamation No. 216
refers to "other rebel groups" found in Proclamation No. 55, which it cited by way of reference
in its Whereas clauses.

b. NO. Operational guidelines will serve only as mere tools for the implementation of the
proclamation. There is no need for the Court to determine the constitutionality of the
implementing and/or operational guidelines, general orders, arrest orders and other orders
issued after the proclamation for being irrelevant to its review. Thus, any act committed under
the said orders in violation of the Constitution and the laws, such as criminal acts or human
rights violations, should be resolved in a separate proceeding. Finally, there is a risk that if the
Court wades into these areas, it would be deemed as trespassing into the sphere that is
reserved exclusively for Congress in the exercise of its power to revoke.

7.)

a. YES. The President, in issuing Proclamation No. 216, had sufficient factual bases tending to
show that actual rebellion exists. The President’s conclusion was reached after a tactical
consideration of the facts. In fine, the President satisfactorily discharged his burden of proof.
After all, what the President needs to satisfy is only the standard of probable cause for a valid
declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

b. YES. The 1987 Constitution grants to the President, as Commander-in-Chief, the discretion
to determine the territorial coverage or application of martial law and suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The Kilometer Zero marker in Mindanao is found in
Marawi City, the only Islamic City of the South, thereby making Marawi City the point of
reference of all roads in Mindanao. Thus, there is reasonable basis to believe that Marawi is only
the staging point of the rebellion, both for symbolic and strategic reasons. Moreover, the
President's duty to maintain peace and public safety is not limited only to the place where there
is actual rebellion; it extends to other areas where the present hostilities are in danger of spilling
over.

8.) YES. Rebellion is only one of the various means by which terrorism can be committed.
Terrorism neither negates nor absorbs rebellion. While rebellion is one of the predicate crimes
of terrorism, one cannot absorb the other as they have different elements. For the validity of
the declaration of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,
there must be a concurrence of actual invasion or rebellion, and when public safety requires it.
 9.)

a. NO. The calling out power is in a different category from the power to declare martial law
and the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; the nullification of
Proclamation No. 216 will not affect Proclamation No. 55. Among the three extraordinary
powers of the President, the calling out power is the most benign and involves ordinary police
action. The President may resort to this extraordinary power whenever it becomes necessary to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, or rebellion. “The power to call is fully
discretionary to the President;" the only limitations being that he acts within permissible
constitutional boundaries or in a manner not constituting grave abuse of discretion.

b. NO. Neither would the nullification of Proclamation No. 216 result in the nullification of
the acts of the President done pursuant thereto. Under the "operative fact doctrine," the
unconstitutional statute is recognized as an "operative fact" before it is declared
unconstitutional.

6. Gonzales v. Abaya, GR No. 164007, Aug. 8, 2006

DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

For our resolution is the Petition for Prohibition (with prayer for a temporary restraining order) filed by
the above-named members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), herein petitioners, against
the AFP Chief of Staff and the Judge Advocate General, respondents.

The facts are:

On July 26, 2003, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo received intelligence reports that some
members of the AFP, with high-powered weapons, had abandoned their designated places of
assignment. Their aim was to destabilize the government. The President then directed the AFP and
the Philippine National Police (PNP) to track and arrest them.

On July 27, 2003 at around 1:00 a.m., more than 300 heavily armed junior officers and enlisted men
of the AFP – mostly from the elite units of the Army’s Scout Rangers and the Navy’s Special Warfare
Group – entered the premises of the Oakwood Premier Luxury Apartments on Ayala Avenue, Makati
City. They disarmed the security guards and planted explosive devices around the building.

Led by Navy Lt. (SG) Antonio Trillanes IV, the troops sported red armbands emblazoned with the
emblem of the "Magdalo" faction of the Katipunan. 1 The troops then, through broadcast media,
announced their grievances against the administration of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, such
as the graft and corruption in the military, the illegal sale of arms and ammunition to the "enemies" of
the State, and the bombings in Davao City intended to acquire more military assistance from the US
government. They declared their withdrawal of support from their Commander-in-Chief and
demanded that she resign as President of the Republic. They also called for the resignation of her
cabinet members and the top brass of the AFP and PNP.
About noontime of the same day, President Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 427 declaring a state of
rebellion, followed by General Order No. 4 directing the AFP and PNP to take all necessary
measures to suppress the rebellion then taking place in Makati City. She then called the soldiers to
surrender their weapons at five o’clock in the afternoon of that same day.

