MPWT19-14244

The Quebec Bridge Collapse (1907): An Engineer’s Perspective to Avoid Catastrophic Failures

Saleem Parvez Mistry

Saudi Arabian Oil Company
(Saudi Aramco)
Dhahran, 31311
Saudi Arabia

ABSTRACT

The failure assessment of the collapse of the Quebec Bridge in 1907 conducted by the Royal Commission
is discussed in the following paper. The Quebec Bridge is a 987.5 m long; 29 m wide; and 104 m high
riveted steel truss structure which collapsed not once but twice during construction. The reason for the
bridge failure was attributed to member behavior and stability proved by experimental work conducted
following the collapse by Royal Commission. The bridge was finally completed in 1917 and has been in
operation since then. The lessons learned from the bridge collapse were pivotal in the advancement of
engineering design, fabrication and formation of the two organizations, namely - the American
Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO) in 1914 and American Institute of
Steel Construction (AISC) in 1921. The author highlights the importance of validating the design criteria
and specifications by material and load testing, conducting peer reviews, design control, and paying
attention to details. The lessons learned reinforce the need to establish and monitor shop fabrication
practices, inspection procedures and gates (witness, hold and review points) to safely complete the
execution of any civil engineering project, be it onshore or offshore construction.

Keywords: Quebec bridge collapse, AISC, AASHTO peer reviews, stability, design control, attention to
details, fabrication practices, welding procedures, inspection procedures.

1.0 INTRODUCTION

The 1800 feet span Quebec Bridge, at the time of its construction in the early part of twentieth century
(1907) was going to be the longest double cantilever bridge in the world. Sadly, on August 29, 1907 the
bridge collapsed during construction killing 75 erection workers and supervisors. A Royal Commission
task force was set up to investigate the failure of the bridge. An investigation report listed major findings
and mainly attributed the collapse to buckling failure of Chord A9L and the reasons surrounding it. After
the investigation of the collapsed bridge, the Canadian Government decided to redesign and build a much
stronger and stiffer bridge adjacent to the old collapsed bridge. On September 11, 1916; the redesigned
bridge’s center span suddenly fell into the St. Lawrence River during erection. It was the ill-fated bridge’s
second failure during construction. The bearing failure of the jacking equipment (steel casting) led to the
imbalance, instability and loss of the load (central span) which cost eleven (11) human lives. The
contractor, the St. Lawrence Bridge Company, took full responsibility and bore the cost of replacing the
fallen central span. Alloy steel (carbon and nickel) was used to rebuild the central span of the bridge
during the World War I period when steel was scarcely available. On September 20, 1917 the bridge was
finally erected and stands to this day.

The Engineering News Record1 (1917) stated that “the great value of the achievement lies in the
inspiration emanating from the courage of the men who have erected on the failure of 1907 and the loss
of 1916, this greatest of bridges and in so doing not only have erected a monument to themselves and
their courage and ability but have vindicated the profession before a doubting world.”

2.0 CONCEPTUAL DESIGN OF THE QUEBEC BRIDGE

Even though the interest in building a bridge across the St. Lawrence River first surfaced in 1846, the
project got the approval of the Canadian Parliament which passed an act in 1887, establishing Quebec
Bridge Company with $1 million capital and the power to issue bonds2. The Quebec Bridge Company
hired an independent consulting engineer, Theodore Cooper, one of the most prominent bridge engineers
of his time to review the design and supervise the construction of the bridge.

The Quebec Bridge Company solicited tenders for the design and construction of the bridge in 1898.
The specifications called for a double cantilever structure (Fig. 1 & 2) with a clear span of 1600 feet (487.7
m). Project specifications also allowed contractors to bid for alternate systems like suspension bridges
or arch bridges. This was not the first time that the concept of cantilever structure was being utilized in
the construction of long span bridge. The Forth Bridge near Edinburgh, Scotland (1882), a double
cantilever bridge was already design and executed by British engineers Sir John Fowler and Sir Benjamin
Baker. Furthermore, renowned engineer Gustave Eiffel had evaluated and much recommended that
cantilever structure was preferable to either a suspension or an arch bridge for the Quebec site2. This
gave further backing to the utilization of double cantilever concept for the Quebec Bridge (Fig 2).

