RULE 103, 108, RA 9048, RA 10172

Republic vs Michelle Soriano

GR No. G.R. No. 207074 Date:January 17, 2018

Petitioner: Republic of the Philippines Respondents: Michelle Soriano Gallo

Facts:

Michelle Gallo prayed before the RTC of Ilagan City, for the correction of her name from "Michael" to
"Michelle" and of her biological sex from "Male" to "Female". In addition, Gallo asked for the inclusion of
her middle name, "Soriano"; her mother's middle name, "Angangan"; her father's middle name, "Balingao";
and her parent's marriage date, May 23, 1981, in her Certificate of Live Birth, as these were not recorded.
As proof of her claims, she attached to her petition copies of her diploma, voter's certification, official
transcript of records, medical certificate, mother's birth certificate, and parents' marriage certificate, The
RTC on 2010 granted her petition and directed the Civil Registrar General, NSO through the Municipal Civil
Registrar of Ilagan, Isabela to correct the entries in the Birth Certificate of the petitioner.
The Office of the Solicitor General appealed, alleging that the applicable rule should be Rule 103 of the
Rules of Court for Petitions for Change of Name. It argued that Gallo did not comply with the jurisdictional
requirements under Rule 103 because the title of her Petition and the published Order did not state her
official name, "Michael Gallo." Furthermore, the published Order was also defective for not stating the
cause of the change of name.

ISSUE:
Was the petition of Michelle Soriano Gallo involves a substantive change under Rule 103 of the Rules of
Court instead of mere correction of clerical errors?

RULING:
NO. In the case at bar, petitioner raises an issue which requires an evaluation of evidence as determining
whether or not the change sought is a typographical error or a substantive change requires looking into the
party's records, supporting documents, testimonies, and other evidence. Rule 103 of the Rules of Court
does not apply to the case at bar. The change in the entry of Gallo's biological sex is governed by Rule 108
of the Rules of Court while Republic Act No. 9048 applies to all other corrections sought.
Gallo is not attempting to replace her current name. She is merely correcting the misspelling of her given
name. "Michelle" could easily be misspelled as "Michael. She is merely seeking to correct her records to
conform to her true given name.
By qualifying the definition of a clerical, typographical error as a mistake "visible to the eyes or obvious to
the understanding," the law recognizes that there is a factual determination made after reference to and
evaluation of existing documents presented. Thus, corrections may be made even though the error is not
typographical if it is "obvious to the understanding," even if there is no proof that the name or
circumstance in the birth certificate was ever used.
A person may now change his or her first name or correct clerical errors in his or her name through
administrative proceedings. Rules 103 and 108 only apply if the administrative petition has been filed and
later denied. Further, Republic Act No. 10172 does not apply in the case at bar as it was only enacted on
August 15, 2012—more than two (2) years after Gallo filed her Petition
 In Re: Petition for Change of name of Julian Lin Wang GR 159966
GR No. 159968 Date: March 30, 2005

Petitioner: Respondents:
IN RE: PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME CEBU CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR, duly represented by the Registrar
AND/OR CORRECTION/CANCELLATION OSCAR B. MOLO
OF ENTRY IN CIVIL REGISTRY OF
JULIAN LIN CARULASAN WANG also
known as JULIAN LIN WANG, to be
amended/corrected as JULIAN LIN
WANG, JULIAN LIN WANG, duly
represented by his mother ANNA LISA
WANG
Facts:
A petition was filed by Anna Lisa Wang for the change of name and/or correction/cancellation of entry in
the Civil Registry of her son, a minor, Julian Lin Carulasan Wang before the RTC of Cebu City. Julian was
the son of Anna Lisa Wang and Sing-Foe Wang. They were not yet married to each other when Julian was
born. Subsequently, when Julian’s parents got married, the latter executed a deed of legitimation of their
son so that the child’s name was changed from Julian Lin Carulasan to Julian Lin Carulasan Wang. Since the
family plans to stay in Singapore and, since in Singapore middle names or the maiden surname of the
mother are not carried in a persons name, they anticipated that Julian will be discriminated against because
of his current registered name which carries a middle name. Also, the spouses’ daughter and Julian might
get confused if they are really brothers and sisters because they have different surnames. Lastly, Carulasan
sounds funny in Singapore’s Mandarin language since they do not have the letter “R” but if there is, they
pronounce it as “L”. It is for these reasons why the name of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang is requested to be
changed to Julian Lin Wang. RTC denied the petition. It found that the reasons above-mentioned does not
fall within the grounds recognized by law. It further ruled that the real reason behind is only convenience.
Hence, this Appeal. SC required the OGS to comment on the petition. OSG opined that the Trial Court is
correct. legitimate children have the right to bear the surnames of both their mother and father, and such
right cannot be denied by the mere expedient of dropping the same (Family Code). Mere convenience is
not sufficient to support a petition for change of name and/or cancellation of entry.
ISSUE: Whether the name mother’s surname should be dropped in the instant case because it is a common
practice in Singapore to omit said surname?
RULING: No. Petition is denied.
The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification, and
that A CHANGE OF NAME IS A PRIVILEGE AND NOT A RIGHT, so that before a person can be authorized to
change his name given him either in his certificate of birth or civil registry, he must show PROPER AND
REASONABLE CAUSE, or ANY COMPELLING REASON which may justify such change. Otherwise, the request
should be denied. The valid grounds for a change of name are:
When the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
When the change results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation;
When the change will avoid confusion;
When one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of
alien parentage;
A sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without
prejudicing anybody; and
When the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was
for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest.
In granting and denying the Petition, the question of proper and reasonable cause is left to the sound
discretion of the court. The evidence presented need only be satisfactory to the court and not all the best
evidence available What is involved is not a mere matter of allowance or disallowance of the request, but a
JUDICIOUS evaluation of the sufficiency and propriety of the justifications advanced in support thereof,
mindful of the consequent results in the event of its grant and with the sole prerogative for making such
determination being lodged in the courts.
MIDDLE NAME PURPOSE: Middle names serve to identify the maternal lineage or filiation of a person as
well as further distinguish him from others who may have the same given name and surname as he has.
In this case, the only reason advanced by petitioner for the dropping of his middle name is convenience.
However, how such change of name would make his integration into Singaporean society easier and
convenient is not clearly established. That the continued use of his middle name would cause confusion and
difficulty does not constitute proper and reasonable cause to drop it from his registered name. In addition,
petitioner is only a minor. Considering the nebulous foundation on which his petition for change of name is
based, it is best that the matter of change of his name be left to his judgment and discretion when he
reaches the age of majority. As he is of tender age, he may not yet understand and appreciate the value of
the change of his name and granting of the same at this point may just prejudice him in his rights under
our laws.
 Gan vs Republic
GR No. 207147 Date: September 14, 2016

Petitioner: Respondents:
EMELITA BASILIO GAN REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
Facts:
Emelita Basilio Gan (petitioner) was born on December 21, 1956 out of wedlock to Pia Gan and Consolacion
Basilio. Her birth certificate indicates that her full name is Emelita Basilio.

Petitioner filed a petition for correction of name which sought to change her full name in her birth
certificate from “Emelita Basilio” to “Emelita Basilio Gan.” She claimed that she had been using the name
"Emelita Basilio Gan" in her school records, employment records, marriage contract, and other government
records.

Upon order of RTC, petitioner amended her petition from mere correction of entry in the birth certificate to
change of name under Rule 103. The amended petition contained the same allegations. RTC granted the
petition.

Respondent sought a reconsideration alleging that the petitioner, who is an illegitimate child, failed to
adduce evidence that she was duly recognized by her father, which would have allowed her to use the
surname of her father. RTC denied the motion. On appeal, CA reversed and set aside the RTC order.
ISSUE:
Whether or not CA is correct in setting aside the RTC order allowing the petitioner's change of name.

RULING:
Yes, CA is correct.

A change of name is a privilege and not a matter of right; a proper and reasonable cause must exist before
a person may be authorized to change his name.

In this case, the reason cited by the petitioner in support of her petition for change of name, i.e., that she
had been using the name “Emelita Basilio Gan” in all of her records, is not a sufficient or proper justification
to allow her petition.

Petitioner was born in 1956 and the Civil Code governs the use of surname of children. Pursuant to Article
368, petitioner, as an illegitimate child, shall bear the surname of her mother “Basilio.” Since petitioner
failed to adduce any evidence that would show that she was duly acknowledged by his father, she could
not use her father’s surname “Gan” pursuant to Article 366 of the Civil Code.

Republic vs Virgie Tipay

GR No.209527 Date:February 14, 2018

Petitioner: Respondents:
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VIRGIE (VIRGEL) L. TIPAY
Facts:

In a petition dated February 13, 2009, Virgel sought the correction of several entries in his birth
certificate.Attached to the petition are copies of his birth certificate, respectively issued by the Municipal
Civil Registrar of Governor Generoso, Davao Oriental and the National Statistics Office (NSO)reflect his
gender as "FEMALE" and his first name as "Virgie." It further appears that the month and day of birth in
the local civil registrar's copy was blank, while the NSO-issued birth certificate indicates that he was born
on May 12, 1976.Virgel alleged that these entries are erroneous, and sought the correction of his birth
certificate as follows: (a) his gender, from "FEMALE" to "MALE;" (b) his first name, from "VIRGIE" to
"VIRGEL;" and (c) his month and date of birth to "FEBRUARY 25, 1976." The RTC granted Virgel's
petition.

Republic filed a Notice of Appeal, which was given due course by the trial court. The Republic, through
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) argued that the change of Virgel's name from Virgie should have
been made through a proceeding under Rule 103, and not Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. This argument
was premised on the assumption that the summary procedure under Rule 108 is confined to the
correction of clerical or innocuous errors, which excludes one's name or date of birth. Since the petition
lodged with the RTC was not filed pursuant to Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, the Republic asserted that
the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for correction under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is limited to
changes in entries containing harmless and innocuous errors.

RULING:
No. It is true that initially, the changes that may be corrected under the summary procedure of Rule 108
of the Rules of Court are clerical or harmless errors. Errors that affect the civil status, citizenship or
nationality of a person, are considered substantial errors that were beyond the purview of the
rule.Jurisprudence on this matter later developed, giving room for the correction of substantial errors. The
Court ultimately recognized that substantial or controversial alterations in the civil registry are allowable in
an action filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, as long as the issues are properly threshed out in
appropriate adversarial proceedings— effectively limiting the application of the summary procedure to the
correction of clerical or innocuous errors.

Evidently, the Republic incorrectly argued that the petition for correction under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court is limited to changes in entries containing harmless and innocuous errors. Most importantly, with
the enactment of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9048 in 2001, the local civil registrars, or the Consul General as
the case may be, are now authorized to correct clerical or typographical errors in the civil registry, or
make changes in the first name or nickname, without need of a judicial order. It was further amended in
2011, when R.A. No. 10172 was passed to expand the authority of local civil registrars and the Consul
General to make changes in the day and month in the date of birth, as well as in the recorded sex of a
person when it is patently clear that there was a typographical error or mistake in the entry

Unfortunately, however, when Virgel filed the petition for correction with the RTC in 2009, R.A. No. 10172
was not yet in effect. As such, to correct the erroneous gender and date of birth in Virgel's birth
certificate, the proper remedy was to commence the appropriate adversarial proceedings with the RTC,
pursuant to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The changes in the entries pertaining to the gender and date
 of birth are indisputably substantial corrections, outside the contemplation of a clerical or typographical
error that may be corrected administratively.

The Court has long settled in Republic v. Olaybar that as long as the procedural requirements in Rule 108
were observed, substantial corrections and changes in the civil registry, such as those involving the
entries on sex and date of birth, may already be effected. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the
procedure for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry. The proceedings may either be
summary or adversary. If the correction is clerical, then the procedure to be adopted is summary. If the
rectification affects the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial, and the
procedure to be adopted is adversary

The records of this case show that Virgel complied with the procedural requirements under Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court.