In order to avoid a bloody confrontation, the government sent negotiators to dialogue with the
soldiers. The aim was to persuade them to peacefully return to the fold of the law. After several
hours of negotiation, the government panel succeeded in convincing them to lay down their arms
and defuse the explosives placed around the premises of the Oakwood Apartments. Eventually, they
returned to their barracks.

A total of 321 soldiers, including petitioners herein, surrendered to the authorities.

The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) investigated the incident and recommended that the
military personnel involved be charged with coup d’etat defined and penalized under Article 134-A of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended. On July 31, 2003, the Chief State Prosecutor of the
Department of Justice (DOJ) recommended the filing of the corresponding Information against them.

Meanwhile, on August 2, 2003, pursuant to Article 70 of the Articles of War, respondent General
Narciso Abaya, then AFP Chief of Staff, ordered the arrest and detention of the soldiers involved in
the Oakwood incident and directed the AFP to conduct its own separate investigation.

On August 5, 2003, the DOJ filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Makati City an Information
for coup d’etat 2 against those soldiers, docketed as Criminal Case No. 03-2784 and eventually
raffled off to Branch 61, presided by Judge Romeo F. Barza. 3 Subsequently, this case was
consolidated with Criminal Case No. 03-2678, involving the other accused, pending before Branch
148 of the RTC, Makati City, presided by Judge Oscar B. Pimentel.

On August 13, 2003, the RTC directed the DOJ to conduct a reinvestigation of Criminal Case No.
03-2784.

On the same date, respondent Chief of Staff issued Letter Order No. 625 creating a Pre-Trial
Investigation Panel tasked to determine the propriety of filing with the military tribunal charges for
violations of the Articles of War under Commonwealth Act No. 408, 4 as amended, against the same
military personnel. Specifically, the charges are: (a) violation of Article 63 for disrespect toward the
President, the Secretary of National Defense, etc., (b) violation of Article 64 for disrespect toward a
superior officer, (c) violation of Article 67 for mutiny or sedition, (d) violation of Article 96 for conduct
unbecoming an officer and a gentleman, and (e) violation of Article 97 for conduct prejudicial to good
order and military discipline.

Of the original 321 accused in Criminal Case No. 03-2784, only 243 (including petitioners herein)
filed with the RTC, Branch 148 an Omnibus Motion praying that the said trial court assume
jurisdiction over all the charges filed with the military tribunal. They invoked Republic Act (R.A.) No.
7055. 5

On September 15, 2003, petitioners filed with the Judge Advocate General’s Office (JAGO) a motion
praying for the suspension of its proceedings until after the RTC shall have resolved their motion to
assume jurisdiction.
On October 29, 2003, the Pre-Trial Investigation Panel submitted its Initial Report to the AFP Chief
of Staff recommending that the military personnel involved in the Oakwood incident be charged
before a general court martial with violations of Articles 63, 64, 67, 96, and 97 of the Articles of War.

Meanwhile, on November 11, 2003, the DOJ, after conducting a reinvestigation, found probable
cause against only 31 (petitioners included) of the 321 accused in Criminal Case No. 03-2784.
Accordingly, the prosecution filed with the RTC an Amended Information. 6

In an Order dated November 14, 2003, the RTC admitted the Amended Information and dropped the
charge of coup d’etat against the 290 accused.

Subsequently, or on December 12, 2003, the Pre-Trial Investigation Panel submitted its Final Pre-
Trial Investigation Report 7 to the JAGO, recommending that, following the "doctrine of absorption,"
those charged with coup d’etat before the RTCshould not be charged before the military tribunal for
violation of the Articles of War.

For its part, the RTC, on February 11, 2004, issued an Order 8 stating that "all charges before the
court martial against the accused…are hereby declared not service-connected, but rather absorbed
and in furtherance of the alleged crime of coup d’etat." The trial court then proceeded to hear
petitioners’ applications for bail.

In the meantime, Colonel Julius A. Magno, in his capacity as officer-in-charge of the JAGO, reviewed
the findings of the Pre-Trial Investigation Panel. He recommended that 29 of the officers involved in
the Oakwood incident, including petitioners, be prosecuted before a general court martial for
violation of Article 96 (conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman) of the Articles of War.

On June 17, 2004, Colonel Magno’s recommendation was approved by the AFP top brass. The AFP
Judge Advocate General then directed petitioners to submit their answer to the charge. Instead of
complying, they filed with this Court the instant Petition for Prohibition praying that respondents be
ordered to desist from charging them with violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War in relation to
the Oakwood incident. 9

Petitioners maintain that since the RTC has made a determination in its Order of February 11, 2004
that the offense for violation of Article 96 (conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman) of the
Articles of War is not service-connected, but is absorbed in the crime of coup d’etat, the military
tribunal cannot compel them to submit to its jurisdiction.

