G.R. No. L-46863             November 18, 1939
In admitting and counting in favor of the respondent, 8 ballots either
IRINEO MOYA, petitioner,
vs.
AGRIPINO GA. DEL FIERO, respondent.
Elpidio Quirino for petitioner.
Claro M. Recto for respondent.
ELECTION; APPRECIATION OF BALLOTS; TECHNICAL, RULES SHOULD NOT
DEFEAT INTENTION OF VOTES.—As long as popular government is an end to
be achieved and safeguarded, suffrage, whatever may be the modality and form
devised, must continue to be the means by which the great reservoir of power
must be emptied into the receptacular agencies wrought by the people through
their Constitution in the interest of good government and the common weal.
Republicanism, in so far as it implies the adoption of a representative type of
government, necessarily points to the enfranchised citizen as a particle of popular
sovereignty and as the ultimate source of the established authority. He has a voice
in his Government and whenever possible it is the duty of the judiciary, when
called upon to act in justiciable cases, to give it efficacy and not to stifle or frustrate
it. This, fundamentally, is the reason for the rule that ballots should be read and
appreciated, if not -with utmost, with reasonable, .liberality. . Counsel for both
parties have called our attention to the different and divergent rules laid down by
this court on the appreciation of ballot. It will serve no good and useful purpose for
us, to engage in the task of reconciliation or harmonization of these rules, although
this may perhaps be undertaken, as no two cases will be found to be exactly the
same
LAUREL, J.:
This is a petition for review by certiorari  of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in
the above entitled case declaring the respondent, Agripino Ga. del Fierro, the
candidate-elect for the office of mayor of the municipality of Paracale, Province of
Camarines Norte, with a majority of three votes over his rival, Irineo Moya. In the
general elections held on December 14, 1937, the parties herein were contending
candidates for the aforesaid office. After canvass of the returns the municipal
council of Paracale, acting as board of canvassers, proclaimed the petitioner as
the elected mayor of said municipality with a majority of 102 votes. On December
27, 1937, the respondent field a motion of protest in the Court of First Instance of
Camarines Norte, the Court of Appeals, on July 13, 1939 rendered the judgment
hereinbefore mentioned which is sought by the petitioner to be reviewed and
reversed upon the errors alleged to have been committed by the Court of Appeals:
1.
inadvertently or contrary to the controlling decisions of this Honorable
Court.
2. In admitting and counting in favor of the respondent, 3 ballots marked
"R. del Fierro."
3. In admitting and counting in favor of the respondent, 7 ballots marked
"Rufino del Firro."
4. In admitting and counting in favor of the respondent, 72 ballots marked
"P. del Fierro."
Taking up seriatim the alleged errors, we come to the first assignment involving the
eight (8) ballots now to be mentioned. (1) With reference to ballot Exhibit F-175 in
precinct No. 2, alleged to have been inadvertently admitted in favor of the
respondent, such inadvertence raises a question of fact which could have been
corrected by the Court of Appeals and which could we are not in a position to
determine in this proceeding for review by certiorari. Upon the other hand, if the
error attributed to the Court of Appeals consisted in having admitted ballot Exhibit
F-175 in precinct No. 2 instead of the ballot bearing the same number
corresponding to precinct No. 1, and this latter ballot clearly appears admissible for
the respondent because the name written on the space for mayor is "Primo del
Fierro" or "Pimo de Fierro", the error is technical and deserves but scanty
consideration. (2) Ballot Exhibit F-26 in precinct No. 3 was erroneously admitted
for the respondent by the Court of Appeals, the name written on the space for
mayor being "G.T. Krandes." It is true that on the fourth line for the councilor
"Alcalde Pinong del Fierro": appears; but the intention of the elector is rendered
vague and incapable of ascertaining and the ballot was improperly counted for the
respondent. As to this ballot, the contention of the petitioner is sustained (3) Ballot
Exhibit F-77 in precinct No. 2 should also have been rejected by the Court of
Appeals. The ballot bears the distinguishing mark "O. K." placed after the name
"M. Lopis" written on space for vice-mayor. The contention of the petitioner in this
respect is likewise sustained. (4) Ballot Exhibit F-9 in precinct No. 2 was properly
admitted for respondent. On this ballot the elector wrote within the space for mayor
the name of Regino Guinto, a candidate for the provincial board and wrote the
respondent's name immediately below the line for mayor but immediately above
the name "M. Lopez" voted by him for vice-mayor. The intention of the elector to
vote for the respondent for the office of the mayor is clear under the
circumstances. (5) Ballot F-131 in precinct No. 1 was also properly counted for the
respondent. On this ballot the elector wrote the respondent's name on the space
for vice-mayor, but, apparently realizing his mistake, he placed an arrow
connecting the name of the respondent to the word "Mayor" (Alcalde) printed on
the left side of the ballot. The intention of the elector to vote for the respondent for
the office of mayor is thus evident, in the absence of proof showing that the ballot
had been tampered with. (6) Ballot F-7 in precinct No. 5 is admissible for the
respondent and the Court of Appeals committed no error in so adjudicating.
Although the name of the respondent is written on the first space for member of
the provincial board, said name is followed in the next line by "Bice" Culastico
Palma, which latter name is followed in the next line by word "consehal" and the
name of a candidate for this position. The intention of the elector to vote for the
respondent for the office of mayor being manifest, the objection of the petitioner to
the admission of this ballot is overruled. (7) Ballot F-1 in precinct No. 2 is valid for
the respondent. On this ballot the Christian name of the respondent was written on
the second space for member of the provincial board, but his surname was written
on the proper space for mayor with no other accompanying name or names. The
intention of the elector being manifest, the same should be given effect in favor of
the respondent. (8) Ballot F-44 in precinct No. 2 wherein "Agripino F. Garcia"
appears written on the proper space, is valid for the respondent. In his certificate of
candidacy the respondent gave his name as "Agripino Ga. del Fierro." The
conclusion of the trial court, upheld by the Court of Appeals, that the letter "F"
stands for "Fierro" and "Garcia" for the contraction "Ga." is not without justification
and, by liberal construction, the ballot in question was properly admitted for the
respondent.
The second error assigned by the petitioner refers to three ballots, namely, Exhibit
F-119 in precinct No. 1 Exhibit F-24 in precinct No. 2, and Exhibit F-6 in precinct
No. 4. These three ballots appear to be among the 75 ballots found by the Court of
Appeals as acceptable for the respondent on the ground that the initial letter "P"
stands for "Pino" in "Pino del Fierro" which is a name mentioned in the certificate of
candidacy of the respondent. The petitioner contends that the initial "R" and not
"P". Even if we could reverse this finding, we do not feel justified in doing so after
examining the photostatic copies of these ballots attached to the herein petition
for certiorari. The second assignment of error is accordingly overruled.
Upon the third assignment of error, the petitioner questions the correctness of the
judgment of the Court of Appeals in adjudicating to the respondent the seven
ballots wherein "Rufino del Fierro" was voted for the office of mayor. We are of the
opinion that the position taken by the Court of Appeals is correct. There was no
other candidate for the office of mayor with the name of "Rufino" or similar name
and, as the respondent was districtly identified by his surname on these ballots,
the intention of the voters in preparing the same was undoubtedly to vote for the
respondent of the office for which he was a candidate.lawphi1.net
The fourth assignment of error deals with the 72 ballots wherein "P. del Fierro" was
voted for the office of mayor, and it is the contention of the petitioner that said
ballots should not have been counted by the Court of Appeals in favor of the
respondent. For the identical reason indicated under the discussion of petitioner's
second assignment of error, namely, that "P" stands for "Pino" in "Pino del Fierro"
which is a name mentioned in the certificate of candidacy of the respondent, we
hold that there was no error in the action of the Court of Appeals in awarding the
said ballots to the respondent.
With the exception of ballot marked as Exhibit F-26 in precinct No. 3 and ballot
marked as Exhibit F-77 in precinct No. 2, we are inclined to accept the rest of the
disputed ballots for the respondent not only for the specific reasons already given
but also and principally for the more fundamental reason now to be stated. As long
as popular government is an end to be achieved and safeguarded, suffrage,
whatever may be the modality and form devised, must continue to be the manes
by which the great reservoir of power must be emptied into the receptacular
agencies wrought by the people through their Constitution in the interest of good
government and the common weal. Republicanism, in so far as it implies the
adoption of a representative type of government, necessarily points to the
enfranchised citizen as a particle of popular sovereignty and as the ultimate source
of the established authority. He has a voice in his Government and whenever
called upon to act in justifiable cases, to give it efficacy and not to stifle it. This,
fundamentally, is the reason for the rule that ballots should be read and
appreciated, if not with utmost, with reasonable, liberality. Counsel for both parties
have called our attention to the different and divergent rules laid down by this
Court on the appreciation of ballots. It will serve no good and useful purpose for us
to engage in the task of reconciliation or harmonization of these rules, although
this may perhaps be undertaken, as no two cases will be found to be exactly the
same in factual or legal environment. It is sufficient to observe, however, in this
connection that whatever might have been said in cases heretofore decided, no
technical rule or rules should be permitted to defeat the intention of the voter, if
that intention is discoverable from the ballot itself, not from evidence aliunde. This
rule of interpretation goes to the very root of the system. Rationally, also, this must
be the justification for the suggested liberalization of the rules on appreciation of
ballots which are now incorporated in section 144 of the Election Code
(Commonwealth Act No. 357).
It results that, crediting the petitioner with the two ballots herein held to have been
erroneously admitted by the Court of Appeals for the respondent, the latter still
wins by one vote. In view whereof it becomes unnecessary to consider the
counter-assignment of errors of the respondent.
With the modification of the decision of the Court of Appeals, the petition for the
writ of certiorari  is hereby dismissed, without pronouncement regarding costs.
G.R. No. L-42300             January 31, 1936
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
AMADEO CORRAL, defendant-appellant.
Generoso, Pelayo, Castillo, Braganza, Chavez, Doromal, Diaz and Capili for
appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Hilado for appellee.
1.ELECTION LAW; SUFFRAGE; DISQUALIFICATION.—Under the law a person
is disqualified to vote who, since the 13th day of August, 1898, has been
sentenced by final judgment to suffer not less than eighteen months of
imprisonment, such disability not having been removed by plenary pardon.
(Administrative Code, sec., 482.)
2.ID.; ID.; ID.; VIOLATION OF.—Whoever at any election votes knowing that he is
not entitled so to do incurs in criminal responsibility. (Sec. 2642 of the
Administrative Code.) People vs. Corral, 62 Phil. 945, No. 42300 January 81, 1936
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
Appellant was charged having voted illegally at the general elections held on June
5, 1934. After due trial, he was convicted on the ground that he had voted while
laboring under a legal disqualification. The judgment of conviction was based on
section 2642, in connection with section 432. of the Revised Administrative Code.
Said Section 432 reads as follows:
The following persons shall be disqualified from voting:
(a) Any person who, since the thirteenth day of August, eighteen hundred and
ninety-eight, has been sentenced by final judgment to suffer not less than eighteen
months of imprisonment, such disability not having been removed by plenary
pardon.
(b) Any person who has violated an oath of allegiance taken by him to the United
States.
(c) Insane of feeble-minded persons.
(d) Deaf-mutes who cannot read and write.
(e) Electors registered under subsection (c) of the next proceeding section who,
after failing to make sworn statement to the satisfaction of the board of inspectors
at any of its two meetings for registration and revision, that they are incapacitated
for preparing their ballots due to permanent physical disability, present themselves
at the hour of voting as incapacitated, irrespective of whether such incapacity be
real or feigned.
And section 2642 provides:
Whoever at any election votes or attempts to vote knowing that he is not entitled
so to do, ... shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one month nor
more than one year and by a fine of not less than one hundred pesos nor more
than one thousand pesos, and in all cases by deprivation of the right of suffrage
and disqualification from public office for a period of not more than four years.
It is undisputed that appellant was sentenced by final judgment of this court
promulgated on March 3, 1910,1 to suffer eight years and one day of  presidio
mayor. No evidence was presented to show that prior to June 5, 1934, he had
been granted a plenary pardon. It is likewise undisputed that at the general
elections held on June 5, 1934, the voted in election precinct No. 18 of the
municipality of Davao, Province of Davao.
The modern conception of the suffrage is that voting is a function of government.
The right to vote is not a natural right but is a right created by law. Suffrage is a
privilege granted by the State to such persons or classes as are most likely to
exercise it for the public good. In the early stages of the evolution of the
representative system of government, the exercise of the right of suffrage was
limited to a small portion of the inhabitants. But with the spread of democratic
ideas, the enjoyment of the franchise in the modern states has come to embrace
the mass of the audit classes of persons are excluded from the franchise. Among
the the generally excluded classes are minors idiots, paupers, and convicts.
The right of the State to deprive persons to the right of suffrage by reason of their
having been convicted of crime, is beyond question. "The manifest purpose of
such restrictions upon this right is to preserve the purity of elections. The
presumption is that one rendered infamous by conviction of felony, or other base
offense indicative of moral turpitude, is unfit to exercise the privilege of suffrage or
to hold office. The exclusion must for this reason be adjudged a mere
disqualification, imposed for protection and not for punishment, the withholding of a
privilege and not the denial of a personal right. (9 R.C.L., 1042.)
Upon the facts established in this case, it seems clear that the appellant was not
entitled to vote on June 5 1934, because of section 432 of the Revised
Administrative Code which disqualified from voting any person who, since the 13th
day of August, 1898, had been sentenced by final judgment to offer not less than
eighteen months of imprisonment, such disability not having been removed by
plenary pardon. As above stated, the appellant had been sentenced by final
judgment to suffer eight years and one day of  presidio mayor, and had not been
granted a plenary pardon.
Counsel for the appellant contend that inasmuch as the latter voted in 1928 his
offense had already prescribed, and he could no longer be prosecuted for illegal
voting at the general election held on June 5, 1934. This contention is clearly
without merit. The disqualification for crime imposed under section 432 of the
Revised Administrative Code having once attached on the appellant and not
having been subsequently removed by a plenary pardon, continued and rendered
it illegal for the appellant to vote at the general elections of 1934.
Neither is there any merit in the contention advanced by counsel for the appellant
that the disqualification imposed on the latter must be considered as having been
removed at the expiration of his sentence. This claim is based upon an erroneous
theory of the nature of the disqualification. It regards it as a punishment when, as
already indicated, the correct view is that it is imposed, "for protection and not for
punishment,. the withholding of a prvilege and not the denial of a personal right."
Judicial interpretation and long established administrative practice are against
such a view.
The judgment appealed from is affirmed with costs against the appellant. So
ordered.
G.R. No. 162759 August 4, 2006
LOIDA NICOLAS-LEWIS, GREGORIO B. MACABENTA, ALEJANDRO A.
ESCLAMADO, ARMANDO B. HEREDIA, REUBEN S. SEGURITAN, ERIC
LACHICA FURBEYRE, TERESITA A. CRUZ, JOSEFINA OPENA DISTERHOFT,
MERCEDES V. OPENA, CORNELIO R. NATIVIDAD, EVELYN D.
NATIVIDAD, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
DECISION
Citizenship; Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003 (R.A. No. 9225);
Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 (R.A. No. 9189); Suffrage; There is no
provision in the dual citizenship law—R.A. 9225—requiring “duals” to actually
establish residence and physically stay in the Philippines first before they can
exercise the right to vote—on the contrary, R.A. 9225, in implicit acknowledgment
that “duals” are most likely non-residents, grants under its Section 5(1) the same
right of suffrage as that granted an absentee voter under R.A. 9189.—There is no
provision in the dual citizenship law—R.A. 9225—requiring “duals” to actually
establish residence and physically stay in the Philippines first before they can
exercise their right to vote. On the contrary, R.A. 9225, in implicit acknowledgment
that “duals” are most likely non-residents, grants under its Section 5(1) the same
right of suffrage as that granted an absentee voter under R.A. 9189. It cannot be
overemphasized that R.A. 9189 aims, in essence, to enfranchise as much as
possible all overseas Filipinos who, save for the residency requirements exacted of
an ordinary voter under ordinary conditions, are qualified to vote.
Suffrage; Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003 (R.A. No. 9225);
Overseas Absentee Voting act of 2003 (R.A. 9189); Considering the unison intent
of the Constitution and R.A. 9189 and the expansion of the scope of that law with
the passage of R.A. 9225, the irresistible conclusion is that “duals” may now
exercise the right of suffrage thru the absentee voting scheme and as overseas
absentee voters.—Considering the unison intent of the Constitution and R.A. 9189
and the expansion of the scope of that law with the passage of R.A. 9225, the
irresistible conclusion is that “duals” may now exercise the right of suffrage thru the
absentee voting scheme and as overseas absentee voters. R.A. 9189 defines the
terms adverted to in the following wise: “Absentee Voting” refers to the process by
which qualified citizens of the Philippines abroad exercise their right to vote;
“Overseas Absentee Voter” refers to a citizen of the Philippines who is qualified to
register and vote under this Act, not otherwise disqualified by law, who is abroad
on the day of elections.
Same; Same; Same; The Court notes that the expanded thrust of R.A. 9189
extends also to what might be tagged as the next generation of “duals”; If the next
generation of “duals” may nonetheless avail themselves the right to enjoy full civil
and political rights under Section 5 of the Act, then there is neither rhyme nor
reason why the petitioners and other present day “duals,” provided they meet the
requirements under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution in relation to R.A. 9189,
be denied the right of suffrage as an overseas absentee voter.—While perhaps not
determinative of the issue tendered herein, we note that the expanded thrust of
R.A. 9189 extends also to what might be tag as the next generation of “duals.” This
may be deduced from the inclusion of the provision on derivative citizenship in
R.A. 9225 which reads: SEC. 4. Derivative Citizenship.—The unmarried child,
whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted, below eighteen (18) years of age, of
those who re-acquire Philippine citizenship upon effectivity of this Act shall be
deemed citizens of the Philippines. It is very likely that a considerable number of
those unmarried children below eighteen (18) years of age had never set foot in
the Philippines. Now then, if the next generation of “duals” may nonetheless avail
themselves the right to enjoy full civil and political rights under Section 5 of the Act,
then there is neither no rhyme nor reason why the petitioners and other present
day “duals,” provided they meet the requirements under Section 1, Article V of the
Constitution in relation to R.A. 9189, be denied the right of suffrage as an overseas
absentee voter. Congress could not have plausibly intended such absurd situation.
GARCIA, J.:
In this petition for certiorari and mandamus, petitioners, referring to themselves as
"duals" or dual citizens, pray that they and others who retained or reacquired
Philippine citizenship under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225, the Citizenship
Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003, be allowed to avail themselves of the
mechanism provided under the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 1 (R.A.
9189) and that the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) accordingly be ordered
to allow them to vote and register as absentee voters under the aegis of R.A.
9189.
The facts:
Petitioners are successful applicants for recognition of Philippine citizenship under
R.A. 9225 which accords to such applicants the right of suffrage, among others.
Long before the May 2004 national and local elections, petitioners sought
registration and certification as "overseas absentee voter" only to be advised by
the Philippine Embassy in the United States that, per a COMELEC letter to the
Department of Foreign Affairs dated September 23, 2003 2, they have yet no right
to vote in such elections owing to their lack of the one-year residence requirement
prescribed by the Constitution. The same letter, however, urged the different
Philippine posts abroad not to discontinue their campaign for voter’s registration,
as the residence restriction adverted to would contextually affect merely certain
individuals who would likely be eligible to vote in future elections.
Prodded for clarification by petitioner Loida Nicolas-Lewis in the light of the ruling
in Macalintal vs. COMELEC 3 on the residency requirement, the COMELEC wrote
in response:
Although R.A. 9225 enjoys the presumption of constitutionality …, it is the
Commission's position that those who have availed of the law cannot exercise the
right of suffrage given under the OAVL for the reason that the OAVL was not
enacted for them. Hence, as Filipinos who have merely re-acquired their
citizenship on 18 September 2003 at the earliest, and as law and jurisprudence
now stand, they are considered regular voters who have to meet the requirements
of residency, among others under Section 1, Article 5 of the Constitution. 4
Faced with the prospect of not being able to vote in the May 2004 elections owing
to the COMELEC's refusal to include them in the National Registry of Absentee
Voters, petitioner Nicolas-Lewis et al., 5 filed on April 1, 2004 this petition for
certiorari and mandamus.
A little over a week before the May 10, 2004 elections, or on April 30, 2004, the
COMELEC filed a Comment, 6 therein praying for the denial of the petition. As may
be expected, petitioners were not able to register let alone vote in said elections.
On May 20, 2004, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Manifestation (in
Lieu of Comment), therein stating that "all qualified overseas Filipinos, including
dual citizens who care to exercise the right of suffrage, may do so" , observing,
however, that the conclusion of the 2004 elections had rendered the petition moot
and academic. 7
The holding of the 2004 elections had, as the OSG pointed out, indeed rendered
the petition moot and academic, but insofar only as petitioners’ participation in
such political exercise is concerned. The broader and transcendental issue
tendered or subsumed in the petition, i.e., the propriety of allowing "duals" to
participate and vote as absentee voter in future elections, however, remains
unresolved.
Observing the petitioners’ and the COMELEC’s respective formulations of the
issues, the same may be reduced into the question of whether or not petitioners
and others who might have meanwhile retained and/or reacquired Philippine
citizenship pursuant to R.A. 9225 may vote as absentee voter under R.A. 9189.
The Court resolves the poser in the affirmative, and thereby accords merit to the
petition.
In esse, this case is all about suffrage. A quick look at the governing provisions on
the right of suffrage is, therefore, indicated.
We start off with Sections 1 and 2 of Article V of the Constitution, respectively
reading as follows:
SECTION 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not
otherwise disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen years of age, and who
shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein
they propose to vote for at least six months immediately preceding the election.
xxx.
SEC 2. The Congress shall provide … a system for absentee voting by qualified
Filipinos abroad.
In a nutshell, the aforequoted Section 1 prescribes residency requirement as a
general eligibility factor for the right to vote. On the other hand, Section 2
authorizes Congress to devise a system wherein an absentee may vote, implying
that a non-resident may, as an exception to the residency prescription in the
preceding section, be allowed to vote.
In response to its above mandate, Congress enacted R.A. 9189 - the OAVL 8 -
identifying in its Section 4 who can vote under it and in the following section who
cannot, as follows:
Section 4. Coverage. – All citizens of the Philippines abroad, who are not
otherwise disqualified by law, at least eighteen (18) years of age on the day of
elections, may vote for president, vice-president, senators and party-list
representatives.
Section 5. Disqualifications. – The following shall be disqualified from voting under
this Act:
(a) Those who have lost their Filipino citizenship in accordance with Philippine
laws;
(b) Those who have expressly renounced their Philippine citizenship and who have
pledged allegiance to a foreign country;
(c) Those who have … [been] convicted in a final judgment by a court or tribunal of
an offense punishable by imprisonment of not less than one (1) year, including
those who have … been found guilty of Disloyalty as defined under Article 137 of
the Revised Penal Code, ….;
(d) An immigrant or a permanent resident who is recognized as such in the host
country, unless he/she executes, upon registration, an affidavit prepared for the
purpose by the Commission declaring that he/she shall resume actual physical
permanent residence in the Philippines not later than three (3) years from approval
of his/her registration under this Act. Such affidavit shall also state that he/she has
not applied for citizenship in another country. Failure to return shall be the cause
for the removal of the name of the immigrant or permanent resident from the
National Registry of Absentee Voters and his/her permanent disqualification to
vote in absentia.
(e) Any citizen of the Philippines abroad previously declared insane or incompetent
by competent authority …. (Words in bracket added.)
Notably, Section 5 lists those who cannot avail themselves of the absentee voting
mechanism. However, Section 5(d) of the enumeration respecting Filipino
immigrants and permanent residents in another country opens an exception and
qualifies the disqualification rule. Section 5(d) would, however, face a constitutional
challenge on the ground that, as narrated in Macalintal, it -
… violates Section 1, Article V of the 1987 Constitution which requires that the
voter must be a resident in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place
where he proposes to vote for at least six months immediately preceding an
election. [The challenger] cites … Caasi vs. Court of Appeals 9 to support his claim
[where] the Court held that a "green card" holder immigrant to the [US] is deemed
to have abandoned his domicile and residence in the Philippines.
[The challenger] further argues that Section 1, Article V of the Constitution does
not allow provisional registration or a promise by a voter to perform a condition to
be qualified to vote in a political exercise; that the legislature should not be allowed
to circumvent the requirement of the Constitution on the right of suffrage by
providing a condition thereon which in effect amends or alters the aforesaid
residence requirement to qualify a Filipino abroad to vote. He claims that the right
of suffrage should not be granted to anyone who, on the date of the election, does
not possess the qualifications provided for by Section 1, Article V of the
Constitution. 10 (Words in bracket added.)
As may be recalled, the Court upheld the constitutionality of Section 5(d) of R.A.
9189 mainly on the strength of the following premises:
As finally approved into law, Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 specifically disqualifies
an immigrant or permanent resident who is "recognized as such in the host
country" because immigration or permanent residence in another country implies
renunciation of one's residence in his country of origin. However, same Section
allows an immigrant and permanent resident abroad to register as voter for as long
as he/she executes an affidavit to show that he/she has not abandoned his
domicile in pursuance of the constitutional intent expressed in Sections 1 and 2 of
Article V that "all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law" must
be entitled to exercise the right of suffrage and, that Congress must establish a
system for absentee voting; for otherwise, if actual, physical residence in the
Philippines is required, there is no sense for the framers of the Constitution to
mandate Congress to establish a system for absentee voting.
Contrary to the claim of [the challenger], the execution of the affidavit itself is not
the enabling or enfranchising act. The affidavit required in Section 5(d) is not only
proof of the intention of the immigrant or permanent resident to go back and
resume residency in the Philippines, but more significantly, it serves as an explicit
expression that he had not in fact abandoned his domicile of origin. Thus, it is not
correct to say that the execution of the affidavit under Section 5(d) violates the
Constitution that proscribes "provisional registration or a promise by a voter to
perform a condition to be qualified to vote in a political exercise." 11
Soon after Section 5(d) of R.A. 9189 passed the test of constitutionality, Congress
enacted R.A. 9225 the relevant portion of which reads:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all
Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to
have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act.
SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship. – Any provision of law to the contrary
notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their
Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign
country are hereby deemed to have re-acquired Philippine citizenship upon taking
the following oath of allegiance to the Republic:
xxx xxx xxx
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become
citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the
aforesaid oath.
SEC. 4. Derivative Citizenship. – The unmarried child, whether legitimate,
illegitimate or adopted, below eighteen (18) years of age, of those who re-acquire
Philippine citizenship upon effectivity of this Act shall be deemed citizens of the
Philippines.
SEC. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. – Those who retain or re-acquire
Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be
subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the
Philippines and the following conditions:
(1) Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must meet the requirements
under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise
known as "The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003" and other existing laws;
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the
qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and
existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship …;
3) xxx xxx xxx.
(4) xxx xxx xxx;
(5) That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office in the
Philippines cannot be exercised by, or extended to, those who:
(a) are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the country of which
they are naturalized citizens; and/or
(b) are in active service as commissioned or non-commissioned officers in the
armed forces of the country which they are naturalized citizens.
After what appears to be a successful application for recognition of Philippine
citizenship under R.A. 9189, petitioners now invoke their right to enjoy … political
rights, specifically the right of suffrage, pursuant to Section 5 thereof.
Opposing the petitioners’ bid, however, respondent COMELEC invites attention to
the same Section 5 (1) providing that "duals" can enjoy their right to vote, as an
adjunct to political rights, only if they meet the requirements of Section 1, Article V
of the Constitution, R.A. 9189 and other existing laws. Capitalizing on what at first
blush is the clashing provisions of the aforecited provision of the Constitution,
which, to repeat, requires residency in the Philippines for a certain period, and R.A.
9189 which grants a Filipino non-resident absentee voting rights, 12 COMELEC
argues:
4. ‘DUALS’ MUST FIRST ESTABLISH THEIR DOMICILE/ RESIDENCE IN THE
PHILIPPINES
4.01. The inclusion of such additional and specific requirements in RA 9225 is
logical. The ‘duals,’ upon renouncement of their Filipino citizenship and acquisition
of foreign citizenship, have practically and legally abandoned their domicile and
severed their legal ties to the homeland as a consequence. Having subsequently
acquired a second citizenship (i.e., Filipino) then, ‘duals’ must, for purposes of
voting, first of all, decisively and definitely establish their domicile through positive
acts; 13
The Court disagrees.
As may be noted, there is no provision in the dual citizenship law - R.A. 9225 -
requiring "duals" to actually establish residence and physically stay in the
Philippines first before they can exercise their right to vote. On the contrary, R.A.
9225, in implicit acknowledgment that "duals" are most likely non-residents, grants
under its Section 5(1) the same right of suffrage as that granted an absentee voter
under R.A. 9189. It cannot be overemphasized that R.A. 9189 aims, in essence, to
enfranchise as much as possible all overseas Filipinos who, save for the residency
requirements exacted of an ordinary voter under ordinary conditions, are qualified
to vote. Thus, wrote the Court in Macalintal:
It is clear from these discussions of the … Constitutional Commission that [it]
intended to enfranchise as much as possible all Filipino citizens abroad who have
not abandoned their domicile of origin. The Commission even intended to extend
to young Filipinos who reach voting age abroad whose parents’ domicile of origin
is in the Philippines, and consider them qualified as voters for the first time.
It is in pursuance of that intention that the Commission provided for Section 2
[Article V] immediately after the residency requirement of Section 1. By the
doctrine of necessary implication in statutory construction, …, the strategic location
of Section 2 indicates that the Constitutional Commission provided for an
exception to the actual residency requirement of Section 1 with respect to qualified
Filipinos abroad. The same Commission has in effect declared that qualified
Filipinos who are not in the Philippines may be allowed to vote even though they
do not satisfy the residency requirement in Section 1, Article V of the Constitution.
That Section 2 of Article V of the Constitution is an exception to the residency
requirement found in Section 1 of the same Article was in fact the subject of
debate when Senate Bill No. 2104, which became R.A. No. 9189, was deliberated
upon on the Senate floor, thus:
Senator Arroyo. Mr. President, this bill should be looked into in relation to the
constitutional provisions. I think the sponsor and I would agree that the
Constitution is supreme in any statute that we may enact.
Let me read Section 1, Article V, of the Constitution ….
xxx xxx xxx
Now, Mr. President, the Constitution says, "who shall have resided in the
Philippines." They are permanent immigrants. They have changed residence so
they are barred under the Constitution. This is why I asked whether this committee
amendment which in fact does not alter the original text of the bill will have any
effect on this?