Republic vs Lorena
GR No.206023 Date:April 3, 2017

Petitioner: Republic of the Philippines Respondents: Lorena Sali

Facts:

Sali filed a Petition for Correction of Entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, before the RTC alleging
that the Local Civil Registrar of Baybay, Leyte erroneously entered her name as “Dorothy” instead of
Lorena, and her birthday as June 24, 1968 instead of April 24, 1968. The RTC granted her petition. The
OSG appealed to the SC arguing that the petition was actually a petition for change of name. The first
name being sought to be changed does not involve the correction of a simple clerical, typographical or
innocuous error such as a patently misspelled name, but a substantial change in Sali's first name. Even if
Rule 108 was applicable, she failed to exhaust the administrative remedies pursuant to RA 9048.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the grant of the Petition for Correction of Entry under Rule 108 was correct.
RULING:

1. First Name: NO. Sali’s petition is not for a change of name as contemplated under Rule 103 of the Rules
but for correction of entries under Rule 108. What she seeks is the correction of clerical errors which were
committed in the recording of her name and birth date. The evidence presented by Sali show that, since
birth, she has been using the name "Lorena." Thus, it is apparent that she never had any intention to
change her name. What she seeks is simply the removal of the clerical fault or error in her first name, and
to set aright the same to conform to the name she grew up with.

Under RA 9048, jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is now primarily lodged with the
aforementioned administrative officers. The intent and effect of the law is to exclude the change of first
name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in
the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative petition for change of name is
first filed and subsequently denied. In sum, the remedy and the proceedings regulating change of first
name are primarily administrative in nature, not judicial.

In this case, the petition, insofar as it prayed for the change of Sali's first name, was not within the RTC's
primary jurisdiction. For failure to exhaust administrative remedies, the RTC should have dismissed the
petition to correct Sali's first name.

2. Date of Birth: YES. On the other hand, anent Sali's petition to correct her birth date from "June 24,
1968" to "April 24, 1968," R.A. No. 9048 is inapplicable. It was only on August 15, 2012 that R.A. No.
10172 was signed into law amending R.A. No. 9048. As modified, Section 1 now includes the day and
month in the date of birth and sex of a person.

Republic vs Zosa
GR No. L-48762 Date: September 12, 1988

Petitioner: Respondents:
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES HON. SEGUNDO M. ZOSA, Judge of the Court of Firt Instance of
Samar, Catbalogan, Samar, Branch I, and LEE KING SING
Facts:
Respondent Lee King Sing filed a petition with the CFI of Samar for change of name. For clarity, the said
petition docketed as Special Proceeding No. 5634 is reproduced herein as follows: IN RE: PETITION FOR
CHANGE OF NAME, SPEC PROC. NO. 5634. The petition states that he desires that his present name be
changed to ANTONIO C. LEE. The Lee appearing in his present name is in fact his surname but in the
Chinese way of writing the name, the surname is stated first; hence, his desire to have ANTONIO as his
first name, C. in the first letter of his mother' surname and LEE his present surname which he desires to be
written after his first name as it is the Filipino way. The name he now asked for is ANTONIO C. LEE. Herein
petitioner through the Solicitor General filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that the name
sought to be adopted by respondent and other names by which he is known are not indicated or included
in the title of the petition. Respondent filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss. The lower court denied
the aforesaid motion. After trial and hearing, the court a quo, as already stated, granted the petition;
hence, the instant appeal, petitioner raising a lone assignment of error: THAT RESPONDENT JUDGE OF
THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF SAMAR ERRED IN TAKING COGNIZANCE OF THE PETITION FOR
CHANGE OF NAME DESPITE SUBSTANTIAL DEFECT IN THE PETITION AND PUBLICATION OF THE NOTICE
OF HEARING.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent judge erred in taking cognizance of the petition for change of name
despite substantial defect in the petition and publication of the notice of hearing.
RULING:
Yes. In a petition for change of name the title of the petition should include (1) the applicant's real name,
(2) his aliases or other names, if any, and (3) the name sought to be adopted even if these data are found
in the body of the petition. For the Publication to be valid and effective, the published order should
reproduce the title of the petition containing the data already stated and should contain correct information
as to (1) the name or names of the applicant; (2) the cause for the changed name, and (3) the new name
asked for. In the present case, the petition itself, as well as the order published, carries the following title
"In Re: Petition for Change of Name Lee King Sing, Petitioner." It does not contain the name (Antonio C.
Lee) sought to be adopted and the names by which petitioner was known to his friends and associates. The
title should have read "In the Matter of the Change of Name of Lee King Sing, otherwise known as Antonio
or Tony to Antonio C. Lee, Lee King Sing, Petitioner." The petition does not indicate in its title or caption
that herein respondent desires to change his name to Antonio C. Lee. The published order setting his
petition for hearing reproduced that defective title. The failure to include the name sought to be adopted in
the title of the petition nor in the title or caption of the notices published in the newspapers renders the
trial court without jurisdiction to hear and determine the petition. The reason for the rule requiring the
inclusion of the name sought to be adopted by and the other names or aliases of the applicant in the title
of the petition or in the caption of the published order is that the ordinary reader only glances fleetingly at
the caption of the published order or the title of the petition in a special proceeding. The non-inclusion of
all the names or aliases of the applicant in the caption of the order or in the title of the petition defeats the
very purpose of the required publication. The non-inclusion of all the names or aliases of the applicant in
the caption of the order or in the title of the petition defeats the very purpose of the required publication.

WHEREFORE, the lower court's order under appeal is Reversed and the petition for change of name is
Denied. No costs.

Go Chin Beng vs Republic

GR No. Date:

Petitioner: REPUBLIC OF THE Respondents: GO CHIU BENG, Petitioner-Appellee

PHILIPPINES, Oppositor-Appellant
Facts:

This is an appeal, taken by the Government, from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Leyte granting
the petition of appellee Go Chiu Beng for change of name to that of "Reynaldo Bingo," as prayed for in his
amended petition, instead of "Reynaldo Gosibeng," as prayed for in his original petition.

Upon a review of the records, it is manifest therefrom that the decision appealed from must be set aside as
null and void for want of jurisdiction to entertain appellee’s petition for change of name, it being
undisputed, as it appears from petitioner’s Exhibit "A", that the only name given in the title of the notice of
the order about the filing of appellee’s amended petitions was that of Go Chiu Beng; that no other name
was given in said title, despite the fact that, in both his original and amended petition, appellee alleged that
he had "always" been known, "since his arrival in the Philippines," as "Reynaldo" ; and that his own
certificate of naturalization, Exhibit "B", shows that he is likewise known as "Jimmy Go."cralaw virt

ISSUE: Whether or not the non-inclusion of all the names by which applicant is known in title of notice of
the order of the filing of a petition is a jurisdictional effect

RULING:

Where the only name given in the title of the notice of the order of the filing of appellee’s amended petition
for change of name was that of Go Chiu Beng and no other name was given in said title, despite the fact
that, in both his original and amended petitions, appellee alleged that he had "always" been known, "since
his arrival in the Philippines," as "Reynaldo" ; and that his own certificate of naturalization Exhibit "B",
shows that he is likewise known as "Jimmy Go’’, the decision of the court of first instance granting the
petition of appellee Go Chiu Beng for change of name to that of "Reynaldo Bingo" as prayed for in his
amended petition instead of "Reynaldo Gosibeng," as prayed for in his original petition, must be set aside
as null and void for want of jurisdiction to entertain appellee’s petition.

Indeed, in Ng Yao Siong v. Republic:

"Change of name is a matter of public interest. Petitioner might be in the gallery of wanted criminals; he
could be in hiding to avoid service of sentence or compliance with a judgment in a criminal case; he could
have escaped a penal institution into which he had been confined. If an alien, he might have given cause
for deportation or might be one against whom an order of deportation had actually been issued. And again
the new name petitioner desires to adopt may be similar to that of a respectable person. The latter may
have evidence that petitioner is with unsavory reputation. Naturally, it is to the interest of the person
actually enjoying the good name to protect it against possible mistaken reference to him as the petitioner.

"Change of name is not a right. It is a privilege. The court may give or withhold its consent."cralaw
virtua1aw li

Republic vs Cagandahan
GR No. Date:
Petitioner: Respondents:
Republic of the Philippines Jennifer Cagandahan

Facts:
Jennifer Cagandahan filed before the Regional Trial Court Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna a Petition for
Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate of her name from Jennifer B. Cagandahan to Jeff Cagandahan and
her gender from female to male. It appearing that Jennifer Cagandahan is suffering from Congenital
Adrenal Hyperplasia which is a rare medical condition where afflicted persons possess both male and
female characteristics. Jennifer Cagandahan grew up with secondary male characteristics. To further her
petition, Cagandahan presented in court the medical certificate evidencing that she is suffering from
Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which certificate is issued by Dr. Michael Sionzon of the Department of
Psychiatry, University of the Philippines-Philippine General Hospital, who, in addition, explained that
“Cagandahan genetically is female but because her body secretes male hormones, her female organs did
not develop normally, thus has organs of both male and female.” The lower court decided in her favor but
the Office of the Solicitor General appealed before the Supreme Court invoking that the same was a
violation of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because the said petition did not implead the local civil
registrar.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Cagandahan’s sex as appearing in her birth certificate be changed.

RULING:
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court. It held that, in deciding the case, the Supreme
Court considered “the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees of intersex as variations
which should not be subject to outright denial.” The Supreme Court made use of the available evidence
presented in court including the fact that private respondent thinks of himself as a male and as to the
statement made by the doctor that Cagandahan’s body produces high levels of male hormones (androgen),
which is preponderant biological support for considering him as being male.”
The Supreme Court further held that they give respect to (1) the diversity of nature; and (2) how an
individual deals with what nature has handed out. That is, the Supreme Court respects the respondent’s
congenital condition and his mature decision to be a male. Life is already difficult for the ordinary person.
The Court added that a change of name is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in
the light of the reasons and the consequences that will follow.

Lee vs CA
GR No. 118387 Date: October 11, 2001

Petitioner: Marcelo Lee Respondents: Court of Appeals

Facts:
This is a story of two (2) sets of children sired by one and the same man but begotten of two (2) different
mothers. One set, the private respondents herein, are the children of Lee Tek Sheng and his lawful wife,
Keh Shiok Cheng. The other set, the petitioners herein, are allegedly children of Lee Tek Sheng and his
concubine, Tiu Chuan.

Private respondents filed two separate petitions for the cancellation and/or correction of entries in the
records of birth of petitioners. Both petitions sought to cancel and/or correct the false and erroneous
entries in all pertinent records of birth of petitioners by deleting and/or canceling therein the name of "Keh
Shiok Cheng" as their mother, and by substituting the same with the name "Tiu Chuan", who is allegedly
the petitioners' true birth mother.

Tiu Chuan was introduced by Lee Tek Sheng to his family as their new housemaid but far from becoming
their housemaid, she immediately became Lee Tek Sheng's mistress. As a result of their illicit relations, she
gave birth to petitioners. Unknown to Keh Shiok Cheng and private respondents, every time Tiu Chuan
gave birth to each of the petitioners, their common father, Lee Tek Sheng, falsified the entries in the
records of birth of petitioners by making it appear that petitioners' mother was Keh Shiok Cheng.

The tides turned after Keh Shiok Cheng's demise on May 9, 1989. Lee Tek Sheng insisted that the names
of all his children, including those of petitioners', be included in the obituary notice of Keh Shiok Cheng's
death that was to be published in the newspapers. It was this seemingly irrational act that piqued private
respondents' curiosity, if not suspicion.

Acting on their suspicion, the private respondents requested the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to
conduct an investigation into the matter. After investigation and verification of all pertinent records, the
NBI prepared a report that pointed out as per Chinese General Hospital Patients Records, it is very obvious
that the mother of these 8 children is certainly not KEH SHIOK CHENG, but a much younger woman, most
probably TIU CHUAN.

The petitioners filed a motion to dismiss but was subsequently denied. Thus, seeking for reconsideration in
the Court of Appeals and dismissed their petition. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE/s:
W/N Rule 108 is inappropriate for impugning the legitimacy and filiation of children;
W/N the judges erred by allowing the private respondents to impugn the legitimacy and filiation of their
siblings despite the fact that their undisputed common father is still alive;
W/N the petition has already prescribed;
RULING:
NO. It is precisely the province of a special proceeding such as the one outlined under Rule 108 of the
Revised Rules of Court to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular fact. 18 The petitions filed
by private respondents for the correction of entries in the petitioners' records of birth were intended to
establish that for physical and/or biological reasons it was impossible for Keh Shiok Cheng to have
conceived and given birth to the petitioners as shown in their birth records. Contrary to petitioners'
contention that the petitions before the lower courts were actually actions to impugn legitimacy, the prayer
therein is not to declare that petitioners are illegitimate children of Keh Shiok Cheng, but to establish that
the former are not the latter's children. There is nothing to impugn as there is no blood relation at all
between Keh Shiok Cheng and petitioners.

