Ladonga vs People

FACTS:
Evangelina and Adronico Ladonga and spouse, conspiring and knowing fully well that
they did not have sufficient funds deposited with the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB),
drew and issue UCPB Check No. 284743 postdated July 7, 1990 in the amount of
P9,075.55), payable to Alfredo Oculam, and thereafter, without informing the latter that they
did not have sufficient funds deposited with the bank to cover up the amount of the check, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously pass on, indorse, give and deliver the said
check to Alfredo by way of rediscounting of the aforementioned checks; however, upon
presentation of the check to the drawee bank for encashment, the same was dishonored for
the reason that the account of the accused had already been closed, to the damage and
prejudice of Alfredo.

The RTC rendered a joint decision finding the Ladonga spouses guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violating B.P. Blg. 22. Adronico applied for probation which was granted. On the
other hand, petitioner brought the case to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the RTC erred in
finding her criminally liable for conspiring with her husband as the principle of conspiracy is
inapplicable to B.P. Blg. 22 which is a special law; moreover, she is not a signatory of the
checks and had no participation in the issuance thereof.

ISSUE:
a.) W/N conspiracy is applicable in violations of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, by invoking art.
10 of RPC?

b.) W/N the cases cited by the CA in affirming in toto the conviction of petitioner as
conspirator applying the suppletory character of the RPC to special laws like BP 22 is
applicable?

RULING:
A.) YES. Some provisions of the Revised Penal Code, especially with the addition of the
second sentence in Article 10, are applicable to special laws. It submits that B.P. Blg. 22
does not provide any prohibition regarding the applicability in a suppletory character of the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code to it.

Article 10 of the RPC reads as follows: ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this
Code. – Offenses which are or in the future may be punishable under special laws are not
subject to the provisions of this Code. This Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless
the latter should specially provide the contrary.

The article is composed of two clauses. The first provides that offenses which in the future
are made punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of the RPC, while
the second makes the RPC supplementary to such laws

B.) B.P. Blg. 22 does not expressly proscribe the suppletory application of the provisions of
the RPC. Thus, in the absence of contrary provision in B.P. Blg. 22, the general provisions of
the RPC which, by their nature, are necessarily applicable, may be applied suppletorily.
Indeed, in the recent case of Yu vs. People the Court applied suppletorily the provisions on
subsidiary imprisonment under Article 39 of the RPC to B.P. Blg. 22.

The suppletory application of the principle of conspiracy in this case is analogous to the
application of the provision on principals under Article 17 in U.S. vs. Ponte. For once
conspiracy or action in concert to achieve a criminal design is shown, the act of one is the act
of all the conspirators, and the precise extent or modality of participation of each of them
becomes secondary, since all the conspirators are principals. BUT In the present case, the
prosecution failed to prove that petitioner performed any overt act in furtherance of the
alleged conspiracy. Conspiracy must be established, not by conjectures, but by positive and
conclusive evidence. Thus, Petitioner Evangeline Ladonga is ACQUITTED of the charges
against her under B.P. Blg. 22 for failure of the prosecution to prove her guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. No pronouncement as to costs.
Romualdez vs Marcelo

FACTS:
Petitioner is being charged with violations of Section 7 of RA No. 3019 for failure to file
his Statements of Assets and Liabilities for the period 1967-1985 during his tenure as
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary and for the period 1963-1966 during his
tenure as Technical Assistant in the Department of Foreign Affairs.

Petitioner claims that the Office of the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in
recommending the filing of 24 informations against him for violation of Section 7 of Republic
Act (RA) No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; that the Ombudsman cannot
revive the aforementioned cases which were previously dismissed by the Sandiganbayan in
its Resolution of February 10, 2004; that the defense of prescription may be raised even for
the first time on appeal and thus there is no necessity for the presentation of evidence
thereon before the court a quo. Thus, this Court may accordingly dismiss Criminal Case Nos.
28031-28049 pending before the Sandiganbayan and Criminal Case Nos. 04-23185704-
231860 pending before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, all on the ground of prescription.

In its Comment, the Ombudsman argues that the dismissal of the informations in
Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 does not mean that petitioner was thereafter exempt from
criminal prosecution; that new informations may be filed by the Ombudsman should it find
probable cause in the conduct of its preliminary investigation; that the filing of the complaint
with the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) in 1987 and the filing of the
information with the Sandiganbayan in 1989 interrupted the prescriptive period; that the
absence of the petitioner from the Philippines from 1986 until 2000 also interrupted the
aforesaid period based on Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code.

For its part, the PCGG avers in its Comment[4] that, in accordance with the 1987
Constitution and RA No. 6770 or the Ombudsman Act of 1989, the Omdudsman need not
wait for a new complaint with a new docket number for it to conduct a preliminary
investigation on the alleged offenses of the petitioner; that considering that both RA No. 3019
and Act No. 3326 or the Act To Establish Periods of Prescription For Violations Penalized By
Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin To
Run, are silent as to whether prescription should begin to run when the offender is absent
from the Philippines, the Revised Penal Code, which answers the same in the negative,
should be applied.

