Modals and Quasi-modals

in English
 LANGUAGE AND COMPUTERS:
STUDIES IN PRACTICAL LINGUISTICS

No 67

edited by
Christian Mair
Charles F. Meyer
Nelleke Oostdijk
Modals and Quasi-modals
in English

Peter Collins

Amsterdam - New York, NY 2009

Cover design: Pier Post

The paper on which this book is printed meets the requirements of

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Requirements for permanence".

ISBN: 978-90-420-2532-5
©Editions Rodopi B.V., Amsterdam - New York, NY 2009
Printed in The Netherlands
Contents

Preface ix

1. Introduction 1

1.1 The data 1

1.2 An exercise in corpus linguistics 5
1.3 Previous corpus-based and corpus-informed studies 6
1.4 Diachronic studies of the modals and quasi-modals 7
1.5 Regional and stylistic variation 8

2 Theoretical preliminaries 11

2.1 Modality and mood 11

2.2 The modal auxiliaries 12
2.3 Quasi-modals 15
2.3.1 Properties of the semi-modals 16
2.3.2 Properties of the lexico-modals 17
2.3.3 Grammaticalization and idiomaticity 18
2.3.3.1 Grammaticalization 18
2.3.3.2 Idiomaticity 20
2.3.3.3 Selection of quasi-modals for analysis 21
2.4 Modal meanings: approaches and issues 21
2.4.1 Classifying modal meanings 21
2.4.2 Polysemy vs monosemy 23
2.4.3 Negation and ‘temporality’ 24
2.5 Further dimensions of modality 25
2.5.1 Modal strength 25
2.5.2 Degree of modality 27
2.5.3 Subjectivity/objectivity 28
2.6 General aspects of the relationship between modals and quasi-
modals 29

3 Necessity and obligation 33

3.1 Must 34
3.1.1 Deontic must 35
3.1.2 Epistemic must 38
3.1.3 Dynamic must 40
3.1.4 Time reference of situation 41
vi Contents

3.1.5 Must and negation 43

3.1.6 Must: regional and stylistic variation 43
3.2 Should 44
3.2.1 Deontic should 45
3.2.2 Epistemic should 46
3.2.3 Should and temporality 47
3.2.4 Should and negation 48
3.2.5 Special ‘low-degree’ uses of should 48
3.2.6 ‘Preterite’ should 51
3.2.7 Should: regional and stylistic variation 52
3.3 Ought to 52
3.3.1 Deontic ought to 53
3.3.2 Epistemic ought to 55
3.3.3 Ought to and temporality 56
3.3.4 Ought to and negation 56
3.3.5 Ought to: regional and stylistic variation 56
3.4 Need 57
3.4.1 Meanings of need 57
3.4.2 Need: regional and stylistic variation 59
3.5 Have to 59
3.5.1 Deontic have to 60
3.5.2 Dynamic have to 62
3.5.3 Epistemic have to 63
3.5.4 Time reference of situation 64
3.5.5 Have to and negation 66
3.5.6 Have to: regional and stylistic variation 67
3.6 Have got to 68
3.6.1 Deontic have got to 69
3.6.2 Dynamic have got to 70
3.6.3 Epistemic have got to 70
3.6.4 Have got to and temporality 71
3.6.5 Have got to and negation 72
3.6.6 Have got to: regional and stylistic variation 72
3.7 Need to 73
3.7.1 Deontic need to 73
3.7.2 Epistemic need to 75
3.7.3 Dynamic need to 75
3.7.4 Need to and temporality 75
3.7.5 Need to and negation 76
3.7.6 Need to: regional and stylistic variation 76
3.8 Had better 77
3.8.1 Meanings of had better 77
3.8.2 Had better: regional and stylistic variation 79
3.9 Be supposed to 80
3.9.1 Meanings of be supposed to 80
 Contents vii

3.9.2 Be supposed to: regional and stylistic variation 82

3.10 Be to 83
3.10.1 Meanings of be to 83
3.10.2 Be to: regional and stylistic variation 86
3.11 Be bound to 86
3.11.1 Meanings of be bound to 87
3.11.2 Be bound to: regional and stylistic variation 88

4 Possibility, permission and ability 91

4.1 May 92
4.1.1 Epistemic may 92
4.1.2 Deontic may 95
4.1.3 Dynamic may 95
4.1.4 May: regional and stylistic variation 96
4.2 Can 97
4.2.1 Epistemic can 98
4.2.2 Deontic can 100
4.2.3 Dynamic can 101
4.2.3.1 Theoretical possibility 101
4.2.3.2 Ability 103
4.2.3.3 Dynamic implication 104
4.2.4 Can: regional and stylistic variation 104
4.3 Might and could 105
4.3.1 Uses of might and could as preterite forms 105
4.3.1.1 Temporal uses 105
4.3.1.2 Hypothetical uses 106
4.3.2 Meanings of might and could 108
4.3.2.1 Epistemic possibility 109
4.3.2.2 Dynamic possibility 113
4.3.2.3 Deontic possibility 117
4.3.3 May and might: one lexeme or two? 117
4.3.4 Might and could: regional and stylistic variation 118
4.4 Be able to 119
4.4.1 Meanings of be able to 119
4.4.2 Be able to: regional and stylistic variation 122

5 Prediction and volition 125

5.1 Will 126

5.1.1 Epistemic will 126
5.1.2 Dynamic will 131
5.1.3 Deontic will 134
5.1.4 Will: regional and stylistic variation 135
viii Contents

5.2 Shall 135

5.2.1 Epistemic shall 136
5.2.2 Dynamic shall 137
5.2.3 Deontic shall 137
5.2.4 Shall: regional and stylistic variation 138
5.3 Would 139
5.3.1 Temporal would 140
5.3.2 Hypothetical would 141
5.3.3 Would: regional and stylistic variation 143
5.4 Be going to 143
5.4.1 Epistemic be going to 144
5.4.2 Dynamic be going to 147
5.4.3 Deontic be going to 148
5.4.4 Be going to: regional and stylistic variation 149
5.5 Want to 150
5.5.1 Dynamic want to 152
5.5.2 Deontic want to 152
5.5.3 Epistemic want to 153
5.5.4 Want to: regional and stylistic variation 153
5.6 Be about to 155
5.6.1 Meanings of be about to 155
5.6.2 Be about to: regional and stylistic variation 156

6 Conclusion 159

Appendix 163

References 185

Index 191
Preface

This book represents the culmination of a long period of interest in modal

expressions in English. My first foray into the area was an MA(Hons) dissertation
on “Can and may in Shakespeare’s English” (1978). The second followed my
participation in the project, directed by Pam Peters of Macquarie University, to
compile the Australian Corpus of English, resulting in several publications in
which I used data from the corpus to explore the semantics of the modals in
Australian English (Collins 1988, 1991a, 1991b). My interest was rekindled yet
again by the International Conference on Modality in Contemporary English at
the University of Verona in September 2001, following which I determined to
undertake a more comprehensive corpus-based study. This book reports the
results of the research I have conducted over this period.
I wish to thank Christian Mair from the editorial committee for this
Rodopi series for his welcome encouragement, Eric van Broekhuizen for his
advice on technical matters, Maria Oujo of the University of NSW for her
assistance with editing the manuscript, and Pam Peters and Adam Smith for
facilitating access to some of the corpora. The work has benefited from
discussions with many linguists over the years, including Rodney Huddleston,
Pieter Seuren, Robert Eagleson, Edgar Schneider, Geoffrey Leech, Stig
Johansson, and Michael Halliday.
Last but not least I wish to thank my family for surrendering the dining
room table to my piles of books, papers and data. Without your support I could
never have completed this project.

Peter Collins
Sydney, August 2008
Chapter 1

Introduction

This book reports the findings of a corpus-based study of the meanings of the
modal auxiliaries (or simply ‘modals’) and a set of semantically related ‘quasi-
modals’ in three parallel corpora of contemporary British English (‘BrE’),
American English (‘AmE’) and Australian English (‘AusE’). The study is the
largest and most comprehensive yet attempted in this area, based on an analysis
of every token of the modals and quasi-modals (a total of 46,121) across the
spoken and written data. The selection of corpora was designed to facilitate the
exploration of both dialectal variation (across the three World Englishes
examined), of stylistic variation (across the spoken and written components of the
corpora and their dialogic/monologic and non-printed/printed subcategories
respectively), and – albeit more indirectly – of diachronic variation involving the
modals and quasi-modals.

1.1 The data

The three corpora used in the study were the British component of the
International Corpus of English (‘ICE-GB’), the Australian component of the
International Corpus of English (‘ICE-AUS’), and a specially assembled corpus
of American English (‘C-US’).1 While ICE-GB and ICE-AUS are members of
the collection of parallel million-word corpora of the International Corpus of
English (‘ICE’), C-US is designed to fill the gap caused by the non-availability
hitherto of an actual ICE-US corpus (see further below).
ICE is a collection (not yet complete) of million-word corpora
representing national and regional varieties of English which provides a resource
for linguists pursuing comparative research into English worldwide (see for
example the ICE-based studies reported in the special issue of World Englishes
23: 2, 2004). Prior to ICE the only parallel corpora available for such
comparative research were the Brown Corpus of American English (‘Brown’) and
the Lancaster/Oslo-Bergen Corpus of British English (‘LOB’), both consisting
exclusively of printed material. Initiating the ICE Project in 1988 (in a short
notice in World Englishes) the late Sidney Greenbaum acknowledged the
contribution of Brown and LOB, and proposed that their scope be extended by
representing standard varieties from other countries and national varieties where
English is an additional official language, and by including spoken and
manuscript English. The project resulting from this initiative has as its long-term
goal the preparation of up to twenty one million corpora (with a number of these
already complete and available for scholarly use).2
2 Chapter 1

Each ICE corpus samples the English of adults (aged 18 or above) who
have been educated through the medium of English to at least the end of
secondary schooling. The texts generally date from 1990 to 1994 inclusive; that
is, it is during this period that the printed texts were originally published, the
spoken texts originally recorded, and the handwritten texts composed. The
corpora are intended to be representative of the English used in each country, so a
wide range of the social variables that define the population are included (sex,
age, and regional background in particular). To ensure comparability, each ICE
corpus conforms to a common design, comprising 500 texts, each of 2,000-
words. The main division is between the primary modes of speech and writing,
with 300 spoken texts (600,000 words) and 200 written texts (400,000 words). It
should be noted that 50 of the spoken texts are scripted, and thus have a
combination of spoken and written attributes, enabling them to provide a bridge
between the two modes. The ICE text categories are shown in Table 1.1 below:

Table 1.1. Composition of the ICE corpora

Spoken (300) Dialogues (180) S1A: Private (100)
S1B: Public (80)
Monologues (120) S2A: Unscripted (70)
S2B: Scripted (50)
Written (200) Non-printed (50) W1A: Student writing (20)
W1B: Letters (30)
Printed (150) W2A: Academic (40)
W2B: Popular (40)
W2C: Reportage (20)
W2D: Instructional (20)
W2E: Persuasive (10)
W2F: Creative (20)

The spoken texts are all recorded non-surreptitiously, and in order to

eliminate the possibility of distortion of data resulting from self-consciousness
the first fifteen minutes of recorded conversations are not used. The dialogues
that are private (S1A: face-to-face conversations and telephone calls) differ from
those that are public (S1B: class lessons, parliamentary debates, business
transactions, etc.) in that the latter are intended for an audience comprising those
who are present but not participating in the exchange. Furthermore, while in the
public dialogues the topic is known in advance, the private dialogues range over
unprepared topics. The unscripted monologues (S2A: commentaries, lectures,
demonstrations, etc.) may in some cases involve an element of planning and use
of prepared notes, but the scripted monologues (S2B: broadcast news, speeches,
etc.) are required to be fully prepared. Nevertheless it is the spoken version of
these texts that is used, on the grounds that even a close reading will contain such
speech phenomena as false starts, hesitations and pauses.
Introduction 3

The chief distinction in the written component is between non-printed (or,

manuscript) texts (W1) and printed texts (W2). The two types differ in their
intended readership and mode of composition. The non-printed material (e.g.
examination scripts, letters) is typically intended for a single reader, whereas the
printed material is produced for a large and unrestricted audience unknown to the
writer. The non-printed material is usually not edited by others, whereas the
printed material normally complies with a house style and may be edited and
revised by different people. The printed texts represent a diversity of registers.
The academic, popular and press reportage categories (W2A–W2C) all have a
primarily informational function, by comparison with the instructional role of
administrative/regulatory writing and publications on skills and hobbies (W2D),
the persuasive function of press editorials (W2E), and the creative function of
novels and stories (W2F).
C-US comprises 196,458 words of spoken and written material in equal
proportions to the spoken and written components of the ICE corpora. The C-US
texts are taken from two sources. For the spoken component the Santa Barbara
Corpus (‘SBC’), which consists of texts recorded in the 1990s and was compiled
with a view to inclusion in ICE-US, was selected.3 At the time the present
analysis was conducted, only Parts 1 and 2 were available, and the transcript of
one of the texts (SBC-006) was missing. The 29 texts used contain a total of
116,458 words (this count determined by stripping out all but orthographic words
from the transcripts). Of the texts 23 are dialogic (casual conversations,
discussions, meetings, task related interactions, etc.) and six are monologic (three
lectures, one with a small amount of interaction, and three sermons). There is
unfortunately a degree of generic incomparability between the SBC data used and
the spoken ICE data: in the former monologic texts represent approximately 20%
of all spoken texts, as opposed to 40% in the ICE corpora.4 For the written
component of C-US, a selection of forty of the 2,000-word text categories
(80,000 words) were extracted from the Freiburg-Brown Corpus of Written
American English (‘Frown’). The Frown corpus, which was built to match the
Brown corpus as closely as possible in size and composition, comprises texts
published in 1991, three decades after the Brown texts. Both corpora contain one
million words in 500 text samples representing press, ‘general’, learned and
fictional writing. The selection of Frown texts for the present study was made to
match as closely as possible the ICE categories: see Table 1.2. Again there is,
inevitably, some incomparability with the ICE corpora, due mainly in this case to
the absence of non-printed texts in Frown. For instance the letters in Frown
Category G, being printed, are generally less informal than the letters in the ICE
corpora, and the texts from Category P of Frown (which contain a large amount
of dialogue) resemble, but do not perfectly parallel, the ICE manuscript texts
(with their speech-like properties).
4 Chapter 1

Table 1.2. Parallels between C-US and the ICE corpora

ICE C-US
Text type No. of words Text type No. of words
Spoken Dialogue 360,000 SBC
Monologue 240,000
Total 600,000 Total 116,458
Written Non-printed 100,000 Frown G1-3 (Belles- 20,000
lettres, biography,
etc.); P1-7 (Romance
and love stories)
Printed: 200,000 Frown J1-8 (Learned 40,000
informational and scientific);
Frown F1-8 (Popular
lore); A1-4 (Press
reportage)
Printed: 40,000 Frown H1-2 8,000
instructional (Government
documents, etc.); E1-
2 (Skills, trades and
hobbies)
Printed: 20,000 Frown B1-2 (Press 4,000
persuasive editorials)
Printed: 40,000 Frown K1-4 (General 8,000
creative fiction)
Total 400,000 Total 80,000

All frequencies for C-US were normalized to tokens per one million
words, to match those for ICE-GB and ICE-AUS (by dividing the raw frequency
count by the number of words in C-US and then multiplying by 1,000,000 (i.e.
dividing by 0.196458). In addition, frequencies for the spoken and written
subcategories of ICE-GB and ICE-AUS were normalized to tokens per one
million words.5
We finish this section by presenting the modal expressions examined in
the study along with their raw frequencies (see Table 1.3). The list comprises all
the central and marginal modal auxiliaries with the exception of dare and used to
(excluded on semantic grounds), and a set of quasi-modals selected on the basis
of criteria which are discussed in the next chapter. Each of the expressions has a
number of variant forms (as noted in Chapters 3–5) and can/could, may/might,
shall/should, and will/would are usually regarded as present/preterite forms of
single lexemes.
Introduction 5

Table 1.3. Raw frequencies of the modals and quasi-modals

Modals Quasi-modals
can 7,663 be able to 889
could 3,557 be about to 124
may 2,261 be bound to 27
might 1,499 be going to 2,721
must 1,367 be supposed to 171
need 56 be to 371
ought to 126 had better 89
shall 343 have got to 705
should 2,432 have to 2,827
will 8,505 need to 716
would 7,775 want to 1,897
Total 35,584 Total 10,537

1.2 An exercise in corpus linguistics

The study is an exercise in corpus linguistics. The present section explores the
implications of this claim, while the next section overviews previous corpus-
based studies of the modals.
There is consensus amongst corpus linguists that the use of corpus-derived
data enables the researcher to confront the inescapable danger of subjective bias
in studies based on introspectively-derived examples. However linguists who
make use of corpus data do so in a number of ways, and these tend to be
associated with their attitudes towards the nature and status of corpus linguistics.
The work of those who use corpus data merely for exemplificatory purposes and
in order to determine grammaticality (as in the comprehensive grammars of
Quirk et al. 1985 and Huddleston and Pullum 2002, and in the work on the
modals by Palmer 1990) is merely an extension of the tradition of using textual
data that predates the modern interest in computer corpora (as in Jespersen 1909–
1949, Poutsma 1926–1929). Such ‘corpus-informed’ research may be
distinguished from ‘corpus-based’ research, in which the corpus is not simply a
source of exemplificatory data but more importantly of frequency data. The latter,
typically combined with a commitment to the notion of ‘total accountability’,
may influence hypotheses applied to the data, or formulated on the basis of it.
Within the reference grammar tradition, Biber et al. (1999) is an example and,
within the study of the modals, Coates (1983).
More recently, some corpus linguists have espoused the view that corpora
can be used to redefine linguistic categories and concepts, and to build up new
theories in linguistics. An example is the work of researchers from the University
of Birmingham (e.g. Hunston and Francis 2000) on ‘pattern grammar’ that has
prompted a reconsideration of the division between grammar and lexis.
Proponents, who sometimes refer to their approach as ‘corpus-driven’ (see Römer
6 Chapter 1

2006), regard corpus linguistics as a separate domain of study within linguistics,

rather than merely a methodology (e.g. Leech 1992, Kennedy 1998).
The present study is corpus-based. Corpus data are used not merely for
illustrative purposes but as a source of quantitative information relevant not only
to the semantic framework and categorization system adopted, but also to the
patterns of regional and diachronic variation examined. The study is not an
exercise in corpus-driven linguistics: it seeks to provide a fresh integration of
insights from a variety of sources – including semantic theories of modality, work
on regional variation in the ‘World Englishes’ tradition, and research on
diachronic syntax – but does not pretend to offer a new theory of modality driven
by the data.

1.3 Previous corpus-based and corpus-informed studies

Coates (1983) remains the most detailed and widely referred to corpus-based
study of the English modals. Data are taken from two British corpora, the one
million-word Lancaster corpus (before it was superseded by LOB), and 545,000
words from the Survey of English Usage corpus (representing the spoken,
written-to-be-spoken, and manuscript categories). From these Coates prepared
“[a] representative sample of each modal in each corpus (…) each sample
consisting of approximately 200 cases” (1983: 2). This method allows Coates to
examine the frequencies for the meanings and uses of particular modals but not
the relative frequencies of the modals. Two studies of the English modals which
predate Coates use data from the American Brown corpus: Ehrman (1966) is
based on one-third of Brown, Hermerén (1978) on four out of the 15 categories of
Brown. There are two studies which provide quantitative information about the
modals, the Biber et al. (1999) reference grammar, and Mindt (1995), but the
usefulness of the information presented is limited in both cases by the failure of
the authors to provide specific frequency figures.
While the studies described thus far are corpus-based, there are others that
are merely informed by corpus data. The best known of these is Palmer (1990),
which makes use of data from the Survey of English Usage corpus “for heuristic
and exemplificatory purposes only” (1990: 29). Another significant study which
uses the same corpus as a source of illustrative data is Westney (1995).
Finally, there are a number of smaller studies of individual modal
expressions, or sets thereof, that use corpus data. There is not space to describe
these in detail: a brief and selective overview follows. Berglund (1997) examines
the ‘expressions of future’ will, shall and be going to in various corpora of BrE
(LOB; and the London-Lund Corpus, or ‘LLC’), AmE (Brown), and Indian
English (the Kolhapur Corpus). Berglund’s (1999) sociolinguistic study of be
going to is based on the British National Corpus (‘BNC’), as is Verplaetse’s
(2003) functional study of want to. Facchinetti uses data from ICE-GB in her
studies of be able to (2000), can/could (2002) and may (2003). Nokkonen’s
(2006) study of need to is based on four British corpora: LOB, LLC, FLOB (the
Freiburg-LOB Corpus) and COLT (the Bergen Corpus of London Teenage
Introduction 7

Language). Further quantitative studies, with a diachronic orientation, are

described in the next section.

1.4 Diachronic studies of the modals and quasi-modals

Figures presented by Leech (2003), Smith (2003), and Mair and Leech (2006)
show that BrE and AmE have seen, in the three decades spanning the early 1960s
to the early 1990s, a rise in the frequency of the quasi-modals with a concomitant
and related decline in the frequency of the modal auxiliaries.6 Table 1.4 below
reproduces Mair and Leech’s figures for written BrE and AmE for the items that
are investigated in the present study (listed in alphabetical order), determined by
calculating the difference between the frequencies derived from their 1960s
corpora (LOB and Brown) and from their 1990s corpora (FLOB and Frown), as a
percentage of the former.7

Table 1.4. Changes in the frequency of modals and quasi-modals in recent British
and American writing (from Mair and Leech 2006)
Modals Quasi-modals
BrE AmE BrE AmE
can +2.2% –1.5%% be going to –1.2% +51.6%
could +2.4% –6.8% be to –17.2% –40.1%
may –17.4% –32.4% had better –26.0% –17.1%
might –15.1% –4.5% have got to –34.1% +15.6%
must –29.0% –34.4% have to +9.0% +1.1%
need –40.2% –12.5% need to +249.1% +123.2%
ought to –44.2% –30.0% be supposed to +113.6% +6.3%
shall –43.7% –43.8% want to +18.5% +70.9%
should –11.8% –13.5%
will –2.7% –11.1%
would –11.0% –6.1%

Mair and Leech regret that they are not in a position to provide detailed
information about spoken BrE and AmE, given the tendency for cutting edge
innovations to be associated with speech rather than writing. Nevertheless they
report that a search of spoken corpora of BrE covering a similar period of time
shows the trends found for writing to be more pronounced in speech (compare an
overall rise of 10.0% of the quasi-modals in British writing with one of 36.1% in
British speech, and an overall fall of 9.5% of the modals in British writing with
one of 17.3% in British speech). The unavailability of comparable corpora for
AmE speech deprives Mair and Leech of the opportunity to provide parallel
American figures. However they refer to the results a search of the 4-million-
word Longman Corpus of Spoken American English (from the 1990s) which
indicated that quasi-modals were 62.5% as frequent as core modals (compared
with a figure of 17% for written corpora of AmE and BrE of the same era). This
8 Chapter 1

finding, Mair and Leech conclude, “suggests that, as is often suspected, the
spoken American variety of the language is the main driving force of change in
this area, as presumably in others, and places the encroachment of semi-modals
on the territory of the modals in AmE speech, in frequency terms, beyond doubt”
(2006: 328).
The present study is synchronic rather than diachronic. Nevertheless a
number of the findings have diachronic implications, including the varying
frequencies across speech and writing for particular modal expressions, and for
different regional varieties. For this reason the frequencies reported in Table 1.4
will be regularly invoked throughout Chapters 3–5.

1.5 Regional and stylistic variation

The availability of matching regional corpora containing both spoken and written
material (with identical categories in the case of ICE-GB and ICE-AUS, and
similar in the case of C-US) provided the basis not only for a more detailed and
comprehensive analysis of the modals and quasi-modals than that offered in
previous quantitative studies, but also for the exploration of patterns of dialectal
and stylistic variation. The Appendix contains detailed tables for each item with
frequencies for their meanings in the spoken texts (subdivided into dialogic and
monologic in the ICE corpora) and written texts (subdivided into non-printed and
printed) of the three regional corpora.
It is widely assumed that there are only minimal grammatical differences
between the regional varieties of standard English (cf. Quirk et al. 1985: 18-19).
One aim of this study is to test the validity of this assumption and to determine –
if it view turns out to be wrong – how extensive the regional differences are and
how they are they manifested in the frequency of particular forms and their
meanings. What types of innovation or conservatism are reflected in the varying
modes of usage? Of the two long-established and influential varieties, BrE and
AmE, is one consistently ‘leading the way’ in the changes that are under way
with the modals and quasi-modals? And what of the younger Antipodean dialect,
AusE? Does it exhibit ‘colonial lag’ (cf. Trudgill 1986: 130), or is there evidence
of linguistic individualism, with patterns that are neither clearly British nor
American? This study evidenced a higher frequency of quasi-modals and a lower
frequency of modals in the American data than in the British or Australian,
justifying Leech’s identification of ‘Americanization’ (a shift towards AmE in the
frequency of linguistic categories) as a dissemination process that is driving
developments in this domain.
A second aim is to test Biber et al.’s (1999: 20) claim that “grammatical
differences across registers are more extensive than across dialects”. As noted in
the previous section, Mair and Leech (2006: 327) report a more exaggerated
pattern of change with the modals and quasi-modals in speech than in writing (a
steeper fall for the modals and rise for the quasi-modals). The database used for
the present study, with its spoken versus written subdivision (and further genre
subclasses for ICE-AUS and ICE-GB), facilitated examination of stylistic
Introduction 9

variation. Relevant here, but not testable with the present data, is the possible
influence of ‘colloquialization’ (the shift towards acceptability and use of
informal linguistic features associated with private conversation in public,
official, discourse) on the increasing use in writing of the quasi-modals.
The present study provides ample evidence that stylistic factors are at play
in developments reported, with the quasi-modals flourishing in speech, their
modal counterparts maintaining a penchant for the written word. Furthermore
there is a connection between the regional and the stylistic: it is in AmE that the
stylistic gulf between semi-modals and modals tends to be most marked, and least
in BrE.

Notes

1
I wish to thank to Edgar Schneider for suggesting the label ‘C-US’, and
Pam Peters for providing me with access to ICE-AUS.
2
See Nelson, Wallis and Aarts (2002) for further information on the design
of the ICE corpora, and the ICE website for the latest information on
which corpora are available and how to obtain copies:
www.ucl.ac.uk/english-usage/ice
3
For more information on SBC, visit:
www.linguistics.ucsb.edu/research/sbcorpus.html
4
The (eagerly anticipated) completion of ICE-US will circumvent such
problems and provide researchers in the future with the means to make
more accurate regional comparisons.
5
Normalized frequencies for the spoken component of C-US were obtained
by dividing raw frequencies by 0.116458, and for the written component
by dividing raw frequencies by 0.08. For general details of the
methodology used see Biber, Conrad and Reppen (1998: 263-264).
6
Another study which contains useful diachronic information, on have to,
have got to, and want to in BrE and AmE, is Krug (2000).
7
The figures, from Table 14.3 on p.327 and Table 14.4 in Mair and Leech
(2006: 327-328) are based largely on those reported in Leech (2003).
Chapter 2

Theoretical preliminaries

This chapter is concerned with the categories and dimensions of modality that
inform the study. We begin by defining modality and examining the properties of
the class of modal auxiliaries, and those of the more heterogeneous set of quasi-
auxiliaries. We then move on to the classification of modal meanings, and the
dimensions of strength, degree and subjectivity.

2.1 Modality and mood

Modality embraces a range of semantic notions, including possibility, necessity,

ability, obligation, permission, and hypotheticality. What they have in common is
that they all involve some kind of non-factuality: a situation is represented not as
a straightforward fact, as not being known. Some have sought a more positive
characterization by tying modal meaning to the fundamental concepts – which
constitute the primary concern of modal logic – of necessity and possibility (e.g.
Van der Auwera and Plungian 1998, Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 173), so that it
is envisaged as involving “a speaker’s judgment that a proposition is possibly or
necessarily true or that the actualization of a situation is necessary or possible”
(Depraetere and Reed 2006: 269). The reference to “actualization” here is
important: as we shall see in Section 2.4.1 many consider there to be two
fundamentally different kinds of modality – often labelled ‘epistemic’ and ‘root’
– whose orientation is towards truth and actualization respectively (but which are
united in their mutual association with the concepts of necessity and possibility).
The grammatical realization of modality via verb inflections is known as
‘mood’. The most distinctive is the subjunctive mood, which is used to refer to a
situation in a possible world, and includes both what is traditionally called the
‘present subjunctive’ (the base form of the verb as in God save the Queen and
The chairman demanded that the motion be withdrawn) and the ‘past subjunctive’
(essentially were with a first or third person subject as in I wish I were fitter). In
English today inflectional systems have but a minor role to play in the expression
of modality. The principal means of expressing modality in English is the class of
modal auxiliaries and a set of periphrastic expressions, referred to in this book as
‘quasi-modals’, of the type have to, be going to and be to.1 It is these that form
the focus of this book. The next two sections are devoted to considering their
grammatical properties.
12 Chapter 2

2.2 The modal auxiliaries

As members of the larger class of auxiliaries (which also includes the ‘primary
auxiliaries’ be, have, and do), the modal auxiliaries exhibit a number of
inflectional and syntactic properties that distinguish them from main, or ‘lexical’,
verbs. Let us begin with a provisional list of modals: can, may, will, shall, must,
ought to, need, dare and used to.2 The first four are generally assumed to have
preterite forms (could, might, would, and should), but as noted below this
assumption raises some problematical issues with might and should. Need, dare
and used to may be auxiliaries (as in Need/Dare/Used she (to) stay away?) or
lexical verbs (as in Did she need/dare/used to stay away?). The modals are, like
all auxiliaries, set apart from lexical verbs in the availability of inflectional
negative forms with n’t (can’t, mightn’t, mustn’t etc.).3 Dare and used to are
excluded from this study on the grounds of their semantic dissimilarity to other
modals and quasi-modals, dare expressing the courage of the subject-referent,
and used to expressing aspectual rather than modal meaning.
Syntactically the modals, like all auxiliaries, differ from lexical verbs in
their capacity to be used in the four so-called ‘NICE’ constructions: negation,
inversion (of subject and auxiliary), code (post-verbal ellipsis dependent for its
interpretation upon previous context), and emphasis (emphatic polarity involving
the use of contrastive stress). The constructed examples in (1) below illustrate the
use of auxiliary will in the four constructions, contrasting with the impossibility
of using the lexical verb like:

(1) a. He will not study. *He likes not study. [Negation]

b. Will he study? *Likes he study? [Inversion]
c. She will study, and so will he. *She likes to study, and so does he.
[Code]
d. They think he won’t study, *They think he doesn’t like
but he WILL. studying, but he LIKES.
[Emphasis]

The capacity to serve as ‘operator’ in the NICE constructions does not provide
sufficient grounds for defining the class of auxiliaries, insofar as there are some
lexical verbs that also have this capacity (the copula be as in Is he Malaysian?,
and ‘possessive’ have as in He hasn’t any money). 4
In addition to the above-mentioned inflectional and syntactic properties of
auxiliaries, the properties listed below are distinctive to the modals.5 Can, may,
will, and shall have all these properties, must, ought to, need and dare have most
but not all of them, while the quasi-modals have none.
Theoretical preliminaries 13

i. No non-tensed forms

The modals are morphologically defective, only having tensed forms (i.e. no bare
infinitival or participial forms). The examples in (2), (3) and (4) show that must,
will, and can are modals, but the semantically similar quasi-modals have to, be
able to, and be going to are not.

(2) I’d prefer to *must/have to wait another month.

(3) I resent not *canning/being able to wait another month.
(4) I had *would/been going to wait another month.

ii. No person-number agreement

The modals exhibit further morphological defectiveness in not having a separate

3rd person singular present tense form like other verbs. This enables them to
agree with any kind of subject. Compare for example the agreement restrictions
that apply to the quasi-modal have to but not the modal must: He must/has
to/*have to wait another month; You must/*has to/have to wait another month; I
must/*has to/have to wait another month.

iii. Bare infinitival

Apart from ought to, the modals take a bare infinitival. There are some lexical
verbs that can also take a bare infinitival, but in such cases the infinitive usually
follows a direct object. Compare the lexical verbs make and watch in I
make/watch them train hard with the modal must in They must train hard.

iv. Unreal conditionals

In an unreal conditional the first verb of the apodosis must be a modal. This role
is served by modal would and could in If he won the lottery, he would/could buy a
Ferrari, but cannot be served by quasi-modal was going to or was able to, as
shown by the ungrammaticality of *If he won the lottery, he was going to/was
able to buy a Ferrari.

v. Unreal preterite

As Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 107) point out: “The preterites of the modal
auxiliaries – could, might, would, should – can be used with the modal
remoteness meaning without the grammatical restrictions that apply in the case of
other verbs, where it is found in only a small set of subordinate constructions.”
Thus the preterite modal could but not the preterite quasi-modal were able to can
express non-past hypotheticality in Could/Were you able to you help her? Were
14 Chapter 2

able to can only express this meaning in subordinate clauses such as those in If
you were able to help us we would be grateful and We wish you were able to help
us.
The various properties discussed above may be used to draw a distinction
between what Quirk et al. (1985: 137) refer to as ‘central’ modals (can, will, may,
shall, must) and ‘marginal’ modals (dare, need, ought to, used to). Even within
the central modals we may suggest a distinction between can and will, whose
satisfaction of the properties is straightforward, and must, may and shall, for
which it is more patchy. In addition to the properties discussed above both can
and will have reduced forms (phonologically reduced forms when unstressed and,
in the case of will, the clitic ’ll). It is presumably the availability of such forms
that accounts in large part for the high frequency of can and will in spoken
English (see Sections 4.2.4 and 5.1.4). It is furthermore likely that their syntactic
straightforwardness is a factor in the numerical supremacy that they enjoy over
the other modals (see Section 1.1), and their diachronic success in resisting
incursions into their semantic territory (see Chapter 6).
Consider next must, may and shall. Must lacks a preterite form, so the
‘unreal preterite’ property is not applicable, and it is marginal in the apodosis of
an unreal conditional (e.g. ?If you caught the 11pm bus you must surely be home
by midnight). May is non-prototypical in its lack of a phonologically reduced
form and in the impossibility of mayn’t for most speakers, shall in the limited
currency of shan’t outside BrE. The most telling difference between may and
shall on the one hand, and can and will on the other, is the lack of a clear
temporally-based relationship with the preterite forms might and should. For
many speakers might no longer represents the preterite form of may, but rather is
the present form of a separate lexeme (one which, like must, does not have a
preterite): see Section 4.3.3 below. Should has several specialized uses which
have no counterpart in shall (see Section 3.2.5).
The marginal modals are less straightforward still. Ought to differs from
the other modals in its normal requirement of a to-infinitive (which is only rarely
relaxed, and only in non-affirmative contexts as in Ought we not apologise? and
You ought not complain so much), like must it has no preterite, and it is very
marginal in the apodosis of an unreal conditional (e.g. ?If we left at lunchtime we
ought surely to arrive before sunset). 6 Need and dare can be either modal
auxiliaries or lexical verbs. As modals they are restricted to non-affirmative
contexts (e.g. She needn’t/daren’t apply; Need/Dare she apply?) where their only
irregular features are an absence of reduced forms and, for auxiliary need, the
lack of a preterite counterpart: *Needed she apply?). Used to can also be either a
lexical verb or a modal auxiliary, qualifying as the latter formally but not
semantically. It is the most marginal member of the modal auxiliary class, with
many speakers finding sentences such as They usedn’t to eat meat and Used they
to eat meat? unacceptable, and morphologically very anomalous in its lack of
present tense and participial forms.
Theoretical preliminaries 15

2.3 Quasi-modals

Modern English has an abundance of periphrastic modal forms, a somewhat

loosely-defined grouping formally distinguishable from, but semantically similar
to, the modal auxiliaries, and which have been relatively neglected in the
literature on modality. The term that is widely used for these expressions is
‘quasi-modals’ (e.g. by Hakutani and Hargis 1972, Chapin 1973, Coates 1983,
Perkins 1983, and Westney 1995).
Opinions differ as to the nature of the relationship between the modals and
quasi-modals. It is generally agreed that a number of quasi-modals serve
suppletive roles in the defective morphological paradigms of the modals (e.g.
preterite had to in the absence of *musted, and infinitival to be able to in the
absence of *to can). It is also generally agreed that there is a close semantic
affiliation between a number of quasi-modals and modals, while at the same time
it is recognized that there are shades of difference between them (e.g. have to
tends to be more ‘objective’ than must; an implication of actualization
differentiates was able to from could).
Some have attempted to apply semantic distinctions to modals and quasi-
modals generally, rather than simply to individual pairings. According to Lakoff
(1972: 240), it is the presence or absence of speaker involvement that
distinguishes the modal from the quasi-modal in the pairs must: have to, may: be
allowed to, will: be to, and should: be supposed to. Her suggestion draws support
from Larkin (1976) and Palmer (1990: 81). There was no shortage in the data of
examples such as (5) and (6), which suggest that Lakoff’s distinction is at least in
need of qualification:

(5) You or your partner must be engaged in remunerative work for an average
of at least 24 hours a week. (ICE-GB W2D-005 22)
(6) You’ll have to give me the money for that ’cause I’m not going to pay for
you. (ICE-AUS S1A-017 278)

In (5) the modal must is used without speaker involvement, in the objective
statement of a rule, while in (6) quasi-modal have to is used to convey a speaker-
sourced directive.
It is furthermore difficult to see how Lakoff’s speaker-relatedness
distinction could in any way bear on the actualization implicature that
distinguishes many uses of be able to from can, as in (7), where could would not
be a suitable substitute for was able to (?Lansbury raised himself up and could
address the throng).

(7) Lansbury raised himself up and was able to address the throng through his
cell window. (ICE-GB W2B-019 85)

Westney (1995: 11) invokes three criteria for determining whether a

complex verb qualifies as a periphrastic (or ‘quasi-modal’ in our terms):
16 Chapter 2

grammaticalization (displaying features which suggest membership of a

significant grouping that lacks categorial status), idiomaticity (expressing a
meaning that transcends the meanings of its constituent parts), and semantic
relatedness to a central modal auxiliary. Semantic relatedness may be established
via various tests of equivalence. For example, the utterance in (8) would be
compatible with a reinforcing continuation such as he’s got to, and that in (9)
with she must, suggesting that they are equivalent in strength. On the other hand,
the oddity of she should or she ought to as continuations for (9) suggests that
should and ought to differ in strength from have got to.

(8) There is a crisis and he must act now (ICE-GB S1B 056 89)
(9) She’s got to get it organised before she goes to hospital for her knee (ICE-
AUS S1A-016 25)

We discuss grammaticalization and (more briefly) idiomaticity in Section 2.3.3

below, while semantic relatedness is invoked at various points in the following
discussion and explored in detail in Chapters 3–5.
Within the set of quasi-modals we can distinguish between those which
have an auxiliary as their first element, and those which do not (and are in most
cases formed with be and a lexical item). Quirk et al. (1985: 137-146) distinguish
these as respectively ‘modal idioms’ (had better, would rather, be to, have got to;
plus the ‘less common idioms’ had best, would sooner/(just) as soon, may/might
(just) as well), and ‘semi-auxiliaries’ (have to, be (un)able to, be about to, be
bound to, be going to, be obliged to, be supposed to, be (un)willing to; plus be apt
to, be due to, be likely to, be meant to). Quirk et al.’s terms are not at all
transparent, so instead of ‘modal idioms’ I shall use ‘semi-modals’ (both because
this term is more familiar in the literature and in order to suggest that this class
shares more properties in common with the modal auxiliaries than does the
second class), and instead of ‘semi-auxiliaries’ I shall use the more self-
explanatory term ‘lexico-modals’.

2.3.1 Properties of the semi-modals

The semi-modals had better, would rather, be to, and have got to all express
modal meanings. Had better (whose auxiliary element has arguably been
reanalyzed as a present tense form, as has happened historically with must and
ought) and would rather are both literally comparative idioms, expressing
respectively advisability (similar to ought to and should) and the volitional sense
of preference. Have got to, which derives from a perfect construction, is
semantically similar to the lexico-modal have to (see next section), expressing
both obligation and epistemic necessity. Be to expresses both obligation and
futurity.
The semi-modals have in common that their first element is an auxiliary,
and they are like the modals in having no non-tensed forms (compare *We will
must/have got to tidy up; *The game has should/been to start soon). They could
Theoretical preliminaries 17

only be considered ‘auxiliary-like’ if we invoked a special construal of the NICE

properties, insofar as it is the first element rather than the whole construction that
satisfies these properties (compare He hasn’t got to go/*He has gotn’t to go).
However with had better and would rather negation may or may not take the
auxiliary in its scope (compare They wouldn’t rather/would rather not intervene;
They hadn’t better/had better not intervene). The former, according to Quirk et al.
(1985: 141), is “typically used in ‘second instance’ contexts (especially in
negative questions) where an earlier statement or assumption is being
challenged”.7 All of the semi-modals except would rather display ‘voice
neutrality’ (compare I had better/am to/have got to/would rather settle the bill ~
The bill had better/is to/has got to/*would rather be settled by me).

2.3.2 Properties of the lexico-modals

The lexico-modals are a set of idiomatic expressions expressing modal (and in

some cases aspectual) meanings which – except for have to, need to and want to
– have be as their first element. The membership of the set is by no means
clearcut, and is difficult to delimit in a principled fashion. Quirk et al.’s list
(1985: 143) contains be likely to but not be certain/sure to, and be obliged to but
not be allowed to.
The lexico-modals are modal-like in displaying voice-neutrality (compare
Australia is bound to accept the refugees ~ The refugees are bound to be
accepted by Australia) and in their compatibility with the existential there-
construction (e.g. There are bound to be many refugees). A non-modal-like
feature of the lexico-modals is the availability of non-tensed forms, making
possible combinations of the type had been meant to and seems to be going to.
The availability of the non-tensed forms (in examples such as I will have
to quit; Many employees are having to quit; The company has had to fire many
employees) differentiates the lexico-modal have to from the semantically similar
semi-modal have got to (compare *I will have got to quit; *Many employees are
having got to quit; *The company has had got to fire many employees). Have to
also contrasts with have got to in the availability of a preterite form (compare The
company had to/*had got to fire many employees).
The lexical verb want to is not included in Quirk et al.’s list, but it is
evidently undergoing modalization (for instance, in its common phonological
reduction to /wn/, especially in AmE). For further discussion of the quasi-
modal status of want to see Section 5.5.
Need to is somewhat different from the other quasi-modals in the
closeness of its relationship to its auxiliary counterpart need. Huddleston and
Pullum (2002: 109) treat need and need to as essentially the same verb which can
“behave as” either an auxiliary or lexical verb.
18 Chapter 2

2.3.3 Grammaticalization and idiomaticity

In this section we discuss two of the criteria that, as noted above, were used to
determine the set of quasi-modals examined in the study.

2.3.3.1 Grammaticalization

Some quasi-modals have undergone a greater degree of grammaticalization than

others. Grammaticalization is the diachronic process by which a periphrastic
lexical unit is transformed into a more grammatical one, and typically involves
syntactic simplification, phonological weakening, and semantic bleaching and
generalization.
Within the class of semi-modals we may identify have got to and had
better as more grammaticalized, more auxiliarized, than be to and would rather.
The phonological evidence for this claim is the availability of reduced forms, a
distinctive feature of auxiliary verbs (Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 102). The
auxiliary components of had better and have got to may either be reduced to /d/
and /v/ respectively, or omitted altogether (/bet/, /gt/), represented as better
and gotta orthographically. A consequence of the elision of the auxiliary in had
better is that some speakers reanalyze the lexical element better as an auxiliary, in
structures such as We better go, bettern’t we. In the case of gotta, the obscuring
of the infinitival in the reduction of the periphrastic form results in the semi-
modal governing a bare infinitival complement. The fact that be to and would
rather have not evolved into single morphophonemic forms suggests a lesser
degree of grammaticalization.
What is the semantic evidence for grammaticalization with the semi-
modals? The originally comparative meaning of had better has been largely
bleached, the only trace being the implication of ‘ill consequence’ present in
some instances (see Section 3.8.1). As Jacobsson (1980: 52) notes, examples of
the type in (10) “have not been attested in recent literature”.

(10) You had better murder him than marry him. (Dickens, Bleak House)

The comparative sense of would rather is still salient, however, as in (11):

(11) Simon got fairly close to it but um then he decided he’d rather have the
school holidays than spend the school holidays rehearsing. (ICE-AUS
S1A-100 273)

According to Krug (1998: 179-180) the obligative sense of have got to has
evolved through syntactic renanalysis of possessive constructions (resulting in a
fixed ordering of elements) and subsequent semantic bleaching. Less
spectacularly, the future arrangement and obligation senses of be to may be
assumed to have developed from the futurate use of be (compare There is/is to be
Theoretical preliminaries 19

a board meeting on Friday), the latter via the implication that in appropriate
contexts if a speaker refers to an addressee’s future actions s/he is in fact
requiring thair actualization.
An important aspect of the modalization of the semi-modals is their
capacity to express both ‘epistemic’ and ‘root’ meanings (see Section 2.4.1
below), such semantic duality being a hallmark of the central modal auxiliaries.
The evidence here does not provide as clear a picture of degrees of
grammaticalization as the phonological evidence. Have got to undoubtedly
expresses both root (‘obligation’) and epistemic (‘necessity’) meanings (see
Section 3.6), while would rather does not, being restricted to the specific root
sense of volitional preference. The situation with had better and be to is however
somewhat more difficult to interpret. Had better is regarded by most (e.g. Perkins
1983: 63) as expressing only deontic modality, but Mitchell (2003: 145) claims
that it can also be used epistemically, as in (12) from the British National Corpus:

(12) This had better be good, I thought grimly as I crossed the road and walked
up the cul-de-sac to the Parsonage (BNC, 410)

However Mitchell’s argument, that in such cases the speaker expresses a hope
that something is or will be the case, and “Hoping is a type of epistemic volition:
a wish that a proposition whose truth is unknown turns out to be true” (2003:
145), is unconvincing: had better in (12) is more plausibly interpreted as deontic,
with the speaker anticipating a required outcome (compare the deontic sense of
This must/will have to/will need to be good, I thought grimly as I crossed the
road). As for be to, its scheduled futurity sense is essentially temporal and it lacks
the centrally epistemic use that will has developed (compare They will/?are to be
in Paris by now).
Morphosyntactically, would rather and be to have some properties that
indicate a lesser degree of grammaticalization than have got to and had better.
Would rather retains the un-modal-like capacity to take a finite clause
complement, as in I would rather (that) you went with someone else).
Furthermore, as noted by Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 108) it is possible to
negate the would only under certain conditions (e.g. the use of They wouldn’t
rather intervene to deny a preceding positive, and of Wouldn’t they rather
intervene? to frame a positively-biased negative question). Be to is un-modal-like
in exhibiting subject agreement (compare I am/ought to go; You are/ought to go;
She is/ought to go).
In seeking to determine which members of the set of lexico-modals are the
most grammaticalized we can apply similar criteria to those we have used with
the semi-modals. We shall argue that have to and be going to are the most
advanced in this respect and furthermore that a case can be made for the
classification of want to as a quasi-modal. Also showing signs of modalization
are be bound to and be supposed to. All five of these expressions are prone to
significant phonological reduction, involving not merely the weakening of
20 Chapter 2

infinitival to, but more importantly its incorporation into the preceding word
(/hæft, gn, wn, spost, bandt/).8
There is semantic evidence relating to root/epistemic duality for all five
items. This evidence is straightforward for have to (see Section 3.5.2) and be
supposed to (see Section 3.9.1), even though in the latter case the deontic root
sense evolves by implication from the historically prior epistemic meaning,
contrary to the well documented fact trend for epistemic meanings to develop
historically out of root ones (see, e.g., Traugott 1989). In the case of be going to
the epistemic meaning is of the non-central futurity type (and typically so in the
case of be bound to: see Section 3.11.1). With want to there is evidence of an
incipient epistemic meaning (see Section 5.5.3).