Although recognizing that the changes or corrections sought to be effected are not mere clerical errors of a
harmless or innocuous nature, this Court, sitting en banc, held therein that even substantial errors in a civil
register may be corrected and the true facts established provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail
themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding . In the said case, we also laid down the rule that a
proceeding for correction and/or cancellation of entries in the civil register under Rule 108 ceases to be
summary in nature and takes on the characteristics of an appropriate adversary proceeding when all the
procedural requirements under Rule 108 are complied with.

It is true that in special proceedings formal pleadings and a hearing may be dispensed with, and the
remedy granted upon mere application or motion. But this is not always the case, as when the statute
expressly provides. Hence, a special proceeding is not always summary. One only has to take a look at the
procedure outlined in Rule 108 to see that what is contemplated therein is not a summary proceeding per
se. Rule 108 requires
The publication of the petition three (3) times, i.e., once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks (Sec. 4).
The Rule also requires inclusion as parties of all persons who claim any interest which would be affected
by the cancellation or correction (Sec. 3).
The civil registrar and any person in interest are also required to file their opposition, if any, within fifteen
(15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice (Sec. 5).
Last, but not the least, although the court may make orders expediting the proceedings, it is after hearing
that the court shall either dismiss the petition or issue an order granting the same (Sec. 7)

Thus, we find no reason to depart from our ruling in Republic vs. Valencia, that Rule 108, when all the
procedural requirements thereunder are followed, is the appropriate adversary proceeding to effect
substantial corrections and changes in entries of the civil register.

Further, Republic Act No. 9048 which was passed by Congress on February 8, 2001 substantially amended
Article 412 of the New Civil Code. The above law speaks clearly. Clerical or typographical errors in entries
of the civil register are now to be corrected and changed without need of a judicial order by the city or
municipal civil registrar or consul general. The obvious effect is to remove from the ambit of Rule 108 the
correction or changing of such errors in entries of the civil register. Hence, what is left for the scope of
operation of Rule 108 are substantial changes and corrections in entries of the civil register.

2. NO. The petitioners contend that the private respondents have no cause of action to bring the cases
below as Article 171 of the Family Code allows the heirs of the father to bring an action to impugn the
legitimacy of his children only after his death. Article 171 provides:
The heirs of the husband may impugn the filiation of the child within the period prescribed in the preceding
article only in the following cases:
(1) If the husband should die before the expiration of the period fixed for bringing this action;
(2) If he should die after the filing of the complaint, without having desisted therefrom; or
(3) If the child was born after the death of the husband.

Article 171 of the Family Code is not applicable to the present case. A close reading of the provision shows
that it applies to instances in which the father impugns the legitimacy of his wife's child. The provision,
however, presupposes that the child was the undisputed offspring of the mother.

3. NO. Petitioners claim that private respondents' cause of action had already prescribed as more than five
(5) years had lapsed between the registration of the latest birth among the petitioners in 1960 and the
filing of the actions in December of 1992 and February of 1993.

As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, inasmuch as no law or rule specifically prescribes a fixed
time for filing the special proceeding under Rule 108 in relation to Article 412 of the New Civil Code, it is
the following provision of the New Civil Code that applies:
"Art. 1149. All other actions whose periods are not fixed in this Code or in other laws must be brought
within five years from the time the right of action accrues."

The right of action accrues when there exists a cause of action, which consists of three (3) elements,
namely: a) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is
created; b) an obligation on the part of the defendant to respect such right; and c) an act or omission on
the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff. It is only when the last element occurs or
takes place that it can be said in law that a cause of action has arisen.

It is indubitable that private respondents have a cause of action. The last element of their cause of action,
that is, the act of their father in falsifying the entries in petitioners' birth records, occurred more than thirty
(30) years ago. Strictly speaking, it was upon this occurrence that private respondents' right of action or
right to sue accrued. However, we must take into account the fact that it was only sometime in 1989 that
private respondents discovered that they in fact had a cause of action against petitioners who continue to
use said falsified birth records.

Hence, the petition is DENIED and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

Silverio vs Republic
GR No. 174689 Date: October 22, 2007

Petitioner: Respondents:
Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio Republic of the Philippines
Facts:

Petitioner Rommel Silverio filed a petition before for the change of his first name and sex in his birth
certificate. He alleged that he was born in Manila, his name was registered as Rommel Jacinto Dantes
Silverio, and his sex was registered as male. He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, and that he
always identified himself with girls since childhood, and underwent a sex reassignment surgery eventually.
From then on, petitioner lived as a female. He then sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed
from “Rommel Jacinto” to “Mely”, and his sex from male to female. The trial court rendered a decision in
favor of the petitioner granting the name and sex change. Subsequently, the Republic through the OSG
filed a petition for certiorari in the CA alleging that there is no law allowing the change of entries in the
birth certificate by reason of sex alteration. The CA ruled in favor of the Republic, and set aside the
decision of the trial court and ordered the dismissal of the case. The petitioner moved for reconsideration
but it was denied.

ISSUE:

Whether the petitioner is entitled to change his 1) name and 2) sex in his birth certificate based on his
sexual reassignment

RULING:

No. Petitioner’s contention is unmeritorious. According to RA 9048, the governing law for the change of first
name, the petition for change of first name or nickname may be allowed in any of the following cases: 1)
the petitioner finds the first name or nickname ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or extremely difficult to
write or pronounce; 2) the new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the
petitioner and he has been publicly known by that first name or nickname in the community; or 3) the
change will avoid confusion. The petitioner’s basis for the change of his first name was his sex
reassignment, as he intended his name to be compatible with the sex he sought. The court ruled that a
change of name does not alter one’s legal capacity of civil status. RA 9048 does not sanction a change of
first name in the ground of sex reassignment. In addition, before a person can legally change his given
name, he must present reasonable cause, and that he is prejudiced by the use of his true and official
name. In this case, petitioner failed to show any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his
official name.
No. Again, the petitioner’s contention is without merit. The procedure for the change of sex in the civil
registry under RA 9048 applies only to clerical or typographical errors. Thus in this case, Rule 108 shall
govern. The entries correctable under the said rule are those provided in Art 407 and 408 of the CC. None
of these provisions mention sex reassignment as a ground to correct the entries in the civil registry.
Furthermore, the birth certificate of the petitioner contained no error. All entries therein, including the
petitioner’s first name and sex, were all correct, thus there is no correction necessary.

Republic vs Coseteng - Magpayo

GR No. 189476 Date: February 2, 2011
Petitioner: Respondents:
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON COSETENG- MAGPAYO (A.K.A.
JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON MARQUEZ-LIM COSETENG)

Facts:
Born in Makati on September 9, 1972, Julian Edward Emerson Coseteng Magpayo (Julian) is the son of
Fulvio M. Magpayo Jr. and Anna Dominique Marquez-Lim Coseteng who, as respondent’s certificate of live
birth shows, contracted marriage on March 26, 1972. Julian filed before the RTC of Quezon City a petition
to change his name to Julian Edward Emerson Marquez Lim Coseteng. He claimed that his parents were
never legally married as shown by certifications from the National Statistics Office and Julian’s academic
records.

After due notice and publication and no opposition to the petition having been filed, an order of general
default was entered by the trial court which then allowed Julian to present evidence ex parte. The RTC
subsequently granted the petition and ordered the correction of Julian’s birth certificate by deleting the
entry for the date and place of marriage of his parents thereby changing Julian’s last name to Coseteng.
The name of Julian’s father was likewise deleted in his birth certificate.

In opposition thereto, the Republic of the Philippines filed the present petition contending that the deletion
of the entry on the date and place of marriage of Julian’s parents from his birth certificate has the effect of
changing his civil status from legitimate to illegitimate. Any change in civil status of a person must be
effected through an appropriate adversary proceeding.

ISSUE:
Whether the change in Julian’s legitimacy is a substantial change thereby making Rule 103 of the Rules of
Court inapplicable.
RULING:
Yes. A person can effect a change of name under Rule 103 using valid and meritorious grounds such as:
(a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the
change results as a legal consequence such as legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d)
when one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of
alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good
faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no
showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would
prejudice public interest. In the case at bar, Julian’s reason for changing his name cannot be considered as
one of, or analogous to, the above recognized grounds. The change he seeks goes so far as to affect his
legal status in relation to his parents. As such, Rule 103 would not suffice to grant Julian’s supplication.
Instead, Rule 108 should be made applicable since Julian’s desired change affects his civil status from
legitimate to illegitimate. Such is a substantial correction or change of entry in the civil registry.
Rule 108 clearly directs that a petition which concerns one’s civil status should be filed in the civil registry in
which the entry is sought to be cancelled or corrected. All persons who have or claim any interest which
would be affected thereby should be made parties to the proceeding. In the case at bar, the petition of
Julian was filed not in Makati where his birth certificate was registered but in Quezon City. Moreover,
neither the Civil Registrar of Makati nor his father and mother were made parties thereto. As such, the RTC
order granting the petition should be set aside .
 Writ of Habeas Corpus

Toyoto vs Ramos
GR No. L-69270 Date: October 15, 1985

Petitioner: GERRY TOYOTO, EDDIE Respondents: HON. FIDEL RAMOS, CAPTAIN ALVAREZ AND
GONZALES, DOMINADOR GABIANA AND HON. FIDEL RAMOS, CAPTAIN ALVAREZ AND
REY CINCO CINCO, CAPTAIN BALLEN CAPTAIN BALLEN

Facts:
Petitioners belong to a group called “the Urban Poor” which conducted a march, demonstration and rally
along Northbay Boulevard in Navotas, Metro Manila on Oct. 23, 1983. Petitioners were accused of violating
PD No. 1835 (Codifying the Various Laws on Anti-Subversion and Increasing the Penalties for Membership
in Subversive Organizations [1981]) in RTC. No bail was recommended for their provisional liberty. The
prosecution was able to present only one witness despite repeated postponements. Petitioners moved for
the dismissal of the case. RTC granted the motion.
The order of dismissal was dated November 9, 1984, but on December 5, 1984, when the petition for
habeas corpus was led the respondents had not released and they refused to release the petitioners on the
ground that a Preventive Detention Action had been issued against them. It is to be noted that the
petitioners had been in detention for over one year for they were arrested on October 23, 1983.
Respondents argued that petitioners were released to their relatives on December 8, 1984, pursuant to the
order of the Minister of National Defense. The order is dated November 30, 1984, and orders the
"temporary release" of the petitioners. The respondents pray that the petition be dismissed for having
become moot and academic in view of the release of the petitioners from detention.
The petitioners would have their case considered moot and academic only "if their release would be
permanent."

ISSUE: whether the State can "reserve" the power to re-arrest the petitioners even after they had been
acquitted by a court of competent jurisdiction for the offense for which they had been previously arrested
RULING:
No. Court sustained the petitioners. Ordinarily, a petition for habeas corpus becomes moot and academic
when the restraint on the liberty of the petitioners is lifted either temporarily or permanently. We have so
held in a number of cases. But the instant case presents a different situation. The question to be resolved
is whether the State can reserve the power to re-arrest a person for an offense after a court of competent
jurisdiction has absolved him of the offense. An affirmative answer is the one suggested by the
respondents because the release of the petitioners being merely "temporary" it follows that they can be
rearrested at anytime despite their acquittal by a court of competent jurisdiction. We hold that such a
reservation is repugnant to the government of laws and not of men principle. Under this principle the
moment a person is acquitted on a criminal charge he can no longer be detained or re-arrested for the
same offense. This concept is so basic and elementary that it needs no elaboration

Ilagan vs Enrile
GR No. 70748 Date:October 21, 1985

Petitioners: LAURENTE C. ILAGAN, Respondents: HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, Minister of National
ANTONIO B. ARELLANO, and MARCOS Defense; LT. GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, Acting Chief of Staff, Armed
D. RISONAR, JR., Integrated Bar of the Forces of the Philippines; BRIG. GEN. DIONISIO TAN-GATUE,
Philippines [IBP]; Free Legal Assistance PC-INP Regional Commander for Region XI, Camp Catitipan,
Group [FLAG] and Movement of Davao City
Attorneys For Brotherhood, Integrity and
Nationalism, Inc., [MABINI]
Facts:
On May 10, 1985, Attorney Laurente C. Ilagan, Atty. Antonio Arellano, and Attorney Marcos Risonar were
arrested in Davao City by elements of the PC-INP and detained at Camp Catitipan on the basis of a Mission
Order allegedly issued by the Ministry of National Defense.