Senator Angara. Good question, Mr. President. And this has been asked in various
fora. This is in compliance with the Constitution. One, the interpretation here of
"residence" is synonymous with "domicile."
As the gentleman and I know, Mr. President, "domicile" is the intent to return to
one's home. And the fact that a Filipino may have been physically absent from the
Philippines and may be physically a resident of the United States, for example, but
has a clear intent to return to the Philippines, will make him qualified as a resident
of the Philippines under this law.
This is consistent, Mr. President, with the constitutional mandate that we – that
Congress – must provide a franchise to overseas Filipinos.
If we read the Constitution and the suffrage principle literally as demanding
physical presence, then there is no way we can provide for offshore voting to our
offshore kababayan, Mr. President.
Senator Arroyo. Mr. President, when the Constitution says, in Section 2 of Article
V, it reads: "The Congress shall provide a system for securing the secrecy and
sanctity of the ballot as well as a system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos
abroad."
The key to this whole exercise, Mr. President, is "qualified." In other words,
anything that we may do or say in granting our compatriots abroad must be
anchored on the proposition that they are qualified. Absent the qualification, they
cannot vote. And "residents" (sic) is a qualification.
xxx xxx xxx
Look at what the Constitution says – "In the place wherein they propose to vote for
at least six months immediately preceding the election."
Mr. President, all of us here have run (sic) for office.
I live in Makati. My neighbor is Pateros …. We are separated only by a creek. But
one who votes in Makati cannot vote in Pateros unless he resides in Pateros for
six months. That is how restrictive our Constitution is. ….
As I have said, if a voter in Makati would want to vote in Pateros, yes, he may do
so. But he must do so, make the transfer six months before the election, otherwise,
he is not qualified to vote.
xxx xxx xxx
Senator Angara. It is a good point to raise, Mr. President. But it is a point already
well-debated even in the constitutional commission of 1986. And the reason
Section 2 of Article V was placed immediately after the six-month/one-year
residency requirement is to demonstrate unmistakably that Section 2 which
authorizes absentee voting is an exception to the six-month/one-year residency
requirement. That is the first principle, Mr. President, that one must remember.
The second reason, Mr. President, is that under our jurisprudence … – "residency"
has been interpreted as synonymous with "domicile."
But the third more practical reason, … is, if we follow the interpretation of the
gentleman, then it is legally and constitutionally impossible to give a franchise to
vote to overseas Filipinos who do not physically live in the country, which is quite
ridiculous because that is exactly the whole point of this exercise – to enfranchise
them and empower them to vote. 14 (Emphasis and words in bracket added;
citations omitted)
Lest it be overlooked, no less than the COMELEC itself admits that the Citizenship
Retention and Re-Acquisition Act expanded the coverage of overseas absentee
voting. According to the poll body:
1.05 With the passage of RA 9225 the scope of overseas absentee voting has
been consequently expanded so as to include Filipinos who are also citizens of
other countries, subject, however, to the strict prerequisites indicated in the
pertinent provisions of RA 9225; 15
Considering the unison intent of the Constitution and R.A. 9189 and the expansion
of the scope of that law with the passage of R.A. 9225, the irresistible conclusion is
that "duals" may now exercise the right of suffrage thru the absentee voting
scheme and as overseas absentee voters. R.A. 9189 defines the terms adverted
to in the following wise:
"Absentee Voting" refers to the process by which qualified citizens of the
Philippines abroad exercise their right to vote;
"Overseas Absentee Voter" refers to a citizen of the Philippines who is qualified to
register and vote under this Act, not otherwise disqualified by law, who is abroad
on the day of elections;
While perhaps not determinative of the issue tendered herein, we note that the
expanded thrust of R.A. 9189 extends also to what might be tag as the next
generation of "duals". This may be deduced from the inclusion of the provision on
derivative citizenship in R.A. 9225 which reads:
SEC. 4. Derivative Citizenship. – The unmarried child, whether legitimate,
illegitimate or adopted, below eighteen (18) years of age, of those who re-acquire
Philippine citizenship upon effectivity of this Act shall be deemed citizens of the
Philippines.
It is very likely that a considerable number of those unmarried children below
eighteen (18) years of age had never set foot in the Philippines. Now then, if the
next generation of "duals" may nonetheless avail themselves the right to enjoy full
civil and political rights under Section 5 of the Act, then there is neither no rhyme
nor reason why the petitioners and other present day "duals," provided they meet
the requirements under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution in relation to R.A.
9189, be denied the right of suffrage as an overseas absentee voter. Congress
could not have plausibly intended such absurd situation.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Court rules and
so holds that those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under Republic
Act No. 9225, the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003, may
exercise the right to vote under the system of absentee voting in Republic Act No.
9189, the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 157013            July 10, 2003
ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, HON. ALBERTO ROMULO, in his official
capacity as Executive Secretary, and HON. EMILIA T. BONCODIN, Secretary
of the Department of Budget and Management, respondents.
Election Law; Constitutional Law; Parties in Interest; Taxpayers have the right to
restrain officials from wasting public funds through the enforcement of an
unconstitutional statute.—R.A. No. 9189, entitled, “An Act Providing for A System
of Overseas Absentee Voting by Qualified Citizens of the Philippines Abroad,
Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes,” appropriates funds under
Section 29 thereof which provides that a supplemental budget on the General
Appropriations Act of the year of its enactment into law shall provide for the
necessary amount to carry out its provisions. Taxpayers, such as herein petitioner,
have the right to restrain officials from wasting public funds through the
enforcement of an unconstitutional statute. The Court has held that they may
assail the validity of a law appropriating public funds because expenditure of public
funds by an officer of the State for the purpose of executing an unconstitutional act
constitutes a misapplication of such funds.
Same; Same; Statutes; Laws that do not conform to the Constitution shall be
stricken down for being unconstitutional.—The Constitution is the fundamental and
paramount law of the nation to which all other laws must conform and in
accordance with which all private rights must be determined and all public authority
administered. Laws that do not conform to the Constitution shall be stricken down
for being unconstitutional.
Same; Same; Same; Presumption of constitutionality of a law must be overcome
convincingly.—Generally, however, all laws are presumed to be constitutional. In
Peralta vs. COMELEC, the Court said: . . . An act of the legislature, approved by
the executive, is presumed to be within constitutional limitations. The responsibility
of upholding the Constitution rests not on the courts alone but on the legislature as
well. The question of the validity of every statute is first determined by the
legislative department of the government itself. Thus, presumption of
constitutionality of a law must be overcome convincingly: . . . To declare a law
unconstitutional, the repugnancy of that law to the Constitution must be clear and
unequivocal, for even if a law is aimed at the attainment of some public good, no
infringement of constitutional rights is allowed. To strike down a law there must be
a clear showing that what the fundamental law condemns or prohibits, the statute
allows it to be done.”
Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; A constitutional provision should
function to the full extent of its substance and its terms, not by itself alone, but in
conjunction with all other provisions of that great document.—It is a basic rule in
constitutional construction that the Constitution should be construed as a whole. In
Chiongbian vs. De Leon, the Court held that a constitutional provision should
function to the full extent of its substance and its terms, not by itself alone, but in
conjunction with all other provisions of that great document. Constitutional
provisions are mandatory in character unless, either by express statement or by
necessary implication, a different intention is manifest. The intent of the
Constitution may be drawn primarily from the language of the document itself.
Should it be ambiguous, the Court may consider the intent of its framers through
their debates in the constitutional convention.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Absentee Voting; Members to the Constitutional
Commission intended to enfranchise as much as possible all Filipino citizens
abroad who have not abandoned their domicile of origin.—It is clear from these
discussions of the members of the Constitutional Commission intended to
enfranchise as much as possible all Filipino citizens abroad who have not
abandoned their domicile of origin. The Commission even intended to extend to
young Filipinos who reach voting age abroad whose parents’ domicile of origin is in
the Philippines, and consider them qualified as voters for the first time.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The execution of the affidavit itself is not the
enabling or enfranchising act; The affidavit is not only proof of the intention of the
immigrant or permanent resident to go back and resume residency in the
Philippines, but more significantly, it serves as an explicit expression that he had
not in fact abandoned his domicile of origin.—Contrary to the claim of petitioner,
the execution of the affidavit itself is not the enabling or enfranchising act. The
affidavit required in Section 5(d) is not only proof of the intention of the immigrant
or permanent resident to go back and resume residency in the Philippines, but
more significantly, it serves as an explicit expression that he had not in fact
abandoned his domicile of origin. Thus, it is not correct to say that the execution of
the affidavit under Section 5(d) violates the Constitution that proscribes
“provisional registration or a promise by a voter to perform a condition to qualified
to vote in a political exercise.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Section 5(d) does not only require an affidavit
or a promise to “resume actual physical permanent residence in the Philippines not
later than three years from approval of his/her registration,” the Filipinos abroad
must also declare that they have not applied must be a clear showing that what the
fundamental law condemns or prohibits, the statute allows it to be done.”
Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; A constitutional provision should
function to the full extent of its substance and its terms, not by itself alone, but in
conjunction with all other provisions of that great document.—It is a basic rule in
constitutional construction that the Constitution should be construed as a whole. In
Chiongbian vs. De Leon, the Court held that a constitutional provision should
function to the full extent of its substance and its terms, not by itself alone, but in
conjunction with all other provisions of that great document. Constitutional
provisions are mandatory in character unless, either by express statement or by
necessary implication, a different intention is manifest. The intent of the
Constitution may be drawn primarily from the language of the document itself.
Should it be ambiguous, the Court may consider the intent of its framers through
their debates in the constitutional convention.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Absentee Voting; Members to the Constitutional
Commission intended to enfranchise as much as possible all Filipino citizens
abroad who have not abandoned their domicile of origin.—It is clear from these
discussions of the members of the Constitutional Commission intended to
enfranchise as much as possible all Filipino citizens abroad who have not
abandoned their domicile of origin. The Commission even intended to extend to
young Filipinos who reach voting age abroad whose parents’ domicile of origin is in
the Philippines, and consider them qualified as voters for the first time.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The execution of the affidavit itself is not the
enabling or enfranchising act; The affidavit is not only proof of the intention of the
immigrant or permanent resident to go back and resume residency in the
Philippines, but more significantly, it serves as an explicit expression that he had
not in fact abandoned his domicile of origin.—Contrary to the claim of petitioner,
the execution of the affidavit itself is not the enabling or enfranchising act. The
affidavit required in Section 5(d) is not only proof of the intention of the immigrant
or permanent resident to go back and resume residency in the Philippines, but
more significantly, it serves as an explicit expression that he had not in fact
abandoned his domicile of origin. Thus, it is not correct to say that the execution of
the affidavit under Section 5(d) violates the Constitution that proscribes
“provisional registration or a promise by a voter to perform a condition to qualified
to vote in a political exercise.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Section 5(d) does not only require an affidavit
or a promise to “resume actual physical permanent residence in the Philippines not
later than three years from approval of his/her registration,” the Filipinos abroad
must also declare that they have not applied
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Romulo B.
Macalintal, a member of the Philippine Bar, seeking a declaration that certain
provisions of Republic Act No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of
2003)1 suffer from constitutional infirmity. Claiming that he has actual and material
legal interest in the subject matter of this case in seeing to it that public funds are
properly and lawfully used and appropriated, petitioner filed the instant petition as
a taxpayer and as a lawyer.
The Court upholds the right of petitioner to file the present petition.
R.A. No. 9189, entitled, "An Act Providing for A System of Overseas Absentee
Voting by Qualified Citizens of the Philippines Abroad, Appropriating Funds
Therefor, and for Other Purposes," appropriates funds under Section 29 thereof
which provides that a supplemental budget on the General Appropriations Act of
the year of its enactment into law shall provide for the necessary amount to carry
out its provisions. Taxpayers, such as herein petitioner, have the right to restrain
officials from wasting public funds through the enforcement of an unconstitutional
statute.2 The Court has held that they may assail the validity of a law appropriating
public funds3 because expenditure of public funds by an officer of the State for the
purpose of executing an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such
funds.4
The challenged provision of law involves a public right that affects a great number
of citizens. The Court has adopted the policy of taking jurisdiction over cases
whenever the petitioner has seriously and convincingly presented an issue of
transcendental significance to the Filipino people. This has been explicitly
pronounced in Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, Inc. vs.
Tan,5 where the Court held:
Objections to taxpayers’ suit for lack of sufficient personality standing, or interest
are, however, in the main procedural matters. Considering the importance to the
public of the cases at bar, and in keeping with the Court’s duty, under the 1987
Constitution, to determine whether or not the other branches of government have
kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they
have not abused the discretion given to them, the Court has brushed aside
technicalities of procedure and has taken cognizance of these petitions.6
Indeed, in this case, the Court may set aside procedural rules as the constitutional
right of suffrage of a considerable number of Filipinos is involved.
The question of propriety of the instant petition which may appear to be visited by
the vice of prematurity as there are no ongoing proceedings in any tribunal, board
or before a government official exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial
functions as required by Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, dims in light of the
importance of the constitutional issues raised by the petitioner. In Tañada vs.
Angara,7 the Court held:
In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it
contravenes the Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy.
Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to
settle the dispute. "The question thus posed is judicial rather than political. The
duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is
upheld." Once a "controversy as to the application or interpretation of constitutional
provision is raised before this Court (as in the instant case), it becomes a legal
issue which the Court is bound by constitutional mandate to decide."
In another case of paramount impact to the Filipino people, it has been expressed
that it is illogical to await the adverse consequences of the law in order to consider
the controversy actual and ripe for judicial resolution.8 In yet another case, the
Court said that:
. . . despite the inhibitions pressing upon the Court when confronted with
constitutional issues, it will not hesitate to declare a law or act invalid when it is
convinced that this must be done. In arriving at this conclusion, its only criterion will
be the Constitution and God as its conscience gives it in the light to probe its
meaning and discover its purpose. Personal motives and political considerations
are irrelevancies that cannot influence its decisions. Blandishment is as ineffectual
as intimidation, for all the awesome power of the Congress and Executive, the
Court will not hesitate "to make the hammer fall heavily," where the acts of these
departments, or of any official, betray the people’s will as expressed in the
Constitution . . .9
The need to consider the constitutional issues raised before the Court is further
buttressed by the fact that it is now more than fifteen years since the ratification of
the 1987 Constitution requiring Congress to provide a system for absentee voting
by qualified Filipinos abroad. Thus, strong reasons of public policy demand that the
Court resolves the instant petition10 and determine whether Congress has acted
within the limits of the Constitution or if it had gravely abused the discretion
entrusted to it.11
The petitioner raises three principal questions:
A. Does Section 5(d) of Rep. Act No. 9189 allowing the registration of voters who
are immigrants or permanent residents in other countries by their mere act of
executing an affidavit expressing their intention to return to the Philippines, violate
the residency requirement in Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution?
B. Does Section 18.5 of the same law empowering the COMELEC to proclaim the
winning candidates for national offices and party list representatives including the
President and the Vice-President violate the constitutional mandate under Section
4, Article VII of the Constitution that the winning candidates for President and the
Vice-President shall be proclaimed as winners by Congress?
C. May Congress, through the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created
in Section 25 of Rep. Act No. 9189, exercise the power to review, revise, amend,
and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations that the Commission on
Elections shall promulgate without violating the independence of the COMELEC
under Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution?
The Court will resolve the questions in seriatim.
A. Does Section 5(d) of Rep. Act No. 9189 violate Section 1, Article V of the
1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines?
Section 5(d) provides:
Sec. 5. Disqualifications. – The following shall be disqualified from voting under
this Act:
.........
d) An immigrant or a permanent resident who is recognized as such in the host
country, unless he/she executes, upon registration, an affidavit prepared for the
purpose by the Commission declaring that he/she shall resume actual physical
permanent residence in the Philippines not later than three (3) years from approval
of his/her registration under this Act. Such affidavit shall also state that he/she has
not applied for citizenship in another country. Failure to return shall be cause for
the removal of the name of the immigrant or permanent resident from the National
Registry of Absentee Voters and his/her permanent disqualification to vote in
absentia.
Petitioner posits that Section 5(d) is unconstitutional because it violates Section 1,
Article V of the 1987 Constitution which requires that the voter must be a resident
in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place where he proposes to vote
for at least six months immediately preceding an election. Petitioner cites the ruling
of the Court in Caasi vs. Court of Appeals12 to support his claim. In that case, the
Court held that a "green card" holder immigrant to the United States is deemed to
have abandoned his domicile and residence in the Philippines.
Petitioner further argues that Section 1, Article V of the Constitution does not allow
provisional registration or a promise by a voter to perform a condition to be
qualified to vote in a political exercise;13 that the legislature should not be allowed
to circumvent the requirement of the Constitution on the right of suffrage by
providing a condition thereon which in effect amends or alters the aforesaid
residence requirement to qualify a Filipino abroad to vote.14 He claims that the right
of suffrage should not be granted to anyone who, on the date of the election, does
not possess the qualifications provided for by Section 1, Article V of the
Constitution.
Respondent COMELEC refrained from commenting on this issue.15
In compliance with the Resolution of the Court, the Solicitor General filed his
comment for all public respondents. He contraposes that the constitutional
challenge to Section 5(d) must fail because of the absence of clear and
unmistakable showing that said provision of law is repugnant to the Constitution.
He stresses: All laws are presumed to be constitutional; by the doctrine of
separation of powers, a department of government owes a becoming respect for
the acts of the other two departments; all laws are presumed to have adhered to
constitutional limitations; the legislature intended to enact a valid, sensible, and
just law.
In addition, the Solicitor General points out that Section 1, Article V of the
Constitution is a verbatim reproduction of those provided for in the 1935 and the
1973 Constitutions. Thus, he cites Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of
Representatives16 wherein the Court held that the term "residence" has been
understood to be synonymous with "domicile" under both Constitutions. He further
argues that a person can have only one "domicile" but he can have two
residences, one permanent (the domicile) and the other temporary;17 and that the
definition and meaning given to the term residence likewise applies to absentee
voters. Invoking Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC18 which reiterates the Court’s
ruling in Faypon vs. Quirino,19 the Solicitor General maintains that Filipinos who are
immigrants or permanent residents abroad may have in fact never abandoned their
Philippine domicile.20
Taking issue with the petitioner’s contention that "green card" holders are
considered to have abandoned their Philippine domicile, the Solicitor General
suggests that the Court may have to discard its ruling in Caasi vs. Court of
Appeals21 in so far as it relates to immigrants and permanent residents in foreign
countries who have executed and submitted their affidavits conformably with
Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189. He maintains that through the execution of the
requisite affidavits, the Congress of the Philippines with the concurrence of the
President of the Republic had in fact given these immigrants and permanent
residents the opportunity, pursuant to Section 2, Article V of the Constitution, to
manifest that they had in fact never abandoned their Philippine domicile; that
indubitably, they would have formally and categorically expressed the requisite
intentions, i.e., "animus manendi" and "animus revertendi;" that Filipino immigrants
and permanent residents abroad possess the unquestionable right to exercise the
right of suffrage under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution upon approval of
their registration, conformably with R.A. No. 9189.22
The seed of the present controversy is the interpretation that is given to the
phrase, "qualified citizens of the Philippines abroad" as it appears in R.A. No.
9189, to wit:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – It is the prime duty of the State to provide a
system of honest and orderly overseas absentee voting that upholds the secrecy
and sanctity of the ballot. Towards this end, the State ensures equal opportunity to
all qualified citizens of the Philippines abroad in the exercise of this
fundamental right.
SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. – For purposes of this Act:
a) "Absentee Voting" refers to the process by which qualified citizens of the
Philippines abroad, exercise their right to vote;
. . . (Emphasis supplied)
f) "Overseas Absentee Voter" refers to a citizen of the Philippines who is
qualified to register and vote under this Act, not otherwise disqualified by law,
who is abroad on the day of elections. (Emphasis supplied)
SEC. 4. Coverage. – All citizens of the Philippines abroad, who are not
otherwise disqualified by law, at least eighteen (18) years of age on the day of
elections, may vote for president, vice-president, senators and party-list
representatives. (Emphasis supplied)
in relation to Sections 1 and 2, Article V of the Constitution which read:
SEC. 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise
disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen years of age, and who shall have
resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they
propose to vote for at least six months immediately preceding the election. No
literacy, property, or other substantive requirement shall be imposed on the
exercise of suffrage.
SEC. 2. The Congress shall provide a system for securing the secrecy and
sanctity of the ballot as well as a system for absentee voting by qualified
Filipinos abroad.
. . . . . . . . . (Emphasis supplied)
Section 1, Article V of the Constitution specifically provides that suffrage may be
exercised by (1) all citizens of the Philippines, (2) not otherwise disqualified by law,
(3) at least eighteen years of age, (4) who are residents in the Philippines for at
least one year and in the place where they propose to vote for at least six months
immediately preceding the election. Under Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189, one of
those disqualified from voting is an immigrant or permanent resident who is
recognized as such in the host country unless he/she executes an affidavit
declaring that he/she shall resume actual physical permanent residence in the
Philippines not later than three years from approval of his/her registration under
said Act.
Petitioner questions the rightness of the mere act of execution of an affidavit to
qualify the Filipinos abroad who are immigrants or permanent residents, to vote.
He focuses solely on Section 1, Article V of the Constitution in ascribing
constitutional infirmity to Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189, totally ignoring the
provisions of Section 2 empowering Congress to provide a system for absentee
voting by qualified Filipinos abroad.
A simple, cursory reading of Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 may indeed give the
impression that it contravenes Section 1, Article V of the Constitution. Filipino
immigrants and permanent residents overseas are perceived as having left and
abandoned the Philippines to live permanently in their host countries and
therefore, a provision in the law enfranchising those who do not possess the
residency requirement of the Constitution by the mere act of executing an affidavit
expressing their intent to return to the Philippines within a given period, risks a
declaration of unconstitutionality. However, the risk is more apparent than real.
The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all
other laws must conform and in accordance with which all private rights must be
determined and all public authority administered.23 Laws that do not conform to the
Constitution shall be stricken down for being unconstitutional.
Generally, however, all laws are presumed to be constitutional. In Peralta vs.
COMELEC, the Court said:
. . . An act of the legislature, approved by the executive, is presumed to be within
constitutional limitations. The responsibility of upholding the Constitution rests not
on the courts alone but on the legislature as well. The question of the validity of
every statute is first determined by the legislative department of the government
itself.24
Thus, presumption of constitutionality of a law must be overcome convincingly:
. . . To declare a law unconstitutional, the repugnancy of that law to the
Constitution must be clear and unequivocal, for even if a law is aimed at the
attainment of some public good, no infringement of constitutional rights is allowed.
To strike down a law there must be a clear showing that what the fundamental law
condemns or prohibits, the statute allows it to be done.25
As the essence of R.A. No. 9189 is to enfranchise overseas qualified Filipinos, it
behooves the Court to take a holistic view of the pertinent provisions of both the
Constitution and R.A. No. 9189. It is a basic rule in constitutional construction that
the Constitution should be construed as a whole. In Chiongbian vs. De Leon,26 the
Court held that a constitutional provision should function to the full extent of its
substance and its terms, not by itself alone, but in conjunction with all other
provisions of that great document. Constitutional provisions are mandatory in
character unless, either by express statement or by necessary implication, a
different intention is manifest.27 The intent of the Constitution may be drawn
primarily from the language of the document itself. Should it be ambiguous, the
Court may consider the intent of its framers through their debates in the
constitutional convention.28
R.A. No. 9189 was enacted in obeisance to the mandate of the first paragraph of
Section 2, Article V of the Constitution that Congress shall provide a system for
voting by qualified Filipinos abroad. It must be stressed that Section 2 does not
provide for the parameters of the exercise of legislative authority in enacting said
law. Hence, in the absence of restrictions, Congress is presumed to have duly
exercised its function as defined in Article VI (The Legislative Department) of the
Constitution.
To put matters in their right perspective, it is necessary to dwell first on the
significance of absentee voting. The concept of absentee voting is relatively new. It
is viewed thus:
The method of absentee voting has been said to be completely separable and
distinct from the regular system of voting, and to be a new and different manner of
voting from that previously known, and an exception to the customary and usual
manner of voting. The right of absentee and disabled voters to cast their ballots at
an election is  purely statutory; absentee voting was unknown to, and not
recognized at, the common law.
Absentee voting is an outgrowth of modern social and economic conditions
devised to accommodate those engaged in military or civil life whose duties make
it impracticable for them to attend their polling places on the day of election,
and the privilege of absentee voting may flow from constitutional
provisions or be conferred by statutes, existing in some jurisdictions, which
provide in varying terms for the casting and reception of ballots by soldiers and
sailors or other qualified voters absent on election day from the district or precinct
of their residence.
Such statutes are regarded as conferring a privilege and not a right, or an absolute
right. When the legislature chooses to grant the right by statute, it must
operate with equality among all the class to which it is granted; but statutes
of this nature may be limited in their application to particular types of
elections. The statutes should be construed in the light of any constitutional
provisions affecting registration and elections, and with due regard to their
texts prior to amendment and to predecessor statutes and the decisions
thereunder; they should also be construed in the light of the circumstances
under which they were enacted; and so as to carry out the objects thereof, if this
can be done without doing violence to their provisions and mandates. Further, in
passing on statutes regulating absentee voting, the court should look to the
whole and every part of the election laws, the intent of the entire plan, and
reasons and spirit of their adoption, and try to give effect to every portion
thereof.29 (Emphasis supplied)
Ordinarily, an absentee is not a resident and vice versa; a person cannot be at the
same time, both a resident and an absentee.30 However, under our election laws
and the countless pronouncements of the Court pertaining to elections, an
absentee remains attached to his residence in the Philippines as residence is
considered synonymous with domicile.
In Romualdez-Marcos,31 the Court enunciated:
Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that "[f]or the exercise of civil rights and the
fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of natural persons is their place of
habitual residence." In Ong vs. Republic, this court took the concept of domicile to
mean an individual’s "permanent home," "a place to which, whenever absent for
business or for pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on facts and
circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent." Based on the foregoing,
domicile includes the twin elements of "the fact of residing or physical presence in
a fixed place" and animus manendi, or the intention of returning there permanently.
Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an
individual to a certain place. It is the physical presence of a person in a given area,
community or country. The essential distinction between residence and domicile in
law is that residence involves the intent to leave when the purpose for which the
resident has taken up his abode ends. One may seek a place for purposes such as
pleasure, business, or health. If a person’s intent be to remain, it becomes his
domicile; if his intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is established it is
residence. It is thus, quite perfectly normal for an individual to have different
residences in various places. However, a person can only have a single domicile,
unless, for various reasons, he successfully abandons his domicile in favor of
another domicile of choice. In Uytengsu vs. Republic, we laid this distinction quite
clearly:
"There is a difference between domicile and residence. ‘Residence’ is used to
indicate a place of abode, whether permanent or temporary; ‘domicile’ denotes a
fixed permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the intention of
returning. A man may have a residence in one place and a domicile in
another. Residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the
intention to remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but one domicile for the
same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of residence. His
place of residence is generally his place of domicile, but it is not by any means
necessarily so since no length of residence without intention of remaining will
constitute domicile."
For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are dictated by the
peculiar criteria of political laws. As these concepts have evolved in our election
law, what has clearly and unequivocally emerged is the fact that residence
for election purposes is used synonymously with domicile.32 (Emphasis
supplied)
Aware of the domiciliary legal tie that links an overseas Filipino to his residence in
this country, the framers of the Constitution considered the circumstances that
impelled them to require Congress to establish a system for overseas absentee
voting, thus:
MR. OPLE. With respect to Section 1, it is not clear whether the right of suffrage,
which here has a residential restriction, is not denied to citizens temporarily
residing or working abroad. Based on the statistics of several government
agencies, there ought to be about two million such Filipinos at this time.
Commissioner Bernas had earlier pointed out that these provisions are really lifted
from the two previous Constitutions of 1935 and 1973, with the exception of the
last paragraph. They could not therefore have foreseen at that time the
phenomenon now described as the Filipino labor force explosion overseas.
According to government data, there are now about 600,000 contract workers and
employees, and although the major portions of these expatriate communities of
workers are to be found in the Middle East, they are scattered in 177 countries in
the world.
In a previous hearing of the Committee on Constitutional Commissions and
Agencies, the Chairman of the Commission on Elections, Ramon Felipe, said that
there was no insuperable obstacle to making effective the right of suffrage for
Filipinos overseas. Those who have adhered to their Filipino citizenship
notwithstanding strong temptations are exposed to embrace a more convenient
foreign citizenship. And those who on their own or under pressure of economic
necessity here, find that they have to detach themselves from their families to work
in other countries with definite tenures of employment. Many of them are on
contract employment for one, two, or three years. They have no intention of
changing their residence on a permanent basis, but are technically disqualified
from exercising the right of suffrage in their countries of destination by the
residential requirement in Section 1 which says:
Suffrage shall be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise
disqualified by law, who are eighteen years of age or over, and who shall have
resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they
propose to vote for at least six months preceding the election.
I, therefore, ask the Committee whether at the proper time they might entertain an
amendment that will make this exercise of the right to vote abroad for Filipino
citizens an effective, rather than merely a nominal right under this proposed
Constitution.
FR. BERNAS. Certainly, the Committee will consider that. But more than just
saying that, I would like to make a comment on the meaning of "residence" in the
Constitution because I think it is a concept that has been discussed in various
decisions of the Supreme Court, particularly in the case of Faypon vs. Quirino, a
1954 case which dealt precisely with the meaning of "residence" in the Election
Law. Allow me to quote:
A citizen may leave the place of his birth to look for greener pastures, as the
saying goes, to improve his lot and that, of course, includes study in other places,
practice of his avocation, reengaging in business. When an election is to be held,
the citizen who left his birthplace to improve his lot may decide to return to his
native town, to cast his ballot, but for professional or business reasons, or for any
other reason, he may not absent himself from the place of his professional or
business activities.
So, they are here registered as voters as he has the qualifications to be one, and
is not willing to give up or lose the opportunity to choose the officials who are to
run the government especially in national elections. Despite such registration,
the animus revertendi to his home, to his domicile or residence of origin has not
forsaken him.
This may be the explanation why the registration of a voter in a place other than
his residence of origin has not been deemed sufficient to consider abandonment or
loss of such residence of origin.
In other words, "residence" in this provision refers to two residence qualifications:
"residence" in the Philippines and "residence" in the place where he will vote. As
far as residence in the Philippines is concerned, the word "residence" means
domicile, but as far as residence in the place where he will actually cast his ballot
is concerned, the meaning seems to be different. He could have a domicile
somewhere else and yet he is a resident of a place for six months and he is
allowed to vote there. So that there may be serious constitutional obstacles to
absentee voting, unless the vote of the person who is absent is a vote which
will be considered as cast in the place of his domicile.
MR. OPLE. Thank you for citing the jurisprudence.