2.3.3.2 Idiomaticity

The semi-modals are all idiomatic to the extent that their primary semantic
elements (better, rather, got and be) all have non-equivalent uses in other
contexts. The question is less straightforward with the lexico-modals. Of the
items we have been discussing, have to, be bound to, be going to, be supposed to,
and be about to can be regarded as idiomatic in view of the bleaching of
possessive content with have, of any literal sense of tying or fastening with
bound, of motional meaning with going, of conjectural meaning with supposed,
and of locative meaning with about. Be able to is marginal, insofar as the
meaning of able in the lexico-modal does not differ greatly from its meaning as a
separate adjective. Want to and need to are not idiomatic.
There are various tests that are responsive to idiomaticity. 9 One, suggested
by Quirk et al. (1985: 144) for identifying the idiomaticity of lexico-modals
containing be, is the inability of what follows be to stand at the beginning of a
‘supplementive’ clause. Application of this test using the frame ______ to make a
decision, Matilda agreed to stay for dessert suggests that the status of be able to,
be bound to, and be about to, as quasi-modals is less clear-cut than that of be
going to and be supposed to.
A second test is the impossibility of omitting infinitival to in final position.
Items which pass this test are be about to, have to, be supposed to, be going to
and be bound to (*He has permission to attend, but isn’t about/doesn’t have/isn’t
supposed/isn’t going/isn’t bound), while be able to is marginal (?He has
permission to attend, but isn’t able).
A third test is the resistance of adjectives in lexico-modals to degree
modification, which shows that items such as be able to, be bound to, be
supposed to and be about to are all idiomatic (*She’s very able/bound/
supposed/about to help us), as opposed to, for example, be likely to or be willing
to (She’s very likely/willing to help us).
Theoretical preliminaries 21

2.3.3.3 Selection of quasi-modals for analysis

Table 1.3 in Chapter 1 presents the list of those quasi-modals that were selected
for analysis in the study on the basis of their association with a modal auxiliary
(primarily in the sense of semantic similarity but also, in some cases, in their
serving suppletive roles: see Chapters 3–5), their degree of grammaticalization,
and their level of idiomaticity. The high frequency quasi-modals have to, have
got to, be going, want to and need to, we shall argue, are making inroads into the
‘semantic space’ occupied by their modal equivalents. Of the remaining lower-
frequency quasi-modals, be able to and be about to are less grammaticalized, and
be able to is also less idiomatic, but the closeness of their semantic relationship to
can and will respectively was considered sufficient grounds for their inclusion.
Would rather and may/might as well are discussed, but not analyzed in detail:
both have undoubtedly undergone some degree of grammaticalization and
idiomaticization, but their meanings are nevertheless largely predictable from
those of their auxiliary elements in combination with the comparative sense of the
lexical element.

2.4 Modal meanings: approaches and issues

In this section we discuss some approaches to the classification of, and issues in
the analysis of, modal meanings.

2.4.1 Classifying modal meanings

Many scholars operate with a two-way distinction between ‘epistemic’ and ‘root’
modality (e.g. Coates 1983, and many American linguists), though with
differences of terminology. 10 The term ‘root’ suggests that this kind of modality
is more basic, an idea that derives support from diachronic evidence that
epistemic meanings tend to develop from root meanings via the extension of
concepts involving human interaction and properties to the domain of reasoning
and judgement (Sweetser’s 1990 ‘subjectification’). Epistemic modality is
prototypically concerned with the speaker’s attitude towards the factuality of the
situation, the speakers’s judgement of the likelihood that the proposition on
which the utterance is based is true, located along a scale ranging from weak
possibility (“It may be the case”) to strong necessity (“It must be the case”). In
non-protypical instances epistemic modality will be a matter of objective
conclusion rather than the speaker’s attitude (as in the objective algebraic
necessity expressed by must in If 2x =10, x must be 5). There is not complete
consensus on which modals and quasi-modals are exponents of epistemic
modality: for example Coates (1983: 244) describes will and shall as “marginally
epistemic”, and this in turn follows from their uncertain status, when they
indicate futurity, as markers of epistemic modality (see further Sections 5.1.1 and
5.2.1). Similar questions are then applicable to the epistemic status of the quasi-
22 Chapter 2

modals be going to, be to and be about to. In order to maximize the possibility of
identifying broad differences between epistemic and non-epistemic modality that
can be related to syntactic/semantic, regional and stylistic variables, we shall in
this study assume epistemic modality to be a broad overarching system, and
certainly one capable of subsuming the subsystems posited by some (e.g. Coates’
1983: 18-19 parallel inferential and non-inferential scales, and Palmer’s 2001: 8
distinction between epistemic and evidential modality).
It is not easy to provide a unitary definition of ‘root’ modality. Palmer
(2001: 8) endorses Jespersen’s (1924: 329-31) observation that the modal uses in
question are those “containing an element of will” (whereas those involving
epistemic modality may be regarded as “containing no element of will”. Bybee
and Pagliuca (1985: 63), who use the term ‘agent-oriented’ modalities, describe
them as “modalities that predicate conditions of either an internal or external
nature on a wilful agent: these are the notions of ability, obligation, desire and
intention”. A slightly different focus, on the conditions for actualization rather
than on the agent, occurs in Bybee and Fleischman (1995: 6), for whom agent-
oriented markers “predicate conditions on an agent with regard to the completion
of an action referred to by the main predicate”. The most common and arguably
important type of root modality is ‘deontic’, which occurs when the factors
impinging on the actualization of the situation referred to in the utterance involve
some type of authority – as when a person or a set of rules or a social convention
is responsible for the imposition of an obligation or a granting of permission (as
in You must/may leave at 3pm). However not all cases of root modality are
deontic: a possibility or necessity may arise not from an authority, or ‘deontic
source’, but rather from general circumstances (as in You can get to the island by
ferry) or from properties intrinsic to the subject-referent (as in the ability meaning
of Can he speak Chinese, and the volitional meaning of She will iron your shirt).
Some writers address the comparative heterogeneity of root modality by
recognizing subtypes. For example, Palmer (2001) distinguishes, within what he
calls ‘event’ rather than root modality, between ‘deontic’ and ‘dynamic’
modality: the former deriving from an external source and affecting a discourse-
participant, the latter deriving from and affecting an internal source (namely, the
subject referent). A slightly different distinction, between ‘participant-external’
and ‘participant-internal’ modality, is posited by Van der Auwera and Plungian
(1998). While these categories are broadly similar to Palmer’s deontic and
dynamic respectively, they differ in the exclusion of volition (which Van der
Auwera and Plungian regard as lying outside the bounds of modality) from the
participant-internal category, and in the inclusion of non-deontic root possibility
(which Palmer does not regard as a meaning distinct from ability) within the
participant-external category.
A quite different type of binary distinction, between ‘extrinsic’ and
‘intrinsic’ modality, is advocated by Quirk et al. (1985).11 Extrinsic modality
involves “human judgement of what is or is not likely to happen” (1985: 219) and
includes epistemic modality along with non-deontic root possibility/necessity,
prediction, and ability. Intrinsic modality involves “some kind of intrinsic human
Theoretical preliminaries 23

control over an action” (1985: 221), and covers deontic modality along with
volition. Quirk et al. concede that ability involves human control, but argue that
more importantly it involves a judgement about the likelihood of actualization.
Some writers adopt a tripartite scheme. The division in both Palmer’s
earlier (1990) book, and Huddleston and Pullum (2002), is between epistemic,
deontic and dynamic modality. The dynamic category includes ability, volition
and also non-deontic root (or, circumstantial) meanings. The absence of a larger
category that subsumes dynamic and deontic modality (i.e. ‘root’, or Palmer’s
2001 ‘event’ modality) leaves open the possibility that there may be relationships
between dynamic and epistemic meanings, just as there are between dynamic and
deontic meanings. It is this scheme that is adopted in the present study.

2.4.2 Polysemy vs monosemy

There has been a good deal of debate as to whether the meanings expressed by
the modals are sufficiently discrete and independent for us to acknowledge that
the modals are polysemous, or whether the relationship between the meanings is
sufficiently vague for us to assume that each modal is monosemous, with a core
meaning that is present in all their uses. The availability of ambiguous examples
provides strong evidence that modals are polysemous, as noted by many linguists
(e.g. Lyons 1977, Bybee and Fleischman 1995, Palmer 2001, Huddleston and
Pullum 2002). In cases where it is impossible to decide, out of context, whether a
root or epistemic meaning is intended, the fact that such meanings cannot co-exist
provides evidence that that they are discrete. Sometimes ambiguity occurs in
contexts where both interpretations are possible and valid, as in (13) below (“you
are permitted to receive”; “it is possible that you will receive”).

(13) If you qualify for a War Widow’s Pension you may also get full
Unemployment Benefit on your own contributions. (ICE-GB W2D-002
29)

Further support for a polysemy position comes from the association of root
and epistemic meanings with such grammatical phenomena as the scope of
negation, and from their association with different paraphrases (e.g. “it is possible
that” for epistemic possibility, and “it is possible for” for root possibility).
Supporters of the monosemy position (e.g. Ehrman 1966, Haegeman 1983,
Klinge 1993, Groefsema 1995, Papafragou 2000) point to the occurrence of
allegedly indeterminate examples where the different meanings in question are
not incompatible, and the difference between them is contextually neutralized
(referred to as ‘merger’ by Coates (1983). An example is (14) below, where can
is ambivalent between (dynamic) possibility or deontic possibility (‘permission’).

(14) But we can still be friends (ICE-AUS S1A-099 166)

24 Chapter 2

According to the monosemists the occurrence of such indeterminate cases

suggests that each modal has an invariant, core meaning, with different uses, or
interpretations, being determined by context.
The polysemy and monosemy positions are not in practice absolutely
mutually exclusive. Those who adhere to a polysemy position will not insist that
all the meanings expressed by a particular modal are distinct. Conversely, a
monosemy position does not exempt the analyst from seeking to identify different
interpretations, but the exercise will proceed from a smaller semantic base and
require richer context-dependent analysis than a polysemy one.
In the present study we assume a polysemy position, while at the same
time acknowledging that the dividing line between deontic and dynamic modality
will generally be less determinate than that between epistemic modality and either
of these root categories. Furthermore the three primary meanings have subsumed
uses which are not always clearly distinguishable.

2.4.3 Negation and ‘temporality’

A sentence with a modal expression can, it is generally accepted, be analyzed into

two parts, one representing the modal meaning and the other representing the
‘proposition’ whose truth is being judged or actualization predicated. This
division has consequences for negation and for ‘temporality’ in a modal sentence.
Negation may bear on the proposition, as in:

(15) The changes in her voice may well not be age (ICE-AUS S1A-035 310)

Here the negation falls within the scope of the modal (“It is possible that the
changes in her voice are not age”), and for this reason is described as ‘internal’ by
Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 175). By contrast in (16) the negation is
‘external’, bearing on the modal and falling outside its scope (“It is not possible
that she is much older than me”).

(16) She can’t be much older than me (ICE-AUS S1A-020 50)

The two types of negation may combine, as in (17), where but has negative force.

(17) I mean you you cannot but see that in the context of Cezanne (ICE-GB
S1B-008 157)

The scope of negation is more transparent when there is a lexical

expression of modality (as in the paraphrases provided for (15) and (16) above,
where the presence of a negative in the subordinate clause indicates internal
negation, while one in the superordinate clause indicates external negation). The
parallels between such lexical expressions and modal auxiliaries can be exploited
as a useful test for determining, in cases of negation with a modal auxiliary,
whether the negation is internal or external.
Theoretical preliminaries 25

The distinction between the modal and propositional part of a modal

utterance is also important in enabling us to provide a description of the temporal
information in the sentence. In the literature there is some inaccuracy in the
wording used to account for this. For example Coates (1983: 43) asserts that
epistemic must “refers to states and activities in the present or past”, but such
reference is made in the proposition rather than by the modal itself. Both the
modal and propositional parts are associated with temporal loci and the
relationship of the latter to the former may be distinguished as one of
‘anteriority’, ‘simultaneity’ or ‘posteriority’ (Depraetere and Reed 2006: 284).
Some of the possibilities for deontic must and have to are exemplified in (18)–
(22) (see further Sections 3.1.4 and 3.5.4 below):

(18) No you must meet her (ICE-AUS S1A-018 195)

(19) You’ll have to go down (ICE-AUS S1A-016 130)
(20) He had to be up at Asquith by six-thirty (ICE-AUS S1A-016 71)
(21) Yes, or they must have completed an apprenticeship. (ICE-AUS W2D-002
138)
(22) Managers and supervisors must be able to ensure that they will treat the
matter confidentially (ICE-AUS W2D-004 161)

In (18)–(20) the obligation is located in the present, future and past respectively.
In each case the temporal relationship between the obligation and the situation
referred to in the proposition is one of posteriority (e.g. in (18) “it is desirable that
you should meet her (at some time in the future)”). It is sometimes stated that
deontic modality cannot be associated with an anterior situation (e.g. Depraetere
and Reed 2006: 285). While this is true of subjective uses (given the pragmatic
impossibility of imposing an obligation on someone, or giving them permission,
to do something in the past) it does not apply to general rules or conditions, as
shown by (21). A relationship of simultaneity as in (22) is only possible when the
modality is of this general kind.

2.5 Further dimensions of modality

In Section 2.4.1 we examined various kinds of modal meaning. In this final

section we introduce three further dimensions of modality which are applied at
various points in the analysis presented in Chapters 3–5: strength, degree and
subjectivity.

2.5.1 Modal strength

The dimension of modal strength is defined by Huddleston and Pullum (2002:

175) as “the strength of commitment (prototypically the speaker’s commitment)
to the factuality or actualisation of the situation”. It is this concept that provides
26 Chapter 2

the basis for the distinction between the modal concepts of necessity (where the
commitment is strong) and possibility (where it is weak). They are logically
related in terms of their interaction with negation, as illustrated in (23) and (24).
The examples in (23) express epistemic modality (note that mustn’t is not
possible for all speakers), while those in (24) express non-epistemic meanings.
The abbreviation ‘Poss’ stands for ‘possible’ and ‘Nec’ for ‘necessary’.

(23) It can’t be true [not-Poss] = It mustn’t be true [Nec-not]

It may not be true [Poss-not] = It needn’t be true [not-Nec]
(24) You can’t go [not-Poss] = You mustn’t go [Nec-not]
You can not go, if you
wish [Poss-not] = You needn’t go [not-Nec]

Semantic strength may be affected by pragmatic factors. Compare for

example the different strengths of must in (25) and (26). The uncompromising
instruction in (25), which doesn’t countenance non-compliance, is consistent with
the semantic strength of must. However in (26) the speaker is merely making a
suggestion, and accordingly we may regard the strength of must as being
pragmatically weakened.

(25) If the ball rolls back onto the path or where the player has interference
from his stance or swing, you must re-drop. (ICE-AUS W2D-011 68)
(26) If you’re on holiday in France you must visit a chateau (ICE-AUS S2B-
030 98)

Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 177) identify an intermediate category on

the strength continuum which they call ‘medium modality’, associated with
should and ought, and lexical modal expressions such as likely, probably and
seem. Consider the effect of substituting epistemic should or may for must in the
following example:

(27) He must be making an absolute killing. (ICE-AUS S1A-014 158)

That should would be weaker in strength than must is suggested by the possibility
of felicitously adding a continuation such as but he may not be to the should-
version but not to the original with must, suggesting that must is stronger than
should. Should, on the other hand, is stronger than may, as suggested by the
contrast between the acceptability of He may be making an absolute killing, but
it’s not likely and the unacceptability of He should be making an absolute killing,
but it’s not likely.
Whereas there is a clear semantic difference between internal and external
negation with strong and weak modality, medium strength modality is distinctive
in the pragmatic closeness of the two negation patterns. Consider:
Theoretical preliminaries 27

(28) Well I’ll find it after I get out of here which shouldn’t be very hard (ICE-
AUS S1A-090 362)

The negation here is internal, paraphraseable as “It is not likely that it will be very
hard”, which is pragmatically equivalent to “It is likely that it will not be very
hard”.

2.5.2 Degree of modality

While the concept of modal harmony has been invoked in the literature (e.g. by
Coates 1983: 45-46, 137-138, 151-152), Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 179-180)
are the first to explain it in terms of the concept of degree of modality, which they
define as “the extent to which there is a clearly identifiable and separable element
of modal meaning” (p.179). A low degree of modality is said to occur when a
modal expression exhibits harmony with the larger construction – that is, conveys
modal meaning of a similar type and strength – such that its selection might be
considered optional. Consider the following:

(29) It must surely qualify as one of the great symbols of Australia, along with
the kangaroo and the koala. (ICE-AUS W2B-030 15)
(30) Everyone takes part just by being there so the tradition is upheld and the
two Marys are still recognised regardless of what the crowds may believe
(ICE-GB S2B-027 157)
(31) It’s odd that ah mysticism should have such a bad name (ICE-AUS S2A-
049 87)

The example in (29) represents the most common type of modal harmony, that
involving verb-adverb pairings where the verb and adverb have the same strength,
such that omission of the modal would have little impact on the meaning. If we
replaced must by may the modal harmony would disappear: the weak strength
modal may expressing a different meaning from the strong adverb surely (may
being harmonic with perhaps, possibly, and the like). In (30) may merely
reinforces the concessive meaning expressed by the larger construction, whose
meaning is not significantly different from that of regardless of what the crowds
believe. In (31) the so called ‘subjunctive’ should is harmonic with the emotive
content of the superordinate clause.
In (32) will has low modality, but not on account of modal harmony.
Rather, as noted by Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 180), the low degree of
modality in such cases is due to the “strong association between will and the
temporal concept of futurity”. While will may be omissible in (32) there are
comparable examples where it is not, as in (33).

(32) Dr John Meurig Thomas, Fullerian professor of Chemistry at the Royal

Institute of Great Britain and director of the Davy Faraday Research
Laboratory, will launch Dyfed education authority’s Spacewatch Initiative
28 Chapter 2

at Gwendraeth Valley Comprehensive School on Wednesday. (ICE-GB

W2C-017 93)
(33) He’ll be flown to the Camperdown Children’s hospital (ICE-AUS S2B-
020 133)

2.5.3 Subjectivity/objectivity

The distinction between subjectivity and objectivity, which appears in most

extended accounts of modality (e.g. Coates 1983, Perkins 1983, Palmer 1990,
Westney 1990, Huddleston and Pullum 2002) is of particular importance in this
study because, as we shall see in the following section, it is sometimes claimed to
systematically differentiate modal auxiliaries from quasi-modals. According to
this view the speaker involvement or orientation associated with deontic must in
(34) would be replaced by an external, objective orientation if must were
substituted by have to:

(34) Then we must stop somewhere for breakfast (ICE-AUS S1A-017 210)

Subjective deontic modality is often regarded as typified by ‘performative’

uses of the modals, as in (35), where must has the illocutionary force of a
speaker-initiated directive, by contrast with the objective, externally-initiated, use
exemplified in (36), where its force is that of an assertion or report.

(35) You must let me smell it (ICE-GB S1A-041 253)

(36) If you are the registered keeper of a vehicle and you change your address
or name (on marriage, for example) you must tell DVLA, using the back
of the registration document. (ICE-GB W2D-010 40)

Palmer (1990) regards deontic modality as “essentially performative”, observing

that: “By using a deontic modal, a speaker may actually give permission (may,
can), lay an obligation (must) or make a promise or threat (shall)” (1990: 69). By
contrast Coates (1983: 32-33) invokes the notion of performativity only with
must, associating it with the stereotypically subjective core of the must’s ‘cline’
of meaning.
The subjectivity/objectivity distinction applies to epistemic as well as to
deontic modality. Consider the following examples:

(37) Look at your injuries. You must have really hurt yourself. (ICE-AUS S1A-
022 140)
(38) If there’s a reasonable doubt as to whether there’s a car in front of Mr
McGregor’s vehicle that also must point in my submission to a finding of
not guilty. (ICE-AUS S2A-068 158)
(39) it is common to hear comments made suggesting that Muslims are really
clean, that all other religions are deficient or distorted in some way and
hence rejected by God, that only Muslims can lead a truly moral life while
Theoretical preliminaries 29

non-Muslims are necessarily amoral and entirely promiscuous, and that

Western societies (and indeed all societies that have undergone any
process of secularization) must inherently lack any moral foundation
whatsoever. (ICE-AUS W2A-013 91)

In (37) epistemic must represents the expression of speaker inference or judgment

that is regularly associated with epistemic modality. It is considerably weaker
than objective epistemic must as exemplified in (38) and (39) (note that there is a
greater difference between (37) and its unmodalized counterpart, You have really
hurt yourself, than there is between (38) and that also points to a finding of not
guilty, and between (39) and Western societies lack any moral foundation
whatsoever). Objective epistemic must can be dissociated from the speaker’s
opinions and attitudes in two possible ways. It may be alethic (q.v. Lyons 1977:
797, Palmer 1990: 6-7), as in (38), involving a strict semantic necessity,
determinable via quasi-mathematical deduction (“If x, then there is no other
possible conclusion than y”). Alternatively there may be a contextually
determined distancing from the speaker, as in (39): it is not the speaker’s own
assessment that is presented but rather one that arises externally and is merely
reported.

2.6 General aspects of the relationship between modals and quasi-modals

Is it possible to generalize across the differences between modals and quasi-

modals in a theoretically-principled and well-motivated fashion? According to
Palmer (1990: 10-11) the modals are inherently subjective and it is this property
that distinguishes them from quasi-modal expressions. Palmers’s arguments are
discussed in some detail by Westney (1995: 54-59), who accepts their general
plausibility but at the same time identifies “some complicating factors that may
make the whole case less straightforward than it appears” (1995: 55). For
example Palmer attributes the fact that preterite forms are either lacking for
modals or normally unavailable for expressing past time to their distinctively
performative, and hence subjective, nature. The problem here is the assumption
that quasi-modals cannot be used subjectively, one that Westney rightly questions
and that the data for the present study indicate is open to challenge. For example
’ve got to in (40) is used to impose an obligation, the subjectivity/performativity
here being no less apparent than in You must decide or the imperative You decide.

(40) ‘You’ve got to decide,’ he said. ‘I can’t tell you what to do.’ (ICE-AUS
W2F 002 37)

Palmer further asserts that quasi-modals are not, with the exception of
have to, available to express epistemic modality (following from his view that
epistemic modality is not normally objective). That this claim is disputable is
30 Chapter 2

suggested by the occurrence of examples such as (41), where the subjective

epistemic meaning of ’ve got to is parallel to that of its more formal but
apparently semantically identical alternate must in You must be kidding:

(41) Cass’s eyes go wide. “You’ve got to be kidding.” (ICE-AUS W2F-017 82)

A number of writers (e.g. Lakoff 1972, Bouma 1975) relate the

subjectivity/objectivity distinction to questions of the ‘source’ and ‘target’ of
obligations, permissions, and the like. They lead us to a distinction between
modals as carrying a default interpretation in which the speaker is assumed to be
the source, and thus associated with greater personal involvement with, or
sympathy for, the target than are the quasi-modals. A comprehensive survey of
these and other accounts is offered by Westney (1995: 59-67), who suggests that
we should exercise caution in assessing their merits in view of the often
conflicting evidence presented. Westney’s own view is that while modals are
maximally unspecified or unmarked, “the choice of a periphrastic allows a modal
predication to be more precisely specified both syntactically and semantically”
(1995: 54).

Notes

1
In this book the convention followed in Huddleston and Pullum (2002) of
using bold italics to represent lexemes, in abstraction from any of their
associated word forms, is adopted in principle. However in practice the
use of bold type is restricted to cases where failure to recognize the lexeme
versus word form distinction might be a source of confusion (particularly
in the present chapter). In contexts where the distinction is of no relevance
bold type is avoided on the grounds that it would simply be distracting.
2
Strictly speaking the modal auxiliary lexeme is simply ought, but we shall
take it as including the infinitival particle to. This will be consistent with
our practice with all the quasi-modals examined which, except for had
better, take a to-complement. In the case of need to our practice will serve
to distinguish the quasi-modal from the auxiliary, and in the case of have
to and be to will distinguish the quasi-modal from other uses of have and
be.
3
We accept Huddleston and Pullum’s (2002: 91) analysis of can’t,
mightn’t, mustn’t etc. as inflectional forms rather than ‘contractions’.
Support for this analysis comes from the fact that they are not always
replaceable by their analytic counterparts (e.g. Can’t/*Can not she reach
Theoretical preliminaries 31

it?), and that their phonological form is not always predictable (e.g. won’t,
shan’t).
4
Some grammarians (such as Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 92ff) apply the
term ‘auxiliary’ to all verbs that satisfy the NICE properties, rejecting the
traditional view of auxiliaries as dependents of the following lexical verb
in favour of one in which they are analyzed as (catenative) main verbs that
take non-finite complements. The issue is not one that that has
ramifications for the primarily semantic concerns of this book, and for that
reason is not explored in the present discussion.
5
See Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 106-107) for more detailed discussion.
6
There were no corpus examples of ought to used in the apodosis of an
unreal conditional or without a to-infinitive).
7
There were no corpus examples of wouldn’t rather or hadn’t better.
8
The last of these, /bandt/, does not appear in Huddleston and Pullum’s
(2002: 1616) list of items undergoing such reduction. It is, however,
included in Westney’s (1995: 34) list.
9
For a more detailed discussion of these and other tests of idiomaticity for
the quasi-modals see Westney (1995: 18ff.).
10
A lucid overview of the issues discussed in this section can be found in
Depraetere and Reed (2006).
11
Bolinger (1989) also makes use of this distinction in his study of may.
Chapter 3

Necessity and obligation

This chapter deals with the modals and quasi-modals of necessity and obligation.
This grouping is smaller than those examined in Chapters 4 and 5, particularly in
the terms of the frequency of the auxiliaries, with 3981 modal auxiliary tokens as
against 14,980 for the possibility/permission/ability group and 16,623 for the
prediction/volition group. Furthermore, of the three groupings, it is the only one
for which the quasi-modals (with 4906 tokens) surpass the auxiliaries in
frequency, and may be regarded as regularly replacing their auxiliary
counterparts. Biber et al. (1999), who likewise note a smaller frequency for the
modals of obligation/necessity, suggest as a possible explanation the “general
tendency to avoid the face threatening force of expressions with an obligation
meaning” (1999: 489).
The expressions examined in this chapter are the modals must (embracing
the forms must and mustn’t), should (should and shouldn’t), ought to (ought to
and oughn’t to), and need (need and needn’t), and the quasi-modals have to
(have to, has to, and had to), have got to (have/haven’t got to and has/hasn’t got
to), need to (need to, needs to, needed to, and needing to), had better, be
supposed to (supposed to preceded by all the inflectional forms of be), be to (all
the inflectional forms of be followed by a to-infinitive where the sequence
expresses modal meaning), and be bound to (bound to preceded by all the
inflectional forms of be).1
Within the set of necessity/obligation modal expressions we may
distinguish two broad subgroups in terms of their typical modal strength: the
strong forms must, have to, have got to, need, need to, be bound to and be to;
and the medium strength forms should, ought to, be supposed to and had better.
34 Chapter 3

Table 3.1. Frequencies of the modal expressions of necessity and obligation

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US TOTAL
Modals must 613 675 402 (79) 1,690 (1,367)
should 1,141 1,124 850 (167) 3,115 (2,432)
ought to 36 80 51 (10) 167 (126)
need 19 34 15 (3) 68 (56)
Total 1,809 1,913 1,318 (259) 5,040 (3,981)
Quasi- have to 1,311 1,244 1,385 (272) 3,940 (2,827)
modals have got to 332 339 173 (34) 844 (705)
need to 343 280 473 (93) 1,096 (716)
had better 48 33 41 (8) 122 (89)
be supposed to 47 99 127 (25) 273 (171)
be to 135 221 76 (15) 432 (371)
be bound to 9 17 5 (1) 31 (27)
Total 2,225 2,233 2,280 (448) 6,738 (4,906)
Total 4,034 4,146 3,598 (707) 11,778 (8,887)
NB In this and all subsequent tables, in columns with two sets of frequencies,
raw frequencies are bracketed and tokens per one million words are
unbracketed.
NB The figures for should include 289 tokens of specialized uses where it’s not a
necessity/obligation modal; and for be to 139 tokens of the conditional
use.

3.1 Must

While must expresses mainly deontic necessity, or ‘obligation’, it also has a well-
established epistemic necessity meaning (this being a minor, incipient, meaning
with must’s quasi-modal rivals have to and have got to). A third, minor, meaning
is dynamic necessity.

Table 3.2. Meanings of must

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Total %
Deontic 369 391 209 (41) 969 (801) 57.3%
Epistemic 185 216 153 (30) 554 (431) 32.8%
Dynamic 40 41 25 (5) 106 (86) 6.3%
Indeterminate 19 27 15 (3) 61 (49) 3.6%
Total 613 675 402 (79) 1,690 (1,367) 100%
Necessity and obligation 35

3.1.1 Deontic must

While deontic must has a default interpretation in which the speaker is identified
as the deontic source, as in (1), there is no necessary connection between
subjectivity and the use of must. In (2) must is objective, with the source of the
obligation (‘the world’) external to the speaker.

(1) If you’re on holiday in France you must visit a Chateau (ICE-AUS S2B-
030 98)
(2) At the United Nations the world agreed that Iraq must withdraw or be
driven out of Kuwait (ICE-GB S2B-030 19)

According to Lyons (1977: 832-833) subjective deontic must as in You

must open the door – compare the corpus example in (3) – can be used
performatively by the speaker (imposing a directive). However, despite the
strong compulsion expressed by must in (3), there is not the same degree of
directness as would be conveyed by its imperative counterpart (Stop doing that),
where the speaker requires immediate compliance.

(3) Then she said oh you must stop doing that (ICE-GB S1A-062 150)

In other cases involving must with a 2nd person subject it would be even less
appropriate to invoke the concept of performativity. Subjective deontic must is
commonly used in cases where the speaker is not in a position to – or may not
even wish to – require actualization, as in the advice in (4), the request in (5), and
the exhortation in (6).

(4) You must only do it with your teacher, because you can so easily get into
the wrong (ICE-GB S1A-045 61)
(5) you must let me photograph your baby for my magazine (ICE-GB S1A-
039 93)
(6) You must meet Forename6 you haven’t met her at all have you (ICE-AUS
S1A-018 191)

Objective deontic must is typically found in formal documents containing

laws, rules or regulations, as in (7):

(7) A complaint procedure must therefore ensure that both parties are given
the opportunity to be heard in a fair and impartial way by a person who is
sensitive to the issues and primarily concerned with the effective
resolution of the problem. (ICE-AUS W2D-004 75)

Somewhat more abstractly, but still within the realm of human

involvement, the deontic source for objective must may be an official position or
36 Chapter 3

view as in (8), or simply an unspecified consideration of what may be considered

morally desirable as in (9):

(8) There is this stuffy attitude you know not just in politics but beyond, that
somebody must wait another two or three years (ICE-GB S1B-043 54)
(9) It would not be in the interests of our troops to do so and they of course
must be our prime concern (ICE-GB S2B-014 41)

Deontic must can sometimes be ambivalently subjective/objective, with

uncertainty as to the deontic source. For example in (10) it is unclear whether the
speaker is giving instructions as a person in authority, or objectively stating rules
of the company which employees must abide by.

(10) You should help callers assess the responsibilities and duties of the
position, and offer any other relevant information. Once the position has
been advertised, you must be available to accept enquiries. (ICE-AUS
W2D-001 18)

The present study confirmed the tendency noted by Coates (1983: 34-35)
for the subjectivity/objectivity of deontic must to correlate with the person of the
subject. The clearest cases of subjective deontic must are those where the subject
is you, as in (3)–(6) above. Similarly the clearest cases of objective deontic must
are those with a 3rd person subject, as for example in (7)–(9) above. It is
important to reiterate that that the correlation between subjectivity/objectivity
and the person of the subject is merely a tendency, as examples such as the
following show:

(11) Northern Building Society has informed us that you must return the
Mercantile Mutual Insurance Policy to enable settlement to proceed on the
due date, namely 1 September, 1991. (ICE-AUS W1B 326)
(12) Depreciation on certain motor vehicles falls under the substantiation rules.
For these motor vehicles you must provide proof of cost if they were
bought after 30 June 1986. (ICE-AUS W2D-008 122)
(13) You must keep them moist (…) That uh bud must not dry out at all. (ICE-
GB S1B-025 91)

In (11) and (12) must has a 2nd person subject but the speaker is not the
deontic source: (11) is used to report an instruction rather than to impose one,
while in (13) the 2nd person subject is non-specific plural you (for which the
indefinite pronoun one sometimes serves as a more formal alternative) and the
obligation originates from an institution. Must in (13) has a 3rd person subject,
but the speaker is the deontic source.
With 1st person subjects we regularly find both subjectivity and
objectivity. The examples in (14)–(17) invite a subjective interpretation: in (14)
the speaker engages in insistent self-incitement, (15) instantiates a polite
Necessity and obligation 37

exhortation of self and addressee using inclusive we, and (16) and (17) illustrate
the formulaic use of must with a verb of communication in which the utterance
effectively realizes the act of admission or statement (a very common use which
accounts for 30% of all tokens of (deontic) must with a 1st person subject in the
present data):

(14) It was very comfortable except for not have enough non-smoking places.
As there were families with children in the same section it seems obvious
they should do something about it. I must write & tell them. (ICE-AUS
W1B-009 25)
(15) Well Harold mentioned it to me at the time, but I think it was one of those
invitations like we must have lunch sometime (ICE-GB S1B-040 7)
(16) Yeah I must admit I went home depressed as well (ICE-AUS S1A-024
332)
(17) And I must say at the outset that I’m in complete agreement (ICE-AUS
S1B-052 91)

In other cases deontic must with a 1st person subject expresses a requirement
which, if not externally imposed, at best has a vague source, as in:

(18) Becoming who we are and taking full possession of our own historically
conditioned cultural identities – something that we must all attempt if we
are to live responsible lives – is, then, of a piece with the practice of
anthropology (ICE-AUS W2A-013 165)

The subjective/objective dimension was found not to be reliably

quantifiable because of the large number of indeterminate instances. However in
view of the tendency for these categories to correlate with the person of the
subject, the figures presented in Table 3.3, showing that over two-thirds of
deontic musts have a 3rd person subject and less than 10% have a 2nd person
subject, suggest that deontic must is more commonly used objectively than
subjectively.

Table 3.3. Person of subject with deontic must

(Frequencies for C-US normalized to tokens per million words)
1st person 2nd person 3rd person Total
ICE-AUS 70 (19.0%) 42 (11.4%) 257 (69.6%) 369 (100%)
ICE-GB 85 (21.7%) 37 (9.5%) 269 (68.8%) 391 (100%)
C-US 67 (32.0%) 10 (4.8%) 132 (63.2%) 209 (100%)
Total 222 (22.9%) 89 (9.2%) 658 (67.9%) 969 (100%)

Deontic must is semantically strong, but it is commonly prone to

pragmatic weakening. Its strength – what Sweetser (1990: 54) calls its
‘resistibility’, degrees thereof being determined by the severity of the
38 Chapter 3

consequences for non-fulfilment of the obligation – is closely associated with

subjectivity/objectivity. The present data evidenced a tendency for subjective
uses to be strong, objective uses to be weak. At the maximum end of the scale of
strength we may locate subjective examples like (3) above, where the speaker has
sole responsibility for the directive and non-compliance is not countenanced. At
the other, weak, end of the scale we may locate an example such as (19), an
agentless passive with an unspecified deontic source having no necessary
connection with the speaker, where must merely expresses what is thought to be
desirable.
(19) And I think that they must be encouraged to implement a democratic
structure to follow this and not just have yet another military regime (ICE-
GB S1B-036 72)

The correspondence is not perfect, however. For example in (20) the

modality is subjective (the obligation being self-imposed by the speaker), but
must makes a very weak statement of requirement (as reflected in the fact that, in
conventional politeness formulae of this type the degree of modality is low, with
the modal being readily omissible).

(20) Uhm I must confess that I’m unrepentant about the poll tax (ICE-GB S1B-
034 6)

As with subjectivity/objectivity, so with strength, there is predictably a

degree of correspondence with the person of the subject: compare the strength of
(3), where must has a 2nd person subject, with the weakness of (19), where it has
a 3rd person subject. However here the correlations are looser. For example in (2)
above, where must has a 3rd person subject, the modality is clearly objective and
yet at the same time it is high-strength, with the severity of the consequences for
non-compliance spelt out. Again, the 2nd person subject in (6) above is associated
with a clearly subjective use of must, but the speech act of polite exhortation is
associated with weak resistibility only.

3.1.2 Epistemic must

In discussing epistemic must both Coates (1983: 41) and Huddleston and Pullum
(2002: 181) refer to the speaker’s ‘confidence’. However it is important to be
careful here. As with deontic must, we may distinguish between subjective and
objective uses. Objective epistemic must expresses logical certainty, a logical
necessity based on what is known, as in:

(21) When you uhm therefore say that you agree with the sentence in practice
the hysteric is not infrequently a malingerer too, it must follow from the
very terms of that sentence, that sometimes there are hysterics who are
not, malingerers too (ICE-GB S1B-070 14)
Necessity and obligation 39

(22) People tend to think that because many of the problems are global, the
answer must be global. (ICE-GB W2B-013 46)

In such cases the degree of modality is low and the speaker apparently confident
that the conclusion presented is the only one possible. However, it is far more
common for epistemic must to be used subjectively (91% of all epistemic musts
were subjective) and here we find variation in the amount of confidence shown
by the speaker. There is no doubt that we can speak of the speaker’s ‘confident’
inference in many cases, especially those where the grounds for the deduction are
spelt out, as in (23) and (24), and those where a harmonic expression such as
surely in (25) indicates a low degree of modality and correspondingly strong
confidence.

(23) Kim Childs has got about 6 letters this week, her father must be the head
of Australia Post. (ICE-AUS W1B-014 85)
(24) With all the bits of work you’ve done over the years, your CV must be
pretty full? (ICE-GB W1B-001 180)
(25) It must surely qualify as one of the great symbols of Australia, along with
the kangaroo and the koala. (ICE-AUS W2B-030 15)

However in the majority of subjective cases ‘confidence’ does not seem

an appropriate term to use. Semantically strong they may be (insofar as,
logically, ‘necessarily p’ entails ‘p’), but there tends to be considerable pragmatic
weakening. The presence in the following examples of the (semantically non-
harmonic) expressions I suppose, at a guess, presumed, and ‘estimative’ oh
provides evidence in support of this claim:

(26) The shelves must be four foot wide I suppose at least and they’re just they
just go up to the roof (ICE-AUS S1A-016 262)
(27) At a guess the monkey must have been something like 5ft (1.5m) high
standing on its hind legs. (ICE-GB W2B-021 49)
(28) I always presumed the child a man has by one woman must be
temperamentally different from one he has by another woman. (ICE-GB
W2B-004 48)
(29) ‘It’s years,’ he said, ‘since I’ve sat on a high stool like this. It must be, oh,
eighteen years ago, when Natalie and I lived over in Darlinghurst.’ (ICE-
AUS W2F-003 56)

Table 3.4 compares Coates’s figures for harmonic expressions such as I’m
sure, surely and certain and for ‘hedges’ such as I suppose and I think with those
for the present study. In both studies there were more hedges than harmonic
expressions, confirming that pragmatic weakening is common with this modal. In
the present study ICE-AUS had relatively fewer hedges, perhaps indicating that
for Australians must is epistemically weaker than it is for their British and
American counterparts.
40 Chapter 3

Table 3.4. Harmonic expressions and hedges with epistemic must

Harmonic expressions Hedges
Coates SEU 8 23
Collins ICE-AUS 8 7
ICE-GB 8 13
C-US 10 15
Total 26 35

Further evidence of the pragmatically weak strength of subjective epistemic

must, as noted by Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 181), is to be found in the
contrast between the negative must not/mustn’t and its semantically equivalent
but pragmatically stronger and more categorical counterpart can not/cannot/
can’t. Consider for example the effect on modal strength of substituting can for
must in (30). Rather than an inferred conclusion, the speaker would be felt to be
making a statement of what is obvious or perhaps a contradiction of a previous
claim.

(30) And secondly he must not be too far off the second person if he doesn’t
manage to get second himself (ICE-GB S2B-009 89)

As noted by Coates (1983: 44), and as for epistemic modality generally,

epistemic must regularly co-occurs with a range of syntactic features: the perfect
aspect as in (27), a stative verb as in (25) and (28), pleonastic/expletive it as in
(21), an inanimate subject as in (26), the progressive aspect as in (31) below, and
existential there as subject as in (32).2

(31) Yeah All over him I’m pretty sure he must be sniffing it or something
(ICE-AUS S1A-053 11)
(32) And there must be a tremendous temptation when you’re when you’ve
been labouring away for hours um just to sort of um mark things fairly
cursorily (ICE-AUS S1A-032 91)

3.1.3 Dynamic must

Dynamic necessity is a minor category with must, accounting for only 6.3% of all
tokens (see Table 3.2 above). The clearest cases are those in which must
expresses an internal need in the subject referent, as in (33) and (34):

(33) But this realm is arid, sterile, and, ahem, bloodless. The vampires must
feed, compulsively, endlessly. (FROWN F01 152)
(34) Dugongs are true mammals and must surface to breathe, and so they will
inevitably be war casualties (ICE-GB W2B-029 74)
Necessity and obligation 41

These are relatively rare by comparison with cases where the necessity or need
for action derives from the force of circumstances, as in the following.

(35) Axon sprouting occurs from the proximal nerve end and must penetrate
the fibrous tissue present at the nerve interface. (ICE-GB W2A-026 126)

Dynamic must may not be sharply distinct, especially with a human

subject, from deontic must. In (36) and (37) must expresses a circumstantially
derived need, involving a habitual time dynamic reading with a non-specific
subject. However in each case there is an additional possible reading – albeit one
arguably less salient – in which an obligation is understood to be imposed by a
deontic source to ensure that the activity occurs, in this case involving a habitual
or future situation with a specific subject.

(36) To get there we must negotiate some of the stormiest oceans in the world
deadly icebergs and several hundred kilometres of pack ice (ICE-AUS
S2B-035 58)
(37) It’s from this land that we must produce all the food all the minerals all
the energy and all the potable water for a rapidly increasing population
(ICE-AUS S2B-021 46)

Examples such as (36) and (37) may suggest the legitimacy of positing a single
root category, as does Coates (1983), who regards both deontic and dynamic
must as belonging to a single ‘root’ continuum dubbed ‘obligation’. The closest
to an example of dynamic modality discussed by Coates is Clay pots … must
have some protection from severe weather (1983: 35), which she describes as
having a “very weak” sense of obligation and “minimal” speaker involvement.
However examples such as (33)–(35), where there is no element of meaning that
could plausibly be associated with speaker involvement, suggest the need to
recognize a distinct dynamic category.

3.1.4 Time reference of situation

In this section we consider the temporal relationship between the modal meaning
and the situation referred to. With deontic must the possibilities differ according
to whether the meaning is subjective or objective. Posteriority is possible in both
cases (as for example with subjective must in (3) and objective in (8) above), as
is simultaneity (as for example with subjective must in (17) and objective in (7)
above). However anteriority is not possible with subjective deontic must (since it
is not possible pragmatically to oblige someone to do something in the past),
although occasional examples are found with objective deontic must used with
general requirements as in (38):
42 Chapter 3

(38) In order to get these credits: the course must have started before you were
21, and you must not have left the course before the beginning of the tax
year in which you were 18 (ICE-GB W2D-002 12)

With epistemic must there are no restrictions on the temporal relationship

between the modal meaning and the situation. In (39) we have simultaneity and
in (40) anteriority:

(39) But it seems to me that the subject that I teach Yiddish must be pretty high
up on the list of subjects about which misinformation abounds and where
the true facts are widely ignored (ICE-GB S2B-042 10)
(40) I was working, so it must have been a Tuesday or a Wednesday or
possibly a Thursday, those were the nights I worked downstairs. (ICE-
AUS W2F-016 34)

Palmer (1990: 54) reports no examples in his SEU data of must relating to
present habitual activity or future situations, while at the same time recognizing
that these are fortuitous omissions, given the acceptability of invented examples
such as He must travel to London regularly indicating habitual activity and
Something must happen next week indicating a future event.3 In the present data
there is no shortage of examples (6.1%) of the former, as in (41), and a small
number of the latter (1.5%), as in (42).