This petition for habeas corpus was then filed by and on behalf of the three arrested lawyers hereinafter
referred to as the detained attorneys on the ground that their arrests were illegal and violative of the
Constitution, since arrests cannot be made on the basis of Mission Orders. Thereafter, the Court issued the
writ.

In their Return, respondents contended that the detained attorneys were arrested on the basis of a PDA
issued by the President on January 25, 1985; that the Writ of habeas corpus is suspended as to them by
virtue of Proclamation No. 2045-A; and that pursuant to the ruling in Garcia-Padilla vs. Ponce Enrile, et al,
Courts lack the authority to inquire into the cause and validity of detention of persons held pursuant to the
suspension. Respondents further expounded on the state of rebellion in Davao City on the basis of seized
subversive documents, implying that the detained attorneys played active roles in organizing mass actions
of the Communist Party of the Philippines and the National Democratic Front.

During the hearing on May 23, 1985, the Court resolved to order the temporary release of the detained
attorneys on the recognizance of the principal counsel of petitioners due to lack of evidence linking the
detained attorneys with the alleged subversive activities. The next day, however, the detained attorneys
were not released. Thus, they filed a Manifestation and Motion praying that they be released.
On May 27, 1985, respondents filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of this Court's Order of Release
reiterating that the suspension of the Writ of Habeas Corpus has the effect of ousting the Court of its
jurisdiction to hear the case.

On May 28, 1985, respondents filed an Urgent Manifestation/Motion stating that an Information for
Rebellion was filed on May 27, 1985 against the detained attorneys before the RTC of Davao City, Branch
X; that a Warrant of Arrest had been issued against them; and praying that this Petition be dismissed for
having been rendered moot and academic.

Petitioners filed an Opposition to respondents' Urgent Motion/Manifestation contending that since the
detained attorneys were not given the benefit of preliminary investigation, they were denied their
constitutional right to due process; consequently, the Information for Rebellion filed against them is void.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for habeas corpus has been rendered moot and academic by virtue of
the filing of an Information against petitioners for Rebellion

RULING: YES. The function of the special proceeding of habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of one's
detention. Now that the detained attorneys' incarceration is by virtue of a judicial order in relation to
criminal cases subsequently filed against them before the Regional Trial Couravao City, the remedy of
habeas corpus no longer lies. The Writ had served its purpose.

SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized.-If it appears the person alleged to be restrained of
his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a
judgment, or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process,
render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after
the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process,
judgment or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize to discharge of a person charged
with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful
judgment. (Rule 102)

If the detained attorneys question their detention because of improper arrest, or that no preliminary
investigation has been conducted, the remedy is not a petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus but a Motion
before the trial court to quash the Warrant of Arrest, and /or the Information on grounds provided by the
Rules or to ask for an investigation / reinvestigation of the case. Habeas corpus would not lie after the
Warrant of commitment was issued by the Court on the basis of the Information filed against the accused.
So is it explicitly provided for by Section 14, Rule of 102 of the Rules of Court.

Go vs Ramos
GR No. 191810 Date: June 22, 2015

Petitioner: JIMMY T. GO a.k.a. JAIME T. Respondents: BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION

GAISANO and its COMMISSIONERS and LUIS T. RAMOS
Facts: A complaint-affidavit for deportation was initiated by Luis T. Ramos before the Bureau of
Immigration against Jimmy T. Go alleging that the latter is an illegal and undesirable alien. Luis alleged
that while Jimmy represents himself as a Filipino citizen, Jimmy’s personal circumstances and records
indicate that he is not so. To prove his contention, Luis presented the birth certificate of Jimmy, issued by
the Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo City, which indicated Jimmy’s citizenship as “FChinese.” Luis
argued that although it appears from Jimmy’s birth certificate that his parents, Carlos and Rosario Tan, are
Filipinos, the document seems to be tampered, because only the citizenship of Carlos appears to be
handwritten while all the other entries were typewritten. He also averred that, Jimmy, through stealth,
machination and scheming managed to cover up his true citizenship, and with the use of falsified
documents and untruthful declarations, was able to procure a Philippine passport from the Department of
Foreign Affairs.
Jimmy refuted the allegations averring that the complaint for deportation initiated by Luis was merely a
harassment case designed to oust him of his rightful share in their business dealings. Jimmy maintained
that there is no truth to the allegation that he is an alien, and insisted that he is a natural-born Filipino.
Jimmy alleged that his father Carlos, who was the son of a Chinese father and Filipina mother, elected
Philippine citizenship in accordance with Commonwealth Act 625.
The complaint for deportation against Jimmy was dismissed. On appeal, The Board of Commissioner
reversed the decision. Their contention is that Carlos' election of citizenship was made out of time hence
the board issued an order for the apprehension and deportation of Jimmy Go to China.
Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus in RTC but was denied by the said court. They questioned the
said decision and filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of appeals.

ISSUE: Whether the petition for habeas corpus should be dismissed.

RULING: A petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is a special proceeding governed by Rule
102 of the Revised Rules of Court. The objective of the writ is to determine whether the confinement or
detention is valid or lawful. If it is, the writ cannot be issued. What is to be inquired into is the legality of
a person’s detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of the application for the writ of habeas corpus, for
even if the detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by reason of some supervening events, such as the
instances mentioned in Section 4 of Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the time of the filing of the
application.
Once a person detained is duly charged in court, he may no longer question his detention through a
petition for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. His remedy would be to quash the information and/or the
warrant of arrest duly issued. The writ of habeas corpus should not be allowed after the party sought to
be released had been charged before any court. The term “court” in this context includes quasi-judicial
bodies of governmental agencies authorized to order the person’s confinement, like the Deportation Board
of the Bureau of Immigration. Likewise, the cancellation of his bail cannot be assailed via a petition for
habeas corpus. When an alien is detained by the Bureau of Immigration for deportation pursuant to an
order of deportation by the Deportation Board, the Regional Trial Courts have no power to release such
alien on bail even in habeas corpus proceedings because there is no law authorizing it.
Given that Jimmy has been duly charged before the Board, and in fact ordered arrested pending his
deportation, coupled by this Court’s pronouncement that the Board was not ousted of its jurisdiction to
continue with the deportation proceedings, the petition for habeas corpus is rendered moot and academic.

Florendo vs Javier
G.R. No. L-36101 Date: June 29, 1979

Petitioner: Respondents:
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE CAPTAIN JAVIER OF THE PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY,
HABEAS CORPUS OF BONIFACIO FLORENDO, ETC
RICARDO ROCERO and RENATO STA. ANA
Facts:
In this petition for habeas corpus filed on January 15, 1973, petitioners allege that on December 4, 1972,
they were taken from their respective residence by individuals posing as police officers, including a certain
Capt. Javier of the Philippine Constabulary, and then detained for more than one (1) month without any
specific offense being filed against them nor any judicial writ or order issued for their commitment. 1 Acting
on this petition, the Court adopted a resolution on January 15, 1973, for the issuance of the writ of habeas
corpus. The respondents were also required to file an answer to the petition. The hearing was then
scheduled for January 22, 1973.

On the day scheduled for hearing, the counsel for petitioners manifested their intention "not to argue the
case because several other cases of the same nature which have been heard by the Court were pending
adjudication. In their manifestation, petitioners also stated that they were submitting the case for
adjudication, having adopted the arguments advanced by petitioners' counsel in similar cases which he had
submitted earlier. Moreover, counsel for petitioners noted the fact that petitioners were brought to the
Supreme Court on the day set for hearing.

In a resolution of this Court dated February 20, 1973, this case was considered submitted for decision
when petitioners failed to comply with the resolution of January 22, 1973 requiring them to comment on
the return to the writ and answer filed by the Solicitor General.

ISSUE:
Whether the failure of the petitioners to file a reply render the case submitted for decision
RULING:
YES. The failure of petitioners to file a reply compels Us to dismiss the present petition. This is in line with
the ruling laid down in "Lorenzo vs. McCoy" 5 and "Arocha vs. Vivo," 6 where it was held that unless the
allegations in the return are controverted, they are deemed to be true or admitted, pursuant to Section 13,
Rule 102, Rules of Court, which provides that the "return shall be considered prima facie evidence of the
cause of restraint, if it appears that the prisoner is in custody under a warrant of commitment in pursuance
of law." Petitioners' arrest and detention have been explained by the Solicitor General as authorized by an
arrest, search and seizure order issued by the Minister of National Defense in connection with the crime of
direct assault with murder and for threatening witnesses. Since this allegation that the arrest was by virtue
of a "warrant of commitment in pursuance of law" has not been denied, petitioners are deemed to have
admitted the legality of their detention, and habeas corpus would, accordingly, not lie.

Flecher vs Director of Prison

GR No. UDK-14071 Date: July 17,2009

Petitioner: Martin Gibbs Fletcher Respondents: Director of Bureau of Corrections

Facts: Petitioner Martin Gibbs Fletcher seeks his release from prison in this petition for the issuance of the
writ of habeas corpus. He claims that his prison sentence of 12 to 17 years was commuted by then
President Fidel V. Ramos to nine to 12 years. Since he had already served 14 years, three months and 12
days, including his good conduct allowance, his continued imprisonment is illegal. In its return to the writ,
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) posited that the petition should be denied for failure to comply
with Section 3, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court. In particular, the petition was neither signed nor verified by
petitioner or a person on his behalf or by his purported counsel. Moreover, it was not accompanied by a
copy of the cause of the petitioner's detention or commitment order.

ISSUE: Whether petition should be denied for failure to comply with Section 3, Rule 102 of the Rules of
Court
RULING: No. The court disagrees with the OSG insofar as it argues that the petition should be dismissed
for failure to comply with Section 3, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court. Strict compliance with the technical
requirements for a habeas corpus petition as provided in the Rules of Court may be dispensed with where
the allegations in the application are sufficient to make out a case for habeas corpus. In Angeles v. Director
of New Bilibid Prison, we held that the formalities required for petitions for habeas corpus shall be
construed liberally. The petition for the writ is required to be verified but the defect in form is not fatal.
Indeed, in the landmark case of Villavicencio v. Lukban,this Court declared that it is the duty of a court to
issue the writ if there is evidence that a person is unjustly restrained of his liberty within its jurisdiction
even if there is no application therefor. So long as this Court sits, technicality cannot trump liberty.
Therefore, a petition which is deficient in form, such as petitioner’s petition-letter in this case, may be
entertained so long as its allegations sufficiently make out a case for habeas corpus. The ultimate purpose
of the writ of habeas corpus is to relieve a person from unlawful restraint. The writ exists as a speedy and
effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint and as an effective defense of personal
freedom. Where the restraint of liberty is allegedly authored by the State, the very entity tasked to ensure
the liberty of all persons (citizens and aliens alike) within its jurisdiction, courts must be vigilant in
extending the habeas corpus remedy to one who invokes it. To strictly restrict the great writ of liberty to
technicalities not only defeats the spirit that animates the writ but also waters down the precious right that
the writ seeks to protect, the right to liberty. To dilute the remedy that guarantees protection to the right is
to negate the right itself. Thus, the Court will not unduly confine the writ of habeas corpus in the prison
walls of technicality. Otherwise, it will betray its constitutional mandate to promulgate rules concerning the
protection and enforcement of constitutional rights

Osorio vs Navera et al GR No. 223272

GR No. 223272 Date: February 26, 2018

Petitioner: SSGT. EDGARDO L. OSORIO
Respondents: ASSISTANT STATE PROSECUTOR JUAN PEDRO C.
NAVERA; ASSISTANT STATE PROSECUTOR IRWIN A. MARAYA;
ASSOCIATE PROSECUTION ATTORNEY ETHEL RHEA G. SURIL
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, MANILA; COLONEL ROBERT
M. AREVALO, COMMANDER, HEADQUARTERS AND
HEADQUARTERS SUPPORT GROUP PHILIPPINE ARMY; COLONEL
ROSALIO G. POMPA, INF (GSC), PA, COMMANDING OFFICER,
MP BATALLION, HHSG, PA; and CAPTAIN TELESFORO C.
BALASABAS, INF PA, and/or any and all persons who may have
actual custody over the person of SSgt. Edgardo L. Osorio,
Facts:
Together with his superior officer, SSgt. Osorio was charged in two (2) Informations before Branch 14,
Regional Trial Court, Malolos City for allegedly kidnapping University of the Philippines students Karen E.
Empeño and Sherlyn T. Cadapan. Warrants of arrest were issued against SSgt. Osorio which caused the
arrest of the latter by Colonel Yambing. SSgt. Osorio was turned over to the Criminal Investigation and
Detection Unit Group in Camp Crame, Quezon City and was detained in Bulacan Provincial Jail. He was later
transferred to the Philippine Army Custodial Center in Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City where he is currently
detained.
Contending that he was being illegally deprived of his liberty, SSgt. Osorio filed a Petition for Habeas
Corpus before the Court of Appeals. He mainly argued that courts-martial, not a civil court such as the
Regional Trial Court, had jurisdiction to try the criminal case considering that he was a soldier on active
duty and that the offense charged was allegedly "service-connected." In the alternative, he argued that the
Ombudsman had jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation and the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction to
try the case because among his co-accused was Major General Palparan, a public officer.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a writ of habeas corpus is SSgt. Osorio's proper remedy?