As the consulting engineer acting on behalf of the Quebec Bridge Company, Theodore Cooper reviewed
the tenders submitted for substructure and superstructure and concluded that the plan of the Phoenix
Bridge Company utilizing double cantilever concept to be the most feasible and economical proposal.
Accordingly, the Quebec Bridge Company selected Phoenix Bridge Company to design and construct
the Quebec Bridge in 1899.

In May 1900, Theodore Cooper proposed to increase the clear span to 1800 feet (548.6 m) for convincing
reasons such as: a) reduced construction time and cost for construction of shallower piers and b) limited
down time from floating ice during construction. Thereafter, the clear span was approved by the Quebec
Bridge Company board to be increased to 1800 feet (548.6 m). Theodore Cooper estimated the increase
in the cost of the bridge by $200,000 3. The Quebec Bridge with a clear span of 1800 feet would therefore
be the longest span double cantilever bridge to be constructed at that time. The cantilever arms were to
extend a distance of 562.5 feet (171.5 m) on either end, whilst supporting a suspended simple span of
length 675 feet (205.75 m), standing 150 feet (45.7 m) above the water level.

Figure 1: Double Cantilever Span Concept6

3.0 DESIGN & MATERIAL SPECIFICATIONS

The Quebec Bridge specifications first prepared in 1898 by Quebec Bridge Company were seemingly a
direct copy of a specification issued by the Department of Railways and Canals in 1896. The specification
was not tailored to include special design, fabrication and construction requirements that an exceptional
structure like Quebec Bridge would impose. In addition to the shortcomings in the specifications, the
document was considered to be tentative by Quebec Bridge Company, drawn up for the purpose of
procuring preliminary tenders3.
Ironically even though main span was increased from 1600 feet to 1800 feet by the consulting engineer,
Theodore Cooper, and officially approved on May 5, 1900; there were no attempts made to amend the
technical specifications by the proponents or the consulting engineer.

3.1 Bridge Parameters & Requirements

Total length of the Bridge = 3240 feet (987.5 m)

i) Center span= 1800 feet (548.6 m)

[Cantilever-562.5 feet (71.45 m); simple span-675 feet (205.75 m); cantilever-562.5 feet (71.45
m)]

ii) Two anchor spans = 500 feet each (152.4 m);

iii) Two approach spans of 220 feet each (67 m).

The St. Lawrence River was about a half mile wide at the site and 200 feet deep at mid channel. The
bridge clearance above highest water level was to be 150 feet and the two main towers were to
magnificently reach 400 feet high above the highest water level.

The bridge was to be designed to accommodate a) two railway tracks, b) two street car tracks, c) two
roadways and d) two sidewalks.

3.2 Material Specification

The material specification for the plates used in bridge construction confirmed with ASTM A7 (30-33 ksi)
Specification for Steel for Buildings and Bridges. This was later confirmed by testing of samples from the
lot produced by the steel mills (Tables 1, 2 & 3) and utilized in the model tests by the failure assessment
enquiry commissioners.

Note: ASTM A7 specification was withdrawn in 1967 and replaced by ASTM A36 Standard specification
for carbon structural steel.

3” x 2” x 3/16” ANGLES
Yield Strength (Fy, psi) Ultimate Strength (Fu, psi)
42,300 63,040
41,780 62,100
5/16” PLATES
 38,270 65,420
37,350 64,200

Table 1: Tensile Tests of Plates and Angles

(Courtesy, Royal Commission Quebec Bridge Inquiry Report Pg: 113)

PLATES OF CHORD MEMBER 9 (AS-BUILT)

Yield Strength (Fy, psi) Ultimate Strength (Fu, psi)
38,840 60,680
40,810 61,440
ANGLES OF CHORD MEMBER (AS-BUILT)
38,000 61,900
41,730 67,640

Table 2: Tensile Tests of Plates and Angles

(Courtesy, Royal Commission Quebec Bridge Inquiry Report Pg: 114)