(41) Ah the calories that the the mother must consume in breastfeeding and
also in the tasks of gathering food while she is nursing the baby mean that
there’s nothing left there’s no nourishment left to re- establish ovulation
(ICE-AUS S2B-041 172)
(42) What with France’s torrential rains, floods and ice, California’s awful
earthquakes and our dreadful bushfires, and the wars that are going on
here and there over the world, things are not very pleasant these days, are
they? They must get better, surely! (ICE-AUS W1B-010 71)

Must itself does not have a preterite form that can locate the modal
meaning in past time. For deontic must, the semantic gap is normally filled by
had to (see Section 3.5.1 below). This does not of course prevent must from
being used in backshift, whether deontic as in (43) or epistemic as in (44), and in
contexts where an interior monologue can be hypothesized, whether deontic as in
(45) or epistemic as in (46):

(43) Apparently he had some difficulty in persuading the conservative English

monks that the ruined choir must be pulled down completely, and even so
they kept much of the wall and the eastern transepts with their Norman
towers. (ICE-GB W2B-004 48)
Necessity and obligation 43

(44) She was born on the 8th which is Roland’s birthday and after trying all
afternoon to ring him for that from Montecalim we knew something must
be happening. (ICE-AUS W1B-009 40)
(45) By dusk I came in view of the spires. I took a room in a public house
because next morning I must present myself spruce for business. (ICE-
AUS W2F-014 49)
(46) Refuge in the US or British embassies was not worth thinking about,
when both were situated in the middle of town where patrols must surely
intercept them. (ICE-GB W2F-015 139)

3.1.5 Must and negation

Must normally takes internal negation (i.e. the negation falls within the scope of
the modal), as in the deontic example in (47) paraphraseable as “It is necessary
that applications received after the cull not be considered”, and the epistemic
example in (48) paraphraseable as “It is necessarily the case that he is not too far
off the second person”.

(47) But applications received after the cull must not be considered. (ICE-AUS
W2D-001 147)
(48) And secondly he must not be too far off the second person if he doesn’t
manage to get second himself (ICE-GB S2B-009 108)

Negation accounts for 6.0% of deontic and dynamic must tokens, but is
extremely rare with epistemic must (with merely three tokens in ICE-GB and
none in ICE-AUS or C-US, or 0.5% overall).4

3.1.6 Must: regional and stylistic variation

Mair and Leech’s (2006) findings indicate that must has been in substantial
decline since the early 1960s, with a frequency difference of 29.0% between
LOB and FLOB and 34.4% between Brown and Frown (see Table 1.4 above). A
comparison of the frequencies for the individual corpora shows must to be
conforming to the trend for AmE to be leading the way in the decline of the
modals with C-US having considerably fewer tokens (402 per million words)
than ICE-GB (675) and ICE-AUS (613). Not surprisingly, in view of its waning
fortunes, must is less popular in speech than writing in all three corpora (with an
average speech/writing ratio of 0.6:1 (see Table 3.5).
It is with the deontic meaning that the regional differences are the
sharpest. As Table 3.2 above shows, Americans have a strong distaste for deontic
must, with C-US yielding only slightly more than half as many tokens per million
words (209) as British speakers (391) and Australians (369). At the same time
the dispreference for deontic must in speech over writing is stronger in C-US
(1:3.13) than it is in ICE-GB (1:2.54) or ICE-AUS (1:2.48): see Table 1
44 Chapter 3

(Appendix). Furthermore, examination of the spoken and written subcategories

of ICE-AUS and ICE-GB is suggestive of conservatism in the use of deontic
must: the frequency of tokens in monologue outweighs that in dialogue by a ratio
of 616:378, or 1.6:1, while that in printed texts outweighs that in non-printed
texts by a ratio of 1,220:1,100, or 1.1:1.5

Table 3.5. Genre distribution of must

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Avg
Spoken Dialogue 511 (184) 553 (199)
Monologue 471 (113) 488 (117)
Total 495 (297) 527 (316) 318 (37) 447
Written Non-printed 980 (98) 560 (56)
Printed 727 (218) 1,010 (303)
Total 790 (316) 898 (359) 525 (42) 738
Total 613 675 402 (79) 563

3.2 Should

Coates’s (1983: 60) ‘fuzzy set’ for should has strong obligation at its ‘core’.
However in prototypical cases its strength is weaker than that of must, and
greater than that of may, as suggested by the contrast between the harmonic
combinations must surely, should probably and may possibly. More appropriate,
then, is Huddleston and Pullum’s (2002: 177, 186) characterization of should as
expressing ‘medium strength modality’. While they distinguish should (and
ought to) from both ‘strong’ must, have (got) to and need (to) and ‘weak’
(possibility) can and may, they nevertheless concede that “intuitively it is closer
to the strong end than to the weak” (2002: 177).
Should expresses mainly deontic modality, with a secondary epistemic
meaning (see Table 3.6). No examples were found of should expressing dynamic
modality. Even in those instances where should expresses the desirability of an
action deriving not from the speaker, or from some moral or legal consideration,
but merely from circumstantial expediency, as in (49) below, we understand the
action to be recommended by the speaker or by some external body representing
the deontic source.

(49) You may need to grip down and adjust the ball position for some shots but
the basics of the swing should be the same. (ICE-AUS W2D-011 214)

In addition, should has a number of minor uses – as a ‘quasi-subjunctive’,

and as a tentative preterite 1st person variant of would – which are examined in
Section 3.2.5.
Necessity and obligation 45

Table 3.6. Meanings of should

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Total %
Deontic 826 721 601 (118) 2,148 (1665) 69.0%
Epistemic 134 112 122 (24) 368 (270) 11.8%
Subjunctive 61 104 41 (8) 206 (173) 6.6%
= would 11 57 15 (3) 83 (71) 2.7%
Indeterminate 109 130 71 (14) 310 (253) 10.0%
Total 1141 1124 850 (167) 3,115 (2,432) 100%

3.2.1 Deontic should

We have characterized should as having ‘medium strength modality’. However

within the section of the scale it occupies it is possible to identify differences,
even if maximally strong should does not not rival maximally strong must in
strength, and maximally weak should likewise does not rival maximally weak
may in weakness. Consider the following examples of stronger should. In (50)
the speaker makes a forceful suggestion, in (51) the speaker reports in categorical
terms a prohibition that is generally known to apply, and in (52) the speaker
makes a suggestion whose strength is clear from the implied seriousness of the
consequences of non-fulfilment.

(50) You should quit (ICE-AUS S1A-036 291)

(51) He was actually one of my students but I don’t know anything about
supplementaries and the grounds that you apply for them and stuff like
that and I from what I know about this place is that you should never talk
about something you don’t know (ICE-AUS S1A-032 14)
(52) Burmese seem to be lactose intolerant and should not be given milk. (ICE-
AUS W2D-019 18)

By contrast in (53) the weak strength of the advice offered is indicated by

the adjunct maybe, while in (54) there is no sense of obligation or duty in the
recommendation reported, merely desirability:

(53) Well maybe you should just let things let him think about what he’s doing
first (ICE-AUS S1A-093 214)
(54) folklore in Kalgoorlie has it that you should watch a certain taxi driver
(ICE-AUS W2B-017 47)

Deontic should may be subjective, indicating what the speaker considers

desirable, appropriate or right (as in (50) and (53)), or objective, where the
appropriateness or desirability of the course of action described stands
independently of the speaker’s endorsement (as in (51), (52) and (54)).
One reason for the comparative lack of strength of deontic should, as
against must, is the fact that should allows for non-actualization, as in (55)–(57).
46 Chapter 3

Here should is used when it is known that the situation is not or was not
actualized, and in these cases criticism is implied.

(55) Well the book’s about two hundred and fifty pages long and we’re not
really doing what we should be doing at the moment (ICE-GB S1A-008 7)
(56) I know that I probably I know that I should eat but when and I cook uh
considerable quite a large quantity of food and then find that I I don’t feel
all that hungry even though mostly uhm I usually skip breakfast and uhm
travel on cups of coffee or tea (ICE-GB S1A-059 48)
(57) He think he thinks like I should have finished it by now (ICE-GB S1A-
084 238)

As Palmer (1990: 123) observes, the implication of non-actualization may be

associated with the presence of a comparative adverb or adjective, conveying the
implication that the subject failed to reach some suggested standard, as in:

(58) And I used to think that she should have had more courage (ICE-GB S1B-
046 63)

With should referring to the future the implicature is not one of non-
actualization but rather of openness or at least neutrality with respect to
actualization. Accordingly, in (59) below a continuation such as ‘but it certainly
won’t be’ would be possible, but if must were substituted for should such a
continuation would produce an unnatural effect.

(59) The budgetary status and viability of the hospital redevelopment should
also be examined. (ICE-AUS W2E-006 166)

As Coates (1983: 60) observes, deontic should is often used idiomatically

in why-questions, as in:

(60) Why should Australians bother to learn Chinese, Japanese, Arabic or

European languages? (ICE-AUS W2E-003 28)

These can be paraphrased as ‘Is x really necessary?’, with the implicit answer
being ‘no’. Hence they may convey a tone of impatience on the part of the
speaker with respect to the supposed obligation.

3.2.2 Epistemic should

As with deontic should, so with epistemic should, a weaker meaning than that
expressed by must is normal. Epistemic should is typically subjective, with the
speaker indicating a tentative assumption, or assessment of the likelihood of the
predication, as in (61) and (62). However occasional examples of objective
Necessity and obligation 47

epistemic should are encountered in the data, as in (63), where the proposition is
deduced from known facts:

(61) Under Wayne Goss’ Labor state government, Queensland appears to have
set a sensible course towards sustainable development and controlled
foreign investment which should ensure the state’s continued economic
growth into the next century while red tape and bureaucratic intervention
remains low. (ICE-AUS W2B-015 19)
(62) You should receive notification next week some point telling you whether
or whether you haven’t got any money from the fund (ICE-GB S1A-078
12)
(63) It would be interesting to look at the Xist levels in X M O mice, if the
parental imprint is erased before random X inactivation occurs there
should be no difference between Xist expression in X P O and X M O
mice. (ICE-AUS W1A-005 48)

As with deontic should, so with epistemic should, we find rhetorical why-

questions, in this case the speaker indicating irritation with an invalid
assumption.

(64) Uhm why should the stratigraphic divisions that we’ve established in
Britain be of use in Australia or China (ICE-GB S1B-006 168)

As Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 187) observe, there is often a deontic

component of meaning in the background with epistemic should. For example
should in (64) focuses on the likelihood that British stratigraphic divisions will
be useful in Australia or China, which is presented as a false assumption, but
there is also at the same time a suggestion that it would not be appropriate or
wise to proceed with using these divisions. What Huddleston and Pullum
conclude from this is that with should the deontic meaning has primacy over the
epistemic.

3.2.3 Should and temporality

Deontic should can be associated with a situation that is simultaneous with the
time of the modality as in (51), (52) and (55) above, or posterior to it as in (50)
and (53) above. When deontic should is used with perfective have the pastness
applies to the modality rather than to the proposition. Thus we would paraphrase
(57) above as “I was under an obligation to finish it by now”, with the perfect
outside the scope of the deontic modality, rather than “I am under an obligation
to have finished it by now”, with the perfect within its scope.
With epistemic should by contrast there are no temporal restrictions on the
proposition. Thus in (65) we have an inference made with respect to a
simultaneously present situation, in (66) with respect to a future situation, and in
(67) with respect to an earlier situation. A comparison of (57) and (67) reveals
48 Chapter 3

that – as we shall see with auxiliary need (see Section 3.4.4) – the scope of the
perfect differs according to whether the modality is deontic or epistemic.
Whereas in (57) it is outside the scope of the deontic modality, in (67) it is within
the scope of the epistemic modality.

(65) If you’ve used the bevel correctly the marks should have your legs
pointing in that direction (ICE-AUS S2A-054 150)
(66) At least you should be able to get some to sleep (ICE-AUS S1A-023 140)
(67) My big news - I have a full-time permanent job! It’s at the university’s pr
PR dept, as Publications Officer (Academic). I’m excited - and getting a
little nervous as the day draws nearer. By the time you get this letter, I
should have started there! (ICE-AUS W1B-007 170)

3.2.4 Should and negation

Should (both deontic and epistemic) normally takes internal negation (where the
negative is within the scope of the modality), expressing the speaker’s
commitment to the wrongness or undesirability of the proposition. In (68) the
speaker urges the addressee to refrain from taking the items in question out of the
bag; and in (69) the speaker asserts the probability that no substantial effect will
occur.

(68) You shouldn’t take them out of the bag. No taking them out of the bag
(ICE-AUS S1A-067 252)
(69) Overall, there shouldn’t be any substantial effect either way. (ICE-GB
W1A-017 235)

Having said this, there is no clear pragmatic difference between internal and
external negation with should, as a medium strength modal (or, as Coates 1983:
64 suggests, as a modal which exhibits merger). (68) above could equally be
paraphrased as “It is advisable that you do not take them out of the bag” or as “It
is not advisable that you take them out of the bag”; (69) could equally be
paraphrased as “It is likely that there will be no substantial effect either way” or
as “It is not likely that there will be any substantial effect either way”.

3.2.5 Special ‘low-degree’ uses of should

Should has a number of uses which Coates (1983: 67) and Leech (2003: 233)
refer to as ‘quasi-subjunctive’, in which it occurs in certain (mainly subordinate)
constructions with low-degree modality (that is, with should contributing little
discernible modal meaning to the construction). These account for 6.6% of
tokens in the corpora. A further use of should which is distinguishable from its
major deontic and epistemic uses, is discussed in Section 3.2.6 below. As Table
Necessity and obligation 49

3.6 above shows these uses are considerably more common in ICE-GB than in
ICE-AUS and C-US.
Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 187) list five types of subordinate
construction in which low-degree should may occur. Each is discussed and
exemplified below.

i. Mandative

Here should serves as a more informal alternative to a subjunctive and, in the

majority of cases, the predicative item in the matrix clause forms a harmonic
combination with the modal, as in:

(70) It is desirable that the robot should be deflected when it is kicked so that
the cow is not harmed. (ICE-GB W2A-033 51)
(71) A Scotland Yard disciplinary tribunal has recommended that seven police
officers, who while off duty were involved in an attack on a man in a pub
three years ago should be sacked (ICE-GB S2B-019 55)
(72) Are you suggesting are you suggesting that they should carte blanche
hand you twenty three million dollars (ICE-AUS S1B-054 176)

In these cases the subjunctive use co-exists readily with the deontic meaning of
should (in (70), for example, either “It is desirable that the robot be deflected” or
“The robot ought to be deflected”).
Should can also combine with a predicative item of strong modality in the
matrix clause (insistent in (73) and important in (74)), suggesting that it has
undergone grammaticalization in the mandative construction (as noted by
Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 187-188).

(73) His task is to convince those powers, notably the Soviet Union and China
but including France, which have been most insistent that force should be
used only if specifically authorised by the UN, that their strict
interpretation of legality cannot be a pretext for inaction or appeasement.
(ICE-GB W2C-008 116)
(74) I’ve got another six days leave but I really think it’s important that I
should travel from Rome to Nice and then Duseldorf (ICE-AUS S1B-061
241)

ii. Adversative

While there are no corpus examples of should in a lest-clause (as in We were

worried lest he should feel left out), the following involves a type of adversative
clause.
50 Chapter 3

(75) They camp on rocky islands in case the ice should suddenly break out
(ICE-AUS S2B-029 53)

iii. Purposive

This category is exemplified in (76):

(76) There was a delib deliberate effort to make it appear surgical and almost
consequence free uh in order that that public opinion at home should not
should not be eroded (ICE-GB S1B-031 98)

iv. Emotive

In this use should occurs primarily with predicative items indicating surprise or
evaluation, as in:

(77) It’s interesting that the men should think feel like that because I think that
most women would think or look great (ICE-AUS S1A-059 30)
(78) And it didn’t strike you as anything odd in in that that the Midland Bank
as far as as you say should should just lend money half a million pounds
to R C Ward simply on the strength of the value of the property without
examining the individual accounts (ICE-GB S1B-061 58)
(79) It is perhaps not so surprising that exporters should enthuse about being
freed from the ups and downs and the extra costs of doing business in
Marks, Francs, Lira and so on, because that would make their job easier.
(ICE-GB W2E-009 11)

v. Conditional

According to Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 188), in this use should “expresses
slightly greater doubt than the non-modal counterpart” (namely, in the case of
(80) and (81) below, “if they somehow reached inside the diplomatic compound”
and “if anything is wrong with swimming pool steps”).

(80) legal representation at a rigged trial was the best they could hope for if
they should somehow reach inside the diplomatic compound. (ICE-GB
W2F-015 142)
(81) but if anything should be wrong with swimming pool steps, as we’ve seen
in this case it’s a potential source of injury isn’t it (ICE-GB S1B-067 117)

More common than if-clauses with should in the corpus data are implicit
conditional clauses featuring subject-auxiliary inversion (in which should is not
omissible), as in:
Necessity and obligation 51

(82) I can only hope that I will be able to provide the support, as selflessly as
you both have done, to you, should you ever require it. (ICE-AUS W1B-
013 20)
(83) This means that a taxpayer can now appeal to the Administrative Appeals
Tribunal should he or she disagree with the commissioner’s decision on
whether to allow a particular deduction. (ICE-AUS W2C-020 32)

3.2.6 ‘Preterite’ should

Should should be analyzed as the preterite counterpart of shall? The fact that
should cannot be used with independent past time meaning (unlike could, would
and sometimes might) would imply that the answer is ‘no’. However, as
Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 202) note, the possibility of a ‘yes’ answer is
suggested by examples such as (84) and (85) involving backshift (in the case of
(85) the resolving is located in past time by the semantics of recall), and (86) and
(87), where the modal occurs in the apodosis of an unreal conditional. The
present tense counterparts of these examples would feature shall in place of
should (for example “He is determined that as prime minister he shall have
greater control”):

(84) He was determined that as prime minister he should have greater control
over policy areas and that key policy initiatives were implemented by the
bureaucracy. (ICE-AUS W2A-012 34)
(85) I think I recall resolving with Zix that I should wear black tie, or rather,
the pink bow tie that she bought for me when we went to a ball in
Cambridge, plus the same dinner jacket & matching pants that I wore on
that occasion. (ICE-GB W1B-015 35)
(86) Had I spent it in some other hostelry, I should now be returning to Oxford
with a mind untroubled by any more disquieting burden than my
responsibilities as Tutor in Legal History at St George’s College. (ICE-
GB W2F-011 7)
(87) If he had been taught by vigilant professors as he says, the wanderings of
fancy would have been restrained, and I should have escaped the
temptations of idleness. (ICE-GB W1A-018 95)

In these examples should is substitutible by would (and in fact in (87) alternates

with would), and normally occurs with a 1st person subject (example (84), from
the Australian corpus, being exceptional in this regard). Of the three corpora
examined it is only ICE-GB (with 57 tokens: see Table 3.6 above) that has an
appreciable number of tokens instantiating this use of should. The relative
paucity of examples in ICE-AUS and C-US suggests that should has been almost
completely reanalyzed as a form lexically distinct from shall in AmE and AusE.
52 Chapter 3

One semantic development from the modally remote use of should is its
politely tentative, formulaic, use – restricted to 1st person subjects and again
substitutible by would – as exemplified in (88)–(90):
(88) Well I should think that it will be more than slightly and it will be less
than twenty or thirty years time (ICE-AUS S1B-024 29)
(89) Oysters I should imagine (ICE-GB S1A-009 296)
(90) I should like to help you as much as I can when you come, but
unfortunately our flat is too cramped to accommodate more than me and
Zix (ICE-GB W1B-015 12)

3.2.7 Should: regional and stylistic variation

The findings reported by Leech (2003), and Mair and Leech (2006), indicate that
should has undergone a mild decline in both British writing (11.8%) and
American writing (13.5%) in recent decades (see Table 1.4 above). According to
Leech (2003) this decline has occurred mainly at the expense of the epistemic
and ‘minor’ uses of should rather than its deontic meaning. In the present corpora
the frequency of the ‘minor’ uses (i.e. ‘subjunctive’ + ‘=would’ in Table 3.6) is
markedly smaller in C-US (56) and ICE-AUS (72) than in ICE-GB (161).
The frequency of should – like that of must – is substantially smaller in C-
US (850 tokens per million words) than it is in ICE-AUS (1141) and ICE-GB
(1124). Should is also distributionally similar to must in its greater degree of
representation, consistently across the corpora, in writing over speech (1.2:1).
This is no doubt one factor in the declining popularity of this modal.
Interestingly, deontic should shows a stronger tendency to be associated with the
written word (with a writing/speech ratio of 1.21:1) than does epistemic should
(1.06:1): see Table 2 (Appendix).

Table 3.7. Genre distribution of should

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Avg
Spoken Dialogue 1,208 (435) 1,111 (400)
Monologue 821 (197) 942 (226)
Total 1,053 (632) 1,043 (626) 764 (89) 953
Written Non-printed 1,300 (130) 1,060 (106)
Printed 1,263 (379) 1,307 (392)
Total 1,273 (509) 1,245 (498) 975 (78) 1,164
Total 1,141 1,124 850 (167) 1,038

3.3 Ought to

The marginal modal ought to is generally regarded in the literature as being

semantically close to, and often interchangeable with, the central modal should.
For example Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 186) claim that “In its most frequent
Necessity and obligation 53

use should expresses medium strength deontic or epistemic modality and is

generally interchangeable with ought (+ to)”. Coates (1983: 69) states that ought
to “has a Root and an Epistemic meaning, both of which are often synonymous
with those of SHOULD.” According to Palmer (1990: 122) “It is not at all clear
that (…) English makes any distinction between SHOULD and OUGHT TO.
They seem to be largely interchangeable”. Quirk et al. (1985: 227) refer to the
“synonymous use” of should and ought to in expressing ‘necessity’ and
‘obligation’. The alternation that is sometimes encountered between should and
ought to, as in (91), lends credibility to these claims.

(91) Presumably if we’re going to distribute the students in this way according
to pro pro rata according to the student uh distribution in the uh college
we ought to be doing the same thing within the faculty should we so a big
department has more representation than a small department (ICE-GB
S1B-075 82)

While ought to and should are very similar semantically, the two modals
are anything but similar in their frequency of use, with should over nineteen
times more frequent than ought to in the present study (2432:126). According to
Harris (1986) the low frequency of ought to in contemporary English is due to
the fact that, unlike have to and need to, it has failed to develop the syntactic
properties of a lexical verb (structures such as they didn’t ought to help him are
certainly attested in some dialects, but are not found in Standard English), while
at the same time its requirement of a to-infinitive has ensured its marginal status
as a modal auxiliary.

Table 3.8. Meanings of ought to

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Total %
Deontic 33 74 51 (10) 158 (117) 94.6%
Epistemic 1 4 0 (0) 5 (5) 3.0%
Indeterminate 2 2 0 (0) 4 (4) 2.4%
Total 36 80 51 (10) 167 (126) 100%

3.3.1 Deontic ought to

Like should, deontic ought to can never be as strong as must, but nevertheless
may convey a forceful representation of what the speaker regards as appropriate
or right, as in (92), where the speaker refers to his uncompromising position in
the matrix clause, and in (93), where it is the strongly prescriptive nature of
certain contracts that raises the ire of the speaker.

(92) it’s our belief as we’ve conveyed to the government that there is sufficient
constitutional power for the Federal Government to move to put in place
54 Chapter 3

ah greater protections um for people who ah are HIV affected and I’ve got
a very strong view that that ought to happen (ICE-AUS S1B-028 68)
(93) Uh and then having got that at the end of the day it’s got to be your
decision anyway because I won’t enter into a contract that says you ought
to go and do that (ICE-GB S1A-035 123)

At the weak end of the strength continuum for ought to, as for should, are
cases that merely suggest that something would be a good idea, as in:

(94) I’ve never done it before partly because all my friends thought it was a
stupid idea but following Bernadette’s experience of finding her father
and then him dying the following year I thought I ought to track mine
down. (ICE-GB W1B-003 116)

Like should, ought to is more commonly subjective than objective, but the
proportion of objective cases is higher with ought to. Subjective ought to is
exemplified in (95), where the speaker is giving advice authoritatively to the
addressee, objective ought to in (96), where generally accepted standards of
appropriate behaviour are being invoked.

(95) There were things he didn’t tell you and things he did tell you but I
suggest to you the things he didn’t tell you were stupid things and not
really things which you ought to use in your deliberations when you’re
considering his evidence (ICE-AUS S2A-063 124)
(96) Uhm B deals with failure to do what one ought to do anyway (ICE-GB
S2A-069 12)

It is probably the greater incidence of objective tokens with ought to that

has prompted claims (Aarts and Wekker 1987; Gailor 1983: 348) that ought to is
more often associated with the expression of duty than should (along with the
stronger dominance of deontic over epistemic meanings with ought to: see
below).
As with should there are no clear instances of dynamic modality: the
closest we get are deontic cases like (97) where what the speaker considers
appropriate is based more on expediency than on moral considerations.

(97) It was a bit too near in time to appreciate having it all set up as if they
were still around - dining table set for a banquet with very blue venetian
wine-glasses & plates which would not improve one's appetite; afternoon
tea tray ready in the drawing room (the only really elegant room) & all his
court robes & other uniforms standing about in a headless gathering. I
heard a lady say in a worried tone: “They ought to be behind glass or
they’ll rot.” (ICE-AUS W1B-009 10)
Necessity and obligation 55

Ought to may convey the same type of implication of non-actualization

with present and past time situations that is found with should. For example in
(97) above the implication is that the uniforms and other paraphernalia are not
behind glass, and in (98) below that the payment was not made:

(98) Your client has stated to various persons that the business has earned in
excess of $350,000.00 profit in the last year. As a 50% partner in the
business, one half of that profit ought to have been paid to our client and
disclosed in his taxation return. (ICE-AUS W1B-20 172)

The present corpus data provide some support for the suggestion of Close
(1981: 121) and Gailor (1983: 348-9) that ought to can indicate a lesser degree of
likelihood of actualization of the proposition than should.6 In (99), which carries
an implication that the obligation has not been fulfilled, and in (100) an
implication that it is not being fulfilled, should would not substitute readily for
ought to unless it were stressed:

(99) And they go public to to expatiate on what they think ought to happen and
what has happened (ICE-AUS AUS-S1B 76)
(100) and say something a a very short something I may say about teaching
itself uh what it is that teachers are or ought to be being taught to do or or
encouraged to become (ICE-GB S2A-021 8)

3.3.2 Epistemic ought to

With most epistemic tokens there is an additional deontic reading that lies in the
background. According to Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 187) this statistical fact
suggests the primacy of the deontic meaning with ought to (and should): “there
are many cases where the interpretation is purely deontic, but few where it is
purely epistemic”. Consider some examples:

(101) an alternative view which I happen to notice that Lor Lord Annan was uh
expressing the other day in the House of Lords and uh uh uh for what it’s
worth I happen to hold myself is uh as a country we we plainly are much
less well educated than we ought to be (ICE-GB S2A-021 29)
(102) As they glide past the sixty-year-old mark they’re as lively as we imagine
twenty-year-olds ought to be (ICE-GB S2A-040 38)

In (101) the epistemic meaning (“than it can safely be predicted that we are”) is
shadowed by a deontic component (“than we have a duty to be educated to that
level”), and likewise in (102) the epistemic meaning (“it is likely that twenty-
year-olds are”) is in the foreground and the deontic reading (“it is
fitting/appropriate/reasonable for them to be”) is in the background.
56 Chapter 3

3.3.3 Ought to and temporality

Ought to behaves like should with respect to temporality. Deontic ought to can
be associated with a simultaneous situation, as in (91) above, or a posterior
situation as in (92) above, and when it is used with perfective have the anteriority
is associated with the modality rather than with the proposition, as in (98) above
(= “one half of that profit was supposed to be paid to our client”). Epistemic
ought to is temporally unrestricted: (101) and (102) above exemplify
simultaneity, (103) below posteriority and (104) below (anteriority):

(103) And it’s that prospect of chaos in a nuclear world that ought to I believe
concentrate our minds (ICE-GB S2B-047 9)
(104) I was the bloke who ought to have been nervous. (ICE-AUS W2F-010 63)

3.3.4 Ought to and negation

Like should, ought to normally takes internal negation, though again there is no
clear distinction between internal and external negation. Thus in (105) the
speaker asserts the desirability of it not being forgotten, but could equally well be
construed as asserting the undesirability of it being forgotten:

(105) it ought not to be forgotten (ICE-GB S2A-019 103)

3.3.5 Ought to: regional and stylistic variation

Ought to is, according to Leech (2003), and Mair and Leech (2006), in severe
decline, with a frequency drop of 44.2% from LOB to FLOB, and of 30.0% from
Brown to Frown (see Table 1.4 above). Yet it may be premature to consider
ought to moribund, at least in all regional varieties. Despite its small numbers in
the present study, ought to was found to be considerably more robust in British
and American speech than writing (the speech/writing ratios for ICE-GB and C-
US respectively being 2.8:1 and 3.8:1). By contrast, the future appears to be
considerably bleaker for ought to in ICE-AUS. Not only are its numbers small
(36 tokens) but it is also strongly dispreferred in speech over writing (by a ratio
of 0.28:1). The frequency of ought to in dialogue bears this message even more
clearly: with 6 tokens per million words in ICE-AUS dialogue it is here is about
six times (6.3) less popular than it is in monologue and nearly ten times (9.7) less
popular than it is in writing.
Necessity and obligation 57

Table 3.9. Genre distribution of ought to

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Avg
Spoken Dialogue 6 (2) 136 (49)
Monologue 38 (9) 67 (16)
Total 18 (11) 108 (65) 69 (8) 65
Written Non-printed 40 (4) 80 (8)
Printed 70 (21) 23 (7)
Total 63 (25) 38 (15) 25 (2) 42
Total 36 80 51 (10) 56

3.4 Need

3.4.1 Meanings of need

The extremely small numbers for auxiliary need (56) contrast dramatically with
those for its quasi-modal counterpart need to (716), which is discussed in Section
3.7. Semantically, the auxiliary and quasi-modal are similar, covering the same
range of meanings (even though these are not represented in quite the same
proportions: see Table 3.10 and 3.16 below). As these tables show, dynamic
necessity is the main meaning, accounting for close to two-thirds of the tokens
for both need and need to. While epistemic necessity is a major meaning for the
auxiliary, it expresses deontic necessity less commonly than the quasi-modal.
Need and need to have received less attention in the literature than other
modal expressions of obligation and necessity, a situation plausibly attributed by
Nokkonen (2006) to their relative infrequency and to the challenge presented by
their semantics: “as obligation is prototypically felt to come from a source
external to the agent and these two markers have been assumed to express
internally motivated obligation” (2006: 35).

Table 3.10. Meanings of need

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Total %
Dynamic 12 21 10 (2) 43 (35) 63.2%
Deontic 2 3 5 (1) 10 (6) 14.7%
Epistemic 4 8 0 (0) 12 (12) 17.6%
Indeterminate 1 2 0 (0) 3 (3) 4.4%
Total 19 34 15 (3) 68 (56) 100%

Is there any semantic distinction between deontic need and need to? If we
confine ourselves to non-affirmative uses, a tendency emerges for auxiliary need
to to be subjective, as in (106) – by contrast with the typical objectivity of quasi-
modal need to (compare (174) in Section 3.7) – confirming Perkins’ (183: 63)
58 Chapter 3

suggestion of an analogy with the distinction between the auxiliary/quasi-modal

‘pair’ must/have to.

(106) I think if you look inside the magazine it’s Miss Kylie Minogue, uh you
you you you can see this on your, copy, needn’t turn it up now, there is a a
a sticker which uh draws particular attention to uh this uh uh article (ICE-
GB S2A-061 090)

That we dealing with tendencies, however, is evident from the occurrence of

examples of objective need as in (107) (compare the (rarer) subjective use of
deontic need to in (175) in Section 3.7).

(107) You need not notify DVLA yourself. (ICE-GB W2D-010 64)

Epistemic need expresses objective logical necessity, with the speaker

making a deduction from the available evidence, as in (108):

(108) And er just just because an accident has happened it doesn’t um mean
that the ah the person has driven without due care and attention and um
due care and attention then due care and attention need not amount to
negligence on the part of the defendant (ICE-AUS S2A-070 85)

Dynamic need expresses a need that is located in external circumstances,

as in (l09):

(109) The plate is held at the bottom by a plastic pin which need not be undone
as the plate can be flexed out of the way. (ICE-GB W2D-018 9)

Like must, have to, and have got to, deontic and dynamic need can refer to
a present requirement that is applied to the actualization of a future situation as in
(106), a present situation as in (107), or a past situation as in (192) in Section 3.7
below.
The same three possibilities are available for epistemic need: applied to a
future situation as in (110), a present situation as in (111), or a past situation as in
(112).

(110) Now it’s true that uh, the worst scenario uh need not necessarily come to
pass (ICE-GB S2A-066 48)
(111) That need not mean allied tanks and troops going all the way to Baghdad,
though if Saddam is determined to fight this war like his other hero, Adolf
Hitler, it could come to that. (ICE-GB W2E-002 44)
(112) Thus it would appear that acceptance of territory need not have implied
service. (ICE-GB W1A-003 27)
Necessity and obligation 59

Whereas with must negation is internal, with need it is external. Thus, in

(113) need not, like don’t have to in the preceding clause, is paraphraseable by
“it is not necessary for” (whereas it must not be in one lump sum would have
involved negation of the proposition: “it is necessary for it not to be”).

(113) Now let’s have the good news. You don’t have to plough in a lot of
money to make a big difference - and it need not be in one lump sum.
(ICE-AUS W2D-012 302)

3.4.2 Need: regional and stylistic variation

Table 3.11. Genre distribution of need

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Avg
Spoken Dialogue 0 (0) 11 (4)
Monologue 25 (6) 67 (16)
Total 10 (6) 33 (20) 0 (0) 14
Written Non-printed 20 (2) 20 (2)
Printed 37 (11) 40 (12)
Total 33 (13) 35 (14) 38 (3) 35
Total 19 34 15 (3) 23

According to Leech (2003), Smith (2003), and Mair and Leech (2006)
need has declined in both British and American writing (while by contrast need
to has increased massively: see Section 3.7.6 below). The frequencies for the
present study suggest that AmE is leading the way in the decline of need, which
is less than half as popular in C-US (15 tokens) as in ICE-GB (34), with ICE-
AUS in-between (19). A relevant factor in the dwindling fortunes of need is its
dispreference in speech as against writing (the ratio being 43:106, or 0.4:1)

3.5 Have to

The lexico-modal have to significantly outnumbers its closest semantic ‘rivals’

must (by a ratio of 2827:1367, or 2.0:1) and have got to (2827:705, or 4.0:1): see
Table 3.1. Deontic necessity is the main meaning with have to, as it is with must,
but more dominantly so for the former. However have to does not rival must in
the popularity of the epsitemic meaning, a situation that may well change as have
to becomes increasingly grammaticalized, with the likely consequence that its
epistemic meaning becomes more established via the process of subjectification.
60 Chapter 3

Table 3.12. Meanings of have to

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Total %
Deontic 998 902 1,099 (216) 2,999 (2,116) 76.1%
Dynamic 295 332 255 (50) 882 (677) 22.4%
Epistemic 5 2 20 (4) 27 (11) 0.7%
Indeterminate 13 8 10 (2) 31 (23) 0.8%
Total 1,311 1,244 1,385 (272) 3,940 (2,827) 100%

3.5.1 Deontic have to

Do deontic must and have to have the same or different senses? That there is
considerable overlap between these two items is suggested by examples where
they alternate, as in (114) and (115) (where, it may further be noted, the different
orderings undermine the possibility that a particular ordering may imply a
difference in strength between the ordered items):

(114) Would my right honourable friend not agree, that the mark of a single
currency is that all other currencies must be extinguished and not merely
extinguished but that the capacity of other institutions to issue currency
has to be extinguished and that in the case of the United Kingdom would
involve this Parliament binding its successors in a way which we have
hitherto regarded as unconstitutional (ICE-GB S1B-053 67)
(115) While a day visit for reference use will normally be granted immediately,
where a special admission ticket has to be made up, particularly for long
term use or borrowing, it may not be possible to issue it immediately, and
applicants must be prepared to accept a 24/48 hour delay, and may not be
able to borrow on their first visit. (ICE-GB W2D-006 136)

While such examples may suggest potential semantic equivalence between

deontic have to and must, there are nevertheless some differences that tend to
differentiate them. According to Westney (1995: 151) deontic have to focuses on
“an external, existent obligation that can be perceived or described independently
of the speaker”, whereas deontic must serves as a very general marker of
obligation with more specific senses such as urgency, irresistibility, and
unconditionality being attributable to pragmatic interpretation. Palmer (1990),
Coates (1983) and Perkins (1983) are all in agreement that have to contrasts with
must in that its distribution is skewed towards the objective (Palmer’s ‘external’)
end of the subjective/objective scale. In other words, deontic have to differs from
must in its preference for objective meaning, where the deontic source is external
to the speaker, as in (116), over subjective meaning, where the speaker is the
deontic source, as in (117).

(116) Yeah and if you’re a bit older I think and you have a a broader perspective
of things then when you have to do an assignment or a presentation your
Necessity and obligation 61

brain is that little bit broader and it makes it easier to do something

original and inventive just being older (ICE-AUS S1A-042 231)
(117) P.S. It’s your fault that I’m so homesick, if I hadn’t had such a good
holiday I would have been glad to get back to Uni PPS Since it’s your
fault, you have to fix it and that means lots of LETTERS and/or
PICTURES (as the case may be) xox (ICE-AUS W1B-015 97)

Admittedly the subjective/objective distinction cannot be consistently

applied to instances of deontic have to insofar as it is commonly used, as Leech
(1987: 79) observes, to express a general requirement or obligation without
specifying the deontic source. Nevertheless there were a sufficient number of
clear cases in the present study to confirm the skewed distribution noted above.
What implications might this skewing have for the strength of deontic have to? It
would appear to suggest that deontic must is stronger than have to, and this view
has certainly found support in the literature. For example Sweetser (1990: 540)
asserts that “Must has connotations of a directly applied and irresistible force,
while have to, ought and need are resistible forces …”. Alexander (1988: 228)
asserts that “must conveys more strongly than have to the idea of inescapable
obligation”. However there are some, including McCallum-Bayliss (1985), who
regard have to as stronger than must. Given such differences of opinion it would
seem that strength is a less useful concept for differentiating these items than
subjectivity/objectivity.
As with must, so with have to, the dimension of subjectivity/objectivity
shows correlations with the person of the subject. The strongest correlation is
between 3rd person subjects and objectivity, as in (118), where the deontic source
is a legal rule.

(118) Manson will have to wait five years for another hearing. (ICE-AUS S2B-
001 208)

Even here, however, examples are found where the speaker appears to be the
source of the requirement, but they tend to lack the strong sense of compulsion
often found with must, as in (119), where the hedge I think indicates pragmatic
weakening.

(119) He moved in with her but of course that wouldn’t do. It was just a
bachelor pad. Now she’s managed to sublet it and they’ve moved into a
bigger unit. I had dinner there last week. Alone. Martha isn’t into
doordarkening yet. We’re debating the issue. I think Martha has to
support me. (ICE-AUS W2F-020 59)

With 1st and 2nd person subjects objective modality again predominates,
but at the same time subjective modality is relatively more common than it is
with 3rd person subjects. Of the 1st person examples below, (120) and (121) are
objective (an external source being implied by the speaker’s expressed reluctance
62 Chapter 3

and by the interrogative mood respectively), while (122) and (123) may be
analyzed as subjective in the absence of an externally identifiable source. Notice
that the use of have to in (121) resembles that of must with verbs of
communication, and in fact have to could be substituted by must without any
appreciable shift of meaning.

(120) and uhm that’s the tradition which reluctantly I have to follow (ICE-GB
S1B-047 15)
(121) What exactly do I have to wear (ICE-GB S1B-079 89)
(122) Although I would love to I have to yes I have to confess an often irking
thought of am I really really two pounds less than Kate Hamilton (ICE-
GB S1A-011 224)
(123) I think we have to be careful with the fabric cos there’s so much of it
(ICE-GB S1A-086 204)

Examples (124)–(126) occur with a 2nd person subject. Whereas (124),

which occurs in a bureaucratic text and has non-specific you as subject, is
straightforwardly objective, in (125) the strong advice given to the addressee
emanates from the speaker. In (126) the deontic source is somewhat ambivalent:
the speaker is reporting a boating regulation while at the same time appearing to
personally endorse it.

(124) I got a a pocket guide to the law and it it explains how how to write your
will so and you have to be specific in in the way you write where what
goes like who you’re leaving what to (ICE-AUS S1A-055 346)
(125) You’ll have to see if dad’ll pick you up afterwards (ICE-AUS S1A-016
153)
(126) If you wanted to start on the opposite tack you wouldn’t ho have right of
way and if you’re in a close call situation a crossing situation you’d have
to give right of way to the other boats that’re on starboard (ICE-AUS
S2A-020 35)

3.5.2 Dynamic have to

Dynamic necessity is, as Tables 3.2 and 3.12 show, more commonly expressed
by have to (22.4%) than by must (6.3%). This meaning is exemplified in (127)–
(130), where no deontic source is identifiable, but rather the factors facilitating
the activity reside in the situation, as in (127) and (128), or in the subject
referent, as in (129) and (130).

(127) Trigger’s still at the lead of the sheep and in Australian conditions that
would be acceptable but in New Zealand conditions he has to drive (ICE-
AUS S2A-016 87)
(128) Four forty one point four six is the time Haley Lewis has to beat to break
her Commonwealth and Australia record (ICE-AUS S2B-016 43)
Necessity and obligation 63

(129) The same thing happens to those who are confined to wheelchairs, or who
have to spend long periods in bed (ICE-GB W2B-022 26)
(130) They have to keep eating however cnidarians to constantly replenish those
dinoflagellates in their tissues (ICE-AUS S2A-025 77)

3.5.3 Epistemic have to

The ascendancy of have to over must that is in evidence with root meanings does
not extend to epistemic necessity, with tokens of epistemic have to accounting
for less than 1% of all tokens (see Table 3.12).
Earlier studies of BrE regard epistemic have to as an innovation.
According to Hughes and Trudgill (1979: 23) it is used by younger speakers
inspired by AmE, and Coates (1983: 57) similarly associates it with the teenage
sub-culture. The present study indicates that while epistemic have to is more
common in AmE (with 20 tokens per million words in C-US: see Table 3.12) it
has become established in AusE and BrE as well. Examples from all three
dialects are given below:

(131) And so, the molecules are speeding up, they’re getting further and further
apart, and taking up more space inside the balloon, so the balloon goes
back to its former size and shape. So that has to be what’s happening to
the balloons, that are inside this container here. (C-US SBC 27 903-5)
(132) And it’s the nature of a new industry that if if it’s not been available in
this country before then you don’t have experience in it and we don’t we
don’t believe that ah it has to follow that the only people who are
qualified to begin a pay television service are those who’re already in
television for the last thirty years (ICE-AUS S1B-046 72)
(133) I mean another way of looking at that is that if you have a continuous
function when you apply it to an interval, it goes to an interval, and since
you can get things as big as you like, this thing has to be an interval.
(ICE-GB S1B-013 149)

One question to be considered is whether the tendency noted above for

deontic must to be subjective and have to objective, is also in evidence with
epistemic uses. Matthews (1991) presents this as a categorical difference,
claiming that:

… whereas must reflects the spontaneous performance of an

inference with respect to some new evidence, have to and have got to
are assertions of objectively or logically necessary inferences.
(Matthews 1991: 235)

The present data suggest that the situation is less clearcut than Matthews would
lead us to believe. Not only can epistemic must be objective (as noted in Section
3.1.2), but epistemic have to can be subjective. Compare the following:
64 Chapter 3

(134) And so, the molecules are speeding up, they’re getting further and further
apart, and taking up more space inside the balloon, so the balloon goes
back to its former size and shape. So that has to be what’s happening to
the balloons, that are inside this container here. (C-US SBC 27 903-5)
(135) It would be the largest released, the tallest bull at the Royal Easter Show
and this little chap has to be the smallest (ICE-AUS S2B-039117)

Example (134) is objective, paraphraseable as “this is the only possible

conclusion that can be drawn”, but (135) is subjective, representing a
presumption, or inference, made by the speaker.

3.5.4 Time reference of situation

Deontic must and have to tend to differ in that must is usually associated with
immediate posteriority as in (136), and have to with ‘habitual simultaneity’ as in
(137).

(136) There is a crisis and he must act now (ICE-GB S1B-056 89)
(137) I mean I do know that it does take up time and I do feel that I have to be
there for every activity that I set up and I think that’s probably right I
think (ICE-GB S1B-078 214)

These are merely tendencies. As (117) and (121) above show, have to can be
used with an immediately posterior situation and, despite Coates’s (1983: 54)
claim that must can never be associated with habitual present meaning, an
example such as (138) indicates that the present requirement expressed by must
can be applied to an indefinite number of occasions.

(138) Brake shoes must always be renewed in sets of four (ICE-GB W2D-018
67)

As with deontic must, so with present forms of have to, anteriority is

possible (a present requirement for the past fulfilment of an action) even though
this is not mentioned in the literature:

(139) And the thir And the third one which was a true exit you have to you ha
ha have to have gone with a band to get to it (ICE-GB S1A-073 48)

With epistemic have to, inferences can be readily made about a present
situation as in (135) above, or about a future situation. While there were no
corpus examples involving anteriority or posteriority, that these are merely
accidental gaps is suggested by the possibility of substituting have to for must in
examples such as (40) and (42) above.
With must, as we have seen, there are limited possibilities for the time of
the modality to be other than present. Have to by contrast has a preterite form
Necessity and obligation 65

had to, as in (140), where it is deontic, expressing a past requirement, and (141),
where it is dynamic, expressing a past circumstantial necessity.