RULING:

No. The arrest warrants against SSgt. Osorio were issued by the court that has jurisdiction over the offense
charged. SSgt. Osorio's restraint has become legal; hence, the remedy of habeas corpus is already moot
and academic. SSgt. Osorio's proper remedy is to pursue the orderly course of trial and exhaust the usual
remedies, the first of which would be a motion to quash, filed before arraignment, on the following
grounds: the facts charged do not constitute an offense; the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over
the offense charged; and the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so.

Rule 102, Section 1 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 1. To what habeas corpus extends. — Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the writ of
habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived
of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto.
The "great writ of liberty" of habeas corpus "was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to
relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom."
Habeas corpus is an extraordinary, summary, and equitable writ, consistent with the law's "zealous regard
for personal liberty." Its primary purpose "is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as
distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint
which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient."
Habeas corpus, therefore, effectively substantiates the implied autonomy of citizens constitutionally
protected in the right to liberty in Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution. With liberty being a
constitutional right, courts must apply a conscientious and deliberate level of scrutiny so that the
substantive right to liberty will not be further curtailed in the labyrinth of other processes. However, a writ
of habeas corpus may no longer be issued if the person allegedly deprived of liberty is restrained under a
lawful process or order of the court. The restraint then has become legal. Therefore, the remedy of habeas
corpus is rendered moot and academic.
If an accused is confined under a lawful process or order of the court, the proper remedy is to pursue the
orderly course of trial and exhaust the usual remedies. This ordinary remedy is to file a motion to quash
the information or the warrant of arrest based on one or more of the grounds enumerated in Rule 117,
Section 3 of the Rules of Court
Kidnapping should never be part of the functions of a soldier. It cannot be done in a soldier's official
capacity. If a soldier nonetheless proceeds allegedly on the orders of a superior officer, the soldier shall be
tried before the civil courts. The remedy of habeas corpus, on the argument that only courts-martial have
jurisdiction over members of the Armed Forces, will not lie.

Writ of Amparo and Writ of Habeas Data

Republic vs Cayanan
GR No. 181796 Date: November 7, 2017

Petitioner: Respondents:
Republic of the Philippines; Director of Regina Cayanan; SPO1 Rolando Pascua
the Criminal Investigation and Detection
Group (CIDG); Philippine National Police
(PNP)

Facts:
On August 16, 2007, Regina Cayanan filed a petition for habeas corpus in the RTC of Quezon City alleging
that Pablo, her husband, was being illegally detained by the Director/Head of the CIDG after a group of
armed men, identifying themselves as operatives of the CIDG, led by respondent SPO1 Rolando Pascua,
had forcibly arrested Pablo without any warrant of arrest. Since then, Pablo had not been heard from and
the CIDG has continually failed to produce his person despite repeated demands by Regina for the same.

Without any other choice and fearing for the safety of her husband, respondent Regina, on August 21,
2007, initiated the said petition for habeas corpus against the CIDG brought in behalf of Pablo. In response
to this, the CIDG filed its Return on the Writ wherein it denied having the custody of Pablo or having
detained him illegally, and as such prayed for its dismissal. The respondent later amended her petition into
one for amparo instead, which the RTC later granted despite opposition from the CIDG.

After failing to change the mind of the lower court, the CIDG brought the matter to the Supreme Court
itself, alleging that the RTC committed a grave abuse of discretion when it ignored the petitioner’s
opposition for the allowance for the Writ of Amparo on the argument that the respondent failed to present
sufficient evidence to grant the relief prayed for. It likewise argued that the petition for amparo should not
have been granted since it failed to mention the probable location of the missing Pablo, as is allegedly
required by the law. Furthermore, the CIDG argued that the petition itself should have been dismissed
outright since it violates respondent Pascua’s right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty.

ISSUE:
Was the issuance of a Writ of Amparo by the RTC proper?
RULING:
Yes, it is; the CIDG’s contentions are untenable.

Under Section 18 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, the law merely requires the presentation of
substantial evidence to establish the allegations to warrant granting the privilege of the Writ. In the present
case, the Sinumpaang Salaysay – which details with clarity the series of events that transpired on the day
Pablo was abducted, from the identity of the perpetrators to the manner by which Pablo captured –
executed by an eyewitness to the abduction was already more than enough to establish the existence of a
danger that would merit the granting of the Writ of Amparo. In fact, Salaysay itself positively identified
SPO1 Pascua as the leader of the group, and as such cannot exculpate himself from the consequences of
his actions by futilely painting himself as another victim of the abduction alongside Pablo. Furthermore,
Regina herself presented corroborating witnesses in order to buttress the validity of the Salaysay, further
casting CIDG’s position in doubt. On the contrary, upon further investigation, the Court found that it was
actually the CIDG itself who was remiss in its own duties.

Under Section 9 and 17 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, the CIDG is required to observe extraordinary
diligence in conducting its investigation over Pablo’s whereabouts by submitting a verified written Return in
response to queries over his location. The purpose of such Return is to spell out the details of the
investigations conducted by the CIDG and the NBI in a manner that would enable the RTC to judiciously
determine whether or not the efforts to ascertain Pablo's whereabouts had been sincere and adequate.
Instead, the CIDG only attached passive certificates issued by its operating divisions to the effect that Pablo
was not being detained by any of them. It is almost needless to characterize the certifications as
inadequate as such is tantamount to non-compliance with the requirement for a detailed Return under law.

As if to further highlight the CIDG’s own shortcomings, it adopted respondent Pascua’s stance on the fact
that it is an essential requirement for a petition for amparo to state where the victim of involuntary
disappearance was being held since the rules of amparo were based on the Mexican version of amparo.
This is untenable as there is no requirement under Section 5 of our own country’s rules for the petition for
amparo to state the probable whereabouts of the victim since it cannot be expected that respondent
Regina could have any knowledge of her husband’s whereabouts when the exact reason why she initially
filed for habeas corpus in the first place was to find out such information. In fact, it was actually
presumptuous for Pascua to argue that there was no evidence at all that indicated the whereabouts of
Pablo following the abduction. There was such evidence, and it was substantial; specifically, a recanted
Sinumpaang Salaysay that stated the place where Pablo was detained or was last seen. This is because
even if the Salaysay was recanted, because it can easily be secured from a poor and ignorant witness
usually through intimidation or for monetary consideration, the information provided therein could be
deemed as even more trustworthy than the fact of recantation itself.

Lastly, on the argument that the issuance of the amparo violates Pascua’s right to be presumed innocent
until proven guilty, it must likewise fail. The proceedings taken under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo are
not akin or similar to those in criminal prosecutions. In the former, the guilt or innocence of the
respondents is not determined, and no penal sanctions are meted out. The proceedings only endeavor to
give the aggrieved parties immediate remedies against imminent or actual threats to life, liberty or security.
The presumption of innocence was never an issue.

Navia vs Pardico
GR No. 184467 Date: June 19, 2012
Petitioner: EDGARDO NAVIA, RUBEN Respondents: VIRGINIA PARDICO, for and in behalf and in
DIO, and ANDREW BUISING representation of BENHUR V. PARDICO

Facts: A vehicle of Asian Land Strategies Corporation (Asian Land) arrived at the house of Lolita M. Lapore.
The arrival of the vehicle awakened Lolitas' son, Enrique Lapore (Bong), and Benhur Pardico (Ben), who
were then both staying in her house. When Lolita went out to investigate, she saw two uniformed guards
disembarking from the vehicle. One of them immediately asked Lolita where they could find her son Bong.
Before Lolita could answer, the guard saw Bong and told him that he and Ben should go with them to the
security office of Asian Land because a complaint was lodged against them for theft of electric wires and
lamps in the subdivision. Shortly thereafter, Bong, Lolita and Ben were in the office of the security
department of Asian Land, also located in Grand Royale Subdivision.
Exasperated with the mysterious disappearance of her husband, Virginia filed a Petition for Writ of Amparo
before the RTC of Malolos City. A Writ of Amparo was accordingly issued and served on the petitioners. The
trial court issued the challenged Decision granting the petition. Petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which was denied by the trial court.
Petitioners essentially assail the sufficiency of the amparo petition. They contend that the writ of amparo is
available only in cases where the factual and legal bases of the violation or threatened violation of the
aggrieved party’s right to life, liberty and security are clear. Petitioners assert that in the case at bench,
Virginia miserably failed to establish all these. First, the petition is wanting on its face as it failed to state
with some degree of specificity the alleged unlawful act or omission of the petitioners constituting a
violation of or a threat to Bens right to life, liberty and security. And second, it cannot be deduced from the
evidence Virginia adduced that Ben is missing; or that petitioners had a hand in his alleged disappearance.
On the other hand, the entries in the logbook which bear the signatures of Ben and Lolita are eloquent
proof that petitioners released Ben on March 31, 2008 at around 10:30 p.m. Petitioners thus posit that the
trial court erred in issuing the writ and in holding them responsible for Ben's disappearance.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT the issuance of a Writ of Amparo is proper.

RULING: NO. A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC or The Rule on the Writ of Amparo was promulgated to arrest the
rampant extralegal killings and enforced disappearances in the country. Its purpose is to provide an
expeditious and effective relief “to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or
threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private
individual or entity.”
Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights recognizes every human being's inherent
right to life, while Article 9 thereof ordains that everyone has the right to liberty and security. The right to
life must be protected by law while the right to liberty and security cannot be impaired except on grounds
provided by and in accordance with law. This overarching command against deprivation of life, liberty and
security without due process of law is also embodied in our fundamental law.
The budding jurisprudence on amparo blossomed in Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis when this Court defined enforced
disappearances. The Court in that case applied the generally accepted principles of international law and
adopted the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances
definition of enforced disappearances, as “the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation
of liberty by agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support
or acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by
concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person, which place such a person outside the
protection of the law.”
From the statutory definition of enforced disappearance, thus, we can derive the following elements that
constitute it:
(a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;
(b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a political
organization;
(c) that it be followed by the State or political organizations refusal to acknowledge or give information on
the fate or whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo petition; and,
(d) that the intention for such refusal is to remove the subject person from the protection of the law for a
prolonged period of time.
As thus dissected, it is now clear that for the protective writ of amparo to issue, allegation and proof that
the persons subject thereof are missing are not enough. It must also be shown and proved by substantial
evidence that the disappearance was carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of,
the State or a political organization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the same or give information on
the fate or whereabouts of said missing persons, with the intention of removing them from the protection
of the law for a prolonged period of time. Simply put, the petitioner in an amparo case has the burden of
proving by substantial evidence the indispensable element of government participation.