It gives me scant comfort thinking of about two million Filipinos who should enjoy
the right of suffrage, at least a substantial segment of these overseas Filipino
communities. The Committee, of course, is aware that when this Article of the
Constitution explicitly and unequivocally extends the right of effective suffrage to
Filipinos abroad, this will call for a logistical exercise of global proportions. In
effect, this will require budgetary and administrative commitments on the part of
the Philippine government, mainly through the COMELEC and the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, and perhaps, a more extensive elaboration of this mechanism that
will be put in place to make effective the right to vote. Therefore, seeking shelter
in some wise jurisprudence of the past may not be sufficient to meet the
demands of the right of suffrage for Filipinos abroad that I have mentioned.
But I want to thank the Committee for saying that an amendment to this effect may
be entertained at the proper time. . . . . . . . . . 33 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the Constitutional Commission recognized the fact that while millions of
Filipinos reside abroad principally for economic reasons and hence they contribute
in no small measure to the economic uplift of this country, their voices are marginal
insofar as the choice of this country’s leaders is concerned.
The Constitutional Commission realized that under the laws then existing and
considering the novelty of the system of absentee voting in this jurisdiction, vesting
overseas Filipinos with the right to vote would spawn constitutional problems
especially because the Constitution itself provides for the residency requirement of
voters:
MR. REGALADO. Before I act on that, may I inquire from Commissioner Monsod if
the term "absentee voting" also includes transient voting; meaning, those who are,
let us say, studying in Manila need not go back to their places of registration, for
instance, in Mindanao, to cast their votes.
MR. MONSOD. I think our provision is for absentee voting by Filipinos abroad.
MR. REGALADO. How about those people who cannot go back to the places
where they are registered?
MR. MONSOD. Under the present Election Code, there are provisions for allowing
students and military people who are temporarily in another place to register and
vote. I believe that those situations can be covered by the Omnibus Election
Code. The reason we want absentee voting to be in the Constitution as a
mandate to the legislature is that there could be inconsistency on the
residence rule if it is just a question of legislation by Congress. So, by
allowing it and saying that this is possible, then legislation can take care of
the rest.34 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, Section 2, Article V of the Constitution came into being to remove any doubt
as to the inapplicability of the residency requirement in Section 1. It is precisely to
avoid any problems that could impede the implementation of its pursuit to
enfranchise the largest number of qualified Filipinos who are not in the Philippines
that the Constitutional Commission explicitly mandated Congress to provide a
system for overseas absentee voting.
The discussion of the Constitutional Commission on the effect of the residency
requirement prescribed by Section 1, Article V of the Constitution on the proposed
system of absentee voting for qualified Filipinos abroad is enlightening:
MR. SUAREZ. May I just be recognized for a clarification. There are certain
qualifications for the exercise of the right of suffrage like having resided in the
Philippines for at least one year and in the place where they propose to vote for at
least six months preceding the elections. What is the effect of these mandatory
requirements on the matter of the exercise of the right of suffrage by the absentee
voters like Filipinos abroad?
THE PRESIDENT. Would Commissioner Monsod care to answer?
MR. MONSOD. I believe the answer was already given by Commissioner Bernas,
that the domicile requirements as well as the qualifications and disqualifications
would be the same.
THE PRESIDENT. Are we leaving it to the legislature to devise the system?
FR. BERNAS. I think there is a very legitimate problem raised there.
THE PRESIDENT. Yes.
MR. BENGZON. I believe Commissioner Suarez is clarified.
FR. BERNAS. But I think it should be further clarified with regard to the residence
requirement or the place where they vote in practice; the understanding is that it is
flexible. For instance, one might be a resident of Naga or domiciled therein, but he
satisfies the requirement of residence in Manila, so he is able to vote in Manila.
MR. TINGSON. Madam President, may I then suggest to the Committee to change
the word "Filipinos" to QUALIFIED FILIPINO VOTERS. Instead of "VOTING BY
FILIPINOS ABROAD," it should be QUALIFIED FILIPINO VOTERS. If the
Committee wants QUALIFIED VOTERS LIVING ABROAD, would that not satisfy
the requirement?
THE PRESIDENT. What does Commissioner Monsod say?
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I think I would accept the phrase "QUALIFIED
FILIPINOS ABROAD" because "QUALIFIED" would assume that he has the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications to vote.
MR. TINGSON. That is right. So does the Committee accept?
FR. BERNAS. "QUALIFIED FILIPINOS ABROAD"?
THE PRESIDENT. Does the Committee accept the amendment?
MR. REGALADO. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Regalado is recognized.
MR. REGALADO. When Commissioner Bengzon asked me to read my proposed
amendment, I specifically stated that the National Assembly shall prescribe a
system which will enable qualified citizens, temporarily absent from the Philippines,
to vote. According to Commissioner Monsod, the use of the phrase "absentee
voting" already took that into account as its meaning. That is referring to qualified
Filipino citizens temporarily abroad.
MR. MONSOD. Yes, we accepted that. I would like to say that with respect to
registration we will leave it up to the legislative assembly, for example, to
require where the registration is. If it is, say, members of the diplomatic
corps who may be continuously abroad for a long time, perhaps, there can
be a system of registration in the embassies. However, we do not like to
preempt the legislative assembly.
THE PRESIDENT. Just to clarify, Commissioner Monsod’s amendment is only to
provide a system.
MR. MONSOD. Yes.
THE PRESIDENT. The Commissioner is not stating here that he wants new
qualifications for these absentee voters.
MR. MONSOD. That is right. They must have the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications.
THE PRESIDENT. It is just to devise a system by which they can vote.
MR. MONSOD. That is right, Madam President.35 (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly therefrom, the intent of the Constitutional Commission is to entrust to
Congress the responsibility of devising a system of absentee voting. The
qualifications of voters as stated in Section 1 shall remain except for the residency
requirement. This is in fact the reason why the Constitutional Commission opted
for the term qualified Filipinos abroad with respect to the system of absentee
voting that Congress should draw up. As stressed by Commissioner Monsod, by
the use of the adjective qualified with respect to Filipinos abroad, the assumption is
that they have the "qualifications and none of the disqualifications to vote." In fine-
tuning the provision on absentee voting, the Constitutional Commission discussed
how the system should work:
MR. SUAREZ. For clarification purposes, we just want to state for the record that in
the case of qualified Filipino citizens residing abroad and exercising their right of
suffrage, they can cast their votes for the candidates in the place where they were
registered to vote in the Philippines. So as to avoid any complications, for
example, if they are registered in Angeles City, they could not vote for a mayor in
Naga City.
In other words, if that qualified voter is registered in Angeles City, then he can vote
only for the local and national candidates in Angeles City. I just want to make that
clear for the record.
MR. REGALADO. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. What does Commissioner Regalado say?
MR. REGALADO. I just want to make a note on the statement of Commissioner
Suarez that this envisions Filipinos residing abroad. The understanding in the
amendment is that the Filipino is temporarily abroad. He may not be actually
residing abroad; he may just be there on a business trip. It just so happens that the
day before the elections he has to fly to the United States, so he could not cast his
vote. He is temporarily abroad, but not residing there. He stays in a hotel for two
days and comes back. This is not limited only to Filipinos temporarily residing
abroad. But as long as he is temporarily abroad on the date of the elections,
then he can fall within the prescription of Congress in that situation.
MR. SUAREZ. I thank the Commissioner for his further clarification. Precisely, we
need this clarification on record.
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, to clarify what we mean by "temporarily
abroad," it need not be on very short trips. One can be abroad on a treaty
traders visa. Therefore, when we talk about registration, it is possible that his
residence is in Angeles and he would be able to vote for the candidates in
Angeles, but Congress or the Assembly may provide the procedure for
registration, like listing one’s name, in a registry list in the embassy abroad.
That is still possible under the system.
FR. BERNAS. Madam President, just one clarification if Commissioner Monsod
agrees with this.
Suppose we have a situation of a child of a diplomatic officer who reaches the
voting age while living abroad and he has never registered here. Where will he
register? Will he be a registered voter of a certain locality in the Philippines?
MR. MONSOD. Yes, it is possible that the system will enable that child to comply
with the registration requirements in an embassy in the United States and his
name is then entered in the official registration book in Angeles City, for instance.
FR. BERNAS. In other words, he is not a registered voter of Los Angeles, but a
registered voter of a locality here.
MR. MONSOD. That is right. He does not have to come home to the Philippines to
comply with the registration procedure here.
FR. BERNAS. So, he does not have to come home.
MR. BENGZON. Madam President, the Floor Leader wishes to inquire if there are
more clarifications needed from the body.
Also, the Floor Leader is happy to announce that there are no more registered
Commissioners to propose amendments. So I move that we close the period of
amendments.36 (Emphasis supplied)
It is clear from these discussions of the members of the Constitutional Commission
that they intended to enfranchise as much as possible all Filipino citizens abroad
who have not abandoned their domicile of origin. The Commission even intended
to extend to young Filipinos who reach voting age abroad whose parents’ domicile
of origin is in the Philippines, and consider them qualified as voters for the first
time.
It is in pursuance of that intention that the Commission provided for Section 2
immediately after the residency requirement of Section 1. By the doctrine of
necessary implication in statutory construction, which may be applied in construing
constitutional provisions,37 the strategic location of Section 2 indicates that the
Constitutional Commission provided for an exception to the actual residency
requirement of Section 1 with respect to qualified Filipinos abroad. The same
Commission has in effect declared that qualified Filipinos who are not in the
Philippines may be allowed to vote even though they do not satisfy the residency
requirement in Section 1, Article V of the Constitution.
That Section 2 of Article V of the Constitution is an exception to the residency
requirement found in Section 1 of the same Article was in fact the subject of
debate when Senate Bill No. 2104, which became R.A. No. 9189, was deliberated
upon on the Senate floor, thus:
Senator Arroyo. Mr. President, this bill should be looked into in relation to the
constitutional provisions. I think the sponsor and I would agree that the
Constitution is supreme in any statute that we may enact.
Let me read Section 1, Article V, of the Constitution entitled, "Suffrage." It says:
Section 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not
otherwise disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen years of age, and who
shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein
they propose to vote for at least six months immediately preceding the election.
Now, Mr. President, the Constitution says, "who shall have resided in the
Philippines." They are permanent immigrants. They have changed residence so
they are barred under the Constitution. This is why I asked whether this committee
amendment which in fact does not alter the original text of the bill will have any
effect on this?
Senator Angara. Good question, Mr. President. And this has been asked in
various fora. This is in compliance with the Constitution. One, the interpretation
here of "residence" is synonymous with "domicile."
As the gentleman and I know, Mr. President, "domicile" is the intent to return to
one’s home. And the fact that a Filipino may have been physically absent
from the Philippines and may be physically a resident of the United States,
for example, but has a clear intent to return to the Philippines, will make him
qualified as a resident of the Philippines under this law.
This is consistent, Mr. President, with the constitutional mandate that we – that
Congress – must provide a franchise to overseas Filipinos.
If we read the Constitution and the suffrage principle literally as demanding
physical presence, then there is no way we can provide for offshore voting
to our offshore kababayan, Mr. President.
Senator Arroyo. Mr. President, when the Constitution says, in Section 2 of Article
V, it reads: "The Congress shall provide a system for securing the secrecy and
sanctity of the ballot as well as a system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos
abroad."
The key to this whole exercise, Mr. President, is "qualified." In other words,
anything that we may do or say in granting our compatriots abroad must be
anchored on the proposition that they are qualified. Absent the qualification,
they cannot vote. And "residents" (sic) is a qualification.
I will lose votes here from permanent residents so-called "green-card holders", but
the Constitution is the Constitution. We cannot compromise on this. The Senate
cannot be a party to something that would affect or impair the Constitution.
Look at what the Constitution says – "In the place wherein they propose to vote for
at least six months immediately preceding the election."
Mr. President, all of us here have run (sic) for office.
I live in Makati. My neighbor is Pateros where Senator Cayetano lives. We are
separated only by a creek. But one who votes in Makati cannot vote in Pateros
unless he resides in Pateros for six months. That is how restrictive our Constitution
is. I am not talking even about the Election Code. I am talking about the
Constitution.
As I have said, if a voter in Makati would want to vote in Pateros, yes, he may do
so. But he must do so, make the transfer six months before the election, otherwise,
he is not qualified to vote.
That is why I am raising this point because I think we have a fundamental
difference here.
Senator Angara. It is a good point to raise, Mr. President. But it is a point already
well-debated even in the constitutional commission of 1986. And the reason
Section 2 of Article V was placed immediately after the six-month/one-year
residency requirement is to demonstrate unmistakably that Section 2 which
authorizes absentee voting is an exception to the six-month/one-year
residency requirement. That is the first principle, Mr. President, that one must
remember.
The second reason, Mr. President, is that under our jurisprudence – and I think this
is so well-entrenched that one need not argue about it – "residency" has been
interpreted as synonymous with "domicile."
But the third more practical reason, Mr. President, is, if we follow the
interpretation of the gentleman, then it is legally and constitutionally
impossible to give a franchise to vote to overseas Filipinos who do not
physically live in the country, which is quite ridiculous because that is
exactly the whole point of this exercise – to enfranchise them and empower
them to vote.38 (Emphasis supplied)
Accordingly, Section 4 of R.A. No. 9189 provides for the coverage of the absentee
voting process, to wit:
SEC. 4. Coverage. – All citizens of the Philippines abroad, who are not otherwise
disqualified by law, at least eighteen (18) years of age on the day of elections, may
vote for president, vice-president, senators and party-list representatives.
which does not require physical residency in the Philippines; and Section 5 of the
assailed law which enumerates those who are disqualified, to wit:
SEC. 5. Disqualifications. – The following shall be disqualified from voting under
this Act:
a) Those who have lost their Filipino citizenship in accordance with Philippine laws;
b) Those who have expressly renounced their Philippine citizenship and who have
pledged allegiance to a foreign country;
c) Those who have committed and are convicted in a final judgment by a court or
tribunal of an offense punishable by imprisonment of not less than one (1) year,
including those who have committed and been found guilty of Disloyalty as defined
under Article 137 of the Revised Penal Code, such disability not having been
removed by plenary pardon or amnesty: Provided, however, That any person
disqualified to vote under this subsection shall automatically acquire the right to
vote upon expiration of five (5) years after service of sentence; Provided, further,
That the Commission may take cognizance of final judgments issued by foreign
courts or tribunals only on the basis of reciprocity and subject to the formalities and
processes prescribed by the Rules of Court on execution of judgments;
d) An immigrant or a permanent resident who is recognized as such in the host
country, unless he/she executes, upon registration, an affidavit prepared for the
purpose by the Commission declaring that he/she shall resume actual physical
permanent residence in the Philippines not later than three (3) years from approval
of his/her registration under this Act. Such affidavit shall also state that he/she has
not applied for citizenship in another country. Failure to return shall be cause for
the removal of the name of the immigrant or permanent resident from the National
Registry of Absentee Voters and his/her permanent disqualification to vote in
absentia.
e) Any citizen of the Philippines abroad previously declared insane or incompetent
by competent authority in the Philippines or abroad, as verified by the Philippine
embassies, consulates or foreign service establishments concerned, unless such
competent authority subsequently certifies that such person is no longer insane or
incompetent.
As finally approved into law, Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 specifically disqualifies
an immigrant or permanent resident who is "recognized as such in the host
country" because immigration or permanent residence in another country implies
renunciation of one’s residence in his country of origin. However, same Section
allows an immigrant and permanent resident abroad to register as voter for as long
as he/she executes an affidavit to show that he/she has not abandoned his
domicile in pursuance of the constitutional intent expressed in Sections 1 and 2 of
Article V that "all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law" must
be entitled to exercise the right of suffrage and, that Congress must establish a
system for absentee voting; for otherwise, if actual, physical residence in the
Philippines is required, there is no sense for the framers of the Constitution to
mandate Congress to establish a system for absentee voting.
Contrary to the claim of petitioner, the execution of the affidavit itself is not the
enabling or enfranchising act. The affidavit required in Section 5(d) is not only
proof of the intention of the immigrant or permanent resident to go back and
resume residency in the Philippines, but more significantly, it serves as an explicit
expression that he had not in fact abandoned his domicile of origin. Thus, it is not
correct to say that the execution of the affidavit under Section 5(d) violates the
Constitution that proscribes "provisional registration or a promise by a voter to
perform a condition to be qualified to vote in a political exercise."
To repeat, the affidavit is required of immigrants and permanent residents abroad
because by their status in their host countries, they are presumed to have
relinquished their intent to return to this country; thus, without the affidavit, the
presumption of abandonment of Philippine domicile shall remain.
Further perusal of the transcripts of the Senate proceedings discloses another
reason why the Senate required the execution of said affidavit. It wanted the affiant
to exercise the option to return or to express his intention to return to his domicile
of origin and not to preempt that choice by legislation. Thus:
Senator Villar. Yes, we are going back.
It states that: "For Filipino immigrants and those who have acquired permanent
resident status abroad," a requirement for the registration is the submission of "a
Sworn Declaration of Intent to Return duly sworn before any Philippine embassy or
consulate official authorized to administer oath…"
Mr. President, may we know the rationale of this provision? Is the purpose of this
Sworn Declaration to include only those who have the intention of returning to be
qualified to exercise the right of suffrage? What if the Filipino immigrant has no
purpose of returning? Is he automatically disbarred from exercising this right to
suffrage?
Senator Angara. The rationale for this, Mr. President, is that we want to be
expansive and all-inclusive in this law. That as long as he is a Filipino, no
matter whether he is a green-card holder in the U.S. or not, he will be
authorized to vote. But if he is already a green-card holder, that means he
has acquired permanent residency in the United States, then he must
indicate an intention to return. This is what makes for the definition of
"domicile." And to acquire the vote, we thought that we would require the
immigrants and the green-card holders . . . Mr. President, the three administration
senators are leaving, maybe we may ask for a vote [Laughter].
Senator Villar. For a merienda, Mr. President.
Senator Angara. Mr. President, going back to the business at hand. The rationale
for the requirement that an immigrant or a green-card holder should file an affidavit
that he will go back to the Philippines is that, if he is already an immigrant or a
green-card holder, that means he may not return to the country any more and that
contradicts the definition of "domicile" under the law.
But what we are trying to do here, Mr. President, is really provide the choice
to the voter. The voter, after consulting his lawyer or after deliberation within the
family, may decide "No, I think we are risking our permanent status in the United
States if we file an affidavit that we want to go back." But we want to give him
the opportunity to make that decision. We do not want to make that decision
for him. 39 (Emphasis supplied)
The jurisprudential declaration in Caasi vs. Court of Appeals  that green card
holders are disqualified to run for any elective office finds no application to the
present case because the Caasi case did not, for obvious reasons, consider the
absentee voting rights of Filipinos who are immigrants and permanent residents in
their host countries.
In the advent of The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 or R.A. 9189, they
may still be considered as a "qualified citizen of the Philippines abroad" upon
fulfillment of the requirements of registration under the new law for the purpose of
exercising their right of suffrage.
It must be emphasized that Section 5(d) does not only require an affidavit or a
promise to "resume actual physical permanent residence in the Philippines not
later than three years from approval of his/her registration," the Filipinos abroad
must also declare that they have not applied for citizenship in another country.
Thus, they must return to the Philippines; otherwise, their failure to return "shall be
cause for the removal" of their names "from the National Registry of Absentee
Voters and his/her permanent disqualification to vote in absentia."
Thus, Congress crafted a process of registration by which a Filipino voter
permanently residing abroad who is at least eighteen years old, not otherwise
disqualified by law, who has not relinquished Philippine citizenship and who has
not actually abandoned his/her intentions to return to his/her domicile of origin, the
Philippines, is allowed to register and vote in the Philippine embassy, consulate or
other foreign service establishments of the place which has jurisdiction over the
country where he/she has indicated his/her address for purposes of the elections,
while providing for safeguards to a clean election.
Thus, Section 11 of R.A. No. 9189 provides:
SEC. 11. Procedure for Application to Vote in Absentia. –
11.1. Every qualified citizen of the Philippines abroad whose application for
registration has been approved, including those previously registered under
Republic Act No. 8189, shall, in every national election, file with the officer of the
embassy, consulate or other foreign service establishment authorized by the
Commission, a sworn written application to vote in a form prescribed by the
Commission. The authorized officer of such embassy, consulate or other foreign
service establishment shall transmit to the Commission the said application to vote
within five (5) days from receipt thereof. The application form shall be
accomplished in triplicate and submitted together with the photocopy of his/her
overseas absentee voter certificate of registration.
11.2. Every application to vote in absentia may be done personally at, or by mail
to, the embassy, consulate or foreign service establishment, which has jurisdiction
over the country where he/she has indicated his/her address for purposes of the
elections.
11.3. Consular and diplomatic services rendered in connection with the overseas
absentee voting processes shall be made available at no cost to the overseas
absentee voter.
Contrary to petitioner’s claim that Section 5(d) circumvents the Constitution,
Congress enacted the law prescribing a system of overseas absentee voting in
compliance with the constitutional mandate. Such mandate expressly requires that
Congress provide a system of absentee voting that necessarily presupposes that
the "qualified citizen of the Philippines abroad" is not physically present in the
country. The provisions of Sections 5(d) and 11 are components of the system of
overseas absentee voting established by R.A. No. 9189. The qualified Filipino
abroad who executed the affidavit is deemed to have retained his domicile in the
Philippines. He is presumed not to have lost his domicile by his physical absence
from this country. His having become an immigrant or permanent resident of his
host country does not necessarily imply an abandonment of his intention to return
to his domicile of origin, the Philippines. Therefore, under the law, he must be
given the opportunity to express that he has not actually abandoned his domicile in
the Philippines by executing the affidavit required by Sections 5(d) and 8(c) of the
law.
Petitioner’s speculative apprehension that the implementation of Section 5(d)
would affect the credibility of the elections is insignificant as what is important is to
ensure that all those who possess the qualifications to vote on the date of the
election are given the opportunity and permitted to freely do so. The COMELEC
and the Department of Foreign Affairs have enough resources and talents to
ensure the integrity and credibility of any election conducted pursuant to R.A. No.
9189.
As to the eventuality that the Filipino abroad would renege on his undertaking to
return to the Philippines, the penalty of perpetual disenfranchisement provided for
by Section 5(d) would suffice to serve as deterrence to non-compliance with
his/her undertaking under the affidavit.
Petitioner argues that should a sizable number of "immigrants" renege on their
promise to return, the result of the elections would be affected and could even be a
ground to contest the proclamation of the winning candidates and cause further
confusion and doubt on the integrity of the results of the election. Indeed, the
probability that after an immigrant has exercised the right to vote, he shall opt to
remain in his host country beyond the third year from the execution of the affidavit,
is not farfetched. However, it is not for this Court to determine the wisdom of a
legislative exercise. As expressed in Tañada vs. Tuvera,40 the Court is not called
upon to rule on the wisdom of the law or to repeal it or modify it if we find it
impractical.
Congress itself was conscious of said probability and in fact, it has addressed the
expected problem. Section 5(d) itself provides for a deterrence which is that the
Filipino who fails to return as promised stands to lose his right of suffrage. Under
Section 9, should a registered overseas absentee voter fail to vote for two
consecutive national elections, his name may be ordered removed from the
National Registry of Overseas Absentee Voters.
Other serious legal questions that may be raised would be: what happens to the
votes cast by the qualified voters abroad who were not able to return within three
years as promised? What is the effect on the votes cast by the non-returnees in
favor of the winning candidates? The votes cast by qualified Filipinos abroad who
failed to return within three years shall not be invalidated because they were
qualified to vote on the date of the elections, but their failure to return shall be
cause for the removal of the names of the immigrants or permanent residents from
the National Registry of Absentee Voters and their permanent disqualification to
vote in absentia.
In fine, considering the underlying intent of the Constitution, the Court does not find
Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 as constitutionally defective.
B. Is Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 in relation to Section 4 of the same Act in
contravention of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution?
Section 4 of R.A. No. 9189 provides that the overseas absentee voter may vote for
president, vice-president, senators and party-list representatives.
Section 18.5 of the same Act provides:
SEC. 18. On-Site Counting and Canvassing. –
.........
18. 5 The canvass of votes shall not cause the delay of the proclamation of a
winning candidate if the outcome of the election will not be affected by the results
thereof. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Commission is empowered to order
the proclamation of winning candidates despite the fact that the scheduled
election has not taken place in a particular country or countries, if the holding of
elections therein has been rendered impossible by events, factors and
circumstances peculiar to such country or countries, in which events, factors and
circumstances are beyond the control or influence of the Commission. (Emphasis
supplied)
Petitioner claims that the provision of Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 empowering
the COMELEC to order the proclamation of winning candidates insofar as it affects
the canvass of votes and proclamation of winning candidates for president and
vice-president, is unconstitutional because it violates the following provisions of
paragraph 4, Section 4 of Article VII of the Constitution:
SEC. 4 . . .
The returns of every election for President and Vice-President, duly certified by the
board of canvassers of each province or city, shall be transmitted to the Congress,
directed to the President of the Senate. Upon receipt of the certificates of canvass,
the President of the Senate shall, not later than thirty days after the day of the
election, open all the certificates in the presence of the Senate and the House of
Representatives in joint public session, and the Congress, upon determination of
the authenticity and due execution thereof in the manner provided by law, canvass
the votes.
The person having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed elected, but in
case two or more shall have an equal and highest number of votes, one of them
shall forthwith be chosen by the vote of a majority of all the Members of both
Houses of the Congress, voting separately.
The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the certificates.
...
which gives to Congress the duty to canvass the votes and proclaim the winning
candidates for president and vice-president.
The Solicitor General asserts that this provision must be harmonized with
paragraph 4, Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution and should be taken to mean
that COMELEC can only proclaim the winning Senators and party-list
representatives but not the President and Vice-President.41
Respondent COMELEC has no comment on the matter.
Indeed, the phrase, proclamation of winning candidates, in Section 18.5 of R.A.
No. 9189 is far too sweeping that it necessarily includes the proclamation of the
winning candidates for the presidency and the vice-presidency.
Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 appears to be repugnant to Section 4, Article VII of
the Constitution only insofar as said Section totally disregarded the authority given
to Congress by the Constitution to proclaim the winning candidates for the
positions of president and vice-president.
In addition, the Court notes that Section 18.4 of the law, to wit:
18.4. . . . Immediately upon the completion of the canvass, the chairman of the
Special Board of Canvassers shall transmit via facsimile, electronic mail, or any
other means of transmission equally safe and reliable the Certificates of Canvass
and the Statements of Votes to the Commission, . . . [Emphasis supplied]
clashes with paragraph 4, Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution which provides
that the returns of every election for President and Vice-President shall be certified
by the board of canvassers to Congress.
Congress could not have allowed the COMELEC to usurp a power that
constitutionally belongs to it or, as aptly stated by petitioner, to encroach "on the
power of Congress to canvass the votes for president and vice-president and the
power to proclaim the winners for the said positions." The provisions of the
Constitution as the fundamental law of the land should be read as part of The
Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 and hence, the canvassing of the votes
and the proclamation of the winning candidates for president and vice-president for
the entire nation must remain in the hands of Congress.
C. Are Sections 19 and 25 of R.A. No. 9189 in violation of Section 1, Article
IX-A of the Constitution?
Petitioner avers that Sections 19 and 25 of R.A. No. 9189 violate Article IX-A
(Common Provisions) of the Constitution, to wit:
Section 1. The Constitutional Commissions, which shall be independent, are the
Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on
Audit. (Emphasis supplied)
He submits that the creation of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee with
the power to review, revise, amend and approve the Implementing Rules and
Regulations promulgated by the COMELEC, R.A. No. 9189 intrudes into the
independence of the COMELEC which, as a constitutional body, is not under the
control of either the executive or legislative departments of government; that only
the COMELEC itself can promulgate rules and regulations which may be changed
or revised only by the majority of its members; and that should the rules
promulgated by the COMELEC violate any law, it is the Court that has the power to
review the same via the petition of any interested party, including the legislators.
It is only on this question that respondent COMELEC submitted its Comment. It
agrees with the petitioner that Sections 19 and 25 of R.A. No. 9189 are
unconstitutional. Like the petitioner, respondent COMELEC anchors its claim of
unconstitutionality of said Sections upon Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution
providing for the independence of the constitutional commissions such as the
COMELEC. It asserts that its power to formulate rules and regulations has been
upheld in Gallardo vs. Tabamo, Jr.42 where this Court held that the power of the
COMELEC to formulate rules and regulations is implicit in its power to implement
regulations under Section 2(1) of Article IX-C43 of the Constitution. COMELEC joins
the petitioner in asserting that as an independent constitutional body, it may not be
subject to interference by any government instrumentality and that only this Court
may review COMELEC rules and only in cases of grave abuse of discretion.
The COMELEC adds, however, that another provision, vis-à-vis its rule-making
power, to wit:
SEC. 17. Voting by Mail. –
17.1. For the May, 2004 elections, the Commission shall authorize voting by mail
in not more than three (3) countries, subject to the approval of the
Congressional Oversight Committee. Voting by mail may be allowed in
countries that satisfy the following conditions:
a) Where the mailing system is fairly well-developed and secure to prevent
occasion for fraud;
b) Where there exists a technically established identification system that would
preclude multiple or proxy voting; and
c) Where the system of reception and custody of mailed ballots in the embassies,
consulates and other foreign service establishments concerned are adequate and
well-secured.
Thereafter, voting by mail in any country shall be allowed only upon review
and approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee . . . . . . . . .
(Emphasis supplied)
is likewise unconstitutional as it violates Section 1, Article IX-A mandating the
independence of constitutional commissions.
The Solicitor General takes exception to his prefatory statement that the
constitutional challenge must fail and agrees with the petitioner that Sections 19
and 25 are invalid and unconstitutional on the ground that there is nothing in Article
VI of the Constitution on Legislative Department that would as much as imply that
Congress has concurrent power to enforce and administer election laws with the
COMELEC; and by the principles of exclusio unius est exclusio alterius and
expressum facit cessare tacitum, the constitutionally enumerated powers of
Congress circumscribe its authority to the exclusion of all others.
The parties are unanimous in claiming that Sections 19, 25 and portions of Section
17.1 are unconstitutional. Thus, there is no actual issue forged on this question
raised by petitioner.
However, the Court finds it expedient to expound on the role of Congress through
the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee (JCOC) vis-à-vis the independence
of the COMELEC, as a constitutional body.
R.A. No. 9189 created the JCOC, as follows:
SEC. 25. Joint Congressional Oversight Committee. – A Joint Congressional
Oversight Committee is hereby created, composed of the Chairman of the Senate
Committee on Constitutional Amendments, Revision of Codes and Laws, and
seven (7) other Senators designated by the Senate President, and the Chairman
of the House Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms, and seven (7) other
Members of the House of Representatives designated by the Speaker of the
House of Representatives: Provided, That, of the seven (7) members to be
designated by each House of Congress, four (4) should come from the majority
and the remaining three (3) from the minority.