(140) When the League of Good Men heard about the gatherings they went to
the kafeneio of Yiorgos the Apeface to put an end to all the mischief. But
when they got there they had to admit that there was no mischief, that
everyone was well behaved. (ICE-AUS W2F-018 22)
(141) And the fog the smog was so bad that we actually had to take the children
home from school. (ICE-AUS S1A-015 130)

Had to can also be used in backshift, as in:

(142) I was actually hoping to have ah one with familiarname1 as well but um
like as in the same type of lunch but ah this did not eventuate as
familiarname1 got an attack of calvinistic bad luck and decided he just
had to go and um assuage his guilty feelings (ICE-AUS S1A-099 7)

In such cases, according to Coates (1983: 57), “it seems likely that HAVE TO is
suppletive to MUST (…), functioning as Past for both MUST and HAVE TO”.
Suppletion is difficult to prove, however. It could perhaps be argued that when
had to is used in conventional formulae with verbs of communication as in (140)
(and when it expresses the dynamic ‘inner compulsion’ meaning as in (142)), that
this is more likely to be associated with must than have to in present time
contexts. Nevertheless present forms of have to are available for these uses and,
furthermore, must would itself be possible as an alternative to had to in the
indirect speech context in (142).
Deontic (and dynamic) had to can be associated with a situation that is
present (or, simultaneous) with respect to a past obligation as in (143), past as in
(144), or future as in (145):

(143) The Inuit dog was traditionally fed seal meat and had to fend for itself for
part of the year and so became a good hunter a trait that invariably causes
problems for the dog handlers in the Antarctic (ICE-AUS S2B-029 125)
(144) If the Court had held that it was an indemnity, the defendant would have
had to have paid the loss suffered. (ICE-AUS W1A-015 176)
(145) He had to be up at Asquith by six-thirty and do his little bit and then come
home again (ICE-AUS S1A-016 71)

Have to also differs from must in its capacity to express a future,

anticipated, obligation, in the case of (146) one that is associated with a
simultaneous situation, and in the case of (147) with a future situation.

(146) I think on your bike you’re going to have to wear one for a while, don’t
you (ICE-GB:S1A-022 285)
66 Chapter 3

(147) It’s not a good ball though and Van Den Howe will have to backtrack but
he keeps the ball in play for Tottenham (ICE-GB S2A-015 141)

Depraetere and Reed (2006) do not allow for the possibility of epistemic
modality located in the past or future:

Epistemic modality by definition entails the making of a judgement

about the likelihood that it is true that something is the case. This
means that the modality itself must be located at the time of the
judgement – either speech time or some implicitly or explicitly
evoked speech (or thought) time. (Depraetere and Reed 2006: 286)

However there are several examples in the corpora where had to does in fact
express a past epistemic judgement, as in (148).

(148) He had the worst job in the crew. Apart from being our navigator he also
became the easy target of thousands of mosquitoes. This had to be the
ultimate test for a can of Aerogard! (ICE-AUS W2F-010 58)

3.5.5 Have to and negation

Whereas, as we have seen in Section 3.1.5, when must is negated the negation
falls within the scope of the modal (e.g. He mustn’t go yet means “It is necessary
for him not to go yet”), with have to the negation is outside the scope of the
modal (He doesn’t have to go means “It is not necessary for him to”). Have to
takes external negation whether the meaning is deontic as in (149) (“It is not
required that you to tell me again”), dynamic as in (150) (“It is not necessary for
me to write much”), or epistemic (no corpus examples were found, but note that
(151) is logically equivalent to we believe that it doesn’t have to follow that …,
meaning “it is not necessarily the case that it follows”).

(149) You don’t have to tell me again (ICE-GB S1A-092 87)

(150) Maybe not, but it’s not far from it, as I’m really pissed off with writing
letters to everyone so usually send postcards instead so I don’t have to
write much! (ICE-GB W1B-002 5)
(151) And it’s the nature of a new industry that if if it’s not been available in
this country before then you don’t have experience in it and we don’t we
don’t believe that ah it has to follow that the only people who are
qualified to begin a pay television service are those who’re already in
television for the last thirty years (ICE-AUS S1B-046 72)

The effect of the scopal difference between must and have to with
negation is that the latter may serve as a suppletive for the former. Notice in
(151) that the contrast the writer desires is not one that could be achieved using
must not/mustn’t – hence the use of the lexico-modal:
Necessity and obligation 67

(152) A skilled word processor operator does not have to look at the screen
while typing, but what has been entered must be proof-read and this
requires concentration to ensure that it is done properly. (ICE-GB W2B-
033 63)

3.5.6 Have to: regional and stylistic variation

Table 3.13. Genre distribution of have to

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Total
Spoken Dialogue 1,828 (658) 1,578 (568)
Monologue 1,579 (379) 1,108 (266)
Total 1,728 (1037) 1,390 (834) 2,069 (241) 1,729
Written Non-printed 890 (89) 1,260 (126)
Printed 617 (185) 947 (284)
Total 685 (274) 1,025 (410) 388 (31) 699
Total 1,311 1,244 1,385 (272) 1,313

The decline of must discussed in Section 3.1.6 is matched by an increase in the

frequency of have to (of 9.0% in British writing and 1.1% in American writing:
see Table 1.4). There are several possible reasons for the differing fortunes of the
two items. Syntactically, have to surpasses must in flexibility, occurring in
contexts where the auxiliary would be ruled out on the grounds of its defective
morphology. Semantically, the more objective obligation that have to expresses
in its (dominant) deontic sense, it has been argued by Myhill (1995) and Smith
(2003), appeals to speakers seeking a more ‘democratic’, less authoritarian,
tenor. Stylistically, as we shall see, have to is more widely attested in speech.
In view of the diachronic findings it is not surprising that the popularity of
have to should outweigh that of must in the present study. A comparison of the
figures for the three regional varieties (see Table 3.13) shows have to following
the general trend for AmE to be leading the way in the decline of the modals and
the rise of the quasi-modals (see Section 1.4 above), with a must/have to ratio of
1:3.4 in C-US. In both respects, furthermore, BrE is the most conservative (1:1.8
in ICE-GB), with AusE (1:2.1 in ICE-AUS) occupying a position mid-way
between AmE and BrE.
An examination of the frequencies of must and have to across speech and
writing provides insights into their contrasting fortunes. Must is consistently
around 40% less popular in speech than writing, in all three dialects. By contrast
have to is approximately two and a half (2.47) times more popular in speech than
writing. Furthermore the ordering of the dialects in terms of the relative
popularity of have to in speech (C-US 5.3:1, ICE-AUS 2.5:1, ICE-GB 1.4:1)
matches the ordering as determined by the frequency of have to tokens.
The preference for occurrence in speech that we find with have to is even
stronger for deontic have to (2.83:1). Similarly the robustness of have to in
speech in AmE is even more evident with deontic have to (whose speech/writing
68 Chapter 3

ratio in C-US is 5.5:1). Finally, deontic have to reverses the order of preference
displayed by deontic must in the four genre subcategories: deontic have to is
preferred in dialogue over monologue by a ratio of 2,506:2,267, or 1.1:1, and in
non-printed over printed texts by a ratio of 1,410:1,043, or 1.4:1.

3.6 Have got to

Have got to occurs commonly in reduced form as gotta (gotta accounting for
67.8% of all tokens in the corpora). Further variant realizations are found, such
as ’re gotta in (153) (not surprisingly, in view of the grammaticalization that
have got to is undergoing: see Krug 1998).

(153) They’re a year old now exactly and they’re gotta be two years old before
they’re old enough to breed (ICE-AUS S1B-041 200)

Have got to and have to are often treated as variants in the literature but
they differ in a number of respects, which we mention briefly here but in some
cases develop in more detail below. Syntactically, as noted in Section 2.3.1
above, the semi-modal have got to differs from the lexico-modal have to in
exhibiting most of the formal properties of the modal auxiliaries: have got to
lacks non-tensed forms (compare *to have got to with to have to, *having got to
with having to), cannot cooccur with modals (compare *may have got to with
may have to), and exhibits the properties of an operator. Furthermore, whereas
the preterite form had to is common, had got to is unattested in the present data
(see Section 3.6.4 below). Dialectally, AmE display a marked dispreference for
have got to over have to in comparison to BrE and AmE (see Section 3.6.6
below). Stylistically, have got to is rare outside of conversation in the corpus (see
Section 3.6.6), and thus contrasts with the stylistic neutrality of have to.
Semantically, have got to contrasts with have to in its typical subjectivity and in
its typical incompatibility with habitual situations (see further Sections 3.6.1–
3.6.4 below).

Table 3.14. Meanings of have got to

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US TOTAL %
Deontic 278 279 153 (30) 710 (587) 84.1%
Dynamic 42 51 15 (3) 108 (96) 12.8%
Epistemic 8 2 5 (1) 15 (11) 1.8%
Indeterminate 4 7 0 (0) 11 (11) 1.3%
Total 332 339 173 (34) 844 (705) 100%
Necessity and obligation 69

3.6.1 Deontic have got to

Deontic have got to resembles must in its capacity to be used more often
subjectively, encoding a speaker-based statement of requirement, than
objectively, encoding an external, existent obligation that is independent of the
speaker. In this respect it differs from have to, which as we have noted is
predominantly objective. In the following examples objective have got to can
readily be substituted by have to, the consequence being more a matter of a shift
towards greater formality than any change of meaning:

(154) So I’ve been told I’ve got to do a a month o o a month of reading (ICE-
GB S1A-093 40)
(155) That’s the thing you’ve gotta you’ve gotta really say spelt haven’t you
(ICE-AUS S1B-020 196)

Predictably, however, subjective deontic have got to in the following

examples is more readily substitutible by must than it is by have to. In (156) the
obligation is self-imposed by the speaker, while (157) exemplifies the
‘performative’ use that is found with must but which Coates (1983: 53) wrongly
claims is never possible with have got to.

(156) It’s her birthday so I’ve got to try and find think about what to get her
(ICE-GB S1A-025 328)
(157) “Leigh, why? Why do you keep latching on to men like that? You’ve
gotta stop” (ICE-AUS W2F-017 39)

Have got to also has in common with must that it is often used in quasi-
formulaic locutions with verbs of communication where the speaker appears to
be the deontic source, as in:

(158) Right Yeah Well I mean Well OK I can understand that but um you’ve
gotta remember that um I mean this image of the of the rolling drunk you
know the drunken yobbo is I mean it’s an it’s an extreme (ICE-AUS S1A-
053 76)

As with must and have to, so with have got to, the tendency towards
deontic subjectivity is strongest with 2nd person subjects as in (157) and (158)
above, and weakest with 3rd person subjects as in (159), where the deontic source
that is explicitly invoked is the constitution.

(159) Remember we we’re we’re faced with a constitution that says that it’s got
to be um prevention and settlement of um industrial disputes extending
beyond the limits of one state so we’ve got to satisfy the requirement the
requirement of interstateness um (ICE-AUS S1B-010 221)
70 Chapter 3

With 1st person subjects the requirement is equally likely to be objective

or subjective. In (160) the deontic source is speaker-external, while in (161) it is
speaker-internal, with have got to expressing ‘self-compulsion’ or ‘self-
obligation’ (Leech 1987: 77):

(160) Yeah I’ve got to go to the dentist this afternoon (ICE-AUS S1A-024 61)
(161) David I’ve got to ask you this I mean with this is a brand new show for
yourself and obviously I wha the reports the reviews have been just
fantastic (ICE-AUS S1B-044 261)

According to Westney (1995: 127, 151) a further difference between have

got to and have to is that the former conveys a sense of immediacy or urgency.
However such a sense is elusive and seems not to be in evidence in an example
such as (162), where have got to and have to alternate, displaying not only
comparable modal strength but also a comparable degree of immediacy or
urgency.

(162) Oh I’ve got to I’ve got to ring up I have to find out ’cause they’re
supposed to call her back today from the interview that she went on
Monday (ICE-AUS S1A-013 137)

3.6.2 Dynamic have got to

Like deontic have got to, dynamic have got to can alternate freely with have to,
as in:

(163) and so the rest of the heat that’s got to get to back out into space to
balance this uh process uhm has to get away as heat energy (ICE-GB
S2A-043 97)

Dynamic have got to may be similar in meaning to need (to) in its capacity to
express some need that is intrinsic to the subject-referent as in (163), or it may, as
have to regularly does, express a need imposed by external circumstances as in
(164).

(164) I mean you you’ve got to have a big powerful machine to run it or plenty
of RAM (ICE-GB S1A-029 242)

3.6.3 Epistemic have got to

As Table 3.14 shows, epistemic necessity is a minor meaning for have got to, just
as it is for have to, and especially in BrE.7 Like must, epistemic have got to tends
to be subjective, as in:
Necessity and obligation 71

(165) Ah, he’s got to have some stashed away somewhere He’s gotta, with that
sort of empire he’s gotta have, name a figure, five ten twenty fifty million
dollars stashed away somewhere (ICE-AUS S1B-049 79)
(166) Loose shirts over jeans has got to be a sort of, temporary prejudice (ICE-
GB S1A-054 161)

Nowhere is this subjectivity more apparent than when have got to combines with
a progressive construction, often with an emotive overlay, as in (167). The
popularity of this combination is compatible with Melrose’s (1983) claim that
have got to is used for expressing affective, or emotionally-loaded, modality.

(167) Cass’s eyes go wide. “You’ve got to be kidding.” (ICE-AUS W2F-017 82)

3.6.4 Have got to and temporality

Temporally, have got to tends to be closer to must in its characteristic association

with immediate posteriority, as in the deontic example in (168), the dynamic in
(169) and the epistemic in (170), than it is to have to, which is more often
associated with ‘habitual simultaneity’.

(168) I’ve got to go and see to the dinner in a minute (ICE-GB S1A-007 219)
(169) They’ve got to average sixty-one point five for the last five laps to get
them near the qualifying time (ICE-GB S2A-007 66)
(170) Not much coming in. Something’s gotta give here sooner or later (ICE-
AUS S1A-014 90)

This is not to deny the possibility of have got to expressing habitual meaning,
despite the fact that Coates (1983: 54) disallows this. As with must, occasional
examples are found, as in (171):

(171) Oh they’re terrible. They’ve always got to know where you are. (ICE-
AUS S1A-093 88)

Present epistemic have got to can be used with a present situation as in

(165)–(167) above, or a future situation as in (170). While there were no
examples of anteriority, that this is an accidental gap is suggested by the
possibility of substituting have got to for must in (40) above.
Have got to is also like must, and different from have to, in having no
independent past use (had got to) in any meaning. A plausible suggestion for this
gap, with respect to epistemic have got to, is offered by Westney (1995: 148): “in
contrast to had to, it lacks any suggestion of actuality, and this would be
particularly odd for an epistemic use, which in past reference would naturally
suggest actuality”.
72 Chapter 3

3.6.5 Have got to and negation

Negation of have got to is rare in the corpus. As with have to, negation is
external, applying to the predication rather than the modality: the paraphrase “it
is not necessary for” is thus applicable to the following two examples.

(172) I just want somewhere where I haven’t got to worry about living, where
someone will look after me. (ICE-AUS W2F-011 75)
(173) That means we haven’t got to keep looking (ICE-AUS S1A-023 15)

3.6.6 Have got to: regional and stylistic variation

Table 3.15. Genre distribution of have got to

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Avg
Spoken Dialogue 739 (266) 789 (284)
Monologue 217 (52) 167 (40)
Total 530 (318) 540 (324) 266 (31) 445
Written Non-printed 10 (1) 80 (8)
Printed 43 (13) 23 (7)
Total 35 (14) 38 (15) 38 (3) 37
Total 332 339 173 (34) 281

As we have seen in Section 3.5, the overall frequency of have got to is one
quarter that of have to and one half that of must in contemporary English. For
this quasi-modal the diachronic profile that is offered in Table 1.4 is somewhat
unrevealing. It is based on written English and thus does not reflect the most
sweeping change that is under way; namely, as Krug (2000: 63), Smith (2003),
and Leech (2003) all note, a strong increase in informal spoken usage. As Table
3.15 indicates, in the present data have got to is overwhelmingly more common
in speech than it is in writing (by a ratio of 1,366:111, or 12.3:1), and
furthermore almost four times more common in dialogue than monologue in the
British and American corpora (1,500:381, or 3.93:1). It is highly likely that the
traditional stigma attached to got, especially in more formal styles, has had a role
to play in this generic imbalance.
Have got to bucks the trend found with most of the ‘major’ ascendant
quasi-modals (compare have to, be going to, want to) for AmE to be the most
innovative of the dialects and to have the highest frequency of tokens in the
present corpora. In fact C-US lags well behind the other two corpora, with only
about half as many tokens as each (C-US 173, ICE-AUS 332, and ICE-GB 339).
Necessity and obligation 73

3.7 Need to

As noted in Section 3.4.1 above, the numbers for quasi-modal need to (716) are
significantly larger than those for auxiliary need (56). Like its auxiliary
counterpart, need to expresses mainly dynamic necessity, but differs from it in
the relative proportions of deontic tokens (28.9% for need to and 14.7% for need)
and epistemic tokens (2.5% for need to and 17.6% for need).

Table 3.16. Meanings of need to

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Total %
Dynamic 217 158 305 (60) 680 (435) 62.0%
Deontic 99 96 122 (24) 317 (219) 28.9%
Epistemic 6 11 10 (2) 27 (19) 2.5%
Indeterminate 21 15 36 (7) 72 (43) 6.6%
Total 343 280 473 (93) 1,096 (716) 100%

3.7.1 Deontic need to

Consider the basic difference between must, have to and need to. In a sentence
with a 1st person subject as in I must/have to/need to get ready, must would tend
to suggest self-obligation arising from a personal sense of duty, have to an
obligation arising from a source external to the speaker, and need to a
compulsion arising from within the speaker. It is from this sense of internal
compulsion that the deontic meaning of need to derives. Statements pertaining to
an addressee’s needs come – via indirect illocutionary force – to serve the role of
recommendations or exhortations. As Smith (2003: 260) observes, need to “can
acquire the force of an imposed obligation, but – something which does not apply
to the other markers – the writer or speaker can claim than the required action is
merely being recommended for the doer’s own sake”.
In Section 3.4.1 above it was suggested that in non-assertive contexts
deontic need to tends to be objective, by contrast with the typical subjectivity of
deontic need. Of the following two examples, then, that with objective need to in
(174) is more typical than that with subjective need to in (175).

(174) If your contribution is £1.20 or more you do not need to fill in ST (V)
(ICE-GB W2D-001 84)
(175) You don’t need to bother (ICE-GB S1A-057 64)

Affirmative deontic need to is not, however, resistant to subjectivity.

What we find here is the same tendency for modal strength and
subjectivity/objectivity to correlate with the person of the subject, as we have
found with deontic must and have to. Strong subjectivity is most likely when
need to occurs with a 2nd person subject. In contexts where there is an apparent
authority structure the utterance will have the force of a directive, as in:
74 Chapter 3

(176) I think you need to focus now, on one aspect, whether it’s impacts
whether it’s just temperature whether it’s rainfall (ICE-GB S1B-007 216)
(177) And the rest of you need to gather around. One or two of you can lay on
the ground. (ICE-AUS S2A-060 50)

Slightly weaker are cases where the speaker is merely making a suggestion or
giving advice, as in:

(178) Maybe you need to try to do that through your GP locally (ICE-GB S1A-
062 117)
(179) then you need to have your teeth extremely thoroughly cleaned, as soon as
possible (ICE-GB S1A-087 197)

With 1st person singular I as subject, need to far more commonly

expresses dynamic than deontic modality. When deontic, it may be objective as
in (180), where compliance with legal regulations is at issue, or subjective as in
(181), where it serves as an indirect directive.

(180) On 17 Nov I rang to ask progress and was informed by Mr Bromet that he
was preparing his report for Head Office. I asked how long it would take
to get a decision and he said it could take a year but, in any case, it would
not help me as I needed to take my own legal action. (ICE-AUS W1B-023
83)
(181) I need to know exactly where the car is going to be (ICE-GB S1B-080 71)

Instances of need to in the self-hortatory use that is found with deontic must as in
(14) above are rare. An example is (182):

(182) And worse now it appears that territorial gains made by the Serbians in
particular and to some extent I need to say the Croatians through a
through aggression will actually now be legitimized (ICE-AUS S1B-051
103)

Deontic need to can be used with 1st person plural we to convey a speaker-
derived directive as in (183) and as a rhetorical marker as in (184):

(183) I think this is the first action that needs to be taken and we need to take it
very soon (ICE-GB S2A-031 43)
(184) And what we need to recognise is that in the in um covering some of the
options there are degrees of formality (ICE-AUS S1B-011 7)

With 3rd person subjects deontic need to is typically objective as in (185),

where the deontic source is an institutional requirement:
Necessity and obligation 75

(185) Could you also inform me whether individual members receive the
journal or whether they need to be journal subscribers as well. (ICE-GB
W1B-028 148)

3.7.2 Epistemic need to

Clear examples of epistemic need to, as in (186), are rare, and like epistemic
need express objective logical necessity:

(186) Of course the chaos when the Supreme Being was discovered tied up and
concussed on the floor would be indescribable, but surely they would
need to be more than just lucky to win much more time out of mere
chaos? (ICE-GB W2F-015 69)

3.7.3 Dynamic need to

Dynamic need to, but not need, may express a need that is intrinsic to the subject-
referent, an ‘internal compulsion’ (Nokkonen 2006: 62), as in (187) and (188), or
one that is located in external circumstances, as in (189):

(187) They need to sort of let their hair down (ICE-GB S1A-048 138)
(188) So where we may need to have three or four meals a day the ah the
crocodiles only need to eat once or twice a week or a month um or even
go much longer than that without eating (ICE-AUS S2A-057 20)
(189) occasionally you need to crown a tooth which is perfectly, you know
perfectly sound from the <unclear word> aspect and there’s no reason for
an x-ray but, they just insist on having one (ICE-GB S1A-088 12)

3.7.4 Need to and temporality

Like must, have to, and have got to, deontic and dynamic need to can refer to a
present requirement that is applied to the actualization of a future situation as in
(176–179) above, a present situation as in (174), (185) and (187–189) above, or a
past situation as in (190) below:

(190) Non-contributory means that you don’t need to have paid National
Insurance contributions to qualify. (ICE-GB W2D-005 3)

When the modality is in the past there is a contrast between need to,
whose preterite is formed inflectionally, as in (191), and need, which has no
preterite but can express a past necessity in construction with perfect have, as in
(192) below. The meanings here are not identical, differing in their actualization
implicatures. In (192) we understand that the situation, of ‘worrying’, was
76 Chapter 3

actualized, but there is no such implicature in (191), as evidenced by the

possibility of a continuation such as and so she didn’t.

(191) I had taught myself strength as another man might have taught himself
ballroom-dancing, had learned strength as a way of dealing with my
weakness. But Lilian seemed to have been born with unbreakable will: it
was not something she needed to learn. (ICE-AUS W2F-012 51)
(192) However, she need not have worried. I was just a normal schoolboy with
normal schoolboy habits and a propensity for mishap, as evidenced by the
day I came a cropper in tar at Mentone. (ICE-AUS W2F-013 42)

A further temporal possibility available to need to, but not need, is the
expression of a future necessity, as in:

(193) We may need to see him. We -- we w- will need to see him again. (C-US
SBC 18 82-4)

3.7.5 Need to and negation

Need to, like need, takes external negation. Thus, in (194) do not need to is
paraphraseable as “it is not necessary for”:

(194) You do not need to show your Registration Document when relicensing
with a reminder form. (ICE-GB W2D-010 111)

3.7.6 Need to: regional and stylistic variation

According to Leech (2003), Smith (2003), and Mair and Leech (2006) while
need has declined sharply in both British and American writing, need to has
enjoyoyed a spectacular increase (of 249.1% in British writing and 123.2% in
American writing: see Table 1.4 above). According to Smith (2003), the rise of
the quasi-modal has been more pronounced in assertive than non-assertive
contexts (where it might be argued that it is entering into competition with must
and have to).
There are several possible reasons for the contrasting diachronic fortunes
of the two items. One is the greater syntactic flexibility of need to, which is not
like auxiliary need restricted to non-affirmative contexts and lacking in preterite
and non-tensed forms. Another reason may be that the trend towards increasing
informality in English, especially in public modes of discourse (Fairclough 1992)
favours the quasi-modal. Whereas need is, as noted in Section 3.4.2, strongly
disfavoured in speech over writing, need to is preferred in speech (with a
speech/writing a ratio of 1310:786, or 1.66:1. Furthermore need to is more
common – albeit marginally – in dialogue than in monologue in ICE-AUS and
ICE-GB, by a ratio of 662:608, or 1.08:1 (see Appendix Table 7).
Necessity and obligation 77

The frequencies for the present study suggest that AmE is leading the way
in the rise of need to, as it is in the decline of need. Need to is almost twice as
popular in C-US (473 tokens per million words) as in ICE-GB (280), with ICE-
AUS in-between (343).

Table 3.17. Genre distribution of need to

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Avg
Spoken Dialogue (107) (131)
Monologue (101) (45)
Total 347 (208) 293 (176) 670 (78) 437
Written Non-printed 320 (32) 240 (24)
Printed 343 (103) 267 (80)
Total 338 (135) 260 (104) 188 (15) 262
Total 343 280 473 (93) 365

3.8 Had better

With its modest frequency (89 tokens in the present corpora, and its numbers
reportedly declining (Mair and Leech 2006: 328) semi-modal had better is a
minor item. As Mitchell (2003) points out, had better has in common with the
modal idioms may/might as well that their etymological background involves the
notion of comparison, and that as a result of grammaticalization and semantic
bleaching this notion has been attenuated. The extent of grammaticalization of
had better is evident in the proportion of instances where the auxiliary had is
dropped (20.2%), as in the second two instances in (195):

(195) ‘No, I’d better talk to her.’ Better face the bloody music, whatever it is,
she thought, but when she picked up the phone, her hand was shaking.
‘Listen, bitch,’ hissed the thin, hoarse voice, ‘y’ better get round ’ere
quick an’ bail out y’ precious boyfriend.’ (ICE-AUS W2F-004 127)

3.8.1 Meanings of had better

In Section 2.3.3.1 above we noted, and rejected, Mitchell’s (2003: 145) claim
that the quasi-modal had better has developed an epistemic sense. As a
consequence had better is here regarded as essentially monosemous, a deontic
expression (so the title of this subsection is admittedly slightly misleading).
It is via semantic bleaching that had better earns its place in the modal
system. It is typically used with mitigated directive force representing a type of
subjective deontic modality, with a meaning best described as ‘advisability’ (q.v.
Jacobsson 1980: 52). There was only one example of had better in the corpora
where its literally comparative sense is still salient (as reinforced by the
following comparative clause):
78 Chapter 3

(196) Actually today I’m nursing a very bad hangover so I decided I had better
stay at home rather than throw up on the Metro! (ICE-GB W1B-009 33)

A number of writers have suggested that the advice or warning that is

conveyed by had better is often accompanied by an implication that the speaker
has good grounds for the directive, insofar as a less desirable alternative is
understood to exist. For example Palmer (1990: 82) suggests that had better
implies an “or else” consequence as part of its basic meaning, claiming that the
speaker “is fairly firm about his advice with the implication that unpleasant
consequences may follow if it is not taken”. Similarly Perkins (1983: 64)
suggests that non-fulfilment “entails adverse consequences” and Edmonson et al.
(1977: 297) claim that the basic meaning of had better involves a threat for the
subject. This implication is in fact quite rare (accounting for only 4.5%, of tokens
in the corpora). (196) above is an example, and others are provided below. In
(197) the speaker reports the advice that she has been given to start a family on
the grounds that she is approaching the age when it may be difficult to do so. In
(198) the undesirable alternative, that “no one’ll believe her unless she’s taken a
photograph of the three sisters” is stated explicitly.

(197) My main thing ’cos we want to start a family and I know I’m I’m no
spring chicken any more and everyone keeps saying hey you’d better get
on with it you know (ICE-AUS S1A-046 231)
(198) Um well I thought we’d better go and do the touristy bit because no one’ll
believe her unless she’s taken a photograph of the three sisters (ICE-AUS
S1A-057 320)

In the majority of cases, however, there is little justification for invoking the
notion of an adverse consequence. In (199) had better merely conveys a deontic
sense that is similar to that of should (which could be readily substituted for it).
Notice that had better is harmonic, as is should, with perhaps.

(199) B: Perhaps I’d better give her a ring

A: Perhaps you’d better Yeah That’s probably a really good idea (ICE-
AUS S1A-075 120, 121)

Like should, had better typically has medium strength, as in (199), where
it would be possible for the advice to be politely declined. However it may be
pragmatically strengthened, as in (200), in which a forceful imperative is
reported, reinforced by the swear word bloody. Here the strength of had better is
stronger than that of should, approaching that of performative must, which it
resembles in not countenancing non-actualization (neither You must turn the tape
around nor You’d better turn the tape around could felicitously be followed by
but I don’t suppose you will, unlike You should turn the tape around).

(200) I said better turn the bloody tape round (ICE-AUS S1A-020 194)
Necessity and obligation 79

Perkins (1983: 63) wrongly claims that had better is objective: “it is
objective in that the deontic source is not (directly) identifiable as the speaker”.
In fact, as Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 196) observe, it is “generally
subjective, giving the speaker’s judgement as to the best course of action”.
Quantitative support for this claim comes from the high proportion of instances
(61.8%) with a 2nd person subject, which we have seen with other modals to
correlate strongly with subjectivity, and a 1st person subject (34.8%). Only 3.4%
of tokens have a 3rd person subject.
Had better is consistently used in the data with reference to specific future
events, as reinforced by the temporal adjunct right now in (201), and appears
incapable of being used with the general present reference that is common with
should.8 Notice that had better could not be felicitously substituted for should in
(202):

(201) In that case you’d better switch off right now (ICE-AUS S1B-030146)
(202) You should always look carefully at your map afterwards so you can see
what’s what’s around that area (ICE-AUS S1A-056 292)

Finally, had better normally takes internal negation, whether the negative
follows better, as in (203), or whether it is it precedes it (as in You hadn’t better
let Jo get hold of this – there were no corpus examples of the latter), both more
plausibly paraphraseable as “it’s advisable that you do not let Jo get hold of this”
than “it’s not advisable that you let Jo get hold of this”.

(203) You’d better not let Jo get hold of this (ICE-GB S1A-030 282)

3.8.2 Had better: regional and stylistic variation

As Table 3.18 shows, the numbers for had better are healthiest in ICE-AUS,
perhaps a reflection of its relatively greater vitality in speech (with a
speech/writing ratio of 2.4:1, as against 1.1:1 in C-US and 1.0:1 in ICE-GB). The
much higher frequency of this quasi-modal in dialogue as against monologue
(4.3:1) and in non-printed as against printed texts (3.0:1) is predictable from the
dominance of its subjective deontic meaning.

Table 3.18. Genre distribution of had better

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Avg
Spoken Dialogue 89 (32) 53 (19)
Monologue 29 (7) 4 (1)
Total 56 (39) 33 (20) 43 (5) 47
Written Non-printed 10 (1) 100 (10)
Printed 27 (8) 10 (3)
Total 23 (9) 33 (13) 38 (3) 31
Total 48 33 41 (8) 40
80 Chapter 3

3.9 Be supposed to

Be supposed to is a medium strength lexico-modal with semantic affinities to

should and ought to. Mair and Leech’s (2006: 328) figures show it to be on the
rise, especially in British writing: see Table 1.4 above. It may well be that its
increasing numbers are occurring at the expense of ought to, with which it is
most similar.

3.9.1 Meanings of be supposed to

Table 3.19. Meanings of be supposed to

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Total %
Deontic 26 46 66 (13) 138 (85) 50.5%
Epistemic 18 44 51 (10) 113 (72) 41.4%
Dynamic 2 6 5 (1) 13 (9) 4.8%
Indeterminate 1 3 5 (1) 9 (5) 3.3%
Total 47 99 127 (25) 273 (171) 100%

Whereas the typical pattern with modal expressions, certainly for the modal
auxiliaries, is for epistemic senses to derive from historically prior deontic ones,
with this lexico-modal it is the epistemic meaning that is prior. As Table 3.19
indicates, be supposed to expresses predominantly deontic and epistemic
modality, and very occasionally dynamic, these meanings being illustrated
respectively in (204) (“I’m obliged to”), (205) (“he’s thought/alleged to be”), and
(206) (“what is determined by circumstances/nature”).

(204) But you were saying I’m supposed to be encouraging you (ICE-GB S1A-
075 11)
(205) That boy, he’s supposed to be awesome. (C-US SBC 02 27-29)
(206) When they usually run, and, fish weren’t running this year, you know, it’s
like everywhere. Nothing’s doing what it’s supposed to, anymore,
anywhere. (C-US SBC 04 480-2)

The senses are not sharply distinct, and pose challenges to analysis. In (207), for
example, an epistemic reading (“it is supposedly/it is thought that it is”), and a
deontic reading (“it is under an obligation to be”) are both possible, though
arguably the former is the more salient. Similarly possible, in (208), are both the
epistemic sense of something that is alleged or assumed to be the case and the
deontic sense of something that is appropriate or required by custom.
Necessity and obligation 81

(207) Although the monarchy is supposed to be part and parcel of British life
people of all sorts can envisage Britain without a monarchy (ICE-GB
S2B-032 19)
(208) Yeah and so strange the things that people (unclear word) about religion
(unclear words) for something that’s supposed to make you behave well to
the people around you treat them with respect and dignity and caring and
kindness (ICE-GB S1A-084 191)

While be supposed to is similar to both should and ought to in strength, its

objectivity gives it a closer affinity with ought to than with the typically
subjective should. Be supposed to is consistently objective, with the expectation
or requirement arising from a source external to the speaker. Despite Edmonson
et al.’s (1977: 289-90) claim that it is possible for deontic be supposed to to be
subjective, there are no clear examples in the corpora (not surprisingly perhaps,
since, as Westney 1995: 178 notes, these might be construed as “conversationally
misleading”).
Be supposed to also resembles ought to in its conversationally-derived
implication of non-fulfilment, an implication which is clear in epistemic cases
with a past predication as in (209) and deontic cases with the modality in the past
as in (210):

(209) He’s the guy who is supposed to have left (ICE-GB S1A-008 266)
(210) The idea was you know we were supposed to do all these graphs and stuff
(ICE-GB S1A-008 52)

The temporal flexibility of be supposed to suggests that it may operate as

a suppletive to medium strength modals like should and ought to. Both the
modality and the proposition can be associated with a variety of temporal
domains. With epistemic be supposed to both the modality and proposition can
be present or past, but not future. In (205) above both the modality and the
proposition are present, while in (209) the modality is present and the proposition
past. In (211) the modality is past and the proposition present, and in (212) both
are past:

(211) Shem was the uhm (unclear word) Semitic and Ham was supposed to be
the descendant of Africans and Japeth’s the European (ICE-GB S1A-053
241)
(212) I mean, this destruction was supposed to have occurred in the eighteen
eighties (ICE-AUS S2A-035 180)

With deontic be supposed to the modality can be present or past, the

proposition, present, past or future. For example in (204) above and (213) below
both are present, while in (210) the modality is past and the proposition future
(with respect to the modality). In (214) the modality is past and the proposition
present. In (215), even though the perfect is associated syntactically with the
82 Chapter 3

complement of supposed, it applies semantically to the modality (“my results

were required (PAST) to come out today (FUTURE)”). With deontic be
supposed to the two syntactic options are available, but the perfect option is the
only one available for deontic should and ought to (my results should/ought to
have come out today).

(213) I’m afraid I think the I think I think the uhm that chicken is supposed to
be a bit juicier (ICE-GB S1A-022 76)
(214) The photographs came to life as she talked. (This was called a voice-
over.) They were supposed to have all the gloss and the false authority of
a soft drink commercial. (ICE-AUS W2F-020 11)
(215) And apart from that I mean my results are supposed to have come out
today (ICE-GB S1A-093 237)

Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 187) observe that should and ought to
normally take internal negation, and claim that there are no “equivalent items
taking external negation” (which they attribute to the lack of a clear pragmatic
difference between external and internal negation with medium strength
modality). Arguably, however, be supposed to fills the gap in the paradigm,
Consider:

(216) But I’m not supposed to be saying anything (ICE-GB S1A-017 337)
(217) The thing is you’re not supposed to do it without your teacher (ICE-GB
S1A-045 56)

It is certainly possible to construe (216) and (217) as having internal negation

like should and ought to (“expected/obliged not to”). However examples of this
type are often felt to express more than medium strength modality. The basis for
this is probably that they may alternatively be regarded as having a
conventionally established interpretation involving negative raising and external
negation (q.v. Westney 1995: 180).

3.9.2 Be supposed to: regional and stylistic variation

Table 3.20. Genre distribution of be supposed to

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Avg
Spoken Dialogue 92 (33) 200 (72)
Monologue 21 (5) 42 (10)
Total 63 (38) 137 (82) 146 (17) 115
Written Non-printed 30 (3) 50 (5)
Printed 20 (6) 40 (12)
Total 23 (9) 43 (17) 100 (8) 55
Total 47 99 127 (25) 91
Necessity and obligation 83

As Mair and Leech’s (2006) figures in Table 1.4 indicate, be supposed to has
undergone a marked increase in recent British writing (113.6%), and a mild
increase (6.3%) in recent American writing. Be supposed to is marginally more
frequent in C-US than in ICE-GB (and quite unpopular in ICE-AUS), but at the
same time relatively more robust in spoken BrE than spoken AmE (with a
speech/writing ratio in ICE-GB of 137:43, or 3.18:1, as against 146:100, or
1.46:1, in C-US). Given the semantic similarities between be supposed to and
ought to, it may be conjectured that the increasing numbers of the lexico-modal
are occurring at the expense of the marginal modal.

3.10 Be to

Be to is a semantically strong semi-modal, like be bound to. In addition to its

deontic, epistemic and deontic meanings it has special uses in the protasis of
conditional constructions. It is on the grounds of its deontic meaning that be to is
included in the present chapter, rather than in Chapter 4 on the basis of its can-
like dynamic meaning, or Chapter 5 on the basis of its will-like temporal
meaning.

Table 3.21. Meanings/uses of be to

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Total %
Deontic 46 26 31 (6) 103 (78) 23.8%
Epistemic 39 86 15 (3) 140 (128) 32.4%
Dynamic 5 18 5 (1) 28 (24) 6.5%
Conditional 40 79 20 (4) 139 (123) 32.2%
Indeterminate 5 12 5 (1) 22 (18) 5.1%
Total 135 221 76 (15) 432 (371) 100%

3.10.1 Meanings of be to

Be to expresses strong deontic necessity. It can be strongly subjective,

comparable to deontic must, as in (218), which reports an aggressive command:

(218) and afterward he had kicked her out of his car, telling her she was ugly,
and that he had never loved her, and that she was to remember his name,
because he was a man who was going places. (SBC Frown P04 145)

More commonly however it is objective, as in (219) and (220), where it is

semantically close to objective have to (with which it alternates in (219)), and in
(221), where the deontic source is an institutional regulation and be to is close to
deontic shall.
84 Chapter 3

(219) Liz and John had to get dressed and Liz was to ring the house we were
going to. John had to get the truck ready. I was to finish shutting my
cases, then wake Stuart up. (ICE-AUS W2B-004 16)
(220) We note that you are to discuss your overall condition with him upon
your next attendance. (ICE-AUS W1B-023 65)
(221) (6) The Council may appoint any other person who is neither a student nor
a member of staff of the University to be a member of the Council and the
person, on being appointed, is to be taken to be an appointed member of
the Council in addition to the members appointed under subsection(4).
(ICE-AUS W2D-005 186)

With strong deontic be to negation is internal, as in (222) (“it is stipulated

that they not be consulted”):

(222) and the peoples of Europe are not to be formally consulted at any point,
by referendum or otherwise. (ICE-GB W2E-001 29)

When deontic be to takes a passive complement as in (223), or an active

complement with a passive interpretation as in (224), its strength may be less,
comparable to that of deontic should.

(223) And I think the strength of the police authorities is something which is to
be applauded (ICE-GB S1B-033 23)
(224) Federal Environment Minister Ros Kelly says the public is not always to
blame for the country’s water problems (ICE-AUS S2B-004 248)

Even weaker in strength is the use of be to to express dynamic

(theoretical) possibility with passive complements. In (225), (226) and (227) be
to is similar in meaning and strength to dynamic can, with which it alternates in
(227).

(225) This is the dying society of “The Dead”. One of non-questioning being
replaced by another intellectual one. The evidence is to be found at
several points through the story. (ICE-AUS W1A-013 113)
(226) If there is no abrupt change, but rather a gradual transformation, in uncial
letter forms, it is perhaps in the use of uncial that a break or change is to
be observed. (ICE-GB w2A-008 031)
(227) Therefore an unconformity is to be found in the bottom of a rock unit and
can be identified by the varying dip or erosive nature between the two
beds. (ICEGB W1A-020 091)

Whereas, as we have seen, deontic be to takes internal negation, dynamic be to

takes external negation (is not to be found = “it is not possible for it to be found”:
there were no corpus examples).
Necessity and obligation 85

Be to has some further uses which are more temporal than modal. It may
refer to an event that is planned or scheduled, whether the plan/schedule is in the
present as in (228), or in the past as in (229).

(228) And fines are to be related for the first time to the offender’s income, so
that the jails will be less crowded with those who will not pay because
they cannot. (ICE-GB W2C-007 53)
(229) It appears that the network manager, which was to be sited in the Box
Office itself will now be in the general office along with the third
terminal. (ICE-GB W1B-021 48)

Here the clause containing be to does not indicate whether or not the situation
was actualized (although non-actualization can be implicated contextually as in
(229) above, or by means of the perfect aspect as in (230).

(230) The cost of the project was to have been about £9,000m, with much of the
money coming from the private sector. (ICE-GB W2E-008 046)

Actualization is, however, entailed in the “future in the past” use (Palmer 1990:
165, Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 206) referring to an event that was known to
occur subsequent to other events in the past. In this use, exemplified in (231) and
(232), be to is equivalent to would.

(231) By the time Samuel Stead came to Sydney, gold had paved the way for a
boom in the Australian economy that was to last for thirty years. (ICE-
AUS W2B-003 20)
(232) Sweetheart was then quite a local identity, although she was to be caught
by the rangers a few months later and moved to a reserve (ICE-AUS
W2F-010 51)

Finally, be to has some special uses in conditionals. In the protasis of an

open conditional, as in (233), it may carry a sense of purpose, while in the
protasis of a remote conditional, as in (234), it simply reinforces the remoteness
of the condition (compare if Done’s work broke the mould of its commercial
reputation).

(233) Here the Government has recognised that schoolteachers will have to
educate children about the environment if future generations are to solve
global problems (ICE-GB S2B-022 82 2)
(234) Still, Capon does indicate that if Done’s work was to break the mould of
its commercial reputation, he may be exhibited by leading galleries. (ICE-
AUS W2B-010 160)

Opinions differ as to whether the futurity or deontic use of be to is the

more basic. According to Quirk et al. (1985: 143) be to is to be regarded as
86 Chapter 3

“expressing futurity, with varied connotations of ‘compulsion’, ‘plan’, ‘destiny’,

etc, according to context”. By contrast, according to Perkins (1983: 69) is to
indicates that circumstances which involve “some conscious organization” are
disposed towards the occurrence of an event. In this account the futurity use is an
incidental consequence of the fact that determined actions necessarily take place
in subsequent time.

3.10.2 Be to: regional and stylistic variation

Table 3.22. Genre distribution of be to

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Avg
Spoken Dialogue 33 (12) 94 (34)
Monologue 83 (20) 271 (65)
Total 53 (32) 165 (99) 52 (6) 90
Written Non-printed 250 (25) 180 (18)
Printed 260 (78) 347 (104)
Total 258 (103) 305 (122) 113 (9) 225
Total 135 221 76 (15) 144

According to Mair and Leech (2006: 328) be to is in decline in both written BrE
and written AmE, and especially the latter, where it is both less frequent, and
declining more rapidly. In the present study the difference between the two
Englishes is even more marked, with almost three times as many tokens in ICE-
GB as in C-US (221:76, or 2.90:1). The relative unpopularity of this item in
speech is most likely a factor in its declining fortunes (the ratio of tokens in
speech/writing being 270:590, or 1:2.18). One reflection of the greater vitality of
be to in BrE is the comparatively milder dispreference for this expression in
speech in that dialect (the speech/writing ratio in ICE-GB being 165:305, or
1:1.84, as against 52:113, or 1:2.17, in C-US). The relative dispreference for be
to in speech is even greater with Australian speakers, with tokens in speech
outstripped by those in writing by a ratio of 53:258, or 1:4.86.

3.11 Be bound to

The lexico-modal be bound to is a very minor item in frequency terms, but

included in the study on semantic grounds: it expresses strong deontic and
epistemic necessity and is sometimes claimed to be a suppletive for must.
Necessity and obligation 87

Table 3.23. Meanings of be bound to

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Total %
Deontic 2 4 0 (0) 6 (6) 19.4%
Epistemic 7 12 5 (1) 24 (20) 77.4%
Indeterminate 0 1 0 (0) 1 (1) 3.2%
Total 9 17 5 (1) 31 (27) 100%

3.11.1 Meanings of be bound to

Like must, have to, have got to, need and need to, the lexico-modal be bound to
expresses strong modality. It is used both deontically and epistemically, though
the latter is considerably more common (see Table 3.23 above). Deontic be
bound to, which conveys a strong objective obligation, is exemplified in (235)
and (236):

(235) I’m bound to say there are a whole series of things that one has to consider
when one’s examining matters to do with the leadership of the
Conservative party (ICE-GB S1B-043 008)
(236) In my submission Your Worship you’re bound to act on uncontradicted
evidence if that evidence is credible (ICE-AUS S2A-068 104)

According to Palmer (1990: 55-56) epistemic be bound to operates as a

kind of suppletive for must when future time reference is involved. It is true that
substitution of must for ’s bound to in (237) would result in unacceptability.

(237) For for the shoppers so that there you know there may not be as many
spaces there but if he’s going at half past six he’s bound to get one (ICE-
AUS S1A-068 38)

However the notion that be bound to is a suppletive item is problematical. As

Coates (1983: 42-43) has noted, not only is be bound to rare, but also epistemic
must can at times be used with reference to a future situation (as we have seen in
Section 3.1.4 above). Furthermore, be bound to can be used with a present
situation, as Palmer himself (1990: 55) observes, and as the habitual present
example in (238) confirms, as well as a past situation as in (239).