The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, counters that R.A. No. 7055 specifies which
offenses covered by the Articles of War areservice-connected. These are violations of Articles 54 to
70, 72 to 92, and 95 to 97. The law provides that violations of these Articles are properly cognizable
by the court martial. As the charge against petitioners is violation of Article 96 which, under R.A. No.
7055 is a service-connected offense, then it falls under the jurisdiction of the court martial.

Subsequently, petitioners filed with this Court a Supplemental Petition raising the additional issue
that the offense charged before the General Court Martial has prescribed. Petitioners alleged therein
that during the pendency of their original petition, respondents proceeded with the Pre-Trial
Investigation for purposes of charging them with violation of Article 96 (conduct unbecoming an
officer and a gentleman) of the Articles of War; that the Pre-Trial Investigation Panel then referred
the case to the General Court Martial; that "almost two years since the Oakwood incident on July 27,
2003, only petitioner Lt. (SG) Antonio Trillanes was arraigned, and this was done under questionable
circumstances;" 10 that in the hearing of July 26, 2005, herein petitioners moved for the dismissal of
the case on the ground that they were not arraigned within the prescribed period of two (2) years
from the date of the commission of the alleged offense, in violation of Article 38 of the Articles of
War; 11 that "the offense charged prescribed on July 25, 2005;" 12 that the General Court Martial
ruled, however, that "the prescriptive period shall end only at 12:00 midnight of July 26, 2005;" 13 that
"(a)s midnight of July 26, 2005 was approaching and it was becoming apparent that the accused
could not be arraigned, the prosecution suddenly changed its position and asserted that 23 of the
accused have already been arraigned;" 14 and that petitioners moved for a reconsideration but it was
denied by the general court martial in its Order dated September 14, 2005. 15

In his Comment, the Solicitor General prays that the Supplemental Petition be denied for lack of
merit. He alleges that "contrary to petitioners’ pretensions, all the accused were duly arraigned on
July 13 and 18, 2005." 16 The "(r)ecords show that in the hearing on July 13, 2005, all the 29 accused
were present" and, "(o)n that day, Military Prosecutor Captain Karen Ong Jags read the Charges
and Specifications from the Charge Sheet in open court (pp. 64, TSN, July 13, 2005)." 17

The sole question for our resolution is whether the petitioners are entitled to the writ of prohibition.

There is no dispute that petitioners, being officers of the AFP, are subject to military law. Pursuant to
Article 1 (a) of Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended, otherwise known as the Articles of War,
the term "officer" is "construed to refer to a commissioned officer." Article 2 provides:

Art. 2. Persons Subject to Military Law. – The following persons are subject to these articles and
shall be understood as included in the term "any person subject to military law" or "persons subject
to military law," whenever used in these articles:

(a) All officers and soldiers in the active service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or of
the Philippine Constabulary, all members of the reserve force, from the dates of their call to active
duty and while on such active duty; all trainees undergoing military instructions; and all other
persons lawfully called, drafted, or ordered into, or to duty or for training in the said service, from the
dates they are required by the terms of the call, draft, or order to obey the same.

Upon the other hand, Section 1 of R.A. No. 7055 reads:

SEC. 1. Members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and other persons subject to military law,
including members of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Units, who commit crimes or
offenses penalized under the Revised Penal Code, other special penal laws, or local government
ordinances, regardless of whether or not civilians are co-accused, victims, or offended parties, which
may be natural or juridical persons, shall be tried by the proper civil court, except when the offense,
as determined before arraignment by the civil court, is service-connected, in which case, the offense
shall be tried by court-martial, Provided, That the President of the Philippines may, in the interest of
justice, order or direct at any time before arraignment that any such crimes or offenses be tried by
the proper civil courts.

As used in this Section, service-connected crimes or offenses shall be limited to those defined in
Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92, and Articles 95 to 97 of Commonwealth Act No. 408, as
amended.