The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee shall have the power to
monitor and evaluate the implementation of this Act. It shall review, revise,
amend and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations promulgated
by the Commission. (Emphasis supplied)
SEC. 19. Authority of the Commission to Promulgate Rules. – The Commission
shall issue the necessary rules and regulations to effectively implement the
provisions of this Act within sixty (60) days from the effectivity of this Act. The
Implementing Rules and Regulations shall be submitted to the Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee created by virtue of this Act for prior
approval.
. . . . . . . . . (Emphasis supplied)
Composed of Senators and Members of the House of Representatives, the Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee (JCOC) is a purely legislative body. There is
no question that the authority of Congress to "monitor and evaluate the
implementation" of R.A. No. 9189 is geared towards possible amendments or
revision of the law itself and thus, may be performed in aid of its legislation.
However, aside from its monitoring and evaluation functions, R.A. No. 9189 gives
to the JCOC the following functions: (a) to "review, revise, amend and approve the
Implementing Rules and Regulations" (IRR) promulgated by the COMELEC
[Sections 25 and 19]; and (b) subject to the approval of the JCOC [Section 17.1],
the voting by mail in not more than three countries for the May 2004 elections and
in any country determined by COMELEC.
The ambit of legislative power under Article VI of the Constitution is circumscribed
by other constitutional provisions. One such provision is Section 1 of Article IX-A of
the 1987 Constitution ordaining that constitutional commissions such as the
COMELEC shall be "independent."
Interpreting Section 1, Article X of the 1935 Constitution providing that there shall
be an independent COMELEC, the Court has held that "[w]hatever may be the
nature of the functions of the Commission on Elections, the fact is that the framers
of the Constitution wanted it to be independent from the other departments of the
Government."44 In an earlier case, the Court elucidated:
The Commission on Elections is a constitutional body. It is intended to play a
distinct and important part in our scheme of government. In the discharge of its
functions, it should not be hampered with restrictions that would be fully warranted
in the case of a less responsible organization. The Commission may err, so may
this court also. It should be allowed considerable latitude in devising means and
methods that will insure the accomplishment of the great objective for which it was
created – free, orderly and honest elections. We may not agree fully with its choice
of means, but unless these are clearly illegal or constitute gross abuse of
discretion, this court should not interfere. Politics is a practical matter, and political
questions must be dealt with realistically – not from the standpoint of pure theory.
The Commission on Elections, because of its fact-finding facilities, its contacts with
political strategists, and its knowledge derived from actual experience in dealing
with political controversies, is in a peculiarly advantageous position to decide
complex political questions.45 (Emphasis supplied)
The Court has no general powers of supervision over COMELEC which is an
independent body "except those specifically granted by the Constitution," that is, to
review its decisions, orders and rulings.46 In the same vein, it is not correct to hold
that because of its recognized extensive legislative power to enact election laws,
Congress may intrude into the independence of the COMELEC by exercising
supervisory powers over its rule-making authority.
By virtue of Section 19 of R.A. No. 9189, Congress has empowered the
COMELEC to "issue the necessary rules and regulations to effectively implement
the provisions of this Act within sixty days from the effectivity of this Act." This
provision of law follows the usual procedure in drafting rules and regulations to
implement a law – the legislature grants an administrative agency the authority to
craft the rules and regulations implementing the law it has enacted, in recognition
of the administrative expertise of that agency in its particular field of
operation.47 Once a law is enacted and approved, the legislative function is
deemed accomplished and complete. The legislative function may spring back to
Congress relative to the same law only if that body deems it proper to review,
amend and revise the law, but certainly not to approve, review, revise and amend
the IRR of the COMELEC.
By vesting itself with the powers to approve, review, amend, and revise the IRR
for The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003, Congress went beyond the scope
of its constitutional authority. Congress trampled upon the constitutional mandate
of independence of the COMELEC. Under such a situation, the Court is left with no
option but to withdraw from its usual reticence in declaring a provision of law
unconstitutional.
The second sentence of the first paragraph of Section 19 stating that "[t]he
Implementing Rules and Regulations shall be submitted to the Joint Congressional
Oversight Committee created by virtue of this Act for prior approval," and the
second sentence of the second paragraph of Section 25 stating that "[i]t shall
review, revise, amend and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations
promulgated by the Commission," whereby Congress, in both provisions, arrogates
unto itself a function not specifically vested by the Constitution, should be stricken
out of the subject statute for constitutional infirmity. Both provisions brazenly
violate the mandate on the independence of the COMELEC.
Similarly, the phrase, "subject to the approval of the Congressional Oversight
Committee" in the first sentence of Section 17.1 which empowers the Commission
to authorize voting by mail in not more than three countries for the May, 2004
elections; and the phrase, "only upon review and approval of the Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee" found in the second paragraph of the same
section are unconstitutional as they require review and approval of voting by mail
in any country after the 2004 elections. Congress may not confer upon itself the
authority to approve or disapprove the countries wherein voting by mail shall be
allowed, as determined by the COMELEC pursuant to the conditions provided for
in Section 17.1 of R.A. No. 9189.48 Otherwise, Congress would overstep the
bounds of its constitutional mandate and intrude into the independence of the
COMELEC.
During the deliberations, all the members of the Court agreed to adopt the
separate opinion of Justice Reynato S. Puno as part of the ponencia on the
unconstitutionality of Sections 17.1, 19 and 25 of R.A. No. 9189 insofar as they
relate to the creation of and the powers given to the Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee.
WHEREFORE, the petition is partly GRANTED. The following portions of R.A. No.
9189 are declared VOID for being UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
a) The phrase in the first sentence of the first paragraph of Section 17.1, to wit:
"subject to the approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee;"
b) The portion of the last paragraph of Section 17.1, to wit: "only upon review
and approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee;"
c) The second sentence of the first paragraph of Section 19, to wit: "The
Implementing Rules and Regulations shall be submitted to the Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee created by virtue of this Act for prior
approval;" and
d) The second sentence in the second paragraph of Section 25, to wit: "It shall
review, revise, amend and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations
promulgated by the Commission" of the same law;
for being repugnant to Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution mandating the
independence of constitutional commission, such as COMELEC.
The constitutionality of Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 is UPHELD with respect only
to the authority given to the COMELEC to proclaim the winning candidates for the
Senators and party-list representatives but not as to the power to canvass the
votes and proclaim the winning candidates for President and Vice-President which
is lodged with Congress under Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution.
The constitutionality of Section 5(d) is UPHELD.
Pursuant to Section 30 of R.A. No. 9189, the rest of the provisions of said law
continues to be in full force and effect.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-30187             November 15, 1928
MARCOS YRA, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
MAXIMO ABANO, respondent-appellee.
Gregorio Perfecto and Angeles Arabiran for appellant.
Benigno S. Aquino, Cirilo B. Santos and Domingo A. Guevara for appellee.
1.ELECTIONS; "QUO WARRANTO;" MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS;
QUALIFICATIONS OF ELECTIVE MUNICIPAL OFFICERS; ELECTION LAW,
SECTIONS 404, 431, AND 432, AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE CODE, SECTION
2174, CONSTRUED.—A candidate who was elected to the office of municipal
president and who at the time of the election was registered as a voter of Manila
and not of the municipality in which he was a candidate, is nevertheless eligible to
the office, and proceedings in the nature of quo warranto instituted by virtue of the
provisions of section 408 of the Election Law, as amended,. by the vice-president
elect of the municipality, who challenged the right of the municipal president elect,
to the position to which elected on the ground that the municipal president was
ineligible, cannot be successfully maintained.
2.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.—The Election Law makes use of the terms "qualified voter in
his municipality," and "qualified elector therein." To be a qualified voter, does not
necessarily mean that a person must be a registered voter. It is sufficient for the
candidate to possess all of the qualifications prescribed in section, 431 and none
of the disqualifications prescribed in section 432. The fact that a candidate failed to
register as an elector in the municipality does not deprive him of the right to
become a candidate and to be voted for.
3.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.—One may be a qualified voter without exercising the right to
vote. Registering does not confer the right; it is but a condition precedent to the
exercise of the right. Registration regulates the exercise of the right of suffrage. It
is not a qualification for such right.
4.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.—The question of residence for the purposes of the Election
Law is largely one of intention.
5.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.—In elections, the will of the electorate should be respected if
it be possible to effectuate it.
6.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION.—The contemporaneous
construction of the law by the legislative and executive branches of the
Government, while not controlling on the Judiciary, is entitled to respectful
consideration. Yra vs. Abaño, 52 Phil. 380, No. 30187 November 15, 1928
MALCOLM, J.:
These are proceedings in the nature of quo warranto instituted by virtue of the
provisions of section 408 of the Election Law, as amended, in the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan by the petitioner, Marcos Yra, the vice-president elect of
Meycauayan, Bulacan, who challenges the right of the respondent, Maximo
Abano, the municipal president elect of Meycauayan, to the position to which
elected on the ground that the respondent is ineligible. The decision in the lower
court, Judge Anastasio R. Teodoro presiding, was in favor of the respondent and
declared the complaint as without merit.
Maximo Abano is a native of the municipality of Meycauayan, Bulacan. At the
proper age, he transferred to Manila to complete his education. While temporarily
residing in Manila, Abano registered as a voter there. Shortly after qualifying as a
member of the bar and after the death of his father, Abano returned to
Meycauayan to live. From May 10, 1927, until the present, Abano has considered
himself a resident of Meycauayan. When the 1928 elections were approaching, he
made an application for cancellation of registration in Manila which was dated April
3, 1928, but this application was rejected by the city officials for the reason that it
was not deposited in the mails on or before April 4, 1928. Nevertheless Abano
presented himself as a candidate for municipal president of Meycauayan in the
1928 elections and was elected by popular vote to that office.
There can be no uncertainly as to the necessary facts. Undoubtedly, the petitioner-
appellant would be the first to admit them. As addressed, however, to the decision
of the trial court the facts, the petitioner-appellant assigns and argues four errors.
The first error assigned relates to a technical matter which is the act of the trial
judge in permitting the respondent to retire his second answer. This, of course,
does not constitute either prejudicial or reversible error. Passing the second error
for the moment, the third error assigned is found to assail the eligibility of the
respondent because it is alleged that he had not been a resident of Meycauayan
for at least one year previous to the election. In this connection, it is sufficient to
point out that the question of residence is largely one of intention. At least since
May 190, 1927, Abano has been a resident of Meycauayan or more than the one-
year period fixed by the law as a prerequisite to election. The fourth error assigned
is a formal one.
As we see it, the issue in the case is suggested by the second error, and centers
on the alleged non-eligibility of the respondent to hold a municipal office for the
reason that he was not a "qualified voter in his municipality" — not a "qualified
elector therein." In this connection, it is well to recall that Abano was registered as
a voter in Manila and not in Meycauayan in June, 1928, when the election was
held. Is this sufficient to nullify his election? The Election Law, as amended, in
section 404 provides that "No person shall be eligible . . . for any elective . . .
municipal office unless, within the time fixed by law, he shall file a duly sworn
certificate of candidacy. Said certificate shall declare . . . that he is a resident of the
. . . municipality, . . . in which his candidacy is offered; that he is a duly qualified
elector therein, and that he is eligible to the office." The Administrative Code in
section 2174, in giving the qualifications of elective officers, also provides that "An
elective municipal officer must, at the time of the election, be a qualified voter in his
municipality and must have been resident therein for at least one year . . . ."
Section 431 of the Election Law prescribes the qualifications for voters, section
432 the disqualifications. The question before us has arisen in a slightly different
form in the other departments of the Government. In the early days of the
Philippine Assembly, the election of Honorable Fernando Ma. Guerrero as a
member of the Assembly from Manila was contested on the ground that he was
not registered in his electoral district. The Committee of the Philippine Assembly
reached the conclusion that the words "qualified elector" meant a person who had
all of the qualifications provided by law to be a voter and not a person registered in
the electoral list (Taken from Villamor's Tratado de Elecciones, 2d ed., p. 156). So
also the Executive Bureau has been of the opinion that the term "qualified" when
applied to a voter does not necessarily mean that a person must be a registered
voter (Executive Bureau Unnumbered Provincial Circulars, May 19, 1925, May 2,
1925 May 7, 1925, cited in Laurel's The Law of Elections of the Philippine Islands,
1st ed., pp. 32, 33). Senator Jose P. Laurel in his Law of Elections of the Philippine
Islands, pages 32, 33, summarizes the law on the subject in the following
language:
One of the qualifications required by law of a person who announces his candidacy
is that he must be a duly qualified elector. The Executive Bureau has held that the
term "qualified" when applied to a voter does not necessarily mean that a person
must be a registered voter. To become a qualified candidate a person does not
need to register as an elector. It is sufficient that he possesses all the qualifications
prescribed in section 431 and none of the disqualifications prescribed in section
432. The fact that a candidate failed to register as an elector in the municipality
does not deprive him of the right to become a candidate to be voted for.
It is not at all easy to disregard the forcible argument advanced by counsel for the
appellant to the effect that when the law makes use of the phrases "qualified
elector" and "qualified voter" the law means what it says. It is contended that it
would be an absurdity to hold one a qualified elector who was not eligible to vote in
his municipality. At the same time, the contemporaneous construction of the law by
two departments of the Government — one the legislative branch responsible for
its enactment, and the other the executive branch responsible for its enforcement
— while not controlling on the Judiciary, is entitled to our respectful consideration.
For the orderly and harmonious interpretation and advancement of the law, the
courts should, when possible, keep step with the other departments.
But we are not without other authority. The law of Kentucky provided that "No
person shall be eligible to any office who is not at time of his election a qualified
voter of the city and who has not resided therein three years preceding his
election." One Wood was elected a commissioner of the sinking fund. His eligibility
was protested upon the ground that he was not, at the time of his election, a
qualified voter of the city of Louisville since he had not registered as a voter in that
city. The Supreme Court of Kentucky, considering the law and the facts in the case
of Meffert vs. Brown ([1909], 132 Ky., 201), speaking through its Chief Justice, held
that under the Kentucky statutes requiring officers in certain cities to be qualified
voters, one's eligibility is not affected by his failure to register. It was said that "The
act of registering is only one step towards voting, and it is not one of the elements
that makes the citizen a qualified voter. . . . One may be a qualified voter without
exercising the right to vote. Registering does not confer the right; it is but a
condition precedent to the exercise of the right." lawphi1.net
It is but fair to say that if the question were strictly one of first impression in this
jurisdiction, we would be more impressed with the potent points made by the
appellant. In view, however, of the authorities herein- before mentioned, we are
loath to depart from them, particularly as the language which goes to make up
these authorities, on close examination, is found to rest on reason. The distinction
is between a qualified elector and the respondent is such, and a registered
qualified elector and the respondent is such although not in his home municipality.
Registration regulates the exercise of the right of suffrage. It is not a qualification
for such right.
It should not be forgotten that the people of Meycauayan have spoken and their
choice to be their local chief executive is the respondent. The will of the electorate
should be respected.
For all the foregoing, we conclude that the decision rendered in the lower court
should be sustained. Acordingly, it will be affirmed, with the costs of this instance
against the appellant.
G.R. No. 147066 26 March 2001
AKBAYAN - Youth, SCAP, UCSC, MASP, KOMPIL II - Youth, ALYANSA,
KALIPI, PATRICIA Q. PICAR, MYLA GAIL Z. TAMONDONG, EMMANUEL E.
OMBAO, JOHNNY ACOSTA, ARCHIE JOHN TALAUE, RYAN DAPITAN,
CHRISTOPHER OARDE, JOSE MARI MODESTO, RICHARD M. VALENCIA,
EDBEN TABUCOL, petitioners
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTION, respondents.
G.R. No. 147179 26 March 2001
MICHELLE D. BETITO, petitioner,
vs.
CHAIRMAN ALFREDO BENIPAYO, COMMISSIONER MEHOL SADAIN,
RUFINO JAVIER, LUZVIMINDA TANCANGCO, RALPH LANTION,
FLORENTINO TUASON and RESURRECCION BORRA, all of the Commission
on Election (COMELEC), respondents.
BUENA, J.:
At the helm of controversy in the instant consolidated petitions (G.R. No. 147066
and G.R. 147179.) before us is the exercise of a right so indubitably cherished and
accorded primacy, if not utmost reverence, no less than by the fundamental law -
the right of suffrage.
Invoking this right, herein petitioners - representing the youth sector - seek to direct
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to conduct a special registration before
the May 14, 2001 General Elections, of new voters ages 18 to 21. According to
petitioners, around four million youth failed to register on or before the December
27, 2000 deadline set by the respondent COMELEC under Republic Act No. 8189
(Voter's Registration Act of 1996).
Acting on the clamor of the students and civic leaders, Senator Raul Roco,
Chairman if the Committee on Electoral Reforms, Suffrage, and People's
Participation, through a Letter dated January 25, 2001, invited the COMELEC to a
public hearing for the purpose of discussing the extension of the registration of
voters to accommodate those who were not able to register before the COMELEC
deadline.
Commissioner Luzviminda G. Tancangco and Ralph C. Lantion, together with
Consultant Resurreccion Z. Borra (now Commissioner) attended the public hearing
called by the Senate Committee headed by Senator Roco, held at the Senate,
New GSIS Headquarters Bldg., Pasay City.
On January 29, 2001, Commissioners Tancangco and Lantion submitted
Memorandum No. 2001-027 on the Report on the Request for a Two-day
Additional Registration of New Voters Only, excerpts of which are hereto quoted:
"Please be advised that the undersigned attended the public hearing called by the
Senate Committee on Electoral Reforms, Suffrage and People's Participation
presided by the Hon. Sen. Raul Roco, its Committee Chairman to date at the
Senate, new GSIS Headquarters Building, Pasay City. The main agenda item is
the request by youth organizations to hold additional two days of registration.
Thus, participating students and civic leaders along with Comelec Representatives
were in agreement that is legally feasible to have a two-day additional registration
of voters to be conducted preferably on February 17 and 18, 2001 nationwide. The
deadline for the continuing voters registration under R.A. 8189 is December 27,
2000.
"To address the concern that this may open the flood parts for 'hakot system,'
certain restrictive parameters were discussed. The following guidelines to serve as
safeguard against fraudulent applicants:
1. The applicants for the registration shall be 25 years of age or less
and will be registering for the first time on May 14, 2001;
2. The applicants shall register in their places of residences; and,
3. The applicants shall present valid identification documents, like
school records
"Preparatory to the registration days, the following activities are likewise agreed:
1. Submission of the list of students and their addresses immediately
prior to the actual registration of the applicants;
2. The Comelec filed officers will be given the opportunity to verify
the voters enumerator's list or conduct ocular inspection;
3. Availability of funds for the purpose; and,
4. Meetings with student groups to ensure orderly and honest
political awareness and interest to participate in the political
process generated by the recent political events in the country
among our youth. considering that they failed to register on
December 27, 2000 deadline, they approved for special
registration days.
"In viewing of the foregoing, the Commission en banc has to discuss all aspects
regarding this request with directives to the Finance Services Department (FSD) to
submit certified available funds for the purpose, and for the Deputy Executive
Director for Operations (DEDO) for estimated costs of additional two days of
registration.
The presence of REDs on January 30 can be used partly for consultation on the
practical side and logistical requirements of such additional registration days. The
meeting will be set at 1:30 p.m. at the Office of ED.
Immediately, Commissioner Borra called a consultation meeting among regional
heads and representatives, and a number of senior staff headed by Executive
Director Mamasapunod Aguam. It was the consensus of the group, with the
exception of Director Jose Tolentino, Jr., of the ASD, to disapproved the request
for additional registration of voters on the ground that Section 8 of R.A. 8189
explicitly provides that no registration shall be conducted during the period starting
one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election and that the Commission
has no more time left to accomplish all pre-election activities.
On February 8, 2001, the COMELEC issued Resolution N. 3584, the decretal
portion:
"Deliberating on the foregoing memoranda, the Commission RESOLVED, as it
hereby RESOLVES, to deny the request to conduct a two-day additional
registration of new voters on February 17, and 18 2001."
Commissioners Rufino S.B. Javier and Mehol K. Sadain voted to deny the request
while Commissioners Luzviminda Tancangco and Ralph Lantion voted to
accommodate the students' request. With this impasse, the Commission construed
its Resolution as having taken effect.
Aggrieved by the denial, petitioners AKBAYAN-Youth, SCAP, UCSC, MASP,
KOMPIL II (YOUTH) et. al. filed before this Court the instant Petition for Certiorari
and Mandamus, docketed as G.R. NO. 147066, which seeks to set aside and
nullify respondent COMELEC's Resolution and/or to declare Section 8 of R.A.
8189 unconstitutional insofar as said provision effectively causes the
disenfranchisement of petitioners and others similarly situated. Likewise,
petitioners pray for the issuance of a writ of mandamus directing respondent
COMELEC to conduct a special registration of new voters and to admit for
registration petitioners and other similarly situated young Filipinos to qualify them
to vote in the May 14, 2001 General Elections.
On March 09, 2001, herein petitioner Michelle Betito, a student of the University of
the Philippines, likewise filed a Petition for Mandamus, docketed as G.R. No.
147179, praying that this Court direct the COMELEC to provide for another special
registration day under the continuing registration provision under the Election
code.
On March 13, 2001, this court resolved to consolidate the two petitions and further
required respondents to file their Comment thereon within a non-extendible period
expiring at 10:00 A.M. of March 16, 2001. Moreover, this Court resolved to set the
consolidated cases for oral arguments on March 16, 2001.
On March 16, 2001, the Solicitor General, in its Manifestation and Motion in lieu of
Comment, recommended that an additional continuing registration of voters be
conducted at the soonest possible time "in order to accommodate the
disfranchised voters for purposes of the May 14, 2001 elections."
In effect, the Court in passing upon the merits of the present petitions, is tasked to
resolve a two-pronged issue focusing on respondent COMELEC's issuance of the
assailed Resolution dated February 8, 2001, which Resolution, petitioners, by and
large, argue to have undermined their constitutional right to vote on the May 14,
2001 general elections and caused the disenfranchisement of around for four
million Filipinos of voting age who failed to register before the registration deadline
set by the COMELEC.
Thus, this Court shall determine:
a. Whether or not respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion in issuing COMELEC Resolution dated February 8, 2001.
b. Whether or not this Court can compel respondent COMELEC, through the
extraordinary writ of mandamus, to conduct a special registration of new
voters during the period between the COMELEC's imposed December 27,
2000 deadline and the May 14, 2001 general elections.
The petitions are bereft of merit.
In a representative democracy such as ours, the right of suffrage, although
accorded a prime niche in the hierarchy of rights embodied in the fundamental law,
ought to be exercised within the proper bounds and framework of the Constitutions
and must properly yield to pertinent laws skillfully enacted by the Legislature,
which statutes for all intents and purposes, are crafted to effectively insulate such
so cherished right from ravishment and preserve the democratic institutions our
people have, for so long, guarded against the spoils of opportunism, debauchery
and abuse.
To be sure, the right of suffrage ardently invoked by herein petitioners, is not at all
absolute. Needles to say, the exercise of the right of suffrage, as in the enjoyment
of all other rights, is subject to existing substantive and procedural requirements
embodied in our Constitution, statute books and other repositories of law. Thus, as
to the substantive aspect, Section 1, Article V of the Constitutions provides:
"SECTION 1. SUFFRAGE MAY BE EXERCISED BY ALL CITIZENS OF THE
PHILIPPINES NOT OTHERWISE DISQUALIFIED BY LAW, WHO ARE AT LEAST
EIGHTEEN YEARS OF AGE, AND WHO SHALL HAVE RESIDED IN THE
PHILIPPINES FOR AT LEAST ONE YEAR AND IN THE PLACE WHEREIN THEY
PROPOSE TO VOTE FOR AT LEAST SIX MONTHS IMMEDIATELY
PRECEDING THE ELECTION. NO LITERACY, PROPERTY, OR OTHER
SUBSTANTIVE REQUIREMENT SHALL BE IMPOSED ON THE EXERCISE OF
SUFFRAGE."
As to the procedural limitation, the right of a citizen to vote is necessarily
conditioned upon certain procedural requirements he must undergo: among
others, the process of registration. Specifically, a citizen in order to be qualified to
exercise his right to vote, in addition to the minimum requirements set by
fundamental charter, is obliged by law to register, at present, under the provisions
of Republic Act No. 8189, otherwise known as the "Voter's Registration Act of
1996."
Stated differently, the act of registration is an indispensable precondition to the
right of suffrage. For registration is part and parcel of the right to vote and an
indispensable element in the election process. Thus, contrary to petitioners'
argument, registration cannot and should not be denigrated to the lowly stature of
a mere statutory requirement. Proceeding from the significance of registration as a
necessary requisite to the right to vote, the State undoubtedly, in the exercise of its
inherent police power, may then enact laws to safeguard and regulate the act of
voter's registration for the ultimate purpose of conducting honest, orderly and
peaceful election, to the incidental yet generally important end, that even pre-
election activities could be performed by the duly constituted authorities in a
realistic and orderly manner - one which is not indifferent and so far removed from
the pressing order of the day and the prevalent circumstances of the times.
Viewed broadly, existing legal proscription and pragmatic operational
considerations bear great weight in the adjudication of the issues raised in the
instant petitions.
On the legal score, Section 8 or R.A. 8189, which provides a system of continuing
registration, is explicit, to wit:
"SEC. 8. System of Continuing Registration of Voters. - The Personal filing of
application of registration of voters shall be conducted daily in the office of the
Election Officer during regular office hours. No registration shall, however, be
conducted during the period starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a
regular election and ninety (90) days before a special election," (Emphasis Ours)
Likewise, Section 35 of R. A. 8189, which among others, speaks of a prohibitive
period within which to file a sworn petition for the exclusion of voters from the
permanent voter's list, provides:
"SEC. 35. Petition for Exclusion of Voters from the List - Any registered voter,
representative of a political party x x x may file x x x except one hundred (100)
days prior to a regular election x x x."
As aptly observed and succinctly worded by respondent COMELEC in its
Comment:
"x x x. The petition for exclusion is a necessary component to registration since it is
a safety mechanism that gives a measure of protection against flying voters, non-
qualified registrants, and the like. The prohibitive period, on the other hand serves
the purpose of securing the voter's substantive right to be included in the list of
voters.
"In real-world terms, this means that if a special voter's registration is conducted,
then the prohibitive period for filing petitions for exclusion must likewise be
adjusted to a later date. If we do not, then no one can challenge the Voter's list
since we would already be well into the 100-day prohibitive period. Aside from
being a flagrant breach of the principles of due process, this would open the
registration process to abuse and seriously compromise the integrity of the voter's
list, and consequently, that of the entire election.
"x x x. The short cuts that will have to be adopted in order to fit the entire process
of registration within the last 60 days will give rise to haphazard list of voters, some
of whom might not even be qualified to vote, x x x the very possibility that we shall
be conducting elections on the basis of an inaccurate list is enough to cast a cloud
of doubt over the results of the polls. If that happens, the unforgiving public will
disown the results of the elections, regardless of who wins, and regardless of how
many courts validate our own results. x x x"
Perhaps undaunted by such scenario, petitioners invoke the so called "standby"
powers or "residual" powers of the COMELEC, as provided under the relevant
provisions of Section 29, Republic Act No. 6646 (An act introducing additional
reforms in the electoral system and for other purposes) and adopted verbatim in
Section 28 of Republic Act No. 8436 (An act authorizing the COMELEC to use an
automated election system in the May 11, 1998 national or local electoral
exercises, providing funds therefore and for other purposes), thus:
"SEC. 28. Designation of other Dates for Certain Pre-election Acts - if it should no
longer be possible to observe the periods and dates prescribed by law for certain
pre-election acts, the Commission shall fix other periods and dates in order to
ensure accomplishments of the activities so voters shall not be deprived of their
right to suffrage."
On this matter, the act of registration is concededly, by its very nature, a pre-
election act. Under Section 3(a) of R. A. 8189, registration, as a process, has its
own specific definition, precise meaning and coverage, thus:
"a) Registration refers to the act of accomplishing and filing of a sworn application
for registration by a qualified voter before the election officer of the city or
municipality wherein he resides and including the same in the book of registered
voters upon approval by the Election Registration Board."
At this point, it bears emphasis that the provision of Section 29 R.A. 8436 invoked
by herein petitioners and Section 8 of R.A. 8189 volunteered by respondent
COMELEC, far from contradicting each other, actually share some common
ground. True enough, both provisions, although at first glance may seem to be at
war in relation to the other, are in more circumspect, perusal, necessarily capable
of being harmonized and reconciled.
Rudimentary is the principle in legal hermeneutics that changes made by the
legislature in the form of amendments to a stature should be given effect, together
with other parts of the amendment act. It is not to be presumed that the legislature,
in making such changes, was indulging in mere semantic exercise. There must be
some purpose in making them, which should be ascertained and given effect.
Similarly, every new statute should be construed in connection with those already
existing in relation to the same subject matter and all should be made to
harmonize and stand together, if they can be done by any fair and reasonable
interpretation. Interpretare et concordare legibus est optimus interpretandi,
which means that the best method of interpretation is that which makes laws
consistent with other laws. Accordingly, Courts of justice, when confronted with
apparently conflicting statutes, should endeavor to reconcile them instead of
declaring outright the invalidity of one against the other. Courts should harmonize
them, if this is possible, because they are equally the handiwork of the same
legislature.
In light of the foregoing doctrine, we hold that Section 8 of R.A. 8189 applies in the
present case, for the purpose of upholding the assailed COMELEC Resolution and
denying the instant petitions, considering that the aforesaid law explicitly provides
that no registration shall be conducted during the period starting one hundred
twenty (120) days before a regular election.
Corollarily, it is specious for herein petitioners to argue that respondent COMELEC
may validly and legally conduct a two-day special registration, through the
expedient of the letter of Section 28 of RA 8436. To this end, the provisions of
Section 28, RA 8436 would come into play in cases where the pre-election acts
are susceptible of performance within the available period prior to election day. In
more categorical language, Section 28 of R.A 8436 is, to our mind, anchored on
the sound premise that these certain "pre-election acts" are still capable of being
reasonably performed vis-a-vis the remaining period before the date of election
and the conduct of other related pre-election activities required under the law.
In its Comment, respondent COMELEC- which is the constitutional body tasked by
no less that the fundamental charter (Sec 2, par. 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution)
to decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting elections,
including registration of voters painstakingly and thoroughly emphasized the
"operational impossibility of conducting a special registration, which in its own
language, "can no longer be accomplished within the time left to (us) the
Commission."