(238) You’re bound to make mistakes early on and the instructor is there to help
you put them right (ICE-GB S2A-054 102)
(239) She’s bound to have lost it (ICE-GB S1A-093 230)

Epistemic be bound to is similar to must in expressing strong modality,

but whereas epistemic must has a sense of conclusion (suggesting the likelihood
that the speaker is drawing the most obvious conclusion), epistemic be bound to
carries a sense of inevitability (as reflected in the fact that epistemic will could
88 Chapter 3

readily serve as a substitute in (238) and (239), whereas must would be

impossible in (238) and would express conclusivity in (239).
The sense of inevitability carried by epistemic be bound to presents
problems for the view that it is a suppletive item: inevitability is not the same as
conclusivity and epistemic be bound to tends to be more readily substitutible by
epistemic will than it is by must.

3.11.2 Be bound to: regional and stylistic variation

Table 3.24. Genre distribution of be bound to

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Avg
Spoken Dialogue 6 (2) 19 (7)
Monologue 13 (3) 13 (3)
Total 8 (5) 17 (10) 0 (0) 8
Written Non-printed 10 (1) 10 (1)
Printed 10 (3) 20 (6)
Total 10 (4) 18 (7) 5 (1) 11
Total 9 17 5 (1) 10

Be bound to enjoys greater representation in BrE than in the other two dialects
and greater popularity in more ‘conservative’ genres. It is preferred more in
writing than in speech (by a ratio of 33:25, or 1.32:1), marginally more in
monologue than dialogue (by a ratio of 26:25, or 1.04:1), and more in printed
than non-printed writing (by a ratio of 30:20, or 1.5:1).

Notes

1
There were no tokens of oughtn’t to in the corpora.
2
Pleonastic it is not listed by Coates (1983).
3
Both Palmer (1990: 55) and Coates (1983: 42-43) point out that bound to
is available for expressing posteriority with epistemic necessity: see
further Section 3.11.
4
Coates’s (1983: 46) claim that negative epistemic must does not exist, and
that the missing form in the must paradigm is supplied by can’t, is thus
wrong. The absence of tokens in ICE-AUS and C-US would appear to be
accidental. Collins (1991: 156) presents the following example from his
225,000-word corpus of AusE: He mustn’t have wanted the coupons
because he came up and give them to me.
Necessity and obligation 89

5
It was not possible to determine if the same situation obtains in C-US,
because the Santa Barbara texts are not subclassified on the
dialogic/monologic dimension.
6
Westney (1995: 170) makes the interesting point that as you should know
is natural as an opener when a speaker is giving information or advice, but
not as you ought to know, because the latter impolitely suggests, more
strongly than should, that the addressee doesn’t know something that it
would be appropriate for him/her to know.
7
These figures provide some support for Palmer’s (1990: 56) suggestion
that You must be kidding is more likely in BrE than You’ve got to be
kidding.
8
Westney (1995: 183) notes that past reference is possible, as in You’d
better have left by the time I get there (there were no examples in the
present corpora). However, note that even here the advised departure is (to
be) in the future with respect to the time of utterance.
Chapter 4

Possibility, permission and ability

The two modals of possibility, can and may, share a high level of semantic
overlap, so it is not surprising that there has been a good deal of attention paid to
the relationship between them in the literature (e.g. Lebrun 1965, Duffley et al.
1981, Dirven 1981, Collins 1988, Bolinger 1989, Klinge 1993, Coates 1995,
Groefsema 1995). Perhaps more than any other of the modal expressions
examined in this book, can and may raise challenging questions as to the
preferability of a polysemy or monosemy position. In analyzing their meanings,
as is the practice elsewhere in this book, we adopt a polysemy approach,
assuming that each modal has a number of independent meanings (a position
which, as noted in Section 2.4.2 above, is supported by the availability of
instances which, in abstraction from context, are ambiguous between an
epistemic and non-epistemic meaning; e.g. She may go may mean “She is
permitted to go” or “It is possible that she will go”). At the same time it must be
conceded that polysemy is less clearly in evidence with can, whose permission,
(root) possibility and ability meanings are not always readily distinguishable,
than it is with may. Despite this difference it is not necessary to infer that can is
monosemous, as do Leech and Coates (1980) who gather the various subsenses
into a single gradient unified by the notion of ‘inherency’, with one extreme
(weakest inherency) implying “the circumstances which enable p to happen are
independent of the participants in p”, and the other (strongest inherency) “the
circumstances which enable p to happen are inherent to the performer of p”
(1980: 83).
This chapter examines can and may, along with their preterite counterparts
could and might (including the negative forms can’t, cannot, mayn’t, couldn’t,
and mightn’t). Also discussed is the lexico-modal be able to (able to and unable
to preceded by all the inflectional forms of be).1
As Table 4.1 below shows, the frequency of can in the corpora is
considerably greater than that of may (7763:2261, or 3.4:1), and that of could
outstrips might (3357:1499, or 2.2:1). There are, furthermore, some striking
regional differences, may being more popular in ICE-GB than in the other two
corpora (see further Section 4.1.4), and might less popular in C-US than in the
other two corpora (see further Section 4.3.4).
92 Chapter 4

Table 4.1. Frequencies of the modal expressions of possibility and permission

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Total
Modals may 881 1,218 825 (162) 2,924 (2,261)
can 3,378 3,565 3,665 (720) 10,608 (7,663)
might 695 702 520 (102) 1,917 (1,499)
could 1,590 1,622 1,757 (345) 4,969 (3,557)
Total 6,544 7,107 6,765 (1,329) 20,417 (14,980)
Quasi- be able to 387 434 346 (68) 1,167 (889)
modals
Total 6,931 7,541 7,111 (1,397) 21,583 (15,869)

4.1 May

As Table 4.2 shows, the epistemic possibility meaning of may is dominant

(accounting for 79.0% of tokens), with deontic and dynamic possibility being at
best minor meanings. As we shall see in Section 4.2, while can expresses similar
meanings to may, the proportions are quite different, with can being dominantly
dynamic.

Table 4.2. Meanings of may

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Total %
Epistemic 651 1,023 636 (125) 2,310 (1,799) 79.0%
Deontic 78 70 56 (11) 204 (159) 7.0%
Dynamic 101 60 76 (15) 237 (176) 8.1%
Indeterminate 51 65 56 (11) 172 (127) 5.9%
Total 881 1,218 825 (162) 2,924 (2,261) 100%

4.1.1 Epistemic may

Epistemic may can be either subjective or objective, though the latter possibility
is quite rare, and rarely mentioned in the literature. Coates (1983: 134) is an
exception, but she nevertheless claims not to have found any instances in her
data. The examples in (1) and (2) illustrate the subjective use, expressing the
speaker’s lack of knowledge as to whether or not the proposition is true, and
assessment of it as merely a possibility. In (1) the speaker’s lack of confidence in
the truth of the proposition is reflected in the harmonic combination with I s’pose,
and in (2) with I dunno.

(1) Ah we’re not talking about mutualism so much now except that of course
they don’t have to eat as much algae as they would normally do because
they have maintained the chloroplasts and I s’pose that may be some
Possibility, permission and ability 93

marginal significance in a mutualistic sort of way to the algae that they are
feeding on (ICE-AUS S2A-025 111)
(2) I dunno. They may have (ICE-AUS S1A-073 102)

Verstraete (2001) claims that epistemic modality cannot be objective,

invoking as an argument the resistance of epistemic modals to interrogatives (a
resistance which presumably derives from the orientation of interrogatives
towards the interlocutor rather than the speaker) and to if-clauses (the resistance
here deriving from the suspension of the speaker’s commitment to the
proposition). However instances of objective may do occur, where the estimation
is one that is entertained more generally. In (3) the impersonal extraposition with
It’s thought as matrix clause, and in (4) the existential construction there are
suggestions …, indicate that the judgement is not limited to the speaker but rather
on public record, as it were.

(3) It’s thought the man may have committed suicide (ICE-GB S2B-016 134)
(4) The nature of the mutation in sugary maize has not been characterized
biochemically, but there are suggestions that it may involve a debranching
enzyme. (ICE-AUS W2A-038 164)

Epistemic may has a concessive use, which accounts for 4.9% of all
epistemic may tokens and which, according to Coates (1983: 136), serves to
‘soften’ the speaker’s assertion. However, it is more accurately interpreted as
involving a type of pragmatic strengthening (see further Section 2.5.2 above) in
which the speaker concedes the truth of the proposition, rather than expressing a
lack of confidence in it. Thus in (5) below the clause containing concessive may
is equivalent to the unmodalized clause “although the timing is uncertain”, and
similarly in (6) to “although we believe the rulers of this period and their advisers
were misguided and deluded in …”).

(5) The timing may be uncertain but the outcome is absolutely certain (ICE-
GB S2B-005 116)
(6) However misguided and deluded we may believe the rulers of this period
and their advisers to have been in seeking to resolve conflicts by force of
arms, the relative weakness of diplomatic alternatives must always be
borne in mind. (ICE-GB W2A-010 17)

The time of the situation with epistemic may can be past, as in (7), present
as in (8) (including ‘general present’: see below), or future as in (9).

(7) Instead, it seems that relying on the free market in health may have
brought nemesis on those who deny the right of all to health and trust to
the impersonal forces of the market to protect them. (ICE-GB W2A-019
70)
94 Chapter 4

(8) We can’t eat beef that may be contaminated with BSE and cheese that may
be full of lysteria. (ICE-GB W2B-014 26)
(9) One person who thinks it is not, and who suspects we may be in for a flip
of the current system (and therefore the climate) into a new pattern is
Wallace Broecker. (ICE-GB W2B-025 45)

The use of may with a general present time situation as in (10) and (11)
below raises challenging issues of classification.

(10) In severe cases, the condition may seriously interfere with the child’s
schooling and special arrangements may have to be made. (ICE-GB W2B-
023 24)
(11) The aura only lasts a few moments before the convulsion begins but may
be long enough to enable the patient to get himself into a safe and
comfortable position so that he will not hurt himself by falling to the floor.
(ICE-GB W2B-023 40)

The meaning of may here is somewhat ambivalent between epistemic

modality (paraphraseable by “it is possible that”) and dynamic modality
(paraphraseable by “it is possible for”), and this has prompted some writers (e.g.
Coates 1983, Vihla 2000) to characterize cases such as those in (10) and (11) as
involving neutralization or ‘merger’. They are nevertheless here analyzed as
epistemic on the grounds that the main focus of attention is on the speaker’s
uncertainty as to whether or not, at any given moment, a situation whose potential
for occurrence is not in doubt will be actualized (and may be paraphrased by “it is
possible that … will”).
Further support for this position is to be found in the incidence of
harmonic combinations with epistemic expressions, such as the occurrence of
may in an extraposed that-clause with it is possible as matrix clause as in (12),
and with the epistemic adjunct possibly as in (13):

(12) Their primary role is likely to be in the removal of nutrients (nitrogen and
phosphorus), although in the absence of light it is possible that they may
behave heterotrophically and play a small part in BOD removal. (ICE-GB
W2A-021 22)
(13) they may possibly increase the capacity of an individual organism to track
or avoid change. (ICE-GB W1A-009 56)

Finally, the compatibility between may and intensifying adverb well, exemplified
in (14), contrasts with the resistance of can to it:

(14) The physical mechanisms governing intra-plate earthquakes are not well-
understood although they may well be associated with previous faulting
activity (Johnston and Kantor, 1990). (ICE-AUS W2A-033 25)
Possibility, permission and ability 95

As Table 4.3 indicates, the frequencies for may used with future, present
and general present situations were quite similar, with past situations less
common. C-US is slightly out of step with the other two corpora, with relatively
more present tokens and relatively fewer past and general present.

Table 4.3. Time reference with epistemic may

Future Present Past General pres Total

ICE-GB 291 (28.4%) 267 (26.1%) 120 (11.7%) 345 (33.7%) 1023 (100%)
ICE-AUS 187 (28.7%) 174 (26.7%) 66 (10.1%) 224 (34.4%) 651 (100%)
C-US 35 (28.0%) 60 (48.0%) 5 (4.0%) 25 (20.0%) 125 (100%)
Total 513 (28.0%) 501 (27.8%) 191 (10.6%) 594 (33.0%) 1,799 (100%)

4.1.2 Deontic may

Leech (2003: 232-234) notes that while epistemic may has increased in frequency
in recent decades, there has been a marked decline in the frequency of deontic
may (mainly in speech). In the present data it is the least common of the
meanings of may (see Table 4.2 above). Deontic may is prototypically, but not
more frequently, subjective, with the speaker as the deontic source as in (15), or –
more commonly – the addressee in questions as in (16) and in conditionals as in
(17). The rarity of subjective examples is reflected in the incidence of somewhat
formal, formulaic, tokens of the type in (16) and (17).

(15) You may use my desk.

Well wait a minute, it’s a royal mess, isn’t it. (C-US SBC-019 138-140)
(16) Oh who’s he meeting there may I ask (ICE-AUS S1A-058 175)
(17) Let me develop the point if I may Jonathan (ICE-GB S1B-043 119)

In the corpora, examples of this type are surpassed in frequency by those

in which the deontic possibility is objective, found predominantly in the
statement of rules and regulations in bureaucratic and administrative writing, as
in:

(18) Your local Training Officer can assist you in understanding and meeting
your obligations. Any problems that arise may be referred to the
Vocational Training Board. (ICE-AUS W2D-002 258)

4.1.3 Dynamic may

Epistemic possibility is a homogeneous semantic category, concerned with

verification, with the question of whether a situation has been, is, or will be,
actualized). By contrast, dynamic possibility is a rather heterogeneous category,
as reflected in the plethora of terms that have been proposed in attempts to
96 Chapter 4

generalize across its range of subsenses. None of these terms seems capable of
capturing the full range of dynamic senses. For instance the notion of
‘potentiality’, as invoked by Klinge (1993), does not encompass dynamic can as
used with verbs of perception which, we argue in Section 4.2.3.2 below, often
denotes actualization rather than merely potentiality. The further notions of
‘inherency’ (Leech and Coates 1980) and ‘intrinsicness’ (Bolinger 1989) cannot
be convincingly applied to dynamic can in its ‘circumstantially possible’ use (see
Section 4.2.3.1), since the orientation of can here is to external rather than
internal factors.
Dynamic possibility is, we have seen, a minor meaning for may but a
major one for can. Accordingly the discussion in the present section will be quite
brief, with a more detailed account reserved for dynamic can in Section 4.2.3.
May is used to express two types of dynamic possibility. The first,
‘theoretical possibility’ (a term suggested by Leech 1987), involves a potentiality
for action that resides in the external situation. In this use may is often associated
with a greater degree of formality than can. Examples follow:

(19) it’s not necessary uh for uh me to dwell at length upon, the Civil Evidence
Act uh or uh the uh Rules i in regard to, uh what evidence may be uh,
adduced (ICE-GB S2A-063 17)
(20) The role of the convenor is to direct the conduct and activities of the
Selection Committee so it may find the most efficient applicant for the
vacant position. (ICE-AUS W2D-001 67)

The second use, ‘dynamic implication’ (a term suggested by Palmer

1990), involves a potentiality for action that is the basis for an implied directive
speech act. This category differs from theoretical possibility to the extent that it
requires an expansion of the semantic framework into pragmatics. The literal
meaning of may in the following example is dynamic, but a more satisfactory
interpretation requires reference to its directive illocutionary force.

(21) And you may remember that the organisations the republics that were in
the Soviet Union competed in the recent Winter Olympics under the title
Commonwealth of Independent States (ICE-AUS S2A-027 40)

4.1.4 May: regional and stylistic variation

Figures supplied by Mair and Leech (2006) indicate that may has been
undergoing a decline in frequency in recent decades, one more marked in AmE
(32.4%) than BrE (17.4%): see Section 1.4. This regional difference is reflected,
in the present study (see Table 4.4), in the striking difference in overall
frequencies for may between ICE-GB (1218 tokens) on the one hand and C-US
(825 tokens per million words). ICE-AUS, with 881 tokens, patterns more closely
with C-US than ICE-GB.
Possibility, permission and ability 97

The comparative unpopularity of may in speech over writing (by an

overall ratio of 3.3:1 across the three corpora) reflects its declining fortunes in
Modern English. The findings presented in Table 4.4 suggest that this decline is
most advanced in C-US, where the speech vs writing gap is the greatest (3.7:1, by
comparison with 3.2:1 for ICE-AUS and 3.1:1 for ICE-GB). A comparison of the
frequencies for subvarieties in ICE-AUS and ICE-GB confirms the greater
conservatism of the latter for the written component. The printed vs non-printed
ratio for ICE-GB, based on normalized frequencies, is 2257:1420, or 1.6:1,
compared with 1427:1690, or 0.8:1 for ICE-AUS (see Appendix Table 12).
The present study provides some support for Coates’s (1995) claim that
“may is the chief exponent of epistemic possibility in British English, but is less
common in American English, where may has connotations of formality” (p.64).
Not only are there more tokens of epistemic may per million words in ICE-GB
(1023) than in C-US (636), but the notion that epistemic may has connotations of
formality in AmE is supported by the finding that the ratio of written to spoken
tokens in C-US is weighted more towards the (generally more formal) written
categories (4.2:1) than is the case for ICE-GB (2.2:1), and also for ICE-AUS
(2.7:1): see Appendix Table 12.

Table 4.4. Genre distribution of may

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Avg
Spoken Dialogue 350 (126) 544 (196)
Monologue 658 (158) 846 (203)
Total 473 (284) 665 (399) 395 (46) 511
Written Non-printed 1,690 (169) 1,420 (142)
Printed 1,427 (428) 2,257 (677)
Total 1,493 (597) 2,048 (819) 1,450 (116) 1,664
Total 881 1,218 825 (162) 975

4.2 Can

Can contrasts with may in the dominance of the dynamic possibility meaning,
across all three dialects (see Table 4.5). The popularity of deontic can is not even
across the corpora. According to Coates (1995: 64) “can is less commonly used
to express permission in American English; may is the normal exponent of
permission” (p.64). However the findings of the present study suggest otherwise:
not only are there relatively more tokens of deontic can per million words in C-
US than in the other two corpora, but as Table 4.2 above indicates, deontic may is
relatively dispreferred in C-US.
98 Chapter 4

Table 4.5. Meanings of can

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Total %
Dynamic 2,729 2,953 2,906 (571) 8,588 (6,253) 81.0%
Deontic 353 279 417 (82) 1,049 (714) 9.9%
Epistemic 24 32 56 (11) 112 (67) 1.1%
Indeterminate 272 301 285 (56) 858 (629) 8.1%
Total 3,378 3,565 3,665 (720) 10,608 (7663) 100%

4.2.1 Epistemic can

The status of can as a modal that can express epistemic possibility is a matter of
some controversy. According to some (e.g. Collins 1988, Huddleston and Pullum
2002: 180) can may serve as a marker of epistemic possibility, albeit restricted to
non-affirmative contexts, as in (22) and (23):

(22) There are plenty of funds available to educate women about osteoporosis -
thanks to an exhaustive public health campaign there can’t be a woman
alive in Australia unaware that calcium rich foods help prevent the disease
of bone deterioration. (ICE-AUS W2B-012 100)
(23) How can it be an intrusion of privacy if the newspapers are being
presented with the stories from the main participants on a silver plate
(ICE-AUS S2B-004 159)

For others (e.g. Coates 1983) can is merely a suppletive form for must which
supplies the missing non-affirmative form in the epistemic must paradigm.
Interestingly, in a subsequent publication Coates (1995) suggests that can is
beginning to develop a ‘genuinely’ affirmative epistemic use in AmE, a
development which she correctly observes is in conformity with the “historical
pattern of epistemic meanings developing from root meanings” (Coates 1995:
62). Coates quotes an example she heard at a symposium at the University of
New Mexico in 1992: we hope this coding system can be useful (to other linguists
working in the field). An example such as the following from ICE-GB shows that
the emergence of assertive epistemic can is not limited to AmE.

(24) B: If if girls have uhm I’m going to show my ignorance in front of the tape
here. If girls have black eyebrows but really blond hair is there something
odd there does that
A: I think some guys do as well
B: Oh it it’s not it doesn’t mean they’ve dyed it then does it
A: I think they can have but I’m not sure. I think they’re just darker, the
hair’s just dark. It may mean their hair is dyed actually (ICE-GB S1A-041
46)
Possibility, permission and ability 99

Like epistemic may, epistemic can is typically subjective, as in (25) and

(26), where the inferencing on which the speaker’s assessment of possibilities is
based is spelt out respectively in the because-clause and in the preceding
coordinated clause.

(25) No it can’t be hundred percent wrong ’cause the program um if you don’t
have your exact time of birth you set it to oblique orbit of zero for the time
and PM for the hour (ICE-AUS S1A-064 259)
(26) Oh I’ve only been back a few minutes anyway but the school hasn’t
phoned so he can’t be too bad (ICE-AUS S1A-096 95)

Like epistemic may, epistemic can can be used with a past situation as in
(27), present as in (28), or future as in (29). With future time situations, epistemic
may is common while can is rare, though Huddleston and Pullum’s (2002: 182)
claim that the latter is “barely possible” is an overstatement, as shown by the
naturalness of (29).

(27) No they can’t have done it (ICE-GB S1B-071 34)

(28) It’s just uh it’s just it’s so convoluted and all the rest of it that it can’t
possibly be right (ICE-GB S1A-005 32
(29) Well I waited for the weather to break and I kept looking out thinking oh
its it’s going to you know this can’t last all day (ICE-AUS S1A-100 7)

As we have noted in Section 4.1.1, the use of may with a general present
time situation (as in (10) and (11) above) presents some classificatory difficulties.
Apparently similar examples with can are found, as in (30):

(30) But it is a reminder that pain can be the one reality in one’s life. It can be
the only thing that anyone even the Son of Man can think about. (ICE-GB
S2B-028 75)

However, there is a semantic distinction, admittedly subtle, between may and can
in these cases, one determined by the boundary which separates epistemic and
dynamic modality. May falls on the epistemic side of the boundary, expressing
the speaker’s uncertainty as to the serial actualization of a situation over a period
of time (“it is possible that … will”). On the other hand can, which falls on the
dynamic side, focuses merely upon the potential for occurrence of a situation (“it
is possible for … to”). This distinction has been discussed in the literature, with a
variety of labels applied to relevant senses of may and can: ‘factual possibility’
and ‘theoretical possibility’ (Leech 1987); ‘indeterminacy’ and ‘contingency’
(Van der Auwera 1986); ‘extrinsic possibility’ and ‘intrinsic possibility’
(Bolinger 1989); and ‘possibility’ and ‘potentiality’ (Klinge 1993).
Some evidence for a ‘different meanings’ position was presented in
Section 4.1.1 above. A merger interpretation might be argued to draw support
from examples such as (31) and (32), where the alternation between may and can
100 Chapter 4

is suggestive of semantic closeness between may and can. However it is not

necessary to assume that two meanings have merged into one in such cases. It is
more plausible to maintain that the meanings of may and can are in fact
distinguishable – as epistemic and dynamic respectively – and that there are
certain contexts which are compatible with both meanings. Casting further doubt
on the validity of a merger interpretation is the strong tendency for can to precede
may in alternations of the type in (31) and (32): if one were to assume that may
and can expressed the same meaning in such alternations, then it might be
expected that their relative ordering would be random.

(31) There can be a similar problem with satellite dishes, where several
“footprints” may overlap a particular geographical area. (ICE-GB W2D-
014 29)
(32) It can lead to a disproportionate preoccupation for example with esoteric
tax issues which may affect only a handful of people invariably the
already-advantaged as compared with the unattended deserts of popular
ills particularly in fields of poverty law and tribunals (ICE-GB S2A-039
90)

4.2.2 Deontic can

It has been argued that deontic may and can are semantically distinct (generally
by writers whose allegiance is to a monosemy approach, and who therefore
assume – surely counterintuitively – that the same meaning can never be
expressed by different modals). For Vanparys (1987: 232) the difference is that
may is subjective and can objective: “May is used to perform acts of granting
permission, while can is used to state that someone has permission”. Groefsema
(1995: 68) is of the view that “when I ask you May I smoke in here, I make my
smoking solely dependent on your permission, whereas when I ask Can I smoke
in here, I communicate that your permission is only one factor under
consideration”. Duffley et al. (1981) characterize may as expressing the ‘virtual’
giving of permission, involving some external permitter, whereas with can it is
intrinsically possessed by the permittee. Bolinger (1989: 7) differentiates can and
may in terms of ‘intrinsic’ and ‘extrinsic’ possibility. In his opinion “Can refers
to what a person, thing, or situation is endowed with, whether naturally in place
(physical, mental) or implanted (authorized, permitted); it invokes what is
immanent, inherent. May refers to the external, to what transcends the entity or
situation.”
It is certainly true that deontic can is more often objective than subjective,
as in (33):

(33) As a race official, John cannot place any bets on the Cup. But the rest of
Australia wagered an amazing $71.4 million with the TAB last Cup day.
(ICE-AUS W2B-002 44)
Possibility, permission and ability 101

Nevertheless there is no shortage of examples in the present data in which

deontic can and may are semantically parallel, even though they differ in their
frequency of occurrence and often in formality: (34)–(36) below match (15)–(17)
above.

(34) You can come back for a second helping (ICE-AUS S1A-004 257)
(35) Uh can I pick the boxes up please (ICE-GB S1A-068 184)
(36) If I can partly misquote John and say yes indeed it adds to the gaiety of the
country (ICE-GB S1B-024 26)

4.2.3 Dynamic can

In Section 4.1.3 above we identified two uses of dynamic may, ‘theoretical

possibility’ and ‘dynamic implication’. Both are found with can, as is a third use
that is not available for may, ‘ability’. Ability involves a potentiality for action
that lies within the capacities of the subject-referent. Table 4.6 below presents
figures for these dynamic possibility uses, not only for can but also may. The
theoretical possibility use is the most common of the three dynamic uses,
accounting for 77.2% of all dynamic tokens of may, and 65.8% of can. The
ability use, which is not found with may, is expressed by just over one quarter of
dynamic possibility (28.7%) cans, and is less popular in ICE-AUS than it is in the
British and American corpora. The dynamic implicature use is a minor one for
can (accounting for 5.6% of its dynamic uses), and relatively more common in
ICE-GB, but quite common with may (22.8%), though comparatively rare in ICE-
GB.

Table 4.6. Dynamic possibility with can and may

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Total

Theoretical can 1,869 1,895 1,883 (370) 5,647 (4,134)
possibility may 75 52 56 (11) 183 (138)
Ability can 703 862 896 (176) 2,461 (1,741)
Dynamic can 157 196 127 (25) 480 (378)
implication may 26 8 20 (4) 54 (38)
Total can 2,729 2,953 2,906 (571) 8,588 (6,253)
may 101 60 76 (15) 237 (176)

4.2.3.1 Theoretical possibility

In the clearest cases of theoretical possibility there is explicit mention of the

enabling circumstances, as in (37) and (38):
102 Chapter 4

(37) Eucalypts that grow on nutrient-poor soils, however, cannot do this

because the lack of nutrients limits their growth. (ICE-AUS W2B-024
190)
(38) It’s great to have my own bolt-hole where I can do as I like without
having to fit around anyone else (ICE-GB W1B-013 54)

There are two recognizable subtypes of theoretical possibility, ‘existential’

and ‘rational’. Existential modality (to use the term suggested by Palmer 1990
and adopted by, amongst others, Facchinetti 2002, and Huddleston and Pullum
2002) lies on the borderline between modality and aspectuality, and is found with
can but not may. Its characteristic feature is an implicit existential quantifier,
which involves either set membership as in (39) (“Some of these movements are
quite large”) or characteristic behaviour as in (40) “She sometimes acts in a
pushy way”).

(39) These movements can be quite large. Sorensen et al., (10) indicate that
movements of 50 mm are not uncommon, and in extreme cases,
movements as high as 100 mm have been recorded. (ICE-AUS W2A-034
40)
(40) She can be pushy (ICE-AUS S1A-045 181)

Harmonic combinations – particularly with the adjunct sometimes – are

common, as in (41) and (42):

(41) Construction can now begin with the usual format of resistors first,
although it can sometimes be an advantage to fit the IC sockets at an early
stage to assist in the less obvious location of other components. (ICE-GB
W2B-032 73)
(42) UUmm and you’ve got it and they don’t get it back till the Sunday and
they can really make life tough and that can sometimes tempt children to
steal it back (ICE-AUS S2A-039 184)

Existential possibility can is commonly encountered in scientific

discourse, as in (43) and (44):

(43) The interaction of an incident ultrasonic beam with a defect can cause a
number of different responses. (ICE-GB W2A-036 20)
(44) Being labelled “maternally” or “paternally derived” can affect the degree
to which the gene is expressed. (ICE-AUS W1A-005 23)

The second subtype of theoretical possibility, rational modality (to again

use Palmer’s 1990 term), is similar in some respects to objective deontic
possibility, the difference being that with the latter there is an identifiable
personal or institutional deontic source, whereas with rational modality
actualization is licensed by more abstract factors pertaining to what is generally
Possibility, permission and ability 103

considered to be reasonable, legitimate, societally/culturally acceptable, and the

like, as in (45) and (46):

(45) this will bring us to some questions about what can reasonably be
expected from organised government, operating within a framework of
nations, in which nationhood, is regarded as incomplete, unless it entails
sovereignty (ICE-GB S2B-048 13)
(46) But who can deny it’s brought entertainment and enjoyment to countless
hundreds of people (ICE-AUS S1B-036 227)

4.2.3.2 Ability

The ability meaning of can is commonly treated as distinct from its other
meanings. The justification for the present analysis of ability as a subcategory of
dynamic possibility is its association with the notion of potentiality, albeit one
which lies in the subject-referent. Ability can normally requires an animate
subject with agentive function, as in (47) and (48), but inanimate subjects can
also be found, as in (49) and (50):

(47) and uh about the age of four most children can actually speak to virtually
the same standard uh that a adult can speak (ICE-GB S1B-003 54)
(48) And he can play chess and I can’t (ICE-AUS S1A-076 147)
(49) The features for feeding paper that are built into a printer depend on the
use for which it was designed. The two types of paper these printers can
handle are cut sheet and/or continuous forms. (ICE-AUS W2B-038 31)
(50) Modern launch vehicles have more efficient engines and can launch a
heavier payload: typically as much as two per cent of their launch weight.
(ICE-GB W2B-035 71)

The ability meaning may be close to actualization, though it may not be

realized. Compare the following two examples. In (51) we understand that the
record-breaking in question is yet to be achieved, while in (52) the evidence for
the subject-referent’s ability is past actualization (there is little difference
between (52) and its unmodalized counterpart, You speak French).

(51) Can Haley Lewis break the Commonwealth record I don’t think she can
(ICE-AUS S2B-016(C):49)
(52) You you can speak French. Oh well you’ve studied French and I’m
studying German and you’re studying Japanese. (ICE-AUS S1A-037 217)

With verbs denoting perception and cognition there is an especially low

degree of modality. Thus in (53)–(56) it would make little difference if the modal
were absent (I see the Prime Minister; I hear the crowds …; I remember vividly
…; I don’t understand …).
104 Chapter 4

(53) And now I can see the Prime Minister, John Major (ICE-GB S2A-019 30)
(54) Outside I can hear the crowds cheering as Her Majesty the Queen arrives
with the Duke of Edinburgh to be greeted by the Minister of Glasgow
Cathedral Dr William Morris one of her chaplains (ICE-GB S2A-020 118)
(55) I can remember vividly my first day at primary school (ICE-GB S1A-076
103)
(56) No I can’t understand any of this at all (ICE-GB W1B-003 170)

4.2.3.3 Dynamic implication

As noted in Section 4.1.3 above, with the category of dynamic implication the
modal is used in the formulation of an indirect speech act. The utterances in the
following examples are more than merely statements of dynamic possibility: the
illocutionary force of (57) is offer, request in (58), suggestion in (59), and
instruction in (60).

(57) Well I I can write on your behalf (ICE-AUS S1B-073 272)

(58) Can you pass the s the sour cream please (ICE-GB S1A-071 141)
(59) Perhaps we can talk about that on another occasion (ICE-GB S1B-055 65)
(60) Well, I’ll pour the ladies’, you can pour the men’s (ICE-AUS S1A-004
116)

As noted by Facchinetti (2002: 237), dynamic implication is common in

instructional and didactic registers, as in (61) and (62):

(61) So in fact the far side of this temple here, and there you can just make out
some, uh, stony parts which are in fact the remains of outdoor altars
because you offer sacrifices sacrifices of huge animals like oxen which
have just been, just been killed (ICE-GB S2A-024 94)
(62) OK this one has obviously got its body wall cut up so I’m not gonna do
another one now this afternoon but you can look at this one (ICE-AUS
S2A-052 10)

4.2.4 Can: regional and stylistic variation

Mair and Leech’s (2006) diachronic figures, as presented in Table 1.4 above,
indicate that, by contrast with may, can has been relatively stable in recent
decades, enjoying a small increase in British writing (2.2%) and suffering a small
decline in American writing (1.5%). However, as the figures in Table 4.7
indicate, the three corpora vary in the relative popularity of can in their spoken
and written components. The figures suggest greater vitality for this modal in
AmE (the ratio of tokens in speech to writing in C-US being 1.9:1) than in AusE
(ICE-AUS 1.5:1) and BrE (ICE-GB 1.2:1). Interestingly, closer inspection of the
figures for subvarieties of speech and writing in ICE-GB and ICE-AUS (not
Possibility, permission and ability 105

possible for C-US) suggests greater vitality for can in BrE than AusE. The extent
to which can’s popularity in dialogue exceeds that in monologue is greater in
ICE-GB (4275:3117, or 1.4:1) than in ICE-AUS (3908:3829, or 1.02:1). A
similar conclusion is suggested by a comparison of the ratio for can in non-
printed as against printed texts (ICE-GB 3780:3000, or 1.3:1; ICE-AUS
2570:2650, or 0.96:1).

Table 4.7. Genre distribution of can

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Avg
Spoken Dialogue 3,908 (1407) 4,275 (1,539)
Monologue 3,829 (919) 3,117 (748)
Total 3,877 (2,326) 3,817 (2,287) 4,525 (527) 4,073
Written Non-printed 2,570 (257) 3,780 (378)
Printed 2,650 (795) 3,000 (900)
Total 2,630 (1,052) 3,195 (1,278) 2,413 (193) 2,746
Total 3,378 3,565 3,665 (720) 3,536

4.3 Might and could

It has been our practice thus far to devote each section to a single modal
expression. However, because as preterite modal forms could and might share
certain uses which normally differentiate them from can and may respectively, it
is preferable to treat them together.

4.3.1 Uses of might and could as preterite forms

Two broad uses may be distinuished, both of which serve to distance the situation
from the reality of the present moment: temporal and hypothetical.

4.3.1.1 Temporal uses

Temporal could and might may both serve either to identify a past time situation,
or as a backshifted preterite. Could occurs readily in the past time use, as in (63).
Might, on the other hand, has been claimed to be obsolete in this use. For
example, according to Joos (1964: 187) might “never has real-past meaning in
modern English; its remoteness is that of unreality.” This claim is wrong: might is
not obsolete, though certainly rare, and largely restricted to formal and literary
genres, as in (64).

(63) After two meals from the Small Palace Garden, Ella began to make dinner
for the film-makers. She could tolerate fish and chips once a week, but
would go no further along that path. (ICE-AUS W2F-020 9)
106 Chapter 4

(64) His Honour would lightly touch the arm of a young waitress who was
passing, he would put his hand on her wrist, she would feel constrained to
bend close and listen to his whispered request, so that, with their foreheads
almost touching, for a moment the two would seem to be lovers. He might
even lift the fall of her hair from her cheek and hold it gently aside in a
manner both suggestive and dotted line well, judicious, quaintly formal,
certainly irreproachable, in order to murmur his order privately. (ICE-
AUS W2F-016 71)

Preterite could and might may also be used as backshifted counterparts of

present tense can and may, as in (65) and (66). Here they are non-deictic, the past
time reference being identified by the matrix verb.

(65) He told the C B I conference in Glasgow that Britain could protect its own
interests within the European Community without having to protest about
threats to national sovereignty (ICE-GB S2B-007 14)
(66) Virgo Lonergan had started life as Virginia. After seventeen years of being
asked if Santa Claus existed, and five of smutty puns, she decided she
might as well go the whole hog. (ICE-AUS W2F-008 26)

Backshifted could and might are not restricted to indirect reported speech
(notice that the matrix clause in (66) above expresses a reported thought), and
may be used to represent interior monologue, as in (67):

(67) How could she wait, with ever-increasing anticipation, for her dead child
to come back to her (ICE-GB W2F-020 152)

4.3.1.2 Hypothetical uses

Two subclasses may again be identified, which we shall refer to as ‘unreal’ and
‘weak’. The unreal use is found in the apodosis of unreal conditionals (with the
protasis expressed as in (68), implicit in a construction other than an if-clause as
in (69), or textually implied as in (70)), and in the complement of wish as in (71).
Hypothetical could and might are used for talking about a counterfactual situation
(for example in (68) it is presupposed that Mr Gorbachev does not have the
implied level of respect, in (70) that the discussion has not taken place, and in
(71) that the speaker cannot drive):

(68) In the meantime, Mr Gorbachev might achieve greater respect if he

dropped the pretence that his republics would enjoy equality - let alone
sovereignty. (ICE-GB W2E-008 22)
(69) An effective judicial control of the preparation of serious criminal cases
for trial could greatly reduce the opportunities of police wrongdoing at
that stage or at the very least expose such wrongdoing before trial (ICE-
GB S2B-037 113)
Possibility, permission and ability 107

(70) There are many parts of the climate system that we could discuss uhm
(ICE-GB S2A-0143 22)
(71) I felt so guilty not driving you on Frid on Saturday though I wish I could
drive (ICE-AUS S1A-094 79)

Some unreal tokens are used to express what Huddleston and Pullum
(2002: 201-202) refer to as ‘unactualized possibility’, which they regard as a
distinct use. In (72), for example, we understand that the adoption of a different
attitude did not occur, even though it was logically possible:

(72) So uh if it had been put like that you might have taken a different attitude
(ICE-GB S1B-069 158)

The weak use of could and might has arisen via pragmatic extension from
the unreal use. In the absence of an implicit condition the ‘irrealis’ meaning has
receded, enabling the modal to superimpose a component of tentativeness or
diffidence onto the meaning expressed by its present tense counterpart. In (73),
for example, the illocutionary force associated with might, a tentative marker of
dynamic possibility, is that of polite suggestion.

(73) It might be an idea if you were to spend some time with each head of
department here, let them show you their areas of work (ICE-GB S1B-053
101)

Weak might serves most frequently as a diffident marker of epistemic

possibility, a use that accounts for 59.5% of all tokens in the three corpora. AmE
leads the way in the development of this use, which accounts for 63.0% of tokens
in C-US, followed closely by AusE (62.5% in ICE-AUS) and BrE (53.8% in ICE-
GB). Moreover, as discussed in Section 4.3.2.1 below, a further development has
taken place, with the diffidence associated with might eroding to the point that it
has come to express a degree of likelihood comparable to that of epistemic may.
In addition to this, as we shall see, could appears to be undergoing a similar
semantic development, with a weak epistemic use evolving from the unreal use
via bleaching of irrealis meaning, and subsequent shedding of its tentativeness
marking.
As indicated in Table 4.8, the temporal use is less common than the
hypothetical use with both modals, in all three corpora, but relatively moreso with
might (5.3:1) than with could (1.5:1). Of the three varieties AusE evidences the
strongest relative popularity of hypothetical might over past might (6.3:1), but the
least for hypothetical could over past could (1.3:1). This finding could be
interpreted as suggesting that the process by which may and might are becoming
increasingly distinct from one another as present and past inflectional forms of a
single morpheme is more advanced in AusE than in the other two varieties (see
further Section 4.3.3).
108 Chapter 4

One striking difference between might and could concerns the relative
proportions of the unreal and weak hypothetical uses. In fact there is a degree of
complementarity between the two preterite forms. With might the weak use is
almost five times more popular (4.9:1) than the unreal use. By contrast with could
it is the unreal use that is more popular than the weak use, by a broadly similar
margin (4.4:1). The contrast is more pronounced in C-US than in the other two
corpora (with a weak to unreal ratio of 5.7:1 with might, and an unreal to weak
ratio of 5:1 with could).

Table 4.8. Uses of might and could as preterite forms

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Total
Past 93 118 87 (17) 298 (228)
Unreal 81 120 61 (12) 262 (213)
Hypothetical Weak 503 447 346 (68) 1,296 (1,018)
might
Total 584 567 407 (80) 1,558 (1,231)
Indeterminate 18 22 25 (5) 65 (45)
Total 695 702 519 (102) 1,916 (1,499)
Past 686 598 692 (136) 1,976 (1,420)
Unreal 659 691 870 (171) 2,220 (1,521)
Hypothetical Weak 230 320 173 (34) 723 (584)
could
Total 889 1,011 1,043 (205) 2,943 (2,105)
Indeterminate 15 13 20 (4) 48 (32)
Total 1,590 1,622 1,909 (345) 5,121 (3,557)

4.3.2 Meanings of might and could

The semantic profiles of might and could are broadly comparable to those of their
present tense counterparts, may and can. Like may, might is dominantly
epistemic. The main differences relate to the minor meanings of deontic
possibility (which is extremely rare with might) and dynamic possibility (which is
twice as popular with might as with may). Similarly, both could and can are
dominantly dynamic, but the minor meaning of epistemic possibility is extremely
rare with can, and that of deontic possibility with could.
Possibility, permission and ability 109

Table 4.9. Meanings of might and could

ICE- ICE- C-US Total %
AUS GB
might Dynamic 122 120 76 (15) 318 (257) 16.6%
Deontic 7 5 0 (0) 12 (12) 0.6%
Epistemic 534 534 412 (81) 1,480 (1,149) 77.2%
Indeterminate 32 43 31 (6) 106 (81) 5.5%
Total 695 702 520 (102) 1,917 (1,499) 100%
could Dynamic 1,197 1,220 1,430 (281) 3,847 (2,698) 77.4%
Deontic 61 40 41 (8) 142 (109) 2.9%
Epistemic 235 280 188 (37) 703 (552) 14.1%
Indeterminate 97 82 97 (19) 276 (198) 5.6%
Total 1,590 1,622 1,756 (345) 4,969 (3,557) 100%

4.3.2.1 Epistemic possibility

In both their temporal and hypothetical uses might and could may express
epistemic meaning. Epistemic could is not restricted – as can is largely (see
Section 4.2.1 above) – to non-affirmative uses. Consider first the temporal uses,
the past time use of epistemic could in (74)–(76) with reference respectively to a
present situation (“it was not possible that there were”), a past situation (“it was
possible that it had been”) and a future time situation (“it was possible that it
would”) and the backshifted use of epistemic could in (77)–(79), again
respectively with a present, past and future time situation:

(74) By Jean’s calculation, there couldn’t possibly be many more left before
someone summoned sufficient daring to enter Forla’s presence. (ICE-GB
W2F-015 60)
(75) But it could as easily have been a picnic at Cedar Creek Falls that he saw,
or the railway cutting, how would I know? (ICE-AUS W2F-016 58)
(76) Another tree surgeon was unwilling to report in case he was proved wrong
as it could do anything including collapsing under its own weight. (ICE-
AUS W1B 126)
(77) In the interim Ken Jack had been busily sabotaging our efforts by
nugatorially ringing all and sundry and telling them we couldn’t possibly
have enough water in the pond, it had taken five days last time and we had
only forty-hours left. (ICE-AUS W1B-005 68)
(78) Dee reflected grimly that it was too bad that the other half of the worried
duo couldn’t have been Hal. (ICE-GB W2F-006 155)
(79) He said the Federal Government's approach could lead to reduced
investment (ICE-AUS W2C-008 38)
110 Chapter 4

There are no tokens in the corpora of past time epistemic might but the full
set of possibilities occurs with backshifted might. In (80) it occurs with a present
situation, in (81) with a past situation, and in (82) with a future situation.

(80) She was terrified by her anger. It was like a tall, black wave rearing,
threatening her dotted line she could lose her footing, drown in it, and she
never knew where it might be waiting to rise. (ICE-AUS W2F-020 61)
(81) Yes I thought I might have got a chance today but there wasn't a lot of
time (ICE-AUS S1A-016 124)
(82) and uh, so, we thought we might be OK this year cos I’m sending my son
(ICE-GB S1A-087 114)

Epistemic might can also be used with general time situations, as in the
past time example in (64) above and the backshifted example in (83):

(83) Apart from creating an impression that Rajiv could not meet the American
president without straight away reporting back to Moscow, the Moscow
stop-over gave rise to worries that he might be giving Mikhail Gorbachev
advance information of an American posture at Geneva. (ICE-GB W2B-
011 26)

In this use might, like its present counterpart may, is close to the somewhat
indeterminate borderline between epistemic modality (paraphraseable by
“possible that”) and dynamic modality (paraphraseable by “possible for”).
Semantically similar examples with could are found, as in (84), but the position
adopted here – as argued above for can – is that they fall on the dynamic
(existential) side of the borderline (see Section 4.3.2.2 below).

(84) During my banking or property days August could be a very busy month
indeed (ICE-GB W2B-012 31)

Hypothetical (unreal) could and might can both express epistemic

possibility (“it is possible that NP would ...”), with reference to a present situation
in (85) and (86), a past situation in (87) and (88), and a future situation in (89)
and (90).