CHEMICAL ANALYSIS
Description C P Mn S
5/16” Plate 0.21 0.016 0.40 0.023
5/16” Plate 0.23 0.025 0.42 0.024
54-1/2” x7/8” Plate 0.17 0.01 0.46 -
54-1/2” x15/16” Plate 0.17 0.01 0.46 -
8” X 3” X 15/16” Angles 0.16 0.041 0.36 -
4” X 3” X 3/8” Angles 0.18 0.036 0.66 -

Table 3: Chemical Analysis of Plates and Angles

(Courtesy, Royal Commission Quebec Bridge Inquiry Report Pg: 114)
 4.0 COLLAPSE OF THE BRIDGE

On August 29, 1907 the entire south half of the bridge weighing 19,000 tons of steel collapsed while a
traveler derrick weighing 250 tons was erecting the suspended portion of the bridge. The nearly vertical
fall of the bridge took about 15 seconds and killed 75 workers.

The cause of failure was mainly attributed to the buckling of compression chords A9L and A9R. As per
inspection reports, member A9L had laterally deflected about 2-1/4 inches (57 mm), bend in the shape
of ‘S’. The lateral deflection (out-of-plane) was discovered about three days prior to the collapse and
reported to the consulting engineer, Theodore Cooper. On August 27, the construction was halted by the
foreman until matter could be resolved. However, the foreman later changed his mind after assurance
from Edward Hoare, the chief engineer of the Quebec Bridge Company that the chords were carrying
“much less than maximum load.” This decision was taken without the involvement of Theodore Cooper,
the consulting engineer. The Government of Canada formed a Royal Commission to investigate the
incident.

4.1 ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT

The investigation of the bridge collapse was entrusted to three civil engineers, Henry Holgate, John G.
Kerry and John Galbraith by the Governor General of Canada. The official report submitted by the
committee in 1908 attributed the collapse to a number of reasons. Major findings listed in the report3 by
the commissioners are as follows:

1. “The collapse of the Quebec Bridge resulted from the failure of lower chords in the anchor arm
near the main pier. The failure of these chords was due to their defective designs.”

2. “We do not consider that the specifications for the work were satisfactory or sufficient, the unit
stresses in particular being higher than any established by past practice. The specifications were
accepted without protest by all interested.”

3. “A grave error was made in assuming the dead load for the calculations at too low a value and
not afterwards revising this assumption. This error was of sufficient magnitude to have required
the condemnation of the bridge, even if the details of the lower chords had been of sufficient
strength, because, if the bridge has been completed as designed, the actual stresses would have
been considerably greater than those permitted by the specifications.”

4. “The work done by the Phoenix Bridge Company in making the detail drawings and in planning
and carrying out the erection, and by the Phoenix Iron Company in fabricating the material was
good, and the steel used was of good quality. The serious defects were fundamental errors in
design.”
 5.0 ROOT CAUSES OF BRIDGE FAILURE

The disastrous collapse of the Quebec Bridge primarily resulted from the failure of the load-bearing
member A9L & A9R. The failure was attributed to buckling failure of the primary members due to a
number of reasons, like:

1. Incorrect Bridge Self-weight (Dead Load) calculation:

The cantilever span was changed from 1600 feet to 1800 feet before the start of bridge fabrication.
However, the dead loads and member stresses were not rechecked based on the increased span.
When the matter came to the attention of the consulting engineer at the time the erection of bridge
began, a quick estimate of stresses was made indicating that the member stresses would
increase marginally by 7% but well within the unity checks. Ensuing the collapse, the computed
compressive stresses were found to be of the order of 29.7 ksi, much higher than 24 ksi allowed
under extreme conditions. Table 4 gives a summary of the increased dead loads on the bridge
based on design assumptions and as-built fabrication drawings.

Bridge Element Assumed Dead Actual Dead Difference

Load (Pounds) Load (Pounds) (%)
Half suspended span 4,842,000 5,694,000 17.6
Cantilever Arm 13,205, 200 1,804,000 19.7
Anchor Arm 13,317,600 17,318,000 30.0
Table 4: Comparison of Assumed and Actual Dead Loads
(Source: Royal Commission Report3)

2. Allowing higher compressive stresses:

The design specifications in the later part of the eighteenth century limited the allowable
compressive stress to 50% of the yield stress of the member. That was the acceptable practice
based on empirical equations developed by experienced engineers. Therefore, as per established
practices, the allowable compressive stress of compression members should have been limited
to 16.5 ksi (114 Mpa). The consulting engineer for the Quebec Bridge, Theodore Cooper, allowed
compressive stress of 21 ksi (145 Mpa) for operational loading and 24 ksi (165 Mpa) under
extreme loading conditions.