Hence:
"xxx xxx xxx
19) In any case, even without the legal obstacles, the last 60 days will not be a
walk in the park for the COMELEC. Allow us to outline what the Commission has
yet to do, and the time to do it in:
20) First we have to complete the Project of Precincts by the 19th of March. The
Projects of Precincts indicate the total number of established precincts and the
number of registered voters per precincts in a city or municipality. Without the final
Project of Precincts, we cannot even determine the proper allocation of official
ballots, election returns and other election forms and paraphernalia. More
succinctly said, without the Project of Precincts, we won't know how many forms to
print and so we're liable to come up short.
21) More importantly, without a completed Project of Precincts, it will be impossible
to complete the rest of the tasks that must be accomplished prior to the elections.
22) Second, the Board of Elections Inspectors must be constituted on or before the
4th of March. In addition, the list of the members of the BEI - including the precinct
where they are assigned and the barangay where the precinct is located must be
furnished by the Election Officer to all the candidates and political candidates not
later that 26th of March.
23) Third, the Book of Voters, which contains the approved Voter Registration
Records of registered voters in particular precinct must be inspected, verified, and
sealed beginning March 30 until April 15.
24) Fourth, the Computerized Voters' List must be finalized and printed out of use
on election day; and finally
25.) Fifth, the preparation, bidding, printing, and distribution of the voters
Information sheet must be completed on or before April 15.
26.) With this rigorous schedule of pre-election activities, the COMELEC will have
roughly a month that will act as a buffer against any number of unforeseen
occurrences that might delay the elections. This is the logic and the wisdom behind
setting the 120-day prohibitive period. After all , preparing for an election is no
easy task.
27) To hold special registrations now would, aside from being illegal, whittle that
approximately 30-day margin away to nothing.
28) When we say registration of voters, we do not- contrary to popular opinion-
refer only to the act of going to the Election Officer and writing our names down.
Registration is. In fact a long process that takes about three weeks to complete,
not even counting how long it would take to prepare for the registration in the first
place.
29) In order to concretize, the senior Staff of the COMELEC, the other
Commissioners, prepared a time-table in order to see exactly how the
superimposition of special registration would affect the on-going preparation for the
May 14 elections.
30) We assumed for the sake of argument that we were to hold the special
registration on April 16 and 17. These are not arbitrary numbers, by the way it
takes in account the fact that we only have about 800,000 Voters Registration
Forms available, as against an estimated 4.5 million potential registrants, and it
would take about 14 days - if we were to declare special registrations today - to
print up the difference and to verify these accountable forms. After printing and
verification, the forms would have to be packed and shipped - roughly taking up a
further two and a half weeks. Only then can we get on with registration.
31) The first step in registration is, of course, filling the application for registration
with the Election Officer. The application, according to Section 17 of R.A. 8189, is
then set for hearing, with notice of that hearing being posted in the city or
municipal bulletin board for at least one week prior. Thus, if we held registrations
on the 16th and the 17th, the posting requirement would be completed by the 24th.
Considering that time must be allowed for the filling of oppositions, the earliest that
the Election Registration Board can be convened for hearing would be the May 1st
and 2nd.
32) Assuming - and this is a big assumption - that there are rift challenges to the
applicant's right to register, the Election Registration Board can immediately rule
on the applicant's registration, and post notices of its action by the 2nd until the 7th
of May. By the 10th, copies of the notice of the action taken by the board will have
already been furnished to the applicants and the heads of the registered political
parties.
33) Only at this point can our Election Officers once against focus on the business
of getting ready for the elections. Once the results of the special registration are
finalized, they can be encoded and a new Computerized Voters' List generated - at
the earliest, by May 11, after which the new CVL would be posted. Incidentally, if
we were to follow the letter of the law strictly, a May 11 posting date for the new
CVL would be improper since the R.A. 8189 provides that the CVL be posted at
least 90 days before the election.
34) Assuming optimistically that we can then finish the inspection, verification, and
sealing of the Book of Voters by May 15, we will already have overshot the May 14
election date, and still not have finished our election preparations.
35) After this point, we could have to prepare the allocation of Official Ballots,
Election Returns, and other Non-Accountable Forms and Supplies to be used for
the new registrants. Once the allocation is ready, the contracts would be awarded,
the various forms printed, delivered, verified, and finally shipped out to the different
municipalities. All told, this process would take approximately 26 days, from the
15th of May until June 10.
36) Only then can we truly say that we are ready to hold the elections.
XXX XXX XXX
It is an accepted doctrine in administrative law that the determination of
administrative agency as to the operation, implementation and application of a law
would be accorded great weight considering that these specialized government
bodies are, by their nature and functions, in the best position to know what they
can possible do or not do, under prevailing circumstances.
Beyond this, it is likewise well-settled that the law does not require that the
impossible be done. The law obliges no one to perform an impossibility, expressed
in the maxim, nemo tenetur ad impossible. In other words, there is no obligation
to do an impossible thing. Impossibilium nulla obligatio est. Hence, a statute
may not be so construed as to require compliance with what it prescribes cannot,
at the time, be legally ..., it must be presumed that the legislature did not at all
intend an interpretation or application of a law which is far removed from the realm
of the possible. Truly, the interpretation of statutes, the interpretation to be given
must be such that it is in accordance with logic, common sense, reasonableness
and practicality. Thus, we are of the considered view that they "stand-by power" of
the respondent COMELEC under Section 28 of R.A. 8436, presupposed the
possibility of its being exercised or availed of, and not otherwise.
Further, petitioners' bare allegation that they were disfranchised when respondent
COMELEC pegged the registration deadline on December 27, 2000 instead of the
day before the prohibitive period before the May 14, 2001 regular elections
commences - is, to our mind, not sufficient. On this matter, there is no allegation in
the two consolidated petitions and the records are bereft of any showing that
anyone of herein petitioners has filed an application to be registered as a voter
which was denied by the COMELEC nor filed a complaint before the respondent
COMELEC alleging that he or she proceeded to the Office of the Election Officer to
register between the period starting from December 28, 2000 to January 13, 2001,
and that he or she was disallowed or barred by respondent COMELEC from filing
his application for registration. While it may be true that respondent COMELEC set
the registration deadline on December 27, 2000, this Court is of the firm view that
petitioners were not totally denied the opportunity to avail of the continuing
registration under R.A. 8189. Stated in a different manner, the petitioners in the
instant case are not without fault or blame. They admit in their petition that they
failed to register, for whatever reason, within the period of registration and came to
this Court and invoked its protective mantle not realizing, so to speak, the speck in
their eyes. Impuris minibus nemo accedat curiam. Let no one come to court
with unclean hands.
In a similar vein, well-entrenched is the rule in our jurisdiction that the law aids the
vigilant and not those who slumber on their rights. Vigilanties sed non
dormientibus jura in re subveniunt.
Applying the foregoing, this Court is of the firm view that respondent COMELEC
did not commit an abuse of discretion, much less be adjudged to have committed
the same in some patent, whimsical and arbitrary manner, in issuing Resolution
No, 3584 which, in respondent's own terms, resolved "to deny the request to
conduct a two-day additional registration of new voters on February 17 and 18,
2001."
On this particular matter, grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or, when the
power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion
of positive duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of laws.
Under these circumstances, we rule that the COMELEC in denying the request of
petitioners to hold a special registration, acted within the bounds and confines of
the applicable law on the matter - Section 8 of R.A. 8189. In issuing the assailed
Resolution, respondent COMELEC simply performed its constitutional task to
enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election, inter alia, questions relating to the registration of voters; evidently,
respondent COMELEC merely exercised a prerogative that chiefly pertains to it
and one which squarely falls within the proper sphere of its constitutionally
mandated powers. Hence, whatever action respondent takes in the exercise of its
wide latitude of discretion, specifically on matters involving voters' registration,
pertains to the wisdom rather than the legality of the act. Accordingly, in the
absence of clear showing of grave abuse of power or discretion on the part of
respondent COMELEC, this Court may not validly conduct an incursion and
meddle with affairs exclusively within the province of respondent COMELEC - a
body accorded by no less than the fundamental law with independence.
As to the petitioners' prayer for the issuance of the writ of mandamus, we hold that
this Court cannot, in view of the very nature of such extraordinary writ, issue the
same without transgressing the time-honored principles in this jurisdiction.
As an extraordinary writ, the remedy of mandamus lies only to compel an officer to
perform a ministerial duty, not a discretionary one; mandamus will not issue to
control the exercise of discretion of a public officer where the law imposes upon
him the duty to exercise his judgment in reference to any manner in which he is
required to act, because it is his judgment that is to be exercised and not that of
the court.
Considering the circumstances where the writ of mandamus lies and the
peculiarities of the present case, we are of the firm belief that petitioners failed to
establish, to the satisfaction of this Court, that they are entitled to the issuance of
this extraordinary writ so as to effectively compel respondent COMELEC to
conduct a special registration of voters. For the determination of whether or not the
conduct of a special registration of voters is feasible, possible or practical within
the remaining period before the actual date of election, involves the exercise of
discretion and thus, cannot be controlled by mandamus.
In Bayan vs. Executive Secretary Zamora and related cases, we enunciated that
the Court's function, as sanctioned by Article VIII, Section 1, is "merely [to] check,
whether or not the governmental branch or agency has gone beyond the
constitutionally limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different view. In
the absence of a showing ...[of] grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power...It
has no power to look into what it thinks is apparent error.
Finally, the Court likewise takes judicial notice of the fact that the President has
issued Proclamation No. 15 calling Congress to a Special Session on March 18,
2001, to allow the conduct of Special Registration of new voters. House Bill No.,
12930 has been filed before the Lower House, which bills seeks to amend R.A.
8189 as to the 120-day prohibitive period provided for under said law. Similarly,
Senate Bill No. 2276 was filed before the Senate, with the same intention to
amend the aforesaid law and, in effect, allow the conduct of special registration
before the May 14, 2001 General Elections.This Court views the foregoing factual
circumstances as a clear intimation on the part of both the executive and
legislative departments that a legal obstacle indeed stands in the way of the
conduct by the Commission on Elections of a special registration before May 14,
2001 General Elections.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petitions for certiorari and
mandamus are hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 120295 June 28, 1996
JUAN G. FRIVALDO, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and RAUL R. LEE, respondents.
G.R. No. 123755 June 28, 1996
RAUL R. LEE, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JUAN G. FRIVALDO, respondents.
 
PANGANIBAN, J.:p
The ultimate question posed before this Court in these twin cases is: Who should
be declared the rightful governor of Sorsogon -
(i) Juan G. Frivaldo, who unquestionably obtained the highest number of votes in
three successive elections but who was twice declared by this Court to be
disqualified to hold such office due to his alien citizenship, and who now claims to
have re-assumed his lost Philippine citizenship thru repatriation;
(ii) Raul R. Lee, who was the second placer in the canvass, but who claims that
the votes cast in favor of Frivaldo should be considered void; that the electorate
should be deemed to have intentionally thrown away their ballots; and that legally,
he secured the most number of valid votes; or
(iii) The incumbent Vice-Governor, Oscar G. Deri, who obviously was not voted
directly to the position of governor, but who according to prevailing jurisprudence
should take over the said post inasmuch as, by the ineligibility of Frivaldo, a
"permanent vacancy in the contested office has occurred"?
In ruling for Frivaldo, the Court lays down new doctrines on repatriation,
clarifies/reiterates/amplifies existing jurisprudence on citizenship and elections,
and upholds the superiority of substantial justice over pure legalisms.
G.R. No. 123755
This is a special civil action under Rules 65 and 58 of the Rules of Court
for certiorari and preliminary injunction to review and annul a Resolution of the
respondent Commission on Elections (Comelec), First Division,1 promulgated on
December 19, 19952 and another Resolution of the Comelec en banc promulgated
February 23, 19963 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The Facts
On March 20, 1995, private respondent Juan G. Frivaldo filed his Certificate of
Candidacy for the office of Governor of Sorsogon in the May 8, 1995 elections. On
March 23, 1995, petitioner Raul R. Lee, another candidate, filed a petition4 with the
Comelec docketed as SPA No. 95-028 praying that Frivaldo "be disqualified from
seeking or holding any public office or position by reason of not yet being a citizen
of the Philippines", and that his Certificate of Candidacy be canceled. On May 1,
1995, the Second Division of the Comelec promulgated a Resolution5 granting the
petition with the following disposition6:
WHEREFORE, this Division resolves to GRANT the petition and declares that
respondent is DISQUALIFIED to run for the Office of Governor of Sorsogon on the
ground that he is NOT a citizen of the Philippines. Accordingly, respondent's
certificate of candidacy is canceled.
The Motion for Reconsideration filed by Frivaldo remained unacted upon until after
the May 8, 1995 elections. So, his candidacy continued and he was voted for
during the elections held on said date. On May 11, 1995, the Comelec en
banc7 affirmed the aforementioned Resolution of the Second Division.
The Provincial Board of Canvassers completed the canvass of the election returns
and a Certificate of Votes8 dated May 27, 1995 was issued showing the following
votes obtained by the candidates for the position of Governor of Sorsogon:
Antonio H. Escudero, Jr. 51,060
Juan G. Frivaldo 73,440
Raul R. Lee 53,304
Isagani P. Ocampo 1,925
On June 9, 1995, Lee filed in said SPA No. 95-028, a (supplemental)
petition9 praying for his proclamation as the duly-elected Governor of Sorsogon.
In an order10 dated June 21, 1995, but promulgated according to the petition "only
on June 29, 1995," the Comelec en banc directed "the Provincial Board of
Canvassers of Sorsogon to reconvene for the purpose of proclaiming candidate
Raul Lee as the winning gubernatorial candidate in the province of Sorsogon on
June 29, 1995 . . ." Accordingly, at 8:30 in the evening of June 30, 1995, Lee was
proclaimed governor of Sorsogon.
On July 6, 1995, Frivaldo filed with the Comelec a new petition,11 docketed as SPC
No. 95-317, praying for the annulment of the June 30, 1995 proclamation of Lee
and for his own proclamation. He alleged that on June 30, 1995, at 2:00 in the
afternoon, he took his oath of allegiance as a citizen of the Philippines after "his
petition for repatriation under P.D. 725 which he filed with the Special Committee
on Naturalization in September 1994 had been granted". As such, when "the said
order (dated June 21, 1995) (of the Comelec) . . . was released and received by
Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 at 5:30 o'clock in the evening, there was no more legal
impediment to the proclamation (of Frivaldo) as governor . . ." In the alternative, he
averred that pursuant to the two cases of Labo vs. Comelec,12 the Vice-Governor -
not Lee - should occupy said position of governor.
On December 19, 1995, the Comelec First Division promulgated the herein
assailed Resolution13 holding that Lee, "not having garnered the highest number of
votes," was not legally entitled to be proclaimed as duly-elected governor; and that
Frivaldo, "having garnered the highest number of votes,
and . . . having reacquired his Filipino citizenship by repatriation on June 30, 1995
under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 725 . . . (is) qualified to hold the
office of governor of Sorsogon"; thus:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Commission (First Division), therefore RESOLVES
to GRANT the Petition.
Consistent with the decisions of the Supreme Court, the proclamation of Raul R.
Lee as Governor of Sorsogon is hereby ordered annulled, being contrary to law, he
not having garnered the highest number of votes to warrant his proclamation.
Upon the finality of the annulment of the proclamation of Raul R. Lee, the
Provincial Board of Canvassers is directed to immediately reconvene and, on the
basis of the completed canvass, proclaim petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo as the duly
elected Governor of Sorsogon having garnered the highest number of votes, and
he having reacquired his Filipino citizenship by repatriation on June 30, 1995
under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 725 and, thus, qualified to hold the
office of Governor of Sorsogon.
Conformably with Section 260 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), the
Clerk of the Commission is directed to notify His Excellency the President of the
Philippines, and the Secretary of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of
Sorsogon of this resolution immediately upon the due implementation thereof.
On December 26, 1995, Lee filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied
by the Comelec en banc in its Resolution 14 promulgated on February 23, 1996. On
February 26, 1996, the present petition was filed. Acting on the prayer for a
temporary restraining order, this Court issued on February 27, 1996 a Resolution
which inter alia directed the parties "to maintain the status quo  prevailing prior to
the filing of this petition."
The Issues in G.R. No. 123755
Petitioner Lee's "position on the matter at hand may briefly be capsulized in the
following propositions"15:
First -- The initiatory petition below was so far insufficient in form and substance to
warrant the exercise by the COMELEC of its jurisdiction with the result that, in
effect, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of and
deciding said petition;
Second -- The judicially declared disqualification of respondent was a continuing
condition and rendered him ineligible to run for, to be elected to and to hold the
Office of Governor;
Third -- The alleged repatriation of respondent was neither valid nor is the effect
thereof retroactive as to cure his ineligibility and qualify him to hold the Office of
Governor; and
Fourth -- Correctly read and applied, the Labo Doctrine fully supports the validity of
petitioner's proclamation as duly elected Governor of Sorsogon.
G.R. No. 120295
This is a petition to annul three Resolutions of the respondent Comelec, the first
two of which are also at issue in G.R. No. 123755, as follows:
1. Resolution16 of the Second Division, promulgated on May 1, 1995, disqualifying
Frivaldo from running for governor of Sorsogon in the May 8, 1995 elections "on
the ground that he is not a citizen of the Philippines";
2. Resolution17 of the Comelec en banc, promulgated on May 11, 1995; and
3. Resolution18 of the Comelec en banc, promulgated also on May 11, 1995
suspending the proclamation of, among others, Frivaldo.
The Facts and the Issue
The facts of this case are essentially the same as those in G.R. No. 123755.
However, Frivaldo assails the above-mentioned resolutions on a different ground:
that under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, which is reproduced
hereinunder:
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy. -- A
verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy
may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material
representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The
petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the
filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after notice and
hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election. (Emphasis supplied.)
the Comelec had no jurisdiction to issue said Resolutions because they were not
rendered "within the period allowed by law" i.e., "not later than fifteen days before
the election."
Otherwise stated, Frivaldo contends that the failure of the Comelec to act on the
petition for disqualification within the period of fifteen days prior to the election as
provided by law is a jurisdictional defect which renders the said Resolutions null
and void.
By Resolution on March 12, 1996, the Court consolidated G.R. Nos. 120295 and
123755 since they are intimately related in their factual environment and are
identical in the ultimate question raised, viz., who should occupy the position of
governor of the province of Sorsogon.
On March 19, 1995, the Court heard oral argument from the parties and required
them thereafter to file simultaneously their respective memoranda.
The Consolidated Issues
From the foregoing submissions, the consolidated issues may be restated as
follows:
1. Was the repatriation of Frivaldo valid and legal? If so, did it seasonably cure his
lack of citizenship as to qualify him to be proclaimed and to hold the Office of
Governor? If not, may it be given retroactive effect? If so, from when?
2. Is Frivaldo's "judicially declared" disqualification for lack of Filipino citizenship a
continuing bar to his eligibility to run for, be elected to or hold the governorship of
Sorsogon?
3. Did the respondent Comelec have jurisdiction over the initiatory petition in SPC
No. 95-317 considering that said petition is not "a pre-proclamation case, an
election protest or a quo warranto case"?
4. Was the proclamation of Lee, a runner-up in the election, valid and legal in light
of existing jurisprudence?
5. Did the respondent Commission on Elections exceed its jurisdiction in
promulgating the assailed Resolutions, all of which prevented Frivaldo from
assuming the governorship of Sorsogon, considering that they were not rendered
within the period referred to in Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, viz., "not
later than fifteen days before the elections"?
The First Issue: Frivaldo's Repatriation
The validity and effectivity of Frivaldo's repatriation is the lis mota, the threshold
legal issue in this case. All the other matters raised are secondary to this.
The Local Government Code of 199119 expressly requires Philippine citizenship as
a qualification for elective local officials, including that of provincial governor, thus:
Sec. 39. Qualifications. -- (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the
Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in
the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod,
or sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a resident
therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; and
able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.
(b) Candidates for the position of governor, vice governor or member of the
sangguniang panlalawigan, or mayor, vice mayor or member of the sangguniang
panlungsod of highly urbanized cities must be at least twenty-three (23) years of
age on election day.
x x x           x x x          x x x
Inasmuch as Frivaldo had been declared by this Court20 as a non-citizen, it is
therefore incumbent upon him to show that he has reacquired citizenship; in fine,
that he possesses the qualifications prescribed under the said statute (R.A. 7160).
Under Philippine law,21 citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by
naturalization or by repatriation. Frivaldo told this Court in G.R. No. 10465422 and
during the oral argument in this case that he tried to resume his citizenship
by direct act of Congress, but that the bill allowing him to do so "failed to
materialize, notwithstanding the endorsement of several members of the House of
Representatives" due, according to him, to the "maneuvers of his political rivals." In
the same case, his attempt at naturalization was rejected by this Court because of
jurisdictional, substantial and procedural defects.
Despite his lack of Philippine citizenship, Frivaldo was overwhelmingly elected
governor by the electorate of Sorsogon, with a margin of 27,000 votes in the 1988
elections, 57,000 in 1992, and 20,000 in 1995 over the same opponent Raul Lee.
Twice, he was judicially declared a non-Filipino and thus twice disqualified from
holding and discharging his popular mandate. Now, he comes to us a third time,
with a fresh vote from the people of Sorsogon and a favorable decision from the
Commission on Elections to boot. Moreover, he now boasts of having successfully
passed through the third and last mode of reacquiring citizenship: by repatriation
under P.D. No. 725, with no less than the Solicitor General himself, who was the
prime opposing counsel in the previous cases he lost, this time, as counsel for co-
respondent Comelec, arguing the validity of his cause (in addition to his able
private counsel Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr.). That he took his oath of allegiance under
the provisions of said Decree at 2:00 p.m. on June 30, 1995 is not disputed.
Hence, he insists that he -- not Lee -- should have been proclaimed as the duly-
elected governor of Sorsogon when the Provincial Board of Canvassers met at
8:30 p.m. on the said date since, clearly and unquestionably, he garnered the
highest number of votes in the elections and since at that time, he already
reacquired his citizenship.
En contrario, Lee argues that Frivaldo's repatriation is tainted with serious defects,
which we shall now discuss in seriatim.
First, Lee tells us that P.D. No. 725 had "been effectively repealed", asserting that
"then President Corazon Aquino exercising legislative powers under the Transitory
Provisions of the 1987 Constitution, forbade the grant of citizenship by Presidential
Decree or Executive Issuances as the same poses a serious and contentious
issue of policy which the present government, in the exercise of prudence and
sound discretion, should best leave to the judgment of the first Congress under the
1987 Constitution", adding that in her memorandum dated March 27, 1987 to the
members of the Special Committee on Naturalization constituted for purposes of
Presidential Decree No. 725, President Aquino directed them "to cease and desist
from undertaking any and all proceedings within your functional area of
responsibility as defined under Letter of Instructions (LOI) No. 270 dated April 11,
1975, as amended."23
This memorandum dated March 27, 198724 cannot by any stretch of legal
hermeneutics be construed as a law sanctioning or authorizing a repeal of P.D.
No. 725. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones 25 and a repeal may be
express or implied. It is obvious that no express repeal was made because then
President Aquino in her memorandum -- based on the copy furnished us by Lee --
did not categorically and/or impliedly state that P.D. 725 was being repealed or
was being rendered without any legal effect. In fact, she did not even mention it
specifically by its number or text. On the other hand, it is a basic rule of statutory
construction that repeals by implication  are not favored. An implied repeal will not
be allowed "unless it is convincingly and unambiguously demonstrated that the two
laws are clearly repugnant and patently inconsistent that they cannot co-exist".26
The memorandum of then President Aquino cannot even be regarded as a
legislative enactment, for not every pronouncement of the Chief Executive even
under the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution can nor should be
regarded as an exercise of her law-making powers. At best, it could be treated as
an executive policy addressed to the Special Committee to halt the acceptance
and processing of applications for repatriation pending whatever "judgment the first
Congress under the 1987 Constitution" might make. In other words, the former
President did not repeal P.D. 725 but left it to the first Congress -- once created --
to deal with the matter. If she had intended to repeal such law, she should have
unequivocally said so instead of referring the matter to Congress. The fact is she
carefully couched her presidential issuance in terms that clearly indicated the
intention of "the present government, in the exercise of prudence and sound
discretion" to leave the matter of repeal to the new Congress. Any other
interpretation of the said Presidential Memorandum, such as is now being
proffered to the Court by Lee, would visit unmitigated violence not only upon
statutory construction but on common sense as well.
Second, Lee also argues that "serious congenital irregularities flawed the
repatriation proceedings," asserting that Frivaldo's application therefor was "filed
on June 29, 1995 . . . (and) was approved in just one day or on June 30, 1995 . . .",
which "prevented a judicious review and evaluation of the merits thereof." Frivaldo
counters that he filed his application for repatriation with the Office of the President
in Malacañang Palace on August 17, 1994. This is confirmed by the Solicitor
General. However, the Special Committee was reactivated only on June 8, 1995,
when presumably the said Committee started processing his application. On June
29, 1995, he filled up and re-submitted the FORM that the Committee required.
Under these circumstances, it could not be said that there was "indecent haste" in
the processing of his application.
Anent Lee's charge that the "sudden reconstitution of the Special Committee on
Naturalization was intended solely for the personal interest of respondent,"27 the
Solicitor General explained during the oral argument on March 19, 1996 that such
allegation is simply baseless as there were many others who applied and were
considered for repatriation, a list of whom was submitted by him to this Court,
through a Manifestation28 filed on April 3, 1996.
On the basis of the parties' submissions, we are convinced that the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duty and the presumption of legality in the
repatriation of Frivaldo have not been successfully rebutted by Lee. The mere fact
that the proceedings were speeded up is by itself not a ground to conclude that
such proceedings were necessarily tainted. After all, the requirements of
repatriation under P.D. No. 725 are not difficult to comply with, nor are they tedious
and cumbersome. In fact, P.D.
72529 itself requires very little of an applicant, and even the rules and regulations to
implement the said decree were left to the Special Committee to promulgate. This
is not unusual since, unlike in naturalization where an alien covets a  first-time entry
into Philippine political life, in repatriation the applicant is a former natural-born
Filipino who is merely seeking to reacquire his previous citizenship. In the case of
Frivaldo, he was undoubtedly a natural-born citizen who openly and faithfully
served his country and his province prior to his naturalization in the United States
-- a naturalization he insists was made necessary only to escape the iron clutches
of a dictatorship he abhorred and could not in conscience embrace -- and who,
after the fall of the dictator and the re-establishment of democratic space, wasted
no time in returning to his country of birth to offer once more his talent and services
to his people.
So too, the fact that ten other persons, as certified to by the Solicitor General, were
granted repatriation argues convincingly and conclusively against the existence of
favoritism vehemently posited by Raul Lee. At any rate, any contest on the legality
of Frivaldo's repatriation should have been pursued before the Committee itself,
and, failing there, in the Office of the President, pursuant to the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Third, Lee further contends that assuming the assailed repatriation to be valid,
nevertheless it could only be effective as at 2:00 p.m. of June 30, 1995 whereas
the citizenship qualification prescribed by the Local Government Code "must exist
on the date of his election, if not when the certificate of candidacy is filed," citing
our decision in G.R. 10465430 which held that "both the Local Government Code
and the Constitution require that only Philippine citizens can run and be elected to
public office." Obviously, however, this was a mere obiter as the only issue in said
case was whether Frivaldo's naturalization was valid or not -- and NOT the
effective date thereof. Since the Court held his naturalization to be invalid, then the
issue of when an aspirant for public office should be a citizen was NOT resolved at
all by the Court. Which question we shall now directly rule on.
Under Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code, "(a)n elective local official must be:
* a citizen of the Philippines;
* a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province . . . where he
intends to be elected;
* a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the
election;
* able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.
* In addition, "candidates for the position of governor . . . must be at least twenty-
three (23) years of age on election day.
From the above, it will be noted that the law does not specify any particular date or
time when the candidate must possess citizenship, unlike that for residence (which
must consist of at least one year's residency immediately preceding the day of
election) and age (at least twenty three years of age on election day).
Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective public
office,31 and the purpose of the citizenship qualification is none other than to
ensure that no alien, i.e., no person owing allegiance to another nation, shall
govern our people and our country or a unit of territory thereof. Now, an official
begins to govern or to discharge his functions only upon his proclamation and on
the day the law mandates his term of office to begin. Since Frivaldo re-assumed
his citizenship on June 30, 1995 -- the very day32 the term of office of governor
(and other elective officials) began -- he was therefore already qualified to be
proclaimed, to hold such office and to discharge the functions and responsibilities
thereof as of said date. In short, at that time, he was already qualified to govern his
native Sorsogon. This is the liberal interpretation that should give spirit, life and
meaning to our law on qualifications consistent with the purpose for which such
law was enacted. So too, even from a literal (as distinguished from liberal)
construction, it should be noted that Section 39 of the Local Government Code
speaks of "Qualifications" of "ELECTIVE OFFICIALS", not of candidates. Why then
should such qualification be required at the time of election or at the time of the
filing of the certificates of candidacies, as Lee insists? Literally, such qualifications
-- unless otherwise expressly conditioned, as in the case of age and residence --
should thus be possessed when the "elective [or elected] official" begins to
govern, i.e., at the time he is proclaimed and at the start of his term -- in this case,
on June 30, 1995. Paraphrasing this Court's ruling in Vasquez vs. Giap and Li
Seng Giap & Sons, 33 if the purpose of the citizenship requirement is to ensure that
our people and country do not end up being governed by aliens, i.e., persons
owing allegiance to another nation, that aim or purpose would not be thwarted but
instead achieved  by construing the citizenship qualification as applying to the time
of proclamation of the elected official and at the start of his term.
But perhaps the more difficult objection was the one raised during the oral
argument34 to the effect that the citizenship qualification should be possessed at
the time the candidate (or for that matter the elected official) registered as a voter.
After all, Section 39, apart from requiring the official to be a citizen, also specifies
as another item of qualification, that he be a "registered voter". And, under the
law35 a "voter" must be a citizen of the Philippines. So therefore, Frivaldo could not
have been a voter -- much less a validly registered one -- if he was not a citizen at
the time of such registration.
The answer to this problem again lies in discerning the purpose of the requirement.
If the law intended the citizenship qualification to be possessed prior to election
consistent with the requirement of being a registered voter, then it would not have
made citizenship a SEPARATE qualification. The law abhors a redundancy. It
therefore stands to reason that the law intended CITIZENSHIP to be a qualification
distinct from being a VOTER, even if being a voter presumes being a citizen first. It
also stands to reason that the voter requirement was included as another
qualification (aside from "citizenship"), not to reiterate the need for nationality but to
require that the official be registered as a voter IN THE AREA OR TERRITORY he
seeks to govern, i.e., the law states: "a registered voter in the barangay,
municipality, city, or province . . . where he intends to be elected." It should be
emphasized that the Local Government Code requires an elective official to be
a registered voter. It does not require him to vote actually. Hence, registration --
not the actual voting -- is the core of this "qualification". In other words, the law's
purpose in this second requirement is to ensure that the prospective official is
actually registered in the area he seeks to govern -- and not anywhere else.