In imposing the penalty for such crimes or offenses, the court-martial may take into consideration the
penalty prescribed therefor in the Revised Penal Code, other special laws, or local government
ordinances.
Section 1 of R.A. No. 7055, quoted above, is clear and unambiguous. First, it lays down the general
rule that members of the AFP and other persons subject to military law, including members of the
Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Units, who commit crimes or offenses penalized under the
Revised Penal Code (like coup d’etat), other special penal laws, or local ordinances shall be tried by
the proper civil court. Next, it provides the exception to the general rule, i.e., where the civil court,
before arraignment, has determined the offense to be service-connected, then the offending soldier
shall be tried by a court martial. Lastly, the law states an exception to the exception, i.e., where the
President of the Philippines, in the interest of justice, directs before arraignment that any such
crimes or offenses be tried by the proper civil court.

The second paragraph of the same provision further identifies the "service-connected crimes or
offenses" as "limited to those defined in Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92, and Articles 95 to 97"
of the Articles of War. Violations of these specified Articles are triable by court martial. This
delineates the jurisdiction between the civil courts and the court martial over crimes or offenses
committed by military personnel.

Such delineation of jurisdiction by R.A. No. 7055 is necessary to preserve the peculiar nature of
military justice system over military personnel charged with service-connected offenses. The military
justice system is disciplinary in nature, aimed at achieving the highest form of discipline in order to
ensure the highest degree of military efficiency. 18 Military law is established not merely to enforce
discipline in times of war, but also to preserve the tranquility and security of the State in time of
peace; for there is nothing more dangerous to the public peace and safety than a licentious and
undisciplined military body. 19 The administration of military justice has been universally practiced.
Since time immemorial, all the armies in almost all countries of the world look upon the power of
military law and its administration as the most effective means of enforcing discipline. For this
reason, the court martial has become invariably an indispensable part of any organized armed
forces, it being the most potent agency in enforcing discipline both in peace and in war. 20

Here, petitioners are charged for violation of Article 96 (conduct unbecoming an officer and a
gentleman) of the Articles of War before the court martial, thus:

All persons subject to military law, did on or about 27 July 2003 at Oakwood Hotel, Makati City,
Metro Manila, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously violate their solemn oath as officers to defend
the Constitution, the law and the duly-constituted authorities and abused their constitutional
duty to protect the people and the State by, among others, attempting to oust the incumbent duly-
elected and legitimate President by force and violence, seriously disturbing the peace and tranquility
of the people and the nation they are sworn to protect, thereby causing dishonor and disrespect
to the military profession, conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman, in violation of AW
96 of the Articles of War.

CONTRARY TO LAW. (Underscoring ours)

Article 96 of the Articles of War 21 provides:

ART. 96. Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman. – Any officer, member of the Nurse
Corps, cadet, flying cadet, or probationary second lieutenant, who is convicted of conduct
unbecoming an officer and a gentleman shall be dismissed from the service. (Underscoring ours)

We hold that the offense for violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War is service-connected. This is
expressly provided in Section 1 (second paragraph) of R.A. No. 7055. It bears stressing that the
charge against the petitioners concerns the alleged violation of their solemn oath as officers to
defend the Constitution and the duly-constituted authorities.Such violation allegedly caused
dishonor and disrespect to the military profession. In short, the charge has a bearing on
their professional conduct or behavior as military officers. Equally indicative of the "service-
connected" nature of the offense is the penalty prescribed for the same – dismissal from the
service – imposable only by the military court.Such penalty is purely disciplinary in character,
evidently intended to cleanse the military profession of misfits and to preserve the stringent standard
of military discipline.

Obviously, there is no merit in petitioners’ argument that they can no longer be charged before the
court martial for violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War because the same has been declared by
the RTC in its Order of February 11, 2004 as "not service-connected, but rather absorbed and in
furtherance of the alleged crime of coup d’etat," hence, triable by said court (RTC). The RTC, in
making such declaration, practically amended the law which expressly vests in the court martial the
jurisdiction over "service-connected crimes or offenses." What the law has conferred the court
should not take away. It is only the Constitution or the law that bestows jurisdiction on the court,
tribunal, body or officer over the subject matter or nature of an action which can do so. 22 And it is
only through a constitutional amendment or legislative enactment that such act can be done. The
first and fundamental duty of the courts is merely to apply the law "as they find it, not as they like it to
be." 23 Evidently, such declaration by the RTC constitutes grave abuse of discretion tantamount to
lack or excess of jurisdiction and is, therefore, void.

In Navales v. Abaya., 24 this Court, through Mr. Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., held:

We agree with the respondents that the sweeping declaration made by the RTC (Branch 148) in the
dispositive portion of its Order dated February 11, 2004 that all charges before the court-martial
against the accused were not service-connected, but absorbed and in furtherance of the crime of
coup d’etat, cannot be given effect. x x x, such declaration was made without or in excess of
jurisdiction; hence, a nullity.