Reyes vs CA (GR 182161)

GR No. G.R. No. 182161 Date: December 3, 2009

Petitioner: Respondents:
Reverend Father ROBERT P. REYES Court of Appeals

Facts:
Petitioner and 49 others were arrested in the Manila Peninsula Hotel Seige and were charged of the crime
of rebellion under the Revised Penal Code. DILG issued a Hold Departure Order in the interest of national
security and public safety.
On December 13, 2007, RTC issued an order dismissing the charge for Rebellion against the petitioner and
17 others for lack of probable cause. That petitioners and other accused civilians were arrested because
they ignored the call of the police despite the deadline given to them to come out from the 2nd Floor of the
Hotel and submit themselves to the police authorities.
Counsel for petitioner file thru the DOJ for the lifting of the HDO since despite the dismissal of the crime of
rebellion, he was held by the BID officials at NAIA as his name is included in the Hold Departure List. This
happens every time he left for abroad.
Writ of Amparo was filed on the ground that the respondents violated the petitioner’s constitutional right to
travel.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner’s right to liberty has been violated or threatened with violation by the
issuance of the subject HDO, which would entitle him to the privilege of the writ of amparo.
RULING:

No. The writ is a remedy for any person whose wright to life, liberty or security is violated or threatened
with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private person or
entity.

The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearance or threats thereof.

Liberty has been defined as the right to exist and the right to be free form arbitrary restraint or servitude.
The term cannot be dwarfed from arbitrary into mere freedom from physical restraint of the person of the
citizen,but is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the facilities he has been endowed by his
Creator.

Security is the freedom of persons from fear, freedom from threat.

In the case at bar, the restriction on petitioner’s right to travel as a consequence of the pendency of the
criminal case filed against him was not unlawful. Petitioner has also failed to establish that his right to
travel was impaired in the manner and to the extent that it AMOUNTED to a serious violation of his right to
life, liberty and security for which there exists no readily available legal recourse or remedy.

Tapuz vs Judge Del Rosario

GR No. 182484 Date: June 17, 2008

Petitioner: Respondents:
Daniel Masangkay Tapuz, et al Judge Elmo Del Rosario

Facts:
Private respondents, Sps. Sanson filed a complaint for forcible entry and damages with prayer for issuance
of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against petitioners, Tapuz et. al. and other John Does totaling
to 120 persons before Aklan MCTC, alleging that they are the (1) registered owner of the disputed land;
and (2) prior possessors, when Tapuz et. al., armed with bolos and carrying suspected firearms together
with unidentified persons, entered the disputed land by force and intimidation without their permission and
build thereon a nipa and bamboo structure.
Petitioners, in their answer, denied the material allegations and essentially claimed that they are the (1)
actual and prior possessors of the disputed land; (2) on the contrary, the private respondents are the
intruders; and (3) private respondents’ certificate of title to the disputed land is spurious, asked for the
dismissal of the complaint and interposed a counterclaim for damages.
MCTC decided in private respondents’ favor, finding prior possession through the construction of perimeter
fence in 1993. On appeal, Judge Marin granted private respondents’ motion for issuance of writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction upon posting of a bond but the writ authorizing the immediate
implementation of the MCTC decision was actually issued by public respondent Judge Del Rosario after
private respondents had complied with the imposed condition. Petitioners moved for reconsideration, while
private respondents filed a motion for demolition. Public respondent judge denied petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration to defer enforcement of preliminary mandatory injunction. Meanwhile, petitioners opposed
the motion for demolition, but public respondent judge nevertheless, issued a special order – a Writ of
Demolition to be implemented within 15 days after the Sheriff’s notice to the petitioners to voluntarily
demolish their houses to allow private respondents to effectively take actual possession of the land.
Petitioners then filed a Petition for Review of the Permanent Mandatory Injunction and the Order of
Demolition before the CA. Thereafter, Sheriff issued a Notice to Vacate and for Demolition; hence,
petitioners filed before SC a petition for Certiorari with prayer for Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data.

ISSUE:
Whether petition for Certiorari with Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data, is proper?

RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. The Supreme Court held that the petition for certiorari and
issuance of a writ of habeas data are fatally defective, both in substance and in form, and the petition for
the issuance of the writ of amparo is fatally defective as to the content and substance.
As to the issuance of the Writ of Amparo, the Supreme Court held that the writ of amparo is intended to
address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security, as an extraordinary and independent
remedy beyond those available under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy supplemental to these Rules.
What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that
we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds. Consequently, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo - in line
with the extraordinary character of the writ and the reasonable certainty that its issuance demands -
requires that every petition for the issuance of the writ must be supported by justifying allegations of fact,
to wit, inter alia, “The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened with
violation by an unlawful act or omission of the respondent, and how such threat or violation is committed
with the attendant circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits”
In this case, what is involved is a property issues rooted from physical possession disputed by the parties.
No issues relating to life or liberty can hardly be discerned except to the extent that the occurrence of the
past violence has been alleged. Right to security, on the other hand, is alleged only to the extent of threats
and harassment implied from the presence of “armed men bare to the waist” and the alleged pointing and
firing of weapons, however, none of the supporting affidavits compellingly show that the threat to the right
to life, liberty and security of the petitioners is imminent or continuing.
As to the issuance of the Writ of Habeas Data, the Supreme Court held that there are no concrete
allegations of unjustified or unlawful violation of the right to privacy related to the right to life, liberty or
security. The petition likewise has not alleged, much less demonstrated, any need for information under the
control of police authorities other than those it has already set forth as integral annexes. The necessity or
justification for the issuance of the writ, based on the insufficiency of previous efforts made to secure
information, has not also been shown. In sum, the prayer for the issuance of a writ of habeas data is
nothing more than the "fishing expedition" that the Court - in the course of drafting the Rule on habeas
data - had in mind in defining what the purpose of a writ of habeas data is not.

Meralco vs Lim
GR No. 184769 Date: October 5,2010

Petitioner: Respondents:
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, ROSARIO GOPEZ LIM|||
ALEXANDER S. DEYTO and RUBEN A.
SAPITULA|||
Facts:
Rosario Lim (respondent) is an administrative clerk at the Manila Electric Company. An anonymous letter
was posted at the door of the Metering Office of MERALCO Bulacan Sector, at which respondent is
assigned, denouncing respondent. Petitioner Alexander Deyto, Head of MERALCO's Human Resource
Staffing, directed the transfer of respondent to MERALCO's Alabang Sector in light of the receipt of reports
that there were accusations and threats directed against her from unknown individuals and which could
possibly compromise her safety and security.||Respondent requested for the deferment of her transfer
alleging that there was lack of due process and likewise citing the grueling travel from her residence in
Pampanga to Alabang and back, and violation of the provisions on job security of their Collective Bargaining
Agreement. No response to her request having been received, respondent filed a petition for the issuance
of a writ of habeas data against petitioners before the RTC.

ISSUE:
Whether Habeas Data is the right remedy for Lim

RULING:
NO. The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or
security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee or of a
private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding
the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.|||
The writ of habeas data cannot be invoked in labor disputes where there is no unlawful violation of the
right to life, liberty or security. Jurisdiction over such concerns is inarguably lodged by law with the NLRC
and the Labor Arbiters. |

Castillo vs Cruz
GR No. 182165 Date:November 25, 2009

Petitioner: Respondents:
P/SUPT. FELIXBERTO CASTILLO, POLICE DR. AMANDA T. CRUZ, NIXON T. CRUZ, and FERDINAND T.
OFFICERS ROMEO BAGTAS, RUPERTO CRUZ
BORLONGAN, EDMUNDO DIONISIO,
RONNIE MORALES, ARNOLD TRIA, and
GILBERTO PUNZALAN, ENGR. RICASOL
P. MILLAN, ENGR. REDENTOR S. DELA
CRUZ, MR. ANASTACIO L. BORLONGAN,
MR. ARTEMIO ESGUERRA, "TISOY," and
JOHN DOES
Facts:
Respondent Spouses Cruz leased a parcel of land situated at Barrio Guinhawa, Malolos. They refused to
vacate the property, despite demands by the lessor Provincial Government of Bulacan (the Province) which
intended to utilize it for local projects. The Province filed for unlawful detainer before the MTC of Bulacan
and it was ruled against the Respondent. RTC affirmed MTC decision.

The respondent still refused to vacate the property. They filed a case for injunction for the issuance of a
permanent writ of injunction to prevent the execution of the final and executory judgment against them. It
was granted but thereafter rendered ineffective by MTC. On motion of the Province, the MTC issued a
Second Alias Writ of Demolition. Respondent filed before the RTC the issuance of temporary restraining
order (TRO) and it was granted.

However, petitioners Police Superintendent Castillo et al., who were deployed by the City Mayor in
compliance with a memorandum issued by Governor Mendoza, entered the property. Respondent refused
to turn over the property. They filed a motion for Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data alleging that despite
the Permanent Injunction issued by RTC, petitioners unlawfully entered the property with the use of heavy
equipment, tore down the barbed wire fences and tents, and arrested them when they resisted petitioners’
entry; and members of the PNP had already camped in front of the property a day before they entered.

ISSUE:
Whether Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data is the proper remedy for the spouses Cruz.

RULING:
No.
The Court , under the Constitution, is empowered to promulgate rules for the protection and enforcement
of constitutional rights.
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides that the petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy
available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an
unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity. The writ shall
cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.

What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that
we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds. Consequently, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo – in
line with the extraordinary character of the writ and the reasonable certainty that its issuance demands –
requires that every petition for the issuance of the writ must be supported by justifying allegations of fact.

Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data provides that the writ of habeas data is a remedy
available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an
unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee or of a private individual or entity engaged in the
gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and
correspondence of the aggrieved party.

To thus be covered by the privilege of the writs, respondents must meet the threshold requirement that
their right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with an unlawful act or omission. Evidently,
the present controversy arose out of a property dispute between the Provincial Government and
respondents.
Bare allegations will not suffice to prove entitlement to the remedy of the writ of amparo. For the issuance
of writ of habeas corpus, the respondents failed to allege that petitioners are gathering, collecting or
storing data or information regarding their person, family, home and correspondence.

Absent any considerable nexus between the acts complained of and its effect on respondents’ right to life,
liberty and security, the Court will not delve on the propriety of petitioners’ entry into the property.

Roriguez vs Arroyo
GR No. 191805 Date: November 15, 2011

Petitioner: Respondents:
Noriel H. Rodriguez Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Gen. Victor S. Ibrado, PDG Jesus Ame
Versoza, Lt. Gen. Delfin Bangit, Maj. Gen. Nestor Z. Ochoa,
P/Csupt. Ameto G. Tolentino, P/Ssupt. Jude W. Santos, Col.
Remigio M. De Vera, an officer named Matutina, Lt. Col. Mina,
Calog, George Palacpac under the name “Harry” Antonio Cruz,
Aldwin “Bong” Pasicolan and Vincent Callagan
Facts:

Petitioner Noriel Rodriguez was tagged as a member of Kilusang Mambubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP). KMP is an
enemy of the State under Oplan Bantay Laya, making its members targets of extrajudicial killing and
enforced disappearances. One night, Rodriguez was forcibly taken. He was forced to get inside a car,
where they tortured him and forced him to confess that he is a member of the NPA. He remained silent
until they reached a military camp and was subjected to more beatings. In the camp, he was made to
admit that he was a member of the NPA, and when he did not answer, he is repeatedly beaten and
tortured. Days later, the petitioner’s mother and brother along with members of the CHR came to see him,
they insisted to take Rodriguez home with them to Manila. He arrived in Manila the following day. However,
the harassment did not stop. A few months later, Rodriguez and his girlfriend noticed that several
suspicious looking men followed them on the streets, jeepney and MRT. He then filed a Petition for the Writ
of Amparo and Petition for Habeas Data with prayers for protection orders, inspection of place, and
production of documents and personal properties against the respondents of the case, including then
President GMA. The respondents contend that Rodriguez is a double agent. The SC granted the writs after
finding that the petition sufficiently alleged the abduction and torture of Rodriguez. The SC directed the CA
to hear the petition. The CA ruled in favor of Rodriguez, and found the military men liable, with the
exception of Calog and Palacpac. The case against President Arroyo was dismissed on account of her
immunity from suits.