Cooper’s formula (Allowable compressive stress) = 24,000 – 100 (l/r) psi;

Where, l = length of compression member; r = radius of gyration.
 Figure 3. Compression Chord – A9L (Cross Section & Plan)
Cross Sectional Area: 842 Sq.In. (543, 225 mm2)

COMPRESSIVE STRESS (Y-AXIS) VS. SLENDERNESS RATIO (KL/R)

25000

20000

15000

10000

5000

0
0 10 20 30 40 50

AISC-1989 Specification
(Cooper's Formula) AISC -1923 Specification

Figure 4: Allowable Compressive Stress (Fa) vs. Slenderness Ratio (KL/r)

A comparison of Member A9L compression capacity check revealed that Cooper’s formula
allowed 12% more capacity when compared to modern day AISC specification (1989), which is
still utilized in the offshore industry (Figure. 4 & Table 5).

Though efforts were made to test tension members (eye bars), the consulting engineer rejected
the idea of performing compression load testing on compression chords. Post collapse, the Royal
Commission conducted compression testing on scaled models and could confidently identify loss
of capacity in compression member as the primary reason for the bridge collapse.
 Allowable Compressive Stress (psi)
Radius of
Span length
Gyration AISC-1989
S. No. (l) L/r (Cooper's AISC -1923
( r) Specification
(inches) Formula) Specification
(inches)

1 100 15.45 6.47 23352 17958 19559

2 200 15.45 12.94 22705 17833 19278

3 300 15.45 19.41 22058 17630 18960

4 400 15.45 25.88 21411 17353 18604

5 500 15.45 32.36 20763 17010 18215

6 684 15.45 44.27 19572 16232 17413

7 700 15.45 45.30 19469 16157 17338

Table 5: Comparison of Cooper’s Formula with AISC Specifications (1923 & 1989)
Based on 33 ksi steel (highlighted line # 6 is Member A9L’s calculated capacities)

Experimental work conducted by the Royal Commission3

A model chord section was built to a linear scale of one-third of the lower chord section A-9 and
was tested to destruction. An interesting observation made from the model tests were that no
permanent strains or distortions of any kind were discovered up to the loading producing failure.
Inference can be made from this observation is that none of the chord members were stressed
up to its elastic limit. The compression member lost its ability to carry more loads and buckled
when the lattice connections failed in shear. See Fig. 5, showing connection failure in lattice
(angle) member.

Figure 5: Compression test on scaled model (member A-9, Anchor Arm)

Courtesy, Royal Commission Report Photograph 1, Appendix 15
 Experimental work conducted by Joseph A. Yura7

The ‘S’ shape of the buckled member A-9, was experimentally proven by Dr. Yura7. Experimental
works were conducted to demonstrate the effect of connection details on built-up column
behavior. In Fig. 6, the built-up section on the left was made by providing end shear plate
connections which prevented slip at its ends while slip could occur at other locations along the
length. On the contrary, the two members were fully connected without allowing any slip to occur
along the built-up section on the right.

The chord member A-9 in the Quebec Bridge was ‘boxed’ at the last two end panels (See Fig. 5)
and lattice connected by angle member along the remaining length. The site engineers reported
deflection in the chord member before failure. The buckled shape of the chord did not deviate
from the analytical theory and later experimental works as discussed in this paper.