The second paragraph of the above provision (referring to Section 1 of R.A. No. 7055) explicitly
specifies what are considered "service-connected crimes or offenses" under Commonwealth Act No.
408, as amended, also known as the Articles of War, to wit:

Articles 54 to 70:

Art. 54. Fraudulent Enlistment.

Art. 55. Officer Making Unlawful Enlistment.

Art. 56. False Muster.

Art. 57. False Returns.

Art. 58. Certain Acts to Constitute Desertion.

Art. 59. Desertion.

Art. 60. Advising or Aiding Another to Desert.

Art. 61. Entertaining a Deserter.

Art. 62. Absence Without Leave.

Art. 63. Disrespect Toward the President, Vice-President,

Congress of the Philippines, or Secretary of National

Defense.

Art. 64. Disrespect Toward Superior Officer.

Art. 65. Assaulting or Willfully Disobeying Superior Officer.

Art. 66. Insubordinate Conduct Toward Non-Commissioned Officer.

Art. 67. Mutiny or Sedition.

Art. 68. Failure to Suppress Mutiny or Sedition.

Art. 69. Quarrels; Frays; Disorders.

Art. 70. Arrest or Confinement.

Articles 72 to 92:

Art. 72. Refusal to Receive and Keep Prisoners.

Art. 73. Report of Prisoners Received.

Art. 74. Releasing Prisoner Without Authority.

Art. 75. Delivery of Offenders to Civil Authorities.

Art. 76. Misbehavior Before the Enemy.

Art. 77. Subordinates Compelling Commander to Surrender.

Art. 78. Improper Use of Countersign.

Art. 79. Forcing a Safeguard.

Art. 80. Captured Property to be Secured for Public Service.

Art. 81. Dealing in Captured or Abandoned Property.

Art. 82. Relieving, Corresponding With, or Aiding the Enemy.

Art. 83. Spies.

Art. 84. Military Property.–Willful or Negligent Loss, Damage

or wrongful Disposition.
Art. 85. Waste or Unlawful Disposition of Military Property

Issued to Soldiers.

Art. 86. Drunk on Duty.

Art. 87. Misbehavior of Sentinel.

Art. 88. Personal Interest in Sale of Provisions.

Art. 88-A. Unlawful Influencing Action of Court.

Art. 89. Intimidation of Persons Bringing Provisions.

Art. 90. Good Order to be Maintained and Wrongs Redressed.

Art. 91. Provoking Speeches or Gestures.

Art. 92. Dueling.

Articles 95 to 97:

Art. 95. Frauds Against the Government.

Art. 96. Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman.

Art. 97. General Article.

Further, Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 7055 vests on the military courts the jurisdiction over the
foregoing offenses. x x x.

It is clear from the foregoing that Rep. Act No. 7055 did not divest the military courts of jurisdiction to
try cases involving violations of Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92, and Articles 95 to 97 of the
Articles of War as these are considered "service-connected crimes or offenses." In fact, it mandates
that these shall be tried by the court-martial.

Moreover, the observation made by Mr. Justice Antonio T. Carpio during the deliberation of this case
is worth quoting, thus:

The trial court aggravated its error when it justified its ruling by holding that the charge of Conduct
Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman is ‘absorbed and in furtherance to the alleged crime of
coup d’etat.’ Firstly, the doctrine of ‘absorption of crimes’ is peculiar to criminal law and generally
applies to crimes punished by the same statute, 25 unlike here where different statutes are involved.
Secondly, the doctrine applies only if the trial court has jurisdiction over both offenses. Here, Section
1 of R.A. 7055 deprives civil courts of jurisdiction over service-connected offenses, including Article
96 of the Articles of War. Thus, the doctrine of absorption of crimes is not applicable to this case.

Military law is sui generis (Calley v. Callaway, 519 F.2d 184 [1975]), applicable only to military
personnel because the military constitutes an armed organization requiring a system of discipline
separate from that of civilians (see Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83 [1953]). Military personnel carry
 high-powered arms and other lethal weapons not allowed to civilians. History, experience, and the
nature of a military organization dictate that military personnel must be subjected to a separate
disciplinary system not applicable to unarmed civilians or unarmed government personnel.