(85) That’s funny cos I was reading somewhere that historically if you said
someone has left his coat you could mean male or female (ICE-GB S1A-
053 319)
(86) You know Rachel you might have a chance if you if you got that accepted
that that pavilion was sacrosanct to the men most probably because they
want to be on their own (ICE-GB S1B-021 39)
Possibility, permission and ability 111

(87) It’s a photographer's paradise I could have spent the rest of my life well
the rest of my Saturdays of my life wandering around here and I I would
never have run out of material (ICE-AUS S2A-048 91)
(88) It’s an interdisciplinary field which if you if you ah occasionally read the
Higher Education Supplement in The Australian you might’ve noticed is
even now traversed by controversy and that’s exactly appropriate (ICE-
AUS S2A-037 37)
(89) Well I mean our s our corpus is could become very large indeed, if our
plans go forward for the for the raising of the funding for the language
centre ww are talking about very big money (ICE-GB S1B-076 11)
(90) Or if she was eighteen she might have a sexual relationship of her own
(ICE-GB S1A-031 57)

The weak use of epistemic might derives historically from its ‘irrealis’ use,
but insofar as there is no longer any requirement of an explicit or even implicit
condition it is preferable to regard it as real rather than unreal. It is sometimes
maintained (e.g. by Hermerén 1978, Palmer 1990) that epistemic might and may
differ in terms of the degree of likelihood they express, with might lower on the
scale. This view would seem to draw support from examples such as (91), where
the speaker’s confidence about possible market penetration appears to increase
with the switch from might to may, suggesting that might is being used as a more
diffident marker of epistemic possibility than may.

(91) It is increasingly a question of how we can penetrate market places in the

Asia Pacific region or other parts of the world where our products might,
oh oh and indeed our services um may be desired (ICE-AUS S2A-028 51)

Coates (1983: 152), however, finds epistemic may and might in her data to
express similar degrees of likelihood: “MIGHT, in my data at least, does not
seem to express a more tentative meaning than MAY”. The data in the present
study provide support for Coates’ claim, yielding numerous cases of epistemic
may and might being used alternately without any apparent difference in
diffidence, as in (92) and (93).

(92) there’s no doubt so it seems to me uh that for a considerable time, he may

well have hoped uh that uh some at least, of these uh witnesses from
Gibraltar who gave evidence at the inquest, uh might’ve been, in the case
of those whose identity is not known, identified and might have been uh
uh brought able to be brought here to give oral evidence (ICE-GB S2A-
063 68)
(93) I think Mrs Thatcher might possibly have done a lot of things uh that
would’ve been very different stimulated the private sector to a substantial
extent in the fourth term and I think sooner or later the Government may
actually have to say that (ICE-GB S1B-039 53)
112 Chapter 4

Notice too that might, like may, is compatible with the strengthening adverb well:

(94) That’s some way short of it but it might well be an improvement on the
lead (ICE-GB S2A-007 18)

In fact the present data in fact suggest that, even though epistemic may
outnumbers its might counterpart (2310:1480 tokens per million words, or 1.6:1),
and even though the semantic territory of may is more strongly dominated by
present epistemic meaning (83.5%) than is that of might (60.2%), there are signs
that might is beginning to threaten may as the primary exponent of epistemic
possibility. One piece of evidence for this claim is that epistemic may and might
sometimes figure in repairs, and in such cases it is usually may that is repaired to
might, as in:

(95) I dunno Advice may be might be too harsh a word (ICE-AUS S1B-003
250)

Another is that present epistemic might has become the less stylistically
unmarked of the pair: epistemic might occurs more commonly in speech than in
writing (1721:1262, or 1.4:1), while epistemic may occurs far more commonly in
writing than speech 3856:1270, or 3.0:1). It would seem that there is a more
salient difference between present epistemic may and might in formality than in
diffidence.2
A similar historical process to that which applied to might has seen
‘irrealis’ could also develop a weak epistemic sense. In fact, according to Leech
(1987: 120-1), it is difficult to see any difference between could and might in
sentences such as: There could be trouble at the Springboks match tomorrow; The
door might be locked already; Our team might still win the race. His view is
apparently shared by Quirk et al. (1985: 233), who claim that “could and might
have the same meaning and both express the epistemic possibility associated with
may”. Coates (1983: 167), however, finds epistemic could more tentative than
might: “It does not seem implausible to suggest that, while might is becoming the
main exponent of Epistemic possibility in every day spoken language and no
longer expresses a more tentative meaning but is in most contexts synonymous
with may, could is filling the gap left by might and is the new exponent of
tentative Epistemic possibility.” Gresset (2003: 82) concedes that could is being
used increasingly in “apparently epistemic or epistemically-oriented contexts”,
but nevertheless argues that this does not necessarily entail that they are
synonymous. According to Gresset, not only does could express a higher degree
of probability than might, but it can never be purely epistemic (insofar as, in his
view, the possibility expressed invariably derives from the subject referent’s
properties or characteristics).
As persuasive as the arguments of Coates and Gresset may seem, there is
no shortage in the data of cases where epistemic could and might alternate freely,
Possibility, permission and ability 113

with no apparent difference in their meanings or in the level of likelihood

expressed, as in (96) and (97):

(96) Failures that can be traced to excessively high or low temperatures might
be beyond the scope of your maintenance contract and could result in a
bill approaching half the original cost of the damaged equipment. (ICE-
GB W2B-033 14)
(97) The market has reacted to good news but, over the period of the conflict,
something awful could happen and the market might react downwards.
(ICE-GB W2C-012 86)

In the present study only 11.7% of coulds expressed present epistemic

possibility, indicating that this meaning is as yet less established with could than
it is with might (60.2%). Curiously, while the expansion of this meaning with
might is more advanced in AmE (64.7%) and AusE (64.2%) than it is in BrE
(55.6%), the reverse is the case with could, with BrE (13.1%) ahead of AusE
(11.4%) and AmE (6.4%).
Epistemic might and could can, like epistemic may (see Section 4.1.1), be
used concessively. In such cases the degree of modality is low: in (98) and (99)
the meaning would not differ significantly if the modal were omitted (“even if he
is innocent”, “whatever that means”).

(98) He’s obviously a criminal and he should go down and and their arguments
are basically there’s too much crime in society and if we let the buggers
get away with the things even if he might be if if even if he might be
innocent if he didn’t do this he’s done something else (ICE-AUS S1A-095
195)
(99) Now, how does that fit with our observation that sometimes when we hear
people speak there are bits missing, whatever that could mean (ICE-GB
S2A-030 136)

4.3.2.2 Dynamic possibility

In both their past time and hypothetical uses could and might parallel can and
may in their dynamic uses. Given the number of uses, and in some cases subtypes
of these, associated with the dynamic meaning, we shall not attempt to provide a
full set of examples.
Consider firstly theoretical possibility. In the most central cases the
potentiality lies in the physical situation, an appropriate paraphrase being “have
an opportunity to”, expressed by past temporal could and might in (100) and
(101) respectively, by backshifted temporal could in (102), and by unreal
hypothetical might and could in (103) and (104) respectively.
114 Chapter 4

(100) I realised fairly quickly what I had done and was able to get Stuart to grab
the stuff on my lap, so I could put my head behind the newspaper better
and my leg down without anything else sliding. (ICE-AUS W2B-004 63)
(101) Such a glittering vehicle as this might occasionally be seen elsewhere in
the city, but never in their lives had these ragged, undernourished people
seen a pale blue Jaguar roadster in their dirty alleys, the gold insignia of
General Forla glinting malignantly as it passed. (ICE-GB W2F-015 32)
(102) He said they didn’t have any water in wh in whi in which they could bathe
(ICE-GB S1B-038 102)
(103) This is of course we know now a a rather simplistic kind of view of how
his uh ends might have been achieved (ICE-GB S2A-026 59)
(104) If many more views of the object were available the shape could be more
easily established (ICE-GB W2A-036 57)

The rational subtype is exemplified with past temporal might in (105), and
with hypothetical could and might in (106) and (107). In (105) the adjectival
modifier reasonable, and in (107) the adverb reasonably, provide harmonic
reinforcement.

(105) It landed me in some small adventures such as no reasonable Anglo-

Prussian might expect (ICE-GB S2B-025 2)
(106) A high level of population/employment growth, high labour mobility and
successful labour market programs has ensured that Australia has avoided
the structural unemployment problems experienced in Europe. It could be
argued however that the high unemployment rate may in itself create
structural unemployment. (ICE-AUS W1A-008 62)
(107) Um what are Australia's top priorities in public expenditures which might
reasonably be directed in the next decade to research and development
(ICE-AUS S2A-028 29)

The implicitly quantificational, existential, subtype is exemplified with

past temporal could in (108) and unreal hypothetical could in (109), where the
proposition is understood to apply to a subset of members of the relevant
population (“Some Augusts were very busy”, “There are some individuals it
would not be possible to hypnotise …”).

(108) During my banking or property days August could be a very busy month
indeed (ICE-GB W2B-012 31)
(109) Some individuals couldn’t be hypnotized and you couldn’t produce that,
but to a large proportion of the population you could hypnotise them and
say to them under hypnosis, your left arm is paralysed (ICE-GB S1B-070
85)

The ability use is found almost exclusively with could: the only instances
of ability might appearing archaic, as in (110):
Possibility, permission and ability 115

(110) Frantic now, not thinking how he might control his rage, he ran from room
to room, scattering sundry possessions from the dressing-table, bathroom
shelves, kitchen cupboards (ICE-GB W2F-008 115)

As observed above, the ability use differs from the other dynamic uses we have
discussed to the extent that the potentiality in question is located within the
subject-referent. As with ability can, the basis on which such potentiality is
predicated of the subject-referent is prior actualization, as in (111).

(111) But I mean it’s it yeah it’s even at a higher level than that though because I
mean Pete could do basic things on a computer but it wasn’t enough (ICE-
GB S1A-005 189)

However this is not a necessary condition: in (112) we are led to understand that
Weary has not previously swum across lake Eacham.

(112) Weary has never been able to resist a challenge, especially one involving
extraordinary physical effort, and he accepted a bet that he couldn’t swim
across Lake Eacham and back, a distance which he calculated to be about
a kilometre and a half. (ICE-AUS W2B-005 25)

The lexical verbs in this use may denote not only acquired skills as in
(111) and (112), but also innate capacities, as in (113), in which case non-human
and even inanimate subjects are possible:

(113) The Combi couldn’t do more than about twenty miles an hour (ICE-AUS
S1A-059 149)

The potentiality sense is associated not only with temporal uses as in

(111), and (112), but also hypothetical, as in (114) and (115).

(114) For instance, the same system viewing a 60 km by 60 km area from a low
orbit could transmit data to give 10 m resolution, but used in geostationary
orbit to cover a whole hemisphere would have to be restricted to 5 km
resolution using the same data transmission rate. (ICE-GB W2A-037 58)
(115) Frantic now, not thinking how he might control his rage, he ran from room
to room, scattering sundry possessions from the dressing-table, bathroom
shelves, kitchen cupboards (ICE-GB W2F-008 115)

When ability could is used with verbs of perception as in (116), and

cognition as in (117), the degree of modality is low, as evidenced by the fact that
could could typically be readily omitted (“They heard the phone ringing”; “Dr
Hewson said he understood Mr Bradbury’s frustration”).
116 Chapter 4

(116) As they drove into the garden, they could hear the phone ringing through
the empty house. (ICE-AUS W2F-004 122)
(117) Dr Hewson said he could understand Mr Bradbury’s frustration but he
must accept that he and the party organisation do not make the policies of
the parliamentary party. (ICE-AUS W2C-004 28)

The currently actualized sense may be associated not only with the temporal uses
as in (116) and (117), but also hypothetical as in (118).

(118) They’ve got all the cheeses and they’ve got ah eggs and brus bread and
bread rolls and pitta bare bread um and all the nuts of course as well as all
the beautiful fruit that you could imagine (ICE-AUS S1A-092 93)

Dynamic implication, found mainly with could, is a pragmatic extension

of the unreal hypothetical use, with the utterance being used to perform a speech
act other than mere assertion: for instance, offer as in (119), and request as in
(120):

(119) I could uhm get you that other book when I stay at Hilda’s if you’re near
U C (ICE-GB S1A-053 167)
(120) In your letter to me you say that “it is not the ownership of the NRMA that
is under review.” Could you explain that to me please? (ICE-AUS W1B-
026 86)

Might can be used to implicate a suggestion, as in (121), and is regularly used to

do so in the idiom might as well, as in (122):

(121) Now if if that is the form that your publication is is going to take um then
one of the things that you might also think about as an adjunct to your
address is the use of audio-visuals or at least visuals. (ICE-AUS S1B-003
220)
(122) I used to just always heat the house because it was always if you if your
house was cold the kids get sick and you pay it out in medical bills
anyway if so you might as well just forget about it just heat your house
(ICE-AUS S1A-046 15)

Dynamic implicature is typically found with 1st and 2nd person subjects,
rd
but 3 person subjects are also possible, as in (123):

(123) It would be advantageous if the initial clean could occur the previous
weekend 20/21 July. (ICE-GB W1B-028 29)
Possibility, permission and ability 117

4.3.2.3 Deontic possibility

In the present corpora all tokens of deontic possibility, or ‘permission’, might

were subjective, and generally found in questions as in (124), and in conditionals
as in (125), with the addressee as the deontic source:

(124) My oh why I don’t lose sl I don’t lose sleep over it might I say (ICE-AUS
S2B-047 181)
(125) If I might just turn to that ah and just point out where I think that the the
defect is (ICE-AUS S1B-057 28)

Permission could, by contrast, yielded both subjective tokens as in (126)

and objective as in (127).

(126) Steve Kayland, could I ask you to comment here (ICE-AUS S1B-021 181)
(127) Anderson states the British imperialism was a cultural policy of
anglization anglicisation and stresses the incompatibility of empire and
nation. Australians could not become Governors-general until much later
on and these positions were held by the English English. (ICE-AUS W1A-
007 27)

4.3.3 May and might: one lexeme or two?

Could regularly serves as a temporal past form and is uncontroversially regarded

as the preterite counterpart of can. The evidence for a comparable inflectional
relationship between may and might is somewhat less compelling. As we have
seen, might is rarely temporal past (see Section 4.3.1.1). In the epistemic meaning
(see Section 4.3.2.1) the level of likelihood expressed by ‘weak’ might is no
longer systematically distinguishable from that expressed by may. Conversely,
may has assumed functions once the sole province of might, as suggested by
examples – encountered more commonly in the Australian data than in the British
or American – of the type in (128) where may is used in backshift, and in (129)
where it is used in an unreal conditional.

(128) The Sandanistas thought that the invasion of Grenada may help their
prospects for the 1990 election which resulted from a peace process
initiated by the Central American governments. (ICE-AUS W1A-014 171)
(129) Queenslanders may be much better off if there was simply a moratorium
on new Government services and programs until the economy picks up.
(ICE-AUS W2C-002 197)

It would appear that the relationship between may and might is considerably less
regular than that between can and could, supporting Huddleston and Pullum’s
(2002: 202) claim that for many speakers today “may has been reanalyzed as
118 Chapter 4

lexically distinct from might: they are forms of different lexemes, both present
tense forms.”

4.3.4 Might and could: regional and stylistic variation

Mair and Leech’s (2006) findings indicate that might is in decline both in BrE
writing (with a decrease of 15.1% in the period spanning the early 1960s to the
early 1990s) and AmE writing (4.5%): see Table 1.4 above. However a
comparison of its frequencies in speech and writing suggests that might’s future
may not be as bleak as that of its present tense counterpart may. As noted in
Section 4.1.4 above, may is over three times more common in writing. By
contrast, might is more popular in speech than writing (by a ratio of 2115:1619,
or 1.3:1). There are some striking regional differences: in the Australian corpus
might is more than twice as common in speech as writing (875:425, or 2.05:1),
but in C-US marginally more common in writing (539:507, or 1.06:1). The
apparent association of might with more conservative, formal, usage in the
American corpus is consistent with its relatively smaller overall numbers.

Table 4.10. Genre distribution of might

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Avg
Spoken Dialogue 958 (345) 872 (314)
Monologue 750 (180) 525 (126)
Total 875 (525) 733 (440) 507 (59) 705
Written Non-printed 240 (24) 520 (52)
Printed 487 (146) 700 (210)
Total 425 (170) 655 (262) 539 (43) 540
Total 695 702 520 (102) 639

By comparison with might, could is more frequent in C-US than in the

other two corpora. Mair and Leech’s (2006) finding that could has undergone a
6.8% decline in recent AmE is perhaps reflected in its more modest popularity in
speech over writing in C-US (1.02:1) than in ICE-GB (1.13:1) or ICE-AUS
(1.18:1).

Table 4.11. Genre distribution of could

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Avg
Spoken Dialogue 1,883 (678) 1,925 (693)
Monologue 1,325 (318) 1,358 (326)
Total 1,660 (996) 1,698 (1,019) 1,767 (206) 1,708
Written Non-printed 1,540 (154) 1,370 (137)
Printed 1,467 (440) 1,553 (466)
Total 1,485 (594) 1,508 (603) 1,738 (139) 1,577
Total 1,590 1,622 1,757 (345) 1,656
Possibility, permission and ability 119

4.4 Be able to

With a total of 889 tokens in the three corpora, the lexico-modal be (un)able to
does not threaten the numerical supremacy of can/could, whose combined total is
11,220 tokens.

4.4.1 Meanings of be able to

There are conflicting opinions in the literature regarding the semantic relationship
between can and the lexico-modal be able to. According to some, be able to can
only express ability. For example Hermerén (1978: 83) claims that “be able to
will be used as a paraphrase of can (in the ability sense)”, and Facchinetti (2000:
118) that “Of the three values conveyed by can – possibility, ability, and
permission – the modal appears to be paraphrased by use of be able to only with
the value of ability”. By contrast Coates (1983: 124) is of the view that be able to
covers the range of meaning associated with can. The truth lies somewhere in-
between: be able to can certainly express more than merely ability, and yet at the
same time there are several uses of can that cannot be served by be able to. The
lexico-modal cannot be used for subjective deontic possibility, dynamic
existential possibility, present actualized ability with ‘private’ verbs of perception
and cognition, or epistemic possibility, and thus could not readily be substituted
for can in the following:

(130) She she she came to the point where she said you know you don’t have to
go you can stay al alright (ICE-AUS S1A-064 86)
(131) it’s her it’s her duty to be on the door every night but um yeah it can be a
bit of a nuisance sometimes (ICE-AUS S1A-074 125)
(132) Yes you said I can understand that (ICE-AUS S1A-006 279)
(133) It can’t possibly be faster on the back (ICE-AUS S1A-005 277)

However, as the following examples show, apart from these restrictions, be able
to can be used across the range of meanings expressed by can. With the exception
of the two dynamic uses illustrated in (131) and (132) above, all the other
dynamic uses of can are possible with be able to. Thus, the lexico-modal
expresses ability in (134), circumstantial potentiality in (135), rational possibility
in (136), and dynamic implication (here with the illocutionary force of a
suggestion) in (137). In (138) it expresses objective deontic possibility:

(134) And I’m sure even the affirmative team once they’d eventually nutted out
the on part would be able to work out how to turn the bloody thing off
(ICE-AUS S1B-036 219)
(135) I just presumed that you were able to weigh yourself at Brin’s (ICE-GB
S1A-011 183)
(136) However, not all is rosy. Jill Matthews in 1988 (1986?) was able to
complain about the far greater number of male contributions to the
120 Chapter 4

Australian bicentenary project than women, and also to state that, in these
volumes, the role of women generally remained confined to childcare and
food production, and providing an audience while men got on with
whatever real business. (ICE-AUS W1A-018 92)
(137) I said on the ’phone, we have not reached any decision about this and it
would be very helpful if we were able to discuss it further. (ICE-GB
W1B-017 80)
(138) It is not clear whether a publisher is able to control the making of a
machine readable copy of the edition by exercise of the published edition
copyright. (ICE-AUS W1B-17 60)

As Table 4.12 indicates, the dynamic uses are dominant with be able to
(representing 90.4% of all tokens, compared with 81.0% for can and 77.4% for
could), with only a handful of deontic cases.

Table 4.12. Meanings of be able to

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Total %
Ability 139 204 158 (31) 501 (374) 42.9%
Theor poss 209 182 163 (32) 554 (423) 47.5%
Deontic 18 23 10 (2) 51 (43) 4.4%
Indeterminate 21 25 15 (3) 61 (49) 5.2%
Total 387 434 346 (68) 1,167 (889) 100%

Both Facchinetti (2000) and Aijmer (2004) attempt to distinguish can and
be able to on the basis of an implication of actuality carried by the latter, often
paraphraseable by ‘manage to’ or ‘succeed in’. Thus in (139), where could would
sound quite unnatural, was able to conveys the subject-referent’s successful
achievement of its victory (“the Labor Government managed to achieve/
succeeded in achieving its victory”).

(139) But now it’s time now it’s time for the Student Movement to ask the
Federal Government to return that favour in kind because there’s no doubt
that it was due to the support the support from groups such as the Student
Movement that the Labor Government was able to achieve its victory
(ICE-AUS S2A-040 90)

However, this claim is problematical, or at least in need of extensive

qualification. For one thing, as we have seen in Section 4.2.3.2 above there are
uses of can (most notably with verbs of perception and cognition) where we can
speak of actualization. Furthermore the difference is far more salient when we
compare the preterite forms could and was/were able to than it is when we
compare the present forms can and am/is/are able to. In (140) the present
generalizations about the abilities of the human body feature a number of relevant
expressions including not only can and be able to but also ability, able-bodied
Possibility, permission and ability 121

and capable, with no apparent difference in implied actuality.

(140) And it also makes you so aware of your own ability, and other people’s
abilities, and how the body works whereas, uhm when you’re uhm
working with a very able-bodied people you become very blasé about it I
think and you forget, how complicated the body is and how, wonderful it
is to be able to move certain parts and ways of doing it and the various
different ways you can do it and even when you can’t actually, uh you
aren’t capable of moving how you can get around these problems and
become capable of moving (ICE-GB S1A-002 45)

On the other hand, as noted by Palmer (1990: 90): “In the past tense BE
ABLE TO is used to indicate ‘actuality’ in environments in which CAN cannot
be used”. Thus be able to is virtually obligatory in assertive contexts with a single
action as in (141), and is preferred to could when habitual or repeated actions are
referred to, as in (142).

(141) Because I had been carrying the tape recorder with me, I was able to
record the authentic sounds of the of the various technicians and therapists
at work, when I went to the National Hospital for check ups. (ICE-GB
W2B-001 55)
(142) However there have been highly hierarchical society pastoralists groups
such as the Mongols who, through intense military organization were able
to conquer a huge area of land, maintaining an empire that negotiated
trade routes between the East and the West. (ICE-GB W1A-011 57)

This restriction does not apply to non-assertive contexts, however, presumably

because these carry no implication of actuality. Thus could not is possible as a
replacement for the semantically negative were unable to in (143):

(143) Done first saw The Cabin when he was 14, began renting it in the early
eighties, but was unable to buy it until 1987. (ICE-AUS W2B-010 198)

It is perhaps the availability of preterite was/were able to for indicating

actualization, where could is unable to do so, that explains the different
proportions of present/preterite forms for be able to (134 preterite tokens as
against 124 present: see Table 4.13) and can (7663 present tokens as against 3557
preterite).
122 Chapter 4

Table 4.13. Be able to and tense

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Total %
Present 49 67 41 (8) 157 (124) 13.5%
Preterite 55 67 61 (12) 183 (134) 15.7%
Non-tensed 283 300 244 (48) 827 (631) 70.9%
Total 387 434 346 (68) 1,167 (889) 100%

4.4.2 Be able to: regional and stylistic variation

Of the three corpora ICE-GB has the largest number of tokens (434) and C-US
the smallest (346), with ICE-AUS in-between (387). Interestingly, however, C-
US is the only corpus in which be able to is more frequent in speech than writing
(by a ratio of 412:250, or 1.6:1, compared to 343:453, or 0.75:1, for ICE-AUS
and 380:515, or 0.73:1, for ICE-GB), perhaps suggesting that despite its modest
numbers in C-US the lexico-modal is faring comparatively well.

Table 4.14. Genre distribution of be able to

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Avg
Spoken Dialogue 325 (117) 381 (137)
Monologue 371 (89) 379 (91)
Total 343 (206) 380 (228) 412 (48) 378
Written Non-printed 650 (65) 800 (80)
Printed 387 (116) 420 (126)
Total 453 (181) 515 (206) 250 (20) 406
Total 387 434 346 (68) 389

Notes

1
Even though, strictly speaking, able and unable are separate lexemes they
are here treated as belonging to the same lexico-modal on the grounds of
the close relationship between not able to and unable to.
2
Trousdale’s (2003) study of non-standard Tyneside English reveals trends
far more advanced than in the present study. In this variety might has
become the main marker of epistemic possibility, with 91.2% of might
tokens expressing this meaning (as against 79.2% for standard BrE in the
present study). A more striking finding in the Trousdale study is that
epistemic possibility accounted for only 8.8% of may tokens (whereas in
the present study it seems to be more a matter of might catching up to may
Possibility, permission and ability 123

– 79.0% of whose tokens expressed epistemic possibility – than a case of

may declining).
Chapter 5

Prediction and volition

While necessity and possibility are firmly established domains of modality,

logically related to each other and involving clearly identifiable epistemic and
deontic meanings, by contrast the prediction/volition domain discussed in this
chapter is less central. It includes epistemic uses of a temporal nature which may
involve a minimal component of modal meaning. Furthermore, the dominant type
of non-epistemic meaning, involving the subject-referent’s volition, has received
little attention in the literature on modality, a situation explained by Krug (2000)
as follows:

Due to the progressive grammaticalization of the will future since

Middle English, no central modal has ‘desire’ as its central notional
domain any longer, even though some volitive traces can be found in
will and would. (Krug 2000: 117)

Volition has, furthermore, been associated with different types of modality: not
only dynamic, as in the present study, but also deontic (e.g. Traugott 1989: 38)
and agent-oriented (Bybee et al. 1994: Chapter 6).
The expressions examined in this chapter are the modals will (embracing
the forms will, ’ll and won’t, and the preterite forms would, ’d and wouldn’t) and
shall (shall, shan’t), and the quasi-modals be going to (going to preceded by all
the inflectional forms of be, along with gonna and gunna), want to (want to,
wants to, wanted to, wanting to, plus wanna), and be about to (about to preceded
by all the inflectional forms of be).
As Table 5.1 shows, this group is dominated by will and would, which
together account for 75.2% of all tokens across the three corpora. Shall is by
contrast a minor modal (shown by Mair and Leech 2006 to be in severe decline:
see Section 1.4 above), with an average frequency 27.4 times smaller than that of
will. The quasi-modals be going to and want to are both substantially more
popular in C-US than in the British and Australian corpora, a finding that is
compatible with Mair and Leech’s (2006) finding that they have undergone a
massive increase in AmE writing in recent decades (see Section 1.4). Although
will is not under threat from want to in terms of overall frequency, a comparison
of the volitional tokens (2,296 for will and 2,137 for want to: see Table 5.3 and
5.14 below) suggests that with respect to this meaning the quasi-modal may be
challenging the modal.
126 Chapter 5

Table 5.1. Frequencies of the expressions of prediction and volition

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Total Avg
Modals will 3,868 3,861 3,950 (776) (8,505) 3,893
shall 100 223 102 (20) (343) 142
would 3,585 3,404 4,001 (786) (7,775) 3,663
Total 7,553 7,488 8,053 (1,582) (16,623) 7,698
Quasi- be going to 1,191 1,056 2,413 (474) (2,721) 1,553
modals want to 1,039 858 1,425 (280) (1,897) 1,107
be about to 63 54 36 (7) (124) 51
Total 2,293 1,968 3,874 (761) (5,022) 2,717
Total 9,846 9,456 11,926 (2,343) (21,645) 10,409
NB For C-US figures are normalized to tokens per one million words; raw figures
in parentheses.

5.1 Will

Will is primarily an exponent of epistemic modality, this meaning accounting for

59.2% of all tokens across the three corpora, approximately twice as many as for
dynamic modality (30.4%), while deontic modality was a minor meaning in the
data (1.7%).

Table 5.2. Meanings of will

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Total %
Epistemic 2,662 2,523 2,128 (418) 6,913 (5,603) 59.2%
Dynamic 945 1,044 1,563 (307) 3,552 (2,296) 30.4%
Deontic 68 84 51 (10) 203 (162) 1.7%
Indeterminate 193 210 209 (41) 612 (444) 5.2%
Total 3,868 3,861 3,950 (776) 11,679 (8,505) 100%

5.1.1 Epistemic will

There are two main uses of epistemic will, which we shall discuss in turn. One is
the uncontroversially epistemic use in which will is found with present and past
situations, and labelled ‘central-epistemic’ by Huddleston and Pullum (2002:
188), and ‘predictability’ by Coates (1983: 169). The other use, where the status
of will as temporal or modal has been subject to debate in the literature (e.g.
Lyons 1968: 310, Palmer 1990: 163), is found with future time situations. The
use is labelled ‘futurity’ by Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 188), and ‘prediction’
by Coates (1983: 169). We shall adopt Coates’ terms ‘predictability’ and
‘prediction’.
Prediction and volition 127

In (1) and (2) predictability will conveys the speaker’s confidence in the
truth of the proposition, based on evidence and knowledge of, respectively, a
present situation and a past situation:

(1) In other words, referring to a particular instance of the the total idea, a
home truth or a a particular type of truth then it will have those properties
(ICE-AUS S2A-022 92)
(2) It has to be said that some of the reason for this is that S&P rate only the
top tier of companies in Europe, so the highly publicised troubles that
have hit smaller companies don’t show in the European statistics, while
they will have been a major factor behind the increase in the US
downgradings. (ICE-GB W2C-013 55)

Predictability will predominantly involves subjective modality, but

occasional objective examples are found, as in:

(3) However, the positive side of C3 is connected to the supply via R11.
Because its negative end is now connected to a low, C3 will charge
towards 12V. When C3 has charged sufficiently, the input to IC1c will be
a logic 1, causing its output to switch low. (ICE-AUS W2D-013 76)

In such cases there is a low degree of modality: the evidence for the factuality of
the proposition is so compelling that it would be possible to substitute is for will
be (“the input to IC1c is a logic 1”) with little change of meaning.
Predictability will is semantically strong, comparable in strength to
epistemic must. In (4) epistemic will and must alternate, and it would be possible
to substitute one for the other without altering the strength of the speaker’s
claims:

(4) Douglas Hurd will doubtless be grateful for that endorsement not least
because of the pressure he must be feeling this morning. (ICE-GB S2B-
009 87)

Nevertheless must and will are dissimilar in other ways, as Huddleston and
Pullum (2002: 189) observe:

Must conveys the idea of conclusion, and is often used in explanations:

Ed’s late – he must have overslept. With central-epistemic will it is more a
matter of assumption or expectation, very often with a suggestion of future
confirmation, as in: I can’t tell you what the word means but it will be in
the dictionary. (Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 189)

The second, ‘prediction’, use of will has prompted a good deal of debate
concerning its status as a marker of future tense or an epistemic modal (e.g.
Declerck 1991: 8-13, Huddleston 1995, Larreya 2000). It is excluded from the
128 Chapter 5

epistemic category by Palmer, who nevertheless concedes that: “Where there is

reference to future action, it is difficult, and sometimes impossible, to distinguish
epistemic WILL from the WILL of futurity” (1990: 57). Palmer’s case for
maintaining a distinction between futurity will and epistemic will rests primarily
on examples such as (5) and (6) which, in his view, involve factual assertions that
lack any element of speaker judgement (Palmer 1990: 163).

(5) It’ll be Christmas soon. (ICE-GB W2F-016 115)

(6) ’Cos she’s she’ll be seventeen after August so seventeen’s normal but
most people are seventeen turning eighteen and she’s sixteen turning
seventeen (ICE-AUS S1A-036 75)

It is certainly true that the degree of modality is low here, with will seemingly
little more than a mere marker of futurity (as indicated by the fact that will could
be readily omitted: “It’s Christmas soon”; “she’ll be seventeen after August”).
While the epistemic modal component may be minimal, it is nevertheless not
completely absent: even in the case of (5) and (6) the prediction could be
prevented from coming true by an unforeseen eventuality, such as the death of the
subject-referent in the case of (6). As Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 190)
observe, there is an intimate connection between futurity and modality: “our
knowledge about the future is inevitably much more limited than our knowledge
about the past and the present, and what we say about the future will typically be
perceived as having the character of a prediction rather than an unqualified
factual assertion”. In the present study the will of ‘prediction’ is treated as
belonging to epistemic modality rather than being merely a marker of futurity.
A further indication of the low degree of modality associated with
prediction will is its compatibility with a wide range of modal adjuncts of
different strengths, such as hopefully in (7), possibly in (8), and most likely in (9),
which provide more specific modal meaning in the absence of a distinctive
epistemic component expressed by the modal.

(7) The following notes provide guidance on some of the conditions placed on
these arrangements, and hopefully will serve to avoid misunderstandings.
(ICE-GB W2D-006 118)
(8) Depending on who comes, you’ll possibly need to bring sleeping bags and
I hope you don't mind sleeping on the floor. (ICE-GB W1B-004 53)
(9) you’ll most likely strengthen your defenses (C-US Frown G03 118)

The case for regarding prediction will as expressing epistemic modality is

based not merely on the modal overlay that accompanies instances of its use, but
also on the co-occurrence patterns that it shares with predictability will. For
example, both predictability will and prediction will may collocate with the
epistemic adjunct probably, as in (10) and (11) respectively:
Prediction and volition 129

(10) The bait will probably be stored in a fridge in the same medium in which it
was supplied from the maggot farm (invariably sawdust). (ICE-GB W2D-
017 52)
(11) The sun is out, just a spasm, but by this arvo it will probably be slightly
warmer. (ICE-AUS W1B-003 21)

Predictability will and prediction will may both be used with the perfect aspect, as
in (12) and (13):

(12) Well if it’s any sort of amendment at all and the proposer doesn’t accept it
then it can’t go straight to the vote until uhm the amendment has been li
discussed because there won’t have been a speech against the motion by
by b by by by the very nature of the fact you cannot move it until there’s
been a speech against it (ICE-GB S1A-068 26)
(13) So in just three years with Richmond Jackson will’ve played just nineteen
games (ICE-AUS S2B-016 183)

In (14) and (15) both are used with the progressive aspect:

(14) Okay And the events that they’ll be talking about will be occurring in the
here and now whereas with decontextualized language the entities are
likely to be absent from the material situation or setting or they're likely to
be generic kind of entities (ICE-AUS S2A-046 64)
(15) His lead up months haven’t been too bad and he’ll be running on at the
end of the race (ICE-AUS S2A-017 131)

In (16) and (17) both are used with the passive voice:

(16) It will gradually be incorporated into the soil by earthworms and other soil
creatures. (ICE-GB W2D-016 29)
(17) At the end of the seventy five days the licence will be allocated to us I
believe (ICE-AUS S1B-046 215)

In (18) and (19) both are used with non-agentive verbs:

(18) A good quality pencil has a bonded lead, usually etched with acid, that
will not shatter inside the wood if the pencil is dropped, nor slide out in
use. (ICE-GB W2D-016 29)
(19) These are just a few of the visible benefits that will come about as
chemical farming methods are gradually abandoned. (ICE-GB W2B-027
46)

In (20) and (21) both are used with stative verbs:

130 Chapter 5

(20) Even the most moderately priced unit these days will have a zoom facility,
which ideally should give a bottom picture section of about thirty metres.
(ICE-AUS W2D-015 77)
(21) They won’t like that, and if you feel like me ... you couldn’t face being
stripped by Manangans anyhow. (ICE-GB W2F-015 163)

In (22) and (23) both are used in the existential there-construction:

(22) And within any phrase there will be an internal structure consisting of the
main word, usually referred to as the head and the subordinate words or
the dependent words (ICE-AUS S2A-022 31)
(23) Don’t forget next weekend is um Anzac weekend though so there’ll be a
lot of people away (ICE-AUS S1A-023 323)

Finally, in (24) and (25) both are used in the it-extraposition construction:

(24) In other words, if you look around the languages of the world, it will
probably be true that if they have nouns and if they have verbs and if they
have adjectives, the most common sorts of roles that these words play will
be to refer to things in the case of nouns, to refer to actions in the case of
verbs, to refer to descriptions in the case of adjectives (ICE-AUS S2A-022
205)
(25) Uh it’ll probably be rather nice actually actually trying to match that up
(ICE-GB S1A-086 100)

Prediction will is semantically strong (like predictability will but unlike

other epistemic modals that may be used with reference to future time situations,
such as may, might, should, could). Note the contrast between epistemically weak
might and semantically strong will in the following example:

(26) You might be admired for your red tie, but you will be derided for your
seventies attitudes. (ICE-AUS S2A-044 34)

Epistemic will may also, as both Palmer (1990: 138) and Huddleston and Pullum
(2002: 191-192) observe, convey a conditional meaning: more precisely, it may
be used in the apodosis of conditional constructions, where it has a stronger sense
than weak epistemic may. The time of the situation may be present or past (with
the will of predictability) as in (27) and (28), or future (with the will of
prediction) as in (29). In this conditional use will is usually objective, and low in
modality (note that the will-clause in (27) is a repair for the incomplete, and
unmodalized, you actually see them in the papers).

(27) And if you keep your eyes open you actually you’ll see them in the papers
as as as facts (ICE-GB S1A-063 167)
Prediction and volition 131

(28) But if you take those patients on the weekly regimen who finish their
treatment at this point in time here they will have received a much higher
overall dose than patients on the three-weekly regimen at the same point in
time (ICE-GB S2A-035 70)
(29) The organisation ARK has said that sea-level will rise by one metre if
present pollution levels and conditions continue (ICE-GB S1B-007 199)

The figures in Table 5.3 suggest that speakers use epistemic will far more
commonly to make predictions and predictability judgements about a third party
(80.0%) than about either themselves (8.7%) or their addressee(s) (11.2%). By
contrast with epistemic will, dynamic will occurs most commonly with a 1st
person subject (72.2%), speakers presumably finding themselves more often in a
position to describe their own volition than that of others.

Table 5.3. Person of the subject with will

1st 2nd 3rd Total
Epistemic 489 (8.7%) 630 (11.2%) 4,484 (80.0%) 5,603 (100%)
Dynamic 1,658 (72.2%) 51 (2.2%) 587 (25.6%) 2,296 (100%)
Deontic 0 (0.0%) 149 (92.0%) 13 (8.0%) 162 (100%)
Indeterminate 145 (32.7%) 30 (6.8%) 269 (60.6%) 444 (100%)
Total 2,292 (26.9%) 860 (10.1%) 5,353 (62.9%) 8,505 (100%)

Whereas modals in the other semantic groups enter into contrasts of

internal and external negation, such as that between mustn’t and needn’t (see
Section 3.4.1), epistemic will does not enter into such contrasts. In the case of
both predictability won’t as in (30) and prediction won’t as in (31) the negation is
internal (“it can be predicted that not-p”), and there are no forms available in
which the modality rather than the proposition is negated.

(30) your English guide thing is is sure to have that won’t it (ICE-AUS S2B-
032 74)
(31) Oh well ours won’t be till September as usual (ICE-GB S1A-087 123)

As Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 192) point out the behaviour of epistemic will
with respect to negation is a reflection, along with the fact that as noted above it
is compatible with modal adjuncts of differing strengths, of its status as a low-
degree modal.

5.1.2 Dynamic will

Dynamic will expresses the potential for an activity or event deriving,

characteristically, from the subject-referent’s volition. In (32) there is a contrast
between the first instance of won’t, which expresses this meaning (“I am
unwilling/reluctant to take the case”), and the second, which occurs within a
132 Chapter 5

clausal complement to the noun likelihood with the non-agentive verb come (up
with) and expresses epistemic prediction (“I can be predicted not to”):

(32) I’m not saying I won’t take the case, but you’ve got to be prepared for the
likelihood that I won’t come up with anything. (ICE-AUS W2F-008 73)

A distinction may be drawn within the volitional will category, one

comparable in some respects to the temporally-determined distinction between
(future) prediction and (non-future) predictability, between ‘intention’ and
‘willingness’ (Coates 1983: 169-176). Intentional will, exemplified in (33) and
(34), focuses upon a future event that is planned, promised, threatened, etc.
(Coates’ ‘intention’), whereas with willingness will, exemplified in (35) and (36),
the focus is upon the present state of mind of the subject-referent.

(33) All right Go on Don’t be shy I won’t bite you yet but my God I will soon
(ICE-AUS S2A-056 37)
(34) We have submitted Purchasers Requisitions to the Vendor. We will
undertake the usual searches as soon as we receive your advices that
finance has been approved. (ICE-AUS W1B-021 36)
(35) Uh and then having got that at the end of the day it’s got to be your
decision anyway, because I won’t enter into a contract that says you ought
to go and do that (ICE-GB S1A-035 123)
(36) Will you please explain to me the meaning of the phrase “Currently,
NRMA’s profits are “locked up” ” used in answer to L.G. Norman’s
letter? (ICE-AUS W1B-026 78)

The strength of the volition with willingness will may be heightened, so

that it expresses determination or insistence. In the most typical cases will occurs
with a 1st person subject, is stressed and is not contractible to ’ll, as in (37) below.

(37) I certainly will yes (ICE-GB S1A-100 37)

Willingness will may often be glossed by periphrastic expressions such as

be willing to, and be prepared to. In (38) the alternation between will and be
willing to is suggestive of semantic closeness:

(38) But there’s a lot of people you get who who won’t accept that aren’t
willing to argue (ICE-GB S1A-084 117)

However as Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 192) warn, the auxiliary differs from
the periphrastic expressions in several respects. For one thing, the auxiliary
expresses stronger modality. In (34) above, for example, We will undertake the
usual searches entails the actualization of the searches, which explains why it
would sound odd to add but we may not manage to do so. Compare the
acceptability of We are willing to/are prepared to undertake the usual searches
Prediction and volition 133

but we may not manage to. Also suggestive of a semantic difference between
dynamic will and the periphrastics is the absence of a contrast with dynamic will,
as with epistemic will, between internal and external negation. In (35) for
example the negation type is unclear (though it may be preferable to regard it as
internal, insofar as it is our non-entering into a contract that is entailed rather than
our lack of volition), by contrast with the clear difference between We are not
willing to enter into a contract and We are willing not to enter into a contract.
Finally, whereas with dynamic will the time of the volition can only be present,
with the periphrastics it can also be past (was willing to, was prepared to, etc.) or
future (will be willing to, will be prepared to, etc.).
According to Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 193) the volitional meaning
of will is to be interpreted as a futurity-related implicature, deriving from the
assumption that a future situation is subject to the will of subject-referent. They
note, furthermore, that with a 1st person subject, as in (33) and (37) above,
volition may be associated with an additional implicature of commitment, such
that the speaker’s speech act might be thought of as a promise or an undertaking.
However, the distinctive co-occurrence patterns that we have noted above to be
displayed by epistemic will suggest that dynamic and epistemic prediction will
are in fact readily distinguishable. The difference between them is perhaps
sharpest in cases where the volitionality of dynamic will is reinforced by
negativeness, as in (35) above and (39) below, or by its use in a closed
interrogative with the illocutionary force of a request, as in (36) above and (40)
below:

(39) Those who won’t ask don’t get (ICE-GB W2E-003 57)
(40) If you cannot agree will you please telephone this office before sending
any further demands. (ICE-GB W1B-023 121)

According to Coates (1983: 176) the dynamic uses of will that we have
discussed above always occur with an animate subject. However in the present
data there were examples of will used with an inanimate subject (generally with
respect to situations concerned with the satisfaction of the speaker’s desires or
needs), as in:

(41) it won’t print because it keeps saying feed paper (ICE-GB S1A-077 6)
(42) when I go to bed at night I I have to st my arm won’t straighten you see
(ICE-GB S1A-052 73)

Dynamic will may be used with reference to an habitual or typical activity

that is ascribable to the disposition or insistence of the subject-referent.
Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 194) label this use ‘propensity’, describing it as
concerned with either “characteristic or habitual behaviour of animates” as in (43)
and (44), often with an attendant suggestion of the speaker’s disapproval or
resignation, or “general properties of inanimates” as in (45) and (46). Palmer
(1990: 136-137) distinguishes these as two different subtypes which he calls
134 Chapter 5

respectively ‘habit’ (“concerned with habitual (or better, ‘typical’) behaviour”)

and ‘power’ (“volition applied to inanimate objects”).

(43) There are those who will see all this activity as a sign of chaos, but it is
absolutely the opposite. (ICE-AUS W2C-017 107)
(44) a person with co-dependent behaviour is one who either stays in
relationships they don’t want to be in and are destructive for them because
they’re too scared of getting out of them or will never allow themselves to
be close enough to have a relationship because they’re too afraid of the
pains and things involved with it. (ICE-AUS S1B-025 186)
(45) Remember too that heavy rain will raise creek and stream levels and may
render them impassable; (ICE-AUS W2D-018 32)
(46) Hand stroking will remove any loose hairs and shredding is also minimal.
(ICE-AUS W2D-019 28)

Examples of this type are to be distinguished from those involving

habituality where the speaker makes an inference about the predictability of an
activity based on its regular occurrence and the disposition of the subject-referent
is not at-issue, as in (47) and (48). These I have classified as epistemic rather than
dynamic.1

(47) Wide departures from this value will invariably lead to malfunction which
can be either (1) insidious, hidden, with the system apparently working
normally or (2) catastrophic with total hardware failure with, perhaps, disk
drives not starting, components breaking down and sometimes even
smoke! (ICE-GB W2B-033 13)
(48) With an aperture setting of f2 the plane of sharpness will be rather
shallow, in some cases only a matter of a few centimetres. (ICE-AUS
W2D-016 54)

5.1.3 Deontic will

Will is occasionally used deontically, with a 2nd person subject and the speaker
understood to be the deontic source. Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 194) identify
this use as deriving via implicature from futurity: “if I predict your agentive
actions (or someone else’s) in a context where I have the authority to require
them, I will be understood as tacitly invoking that authority”. Examples follow:

(49) I’ll withdraw that above your right eye. You’ll say he headbutted you.
(ICE-AUS S1B-067 88)
(50) You’ll clear the bikes (ICE-GB S2A-054 35)
(51) And I said yeah and she said oh you’ll be quiet and I said yes so um um
yeah we had to go in and print in there because it just won’t feed and it
tried to do it last Tuesday (ICE-AUS S1A-021 52)
Prediction and volition 135

5.1.4 Will: regional and stylistic variation

Table 5.4. Genre distribution of will

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Avg
Spoken Dialogue 3,942 (1,419) 3,978 (1,432)
Monologue 4,763 (1,143) 3,579 (859)
Total 4,270 (2,562) 3,818 (2,291) 4,173 (486) 4,087
Written Non-printed 4,240 (424) 4,540 (454)
Printed 2,940 (882) 3,720 (1,116)
Total 3,265 (1,306) 3,925 (1,570) 3,625 (290) 3,605
Total 3,868 3,861 3,950 (776) 3,893

Will has very similar frequencies across the three corpora (see Table 5.4).
On average it is marginally more common in speech than writing (by a ratio of
1.1:1, and ratios in the three corpora of 1.31:1 for ICE-AUS, 0.97:1 in ICE-GB
and 1.15:1 in C-US). As Table 5.2 shows, the dominant epistemic and dynamic
meanings are not evenly distributed across the corpora, the ratio of epistemic to
dynamic tokens being 2.4:1 in both ICE-AUS and ICE-GB, but 1.4:1 in C-US.
However, comparison of the speech vs writing frequencies for dynamic will (see
Table 17, Appendix) reveals that it is equally popular in the two modes in C-US
(1,589:1,525) in the other two dialects it is approximately twice as popular in
speech as it is in writing (1,263:492 in ICE-AUS, and 1,298:662 in ICE-GB).
This finding, viewed in conjunction with the greater popularity of want to in C-
US than in ICE-AUS and ICE-GB (see Section 5.6.2), may suggest that – at least
in speech – dynamic will is succumbing to the incursion of want to more rapidly
in AmE than it is in the other two varieties.