Figure 6: Built-up Column Buckling Model by Yura, J.A7

3. Secondary stresses:

The bottom chords for the anchor and cantilever arms (Fig 2) in the Quebec Bridge were slightly
curved for aesthetic reasons. In addition to the fabrication difficulty, the curvature resulted in
increase of secondary stresses (P-Delta) on the members, thereby reducing its load bearing
capacity. The designer had overlooked the secondary stresses generated due to the geometry
of the structure.
 4. Residual stresses:

The compression chord was fabricated built-up section utilizing plates and angles. Cooper’s
equation did not consider residual stresses in the hot-rolled sections and plates whose magnitude
vary from 10 to 15 ksi 4. The compression chord buckled during erection of suspended span,
when the members lattice members and their connections failed under the loads. This directly
correlates to the residual stresses in lattice members which were designed without paying
attention to the residual stresses in the members as a result of shearing, cutting, and punching of
rivet holes along with riveting.

5. Fabrication of Member A9L:

During the fabrication of Member A9L (1905), shop workers perceived the built-up members,
including A9L to be quite slender, based was on their previous practical experience of fabrication
different types of bridges. It was learned that member A9L rib suffered a dent during storage in
the yard, which was later repaired. The steel fabrication works were conducted as per project
specifications and well inspected as reported in the Royal Commission report. However, some
minor rework and repairs during the fabrication work cannot be ruled out considering the
magnitude of the project.

6. Erection of the bridge:

During erection (June 1907) workers observed lateral deflection (June 1907) and misalignment
between members. The consulting engineer thought that it could be due to preexisting condition.
In two-week time the lateral deflection of member A9L increased from 19mm to 57mm. Member
A9R also bent in the same direction (out-of-plane). On August 27, work was stopped by the
erection foreman, but again resumed upon reassurance from Edward Hoare (Chief Engineer of
Quebec Bridge Company). On August 29, 1907, the consulting engineer, Theodore Cooper wired
“Add no more load to the bridge until after due consideration of facts.” A group meeting was
arranged at 5:15 and decision was made to wait until the next morning to decide a course of
action. Meanwhile, the Bridge collapsed on August 29, 1907 at 5:30PM. Poor communication and
coordination between the designer, erector and the owner led to the continuation of erection works
which ultimately led to the collapse of the bridge.

6.0 LESSONS LEARNED

Two very important lessons can be comprehended from the Quebec Bridge failure. In a nutshell, they
can be summarized as follows:
 1. Design validation by conducting load tests:

Globally, conventional design theories currently exist to support design and fabrication of
structures. In rare instances like use of newer materials, profiles, composite construction, wherein
unconventional approach is utilized in sizing the members unsupported by established theories
and empirical equations; the best approach would be to validate the design philosophy using load
tests. International building code5 (Chapter 17) also prescribes design validation by conducting
load tests.

2. Design peer review:

The importance of having designs and drawings peer reviewed needs to be much emphasized.
Engineering design is an iterative process requiring good project control and management skills.
Designers must not believe that peer reviews are acts of subordination, but instead actions that
portray due diligence and good professional conduct.

7.0 CONCLUSIONS

The failure of the Quebec Bridge (1907) upon introspection can be attributed to poor planning and
communications during the project execution, insufficient funding of projects at the right time,
engagement of unqualified personnel in the decision making positions, limited understanding of lattice
type compression members under actual loadings, grave design errors, fabrication and inspection control
to list a few. The result of the bridge collapse led to further research and advancement in the design of
lattice members, stability theories, and development of new standards (AISC, AASHTO) related to design
and fabrication of structural steel buildings and bridge elements.

The determination and perseverance of the engineers and technicians to successfully complete the
Quebec Bridge construction on Sep 18, 1917 (despite suffering two collapses – August 29, 1907 and
September 11, 1916) deserves great appreciation and recognition by every generation of the engineering
community.

8.0 REFERENCES

1. Engineering News Record 1917. Quebec – The Final Chapter: 79, p.579
2. Middleton, W.D., Bridge at Quebec. (Indiana University Press, Indiana 2001)
3. Royal Commission Quebec Bridge Enquiry Report, 1908
4. McCormac, J.C., Structural Steel Design (Harper & Row, Publishers, 1971, p. 56)
5. International Building Code 2018, International Code Council, INC. Chapter. 17.
6. Kaichi Watanabe, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kaichi_Watanabe (Sep 23, 2019)
7. Yura, J.A., Five Useful Stability Concepts, NASCC, April 2008.