Before this Court, Frivaldo has repeatedly emphasized -- and Lee has not disputed
-- that he "was and is a registered voter of Sorsogon, and his registration as a
voter has been sustained as valid by judicial declaration . . . In fact, he cast his
vote in his precinct on May 8, 1995."36
So too, during the oral argument, his counsel steadfastly maintained that "Mr.
Frivaldo has always been a registered voter of Sorsogon. He has voted in 1987,
1988, 1992, then he voted again in 1995. In fact, his eligibility as a voter was
questioned, but the court dismissed (sic) his eligibility as a voter and he was
allowed to vote as in fact, he voted in all the previous elections including on May 8,
1995."3 7
It is thus clear that Frivaldo is a registered voter in the province where he intended
to be elected.
There is yet another reason why the prime issue of citizenship should be reckoned
from the date of proclamation, not necessarily the date of election or date of filing
of the certificate of candidacy. Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code 38 gives
any voter, presumably including the defeated candidate, the opportunity to
question the ELIGIBILITY (or the disloyalty) of a candidate. This is the only
provision of the Code that authorizes a remedy on how to contest before the
Comelec an incumbent's ineligibility arising from failure to meet the qualifications
enumerated under Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code. Such remedy of Quo
Warranto  can be availed of "within ten days after proclamation" of the winning
candidate. Hence, it is only at such time that the issue of ineligibility may be taken
cognizance of by the Commission. And since, at the very moment of Lee's
proclamation (8:30 p.m., June 30, 1995), Juan G. Frivaldo was already and
indubitably a citizen, having taken his oath of allegiance earlier in the afternoon of
the same day, then he should have been the candidate proclaimed as he
unquestionably garnered the highest number of votes in the immediately preceding
elections and such oath had already cured his previous "judicially-declared"
alienage. Hence, at such time, he was no longer ineligible.
But to remove all doubts on this important issue, we also hold that the repatriation
of Frivaldo RETROACTED to the date of the filing of his application on August 17,
1994.
It is true that under the Civil Code of the Philippines, 39 "(l)aws shall have no
retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided." But there are settled
exceptions40 to this general rule, such as when the statute is CURATIVE or
REMEDIAL in nature or when it CREATES NEW RIGHTS.
According to Tolentino,41 curative statutes are those which undertake to cure errors
and irregularities, thereby validating judicial or administrative proceedings, acts of
public officers, or private deeds and contracts which otherwise would not produce
their intended consequences by reason of some statutory disability or failure to
comply with some technical requirement. They operate on conditions already
existing, and are necessarily retroactive in operation. Agpalo,42 on the other hand,
says that curative statutes are
"healing acts . . . curing defects and adding to the means of enforcing existing
obligations . . . (and) are intended to supply defects, abridge superfluities in
existing laws, and curb certain evils. . . . By their very nature, curative statutes are
retroactive . . . (and) reach back to past events to correct errors or irregularities
and to render valid and effective attempted acts which would be otherwise
ineffective for the purpose the parties intended."
On the other hand, remedial or procedural laws, i.e., those statutes relating to
remedies or modes of procedure, which do not create new or take away vested
rights, but only operate in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of such rights,
ordinarily do not come within the legal meaning of a retrospective law, nor within
the general rule against the retrospective operation of statutes.43
A reading of P.D. 725 immediately shows that it creates a new right, and also
provides for a new remedy, thereby filling certain voids in our laws. Thus, in its
preamble, P.D. 725 expressly recognizes the plight of "many Filipino women (who)
had lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens" and who could not, under
the existing law (C.A. No. 63, as amended) avail of repatriation until "after the
death of their husbands or the termination of their marital status" and who could
neither be benefitted by the 1973 Constitution's new provision allowing "a Filipino
woman who marries an alien to retain her Philippine citizenship . . ." because "such
provision of the new Constitution does not apply to Filipino women who had
married aliens before said constitution took effect." Thus, P.D. 725 granted a new
right to these women -- the right to re-acquire Filipino citizenship even during their
marital coverture, which right did not exist prior to P.D. 725. On the other hand,
said statute also provided a new remedy and a new right in favor of other "natural
born Filipinos who (had) lost their Philippine citizenship but now desire to re-
acquire Philippine citizenship", because prior to the promulgation of P.D. 725 such
former Filipinos would have had to undergo the tedious and cumbersome process
of naturalization, but with the advent of P.D. 725 they could now re-acquire their
Philippine citizenship under the simplified procedure of repatriation.
The Solicitor General44 argues:
By their very nature, curative statutes are retroactive, (DBP vs. CA, 96 SCRA 342),
since they are intended to supply defects, abridge superfluities in existing laws
(Del Castillo vs. Securities and Exchange Commission, 96 Phil. 119) and curb
certain evils (Santos vs. Duata, 14 SCRA 1041).
In this case, P.D. No. 725 was enacted to cure the defect in the existing
naturalization law, specifically C.A. No. 63 wherein married Filipino women are
allowed to repatriate only upon the death of their husbands, and natural-born
Filipinos who lost their citizenship by naturalization and other causes faced the
difficulty of undergoing the rigid procedures of C.A. 63 for reacquisition of Filipino
citizenship by naturalization.
Presidential Decree No. 725 provided a remedy for the aforementioned legal
aberrations and thus its provisions are considered essentially remedial and
curative.
In light of the foregoing, and prescinding from the wording of the preamble, it is
unarguable that the legislative intent was precisely to give the statute retroactive
operation. "(A) retrospective operation is given to a statute or amendment where
the intent that it should so operate clearly appears from a consideration of the act
as a whole, or from the terms thereof."45 It is obvious to the Court that the statute
was meant to "reach back" to those persons, events and transactions not
otherwise covered by prevailing law and jurisprudence. And inasmuch as it has
been held that citizenship is a political and civil right equally as important as the
freedom of speech, liberty of abode, the right against unreasonable searches and
seizures and other guarantees enshrined in the Bill of Rights, therefore the
legislative intent to give retrospective operation to P.D. 725 must be given the
fullest effect possible. "(I)t has been said that a remedial statute must be so
construed as to make it effect the evident purpose for which it was enacted, so that
if the reason of the statute extends to past transactions, as well as to those in the
future, then it will be so applied although the statute does not in terms so direct,
unless to do so would impair some vested right or violate some constitutional
guaranty."46 This is all the more true of P.D. 725, which did not specify any
restrictions on or delimit or qualify the right of repatriation granted therein.
At this point, a valid question may be raised: How can the retroactivity of P.D. 725
benefit Frivaldo considering that said law was enacted on June 5, 1975, while
Frivaldo lost his Filipino citizenship much later, on January 20, 1983, and applied
for repatriation even later, on August 17, 1994?
While it is true that the law was already in effect at the time that Frivaldo became
an American citizen, nevertheless, it is not only the law itself (P.D. 725) which is to
be given retroactive effect, but even the repatriation granted under said law to
Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 is to be deemed to have retroacted to the date of his
application therefor, August 17, 1994. The reason for this is simply that if, as in this
case, it was the intent of the legislative authority that the law should apply
to  past events -- i.e., situations and transactions existing even before the law
came into being -- in order to benefit the greatest number of former Filipinos
possible thereby enabling them to enjoy and exercise the constitutionally
guaranteed right of citizenship, and such legislative intention is to be given the
fullest effect and expression, then there is all the more reason to have the law
apply in a retroactive or retrospective manner to situations, events and
transactions subsequent to the passage of such law. That is, the repatriation
granted to Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 can and should be made to take effect as of
date of his application. As earlier mentioned, there is nothing in the law that would
bar this or would show a contrary intention on the part of the legislative authority;
and there is no showing that damage or prejudice to anyone, or anything unjust or
injurious would result from giving retroactivity to his repatriation. Neither has Lee
shown that there will result the impairment of any contractual obligation,
disturbance of any vested right or breach of some constitutional guaranty.
Being a former Filipino who has served the people repeatedly, Frivaldo deserves a
liberal interpretation of Philippine laws and whatever defects there were in his
nationality should now be deemed mooted by his repatriation.
Another argument for retroactivity to the date of filing is that it would prevent
prejudice to applicants. If P.D. 725 were not to be given retroactive effect, and the
Special Committee decides not to act, i.e., to delay the processing of applications
for any substantial length of time, then the former Filipinos who may be stateless,
as Frivaldo -- having already renounced his American citizenship -- was, may be
prejudiced for causes outside their control. This should not be. In case of doubt in
the interpretation or application of laws, it is to be presumed that the law-making
body intended right and justice to prevail.4 7
And as experience will show, the Special Committee was able to process, act upon
and grant applications for repatriation within relatively short spans of time after the
same were filed.48 The fact that such interregna were relatively insignificant
minimizes the likelihood of prejudice to the government as a result of giving
retroactivity to repatriation. Besides, to the mind of the Court, direct prejudice to
the government is possible only where a person's repatriation has the effect of
wiping out a liability of his to the government arising in connection with or as a
result of his being an alien, and accruing only during the interregnum between
application and approval, a situation that is not present in the instant case.
And it is but right and just that the mandate of the people, already twice frustrated,
should now prevail. Under the circumstances, there is nothing unjust or iniquitous
in treating Frivaldo's repatriation as having become effective as of the date of his
application, i.e., on August 17, 1994. This being so, all questions about his
possession of the nationality qualification -- whether at the date of proclamation
(June 30, 1995) or the date of election (May 8, 1995) or date of filing his certificate
of candidacy (March 20, 1995) would become moot.
Based on the foregoing, any question regarding Frivaldo's status as a registered
voter would also be deemed settled. Inasmuch as he is considered as having been
repatriated -- i.e., his Filipino citizenship restored -- as of August 17, 1994, his
previous registration as a voter is likewise deemed validated as of said date.
It is not disputed that on January 20, 1983 Frivaldo became an American. Would
the retroactivity of his repatriation not effectively give him dual citizenship, which
under Sec. 40 of the Local Government Code would disqualify him "from running
for any elective local position?"49 We answer this question in the negative, as there
is cogent reason to hold that Frivaldo was really STATELESS at the time he took
said oath of allegiance and even before that, when he ran for governor in 1988. In
his Comment, Frivaldo wrote that he "had long renounced and had long
abandoned his American citizenship -- long before May 8, 1995. At best, Frivaldo
was stateless in the interim -- when he abandoned and renounced his US
citizenship but before he was repatriated to his Filipino citizenship."50
On this point, we quote from the assailed Resolution dated December 19, 1995:51
By the laws of the United States, petitioner Frivaldo lost his American citizenship
when he took his oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government when he ran for
Governor in 1988, in 1992, and in 1995. Every certificate of candidacy contains an
oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government."
These factual findings that Frivaldo has lost his foreign nationality long before the
elections of 1995 have not been effectively rebutted by Lee. Furthermore, it is
basic that such findings of the Commission are conclusive upon this Court, absent
any showing of capriciousness or arbitrariness or
abuse.52
The Second Issue:  Is Lack of Citizenship
a Continuing Disqualification?
Lee contends that the May 1, 1995 Resolution 53 of the Comelec Second Division
in SPA No. 95-028 as affirmed in toto by Comelec En Banc in its Resolution of
May 11, 1995 "became final and executory after five (5) days or on May 17, 1995,
no restraining order having been issued by this Honorable Court.54 Hence, before
Lee "was proclaimed as the elected governor on June 30, 1995, there was already
a final and executory judgment disqualifying" Frivaldo. Lee adds that this Court's
two rulings (which Frivaldo now concedes were legally "correct") declaring Frivaldo
an alien have also become final and executory way before the 1995 elections, and
these "judicial pronouncements of his political status as an American citizen
absolutely and for all time disqualified (him) from running for, and holding any
public office in the Philippines."
We do not agree.
It should be noted that our first ruling in G.R. No. 87193 disqualifying Frivaldo was
rendered in connection with the 1988 elections while that in G.R. No. 104654 was
in connection with the 1992 elections. That he was disqualified for such elections is
final and can no longer be changed. In the words of the respondent Commission
(Second Division) in its assailed Resolution:55
The records show that the Honorable Supreme Court had decided that Frivaldo
was not a Filipino citizen and thus disqualified for the purpose of the 1988 and
1992 elections. However, there is no record of any "final judgment" of the
disqualification of Frivaldo as a candidate for the May 8, 1995 elections. What the
Commission said in its Order of June 21, 1995 (implemented on June 30, 1995),
directing the proclamation of Raul R. Lee, was that Frivaldo was not a Filipino
citizen "having been declared by the Supreme Court in its Order dated March 25,
1995, not a citizen of the Philippines." This declaration of the Supreme Court,
however, was in connection with the 1992 elections.
Indeed, decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of citizenship cannot govern a
person's future status with finality. This is because a person may subsequently
reacquire, or for that matter lose, his citizenship under any of the modes
recognized by law for the purpose. Hence, in Lee vs. Commissioner of
Immigration,56 we held:
Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or
administrative case, whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority
decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered res judicata,
hence it has to be threshed out again and again, as the occasion demands.
The Third Issue: Comelec's Jurisdiction
Over The Petition in SPC No. 95-317
Lee also avers that respondent Comelec had no jurisdiction to entertain the
petition in SPC No. 95-317 because the only "possible types of proceedings that
may be entertained by the Comelec are a pre-proclamation case, an election
protest or a quo warranto  case". Again, Lee reminds us that he was proclaimed on
June 30, 1995 but that Frivaldo filed SPC No. 95-317 questioning his (Lee's)
proclamation only on July 6, 1995 -- "beyond the 5-day reglementary period."
Hence, according to him, Frivaldo's "recourse was to file either an election protest
or a quo warranto action."
This argument is not meritorious. The Constitution57 has given the Comelec ample
power to "exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the
elections, returns and qualifications of all elective . . . provincial . . . officials."
Instead of dwelling at length on the various petitions that Comelec, in the exercise
of its constitutional prerogatives, may entertain, suffice it to say that this Court has
invariably recognized the Commission's authority to hear and decide petitions for
annulment of proclamations -- of which SPC No. 95-317 obviously is one.58 Thus,
in Mentang vs. COMELEC,59 we ruled:
The petitioner argues that after proclamation and assumption of office, a pre-
proclamation controversy is no longer viable. Indeed, we are aware of cases
holding that pre-proclamation controversies may no longer be entertained by the
COMELEC after the winning candidate has been proclaimed. (citing  Gallardo vs.
Rimando, 187 SCRA 463; Salvacion vs. COMELEC, 170 SCRA 513; Casimiro vs.
COMELEC, 171 SCRA 468.) This rule, however, is premised on an assumption
that the proclamation is no proclamation at all and the proclaimed candidate's
assumption of office cannot deprive the COMELEC of the power to make such
declaration of nullity. (citing  Aguam vs. COMELEC, 23 SCRA 883; Agbayani vs.
COMELEC, 186 SCRA 484.)
The Court however cautioned that such power to annul a proclamation must "be
done within ten (10) days following the proclamation." Inasmuch as Frivaldo's
petition was filed only six (6) days after Lee's proclamation, there is no question
that the Comelec correctly acquired jurisdiction over the same.
The Fourth Issue: Was Lee's Proclamation Valid?
Frivaldo assails the validity of the Lee proclamation. We uphold him for the
following reasons:
First. To paraphrase this Court in Labo vs. COMELEC,60 "the fact remains that he
(Lee) was not the choice of the sovereign will," and in Aquino vs. COMELEC,61 Lee
is "a second placer, . . . just that, a second placer."
In spite of this, Lee anchors his claim to the governorship on the pronouncement of
this Court in the aforesaid Labo62 case, as follows:
The rule would have been different if the electorate fully aware in fact and in law of
a candidate's disqualification so as to bring such awareness within the realm of
notoriety, would nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible candidate. In
such case, the electorate may be said to have waived the validity and efficacy of
their votes by notoriously misapplying their franchise or throwing away their votes,
in which case, the eligible candidate obtaining the next higher number of votes
may be deemed elected.
But such holding is qualified by the next paragraph, thus:
But this is not the situation obtaining in the instant dispute. It has not been shown,
and none was alleged, that petitioner Labo was notoriously known as an ineligible
candidate, much less the electorate as having known of such fact. On the contrary,
petitioner Labo was even allowed by no less than the Comelec itself in its
resolution dated May 10, 1992 to be voted for the office of the city Payor as its
resolution dated May 9, 1992 denying due course to petitioner Labo's certificate of
candidacy had not yet become final and subject to the final outcome of this case.
The last-quoted paragraph in Labo, unfortunately for Lee, is the ruling appropriate
in this case because Frivaldo was in 1995 in an identical situation as Labo was in
1992 when the Comelec's cancellation of his certificate of candidacy was not yet
final on election day as there was in both cases a pending motion for
reconsideration, for which reason Comelec issued an (omnibus) resolution
declaring that Frivaldo (like Labo in 1992) and several others can still be voted for
in the May 8, 1995 election, as in fact, he was.
Furthermore, there has been no sufficient evidence presented to show that the
electorate of Sorsogon was "fully aware in fact and in law" of Frivaldo's alleged
disqualification as to "bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety;" in other
words, that the voters intentionally wasted their ballots knowing that, in spite of
their voting for him, he was ineligible. If Labo has any relevance at all, it is that the
vice-governor -- and not Lee -- should be pro- claimed, since in losing the election,
Lee was, to paraphrase Labo again, "obviously not the choice of the people" of
Sorsogon. This is the emphatic teaching of Labo:
The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does
not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be
declared elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to
the office.
Second. As we have earlier declared Frivaldo to have seasonably reacquired his
citizenship and inasmuch as he obtained the highest number of votes in the 1995
elections, he -- not Lee -- should be proclaimed. Hence, Lee's proclamation was
patently erroneous and should now be corrected.
The Fifth Issue:  Is Section 78 of the
Election Code Mandatory?
In G.R. No. 120295, Frivaldo claims that the assailed Resolution of the Comelec
(Second Division) dated May 1, 1995 and the confirmatory en banc Resolution of
May 11, 1995 disqualifying him for want of citizenship should be annulled because
they were rendered beyond the fifteen (15) day period prescribed by Section 78, of
the Omnibus Election Code which reads as follows:
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy. -- A
verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy
may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material
representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The
petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the
filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided after notice and
hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election. (Emphasis supplied.)
This claim is now moot and academic inasmuch as these resolutions are deemed
superseded by the subsequent ones issued by the Commission (First Division) on
December 19, 1995, affirmed en banc63 on February 23, 1996; which both upheld
his election. At any rate, it is obvious that Section 78 is merely directory as Section
6 of R.A. No. 6646 authorizes the Commission to try and decide petitions for
disqualifications even after the elections, thus:
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. -- Any candidate who has been declared by
final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him
shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final
judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the
winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue
with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and upon motion of the
complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the
suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his
guilt is strong. (emphasis supplied)
Refutation of
Mr.  Justice Davide's Dissent
In his dissenting opinion, the esteemed Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. argues
that President Aquino's memorandum dated March 27, 1987 should be viewed as
a suspension (not a repeal, as urged by Lee) of P.D. 725. But whether it decrees a
suspension or a repeal is a purely academic distinction because the said issuance
is not a statute that can amend or abrogate an existing law.
The existence and subsistence of P.D. 725 were recognized in the first Frivaldo
case;64 viz., "(u)nder CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and P.D. No. 725,
Philippine citizenship maybe reacquired by . . . repatriation". He also contends that
by allowing Frivaldo to register and to remain as a registered voter, the Comelec
and in effect this Court abetted a "mockery" of our two previous judgments
declaring him a non-citizen. We do not see such abetting or mockery. The
retroactivity of his repatriation, as discussed earlier, legally cured whatever defects
there may have been in his registration as a voter for the purpose of the 1995
elections. Such retroactivity did not change his disqualifications in 1988 and 1992,
which were the subjects of such previous rulings.
Mr. Justice Davide also believes that Quo Warranto is not the sole remedy to
question the ineligibility of a candidate, citing the Comelec's authority under
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code allowing the denial of a certificate of
candidacy on the ground of a false material representation therein as required by
Section 74. Citing Loong, he then states his disagreement with our holding that
Section 78 is merely directory. We really have no quarrel. Our point is that Frivaldo
was in error in his claim in G.R. No. 120295 that the Comelec Resolutions
promulgated on May 1, 1995 and May 11, 1995 were invalid because they were
issued "not later than fifteen days before the election" as prescribed by Section 78.
In dismissing the petition in G.R. No. 120295, we hold that the Comelec did not
commit grave abuse of discretion because "Section 6 of R.A. 6646 authorizes the
Comelec to try and decide disqualifications even after the elections." In spite of his
disagreement with us on this point, i.e., that Section 78 "is merely directory", we
note that just like us, Mr. Justice Davide nonetheless votes to "DISMISS G.R. No.
120295". One other point. Loong, as quoted in the dissent, teaches that a petition
to deny due course under Section 78 must be filed within the 25-day  period
prescribed therein. The present case however deals with the period during which
the Comelec may decide such petition. And we hold that it may be decided even
after the  fifteen day period mentioned in Section 78. Here, we rule that a
decision promulgated by the Comelec even after the elections is valid
but Loong held that a petition filed beyond the 25-day period is out of time. There
is no inconsistency nor conflict.
Mr. Justice Davide also disagrees with the Court's holding that, given the unique
factual circumstances of Frivaldo, repatriation may be given retroactive effect. He
argues that such retroactivity "dilutes" our holding in the first Frivaldo case. But the
first (and even the second Frivaldo) decision did not directly involve repatriation as
a mode of acquiring citizenship. If we may repeat, there is no question that
Frivaldo was not a Filipino for purposes of determining his qualifications in the
1988 and 1992 elections. That is settled. But his supervening repatriation has
changed his political status -- not in 1988 or 1992, but only in the 1995 elections.
Our learned colleague also disputes our holding that Frivaldo was stateless prior to
his repatriation, saying that "informal renunciation or abandonment is not a ground
to lose American citizenship". Since our courts are charged only with the duty of
determining who are Philippine nationals, we cannot rule on the legal question of
who are or who are not Americans. It is basic in international law that a State
determines ONLY those who are its own citizens -- not who are the citizens of
other countries.65 The issue here is: the Comelec made a finding of fact that
Frivaldo was stateless and such finding has not been shown by Lee to be arbitrary
or whimsical. Thus, following settled case law, such finding is binding and final.
The dissenting opinion also submits that Lee who lost by chasmic margins to
Frivaldo in all three previous elections, should be declared winner because
"Frivaldo's ineligibility for being an American was publicly known". First, there is
absolutely no empirical evidence for such "public" knowledge. Second, even if
there is, such knowledge can be true  post facto only of the last two previous
elections. Third, even the Comelec and now this Court were/are still deliberating
on his nationality before, during and after the 1995 elections. How then can there
be such "public" knowledge?
Mr. Justice Davide submits that Section 39 of the Local Government Code refers
to the qualifications of elective local officials, i.e., candidates, and
not elected officials, and that the citizenship qualification [under par. (a) of that
section] must be possessed by candidates, not merely at the commencement of
the term, but by election day at the latest. We see it differently. Section 39, par. (a)
thereof speaks of "elective local official" while par. (b) to (f) refer to "candidates". If
the qualifications under par. (a) were intended to apply to "candidates" and not
elected officials, the legislature would have said so, instead of differentiating par.
(a) from the rest of the paragraphs. Secondly, if Congress had meant that the
citizenship qualification should be possessed at election day or prior thereto, it
would have specifically stated such detail, the same way it did in pars. (b) to (f) far
other qualifications of candidates for governor, mayor, etc.
Mr. Justice Davide also questions the giving of retroactive effect to Frivaldo's
repatriation on the ground, among others, that the law specifically provides that it is
only after taking the oath of allegiance that applicants shall be deemed to have
reacquired Philippine citizenship. We do not question what the provision states.
We hold however that the provision should be understood thus: that after taking
the oath of allegiance the applicant is deemed to have reacquired Philippine
citizenship, which reacquisition (or repatriation) is deemed for all purposes and
intents to have retroacted to the date of his application therefor.
In any event, our "so too" argument regarding the literal meaning of the word
"elective" in reference to Section 39 of the Local Authority Code, as well as
regarding Mr. Justice Davide's thesis that the very wordings of P.D. 725 suggest
non-retroactivity, were already taken up rather extensively earlier in this Decision.
Mr. Justice Davide caps his paper with a clarion call: "This Court must be the first
to uphold the Rule of Law." We agree -- we must all follow the rule of law. But that
is NOT the issue here. The issue is how should the law be interpreted and applied
in this case so it can be followed, so it can rule!
At balance, the question really boils down to a choice of philosophy and perception
of how to interpret and apply laws relating to elections: literal or liberal; the letter or
the spirit, the naked provision or its ultimate purpose; legal syllogism or substantial
justice; in isolation or in the context of social conditions; harshly against or gently in
favor of the voters' obvious choice. In applying election laws, it would be far better
to err in favor of popular sovereignty than to be right in complex but little
understood legalisms. Indeed, to inflict a thrice rejected candidate upon the
electorate of Sorsogon would constitute unmitigated judicial tyranny and an
unacceptable assault upon this Court's conscience.
EPILOGUE
In sum, we rule that the citizenship requirement in the Local Government Code is
to be possessed by an elective official at the latest as of the time he is
proclaimed and at the start of the term of office to which he has been elected. We
further hold P.D. No. 725 to be in full force and effect up to the present, not having
been suspended or repealed expressly nor impliedly at any time, and Frivaldo's
repatriation by virtue thereof to have been properly granted and thus valid and
effective. Moreover, by reason of the remedial or curative nature of the law
granting him a new right to resume his political status and the legislative intent
behind it, as well as his unique situation of having been forced to give up his
citizenship and political aspiration as his means of escaping a regime he abhorred,
his repatriation is to be given retroactive effect as of the date of his application
therefor, during the pendency of which he was stateless, he having given up his
U.S. nationality. Thus, in contemplation of law, he possessed the vital requirement
of Filipino citizenship as of the start of the term of office of governor, and should
have been proclaimed instead of Lee. Furthermore, since his reacquisition of
citizenship retroacted to August 17, 1994, his registration as a voter of Sorsogon is
deemed to have been validated as of said date as well. The foregoing, of course,
are precisely consistent with our holding that lack of the citizenship requirement is
not a continuing disability or disqualification to run for and hold public office. And
once again, we emphasize herein our previous rulings recognizing the Comelec's
authority and jurisdiction to hear and decide petitions for annulment of
proclamations.
This Court has time and again liberally and equitably construed the electoral laws
of our country to give fullest effect to the manifest will of our people,66 for in case of
doubt, political laws must be interpreted to give life and spirit to the popular
mandate freely expressed through the ballot. Otherwise stated, legal niceties and
technicalities cannot stand in the way of the sovereign will. Consistently, we have
held:
. . . (L)aws governing election contests must be liberally construed to the end that
the will of the people in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by mere
technical objections (citations omitted).67
The law and the courts must accord Frivaldo every possible protection, defense
and refuge, in deference to the popular will. Indeed, this Court has repeatedly
stressed the importance of giving effect to the sovereign will in order to ensure the
survival of our democracy. In any action involving the possibility of a reversal of the
popular electoral choice, this Court must exert utmost effort to resolve the issues in
a manner that would give effect to the will of the majority, for it is merely sound
public policy to cause elective offices to be filled by those who are the choice of the
majority. To successfully challenge a winning candidate's qualifications, the
petitioner must clearly demonstrate that the ineligibility is so patently
antagonistic68 to constitutional and legal principles that overriding such ineligibility
and thereby giving effect to the apparent will of the people, would ultimately create
greater prejudice to the very democratic institutions and juristic traditions that our
Constitution and laws so zealously protect and promote. In this undertaking, Lee
has miserably failed.
In Frivaldo's case. it would have been technically easy to find fault with his cause.
The Court could have refused to grant retroactivity to the effects of his repatriation
and hold him still ineligible due to his failure to show his citizenship at the time he
registered as a voter before the 1995 elections. Or, it could have disputed the
factual findings of the Comelec that he was stateless at the time of repatriation and
thus hold his consequent dual citizenship as a disqualification "from running for
any elective local position." But the real essence of justice does not emanate from
quibblings over patchwork legal technicality. It proceeds from the spirit's gut
consciousness of the dynamic role of law as a brick in the ultimate development of
the social edifice. Thus, the Court struggled against and eschewed the easy,
legalistic, technical and sometimes harsh anachronisms of the law in order to
evoke substantial justice in the larger social context consistent with Frivaldo's
unique situation approximating venerability in Philippine political life. Concededly,
he sought American citizenship only to escape the clutches of the dictatorship. At
this stage, we cannot seriously entertain any doubt about his loyalty and dedication
to this country. At the first opportunity, he returned to this land, and sought to serve
his people once more. The people of Sorsogon overwhelmingly voted for him three
times. He took an oath of allegiance to this Republic every time he filed his
certificate of candidacy and during his failed naturalization bid. And let it not be
overlooked, his demonstrated tenacity and sheer determination to re-assume his
nationality of birth despite several legal set-backs speak more loudly, in spirit, in
fact and in truth than any legal technicality, of his consuming intention and burning
desire to re-embrace his native Philippines even now at the ripe old age of 81
years. Such loyalty to and love of country as well as nobility of purpose cannot be
lost on this Court of justice and equity. Mortals of lesser mettle would have given
up. After all, Frivaldo was assured of a life of ease and plenty as a citizen of the
most powerful country in the world. But he opted, nay, single-mindedly insisted on
returning to and serving once more his struggling but beloved land of birth. He
therefore deserves every liberal interpretation of the law which can be applied in
his favor. And in the final analysis, over and above Frivaldo himself, the
indomitable people of Sorsogon most certainly deserve to be governed by a leader
of their overwhelming choice.
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing:
(1) The petition in G.R. No. 123755 is hereby DISMISSED. The assailed
Resolutions of the respondent Commission are AFFIRMED.
(2) The petition in G.R. No. 120295 is also DISMISSED for being moot and
academic. In any event, it has no merit.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 135083 May 26, 1999
ERNESTO S. MERCADO, petitioner,
vs.
EDUARDO BARRIOS MANZANO and the COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, respondents.