5.2 Shall

Shall is traditionally associated with will, but its frequency is strikingly smaller,
the ratio of tokens being 343:8,505 (or 1:24.8). While they express similar
meanings the proportions are quite different (compare Tables 5.2 and 5.5):
epistemic modality/futurity is the main meaning for will, but minor for shall; and
deontic modality is the main meaning for shall, but minor for will. The negative
form shan’t is rare, with only four tokens in the data, three of them in ICE-GB.

Table 5.5. Meanings of shall

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Total %
Epistemic 1 14 31 (6) 46 (21) 10.8%
Dynamic 48 90 41 (8) 179 (146) 42.1%
Deontic 49 116 31 (6) 196 (171) 46.1%
Indeterminate 2 3 0 (0) 5 (5) 1.2%
Total 100 223 102 (20) 425 (343) 100%
136 Chapter 5

5.2.1 Epistemic shall

Both Palmer (1990: 162-163) and Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 195) claim that
shall is never found in the central epistemic use with non-future reference, and
Palmer presents this claim as supporting evidence for his treatment of future will
and shall as non-epistemic. However examples can be found, as in (52):

(52) Like those on the home front in earlier wars we shall often be imperfectly
informed of what is happening, and this too puts our patience to the test.
(ICE-GB W2E-007 22)

Furthermore shall diplays a number of the co-occurrence patterns that we

have observed with epistemic will (Section 5.1.1). These include compatibility
with an epistemic adjunct as in (53), use with the progressive aspect as in (54),
use with a non-agentive verb as in (55), and use with a stative verb as in (56):

(53) I shall probably look in at the College once or twice during the autumn,
and hope to see you then. (ICE-GB W1B-014 69)
(54) I understand that I shall be using this under my own responsibility. (ICE-
GB W1B-017 115)
(55) As we shall discover, the concept of child abuse is an extremely elusive
one and means different things to different people. (ICE-GB W2B-017 26)
(56) He asks God to disperse these mists, which blot and fill My perspective
still as they pass Or else remove me hence unto that hill Where I shall
need no glass (ICE-GB W1A-018 60)

Like epistemic will, epistemic shall may express conditional consequence,

in the apodosis of a conditional construction, as in:

(57) And if she recommends my book after that I shall be very surprised (ICE-
GB S1B-025 127)

Contemporary speakers, the data suggest, pay little heed to the traditional
prescriptive rule, that in referring to the future shall should take a 1st person
subject and will a 2nd or 3rd person subject: 8.7% of epistemic will tokens in the
corpora had a 1st person subject (see Table 5.3 above), while 28.6% of epistemic
shalls had a non-1st person subject (see Table 5.6 below), as in:2

(58) my heart’s desire is that my neighbour Ivan’s donkey shall die tomorrow
morning (ICE-GB S2B-047 77)
Prediction and volition 137

Table 5.6. Person of subject with shall

1st 2nd 3rd Total
Epistemic 15 (71.4%) 1 (4.8%) 5 (23.8%) 21 (100%)
Dynamic 146 (100%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 146 (100%)
Deontic 69 (40.4%) 0 (0%) 102 (59.6%) 171 (100%)
Indeterminate 4 (80%) 1 (20%) 0 (0%) 5 (100%)
Total 234 (68.2%) 2 (0.6%) 107 (31.2%) 343 (100%)
NB Figures represent raw frequencies

5.2.2 Dynamic shall

Dynamic volitionality is the second most common meaning of shall, as it is with

will. Voltional shall always takes 1st person subject in the data, and typically
expresses intentionality as in (59), but occasionally also willingness as in (60).

(59) Everything in Turkey is very cheap - which reminds me Cath, I shall send
you some Turkish money. (ICE-AUS W1B-012 17)
(60) Well I shan’t see her. (ICE-GB S1A-090 103)

5.2.3 Deontic shall

Shall has several deontic uses, the most central to this type of modality being that
which Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 194) describe as “constitutive/regulative”,
used with a 3rd person subject, and normally found in legal documents,
regulations, and the like, as in (61) and (62):

(61) Once an issue has been considered and appropriately addressed by

Council, relevant papers shall no longer be considered “Council-in-
Confidence” material. (ICE-AUS W2D-009 304)
(62) Pursuant to subsection 128(2) of the Act, the Commission Chairperson
may at any time, and shall wherever the Council does not have a
Chairperson, convene a meeting of the Regional Council. (ICE-AUS
W2D-009 34)

There are two further uses of shall which are appropriately identified by
Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 194) and Palmer (1990: 74) as deontic. In the first
of these the meaning may appear to be simply dynamic: however the speaker
does not merely indicate a readiness to carry out the activity, but rather
undertakes an obligation or gives a guarantee to do so (as in You shall have it
tomorrow). While there were no corpus examples with a 2nd person subject,
formulaic addressee-oriented examples of the type in (63) were counted as
belonging to this type:

(63) We shall see (ICE-GB S1A-098 29)

138 Chapter 5

The second non-central deontic use of shall is in ‘direction questions’ as in

(64) and (65), including interrogative tags as in (66), normally with a 1st person
subject. Such questions are used by the speaker to consult the addressee’s wishes,
prompting Coates (1983: 188) to treat this use as volitional. However the
undertaking that the speaker makes to perform the activity suggests that they are
more plausibly regarded as deontic. Notice that the most likely answer is not
declarative but rather imperative (e.g. Yes, do).

(64) Shall I do something civilized, like clear the table? (C-US SBC 03 1221)
(65) Shall I write it down for you? (ICE-GB S1B-080 21)
(66) I’ll go and get it, shall I? (ICE-GB W2F-004 198)

Sometimes the sense of obligation is less salient: the speaker may seek the
addressee’s advice, rather than consulting their wishes, as in (67).

(67) Yeah I’m I’ve been on the same position because I’ve been thinking you
know shall I push them for fulltime or shall I push them for a pay increase
you know (ICE-AUS S1A-061 99)

Like will you, shall we may be used with directive force, as in (68), where it is
used in a tag question attached to a 1st person imperative:

(68) Let’s stop for the moment, shall we? (ICE-GB S1A-001 51)

A similar kind of illocutionary force is associated with the use of shall in the
formula shall we say, used to introduce an expression that the speaker expects the
addressee to accept, even if provisionally:

(69) He did all sorts of things and he became a shall we say suburban
Australian archaeological hero. (ICE-AUS S1A-026 61)

5.2.4 Shall: regional and stylistic variation

Leech (2003) and Mair and Leech (2006) found shall to have suffered a massive
decrease in frequency between 1961 and 1991/2 in AmE and BrE writing (of
almost identical proportions: 43.8% from Brown to Frown, and 43.7% from LOB
to FLOB): see Table 1.4 above. There were some striking differences between the
dialects in the frequency of shall: the dispreference for this modal was relatively
less pronounced in ICE-GB (with 223 tokens per million words) than in ICE-
AUS (100) and C-US (102). The numbers for shall in the American corpus would
have been considerably less had it not been for their high frequency in one,
religious, text (SBC-020).
Prediction and volition 139

Table 5.7. Genre distribution of shall

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Avg
Spoken Dialogue 72 (26) 256 (92)
Monologue 17 (4) 163 (39)
Total 50 (30) 218 (131) 112 (13) 127
Written Non-printed 230 (23) 300 (30)
Printed 157 (47) 207 (62)
Total 175 (70) 230 (92) 88 (7) 164
Total 100 223 102 (20) 142

A comparison of the frequencies for shall across the corpus subcategories

provides further insights into the nature of its survival in BrE and AusE, as
reflected in its degree of robustness in speech. As Table 5.7 shows, shall is
relatively more popular in speech in ICE-GB than it is in ICE-AUS (the speech-
to-writing ratio in the two corpora being 0.9:1 and 0.3:1 respectively). The
skewing in C-US noted above resulting from the high number of tokens in a
single text invalidates meaningful comparisons with C-US on this dimension.

5.3 Would

Like preterite could and might, would has both temporal and hypothetical uses,
albeit in quite different proportions. While the overall ratio of past would to
hypothetical would is 29.5%:70.5%, the proportion of past would is lower in
speech (25.2%), and higher in writing (35.9%). This is not a surprising finding in
view of the relative popularity of past tense forms generally in such written
genres as news and fiction, as against conversation (q.v. Biber et al. 1999: 456).

Table 5.8. Uses of would as a preterite

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Avg
Spoken Past 915 (549) 787 (472) 1,374 (160) 1,025
Hypothetical 2,990 (1,794) 2,863 (1,718) 3,262 (380) 3,038
Total 3,905 (2,343) 3,650 (2,190) 4,637 (540) 4,064
Written Past 1,025 (410) 970 (388) 975 (78) 990
Hypothetical 1,728 (691) 1,770 (708) 1,800 (144) 1,766
Total 2,753 (1101) 2,740 (1096) 2,775 (222) 2,756
Indeterminate 141 118 122 (24) 127
Total 3,585 3,404 4,001 (786) 3,663

Apart from the absence of a deontic use, would shares with will a strong
preference for epistemic over dynamic modality (see Table 5.9).
140 Chapter 5

Table 5.9. Meanings of would

ICE- ICE-GB C-US Total %
AUS
Dynamic 1,210 702 606 (119) 2,518 (2,031) 22.9%
Epistemic 1,903 2,299 2,866 (563) 7,068 (4,765) 64.3%
Indeterminate 472 403 529 (104) 1,404 (979) 12.8%
Total 3,585 3,404 4,001 (786) 10,990 (7,775) 100%

5.3.1 Temporal would

Past time would may be dynamic, expressing volition, as in (70) and (71), and
propensity, as in (72) and (73).

(70) Since the cook would by no means of persuasion be induced to set foot
outside the house Pritchard wandered off by herself. (ICE-GB W2F-005
70)
(71) It was really funny. She like she looks around and this woman wouldn’t
help us wouldn’t serve us or anything (ICE-AUS S1A-009 97)
(72) Whenever it was put to him that India tilted towards the Soviet Union in
the great ideological divide, he would quote his mother. (ICE-GB W2B-
011 33)
(73) Occasionally he would proffer advice, I would decline it, he would insist,
and I would go off to the editor, Mr Trelford, who would almost always
support me. (ICE-GB W2B-015 50)

Like past time could, volitional would is normally restricted to non-affirmative

contexts with a single event. Thus it would not be possible to change the polarity
of (70) (*Since the cook would by means of persuasion …), or to substitute would
for wouldn’t in (71). Propensity would differs from volitional would in that it
involves an habitual situation, applying to the typical behaviour of the subject-
referent.
Epistemic modality is represented by the future in the past use, found
mainly in narrative genres, where we understand the event to have occurred
subsequent to the time referred to by would but before the time of the utterance,
as in (74).

(74) But the the area at the front here uh where in later Greek temples pieces of
sculpture will be placed that’s that’s nowhere near as useful a shape as it
would be later on (ICE-GB S2A-024 89)

The temporal use of would far more commonly involves backshifting. In

(75) and (76) backshifted would expresses respectively volition and futurity.
Prediction and volition 141

(75) One breeder said that any serious breeder would not sell a kitten like the
latter, although the former condition is controllable. (ICE-AUS W2D-019
107)
(76) Bob Hawke was still Prime Minister at that stage and I knew that Hazel
would be constrained to a certain extent in what she could write because of
that public office that she held (ICE-AUS S2A-041 55)

5.3.2 Hypothetical would

As with could and might, so with would, we may distinguish between the
hypothetical and weakened tentative uses.
Hypothetical would is found in the apodosis of unreal conditional
constructions, as in (77), but also occasionally in the clausal complement of wish,
as in (78).

(77) So it would only count if I was doing a coherent major in literature (ICE-
AUS S1A-015 267)
(78) I wish the stores would open earlier. (C-US SBC-011 698-700)

Hypothetical would typically expresses epistemic meaning, as in (77) and (78)

above, but volitional examples are also sometimes found, as in (79).

(79) If you could get them to me I would be d deeply appreciative. (C-US SBC-
021 76-8)

More often than not the protasis of the conditional construction is unexpressed,
implicit in the context, as in (80) where it might be interpreted as something like
“if I had to deal with them”, and in (81) “if you owned one”, and in the volitional
example in (82) “if I didn’t have to”.

(80) I mean I didn’t grow up with young children so I would be hopeless with
young children (ICE-AUS S1B-015 243)
(81) Feeding Breeders feed their cats a wide range of foods from commercial
cat food and biscuits to grated cheese, cottage cheese, yoghurt and lean
meat, with added calcium for kittens. It would cost about $5 to $8 a week
to feed Cornish Rex. (ICE-AUS W2D-019 68)
(82) This town stinks. I would never live here. It’s a dump. (ICE-AUS W1A-
010 233)

The tentative use of hypothetical would, like that of hypothetical could,

might and should, involves such features as diffidence, tact, politeness and
unassuredness. In (83) and (84) epistemic would is less assured or forthright than
epistemic will be or unmodalized is would be:

(83) he’d be a bit younger than Jeff wouldn’t he (ICE-AUS S1A-005 5)

142 Chapter 5

(84) That ’d ’d be about it I think, cos the imaging of planetaries is (ICE-GB

S2A-058 120)

In (85) and (86) it is used to perform the indirect speech act of requesting (literal
questions of this type about a person’s wishes being conventionally interpreted as
requests). (86) is even more syntactically indirect than (86) making it even more
diffident.

(85) We refer to further demands for 1989/90 issued on the 11th June and
would be grateful if you refer to our letter of the 17th June and also would
you please liaise with the Inspector as I do believe there is a repayment
which is sufficient to cover any outstanding amounts for 1989/90. (ICE-
GB W1B-023 120)
(86) Would you care to elaborate (ICEAUS S1B-016 209)

Similarly, in (87) suggest is used performatively, the only difference between

would suggest and suggest being the component of diffidence introduced by
tentative would.

(87) and what I would suggest is that we make you an appointment to go and
see one and talk it through (ICE-GB S1A-078 100)

Example (88) illustrates the formulaic phrase would/’d like to, a less
abrupt and confronting expression of volition than want to insofar as it allows
that it may not be possible to actualize the event expressed in the to-complement.

(88) I’d like to answer that in a s in a slightly different way (ICE-GB S1A-001
118)

The same phrase can also be used to formulate indirect speech acts, as in the
polite request in (89).

(89) Would you like to say grace (ICE-AUS S1A-004 47)

Tentative would is often used to reduce the speaker’s level of confidence in the
truth of the proposition, as in (90) and (91).

(90) I mean I’d ra I would imagine that that’s what people from the country
would bring to cousins in the city wouldn’t you think a a a nice fat goose
(ICE-GB S1B-014 106)
(91) No I wouldn’t think the market’s so slow at the moment (ICE-AUS S1A-
008 34)
Prediction and volition 143

5.3.3 Would: regional and stylistic variation

A comparison of the frequencies for would across the three corpora (see Table
5.4) indicates that it is more robust in the American data not only in terms of its
overall frequency but also in terms of its relative popularity in speech over
writing. In all three corpora would is more frequent in speech, but proportionately
moreso in C-US (1.7:1) than in ICE-AUS (1.4:1) and ICE-GB (1.3:1). This
finding is compatible with that of Mair and Leech (2006) that would has
undergone a milder decline in written AmE (6.1%) than it has in written BrE
(11.0%) in recent decades (see Table 1.4 above).
It may also be noted that AmE differs from the other two varieties in a
further respect. As the figures in Table 5.8 above show, while the proportion of
past woulds is comparable across the written components of the three corpora
(ICE-AUS 37.2%, ICE-GB 35.4%, and C-US 35.1%), C-US has a higher
proportion of past woulds in speech (29.6%) than the others (ICE-AUS 23.4%,
ICE-GB 21.6%).

Table 5.10. Genre distribution of would

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Avg
Spoken Dialogue 2,114 (1,761) 4,672 (1,682)
Monologue 2,800 (672) 2,408 (578)
Total 4,055 (2,433) 3,767 (2,260) 4,809 (560) 4,210
Written Non- 324 (324) 353 (353)
printed
Printed 2,760 (828) 2,637 (791)
Total 2,880 (1,152) 2,860 (1,144) 2,825 (226) 2,855
Total 3,585 3,404 4,001 (786) 3,663

5.4 Be going to

Be going to – a lexico-modal whose frequency (2,721 tokens) is just below that of

the most common lexico-modal in the present data, have to (2,827) – is an
idiomatic expression which derives historically from a progressive construction
with a literally motional sense, but whose motional and progressive senses have
been bleached in contemporary English. The grammaticalization of the idiom is
reflected in the incorporation, in informal varieties, of the infinitival to into a
morphological compound that is typically represented in informal writing as
gonna, sometimes gunna. There are 1,689 tokens of be going to in the three
corpora (as against 1,032 tokens of gonna/gunna). There is immense variation
across the corpora in the magnitude of the difference between the frequencies of
the full form versus the compound (1,047:9 in ICE-GB, 574:617 in ICE-AUS,
and 68:406 in C-US). While such a degree of variation is presumably indicative
of divergent transcription practices and cannot be taken as representative of the
144 Chapter 5

actual occurrence of the full and reduced forms in the three varieties, it is
nevertheless suggestive of dialectal variation, with the compound favoured most
in AmE.
Semantically be going to is broadly similar to will, though favouring
dynamic meanings comparatively more and epistemic meanings comparatively
less (see Tables 5.2 and 5.11).

Table 5.11. Meanings of be going to

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Total %
Epistemic 659 562 1,217 (239) 2,438 (1,460) 52.3%
Dynamic 446 408 957 (188) 1,811 (1,042) 38.9%
Deontic 4 11 25 (5) 40 (20) 0.9%
Indeterminate 82 75 214 (42) 371 (199) 8.0%
Total 1,191 1,056 2,412 (474) 4,659 (2,721) 100%

5.4.1 Epistemic be going to

It is generally assumed that with be going to the predication always refers to a

future event or state (Coates 1983: 198, Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 211).
However there is evidence in the corpora that be going to is not in fact restricted
to being merely a marker of futurity (a reflection of the modalization that it is
undergoing). In (92) and (93) be going to expresses general present reference, or
‘predictability’ (with always providing harmonic reinforcement in (92) and I
think in (93) compatible with the epistemic meaning). Substitution of will would
not affect the meaning in either case.

(92) Even though we’ve got this wretched document we’re talking about
there’s always going to be an Asterix book by the bedside or something
like that (ICE-GB S1A-013 188)
(93) I think that there’s going to be incompetence in every profession (ICE-GB
S1B-030 86)

There are nevertheless a number of differences between epistemic will and

be going to, which require us to qualify Westney’s (1995: 189) claim that “it is
impossible to point to any distinction between epistemic uses of will and be going
to, and it is tempting to see the periphrastic as simply a rare, markedly colloquial
alternative to the modal”. The first thing to notice is that examples such as (92)
and (93) are considerably less common with be going to than they are with will.
Secondly, when be is present tense be going to generally differs from will in
carrying an implicature of immediacy, typically being used with situations that
are on the point of occurring or are already in train. This implicature is
undoubtedly derived from the “current orientation” (Palmer 1990: 144)
associated with present tense forms of be: the future is referred to from the
Prediction and volition 145

standpoint of the present, thereby suggesting that there are features of the present
situation that are determining future events. In (94) and (95), for example, will
would not have the same implicature of immediacy that is found with be going to:
in (94) the imminence of rain is indicated by current weather conditions, while in
(95) the woman is already experiencing the symptoms which lead her to believe
that she is about to faint.

(94) No no um no it’s that it looks as if it’s gonna rain and it’s been like this for
a few days you know (ICE-AUS S1A-090 106)
(95) So we sat down and started to eat and after a minute, maybe two, she said,
“I feel really dreadful”, and I looked at her and she was ashen. … And she
said, “I think I’m going to faint.” (ICE-AUS W2C-013 81)

Sometimes an adverb such as (temporal) just or suddenly is used to reinforce this

sense of immediacy, as in (96) and (97), where will would sound extremely
unnatural:

(96) And all you do is just tip it out of its pot Okay and you can see it just
ready and it’s just gonna spill over the edge there for you (ICE-AUS S2A-
053 104)
(97) the play is going to take a sudden surprise and what they’re suddenly
going to observe is going to be slightly different from what they might
have first thought (ICE-GB S1B-019 120)

The current orientation of epistemic be going to (with present forms of be)

is most apparent when, as in (94)–(97), the future time of the infinitival
complement is close or relatively close, but is also found with situations that are
not temporally near, as in (98) and (99), where the speaker’s prediction is made
on the basis of current trends.

(98) We believe that the demand for hospice care is going to increase in the
future and we want to know more about it to help us formulate our policy.
(ICE-GB W2F-004 78)
(99) Arguably, in the next few years there is going to be a new boom period.
(ICE-GB W1A-014 49)

A third difference between epistemic be going to and will is that, unlike

epistemic will, be going to can occur readily in conditional clauses, as in (100)–
(102). Here again the present orientation is reflected in the fact that the most
likely interpretation in (100) is one where the speaker has already been
performing poorly in exercises, in (101) where the distribution of students is
already being practised, and in (102) where England’s opponents have already
experienced difficulties in the scrum feeds.
146 Chapter 5

(100) So in the end I just thought this is ridiculous this is only the starting-point
and if I’m going to make such a meal out of every exercise I’ll never
complete the course (ICE-GB S1A-064 62)
(101) Presumably if we’re going to distribute the students in this way according
to pro pro rata according to the student uh distribution in the uh college we
ought to be doing the same thing within the faculty should we so a big
department has more representation than a small department (ICE-GB
S1B-075 82)
(102) If they’re going to be pushed around on England’s put-in to the scrum
they’re going to have a very uncomfortable afternoon (ICE-GB S2A-002
40)

Epistemic will could not be substituted for be going to in such cases, and in fact is
very rare in conditional protases. An example is (103) below, where the
prediction made is not one that involves the speaker’s subjective judgement but
rather one involving an objective prediction grounded in the present (“If it is the
case that you will be entitled …”). However (100)–(102) do not lend themselves
to such an objective interpretation.

(103) If you do keep on working you may be able to get Unemployment Benefit
at pension rate when you are out of work if you will be entitled to a
Retirement Pension on your own (or your late husband’s) contributions
when you do retire. (ICE-GB W2D-002 37)

A number of the familiar co-occurrence patterns that are associated with

epistemic modality occur with be going to. These include compatibility with
epistemic adjuncts as in (104), use with the progressive aspect as in (105), use
with the passive voice as in (106), use with non-agentive verbs as in (107), use
with stative verbs as in (108), use in the existential-there construction as in (109),
and use in the it-extraposition construction as in (110):

(104) Well maybe I’m going to win the football pools this weekend (ICE-GB
S1A-067 336)
(105) Well that was before he knew that he was going to be playing it at all these
places next week (ICE-AUS S1A-016 59)
(106) So so really you’re addressing a group of of practitioners who are going to
be be involved in this site that you’ve been researching (ICE-AUS S1B-
003 268)
(107) I came in from the holidays sort of wondering where I was going to get the
energy to do anything at work (ICE-AUS S1A-065 55)
(108) Well I made a big bloomer today because our school’s going to be a centre
of creative ah arts (ICE-AUS S1A-065 2)
(109) He’s pushing Doncaster all the way but Doncaster’s having none of it and
certainly there’s going to be no doubt about the winner (ICE-GB S2A-012
83)
Prediction and volition 147

(110) Um it’s going to be a bit more expensive to do that than to ah basically

here um than keeping the shower and well the basin of any bath around
would be about you know into this position. (ICE-AUS S1B-080 313)

Epistemic be going to most commonly takes a 3rd person subject (see

Table 5.12 below), but less often than epistemic will (see Table 5.3 above), and,
by contrast, takes a first person subject twice as often as epistemic will. A more
general question that is raised by the figures in Table 5.12 is whether be going to
is as ‘personal’ as will? If we base our answer on that meaning of the two modal
expressions which has by far the highest percentage of 1st person subjects (the
dynamic meaning), as Table 5.12 indicates dynamic be going to (for which
64.8% of tokens have a 1st person subject) is marginally less personal than
dynamic will (with 72.2%). By contrast, dynamic be going to is more comfortable
with a 2nd person subject (15.2%) than dynamic will (2.2%).

Table 5.12. Person of subject with be going to

(Figures represent raw frequencies)
1st 2nd 3rd Total
Epistemic 257 (17.6%) 159 (10.9%) 1,044 (71.5%) 1,460 (100%)
Dynamic 675 (64.8%) 158 (15.2%) 229 (22.0%) 1,042 (100%)
Deontic 0 (0%) 6 (30.0%) 14 (70.0%) 20 (100%)
Indeterminate 84 (42.2%) 38 (19.1%) 57 (28.6%) 199 (100%)
Total 1,016 (37.3%) 361 (13.3%) 1,344 (49.4%) 2,721 (100%)

5.4.2 Dynamic be going to

Be going to can be volitional, but it generally conveys the weaker sense of

intention rather than willingness. Thus in (111) I’m not going to post this can be
appropriately paraphrased by “I don’t intend to” whereas I won’t post this in the
same context would be paraphraseable by “I refuse to”.

(111) I am not going to post this until I get prints of my photos to send you all,
so I will update you about her then. (ICE-AUS W1B-008 36)

As Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 212) note, the contrast described here is
sharper in the preterite. Thus in (112) the refusal that would be expressed by
would not would be less appropriate than the non-intentionality expressed by was
not going to if it subsequently transpired that the speaker allowed himself to be
cheated of Lillian.

(112) NATURE HAD DEALT Lillian a nasty blow in making her a female, but
I was not going to be cheated of her. She was a chip off the old block in
148 Chapter 5

every respect but one, and I was going to make sure that one flaw did not
spoil the rest of her. (ICE-AUS W2F-012 5)

When be is preterite, the focus is on the intention that obtained previously,

rather than the intended activity, and thus was/were going to do not entail
actualization of the activity. This is the case in (114) for example, where there is
no entailment that the anticipated purchase actually occurred (and the coordinated
clause in fact strongly suggests that it probably did not).

(113) Cause I was going to go and buy things for you and I but I thought no
(ICE-AUS S1A-022 74)

While be going to normally expresses intentionality it is not, as Coates

(1983: 199-200) implies, restricted to doing so. There are corpus examples which
suggest that be going to can in fact, like will (and shall), express strong
willingness, especially when negative as in (114) (where an additional factor
favouring a willingess interpretation is the multiple situation rather than singulary
future situation), and when be is preterite as in (115) (where an additional factor
is the implication conveyed by decision in the matrix clause that the speaker’s
will has been consciously exercised).

(114) But I can’t I’m not going to buy something inferior if I want something
nice to drink (ICE-GB S1A-047 68)
(115) And uhm I guess I made a decision that I wasn’t going to I wasn’t going to
be hurt again (ICE-GB S1A-072 215)

5.4.3 Deontic be going to

Coates’ (1983: 202) suggestion that the deontic meaning of be going to arises via
pragmatic specialization (compare Huddleston and Pullum’s 2002: 194 analysis
of deontic will discussed in Section 5.1.3 above) seems plausible: “the speaker
makes an assertion about the addressee’s future activities which implies he (the
speaker) intends to see they are carried out.” In the following examples the
addressee, who may be referred to not simply by 2nd person you as in (116) but
also by 1st person-inclusive we as in (117) and even a 3rd person NP as in (118), is
placed under an obligation by the speaker to actualize the predicated activity.

(116) You’re going to try and be bit earlier (ICE-GB S1A-099 115)
(117) Now with your hand still on the front brake we’re going to put the bike on
its side stand (ICE-GB S2A-054 47)
(118) I gave her a look which caused her to shrivel somewhat. ‘Yes, Norah,’ I
said, with an exaggerated show of patience. ‘I am sure it was just the ticket
for you. But no daughter of mine is going to be offered mere emasculated
fragments.’ Norah did not answer this, but went on sipping her tea and
smoothing the fine hairs on her forearm. (ICE-AUS W2F-012 13)
Prediction and volition 149

In some cases we find that deontic be going to has undergone a further extension,
with a third party – rather than the addressee – as the deontic target, as in (119):

(119) The flowers were the perfect cover, so the press were unable to take
photographs of me. (We had bills to pay; they weren’t going to get useful
photographs for nothing.) I put both arms around the flowers and hid my
face behind them. (ICE-AUS W2B-004 57)

5.4.4 Be going to: regional and stylistic variation

The finding of the present study that be going to was more than twice as frequent
in the American corpus as in the Australian or British corpora (see Table 5.13) is
compatible with the diachronic findings reported by Leech (2003), and Mair and
Leech (2006): see Section 1.4 above. Both studies noted an enormous increase in
the frequency of be going to (51.6%) in American writing between 1961 and
1991/2, and by contrast a small decline in British writing.3
In the present study the distribution of be going to across speech and
writing was skewed strongly towards the former (by a ratio of 9.9:1), as Table
5.13 shows. This finding is compatible with Leech’s (2003) discovery, in a
follow-up analysis of be going to in spoken British data (based on a selection of
texts from the Survey of English Usage corpus and ICE-GB), of a sharper
increase in popularity there than in writing, prompting him to conclude: “The
hypothesis that be going to has been increasing in frequency as a consequence of
grammaticalization appears to be supported for spoken British English, though
not for written British English” (Leech 2003: 232).

Table 5.13. Genre distribution of be going to

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Avg
Spoken Dialogue 2,261 (814) 2,161 (778)
Monologue 1,242 (298) 863 (207)
Total 1,853 (1112) 1,642 (985) 3,821 (445) 2,439
Written Non-printed 200 (20) 300 (30)
Printed 197 (59) 137 (41)
Total 198 (79) 178 (71) 363 (29) 246
Total 1,191 1,056 (474) 1,220

What these findings suggest is the influence of two factors in the growth
of be going to. One factor, as suggested by the findings for speech and writing, is
colloquialization, with the attested upsurge of this quasi-modal in American
writing being influenced by its robustness in speech. Note in this regard that, as
the figures in Table 5.13 indicate, be going to is more frequent in the typically
more informal manuscript genres than in the more formal printed genres. A
second factor is ‘Americanization’, with AmE leading the way in the rise of be
150 Chapter 5

going to. Not only is the frequency of be going to significantly higher in C-US
than in the other two corpora, as already noted, but its relative popularity in
speech over writing is also stronger in C-US (10.5:1) than in ICE-AUS (9.4:1)
and ICE-GB (9.2:1).

5.5 Want to

It was suggested in Section 2.3.3 above that, even though want to is not
conventionally regarded as a quasi-modal, a case can be made for such a
classification. As Krug (2000: 117ff) observes, the assumption by want to of
morphological and semantic features associated with modal auxiliaries is
indicative of modalization. According to Bolinger (1980: 297): “(t)he moment a
verb is given an infinitival complement, that verb starts down the road of
auxiliariness”. This observation is especially apposite when there is
morphological incorporation of the infinitival to into a single compound form, as
found commonly found in speech with want to, and represented orthographically
in informal styles as wanna. In this respect want to (with 320/2,177, or 14.7%, of
tokens so reduced) has not progressed as far as be going to (with 1,032/2,721, or
37.9%). As is the case with be going to/gonna, the three regional varieties differ
greatly in the ratio of full form to compound tokens (855:3 in ICE-GB, 841:198
in ICE-AUS, and 161:119 in C-US). Again, while the magnitude of the
differences may indicate that the same conventions were not applied consistently
during transcription of the spoken data, it is nevertheless suggestive of dialectal
variation, with the compound favoured most in AmE.
Semantically, as noted by Krug (2000: 147-151) there is some evidence
that want to is undergoing modalization/auxiliarization in the emergence of
modal senses additional to its dominantly volitional meaning. These meanings,
deontic and epistemic, whose modest frequencies suggest that their development
may be relatively recent, are discussed in Sections 5.4.2 and 5.4.3 below.
There are, in addition to the formal and semantic arguments for counting
want to as a quasi-modal, some functional arguments. As Verplaetse (2003: 156)
observes, “convincing functional correspondence of WANT TO/WANNA and
both central modals and semi-auxiliaries in the modal field can be found in the
negotiation of referential content in spoken discourse”. In (120) want to, be going
to and will alternate within the same volitional domain, even if they differ in the
shades of meaning expressed:

(120) I’m actually going to be using the words so um, while I don’t really want
to apologise to you for doing that, ’cause I don’t think that’s um the
sensible thing to do, I’m um gonna tell you that I will be using the words
to describe what I want to talk about (ICE-AUS S2A-026 22)

Another functional argument concerns the tentative, deferential, use of the

preterite wanted to. It has been observed by many (e.g. Coates 1983: 118, Palmer
2001: 203-204) that preterite modal forms may be used to make an utterance
Prediction and volition 151

more diffident or polite than it would be with a present modal form (compare
Could I ask …? and Can I ask …?: see Sections 4.3.1.2 and 5.3.2). It has
furthermore been noted (e.g. by Bybee 1995: 503-517, Krug 2000: 155,
Veplaetse 2003: 157) that the same effect can be achieved with preterite wanted
to (compare I wanted to ask … and I want to ask …). In (121) and (122) wanted
to is used in a present context to refer to the subject-referent’s present wish.
Significantly, Palmer (2001: 204) observes that this tense usage, possible with
“notionally modal” wanted to, is “not found with other types of verb”.

(121) Now Paul we’ll get to you in a second but I wanted to ask ah you two guys
ah (ICE-AUS S1B 035 52)
(122) Oh look that’s fine. Look I knew I was too inundated this week anyway
but um you know because we did talk about it I wanted to you know let
you know I hadn’t forgotten (ICE-AUS S1A-096 49)

The final argument concerns the role of frequency evidence in the study of
grammaticalization. Krug (2000: 118-141) notes that while want to was very rare
in the Early Modern English period it has increased greatly in frequency in recent
times. This is confirmed by Mair and Leech’s (2006: 328) finding of an 18.5%
increase in written BrE and 70.9% in written AmE over the period 1961–1991
(see further Section 5.5.4 below). In a study of 1st person volition with will, be
going to, and want to in the BNC, Verplaetse (1999) noted that will accounted for
approximately two-thirds of the expression of volition, the remaining third being
shared almost equally by want to and be going to. In the present study volitional
(‘dynamic’) want to (with 2,137 tokens across the three corpora, and for all
persons: see Table 5.14 below) is almost as frequent as volitional will (2,296
tokens), each almost twice as frequent as volitional be going to (1,980 tokens).4
These frequencies suggest that the status of will as the primary modal exponent of
volition may be under challenge from want to.

Table 5.14. Meanings of want to

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Total %
Dynamic 1021 843 1,390 (273) 3,254 (2,137) 98.0%
Deontic 12 8 15 (3) 35 (23) 1.1%
Epistemic 4 6 15 (3) 25 (13) 0.8%
Indeterminate 2 1 5 (1) 8 (4) 0.2%
Total 1,039 858 1,425 (280) 3,322 (2,177) 100%

Finally, the figures in Table 5.15 suggest that want to is more ‘personal’
than the other expressions in the prediction/volition group. 41.9% of want to
tokens have a 1st person subject, as against 26.9% for will and 37.3% for be going
to. If we take 1st person and 2nd person subjects together, the differences are
magnified (want to 68.5%, will 37.1%, and be going to 50.6%).
152 Chapter 5

Table 5.15. Person of subject with want to

(Figures represent raw frequencies)
1st 2nd 3rd Total
Dynamic 905 (42.3%) 555 (26.0%) 677 (31.7%) 2,137 (100%)
Deontic 4 (17.4%) 17 (73.9%) 2 (8.7%) 23 (100%)
Epistemic 3 (23.1%) 7 (53.8%) 3 (23.1%) 13 (100%)
Indeterminate 1 (25.0%) 0 (0%) 3 (75.0%) 4 (100%)
Total 913 (41.9%) 579 (26.6%) 685 (31.5%) 2,177 (100%)

5.5.1 Dynamic want to

In Modern English want to is the item most consistently associated with the
expression of the dynamic (more specifically, volitional) modality, with a
meaning comparable to, though arguably not as strong as, that of willingness will.
Thus in (123) there is no implication that the “making a game of it” will be
actualized, as there would be if we were to substitute ’ll for want to. Even more
pointed is the contrast between the preterite didn’t wanna and its modal auxiliary
counterpart wouldn’t in (124), the latter paraphraseable by “refused to”. The
original would allow a continuation such as “but I managed to”, but this would be
infelicitous with the stronger wouldn’t.

(123) Um I mean it depends whether you want to make a game of it or not (ICE-
AUS S1A-008 109)
(124) you know, I didn’t wanna embarrass her (C-US SBC 10 586)

5.5.2 Deontic want to

As noted above the development of a deontic use of want to provides one piece of
evidence that this catenative lexical verb is undergoing auxiliarization/
modalization. It is found most commonly with a 2nd person subject, as in (125),
(126), and (127).

(125) A: Do you want tap water or this

B: Just normal water
A: It’s it’s Spa
B: Solpadeine is is uh
A: What You want to use the tap water then (ICE-GB S1A-043 143)
(126) So you wanna think about what’s my hypothesis and how am I gonna how
am I gonna attempt then test that hypothesis and what’s the best way to do
it (ICE-AUS S1B-019 129)
(127) Ah ere r we’re coming out of it. We’ve turned the corner and ah I believe
we don’t wanna go to a dog eat dog survival of the fittest society. (ICE-
AUS S1B-029 52)
Prediction and volition 153

It is maintained by some (e.g. Aarts and Aarts 1995: 178) that the sense is
volitional in such cases, with the speaker’s wishes being ‘projected’ onto the
addressee. However a deontic interpretation is consistent with the apparent
issuing of a directive or at least strong recommendation by the speaker in (125)
and (126) (an interpretation supported by the didactic context in (126)), and the
objective statement of an obligation in (127) (“there is an obligation on us”).
Such an obligational interpretation is motivated by implicature (as we have
argued is the case with deontic will in Section 5.1.3 and deontic be going to in
Section 5.4.3), with want to analyzed as comparable in meaning and modal
strength to deontic should and ought to.

5.5.3 Epistemic want to

Is want to in the process of developing the same type of root/epistemic semantic

duality that is characteristic of the modal class? There is some evidence that it is,
but the epistemic meaning of want to is rather more elusive than its deontic
meaning. Bolinger (1980: 297) suggests an example (Pick it up with both hands.
You wanna be careful it doesn’t fall.), but this appears to be deontic rather than
epistemic. Westney (1995: 32) concedes that it is “unclear” whether want to can
be epistemic, but nevertheless offers a plausible (constructed) example which he
describes as “perfectly possible in a colloquial context”: They want to be pretty
stupid if they believe everything he says. Krug (2000: 150) presents an example
overheard from a Californian female shop assistant (Customer: Do you have
coolers? Assistant: Coolers? They wanna be on one of the top shelves
somewhere. They only arrived this morning.). The corpora yielded a small
number of tokens: in (128) and (129) the speaker is making an inference about a
situation rather than describing the subject-referent’s willingness to actualize it.

(128) Lorraine Mullen can hardly lift her legs in third place the thirty seven year
old Kiwi. She would have been used to all these hill running. Once of New
Zealand, twenty two miles of the hardest run you’d ever wanna run. (ICE-
AUS S2A-001 127)
(129) H Well maybe th that’s the reason why they’re leav I mean hopefully if
they wanted a franchise certainly but if they’re retiring one they’re retiring
which
? Well they’d wanna they’d wanna be.
H Being being encouraged, (ICE-AUS S1B-018 199)

5.5.4 Want to: regional and stylistic variation

Two recent diachronic studies have confirmed the growing popularity of want to,
particularly in AmE. In his comparison of the press and fiction categories of
LOB/Brown and FLOB/Frown, Krug (2000: 135) notes spectacular increases in
154 Chapter 5

the American corpora, leading him to conclude that “while the rise of the new
volitional modal probably did not originate in the US, the change obviously
caught on more rapidly here than in Britain”. Similarly, Mair and Leech (2006)
report a spectacular increase in the popularity of want to (of 70.9%) in American
writing between 1961 and 1991/2, with a smaller though still substantial increase
of 18.5% in British writing (see Table 1.4). As Table 5.16 shows, in the present
study want to is more than 50% more popular in the American corpus than in the
British (1.7:1), and almost 50% more popular than in the Australian corpus
(1.4:1).

Table 5.16. Genre distribution of want to

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Avg
Spoken Dialogue 1,889 (680) 1,542 (555)
Monologue 808 (194) 542 (130)
Total 1,457 (874) 1,142 (685) 1,966 (229) 1,522
Written Non-printed 430 (43) 720 (72)
Printed 407 (122) 337 (101)
Total 413 (165) 433 (173) 638 (51) 495
Total 1,039 858 1,425 (280) 1,389

Want to displays stylistic as well as regional variation. In the present study

it was preferred in speech over writing (albeit less overwhelmingly than be going
to (see Section 5.4.4 above) by a ratio of 3.1:1, a finding uncannily in line with
Krug’s (2000: 136) claim that it is “approximately three times more common in
spoken English”. This finding supports the credibility of Krug’s view that
“spoken performance data are influencing the written medium towards a greater
use of this lexeme” (2000: 136); in other words, that colloquialization has played
an important role in the frequency gains experienced by want to in contemporary
English.
The findings for person (see Table 5.15 above) indicate that there is a
certain degree of complementarity between the modal and semi-modal. 2nd person
subjects are considerably more common with dynamic want to (accounting for
26.0% of all tokens) than with dynamic will (2.2%), while dynamic want to
selects a 1st person subject less commonly (42.3%) than does dynamic will
(72.2%). Insofar as volition is more transparently and consistently expressed by
want to than will, this difference may be explained in terms of speakers’ greater
preparedness to make overt reference to their addressee’s volition than to their
own. A further inference that may be drawn from this patterning is that the
incursion that want to seems to be making into the semantic territory of dynamic
will is not occurring haphazardly, but rather in a way that is setting up a certain
degree of distributional complementarity.
Prediction and volition 155

5.6 Be about to

5.6.1 Meanings of be about to

Be about to is a low frequency item whose semantic similarity to be going to

warrants a brief entry at this point. As Table 5.17 shows, however, its epistemic
(futurity) sense is dominant, no deontic meaning and a small number of dynamic
tokens (see further below).

Table 5.17. Meanings of be about to

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Total %
Epistemic 59 52 36 (7) 147 (118) 96.1%
Dynamic 3 2 0 (0) 5 (5) 3.3%
Indeterminate 1 0 0 (0) 1 (1) 0.7%
Total 63 54 36 (7) 153 (124) 100%

In view of the semantic similarities between be about to and be going to it is not

surprising that they display similar behaviour in subject selection (as Table 5.18
indicates, both strongly preferring a 3rd person subject and with 1st person
preferred over 2nd person).

Table 5.18. Person of subject with be about to

(Figures represent raw frequencies)
1st 2nd 3rd Total
Epistemic 26 (22.0%) 4 (3.4%) 88 (74.6%) 118 (100%)
Dynamic 2 (40%) 1 (20%) 2 (40%) 5 (100%)
Indeterminate 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 1 (100%) 1 (100%)
Total 28 (22.6%) 5 (4.0%) 91 (73.4%) 124 (100%)

Like be going to, be about to always locates the situation in future time when be
is present tense. However the sense of immediacy carried by be about to is even
stronger than it is with be going to. For instance the use of be about to in (130)
suggests the imminence of the communication, and in (131) of the landing.

(130) Just a moment I think he was about to say something else (ICE-AUS S1B-
065 299)
(131) I think I can hear the sound of an aircraft, uh in the distance, and I think
they’re about to come into land. (ICE-GB S2A-008 103)

Collocation with temporal just is very common, as in (132) and (133):

156 Chapter 5

(132) We were just about to have tea and he wanted a packet of chips (ICE-AUS
S1A-048 391)
(133) I was just about to tuck into it and I noticed this great fly soaked in tomato
sauce (ICE-GB S1A-055 222)

Be about to is less grammaticalized than be going to (whose

auxiliarization is in evidence phonologically in the appearance of gonna and
semantically in the development of its volitional sense). Nevertheless, there are
several examples which suggest that be about to may have started to undergo a
similar semantic development. In (134), for example, it expresses intentionality,
and in (135) the stronger volitional sense of refusal:

(134) He laughed. You’re not about to let me go on that tea business are you?
(ICE-AUS W2F-001 72)
(135) I wanted to tell you this because we were talking about it when I saw you
and I wanted you to realise that I was am not about to be taken for a ride
(ICE-GB W1B-005 49)

These non-epistemic senses are rare and only found with negation. In (135) there
is another possible interpretation, involving a use of be (not) about to that was
first commented on some 40 years ago as an innovation in AmE, and glossed as
“the actor is not the sort of person from whom such a deed can be expected”
(Joos 1968: 24). This development appears to be comparable to that which
resulted in the ‘propensity’ use of will (see Section 5.1.2 above), involving an
assessment of a person’s character deriving from their wilful behaviour.

5.6.2 Be about to: regional and stylistic variation

Table 5.19 indicates that be about to is less popular in C-US than in the other two
corpora, and this may be associated with its comparative unpopularity in speech,
by contrast with its greater popularity in speech in both ICE-AUS and ICE-GB.