A civilian government employee reassigned to another place by his superior may question his
reassignment by asking a temporary restraining order or injunction from a civil court. However, a
soldier cannot go to a civil court and ask for a restraining or injunction if his military commander
reassigns him to another area of military operations. If this is allowed, military discipline will collapse.

xxx

This Court has recognized that courts-martial are instrumentalities of the Executive to enable the
President, as Commander-in-Chief, to effectively command, control, and discipline the armed forces
(see Ruffy v. Chief of Staff, 75 Phil. 875 [1946], citing Winthrop’s Military Law and Precedents, 2nd
edition, p. 49). In short, courts-martial form part of the disciplinary system that ensures the
President’s control, and thus civilian supremacy, over the military. At the apex of this disciplinary
system is the President who exercises review powers over decisions of courts-martial (citing Article
50 of the Articles of War; quoted provisions omitted).

xxx

While the Court had intervened before in courts-martial or similar proceedings, it did so sparingly
and only to release a military personnel illegally detained (Ognir v. Director of Prisons, 80 Phil. 401
[1948] or to correct objectionable procedures (Yamashita v. Styer, 75 Phil. 563 [1945]). The Court
has never suppressed court-martial proceedings on the ground that the offense charged ‘is
absorbed and in furtherance of’ another criminal charge pending with the civil courts. The Court may
now do so only if the offense charged is not one of the service-connected offenses specified in
Section 1 of RA 7055. Such is not the situation in the present case.

With respect to the issue of prescription raised by petitioners in their Supplemental Petition, suffice it
to say that we cannot entertain the same. The contending parties are at loggerheads as to (a) who
among the petitioners were actually arraigned, and (b) the dates of their arraignment. These are
matters involving questions of fact, not within our power of review, as we are not a trier of facts. In a
petition for prohibition, such as the one at bar, only legal issues affecting the jurisdiction of the
tribunal, board or officer involved may be resolved on the basis of the undisputed facts. 26

Clearly, the instant petition for prohibition must fail. The office of prohibition is to prevent the unlawful
and oppressive exercise of authority and is directed against proceedings that are done without or in
excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, there being no appeal or other plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. 27 Stated differently, prohibition is the
remedy to prevent inferior courts, corporations, boards, or persons from usurping or exercising a
jurisdiction or power with which they have not been vested by law. 28

In fine, this Court holds that herein respondents have the authority in convening a court martial and
in charging petitioners with violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for prohibition is DISMISSED.

o
The nature of the military justice system
o Coup d'etat vis-a-vis violation of the Articles of War
 FACTS:

On July 27, 2003 at around 1:00 a.m., more than 300 heavily armed junior officers and
enlisted men of the AFP entered the premises of the Oakwood Premier Luxury
Apartments on Ayala Avenue, Makati City, where they disarmed the security guards and
planted explosive devices around the building. They then declared their withdrawal of
support from their Commander-in-Chief and demanded that she resign as President of
the Republic.

After much negotiation, the group finally laid down their arms. Subsequently, an
Information for coup d’etat was filed against them with the RTC, at the same time that
they were tried at court martial for conduct unbecoming an officer. They question the
jurisdiction of the court martial, contending that the RTC ordered that their act was not
service-connected and that their violation of Art. 96 of the Articles of War (RA 7055) was
absorbed by the crime of coup d’etat.

ISSUE:

o Whether the act complained of was service-connected and therefore cognizable by

court martial or absorbed by the crime of coup d'etat cognizable by regular courts

RULING:

The military justice system is disciplinary in nature, aimed at achieving the highest
form of discipline in order to ensure the highest degree of military efficiency. Military law
is established not merely to enforce discipline in times of war, but also to preserve the
tranquility and security of the State in times of war, but also to preserve the tranquility
and security of the State in time of peace; for there is nothing more dangerous to the
public peace and safety than a licentious and undisciplined military body. The
administration of military justice has been universally practiced. Since time immemorial,
all the armies in almost all countries of the world look upon the power of military law and
its administration as the most effective means of enforcing discipline. For this reason,
the court martial has become invariably an indispensable part of any organized armed
forces, it being the most potent agency in enforcing discipline both in peace and in war.

The Court held that the offense is service-connected. xxx It bears stressing that
the charge against the petitioners concerns the alleged violation of their solemn
oath as officers to defend the Constitution and the duly-constituted authorities.
Such violation allegedly caused dishonor and disrespect to the military profession. In
short, the charge has a bearing on their professional conduct or behavior as military
officers. Equally indicative of the “service-connected” nature of the offense is the penalty
prescribed for the same – dismissal from the service – imposable only by the military
court. Such penalty is purely disciplinary in character, evidently intended to cleanse the
military profession of misfits and to preserve the stringent standard of military discipline.