 
MENDOZA, J.:
Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent Eduardo B. Manzano were
candidates for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. The
other one was Gabriel V. Daza III. The results of the election were as follows:
Eduardo B. Manzano 103,853
Ernesto S. Mercado 100,894
Gabriel V. Daza III 54,2751
The proclamation of private respondent was suspended in view of a pending
petition for disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that
private respondent was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States.
In its resolution, dated May 7, 1998,2 the Second Division of the COMELEC
granted the petition of Mamaril and ordered the cancellation of the certificate of
candidacy of private respondent on the ground that he is a dual citizen and, under
§40(d) of the Local Government Code, persons with dual citizenship are
disqualified from running for any elective position. The COMELEC's Second
Division said:
What is presented before the Commission is a petition for disqualification of
Eduardo Barrios Manzano as candidate for the office of Vice-Mayor of Makati City
in the May 11, 1998 elections. The petition is based on the ground that the
respondent is an American citizen based on the record of the Bureau of
Immigration and misrepresented himself as a natural-born Filipino citizen.
In his answer to the petition filed on April 27, 1998, the respondent admitted that
he is registered as a foreigner with the Bureau of Immigration under Alien
Certificate of Registration No. B-31632 and alleged that he is a Filipino citizen
because he was born in 1955 of a Filipino father and a Filipino mother. He was
born in the United States, San Francisco, California, September 14, 1955, and is
considered in American citizen under US Laws. But notwithstanding his
registration as an American citizen, he did not lose his Filipino citizenship.
Judging from the foregoing facts, it would appear that respondent Manzano is born
a Filipino and a US citizen. In other words, he holds dual citizenship.
The question presented is whether under our laws, he is disqualified from the
position for which he filed his certificate of candidacy. Is he eligible for the office he
seeks to be elected?
Under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code, those holding dual citizenship
are disqualified from running for any elective local position.
WHEREFORE, the Commission hereby declares the respondent Eduardo Barrios
Manzano DISQUALIFIED as candidate for Vice-Mayor of Makati City.
On May 8, 1998, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration.3 The motion
remained pending even until after the election held on May 11, 1998.
Accordingly, pursuant to Omnibus Resolution No. 3044, dated May 10, 1998, of
the COMELEC, the board of canvassers tabulated the votes cast for vice mayor of
Makati City but suspended the proclamation of the winner.
On May 19, 1998, petitioner sought to intervene in the case for
disqualification.4 Petitioner's motion was opposed by private respondent.
The motion was not resolved. Instead, on August 31, 1998, the COMELEC en
banc rendered its resolution. Voting 4 to 1, with one commissioner abstaining, the
COMELEC en banc reversed the ruling of its Second Division and declared private
respondent qualified to run for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998
elections.5 The pertinent portions of the resolution of the COMELEC en banc read:
As aforesaid, respondent Eduardo Barrios Manzano was born in San Francisco,
California, U.S.A. He acquired US citizenship by operation of the United States
Constitution and laws under the principle of  jus soli.
He was also a natural born Filipino citizen by operation of the 1935 Philippine
Constitution, as his father and mother were Filipinos at the time of his birth. At the
age of six (6), his parents brought him to the Philippines using an American
passport as travel document. His parents also registered him as an alien with the
Philippine Bureau of Immigration. He was issued an alien certificate of registration.
This, however, did not result in the loss of his Philippine citizenship, as he did not
renounce Philippine citizenship and did not take an oath of allegiance to the United
States.
It is an undisputed fact that when respondent attained the age of majority, he
registered himself as a voter, and voted in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998,
which effectively renounced his US citizenship under American law. Under
Philippine law, he no longer had U.S. citizenship.
At the time of the May 11, 1998 elections, the resolution of the Second Division,
adopted on May 7, 1998, was not yet final. Respondent Manzano obtained the
highest number of votes among the candidates for vice-mayor of Makati City,
garnering one hundred three thousand eight hundred fifty three (103,853) votes
over his closest rival, Ernesto S. Mercado, who obtained one hundred thousand
eight hundred ninety four (100,894) votes, or a margin of two thousand nine
hundred fifty nine (2,959) votes. Gabriel Daza III obtained third place with fifty four
thousand two hundred seventy five (54,275) votes. In applying election laws, it
would be far better to err in favor of the popular choice than be embroiled in
complex legal issues involving private international law which may well be settled
before the highest court (Cf. Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections, 257 SCRA
727).
WHEREFORE, the Commission en banc  hereby REVERSES the resolution of the
Second Division, adopted on May 7, 1998, ordering the cancellation of the
respondent's certificate of candidacy.
We declare respondent Eduardo Luis Barrios Manzano to be QUALIFIED as a
candidate for the position of vice-mayor of Makati City in the May 11, 1998,
elections.
ACCORDINGLY, the Commission directs the Makati City Board of Canvassers,
upon proper notice to the parties, to reconvene and proclaim the respondent
Eduardo Luis Barrios Manzano as the winning candidate for vice-mayor of Makati
City.
Pursuant to the resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the board of canvassers, on
the evening of August 31, 1998, proclaimed private respondent as vice mayor of
the City of Makati.
This is a petition for certiorari seeking to set aside the aforesaid resolution of the
COMELEC en banc  and to declare private respondent disqualified to hold the
office of vice mayor of Makati City. Petitioner contends that —
[T]he COMELEC en banc ERRED in holding that:
A. Under Philippine law, Manzano was no longer a U.S. citizen when he:
1. He renounced his U.S. citizenship when he attained the age of majority when he
was already 37 years old; and,
2. He renounced his U.S. citizenship when he (merely) registered himself as a
voter and voted in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998.
B. Manzano is qualified to run for and or hold the elective office of Vice-Mayor of
the City of Makati;
C. At the time of the May 11, 1998 elections, the resolution of the Second Division
adopted on 7 May 1998 was not yet final so that, effectively, petitioner may not be
declared the winner even assuming that Manzano is disqualified to run for and
hold the elective office of Vice-Mayor of the City of Makati.
We first consider the threshold procedural issue raised by private respondent
Manzano — whether petitioner Mercado his personality to bring this suit
considering that he was not an original party in the case for disqualification filed by
Ernesto Mamaril nor was petitioner's motion for leave to intervene granted.
I. PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO BRING THIS SUIT
Private respondent cites the following provisions of Rule 8 of the Rules of
Procedure of the COMELEC in support of his claim that petitioner has no right to
intervene and, therefore, cannot bring this suit to set aside the ruling denying his
motion for intervention:
Sec. 1. When proper and when may be permitted to intervene. — Any person
allowed to initiate an action or proceeding may, before or during the trial of an
action or proceeding, be permitted by the Commission, in its discretion to intervene
in such action or proceeding, if he has legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in
the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or when he is so
situated as to be adversely affected by such action or proceeding.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 3. Discretion of Commission. — In allowing or disallowing a motion for
intervention, the Commission or the Division, in the exercise of its discretion, shall
consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the
adjudication of the rights of the original parties and whether or not the intervenor's
rights may be fully protected in a separate action or proceeding.
Private respondent argues that petitioner has neither legal interest in the matter in
litigation nor an interest to protect because he is "a defeated candidate for the vice-
mayoralty post of Makati City [who] cannot be proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of
Makati City if the private respondent be ultimately disqualified by final and
executory judgment."
The flaw in this argument is it assumes that, at the time petitioner sought to
intervene in the proceedings before the COMELEC, there had already been a
proclamation of the results of the election for the vice mayoralty contest for Makati
City, on the basis of which petitioner came out only second to private respondent.
The fact, however, is that there had been no proclamation at that time. Certainly,
petitioner had, and still has, an interest in ousting private respondent from the race
at the time he sought to intervene. The rule in Labo v. COMELEC,6 reiterated in
several cases,7 only applies to cases in which the election of the respondent is
contested, and the question is whether one who placed second to the disqualified
candidate may be declared the winner. In the present case, at the time petitioner
filed a "Motion for Leave to File Intervention" on May 20, 1998, there had been no
proclamation of the winner, and petitioner's purpose was precisely to have private
respondent disqualified "from running for [an] elective local position" under §40(d)
of R.A. No. 7160. If Ernesto Mamaril (who originally instituted the disqualification
proceedings), a registered voter of Makati City, was competent to bring the action,
so was petitioner since the latter was a rival candidate for vice mayor of Makati
City.
Nor is petitioner's interest in the matter in litigation any less because he filed a
motion for intervention only on May 20, 1998, after private respondent had been
shown to have garnered the highest number of votes among the candidates for
vice mayor. That petitioner had a right to intervene at that stage of the proceedings
for the disqualification against private respondent is clear from §6 of R.A. No.
6646, otherwise known as the Electoral Reform Law of 1987, which provides:
Any candidate who his been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not
be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a
candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified
and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the
Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of action, inquiry, or
protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the
pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate
whenever the evidence of guilt is strong.
Under this provision, intervention may be allowed in proceedings for
disqualification even after election if there has yet been no final judgment
rendered.
The failure of the COMELEC en banc  to resolve petitioner's motion for intervention
was tantamount to a denial of the motion, justifying petitioner in filing the instant
petition for certiorari. As the COMELEC en banc instead decided the merits of the
case, the present petition properly deals not only with the denial of petitioner's
motion for intervention but also with the substantive issues respecting private
respondent's alleged disqualification on the ground of dual citizenship.
This brings us to the next question, namely, whether private respondent Manzano
possesses dual citizenship and, if so, whether he is disqualified from being a
candidate for vice mayor of Makati City.
II. DUAL CITIZENSHIP AS A GROUND FOR DISQUALIFICATION
The disqualification of private respondent Manzano is being sought under §40 of
the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), which declares as
"disqualified from running for any elective local position: . . . (d) Those with dual
citizenship." This provision is incorporated in the Charter of the City of Makati. 8
Invoking the maxim dura lex sed lex, petitioner, as well as the Solicitor General,
who sides with him in this case, contends that through §40(d) of the Local
Government Code, Congress has "command[ed] in explicit terms the ineligibility of
persons possessing dual allegiance to hold local elective office."
To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises
when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more
states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states.9 For
instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of
a state which adheres to the principle of  jus sanguinis is born in a state which
follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary
act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states. Considering the
citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the following
classes of citizens of the Philippines to possess dual citizenship:
(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow
the principle of jus soli;
(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws
of their father's' country such children are citizens of that country;
(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter's country the former are
considered citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have
renounced Philippine citizenship.
There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Philippines may, without
performing any act, be also a citizen of another state; but the above cases are
clearly possible given the constitutional provisions on citizenship.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person
simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While
dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individual's
volition.
With respect to dual allegiance, Article IV, §5 of the Constitution provides: "Dual
allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by
law." This provision was included in the 1987 Constitution at the instance of
Commissioner Blas F. Ople who explained its necessity as follows: 10
. . . I want to draw attention to the fact that dual allegiance is not dual citizenship. I
have circulated a memorandum to the Bernas Committee according to which a
dual allegiance — and I reiterate a dual allegiance — is larger and more
threatening than that of mere double citizenship which is seldom intentional and,
perhaps, never insidious. That is often a function of the accident of mixed
marriages or of birth on foreign soil. And so, I do not question double citizenship at
all.
What we would like the Committee to consider is to take constitutional cognizance
of the problem of dual allegiance. For example, we all know what happens in the
triennial elections of the Federation of Filipino-Chinese Chambers of Commerce
which consists of about 600 chapters all over the country. There is a Peking ticket,
as well as a Taipei ticket. Not widely known is the fact chat the Filipino-Chinese
community is represented in the Legislative Yuan of the Republic of China in
Taiwan. And until recently, sponsor might recall, in Mainland China in the People's
Republic of China, they have the Associated Legislative Council for overseas
Chinese wherein all of Southeast Asia including some European and Latin
countries were represented, which was dissolved after several years because of
diplomatic friction. At that time, the Filipino-Chinese were also represented in that
Overseas Council.
When I speak of double allegiance, therefore, I speak of this unsettled kind of
allegiance of Filipinos, of citizens who are already Filipinos but who, by their acts,
may be said to be bound by a second allegiance, either to Peking or Taiwan. I also
took close note of the concern expressed by some Commissioners yesterday,
including Commissioner Villacorta, who were concerned about the lack of
guarantees of thorough assimilation, and especially Commissioner Concepcion
who has always been worried about minority claims on our natural resources.
Dull allegiance can actually siphon scarce national capital to Taiwan, Singapore,
China or Malaysia, and this is already happening. Some of the great commercial
places in downtown Taipei are Filipino-owned, owned by Filipino-Chinese — it is of
common knowledge in Manila. It can mean a tragic capital outflow when we have
to endure a capital famine which also means economic stagnation, worsening
unemployment and social unrest.
And so, this is exactly what we ask — that the Committee kindly consider
incorporating a new section, probably Section 5, in the article on Citizenship which
will read as follows: DUAL ALLEGIANCE IS INIMICAL TO CITIZENSHIP AND
SHALL BE DEALT WITH ACCORDING TO LAW.
In another session of the Commission, Ople spoke on the problem of these
citizens with dual allegiance, thus: 11
. . . A significant number of Commissioners expressed their concern about dual
citizenship in the sense that it implies a double allegiance under a double
sovereignty which some of us who spoke then in a freewheeling debate thought
would be repugnant to the sovereignty which pervades the Constitution and to
citizenship itself which implies a uniqueness and which elsewhere in the
Constitution is defined in terms of rights and obligations exclusive to that
citizenship including, of course, the obligation to rise to the defense of the State
when it is threatened, and back of this, Commissioner Bernas, is, of course, the
concern for national security. In the course of those debates, I think some noted
the fact that as a result of the wave of naturalizations since the decision to
establish diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China was made in
1975, a good number of these naturalized Filipinos still routinely go to Taipei every
October 10; and it is asserted that some of them do renew their oath of allegiance
to a foreign government maybe just to enter into the spirit of the occasion when the
anniversary of the Sun Yat-Sen Republic is commemorated. And so, I have
detected a genuine and deep concern about double citizenship, with its attendant
risk of double allegiance which is repugnant to our sovereignty and national
security. I appreciate what the Committee said that this could be left to the
determination of a future legislature. But considering the scale of the problem, the
real impact on the security of this country, arising from, let us say, potentially great
numbers of double citizens professing double allegiance, will the Committee
entertain a proposed amendment at the proper time that will prohibit, in effect, or
regulate double citizenship?
Clearly, in including §5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the Constitutional
Commission was not with dual citizens per se but with naturalized citizens who
maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization.
Hence, the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. No. 7160, §40(d) and in R.A. No.
7854, §20 must be understood as referring to "dual allegiance." Consequently,
persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike
those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with
respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it
should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect
Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship
considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws
of different states. As Joaquin G. Bernas, one of the most perceptive members of
the Constitutional Commission, pointed out: "[D]ual citizenship is just a reality
imposed on us because we have no control of the laws on citizenship of other
countries. We recognize a child of a Filipino mother. But whether she is considered
a citizen of another country is something completely beyond our control." 12
By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear
allegiance to the other country of which they are also citizens and thereby
terminate their status as dual citizens. It may be that, from the point of view of the
foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has not effectively renounced his
foreign citizenship. That is of no moment as the following discussion on §40(d)
between Senators Enrile and Pimentel clearly shows: 13
SENATOR ENRILE. Mr. President, I would like to ask clarification of line 41, page
17: "Any person with dual citizenship" is disqualified to run for any elective local
position. Under the present Constitution, Mr. President, someone whose mother is
a citizen of the Philippines but his father is a foreigner is a natural-born citizen of
the Republic. There is no requirement that such a natural born citizen, upon
reaching the age of majority, must elect or give up Philippine citizenship.
On the assumption that this person would carry two passports, one belonging to
the country of his or her father and one belonging to the Republic of the
Philippines, may such a situation disqualify the person to run for a local
government position?
SENATOR PIMENTEL. To my mind, Mr. President, it only means that at the
moment when he would want to run for public office, he has to repudiate one of his
citizenships.
SENATOR ENRILE. Suppose he carries only a Philippine passport but the country
of origin or the country of the father claims that person, nevertheless, as a citizen?
No one can renounce. There are such countries in the world.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Well, the very fact that he is running for public office would,
in effect, be an election for him of his desire to be considered as a Filipino citizen.
SENATOR ENRILE. But, precisely, Mr. President, the Constitution does not
require an election. Under the Constitution, a person whose mother is a citizen of
the Philippines is, at birth, a citizen without any overt act to claim the citizenship.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Yes. What we are saying, Mr. President, is: Under the
Gentleman's example, if he does not renounce his other citizenship, then he is
opening himself to question. So, if he is really interested to run, the first thing he
should do is to say in the Certificate of Candidacy that: "I am a Filipino citizen, and
I have only one citizenship."
SENATOR ENRILE. But we are talking from the viewpoint of Philippine law, Mr.
President. He will always have one citizenship, and that is the citizenship invested
upon him or her in the Constitution of the Republic.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. That is true, Mr. President. But if he exercises acts that will
prove that he also acknowledges other citizenships, then he will probably fall under
this disqualification.
This is similar to the requirement that an applicant for naturalization must renounce
"all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or
sovereignty" 14 of which at the time he is a subject or citizen before he can be
issued a certificate of naturalization as a citizen of the Philippines. In Parado
v. Republic, 15 it was held:
[W]hen a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes an oath that he
renounce, his loyalty to any other country or government and solemnly declares
that he owes his allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, the condition
imposed by law is satisfied and compiled with. The determination whether such
renunciation is valid or fully complies with the provisions of our Naturalization Law
lies within the province and is an exclusive prerogative of our courts. The latter
should apply the law duly enacted by the legislative department of the Republic.
No foreign law may or should interfere with its operation and application. If the
requirement of the Chinese Law of Nationality were to be read into our
Naturalization Law, we would be applying not what our legislative department has
deemed it wise to require, but what a foreign government has thought or intended
to exact. That, of course, is absurd. It must be resisted by all means and at all cost.
It would be a brazen encroachment upon the sovereign will and power of the
people of this Republic.
III. PETITIONER'S ELECTION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP
The record shows that private respondent was born in San Francisco, California on
September 4, 1955, of Filipino parents. Since the Philippines adheres to the
principle of  jus sanguinis, while the United States follows the doctrine of  jus soli,
the parties agree that, at birth at least, he was a national both of the Philippines
and of the United States. However, the COMELEC en banc  held that, by
participating in Philippine elections in 1992, 1995, and 1998, private respondent
"effectively renounced his U.S. citizenship under American law," so that now he is
solely a Philippine national.
Petitioner challenges this ruling. He argues that merely taking part in Philippine
elections is not sufficient evidence of renunciation and that, in any event, as the
alleged renunciation was made when private respondent was already 37 years old,
it was ineffective as it should have been made when he reached the age of
majority.
In holding that by voting in Philippine elections private respondent renounced his
American citizenship, the COMELEC must have in mind §349 of the Immigration
and Nationality Act of the United States, which provided that "A person who is a
national of the United States, whether by birth or naturalization, shall lose his
nationality by: . . . (e) Voting in a political election in a foreign state or participating
in an election or plebiscite to determine the sovereignty over foreign territory." To
be sure this provision was declared unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court
in Afroyim v. Rusk 16 as beyond the power given to the U.S. Congress to regulate
foreign relations. However, by filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his
present post, private respondent elected Philippine citizenship and in effect
renounced his American citizenship. Private respondent's certificate of candidacy,
filed on March 27, 1998, contained the following statements made under oath:
6. I AM A FILIPINO CITIZEN (STATE IF "NATURAL-BORN" OR "NATURALIZED")
NATURAL-BORN
xxx xxx xxx
10. I AM A REGISTERED VOTER OF PRECINCT NO. 747-A, BARANGAY SAN
LORENZO, CITY/MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, PROVINCE OF NCR.
11. I AM NOT A PERMANENT RESIDENT OF, OR IMMIGRANT TO, A FOREIGN
COUNTRY.
12. I AM ELIGIBLE FOR THE OFFICE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED. I WILL
SUPPORT AND DEFEND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES AND
WILL MAINTAIN TRUE FAITH AND ALLEGIANCE THERETO; THAT I WILL
OBEY THE LAWS, LEGAL ORDERS AND DECREES PROMULGATED BY THE
DULY CONSTITUTED AUTHORITIES OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES; AND THAT I IMPOSE THIS OBLIGATION UPON MYSELF
VOLUNTARILY, WITHOUT MENTAL RESERVATION OR PURPOSE OF
EVASION. I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE FACTS STATED HEREIN ARE TRUE
AND CORRECT OF MY OWN PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE.
The filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his American
citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual
citizen. Thus, in Frivaldo v.  COMELEC it was held: 17
It is not disputed that on January 20, 1983 Frivaldo became an American. Would
the retroactivity of his repatriation not effectively give him dual citizenship, which
under Sec. 40 of the Local Government Code would disqualify him "from running
for any elective local position?" We answer this question in the negative, as there
is cogent reason to hold that Frivaldo was really STATELESS at the time he took
said oath of allegiance and even before that, when he ran for governor in 1988. In
his Comment, Frivaldo wrote that he "had long renounced and had long
abandoned his American citizenship — long before May 8, 1995. At best, Frivaldo
was stateless in the interim — when he abandoned and renounced his US
citizenship but before he was repatriated to his Filipino citizenship."
On this point, we quote from the assailed Resolution dated December 19, 1995:
By the laws of the United States, petitioner Frivaldo lost his American citizenship
when he took his oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government when he ran for
Governor in 1988, in 1992, and in 1995. Every certificate of candidacy contains an
oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government.
These factual findings that Frivaldo has lost his foreign nationality long before the
elections of 1995 have not been effectively rebutted by Lee. Furthermore, it is
basic that such findings of the Commission are conclusive upon this Court, absent
any showing of capriciousness or arbitrariness or abuse.
There is, therefore, no merit in petitioner's contention that the oath of allegiance
contained in private respondent's certificate of candidacy is insufficient to
constitute renunciation that, to be effective, such renunciation should have been
made upon private respondent reaching the age of majority since no law requires
the election of Philippine citizenship to be made upon majority age.
Finally, much is made of the fact that private respondent admitted that he is
registered as an American citizen in the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation
and that he holds an American passport which he used in his last travel to the
United States on April 22, 1997. There is no merit in this. Until the filing of his
certificate of candidacy on March 21, 1998, he had dual citizenship. The acts
attributed to him can be considered simply as the assertion of his American
nationality before the termination of his American citizenship. What this Court said
in Aznar v. COMELEC  18 applies mutatis mundatis to private respondent in the
case at bar:
. . . Considering the fact that admittedly Osmeña was both a Filipino and an
American, the mere fact that he has a Certificate staring he is an American does
not mean that he is not still a Filipino. . . . [T]he Certification that he is an American
does not mean that he is not still a Filipino, possessed as he is, of both
nationalities or citizenships. Indeed, there is no express renunciation here of
Philippine citizenship; truth to tell, there is even no implied renunciation of said
citizenship. When We consider that the renunciation needed to lose Philippine
citizenship must be "express," it stands to reason that there can be no such loss of
Philippine citizenship when there is no renunciation, either "express" or "implied."
To recapitulate, by declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino
citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he
will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and
allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private
respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively
repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said before
as a dual citizen.
On the other hand, private respondent's oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when
considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his
education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in
this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.
His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made
under oath. Should he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring
the loss of his Philippine citizenship through expatriation in appropriate
proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, 19 we sustained the denial of entry into
the country of petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as a naturalized
citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared in
commercial documents executed abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A
similar sanction can be taken against any one who, in electing Philippine
citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality, but subsequently does some act
constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 180048               June 19, 2009
ROSELLER DE GUZMAN, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ANGELINA DG. DELA CRUZ, Respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition1 for certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction and temporary
restraining order assails the June 15, 2007 Resolution2 of the First Division of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in SPA No. 07-211, disqualifying petitioner
Roseller De Guzman from running as vice-mayor in the May 14, 2007
Synchronized National and Local Elections. Also assailed is the October 9, 2007
Resolution3 of the COMELEC En Banc denying petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.
Petitioner De Guzman and private respondent Angelina DG. Dela Cruz were
candidates for vice-mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija in the May 14, 2007 elections.
On April 3, 2007, private respondent filed against petitioner a petition4 for
disqualification docketed as SPA No. 07-211, alleging that petitioner is not a citizen
of the Philippines, but an immigrant and resident of the United States of America.
In his answer, petitioner admitted that he was a naturalized American. However,
on January 25, 2006, he applied for dual citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225
(R.A. No. 9225), otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition
Act of 2003.5 Upon approval of his application, he took his oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines on September 6, 2006. He argued that, having re-
acquired Philippine citizenship, he is entitled to exercise full civil and political
rights. As such, he is qualified to run as vice-mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija.
During the May 14, 2007 elections, private respondent won as vice-mayor.
Petitioner filed an election protest on grounds of irregularities and massive
cheating. The case was filed before Branch 31 of the Regional Trial Court of
Guimba, Nueva Ecija and was docketed as Election Protest No. 07-01.
Meanwhile, in SPA No. 07-211, the COMELEC First Division rendered its June 15,
2007 Resolution disqualifying petitioner, which reads as follows:
Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225 states:
"Retention of Philippine Citizenship. – Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who
have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of
a foreign country are hereby deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship
upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic: x x x"
Hence, under the provisions of the aforementioned law, respondent has validly
reacquired Filipino citizenship. By taking this Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines on September 6, 2006 before Mary Jo Bernardo Aragon, Deputy
Consul General at the Philippine Consulate General, Los Angeles, California
respondent was deemed a dual citizen, possessing both Filipino and American
citizenship.
However, subparagraph (2), Section 5 of the aforementioned Act also provides:
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities -- Those who retain or re-acquire
Philippine Citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be
subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the
Philippines and the following conditions:
xxxx
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the
qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and
existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any
public officer authorized to administer an oath.
As can be gleaned from the above cited provision, respondent [herein petitioner]
should have renounced his American citizenship before he can run for any public
elective position. This respondent did not do. The Oath of Allegiance taken by
respondent was for the purpose of re-acquiring Philippine citizenship. It did not, at
the same time, mean that respondent has renounced his American citizenship.
Thus, at the time respondent filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of
Vice-Mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija he was, and still is, a dual citizen, possessing
both Philippine and American citizenship. For this reason alone, respondent is
disqualified to run for the abovementioned elective position.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission (First Division) RESOLVED,
as it hereby RESOLVES, to GRANT the instant petition finding it IMBUED WITH
MERIT. Hence, respondent (petitioner herein) Roseller T. De Guzman is
disqualified to run as Vice-Mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija in the May 14, 2007
Synchronized National and Local Elections.6
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was dismissed on October 9,
2007 by the COMELEC En Banc for having been rendered moot in view of private
respondent’s victory.
Thereafter, the trial court in Election Protest No. 07-01 rendered a Decision,7 dated
November 26, 2007, declaring petitioner as the winner for the Vice-Mayoralty
position. It held:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring protestant ROSELLER T.
DE GUZMAN, as the winner for the Vice-Mayoralty position with a plurality of 776
votes over the protestee, ANGELINA D.G. DELA CRUZ, in the May 14, 2007 Local
Elections in Guimba, Nueva Ecija. With costs against the protestee.
There being no evidence presented as to the damages by both parties, the same
are hereby denied.
SO ORDERED.8
Petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari, alleging that the COMELEC acted
with grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying him from running as Vice-Mayor
because of his failure to renounce his American citizenship, and in dismissing the
motion for reconsideration for being moot.
Petitioner invokes the rulings in Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections9 and Mercado
v. Manzano,10 that the filing by a person with dual citizenship of a certificate of
candidacy, containing an oath of allegiance, constituted as a renunciation of his
foreign citizenship. Moreover, he claims that the COMELEC En Banc prematurely
dismissed the motion for reconsideration because at that time, there was a
pending election protest which was later decided in his favor.
Meanwhile, private respondent claims that the passage of R.A. No. 9225
effectively abandoned the Court’s rulings in Frivaldo and Mercado; that the current
law requires a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship;
and that petitioner, having failed to renounce his American citizenship, remains a
dual citizen and is therefore disqualified from running for an elective public position
under Section 4011 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code of 1991 (LGC).
The issues for resolution are: 1) whether the COMELEC gravely abused its
discretion in dismissing petitioner’s motion for reconsideration for being moot; and
2) whether petitioner is disqualified from running for vice-mayor of Guimba, Nueva
Ecija in the May 14, 2007 elections for having failed to renounce his American
citizenship in accordance with R.A. No. 9225.
An issue becomes moot when it ceases to present a justifiable controversy so that
a determination thereof would be without practical use and value.12 In this case, the
pendency of petitioner’s election protest assailing the results of the election did not
render moot the motion for reconsideration which he filed assailing his
disqualification. Stated otherwise, the issue of petitioner’s citizenship did not
become moot; the resolution of the issue remained relevant because it could
significantly affect the outcome of the election protest. Philippine citizenship is an
indispensable requirement for holding an elective office. As mandated by law: "An
elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines."13 It bears stressing that
the Regional Trial Court later ruled in favor of petitioner in the election protest and
declared him the winner. In view thereof, a definitive ruling on the issue of
petitioner’s citizenship was clearly necessary. Hence, the COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioner’s motion for reconsideration
solely on the ground that the same was rendered moot because he lost to private
respondent.
Anent the second issue, we find that petitioner is disqualified from running for
public office in view of his failure to renounce his American citizenship.
R.A. No. 9225 was enacted to allow re-acquisition and retention of Philippine
citizenship for: 1) natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by
reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country; and 2) natural-born
citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of the law, become citizens of a
foreign country. The law provides that they are deemed to have re-acquired or
retained their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance.14
Petitioner falls under the first category, being a natural-born citizen who lost his
Philippine citizenship upon his naturalization as an American citizen. In the instant
case, there is no question that petitioner re-acquired his Philippine citizenship after
taking the oath of allegiance on September 6, 2006. However, it must be
emphasized that R.A. No. 9225 imposes an additional requirement on those who
wish to seek elective public office, as follows:
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. – Those who retain or re-
acquire Philippine Citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights
and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of
the Philippines and the following conditions:
xxxx
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the
qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and
existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any
public officer authorized to administer an oath.
Contrary to petitioner’s claims, the filing of a certificate of candidacy does not ipso
facto amount to a renunciation of his foreign citizenship under R.A. No. 9225. Our
rulings in the cases of Frivaldo and Mercado are not applicable to the instant case
because R.A. No. 9225 provides for more requirements.