ISSUE: whether or not the offenses for which petitioner are being charged have already
prescribed.

HELD: YES. Rule 117 of the Rules of Court provides that the accused may, at any time
before he enters his plea, move to quash the complaint and information on the ground that
the criminal action or liability has been extinguished, which ground includes the defense of
prescription considering that Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code enumerates prescription as
one of those grounds which totally extinguishes criminal liability. Indeed, even if there is yet to
be a trial on the merits of a criminal case, the accused can very well invoke the defense of
prescription.
Thus, the question is whether or not the offenses charged in the subject criminal cases
have prescribed? We held in the case of Domingo v. Sandiganbayan that:

In resolving the issue of prescription of the offense charged, the following should be
considered: (1) the period of prescription for the offense charged; (2) the time the period of
prescription starts to run; and (3) the time the prescriptive period was interrupted.[

Section 11 of RA No. 3019 provides that all offenses punishable therein shall prescribe in
15 years. Significantly, this Court already declared in the case of People v. Pacificador that:
 It appears however, that prior to the amendment of Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019 by B.P.
Blg. 195 which was approved on March 16, 1982, the prescriptive period for offenses
punishable under the said statute was only ten (10) years. The longer prescriptive period of
fifteen (15) years, as provided in Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019 as amended by B.P. Blg. 195,
does not apply in this case for the reason that the amendment, not being favorable to the
accused (herein private respondent), cannot be given retroactive effect. Hence, the crime
prescribed on January 6, 1986 or ten (10) years from January 6, 1976.

Thus, for offenses allegedly committed by the petitioner from 1962 up to March 15, 1982,
the same shall prescribe in 10 years. On the other hand, for offenses allegedly committed by
the petitioner during the period from March 16, 1982 until 1985, the same shall prescribe in 15
years.

As to when these two periods begin to run, reference is made to Act No. 3326 which
governs the computation of prescription of offenses defined by and penalized under special
laws. Section 2 of Act No. 3326 provides:

SEC. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of
the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the
institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.

The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty
person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not
constituting jeopardy.

Supreme Court ruled that the prescriptive period of the offenses herein began to run from
the discovery thereof or on May 8, 1987, which is the date of the complaint filed by the former
Solicitor General Francisco I. Chavez against the petitioner with the PCGG.

Section 2 of Act. No. 3326 is conspicuously silent as to whether the absence of the
offender from the Philippines bars the running of the prescriptive period. The silence of the
law can only be interpreted to mean that Section 2 of Act No. 3326 did not intend such an
interruption of the prescription unlike the explicit mandate of Article 91.

Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. Offenses which are or in
the future may be punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of this
Code. This Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should specially
provide the contrary.

However, it must be pointed out that the suppletory application of the Revised Penal
Code to special laws, by virtue of Article 10 thereof, finds relevance only when the provisions
of the special law are silent on a particular matter as evident from the cases cited and relied
upon in the Dissenting Opinion:

The term of prescription shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philippines.

In view of the foregoing, the applicable 10-and-15-year prescriptive periods in the instant
case, were not interrupted by any event from the time they began to run on May 8, 1987. As a
consequence, the alleged offenses committed by the petitioner for the years 1963-1982
prescribed 10 years from May 8, 1987 or on May 8, 1997. On the other hand, the alleged
offenses committed by the petitioner for the years 1983-1985 prescribed 15 years from May
8, 1987 or on May 8, 2002.

Therefore, when the Office of the Special Prosecutor initiated the preliminary
investigation of Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 on March 3, 2004 by requiring the petitioner
to submit his counter-affidavit, the alleged offenses subject therein have already prescribed.
Indeed, the State has lost its right to prosecute petitioner for the offenses subject of Criminal
Case Nos. 28031-28049 pending before the Sandiganbayan and Criminal Case Nos. 04-
23185704-231860 pending before the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
 WHEREFORE, premises considered, petitioners Motion for Reconsideration is
GRANTED. Criminal Case Nos. 28031-28049 pending before the Sandiganbayan and
Criminal Case Nos. 04-23185704-231860 pending before the Regional Trial Court of Manila
are all hereby ordered DISMISSED

People vs Simon

FACTS:
Accused Martin Simon was charged with a violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic
Act No. 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. He sold tea bags of marijuana to a
Narcotics Command (NARCOM) poseur-buyer. The confiscated 4 tea bags, weighing a total
of 3.8 grams, when subjected to laboratory examination, were found positive for marijuana.

Simon denied the accusation against him, claiming that on the day of question, he was
picked up by the police at their house while watching TV. He was told that he was a pusher so
he attempted to alight from the jeep but he was handcuffed instead. When they finally
reached the camp, he was ordered to sign some papers and, when he refused, he was boxed
in the stomach eight or nine times by Sgt. Pejoro. He was then compelled to affix his
signature and fingerprints on the documents presented to him. He denied knowledge of the
marked money or the 4 teabags of dried marijuana leaves, and insisted that the marked
money came from the pocket of Pejoro. Moreover, the reason why he vomited blood was
because of the blows he suffered at the hands of Pejoro.