ISSUE:

Whether the doctrine of command responsibility can be used in amparo and habeas data cases
RULING:

Yes, the doctrine of command responsibility may be used to determine whether respondents are
accountable for and have the duty to address the abduction of Rodriguez in order to enable the courts to
devise remedial measures to protect his rights. Clearly, nothing precludes the court from applying the
doctrine of command responsibility to ascertain responsibility in extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances. As explained in Rubrico v. Arroyo, command responsibility pertains to the “responsibility of
commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members of the armed forces or other persons subject
to their control in international wars or domestic conflict.”

In other words, command responsibility may be loosely applied in amparo cases in order to identify those
accountable individuals that have the power to effectively implement whatever processes an amparo court
would issue. In such application, the amparo court does not impute criminal responsibility but merely
pinpoint the superiors it considers to be in the best position to protect the rights of the aggrieved party.

NUPL vs Duterte
GR No. 246175 Date: May 3, 2019

Petitioner: NUPL et al Respondents: President Duterte, et al.

Facts:

The National Union of People’s Lawyers (NUPL) alleged that it was branded as an “enemy” by the Philippine
Army. Thereafter, NUPL-Vice President Atty. Catherine Salucon allegedly experienced heavy surveillance
and harassment and that her paralegal, William Bugatti, was killed hours after they had parted ways after a
court hearing. Another incident where, NUPL-Negros Secretary General Atty. Benjamin Ramos was killed in
Kabankalan, Negros Occidental. They cited other several incidents of threats, harassment and intimidation
due to their work and advocacy. Thus, petitioners sought for the issuance of the writ of amparo for their
protection.
Petitioners are likewise asking the Court to compel the respondents, under the writ of habeas data, to
provide them with copies of all the facts, information, statements, records, photographs, and other
evidence, documentary or otherwise, pertaining to each of them in the respondents’ files and records.

ISSUE: Whether or not A writ of Amparo and habeas data should be issued.
RULING:
Yes.
Sec. 1 of The Rule on Writ of Amparo provides:
The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and
security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee, or of a private individual or entity.
Sec. 1 of The Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data provides:
The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security
is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private
individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the
person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.
In the case at bar, NUPL sought the issuance of Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data for their protection and
that their rights to life, liberty and security have been violated and continued to be violated through the
persistent threats and harassment and red tagging allegedly done. Thus, there is a sufficient cause to issue
A writ of Amparo and Habeas Data.
Therefore, The Supreme Court, in a special En Banc session, issued a writ of amparo and habeas data in
favor of the National Union of Peoples’ Lawyers (NUPL).

Gamboa vs Chan et al (GR 193636)

GR No. 193636 Date: July 24, 2012

Petitioner: MARYNETTE R. GAMBOA Respondents: P/SSUPT. MARLOU C. CHAN, in his capacity as the
PNP-Provincial Director of Ilocos Norte, and P/SUPT. WILLIAM O.
FANG, in his capacity as Chief, Intelligence Division, PNP
Provincial Office, Ilocos Norte
Facts:
Petitioner Marynette R. Gamboa (Gamboa) was the Mayor of Dingras, Ilocos Norte. Meanwhile, respondent
Police Senior Superintendent (P/SSUPT.) Marlou C. Chan was the Officer-in-Charge, and respondent Police
Superintendent (P/SUPT.) William O. Fang was the Chief of the Provincial Investigation and Detective
Management Branch, both of the Ilocos Norte Police Provincial Office. On 8 December 2009, former
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Administrative Order No. 275 (A.O. 275), "Creating an
Independent Commission to Address the Alleged Existence of Private Armies in the Country." The body,
which was later on referred to as the Zeñarosa Commission, was formed to investigate the existence of
private army groups (PAGs) in the country with a view to eliminating them before the 10 May 2010
elections and dismantling them permanently in the future. Upon the conclusion of its investigation, the
Zeñarosa Commission released and submitted to the Office of the President a confidential report entitled "A
Journey Towards H.O.P.E.: The Independent Commission Against Private Armies' Report to the President"
(the Report). Gamboa alleged that the Philippine National Police in Ilocos Norte (PNP-Ilocos Norte)
conducted a series of surveillance operations against her and her aides, and classified her as someone who
keeps a PAG. Purportedly without the benefit of data verification, PNP-Ilocos Norte forwarded the
information gathered on her to the Zeñarosa Commission, thereby causing her inclusion in the Report's
enumeration of individuals maintaining PAGs. Contending that her right to privacy was violated and her
reputation maligned and destroyed, Gamboa filed a Petition dated 9 July 2010 for the issuance of a writ of
habeas data against respondents in their capacities as officials of the PNP-Ilocos Norte. Respondents
likewise asserted that the Petition was incomplete for failing to comply with the following requisites under
the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data: (a) the manner in which the right to privacy was violated or
threatened with violation and how it affected the right to life, liberty or security of Gamboa; (b) the actions
and recourses she took to secure the data or information; and (c) the location of the files, registers or
databases, the government office, and the person in charge, in possession or in control of the data or
information. They also contended that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Data, being limited to cases of
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, was not the proper remedy to address the alleged
besmirching of the reputation of Gamboa.
ISSUE: WON the trial court failed to satisfy the spirit of Habeas Data.

RULING:

No. It must be emphasized that in order for the privilege of the writ to be granted, there must exist a
nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other.
Section 1 of the
Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data reads: Habeas data. — The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to
any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering,
collecting or storing of data information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the
aggrieved party.

Pursuant to the state interest of dismantling PAGs, as well as the foregoing powers and functions accorded
to the Zeñarosa Commission and the PNP, the latter collected information on individuals suspected of
maintaining PAGs, monitored them and counteracted their activities. One of those individuals is herein
petitioner Gamboa. This Court holds that Gamboa was able to sufficiently establish that the data contained
in the Report listing her as a PAG coddler came from the PNP. Contrary to the ruling of the trial court,
however, the forwarding of information by the PNP to the Zeñarosa Commission was not an unlawful act
that violated or threatened her right to privacy in life, liberty or security. The PNP was rationally expected
to forward and share intelligence regarding PAGs with the body specifically created for the purpose of
investigating the existence of these notorious groups. Moreover, the Zeñarosa Commission was explicitly
authorized to deputize the police force in the fulfillment of the former's mandate, and thus had the power
to request assistance from the latter.

In this case, respondents admitted the existence of the Report, but emphasized its confidential nature.
That it was leaked to third parties and the media was regrettable, even warranting reproach. But it must be
stressed that Gamboa failed to establish that respondents were responsible for this unintended disclosure.
In any event, there are other reliefs available to her to address the purported damage to her reputation,
making a resort to the extraordinary remedy of the writ of habeas data unnecessary and improper.

Finally, this Court rules that Gamboa was unable to prove through substantial evidence that her inclusion in
the list of individuals maintaining PAGs made her and her supporters susceptible to harassment and to
increased police surveillance. In this regard, respondents sufficiently explained that the investigations
conducted against her were in relation to the criminal cases in which she was implicated. As public officials,
they enjoy the presumption of regularity, which she failed to overcome.

It is clear from the foregoing discussion that the state interest of dismantling PAGs far outweighs the
alleged intrusion on the private life of Gamboa, especially when the collection and forwarding by the PNP of
information against her was pursuant to a lawful mandate. Therefore, the privilege of the writ of habeas
data must be denied.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The assailed Decision in Special Proc. No. 14979
dated 9 September 2010 of the Regional Trial Court, Laoag City, Br. 13, insofar as it denies Gamboa the
privilege of the writ of habeas data, is AFFIRMED.

Vivares vs St. Therese's College

GR No. 202666 Date:September 29, 2014

Petitioner: Respondents:
RHONDA AVE S. VIVARES and SPS. ST. THERESA'S COLLEGE, MYLENE RHEZA T.ESCUDERO, and
MARGARITA and DAVID SUZARA JOHN DOES
Facts:
Julia and Julienne were both minors and are graduating high school students at St. Theresa's College
(STC), Cebu City. Sometime in January 2012, while changing into their swimsuits for a beach party they
were about to attend, Julia and Julienne, along with several others, took digital pictures of themselves only
in their undergarments. These pictures were then uploaded by Angela Lindsay Tan (Angela) on her
Facebook.
Escudero, a computer teacher at STC's high school department, learned from her students that some
seniors at STC posted pictures online, depicting themselves from the waist up, dressed only in brassieres.
Escudero then asked her students if they knew who the girls in the photos are. In turn, they readily
identified Julia, Julienne, and Chloe Lourdes Taboada (Chloe), among others. Using STC's computers,
Escudero's students logged in to their respective personal Facebook accounts and showed her photos of
the identified students. Escudero's students claimed that there were times when access to or the availability
of the identified students' photos was not confined to the girls' Facebook friends, but were, in fact,
viewable by any Facebook user.
Upon discovery, Escudero reported the matter and, through one of her student's Facebook page, showed
the photos to Tigol, STC's Discipline-in-Charge, for appropriate action. Thereafter, following an
investigation, STC found that they have deported themselves in a manner proscribed by the school's
Student Handbook. As their penalty, the students identified in the photo were then barred from joining the
commencement exercises scheduled on March 30, 2012.
A petition for Injunction and Damages before the RTC of Cebu City against STC was later filed by Angela's
mother a week before graduation to which the defendants filed their memorandum, containing printed
copies of the photographs in issue as annexes. That same day, the RTC issued a temporary restraining
order (TRO) allowing the students to attend the graduation ceremony, to which STC filed a motion for
reconsideration. Despite the issuance of the TRO, STC, nevertheless, barred the sanctioned students from
participating in the graduation rites.
Thereafter, a petition for the writ of habeas data was filed. The petitioners, the interplay of the foregoing
constitutes an invasion of their children's privacy and, thus, prayed that: (a) a writ of habeas data be
issued; (b) respondents be ordered to surrender and deposit with the court all soft and printed copies of
the subject data before or at the preliminary hearing; and (c) after trial, judgment be rendered declaring all
information, data, and digital images accessed, saved or stored, reproduced, spread and used, to have
been illegally obtained in violation of the children's right to privacy.
RTC - dismissed the petition for habeas data.
ISSUE: W/N a writ of habeas data should be issued?
RULING: NO, the High court finds no merit in the petition.

The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security
is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public social or employee, or of a private
individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the
person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party. It is an independent and summary
remedy designed to protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an
individual, and to provide a forum to enforce one's right to the truth and to informational privacy. It seeks
to protect a person's right to control information regarding oneself, particularly in instances in which such
information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends.
The writ, however, will not issue on the basis merely of an alleged unauthorized access to information
about a person. Availment of the writ requires the existence of a nexus between the right to privacy on the
one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other. Thus, the existence of a person's right to
informational privacy and a showing, at least by substantial evidence, of an actual or threatened violation
of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim are indispensable before the privilege of the
writ may be extended.
The SC also ruled that STC did not violate petitioners' daughters' right to privacy.
Without these privacy settings, respondents' contention that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy
in Facebook would, in context, be correct. However, such is not the case. It is through the availability of
said privacy tools that many OSN users are said to have a subjective expectation that only those to whom
they grant access to their profile will view the information they post or upload thereto.
Before one can have an expectation of privacy in his or her OSN activity, it is first necessary that said user,
in this case the children of petitioners, manifest the intention to keep certain posts private, through the
employment of measures to keep certain posts private, through the employment of measures to prevent
access thereto or to limit its visibility. And this intention can materialize in cyberspace through the
utilization of the OSN's privacy tools. In other words, utilization of these privacy tools is the manifestation,
in cyber world, of the user's invocation of his or her right to informational privacy
WHEREFORE , premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated July 27, 2012 of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14 in Cebu City in SP. Proc. No. 19251-CEB is hereby AFFIRMED

In the matter of the petion for Writ of Amparo and Writ of Habeas Data in favor of
Francis Saez ( GR 183533)
GR No. 183533 Date: September 25, 2012

Petitioner: FRANCIS SAEZ Respondents: GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, GEN.