Table 5.19. Genre distribution of be about to

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Avg
Spoken Dialogue 47 (17) 56 (20)
Monologue 113 (27 83 (20)
Total 73 (44) 67 (40) 60 (1) 67
Written Non-printed 50 (5) 40 (4)
Printed 47 (14) 33 (10)
Total 48 (19) 35 (14) 75 (6) 53
Total 63 54 36 (7) 51
Prediction and volition 157

Notes

1
Note, in this regard, that used to – excluded from this study on the grounds
that it expresses aspectual rather than modal meaning – is used to express
characteristic or habitual behaviour in the past, without any suggestion
that the possibility of occurrence of the situation is attributable to
properties of the subject-referent.
2
These figures show that Huddleston and Pullum’s (2002: 189) claim that
shall “always has deontic meaning with 2nd/3rd person subjects” is
inaccurate.
3
Leech’s (2003) percentage figure for British writing is 3.1%, while Mair
and Leech’s (2006) is 1.2%.
4
In fact there are probably more tokens of volitional want to than will,
given that the figure of 2,296 tokens for dynamic will includes those
representing the propensity subclass.
Chapter 6

Conclusion

This book has examined the meanings of the English modal auxiliaries, and a set
of semantically-related quasi-modals, in three parallel corpora representing BrE,
AmE, and AusE. A tripartite classification scheme was adopted, distinguishing
between epistemic, deontic and dynamic modality, and the analysis enriched via
the concepts of modal strength, modal degree, and subjectivity/objectivity. Also
addressed was the interaction between modal expressions and negation, and
between modal expressions and temporality. A number of vexing issues have also
been discussed, including the questionable classification of might and should as
preterite forms, and the modal status of futurity will.
Patterns of regional and stylistic variation have been explored, and the
findings found to be compatible with Mair and Leech’s (2006) conclusion that
AmE is in the box seat of change in the rise of the quasi-modals and the decline
of the modals. The findings further suggest that BrE is the most conservative of
the three regional varieties, with AusE occupying a middle position, appearing to
distance itself from both the innovativeness of the Americans and conservativism
of the British. 1
Consider firstly the quasi-modals examined. The overall frequency for the
quasi-modals examined in C-US (6,500 tokens per million words) is strikingly
larger than that for ICE-AUS (4,905) and ICE-GB (4,625). Mair and Leech
suggest that the rise of the quasi-modals has been particularly marked in spoken
English, as we might expect given the tendency for innovations to spread rapidly
in informal spoken genres before becoming more broadly established in the
language. The quasi-modals’ preference for occurrence in speech over writing is
overwhelmingly greater in the American corpus (with a speech/writing ratio of
9,505:2,196, or 4.33:1) than in ICE-AUS (6,511:2,514, or 2.59:1) and ICE-GB
(5,806:2,883, or 2.01:1). On both measures, then, it is AmE that emerges as the
most progressive, BrE as the least, with AusE in between.
Consider secondly the modals, for which, in view of the attested decline of
the class, a paucity of numbers in a particular variety may be interpretable as a
sign of advanced change. Here the regional differences are less pronounced. BrE
emerges, as the variety with the largest number of tokens (16,508 in ICE-GB), as
the most conservative. AusE has the least number of tokens (15,906 in ICE-
AUS), but is followed closely by AmE (16,136 in C-US). Interestingly if we
restrict the count to just those modals that might be regarded as being in
competition with the quasi-modal ‘big players’ (have to, need to, be going to and
want to), namely must should, need, will and shall, the ordering again mirrors that
for the quasi-modals (C-US 5,370 > ICE-GB 5,777 > ICE-GB 5,997), with AmE
the most innovative and BrE the most conservative. Speech/writing ratios reveal
further symmetries. BrE has the highest proportion of modals in writing
160 Chapter 6

(16,672:16,460, or 1.01:1, in ICE-GB), AmE the least (14,279:17,439, or 0.82:1,

in C-US), and AusE in-between (14,545:16,846, or 0.86:1, in ICE-AUS).
Equipped with this broad picture of American innovativeness, British
conservativism and Australian independence from both, let us review the findings
for individual modal expressions. Consider first the expressions of necessity and
obligation, beginning with the contrasting fortunes of must and have to. Given the
declining numbers of must and increasing numbers of have to (noted in Section
1.4 above) it is not surprising that have to should outstrip must in the three
corpora. The degree of difference (and therefore the degree to which the trend
may have advanced) is considerably greater in C-US. The ordering across the
varieties (C-US 3.44:1 > AusE 2.13:1 > BrE 1.84:1) reflects the same American
domination as that determined by the frequency of have to tokens across the
varieties (C-US 1,385 >AusE 1,311 > BrE 1,244). These findings suggest that at
least one important factor driving the popularity of have to in AusE and BrE may
be ‘Americanization’.
Furthermore, as noted in Section 3.5.6, have to is considerably more
popular in speech than in writing (by a ratio of 2.47:1), contrasting strikingly with
must, which is almost twice as popular – 1.65:1 – in writing. This finding, in
combination with the evidence provided by Mair and Leech (2006) that have to
has been on the rise in recent British and American writing, suggests that another
possible factor is ‘colloquialization’ (the drift into other genres of – and
increasing acceptability of – features associated with colloquial speech). The
result for AmE is particularly notable, with the frequency of have to being more
than five times greater in speech, and the by-now-familiar ordering of dialects (C-
US 5.33:1 > ICE-AUS 2.52:1 > ICE-GB 1.35:1).
A further factor in the encroachment of have to on the semantic territory
of must is suggested by the contrast between the typically subjective deontic
meaning expressed by must and the typically objective kind expressed by have to.
Have to may thus present itself an attractive option for speakers seeking a more
‘democratic’ and less overtly authoritative modal expression than must (see
further Section 3.5.6 above). Again it is AmE that appears to be in the vanguard
of change: the deontic meaning of have to is more dominant, and that of must less
dominant, in C-US than in the other two corpora (see Tables 3.2 and 3.12).
Have got to is semantically similar to have to, but syntactically dissimilar
(compare for example to have to/*to have got to; may have to/*may have got to).
Its regional and stylistic distribution is also quite different from that of have to.
Have got to bucks the trend for quasi-modals to be most numerous in AmE (with
C-US in fact having the least number of tokens of the three corpora). It also
displays a preference for occurrence in speech over writing (12.3:1) that is more
extreme than that for any other quasi-modal examined, and probably attributable
to the likelihood that in speech it will attract less attention than in writing from
prescriptivists concerned with censuring the use of got.
While should may have sufficient numbers to compete with have to in the
semantic field of deontic necessity, it differs from the quasi-modal in its typical
subjectivity and weaker strength. Table 1.4 indicates that should has undergone a
Conclusion 161

decline in recent British and American writing. It seems likely that this decline
has occurred in speech as well, given the smaller numbers for should in speech as
against writing in the present study (see Table 3.7). Furthermore the relatively
modest number of shoulds in C-US (850 per million words) suggests that AmE
may be leading the way in its decline. Ought to is semantically very close to
should, but its numbers are both extremely small by comparison and in serious
decline. In Section 3.3 it was suggested that the main reason for the unpopularity
of ought to is that, despite continuing to require a to-infinitive like have to and
need to, it has failed to develop non-auxiliary syntactic properties in Standard
English.
Need and need to are, like should and ought to, semantically alike though
strikingly different in frequency. Mair and Leech’s (2006) figures (see Table 1.4)
reveal a recent massive rise for need to, complemented by a sharp decline for
need (the latter presumably attributable to the syntactic inflexibility of the
auxiliary, which is restricted largely to negative clauses). Once again it is AmE
leading the way and BrE the most conservative, the frequencies for need to being
C-US 473 > ICE-AUS 343 > ICE-GB 280, and for need C-US 15 > ICE-AUS 19
> ICE-GB 34. Again we find correlations with speech/writing patterns of
distribution: it is in C-US that need to has the strongest preference for occurrence
in speech (3.56:1), and need the weakest (0.0:1). Why is need to expanding so
rapidly? One possible explanation is to be found in the attractive option offered
by its deontic use (which has developed as an extension of its intrinsically
dynamic sense) of enabling the speaker to formulate a requirement that at the
same time acknowledges and endorses the subject-referent’s needs. Such a sense
is not expressed by any of the other expressions of deontic necessity.
There is less to say about the possibility/permission/ability group, given
that the only quasi-modal that we have considered is be able to (and no
diachronic figures are supplied for this item by Mair and Leech). Though
semantically similar to can in its capacity to express a range of dynamic
meanings, be able to differs from the modal in the implication of actuality that it
conveys. The large numbers for can (surpassed only by those for will/would)
along with its diachronic stability (see Table 1.4) suggest that it is not under
threat from be able to.
May expresses a similar range of meanings to can, but the proportions
differ greatly, may being dominantly epistemic, can dynamic. The findings of the
study are in line with Mair and Leech’s finding that may has suffered a stronger
decline in AmE writing than BrE writing (see Table 1.4) with C-US evidencing
the smallest number of tokens (C-US 825 < ICE-AUS 881 < ICE-GB 1218),
along with the greatest degree of unpopularity in speech (C-US 0.27:1 < ICE-
AUS 0.31:1 < ICE-GB 0.32:1).
Finally, consider the prediction/volition group, which is dominated
numerically by will/would, but also contains the two rapidly growing quasi-
modals be going to and want to. There are some subtle semantic differences
between be going to and will which should make us wary of any suggestion that
the former is intruding upon the semantic territory of the latter. While epistemic
162 Chapter 6

will typically locates a situation in future time, epistemic be going to is restricted

to doing so. Furthermore epistemic be going to conveys a sense of immediacy
(albeit not as strong as that conveyed by be about to) that differentiates it from
will. While dynamic will may express willingness or intentionality, dynamic be
going to tends to restricted to the latter. Mair and Leech’s (2006) frequencies,
presented in Table 1.4, document starkly contrasting the fortunes of be going to
in AmE writing (a rise of 51.6%) and BrE writing (a small decline of 1.2%). The
findings of the present study are in keeping with this diachronic picture: be going
to is more than twice as frequent in the American corpus as it is in the others (C-
US 2,413 > ICE-AUS 1,191 > ICE-GB 1,056), with speech/writing ratios
reflecting the same ordering of the regional varieties: C-US 10.52:1 > ICE-AUS
9.35:1 > ICE-GB 9.22:1.
Want to is a predominantly volitional expression, with a meaning
comparable to that of dynamic will. Given its spectacular upsurge in popularity in
American writing, as reported by Mair and Leech (2006), it was not surprising to
find the frequency for want to in C-US outstripping that in the other corpora: C-
US 1,425 > ICE-AUS 1,039 > ICE-GB 858. Meanwhile want to in AmE
evidenced a strong preference for occurrence in speech over writing, albeit one
not quite as strong as that in the Australian corpus: ICE-AUS 3.52:1 > C-US
3.08:1 > ICE-GB 2.63:1.
Shall is traditionally associated with will, even though its primary use in
Modern English is as a deontic modal found mainly in constitutive/regulative
contexts. Its frequency is strikingly smaller than that of will, and rapidly
declining. In the present data shall was found to be considerably more robust in
the British corpus (where it is relatively popular in speech) than in ICE-AUS and
C-US.

Notes
1
I am grateful to Christian Mair for pointing out that a potentially fruitful
avenue for further research would be the diachronic implications of the
pragmatic/politeness dimensions of modality (as reflected in cases such as
I would think so and This would seem to suggest). It may be, for instance,
that instead of the picture of British conservatism that emerges from the
present essentially quantitative study, we find speakers of BrE to be more
prolific users of modal hedges than speakers of AmE and AusE. In turn
such a finding might invite the conclusion that instead of having three
Englishes at different diachronic-developmental stages, what we have is a
fairly stable system of choices in which the available options are used
differently across the varieties for essentially pragmatic reasons.
Appendix

NOTE: In all tables raw frequencies are bracketed, and frequencies normalized to
tokens per one million words are unbracketed.

Table 1. Must in ICE-AUS, ICE-GB, and C-US

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Avg

Dialogue 164 (59) 214 (77)
Spoken Monologue 333 (80) 283 (68)
Total 232 (139) 242 (145) 112 (13) 195
Deontic Non-printed 760 (76) 340 (34)
Written Printed 513 (154) 707 (212)
Total 575 (230) 615 (246) 350 (28) 513
Total 369 (369) 391 (391) 209 (41) 323
Dialogue 17 (6) 17 (6)
Spoken Monologue 38 (9) 21 (5)
Total 25 (15) 18 (11) 9 (1) 17
Dynamic Non-printed 80 (8) 50 (5)
Written Printed 57 (17) 83 (25)
Total 63 (25) 75 (30) 50 (4) 63
Total 40 (40) 41 (41) 25 (5) 35
Dialogue 317 (114) 297 (107)
Spoken Monologue 88 (21) 167 (40)
Total 225 (135) 245 (147) 189 (22) 220
Epistemic Non-printed 120 (12) 150 (15)
Written Printed 127 (38) 180 (54)
Total 125 (50) 173 (69) 100 (8) 133
Total 185 (185) 216 (216) 153 (30) 185
Indeterminate 19 (19) 27 (27) 15 (3) 20
Total 613 (613) 675 (675) 402 (79) 563
164 Appendix

Table 2. Should in ICE-AUS, ICE-GB, and C-US.

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Avg
Dialogue 911 (328) 658 (237)
Spoken Monologue 521 (125) 633 (152)
Total 755 (453) 748 (389) 532 (62) 678
Deontic Non-printed 790 (79) 550 (55)
Written Printed 980 (294) 923 (277)
Total 933 (373) 830 (332) 700 (56) 918
Total 826 (826) 721 (721) 601 (118) 821
Dialogue 158 (57) 142 (51)
Spoken Monologue 125 (30) 67 (16)
Total 145 (87) 112 (67) 103 (12) 120
Epistemic Non-printed 190 (19) 200 (20)
Written Printed 93 (28) 83 (25)
Total 118 (47) 113 (45) 150 (12) 127
Total 134 (134) 112 (112) 122 (24) 123
Dialogue 25 (9) 67 (24)
Spoken Monologue 83 (20) 79 (19)
Total 48 (29) 72 (43) 34 (4) 51
Subjunctive Non-printed 190 (19) 200 (20)
Written Printed 43 (13) 137 (41)
Total 80 (32) 153 (61) 50 (4)
Total 61 (61) 104 (104) 41 (8) 69
Dialogue 19 (7) 106 (38)
Spoken Monologue 8 (2) 38 (9)
Total 15 (9) 78 (47) 9 (1) 34
= would Non-printed 0 (0) 40 (4)
Written Printed 7 (2) 20 (6)
Total 5 (2) 25 (10) 25 (2) 18
Total 11 (11) 57 (57) 15 (3) 28
Indeterminate 109 130 71 (14) 103
Total 1,141 (1,141) 1,124 (1,124) 850 (167) 1,038
Appendix 165

Table 3. Ought to in ICE-AUS, ICE-GB, and C-US

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Avg
Dialogue 6 (2) 133 (48)
Spoken Monologue 38 (9) 54 (13)
Total 18 (11) 102 (61) 69 (8) 63
Deontic Non-printed 40 (4) 70 (7)
Written Printed 60 (18) 20 (6)
Total 55 (22) 33 (13) 25 (2) 38
Total 33 (33) 74 (74) 51 (10) 53
Dialogue 0 (0) 0 (0)
Spoken Monologue 0 (0) 13 (3)
Total 0 (0) 5 (3) 0 (0) 2
Epistemic Non-printed 0 (0) 0 (0)
Written Printed 3 (1) 3 (1)
Total 3 (1) 3 (1) 0 (0) 2
Total 1 (1) 4 (4) 0 (0) 2
Indeterminate 2 (2) 2 (2) 0 (0) 1
Total 36 (36) 80 (80) 51 (10) 56
166 Appendix

Table 4. Need in ICE-AUS, ICE-GB, and C-US

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Avg
Dialogue 0 (0) 6 (2)
Spoken Monologue 17 (4) 42 (10)
Total 7 (4) 20 (12) 0 (0) 9
Dynamic
Non-printed 10 (1) 20 (2)
Written Printed 23 (7) 23 (7)
Total 20 (8) 23 (9) 25 (2) 23
Total 12 (12) 21 (21) 10 (2) 14
Dialogue 0 (0) 3 (1)
Spoken Monologue 0 (0) 4 (1)
Total 0 (0) 3 (2) 0 (0) 1
Deontic Non-printed 10 (1) 0 (0)
Written Printed 3 (1) 3 (1)
Total 5 (2) 3 (1) 13 (1) 7
Total 2 (2) 3 (3) 5 (1) 3
Dialogue 0 (0) 0 (0)
Spoken Monologue 8 (2) 21 (5)
Total 3 (2) 8 (5) 0 (0) 4
Epistemic Non-printed 0 (0) 0 (0)
Written Printed 7 (2) 10 (3)
Total 5 (2) 8 (3) 0 (0) 4
Total 4 (4) 8 (8) 0 (0) 4
Indeterminate 1 (1) 2 (2) 0 (0) 1
Total 19 (19) 34 (34) 15 (3) 23
Appendix 167

Table 5. Have to in ICE-AUS, ICE-GB, and C-US

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Avg
Dialogue 1,389 (500) 1,117 (402)
Spoken Monologue 1,321 (317) 946 (227)
Total 1,362 (817) 1,048 (629) 1,649 (192) 1,353
Deontic Non-printed 610 (61) 800 (80)
Written Printed 400 (120) 643 (193)
Total 453 (181) 683 (273) 300 (24) 479
Total 998 (998) 902 (902) 1,099 (216) 1,000
Dialogue 414 (149) 442 (159)
Spoken Monologue 242 (58) 163 (39)
Total 345 (207) 330 (198) 369 (43) 348
Dynamic Non-printed 280 (28) 440 (44)
Written Printed 180 (60) 300 (90)
Total 220 (88) 335 (134) 88 (7) 214
Total 295 (295) 332 (332) 255 (50) 294
Dialogue 6 (2) 0 (0)
Spoken Monologue 13 (3) 0 (0)
Total 8 (5) 0 (0) 34 (4) 14
Epistemic Non-printed 0 (0) 3 (1)
Written Printed 0 (0) 3 (1)
Total 0 (0) 6 (2) 0 (0) 2
Total 5 (5) 2 (2) 20 (4) 9
Indeterminate 13 (13) 8 (8) 10 (2) 10
Total 1,311 (1,311) 1,244 (1,244) 1,385 (272) 1,313
168 Appendix

Table 6. Have got to in ICE-AUS, ICE-GB, and C-US

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Avg
Dialogue 636 (229) 672 (242)
Spoken Monologue 167 (40) 113 (27)
Total 448 (269) 448 (269) 232 (27) 382
Deontic Non-printed 10 (1) 50 (5)
Written Printed 27 (8) 17 (5)
Total 23 (9) 25 (10) 38 (3) 29
Total 278 (278) 279 (279) 153 (30) 240
Dialogue 81 (29) 94 (34)
Spoken Monologue 38 (9) 50 (12)
Total 63 (38) 77 (46) 26 (3) 166
Dynamic Non-printed 0 (0) 30 (3)
Written Printed 13 (4) 7 (2)
Total 10 (4) 13 (5) 0 (0)
Total 42 (42) 51 (51) 15 (3) 36
Dialogue 11 (4) 6 (2)
Spoken Monologue 13 (3) 0 (0)
Total 12 (7) 3 (2) 9 (1) 8
Epistemic Non-printed 0 (0) 0 (0)
Written Printed 3 (1) 0 (0)
Total 3 (1) 0 (0) 0 (0) 1
Total 8 (8) 2 (2) 5 (1) 5
Indeterminate 4 (4) 7 (7) 0 (0) 4
Total 332 (332) 339 (339) 173 (34) 281
Appendix 169

Table 7. Need to in ICE-AUS, ICE-GB, and C-US

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Avg
Dynamic Dialogue 178 (64) 214 (77)
Spoken Monologue 271 (65) 75 (18)
Total 215 (129) 158 (95) 429 (50) 267
Non-printed 220 (22) 140 (14)
Written Printed 230 (66) 177 (49)
Total 230 (88) 170 (63) 125 (10) 175
Total 220 (217) 527 (158) 305 (60) 351
Deontic Dialogue 94 (34) 122 (44)
Spoken Monologue 108 (26) 96 (23)
Total 100 (60) 112 (67) 189 (22) 134
Non-printed 90 (9) 70 (7)
Written Printed 100 (30) 73 (22)
Total 98 (39) 73 (29) 25 (2) 65
Total 99 (99) 96 (96) 122 (24) 106
Epistemic Dialogue 3 (1) 14 (5)
Spoken Monologue 8 (2) 8 (2)
Total 5 (3) 12 (7) 0 (0) 6
Non-printed 0 (0) 10 (1)
Written Printed 10 (3) 10 (3)
Total 8 (3) 10 (4) 25 (2) 14
Total 6 (6) 11 (11) 10 (2) 9
Indeterminate 21 (21) 15 (15) 36 (7) 24
Total 343 (343) 280 (280) 473 (93) 365
170 Appendix

Table 8. Had better in ICE-AUS, ICE-GB, and C-US

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Avg
Dialogue 89 (32) 53 (19)
Spoken Monologue 29 (7) 4 (1)
Total 65 (39) 33 (20) 43 (5) 47
Deontic
Non-printed 10 (1) 100 (10)
Written Printed 27 (8) 10 (3)
Total 23 (9) 33 (13) 38 (3) 31
Total 48 (48) 33 (33) 41 (8) 40
Appendix 171

Table 9. Be supposed to in ICE-AUS, ICE-GB, and C-US

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Avg
Dialogue 56 (20) 119 (43)
Spoken Monologue 8 (2) 13 (3)
Total 37 (22) 77 (46) 94 (11) 69
Deontic Non-printed 20 (2) 10 (1)
Written Printed 13 (4) 10 (3)
Total 15 (6) 10 (4) 25 (2) 17
Total 28 (28) 50 (50) 66 (13) 48
Dialogue 36 (13) 75 (27)
Spoken Monologue 8 (2) 25 (6)
Total 25 (15) 55 (33) 43 (5) 41
Epist Non-printed 10 (1) 40 (4)
Written Printed 7 (2) 30 (9)
Total 8 (3) 33 (13) 75 (6) 39
Total 18 (18) 46 (46) 56 (11) 40
Indeterminate 1 (1) 3 (3) 5 (1) 3
Total 36 (47) 80 (99) 51 (10) 56
172 Appendix

Table 10. Be to in ICE-AUS, ICE-GB, and C-US

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Avg
Dialogue 8 (3) 14 (5)
Spoken Monologue 0 (0) 21 (5)
Total 5 (3) 17 (10) 26 (3) 16
Deontic Non-printed 70 (7) 10 (1)
Written Printed 120 (36) 50 (15)
Total 108 (43) 40 (16) 38 (3) 62
Total 46 (46) 26 (26) 31 (6) 34
Dialogue 3 (1) 11 (4)
Spoken Monologue 29 (7) 108 (26)
Total 13 (8) 50 (30) 0 (0) 21
Epistemic
(Temporal) Non-printed 120 (12) 100 (10)
Written Printed 63 (19) 153 (46)
Total 78 (31) 140 (56) 38 (3) 85
Total 39 (39) 86 (86) 15 (3) 47
Dialogue 0 (0) 8 (3)
Spoken Monologue 4 (1) 25 (6)
Total 2 (1) 15 (9) 0 (0) 6
Dynamic
Non-printed 10 (1) 20 (2)
(Possibility)
Written Printed 10 (3) 23 (7)
Total 10 (4) 23 (9) 13 (1) 15
Total 5 (5) 18 (18) 5 (1) 9
Dialogue 22 (8) 61 (22)
Spoken Monologue 50 (12) 100 (24)
Total 33 (20) 77 (46) 26 (3) 45
Conditional Non-printed 50 (5) 50 (5)
Written Printed 50 (15) 93 (28)
Total 50 (20) 83 (33) 13 (1) 49
Total 40 (40) 79 (79) 20 (4) 46
Indeterminate 5 12 5 (1)
Total 135 (135) 221 (221) 76 (15) 144
Appendix 173

Table 11. Be bound to in ICE-AUS, ICE-GB, and C-US

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Avg
Dialogue 0 (0) 6 (2)
Spoken Monologue 8 (2) 0 (0)
Total 3 (2) 3 (2) 0 (0) 2
Deontic Non-printed 0 (0) 10 (1)
Written Printed 0 (0) 3 (1)
Total 0 (0) 5 (2) 0 (0) 2
Total 2 (2) 4 (4) 0 (0) 2
Dialogue 6 (2) 11 (4)
Spoken Monologue 4 (1) 13 (3)
Total 6 (3) 12 (7) 0 (0) 6
Epistemic Non-printed 10 (1) 0 (0)
Written Printed 10 (3) 17 (5)
Total 10 (4) 13 (5) 13 (1) 12
Total 7 (7) 12 (12) 5 (1) 8
Indeterminate 0 (0) 1 (1) 0 (0) 0
Total 9 (9) 17 (17) 5 (1) 10
174 Appendix

Table 12. May in ICE-AUS, ICE-GB, and C-US

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Avg
Dialogue 283 (102) 508 (183)
Spoken Monologue 542 (130) 758 (182)
Total 387 (232) 608 (365) 275 (32) 423
Epistemic Non-printed 1,380 (138) 1,160 (116)
Written Printed 937 (281) 1807 (542)
Total 1,048 (419) 1,355 (658) 1,163 (93) 1189
Total 651 (651) 1,023 (1,023) 636 (125) 770
Dialogue 39 (14) 0 (0)
Spoken Monologue 50 (12) 25 (6)
Total 43 (26) 10 (6) 17 (2) 23
Dynamic Non-printed 180 (18) 50 (5)
Written Printed 190 (57) 163 (49)
Total 188 (75) 180 (54) 163 (13) 177
Total 101 (101) 60 (60) 76 (15) 79
Dialogue 8 (3) 3 (1)
Spoken Monologue 33 (8) 25 (6)
Total 18 (11) 12 (7) 77 (9) 36
Deontic Non-printed 60 (6) 100 (10)
Written Printed 203 (61) 177 (53)
Total 168 (67) 158 (63) 25 (2) 117
Total 78 (78) 70 (70) 56 (11) 68
Indeterminate 51 (51) 65 (65) 56 (11) 57
Total 881 (881) 1,218 (1,218) 825 (162) 975
Appendix 175

Table 13. Can in ICE-AUS, ICE-GB, and C-US

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Avg
Dialogue 3,025 (1,089) 3,503 (1,261)
Spoken Monologue 3,196 (767) 2,629 (631)
Total 3,093 (1,856) 3,153 (1,892) 3,460 (403) 3,235
Dynamic Non-printed 2,080 (208) 3,300 (330)
Written Printed 2,217 (665) 2,437 (731)
Total 2,183 (873) 2,653 (1,061) 2,100 (168) 2,312
Total 2,729 (2,729) 2,953 (2,953) 2,906 (571) 2,863
Dialogue 578 (208) 422 (152)
Spoken Monologue 238 (57) 113 (27)
Total 442 (265) 298 (179) 653 (76) 464
Deontic Non-printed 220 (22) 130 (13)
Written Printed 220 (66) 290 (87)
Total 220 (88) 250 (100) 75 (6) 190
Total 353 (353) 279 (279) 417 (82) 350
Dialogue 39 (14) 47 (17)
Spoken Monologue 25 (6) 38 (9)
Total 33 (20) 43 (26) 86 (10) 54
Epistemic Non-printed 0 (0) 20 (2)
Written Printed 13 (4) 13 (4)
Total 10 (4) 15 (6) 13 (1) 13
Total 24 (24) 32 (32) 56 (11) 37
Indeterminate 272 (272) 301 (301) 285 (56) 286
Total 3,378 (3,378) 3,565 (3,565) 3,665 (720) 3,536
176 Appendix

Table 14. Might in ICE-AUS, ICE-GB, and C-US

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Avg
Dialogue 86 (31) 111 (40)
Spoken Monologue 225 (54) 113 (27)
Total 142 (85) 112 (67) 69 (8) 108
Dynamic Non-printed 50 (5) 140 (14)
Written Printed 107 (32) 130 (39)
Total 93 (37) 133 (53) 88 (7) 105
Total 122 (122) 120 (120) 76 (15) 106
Dialogue 8 (3) 6 (2)
Spoken Monologue 4 (1) 0 (0)
Total 7 (4) 3 (2) 0 (0) 3
Deontic Non-printed 0 (0) 10 (1)
Written Printed 10 (3) 7 (2)
Total 8 (3) 8 (3) 0 (0) 5
Total 7 (7) 5 (5) 0 (0) 4
Dialogue 817 (294) 703 (253)
Spoken Monologue 483 (116) 379 (91)
Total 683 (410) 573 (344) 404 (47) 553
Epistemic Non-printed 190 (19) 350 (35)
Written Printed 350 (105) 517 (155)
Total 310 (124) 475 (190) 425 (34) 403
Total 534 (534) 534 (534) 412 (81) 493
Indeterminate 32 (32) 43 (43) 31 (6) 35
Total 695 (695) 702 (702) 520 (102) 639
Appendix 177

Table 15. Could in ICE-AUS, ICE-GB, and C-US

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Avg
Dialogue 1,461 (526) 1,531 (551)
Spoken Monologue 954 (229) 900 (216)
Total 1,258 (755) 1,278 (767) 1,443 (168) 1,326
Dynamic Non-printed 1,170 (117) 1,200 (120)
Written Printed 1,083 (325) 1,110 (333)
Total 1,105 (442) 1,510 (453) 1,413 (113) 1,343
Total 1,197 (1197) 1,220 (1,220) 1,430 (281) 1,282
Dialogue 92 (33) 61 (22)
Spoken Monologue 50 (12) 33 (8)
Total 75 (45) 50 (30) 60 (7) 62
Deontic Non-printed 70 (7) 30 (3)
Written Printed 30 (9) 23 (7)
Total 40 (16) 25 (10) 13 (1) 26
Total 61 (61) 40 (40) 41 (8) 47
Dialogue 203 (73) 231 (83)
Spoken Monologue 250 (60) 346 (83)
Total 222 (133) 277 (166) 172 (20) 224
Epistemic Non-printed 220 (22) 60 (6)
Written Printed 267 (80) 360 (108)
Total 255 (102) 285 (114) 213 (17) 251
Total 235 (235) 280 (280) 188 (37) 234
Indeterminate 97 (97) 82 (82) 97 (19) 92
Total 1,590 (1,590) 1,622 (1,622) 1,756 (345) 1,656
178 Appendix

Table 16. Be able to in ICE-AUS, ICE-GB, and C-US

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Avg
Dialogue 128 (46) 161 (58)
Spoken Monologue 125 (30) 238 (57)
Total 135 (76) 200 (115) 189 (21) 175
Ability Non-printed 160 (16) 300 (29)
Written Printed 173 (47) 213 (60)
Total 170 (63) 235 (89) 125 (10) 177
Total 149 (139) 214 (204) 163 (31) 175
Dialogue 181 (63) 192 (64)
Spoken Monologue 229 (52) 125 (30)
Total 200 (115) 165 (94) 206 (23) 190
Theoretical
possibility Non-printed 420 (39) 500 (45)
Written Printed 193 (55) 160 (43)
Total 250 (94) 245 (88) 125 (9) 207
Total 220 (209) 197 (182) 173 (32) 197
Dialogue 8 (3) 17 (6)
Spoken Monologue 8 (2) 13 (3)
Total 8 (5) 15 (9) 17 (2) 13
Deontic Non-printed 70 (7) 0 (0)
Written Printed 20 (6) 47 (14)
Total 33 (13) 47 (14) 0 (0) 17
Total 18 (18) 23 (23) 10 (2) 17
Indeterminate 21 (21) 25 (25) 15 (3)
Total 387 (387) 434 (434) 346 (68) 389
Appendix 179

Table 17. Will in ICE-AUS, ICE-GB, and C-US

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Avg
Dialogue 1,350 (486) 1,519 (547)
Spoken Monologue 1,133 (272) 967 (232)
Total 1,263 (758) 1,298 (779) 1,589 (185) 1,383
Dynamic Non-printed 850 (85) 1,710 (171)
Written Printed 373 (112) 313 (94)
Total 493 (197) 663 (265) 1,525 (122) 894
Total 955 (955) 1,044 (1,044) 1,563 (307) 1,187
Dialogue 92 (33) 111 (40)
Spoken Monologue 25 (6) 63 (15)
Total 65 (39) 92 (55) 77 (9) 78
Deontic Non-printed 120 (12) 210 (21)
Written Printed 57 (17) 27 (8)
Total 73 (29) 73 (29) 13 (1) 53
Total 68 (68) 84 (84) 51 (10) 68
Dialogue 2,278 (820) 2,125 (765)
Spoken Monologue 3,333 (800) 2,342 (562)
Total 2,700 (1,620) 2,212 (1,327) 2,267 (264) 2,393
Epistemic Non-printed 3,140 (314) 2,350 (235)
Written Printed 2,427 (728) 3,203 (961)
Total 2,605 (1,042) 2,990 (1,196) 1,925 (154) 2,507
Total 2,662 (2,662) 2,523 (2,523) 2,128 (418) 2,438
Indeterminate 183 (183) 210 (210) 209 (41) 201
Total 3,868 (3,868) 3,861 (3,861) 3,950 (776) 3,893
180 Appendix

Table 18. Shall in ICE-AUS, ICE-GB, and C-US

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Avg
Dialogue 25 (9) 139 (50)
Spoken Monologue 4 (1) 75(18)
Total 17 (10) 113 (68) 26 (3) 52
Deontic Non-printed 120 (12) 160 (16)
Written Printed 90 (27) 107 (32)
Total 98 (39) 120 (48) 38 (3) 85
Total 49 (49) 116 (116) 31 (6) 65
Dialogue 44 (16) 108 (39)
Spoken Monologue 13 (3) 79 (19)
Total 32 (19) 97 (58) 34 (4) 54
Dynamic Non-printed 110 (11) 100 (10)
Written Printed 60 (18) 73 (22)
Total 73 (29) 80 (32) 50 (4) 68
Total 48 (48) 90 (90) 41 (8) 60
Dialogue 0 (0) 3 (1)
Spoken Monologue 0 (0) 8 (2)
Total 0 (0) 5 (3) 52 (6) 19
Epistemic Non-printed 0 (0) 40 (4)
Written Printed 3 (1) 23 (7)
Total 3 (1) 28 (11) 0 (0) 10
Total 1 (1) 14 (14) 31 (6) 15
Indeterminate 2 (2) 3 (3) 0 (0)
Total 100 (100) 223 (223) 102 (20) 142
Appendix 181

Table 19. Would in ICE-AUS, ICE-GB, and C-US

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Avg
Dialogue 1,314 (473) 1,108 (399)
Spoken Monologue 1,179 (283) 517 (124)
Total 1,260 (756) 872 (523) 618 (72) 917
Dynamic Non-printed 1,470 (147) 500 (50)
Written Printed 1,023 (307) 430 (129)
Total 1,135 (454) 448 (179) 488 (47) 690
Total 1,210 (1,210) 702 (702) 606 (119) 839
Dialogue 3,000 (1,080) 2,817 (1,014)
Spoken Monologue 1,554 (373) 2,388 (573)
Total 2,422 (1,453) 2,645 (1,587) 3,761 (438) 2,943
Epistemic Non-printed 160 (160) 2,610 (261)
Written Printed 967 (290) 1,503 (451)
Total 1,125 (450) 1,780 (712) 1,562 (125) 1,489
Total 1,903 (1,903) 2,299 (2,299) 2,866 (563) 2,356
Indeterminate 472 (472) 403 (403) 529 (104) 468
Total 3,585 (3,585) 3,404 (3,404) 4,001 (786) 3,663
182 Appendix

Table 20. Be going to in ICE-AUS, ICE-GB, and C-US

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Avg
Dialogue 928 (334) 872 (314)
Spoken Monologue 338 (81) 317 (76)
Total 692 (415) 650 (390) 1,537 (179) 960
Dynamic Non-printed 90 (9) 90 (9)
Written Printed 73 (22) 30 (9)
Total 78 (31) 45 (18) 113 (9) 79
Total 446 (446) 408 (408) 957 (188) 604
Dialogue 6 (2) 17 (6)
Spoken Monologue 0 (0) 17 (4)
Total 3 (2) 17 (10) 34 (4) 18
Deontic Non-printed 0 (0) 0 (0)
Written Printed 7 (2) 3 (1)
Total 5 (2) 3 (1) 13 (1) 7
Total 4 (4) 11 (11) 25 (5) 13
Dialogue 1,189 (428) 1,139 (410)
Spoken Monologue 800 (192) 442 (106)
Total 1,033 (620) 860 (516) 1,898 (221) 1,264
Epistemic Non-printed 90 (9) 180 (18)
Written Printed 100 (30) 93 (28)
Total 98 (39) 115 (46) 225 (18) 146
Total 659 (659) 562 (562) 1,217 (239) 813
Indeterminate 82 (82) 75 (75) 214 (42) 124
Total 1,191 (1,191) 1,056 (1,056) 2,413 (474) 1,553
Appendix 183

Table 21. Want to in ICE-AUS, ICE-GB, and C-US

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Avg

Dialogue 1,856 (668) 1,511 (544)
Spoken Monologue 792 (190) 533 (128)
Total 1,430 (858) 1,120 (672) 1,923 (224) 1,491
Dynamic Non-printed 430 (43) 700 (70)
Written Printed 500 (120) 337 (101)
Total 408 (163) 428 (171) 613 (49) 483
Total 1,021 (1,021) 843 (843) 1,390 (273) 1,085
Dialogue 22 (8) 19 (7)
Spoken Monologue 8 (2) 4 (1)
Total 17 (10) 13 (8) 26 (3) 19
Deontic Non-printed 0 (0) 0 (0)
Written Printed 3 (2) 0 (0)
Total 5 (2) 0 (0) 0 (0) 2
Total 12 (12) 8 (8) 15 (3) 12
Dialogue 6 (2) 8 (3)
Spoken Monologue 8 (2) 4 (1)
Total 6 (4) 6 (4) 9 (1) 7
Epistemic Non-printed 0 (0) 20 (2)
Written Printed 0 (0) 0 (0)
Total 0 (0) 5 (2) 25 (2) 10
Total 4 (4) 6 (6) 15 (3) 8
Indeterminate 2 (2) 1 (1) 5 (1) 3
Total 1,039 (1,039) 858 (858) 1,425 (280) 1,107
184 Appendix

Table 22. Be about to in ICE-AUS, ICE-GB, and C-US

ICE-AUS ICE-GB C-US Avg
Dialogue 47 (17) 56 (20)
Spoken Monologue 104 (25) 79 (19)
Total 70 (42) 65 (39) 9 (1) 48
Epistemic Non-printed 50 (5) 30 (3)
Written Printed 40 (12) 33 (10)
Total 43 (17) 33 (13) 75 (6) 50
Total 59 (59) 52 (52) 36 (7) 49
Dialogue 0 (0) 0 (0)
Spoken Monologue 4 (1) 4 (1)
Total 2 (1) 2 (1) 0 (0) 1
Epistemic Non-printed 0 (0) 10 (1)
Written Printed 7 (2) 0 (0)
Total 5 (2) 3 (1) 0 (0) 3
Total 3 (3) 2 (2) 0 (0) 2
Indeterminate 1 (1) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0
Total 63 (63) 54 (54) 36 (7) 153
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Index

Depraetere, I. 11, 25, 66

Aarts, F. 9, 153
diachronic change 7-8
ability 91-123
Dirven, R. 91
actualization 15, 35, 103, 116, 120,
Duffley, P. et al., 91, 100
148
dynamic implication 96, 104, 116
non-actualization 45-46, 55, 78
Edmonson, W. et al., 78, 81
adversative 49-50
Ehrman, M. 6, 24
Aijmer, K. 121
emotive 50
ambiguity 23
Facchinetti, R. 7, 77, 102, 105, 119,
Americanization 8, 149
121
auxiliary:
Fairclough, N. 77
semi-auxiliary 16
Francis, G. 5
primary auxiliary 12
Freiburg-Brown Corpus 3-4
backshifting 106
gonna 143
be able to 119-122, 178
grammaticalization 16, 18-20, 21,
be about to 155-156, 184
59, 68, 77, 143, 151, 157
be bound to 86-88, 173
Gresset, S. 113
be going to 143-150, 182
Groefsema, M. 24, 91, 100
be supposed to 80-83, 171
had better 77-79, 170
be to 83-86, 172
Haegeman, L. 24
Berglund, Y. 6
Hakutani, Y. 15
Biber, D. et al., 5, 6, 9, 33, 140
Hargis, C.H. 15
Bolinger, D. 91, 96, 100, 150, 153
harmonic 39, 92-93, 94
British National Corpus 19
have got to 68-72, 160, 168
Bybee, J.L. et al., 22, 23, 125
have to 59-68, 160, 167
can 97-105, 175
hedge 39-40
Chapin, P.J. 15
Hermerén, L. 6, 112, 119
Coates, J. 5, 6, 15, 21, 24, 25, 27,
Huddleston, R. 11, 13, 17-19, 23,
28, 29, 36, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43,
24, 26-28, 30, 38, 40, 44, 47, 49,
44, 46, 48, 53, 60, 63, 64, 65, 69,
50, 51, 53, 55, 79, 82, 85, 98, 99,
71, 88, 91, 92, 93, 94, 96, 97, 98,
102, 107, 118, 126-128, 130, 131,
112, 113, 119, 126, 132, 133,
133-138, 144, 148, 149, 157
138, 144, 148, 149, 151
Hughes, A. 63
Collins, P. 91, 98
Hunston, S. 5
colloquialization 9, 149
idiomaticity 16, 21
concessive 93, 113
indirect speech act 104, 142
conditional 50-51, 85, 117, 130, 141
inherency 96
Conrad, S. 9
International Corpus of English 1-3,
corpus linguistics:
9
corpus-based 5-6
irrealis 111-112
corpus-driven 5-6
Jacobsson, B. 18
corpus-informed 5-6
Jespersen, O. 5, 22
could 105-119, 177
192 Index

Kantor, 95 subjunctive mood 11, 27

Kennedy, G. 6 must 35-44, 160, 163
Klinge, A. 24, 91, 96, 100 Myhill, J. 67
Krug, M. 18, 68, 72, 125, 150, 151, necessity 33-89
154, 155 need 57-59, 161, 166
Lakoff, R. 15, 30 need to 73-77, 161, 169
Larkin, D. 15 negation 24-25, 27-28, 43, 48, 56,
Lebrun, Y. 91 66-67, 72, 76, 79, 84, 88, 131,
Leech, G. 6-9, 43, 48, 52, 56, 59, 133
61, 70, 72, 76, 77, 80, 83, 86, 91, Nelson, G. 9
95, 96, 97, 100, 105, 113, 118, ‘NICE’ constructions 12, 17, 31
119, 125, 139, 143, 149, 151, Nokkonen, S. 7
154, 157, 159, 160-162 non-assertive 73, 121
Longman Corpus 7-8 objectivity 28-29, 35-38
Lyons, J. 126 obligation 33-89
Mair, C. 7-9, 43, 52, 56, 59, 76, 77, ought to 52-57, 165
80, 83, 86, 125, 139, 143, 149, Palmer, F. 5, 6, 15, 22, 23, 28-30,
151, 154, 157, 159, 160-162 42, 46, 53, 60, 71, 78, 85, 87, 88,
mandative 49 96, 102, 103, 112, 121, 126, 128,
may 92-97, 161, 174 130, 134, 136, 138, 145, 151
Matthews, R. 64 Papafragou, A. 24
McCallum-Bayliss, H. 61 paraphrase 23
might 105-119, 176 performative 28, 35, 69, 142
Mitchell, K. 77, 78 Perkins, M. 15, 19, 28, 58, 60, 78,
modal harmony 27 79, 86
modality 11 permission 91-123
agent-oriented modality 22 Plungian, V.A. 11, 22
degree of modality 27-28, 39, polysemy 23-24
127-128 possibility 91-123
deontic modality 22, 23 existential possibility 102, 114
dynamic modality 22, 23 rational possibility 102-103, 114
epistemic modality 11, 19, 20, theoretical possibility 96
21, 23 potentiality 96, 103, 115
root modality 11, 19, 20, 21, 22 Poutsma, H. 5
strength of modality 25-27, 33 pragmatic:
modalization 17, 19, 144, 150, 152 pragmatic strengthening 93
modals: pragmatic weakening 27, 37-38,
central modals 14 39-40
lexico-modals 16-17 predictability 126-127
marginal modals 14 prediction 125-157
modal idioms 16 propensity 133
quasi-modals 11, 15-17 purposive 50
semi-modals 16-17 Pullum, G.K. 5, 11, 13, 17-19, 23,
monosemy 23-24 24, 26-28, 30, 38, 40, 44, 47, 49,
mood 11 50, 51, 53, 55, 79, 82, 85, 98, 99,
Index 193

102, 107, 118, 126-128, 130, 131, temporality 24-25, 41-43, 47-48, 56,
133-138, 144, 148, 149, 157 64-66, 71, 75
Quirk, R. et al., 5, 8, 14, 16, 17, 20, Traugott, E. 125
23, 113 Trudgill, P. 8, 63
reanalaysis 117-118 unreal 106
Reed, S. 11, 25, 66 unreal conditional 13
Reppen, R. 9 unreal preterite 13-14
resistibility 37-38 Van der Auwera, J. 11, 22, 100
rhetorical question 47 Vanparys, J. 100
Römer, U. 6 Verplaetse, H. 7, 93, 151, 152
Santa Barbara Corpus 3-4, 9 Vihla, M. 94
semantic bleaching 18-19, 20, 77 voice-neutrality 17
shall 135-139, 162, 180 volition 125-157
should 44-52, 160-161, 164 Wallis, S. 9
quasi-subjunctive should 44, 48 wanna 150
preterite should 51-52 want to 150-154, 162, 183
Smith, N. 59, 67, 72, 73, 76 Westney, P. 6, 15, 16, 28-30, 55,
subjectification 21, 59 60, 70, 72, 79, 81, 83
subjectivity 28-29, 35-38 will 126-135, 161, 179
suppletion 15, 87, 98 would 139-143, 161, 181
Sweetser, E. 21, 37, 61