Dr. Evelyn Gomez-Aguas, a resident physician of Romana Pangan District Hospital,

declared that she treated appellant for three days due to abdominal pain, but her examination
revealed that the cause for this ailment was appellant’s peptic ulcer. She did not see any sign
of slight or serious external injury, abrasion or contusion on his body.

Simon was sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment, to pay a fine of twenty
thousand pesos and to pay the costs.

Simon then seek the reversal of the judgement

ISSUE:

Was the conviction of Simon correct?

RULING:

To sustain a conviction for selling prohibited drugs, the sale must be clearly and
unmistakably established. To sell means to give, whether for money or any other material
consideration. It must, therefore, be established beyond doubt that appellant actually sold and
delivered two tea bags of marijuana dried leaves to Sgt. Lopez, who acted as the poseur-
buyer, in exchange for two twenty-peso bills.

After careful review, the Court held that there were 2 tea bags of marijuana that was sold
and there were 2 other tea bags of marijuana confiscated. Thus, Simon should be charged of
selling for the 2 tea bags of marijuana only.

However, there is an overlapping error in the provisions on the penalty of reclusion

perpetua by reason of its dual imposition, that is, as the maximum of the penalty where the
marijuana is less than 750 grams, and also as the minimum of the penalty where the
marijuana involved is 750 grams or more. The same error has been committed with respect to
the other prohibited and regulated drugs provided in said Section 20. To harmonize such
conflicting provisions in order to give effect to the whole law, the court hereby hold that the
penalty to be imposed where the quantity of the drugs involved is less than the quantities
stated in the first paragraph shall range from prision correccional to reclusion temporal, and
not reclusion perpetua. This is also concordant with the fundamental rule in criminal law that
all doubts should be construed in a manner favorable to the accused.

The court held that Republic Act No. 6425, as now amended by Republic Act No. 7659,
has unqualifiedly adopted the penalties under the Revised Penal Code in their technical
terms, hence with their technical signification and effects. In fact, for purposes of determining
the maximum of said sentence, the court have applied the provisions of the amended Section
20 of said law to arrive at prision correccional and Article 64 of the Code to impose the same
in the medium period. Such offense, although provided for in a special law, is now in effect
punished by and under the Revised Penal Code. Correlatively, to determine the minimum, the
court applied first part of the aforesaid Section 1 which directs that “in imposing a prison
sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the court
shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be
that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules
of said Code, and the minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to
that prescribed by the Code for the offense.”

Thus, in the case at bar, appellant should be begrudged the benefit of a minimum
sentence within the range of arresto mayor, the penalty next lower to prision correccional
which is the maximum range have fixed through the application of Articles 61 and 71 of the
Revised Penal Code. For, with fealty to the law, the court may set the minimum sentence at 6
months of arresto mayor, instead of 6 months and 1 day of prision correccional.

Garcia vs People
FACTS:
On May 11, 1995, within the canvassing period of 1995 senatiorial elections, Aquilino
Pimintel, Jr., was informed that Arsenia Garcia (Arsenia), along with her co-conspirators,
willfully and unlawfully decreased the number of votes of the candidate from 6,998 to 1921
votes.

Pimintel filed a complaint against Asenia and her co-conspirators. All the accused was
acquited due to lack of evidence except for Arsenia who was found guilty of the crime defined
under Republic Act 6646, Section 27 (b) for decreasing the votes of Senator Pimentel in the
total of 5,034 and in relation to BP Blg. 881.

Petitioner appealed to CA which also affirmed the decision of the RTC.

Arsenia appealed to SC, contending that the judgment of CA is erroneous and there was
no motive on her part to reduce the votes of private complainant.

Respondent on the other hand contends that good faith is not a defense in the violation
of an election law, which falls under the class of mala prohibita.

ISSUES: (1) Whether or not a violation of Section 27(b) of Rep. Act No. 6646, classified under
mala in se.

(2) Whether or not good faith and lack of criminal intent be valid defenses?

HELD: (1) YES. Section 27(b) of Republic Act No. 6646 provides: Any member of the board
of election inspectors or board of canvassers who tampers, increases, or decreases the votes
received by a candidate in any election or any member of the board who refuses, after proper
verification and hearing, to credit the correct votes or deduct such tampered votes.

Clearly, the acts prohibited in Section 27(b) are mala in se. For otherwise, even errors
and mistakes committed due to overwork and fatigue would be punishable.

(2) NO. Public policy dictates that extraordinary diligence should be exercised by the
members of the board of canvassers in canvassing the results of the elections. Any error on
their part would result in the disenfranchisement of the voters. The Certificate of Canvass for
senatorial candidates and its supporting statements of votes prepared by the municipal board
of canvassers are sensitive election documents whose entries must be thoroughly scrutinized.

The instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals sustaining
petitioners conviction but increasing the minimum penalty in her sentence to one year instead
of six months is AFFIRMED.