HERMOGENES ESPERON, P/DIR. GEN. AVELINO RAZON, 22ND
MICO, CAPT. LAWRENCE BANAAG, SGT. CASTILLO, CAPT.
ROMMEL GUTIERREZ, CAPT. JAKE OBLIGADO, CPL. ROMANITO
QUINTANA, PVT. JERICO DUQUIL, CPL. ARIEL FONTANILLA, A
CERTAIN CAPT. ALCAYDO, A CERTAIN FIRST SERGEANT, PVT.
ZALDY OSIO, A CERTAIN PFC. SONNY, A CERTAIN CPL. JAMES,
A CERTAIN JOEL, RODERICK CLANZA and JEFFREY GOME
Facts:

On March 6, 2008, the petitioner filed with the Court a petition to be granted the privilege of the writs of
amparo and habeas data with prayers for temporary protection order, inspection of place and production of
documents. In the petition, he expressed his fear of being abducted and killed; hence, he sought that he
be placed in a sanctuary appointed by the Court. He likewise prayed for the military to cease from further
conducting surveillance and monitoring of his activities and for his name to be excluded from the order of
battle and other government records connecting him to the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP).
During the hearings, the petitioner narrated that starting April 16, 2007, he noticed that he was always
being followed by a certain “Joel,” a former colleague at Bayan Muna. “Joel” pretended peddling pandesal
in the vicinity of the petitioner‟s store. Three days before the petitioner was apprehended, “Joel”
approached and informed him of his marital status and current job as a baker in Calapan, Mindoro Oriental.
“Joel” inquired if the petitioner was still involved with ANAKPAWIS. When asked by the CA justices during
the hearing if the petitioner had gone home to Calapan after having filed the petition, he answered in the
negative explaining that he was afraid of Pvt. Osio who was always at the pier.
CA denied the petition for WRIT OF AMPARO because fail to allege how the supposed threat or violation of
petitioner‟s [right to] life, liberty and security is committed. Neither is there any narration of any
circumstances attendant to said supposed violation or threat to violate petitioner‟s right to life, liberty or
security to warrant entitlement to the privilege of the writs prayed for.
Application for WRIT OF HABEAS DATA is likewise denied because allegations therein do not comply with
the aforestated requirements of Section 6 [Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data] of the pertinent rule. The
petition is bereft of any allegation stating with specific definiteness as to how petitioner‟s right to privacy
was violated or threatened to be violated. The court also dropped Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (then incumbent
president) as a party respondent.
The court issued a resolution affirming the decision of CA. Hence, this peititon.
ISSUE:

1) Whether or not the CA committed reversible error in dismissing the petition and dropping Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo as a party respondent.
2) Whether or not the CA committed gross abuse of discretion when it failed to conclude from the evidence
offered by the petitioner the fact that by being placed in the order of battle list, threats and violations to
the latter‟s life, liberty and security were actually committed by the respondents.

RULING:

1) No. The petitioner, however, is not exempted from the burden of proving by substantial evidence his
allegations against the President to make the latter liable for either acts or omissions violative of rights
against life, liberty and security. In the instant case, the petitioner merely included the President‟s name as
a party respondent without any attempt at all to show the latter‟s actual involvement in, or knowledge of
the alleged violations. Further, prior to the filing of the petition, there was no request or demand for any
investigation that was brought to the President‟s attention. Thus, while the President cannot be completely
dropped as a respondent in a petition for the privilege of the writs of amparo and habeas data merely on
the basis of the presidential immunity from suit, the petitioner in this case failed to establish accountability
of the President, as commander-in-chief, under the doctrine of command responsibility.
2) No. The Court notes that the petition for issuance of the privilege of the writs of amparo and habeas
data is sufficient as to its contents. However,
they are mere allegations, which the Court cannot accept “hook, line and sinker”, so to speak, and whether
substantial evidence exist to warrant the granting of the petition is a different matter altogether.
In this case, the petition was mainly anchored on the alleged threats against his life, liberty and security by
reason of his inclusion in the military‟s order of battle, the surveillance and monitoring activities made on
him, and the intimidation exerted upon him to compel him to be a military asset. While as stated earlier,
mere threats fall within the mantle of protection of the writs of amparo and habeas data, in the petitioner‟s
case, the restraints and threats allegedly made allegations lack corroborations, are not supported by
independent and credible evidence, and thus stand on nebulous grounds.

Gov Bautista vs Atty Salucon

GR No.G.R. No. 221862 Date:[January 23, 2018])

Petitioner: GEN. EMMANUEL BAUTISTA, Respondents:

IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE CHIEF OF ATTY. MARIA CATHERINE DANNUG-SALUCON|||
STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES (AFP), GEN. EDUARDO
AÑO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
COMMANDING OFFICER OF THE
INTELLIGENCE SERVICE OF THE ARMED
FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES (ISAFP),
GEN. HERNANDO IRIBERRI, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS COMMANDING GENERAL
OF THE PHILIPPINE ARMY, GEN.
BENITO ANTONIO T. DE LEON, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS COMMANDING GENERAL
OF THE 5TH INFANTRY DIVISION, AND
PC/SUPT. MIGUEL DE MAYO LAUREL, IN
HIS CAPACITY AS CHIEF OF THE
ISABELA PROVINCIAL POLICE OFFICE|||
Facts:
Respondent was at a lunch meeting with the relatives of a detained political prisoner client who was
allegedly among several leaders of people's organizations/sectoral organizations who were falsely charged
in a murder and frustrated murder case pending before the RTC of Lagawe, Ifugao. William Bugatti, her
paralegal who was working with her on said case and who was also an activist and human rights defender,
informed her that he had personally observed that surveillance was being conducted on them. Thus, he
suggested certain security measures for her own protection. Respondent realized the significance of
Bugatti's advice when he was fatally gunned down later that evening. Respondent had asked him early that
very day to identify the names, ranks and addresses of the handler/s of the prosecution witness in the
Lagawe case. That same evening, respondent was informed by a client working as a civilian asset for the
PNP Intelligence Section that the Regional Intelligence of the PNP issued a directive to PNP Burgos,
Isabela, respondent's hometown, to conduct a background investigation on her and to confirm whether she
was a "Red Lawyer." On March 31, 2014, respondent again received a call from her confidential informant,
confirming that she was indeed the subject of surveillance. Upon further investigation, respondent
discovered that individuals riding on motorcycles questioned vendors in front of respondent’s office as to
where she went, with whom, what time she usually returned and who stayed behind in the office whenever
she left. Also that a member of the Criminal Investigation Service (CIS) of the Criminal Investigation
Detection Group (CIDG) came to the law office, asking for the respondent, but without telling her secretary
why he was looking for her, that soldiers came to respondent's office in the guise of asking her to notarize
documents and insisted on leaving the document and picking it up later on when respondent arrived. In her
petition, thus, respondent posited that the above-described acts, taking into consideration previous
incidents where human rights lawyers, human rights defenders, political activists and defenders, were killed
or abducted after being labeled as "communists" and being subjected to military surveillance, may be
interpreted as preliminary acts leading to the abduction and/or killing of respondent. Petitioners
categorically denied respondent's allegations that she was ever under surveillance by the military and/or
police under the command of petitioner’s officials. Petitioners also objected to the impleading of other
petitioners in their official capacities, allegedly under the doctrine of command responsibility, maintaining
that it can only be invoked in a full-blown criminal or administrative case and not in a summary amparo
proceeding. Petitioners also alleged that upon receipt of the CA Resolution promulgated on April 22, 2014,
they immediately exerted efforts to conduct an inquiry and to gather information about the purported
threats on the life, liberty and security of the respondent. Petitioners also noted that respondent's
testimony consisted of mere unverified accounts from an unknown person whose identity respondent did
not want to reveal. Respondent could not categorically identify and link any of the said individuals to
petitioners, claiming only that they were military-looking men. The CA rendered the assailed decision
granting the privilege of the writs of amparo and habeas data. The CA found that petitioner has
substantially proven by substantial evidence her entitlement to the writs of amparo and habeas data.
ISSUE: W/N the CA erred in finding Atty. Salucon's evidence sufficient to justify the granting of the
privilege of the writs of amparo and habeas data.
RULING:
NO. The petition for the writ of amparo partakes of a summary proceeding that requires only substantial
evidence to make the appropriate interim and permanent reliefs available to the petitioner. Upon due
consideration of the facts and circumstances enumerated by the respondent's petition, the CA opined that it
would be all the more difficult to obtain direct evidence to prove the respondent's entitlement to the
privilege of the writ of amparo because no extrajudicial killing or enforced disappearance had yet occurred.
Indeed, her petition referred to acts that merely threatened to violate her rights to life, liberty and security,
or that could be appreciated only as preliminary steps to her probable extrajudicial killing or enforced
disappearance. Even so, it would be uncharacteristic for the courts, especially this Court, to simply told
their arms and ignore the palpable threats to her life, liberty and security and just wait for the irreversible
to happen to her. The direct evidence might not come at all, given the abuse of the State's power to
destroy evidence being inherent in enforced disappearances or extrajudicial killings. Verily, proceedings
related to the petition for the issuance of the writ of amparo should allow not only direct evidence, but also
circumstantial evidence. Under Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis, even hearsay testimony may be considered by the
amparo court provided such testimony can lead to conclusions consistent with the admissible evidence
adduced. What the respondent obviously established is that the threats to her right to life, liberty and
security were neither imaginary nor contrived, but real and probable. The gunning down of her paralegal
Bugatti after he had relayed to her his observation that they had been under surveillance was the
immediate proof of the threat. The purpose and noble objectives of the special rules on the writ of amparo
may be rendered inutile if the rigid standards of evidence applicable in ordinary judicial proceedings were
not tempered with such flexibility.

Delima vs Duterte (GR 227635)

GR No.227635 Date:10/15/2019

Petitioner: Respondents:
LEILA M. DE LIMA, petitioner||| PRESIDENT RODRIGO R. DUTERTE, respondent.|||

Facts:
By petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data petitioner Senator Leila M. de Lima (Sen. De Lima)
seeks to enjoin respondent Rodrigo Roa Duterte, the incumbent Chief Executive of the Philippines, from
committing acts allegedly violative of her right to life, liberty and security.

At the core of the controversy is the inquiry on the application, scope and extent of the principle of
presidential immunity from suit. The question concerns the immunity of the President from suit while he
remains in office.

On May 9, 2016, Davao City Mayor Rodrigo Roa Duterte was elected as the 16th President of the
Philippines. A key agenda of the Duterte Administration was the relentless national crackdown on illegal
drugs. This prompted Sen. De Lima. to call a stop to the alleged extrajudicial killings committed in the
course of the crackdown, and urging her colleagues in the Senate to conduct investigations of the alleged
victims. In response, President Duterte issued a number of public statements against Sen. De Lima,
including denunciations of her corruption and immorality.
Sen. De Lima concludes that taking all the public statements of the President into consideration the
issuance of the writ of habeas data is warranted because there was a violation of her rights to privacy, life,
liberty, and security, and there is a continuous threat to violate her said rights in view of President
Duterte's declaration that he had been "listening to them, with the help of another country. Moreover, the
petition argues that President Duterte is not entitled to immunity from suit, especially from the petition for
the issuance of the writ of habeas data because his actions and statements were unlawful or made outside
of his official conduct.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the President is entitled to immunity from suit, vis a vis, issuance of the writ of habeas data

RULING:
Yes the President is immune from suit.

Presidential immunity in the Philippine jurisdiction attaches during the entire tenure of the President. The
immunity makes no distinction with regard to the subject matter of the suit; it applies whether or not the
acts subject matter of the suit are part of his duties and functions as President. The rationale for the grant
to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and
functions free from any hindrance of distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of the
Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office-holder's time, also demands undivided
attention. Moreover, It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he
can be dragged into court litigations while serving as such.

Finally, Sen. De Lima asserts that for every right violated, there must be a remedy. No one can dispute the
validity of her assertion. We agree with her, but at the same time we must remind her that this ruling will
not deny her any available remedy. Indeed, the Constitution provides remedies for violations committed by
the Chief Executive except an ordinary suit before the courts. The Chief Executive must first be allowed to
end his tenure (not his term) either through resignation or removal by impeachment.

Wherefore, the petition for Writ of Habeas Data is dismissed.