Thus, in Japzon v. COMELEC,15 the Court held that Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225
requires the twin requirements of swearing to an Oath of Allegiance and executing
a Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship, viz:
Breaking down the afore-quoted provision, for a natural born Filipino, who
reacquired or retained his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225, to
run for public office, he must: (1) meet the qualifications for holding such public
office as required by the Constitution and existing laws; and (2) make a personal
and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath.1awphi1
Further, in Jacot v. Dal and COMELEC,16 the Court ruled that a candidate’s oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and his Certificate of Candidacy do
not substantially comply with the requirement of a personal and sworn renunciation
of foreign citizenship. Thus:
The law categorically requires persons seeking elective public office, who either
retained their Philippine citizenship or those who reacquired it, to make a personal
and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before a public officer
authorized to administer an oath simultaneous with or before the filing of the
certificate of candidacy.
Hence, Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 compels natural-born Filipinos, who
have been naturalized as citizens of a foreign country, but who reacquired or
retained their Philippine citizenship (1) to take the oath of allegiance under Section
3 of Republic Act No. 9225, and (2) for those seeking elective public offices in the
Philippines, to additionally execute a personal and sworn renunciation of any and
all foreign citizenship before an authorized public officer prior or simultaneous to
the filing of their certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine
elections.
Clearly Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 (on the making of a personal and
sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship) requires of the Filipinos
availing themselves of the benefits under the said Act to accomplish an
undertaking other than that which they have presumably complied with under
Section 3 thereof (oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines). This is
made clear in the discussion of the Bicameral Conference Committee on
Disagreeing Provisions of House Bill No. 4720 and Senate Bill No. 2130 held on
18 August 2003 (precursors of Republic Act No. 9225), where the Hon. Chairman
Franklin Drilon and Hon. Representative Arthur Defensor explained to Hon.
Representative Exequiel Javier that the oath of allegiance is different from the
renunciation of foreign citizenship:
CHAIRMAN DRILON. Okay. So, No. 2. "Those seeking elective public office in the
Philippines shall meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required
by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate
of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath." I think it’s
very good, ha? No problem?
REP. JAVIER. … I think it’s already covered by the oath.
CHAIRMAN DRILON. Renouncing foreign citizenship.
REP. JAVIER. Ah… but he has taken his oath already.
CHAIRMAN DRILON. No…no, renouncing foreign citizenship.
xxxx
CHAIRMAN DRILON. Can I go back to No. 2. What’s your problem, Boy? Those
seeking elective office in the Philippines.
REP. JAVIER. They are trying to make him renounce his citizenship thinking that
ano…
CHAIRMAN DRILON. His American citizenship.
REP. JAVIER. To discourage him from running?
CHAIRMAN DRILON. No.
REP. A.D. DEFENSOR. No. When he runs he will only have one citizenship.
When he runs for office, he will have only one. (Emphasis ours.)
There is little doubt, therefore, that the intent of the legislators was not only for
Filipinos reacquiring or retaining their Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No.
9225 to take their oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, but also to
explicitly renounce their foreign citizenship if they wish to run for elective posts in
the Philippines. To qualify as a candidate in Philippine elections, Filipinos must
only have one citizenship, namely, Philippine citizenship.
By the same token, the oath of allegiance contained in the Certificate of
Candidacy, which is substantially similar to the one contained in Section 3 of
Republic Act No. 9225, does not constitute the personal and sworn renunciation
sought under Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225. It bears to emphasize that the
said oath of allegiance is a general requirement for all those who wish to run as
candidates in Philippine elections; while the renunciation of foreign citizenship is
an additional requisite only for those who have retained or reacquired Philippine
citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 and who seek elective public posts,
considering their special circumstance of having more than one citizenship.
In the instant case, petitioner’s Oath of Allegiance and Certificate of Candidacy did
not comply with Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 which further requires those seeking
elective public office in the Philippines to make a personal and sworn renunciation
of foreign citizenship. Petitioner failed to renounce his American citizenship; as
such, he is disqualified from running for vice-mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija in the
May 14, 2007 elections.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Petitioner is declared DISQUALIFIED
from running for Vice-Mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija in the May 14, 2007 elections
because of his failure to renounce his foreign citizenship pursuant to Section 5(2)
of R.A. No. 9225.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 148326      November 15, 2001
PABLO C. VILLABER, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and REP. DOUGLAS R. CAGAS, respondents.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
In this petition for certiorari, Pablo C. Villaber, seeks the nullification of two
Resolutions of the Commission on Election (COMELEC) in SPA-01-058. The first
one was issued by its Second Division on April 30, 2001, disqualifying him as a
candidate for the position of Congressman in the First District of the Province of
Davao del Sur in the last May 14, 2001 elections, and cancelling his certificate of
candidacy; and the second is the en banc  Resolution dated May 10, 2001 denying
his motion for reconsideration.
Both petitioner Villaber and respondent Douglas R. Cagas were rival candidates
for a congressional seat in the First District of Davao del Sur during the May 14,
2001 elections. Villaber filed his certificate of candidacy for Congressman on
February 19, 2001,1 while Cagas filed his on February 28, 2001.2
On March 4, 2001, Cagas filed with the Office of the Provincial Election
Supervisor, Commission On Elections (COMELEC), Davao del Sur, a consolidated
petition3 to disqualify Villaber and to cancel the latter's certificate of candidacy.
Cagas alleged in the said consolidated petition that on March 2, 1990, Villaber was
convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 15, in Criminal Case No.
86-46197 for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and was sentenced to suffer
one (1) year imprisonment. The check that bounced was in the sum of
P100,000.00.4 Cagas further alleged that this crime involves moral turpitude;
hence, under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code, he is disqualified to run for
any public office. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (Tenth Division), in its Decision
dated April23, 1992 in CA-G.R. CR No. 09017,5 affirmed the RTC Decision.
Undaunted, Villaber filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari assailing
the Court of Appeals Decision, docketed as G. R. No. 106709. However, in its
Resolution6 of October 26, 1992, this Court (Third Division) dismissed the petition.
On February 2, 1993, our Resolution became final and executory.7 Cagas also
asserted that Villaber made a false material representation in his certificate of
candidacy that he is "Eligible for the office I seek to be elected " - which false
statement is a ground to deny due course or cancel the said certificate pursuant to
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.
In his answers8 to the disqualification suit, Villaber countered mainly that his
conviction has not become final and executory because the affirmed Decision was
not remanded to the trial court for promulgation in his presence.9 Furthermore,
even if the judgment of conviction was already final and executory, it cannot be the
basis for his disqualification since violation of B.P. Blg. 22 does not involve moral
turpitude.
After the opposing parties submitted their respective position papers, the case was
forwarded to the COMELEC, Manila, for resolution.
On April 30, 2001, the COMELEC (Second Division), finding merit in Cagas'
petition, issued the challenged Resolution10 in SPA A 01-058 declaring Villaber
disqualified as "a candidate for and from holding any elective public office" and
canceling his certificate of candidacy. The COMELEC ruled that a conviction for
violation of B.P. BIg. 22 involves moral turpitude following the ruling of this
Court en banc  in the administrative case of People vs. Atty. Fe Tuanda.11
Villaber fIled a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the COMELEC en
banc  in a Resolution12 dated May 10, 2001.
Hence, this petition.
The sole issue for our Resolution is whether or not violation of B.P. Blg. 22
involves moral turpitude.
The COMELEC believes it is. In disqualifying petitioner Villaber from being a
candidate for Congressman, the COMELEC applied Section 12 of the Omnibus
Election Code which provides:
"Sec. 12. Disqualifications. - Any person who has been declared by competent
authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for
subversion, insurrection, rebellion, or for any offense for which he has been
sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months, or for a crime involving
moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any
office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.
"The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed
upon the declaration by competent authority that said insanity or incompetence
had been removed or after the expiration of a period of five years from his service
of sentence, unless within the same period he again becomes disqualified."
(Emphasis ours)
As to the meaning of "moral turpitude," we have consistently adopted the definition
in Black's Law Dictionary as "an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the
private duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary
to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman, or
conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals."13
In In re Vinzon,14  the term "moral turpitude" is considered as encompassing
"everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty , or good morals."
We, however, clarified in Dela Torre vs. Commission on Elections15  that "not
every criminal act involves moral turpitude," and that ''as to what crime involves
moral turpitude is for the Supreme Court to determine."16 We further pronounced
therein that:
"...in International Rice Research Institute vs. NLRC  (221 SCRA 760 [1993]), the
Court admitted that it cannot always be ascertained whether moral turpitude does
or does not exist by merely classifying a crime as malum in se or as malum
prohibitum.  There are crimes which are mala in se and yet but rarely involve moral
turpitude, and there are crimes which involve moral turpitude and are mala
prohibita  only. In the final analysis, whether or not a crime involves moral
turpitude is ultimately a question of fact and frequently depends on all the
circumstances surrounding the violation of the statute." (Emphasis ours)
We reiterate here our ruling in Dela Torre17 that the determination of whether a
crime involves moral turpitude is a question of fact and frequently depends on all
the circumstances surrounding the violation of the statute.
In the case at bar, petitioner does not assail the facts and circumstances
surrounding the commission of the crime. In effect, he admits all the elements of
the crime for which he was convicted. At any rate, the question of whether or not
the crime involves moral turpitude can be resolved by analyzing its elements
alone, as we did in Dela Torre which involves the crime of fencing punishable by a
special law.18
Petitioner was charged for violating B.P. Blg. 22 under the following Information:
"That on or about February 13, 1986, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and
issue to Efren D. Sawal to apply on account or for value Bank of Philippine Islands
(Plaza Cervantes, Manila) Check No. 958214 dated February 13, 1986 payable to
Efren D. Sawal in the amount of P100,000.00, said accused well knowing that at
the time of issue he did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee
bank for payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check,
when presented for payment within ninety (90) days from the date thereof,
was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds,
and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, said accused failed to pay
said Efren D. Sawal the amount of said check or to make arrangement for full
payment of the same within five (5) banking days after receiving said notice."
(Emphasis ours)
He was convicted for violating Section 1 of B.P. Blg. 22 provides :
"SECTION 1. Checks without sufficient funds. - Any person who makes or draws
and issues any check to apply on account or for value, knowing at the time of
issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank
for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check is
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or
would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any
valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment, shall be punished by
imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not more than one (1) year or by a
fine of not less than but not more than double the amount of the check which fine
shall in no case exceed Two Hundred Thousand Pesos, or both such fine and
imprisonment at the discretion of the court." (Emphasis ours).
The elements of the offense under the above provision are:
1. The accused makes, draws or issues any check to apply to account or for value;
2. The accused knows at the time of the issuance that he or she does not
have sufficient funds in, or credit with, the drawee bank for the payment of
the check in full upon its presentment; and
3. The check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of
funds or credit, or it would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the
drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment.19
The presence of the second element manifests moral turpitude. In People vs.
Atty. Fe Tuanda20  we held that a conviction for violation of B.P. BIg. 22 "imports
deceit" and "certainly relates to and affects the good moral character of a person.
…"21 The effects of the issuance of a worthless check, as we held in the landmark
case of Lozano vs. Martinez,22 through Justice Pedro L. Yap, "transcends the
private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the
interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to
the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public" since the circulation of
valueless commercial papers "can very well pollute the channels of trade and
commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society
and the public interest."23 Thus, paraphrasing Black's definition, a drawer who
issues an unfunded check deliberately reneges on his private duties he owes his
fellow men or society in a manner contrary to accepted and customary rule of right
and duty, justice, honesty or good morals.
Petitioner contends that this Court's pronouncement in People v. Atty. Fe
Tuanda,24 insofar as it states that conviction under B.P. BIg. 22 involves moral
turpitude, does not apply to him since he is not a lawyer.
This argument is erroneous.
In that case, the Court of Appeals affirmed Atty. Fe Tuanda's conviction for
violation of B.P. BIg. 22 and, in addition, suspended her from the practice of law
pursuant to Sections 27 and 28 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court. Her
motion seeking the lifting of her suspension was denied by this Court on the
ground that the said offense involves moral turpitude. There we said in part:
"We should add that the crimes of which respondent was convicted also
import deceit and violation of her attorney's oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility, under both of which she was bound to 'obey the laws of the
land.' Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude might not (as in the
instant case, violation of B.P. Blg. 22 does not) relate to the exercise of the
profession of a lawyer; however, it certainly relates to and affects the good
moral character of a person convicted of such offense. x x x."25 (Emphasis
ours)
Clearly, in Tuanda, this Court did not make a distinction whether the offender is a
lawyer or a non-lawyer. Nor did it declare that such offense constitutes moral
turpitude when committed by a member of the Bar but is not so when committed
by a non-member.
We cannot go along with petitioner's contention that this Court's ruling
in Tuanda  has been abandoned or modified in the recent case of Rosa Lim vs.
People of the Philippines,26 which reiterated the ruling in Vaca vs. Court of
Appeals.27 In these two latter cases, the penalty of imprisonment imposed on the
accused for violation of B.P. BIg. 22 was deleted by this Court. Only a fine was
imposed. Petitioner insists that with the deletion of the prison sentence, the offense
no longer involves moral turpitude. We made no such pronouncement. This is what
we said in Rosa Lim:
"In Vaca v. Court  of Appeals,  we held that in determining the penalty to be
imposed for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, the philosophy underlying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law applies. The philosophy is to redeem valuable human material, and
to prevent unnecessary deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness
with due regard to the protection of the social order. There we deleted the prison
sentence imposed on petitioners. We imposed on them only a fine double the
amount of the check issued. We considered the fact that petitioners brought the
appeal, believing in good faith, that no violation of B.P. Blg. 22 was committed,
'otherwise, they would have simply accepted the judgment of the trial court and
applied for probation to evade prison term.' We do the same here. We believe such
would best serve the ends of criminal justice."
In fine, we find no grave abuse of discretion committed by respondent COMELEC
in issuing the assailed Resolutions.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 135150 July 28, 1999
ROMEO LONZANIDA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTION and EUFEMIO
MULI, respondents.
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeks to set aside
the resolutions issued by the COMELEC First Division dated May 21, 1998 and by
the COMELEC En Banc dated August 11, 1998 in SPA 98-190 entitled, In the
matter of the Petition to Disqualify Mayoralty Candidate Romeo Lonzanida of San
Antonio, Zambales, Eufemio Muli, petitioner, vs. Romeo Lonzanida, respondent.
The assailed resolutions declared herein petitioner Romeo Lonzanida disqualified
to run for Mayor in the municipality of San Antonio, Zambales in the May 1998
elections and that all votes cast in his favor shall not be counted and if he has
been proclaimed winner the said proclamation is declared null and
void.1âwphi1.nêt
Petitioner Romeo Lonzanida was duly elected and served two consecutive terms
as municipal mayor of San Antonio, Zambales prior to the May 8, 1995 elections.
In the May 1995 elections Lonzanida ran for mayor of San Antonio, Zambales and
was again proclaimed winner. He assumed office and discharged the duties
thereof. His proclamation in 1995 was however contested by his then opponent
Juan Alvez who filed an election protest before the Regional Trial Court of
Zambales, which in a decision dated January 9, 1997 declared a failure of
elections. The court ruled:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, this court hereby renders judgment declaring the
results of the election for the office of the mayor in San Antonio, Zambales last
May 8, 1995 as null and void on the ground that there was a failure of election.
Accordingly, the office of the mayor of the Municipality of San Antonio, Zambales is
hereby declared vacant.
Both parties appealed to the COMELEC. On November 13, 1997 the COMELEC
resolved the election protest filed by Alvez and after a revision and re-appreciation
of the contested ballots declared Alvez the duly elected mayor of San Antonio,
Zambales by plurality of votes cast in his favor totaling P1,720 votes as against
1,488 votes for Lonzanida. On February 27, 1998 the COMELEC issued a writ of
execution ordering Lonzanida to vacate the post, which he obeyed, and Alvez
assumed office for the remainder of the term.
In the May 11, 1998 elections Lonzanida again filed his certificate of candidacy for
mayor of San Antonio. On April 21, 1998 his opponent Eufemio Muli timely filed a
petition to disqualify Lonzanida from running for mayor of San Antonio in the 1998
elections on the ground that he had served three consecutive terms in the same
post. On May 13, 1998, petitioner Lonzanida was proclaimed winner. On May 21,
1998 the First Division of the COMELEC issued the questioned resolution granting
the petition for disqualification upon a finding that Lonzanida had served three
consecutive terms as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales and he is therefore
disqualified to run for the same post for the fourth time. The COMELEC found that
Lonzanida's assumption of office by virtue of his proclamation in May 1995,
although he was later unseated before the expiration of the term, should be
counted as service for one full term in computing the three term limit under the
Constitution and the Local Government Code. The finding of the COMELEC First
Division was affirmed by the COMELEC En Banc in a resolution dated August 11,
1998.
Petitioner Lonzanida challenges the validity of the COMELEC resolutions finding
him disqualified to run for mayor of San Antonio Zambales in the 1998 elections.
He maintains that he was duly elected mayor for only two consecutive terms and
that his assumption of office in 1995 cannot be counted as service of a term for the
purpose of applying the three term limit for local government officials, because he
was not the duly elected mayor of San Antonio in the May 1995 elections as
evidenced by the COMELEC decision dated November 13, 1997 in EAC No. 6-97
entitled Juan Alvez, Protestant-Appellee vs. Romeo Lonzanida, Protestee-
Appellant; wherein the COMELEC declared Juan Alvez as the duly elected mayor
of San Antonio, Zambales. Petitioner also argues that the COMELEC ceased to
have jurisdiction over the petition for disqualification after he was proclaimed
winner in the 1998 mayoral elections; as the proper remedy is a petition for quo
warranto with the appropriate regional trial court under Rule 36 of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure.
Private respondent Eufemio Muli filed comment to the petition asking this court to
sustain the questioned resolutions of the COMELEC and to uphold its jurisdiction
over the petition for disqualification. The private respondent states that the petition
for disqualification was filed on April 21, 1998 or before the May 1998 mayoral
elections. Under section 6, RA 6646 and Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure petitions for disqualification filed with the COMELEC before the
elections and/or proclamation of the party sought to be disqualified may still be
heard and decided by the COMELEC after the election and proclamation of the
said party without distinction as to the alleged ground for disqualification, whether
for acts constituting an election offense or for ineligibility. Accordingly, it is argued
that the resolutions of the COMELEC on the merits of the petition for
disqualification were issued within the commission's jurisdiction. As regards the
merits of the case, the private respondent maintains that the petitioner's
assumption of office in 1995 should be considered as service of one full term
because he discharged the duties of mayor for almost three years until March 1,
1998 or barely a few months before the next mayoral elections.
The Solicitor-General filed comment to the petition for the respondent COMELEC
praying for the dismissal of the petition. The Solicitor-General stressed that section
8, Art. X of the Constitution and section 43 (b), Chapter 1 of the Local Government
Code which bar a local government official from serving more than three
consecutive terms in the same position speaks of "service of a term" and so the
rule should be examined in this light. The public respondent contends that
petitioner Lonzanida discharged the rights and duties of mayor from 1995 to 1998
which should be counted as service of one full term, albeit he was later unseated,
because he served as mayor for the greater part of the term. The issue of whether
or not Lonzanida served as a de jure or de facto mayor for the 1995-1998 term is
inconsequential in the application of the three term limit because the prohibition
speaks or "service of a term" which was intended by the framers of the Constitution
to foil any attempt to monopolize political power. It is likewise argued by the
respondent that a petition for quo warranto with the regional trial court is proper
when the petition for disqualification is filed after the elections and so the instant
petition for disqualification which was filed before the elections may be resolved by
the COMELEC thereafter regardless of the imputed basis of disqualification.
The petitioner filed Reply to the comment. It is maintained that the petitioner could
not have served a valid term from 1995 to 1998 although he assumed office as
mayor for that period because he was not lawfully elected to the said office.
Moreover, the petitioner was unseated before the expiration of the term and so his
service for the period cannot be considered as one full term. As regards the issue
of jurisdiction, the petitioner reiterated in his Reply that the COMELEC ceased to
have jurisdiction to hear the election protest after the petitioner's proclamation.
The petition has merit.
Sec. 8, Art. X of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which
shall be determined by law shall be three years and no such officials shall serve for
more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his
service for the full term for which he was elected.
Sec. 43 of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160) restates the same rule:
Sec. 43. Term of Office.
(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms in
the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall
not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for
which the elective official concerned was elected.
The issue before us is whether petitioner Lonzanida's assumption of office as
mayor of San Antonio Zambales from May 1995 to March 1998 may be considered
as service of one full term for the purpose of applying the three-term limit for
elective local government officials.
The records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that the three-term limit
which is now embodied in section 8, Art. X of the Constitution was initially
proposed to be an absolute bar to any elective local government official from
running for the same position after serving three consecutive terms. The said
disqualification was primarily intended to forestall the accumulation of massive
political power by an elective local government official in a given locality in order to
perpetuate his tenure in office. The delegates also considered the need to broaden
the choices of the electorate of the candidates who will run for office, and to infuse
new blood in the political arena by disqualifying officials from running for the same
office after a term of nine years. The mayor was compared by some delegates to
the President of the Republic as he is a powerful chief executive of his political
territory and is most likely to form a political dynasty. 1 The drafters however,
recognized and took note of the fact that some local government officials run for
office before they reach forty years of age; thus to perpetually bar them from
running for the same office after serving nine consecutive years may deprive the
people of qualified candidates to choose from. As finally voted upon, it was agreed
that an elective local government official should be barred from running for the
same post after three consecutive terms. After a hiatus  of at least one term, he
may again run for the same office.2
The scope of the constitutional provision barring elective local officials with the
exception of barangay officials from serving more than three consecutive terms
was discussed at length in the case of Benjamin
Borja, Jr.; vs. COMELEC  and Jose Capco, Jr.3 where the issue raised was
whether a vice-mayor who succeeds to the office of the mayor by operation of law
upon the death of the incumbent mayor and served the remainder of the term
should be considered to have served a term in that office for the purpose of
computing the three term limit. This court pointed out that from the discussions of
the Constitutional Convention it is evident that the delegates proceeded from the
premise that the official's assumption of office is by reason of election. This Court
stated:4
Two ideas emerge from a consideration of the proceedings of the Constitutional
Commission. The first is the notion of service of term, derived from the concern
about the accumulation of power as a result of a prolonged stay in office. The
second is the idea of election, derived from the concern that the right of the people
to choose those whom they wish to govern them be preserved.
It is likewise noteworthy that, in discussing term limits, the drafters of the
Constitution did so on the assumption that the officials concerned were serving by
reason of election. This is clear from the following exchange in the Constitutional
Commission concerning term limits, now embodied in Art. VI sections 4 and 7 of
the Constitution, for members of Congress:
MR. GASCON. I would like to ask a question with regard to the issue after the
second term. We will allow the Senator to rest for a period of time before he
can run again?
MR. DAVIDE. That is correct.
MR. GASCON. And the question that we left behind before — if the Gentlemen will
remember-was: How long will that period of rest be? Will it be one election which is
three years or one term which is six years?
MR. DAVIDE. If the Gentlemen will remember, Commissioner Rodrigo expressed
the view that during the election following the expiration of the first 12 years,
whether such election will be on the third year or on the sixth year thereafter, this
particular member of the Senate can run. So it is not really a period of hibernation
for six years. That was the Committees' stand.
xxx xxx xxx
Second, not only historical examination but textual analysis as well supports the
ruling of the COMELEC that Art X, section 8 contemplates service by local officials
for three consecutive terms as a result of election. The first sentence speaks of
"the-term of office of elective local officials" and bars "such officials" from serving
for more than three consecutive terms. The second sentence, in explaining when
an elective official may be deemed to have served his full term of office, states that
"voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered
as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was
elected." The term served must therefore be one "for which the official concerned
was elected." The purpose of the provision is to prevent a circumvention of the
limitation on the number of terms an elective official may serve."
This Court held that the two conditions for the application of the disqualification
must concur: 1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive
terms in the same local government post and 2) that he has fully served three
consecutive terms. It stated:
To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the
right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position.
Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive
terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected  to the same
position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply.
It is not disputed that the petitioner was previously elected and served two
consecutive terms as mayor of San Antonio Zambales prior to the May 1995
mayoral elections. In the May 1995 elections he again ran for mayor of San
Antonio, Zambales and was proclaimed winner. He assumed office and discharged
the rights and duties of mayor until March 1998 when he was ordered to vacate the
post by reason of the COMELEC decision dated November 13, 1997 on the
election protest against the petitioner which declared his opponent Juan Alvez, the
duly elected mayor of San Antonio. Alvez served the remaining portion of the
1995-1998 mayoral term.
The two requisites for the application of the three term rule are absent. First, the
petitioner cannot be considered as having been duly elected to the post in the May
1995 elections, and second, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998
mayoral term by reason of involuntary relinquishment of office. After a re-
appreciation and revision of the contested ballots the COMELEC itself declared by
final judgment that petitioner Lonzanida lost in the May 1995 mayoral elections and
his previous proclamation as winner was declared null and void. His assumption of
office as mayor cannot be deemed to have been by reason of a valid election but
by reason of a void proclamation. It has been repeatedly held by this court that a
proclamation subsequently declared void is no proclamation at all 5 and while a
proclaimed candidate may assume office on the strength of the proclamation of the
Board of Canvassers he is only a presumptive winner who assumes office subject
to the final outcome of the election protest.6 Petitioner Lonzanida did not serve a
term as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales from May 1995 to March 1998 because
he was not duly elected to the post; he merely assumed office as presumptive
winner, which presumption was later overturned by the COMELEC when it decided
with finality that Lonzanida lost in the May 1995 mayoral elections.
Second, the petitioner cannot be deemed to have served the May 1995 to 1998
term because he was ordered to vacate his post before the expiration of the term.
The respondents' contention that the petitioner should be deemed to have served
one full term from May 1995-1998 because he served the greater portion of that
term has no legal basis to support it; it disregards the second requisite for the
application of the disqualification, i.e., that he has fully served three consecutive
terms. The second sentence of the constitutional provision under scrutiny states,
"Voluntary renunciation of office  for any length of time  shall not be considered as
an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which he was elected.
"The clear intent of the framers of the constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent
the three-term limit by a voluntary renunciation of office and at the same time
respect the people's choice and grant their elected official full service of a term is
evident in this provision. Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the
renounced term in the computation of the three term limit; conversely, involuntary
severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law
amounts to an interruption of continuity of service. The petitioner vacated his post
a few months before the next mayoral elections, not by voluntary renunciation but
in compliance with the legal process of writ of execution issued by the COMELEC
to that effect. Such involuntary severance from office is an interruption of continuity
of service and thus, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term.
In sum, the petitioner was not  the duly elected mayor and that he did not hold
office for the full term; hence, his assumption of office from 1995 to March 1998
cannot be counted as a term for purposes of computing the three term limit. The
Resolution of the COMELEC finding him disqualified on this ground to run in the
May 1998 mayoral elections should therefore be set aside.
The respondents harp on the delay in resolving the election protest between
petitioner and his then opponent Alvez which took roughly about three years and
resultantly extended the petitioners incumbency in an office to which he was not
lawfully elected. We note that such delay cannot be imputed to the petitioner.
There is no specific allegation nor proof that the delay was due to any political
maneuvering on his part to prolong his stay in office. Moreover, protestant Alvez,
was not without legal recourse to move for the early resolution of the election
protest while it was pending before the regional trial court or to file a motion for the
execution of the regional trial court's decision declaring the position of mayor
vacant and ordering the vice-mayor to assume office while the appeal was pending
with the COMELEC. Such delay which is not here shown to have intentionally
sought by the petitioner to prolong his stay in office cannot serve as basis to bar
his right to be elected and to serve his chosen local government post in the
succeeding mayoral election.
The petitioner's contention that the COMELEC ceased to have jurisdiction over the
petition for disqualification after he was proclaimed winner is without merit. The
instant petition for disqualification was filed on April 21, 1998 or before the May
1998 elections and was resolved on May 21, 1998 or after the petitioner's
proclamation. It was held in the case of Sunga vs. COMELEC  and Trinidad7 that
the proclamation nor the assumption of office of a candidate against whom a
petition for disqualification is pending before the COMELEC does not divest the
COMELEC of jurisdiction to continue hearing the case and to resolve it on the
merits.
Sec. 6 of RA 6646 specifically mandates that:
Sec. 6. Effects of disqualification Case. — any candidate who has been declared
by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for
him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final
judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the
winning number of votes in such election, the court or commission shall continue
with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the
complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the
suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his
guilt is strong.
This court held that the clear legislative intent is that the COMELEC should
continue the trial and hearing of the disqualification case to its conclusion i.e., until
judgment is rendered. The outright dismissal of the petition for disqualification filed
before the election but which remained unresolved after the proclamation of the
candidate sought to be disqualified will unduly reward the said candidate and may
encourage him to employ delaying tactics to impede the resolution of the petition
until after he has been proclaimed.
The court stated:
Clearly, the legislative intent is that the COMELEC should continue the trial and
hearing of the disqualification case to its conclusion i.e., until judgment is rendered
thereon. The word "shall" signified that this requirement of the law is mandatory,
operating to impose a positive duty which must be enforced. The implication is that
the COMELEC is left with no discretion but to proceed with the disqualification
case even after the election. Thus, in providing for the outright dismissal of the
disqualification case which remains unresolved after the election, Silvestre
vs.  Duavit in effect disallows what R.A. No. 6646 imperatively requires. This
amounts to a quasi-judicial legislation by the COMELEC which cannot be
countenanced and is invalid for having been issued beyond the scope of its
authority. Interpretative rulings of quasi-judicial bodies or administrative agencies
must always be in perfect harmony with statutes and should be for the sole
purpose of carrying their general provisions into effect. By such interpretative or
administrative rulings, of course, the scope of the law itself cannot be limited.
Indeed, a quasi-judicial body or an administrative agency for that matter cannot
amend an act of Congress. Hence, in case of a discrepancy between the basic law
and an interpretative or administrative ruling, the basic law prevails.
Besides, the deleterious effect of the Silvestre ruling is not difficult to foresee. A
candidate guilty of election offenses would be undeservedly rewarded, instead of
punished, by the dismissal of the disqualification case against him simply because
the investigating body was unable, for any reason caused upon it, to determine
before the election if the offenses were indeed committed by the candidate sought
to be disqualified. All that the erring aspirant would need to do is to employ
delaying tactics so that the disqualification case based on the commission of
election offenses would not be decided before the election. This scenario is
productive of more fraud which certainly is not the main intent and purpose of the
law.
The fact that Trinidad was already proclaimed and had assumed the position of
mayor did not divest the COMELEC of authority and jurisdiction to continue the
hearing and eventually decide the disqualification case. In Aguam
v. COMELEC this Court held —
Time and again this Court has given its imprimatur on the principle that COMELEC
is with authority to annul any canvass and proclamation which was illegally made.
The fact that a candidate proclaimed has assumed office, we have said, is no bar
to the exercise of such power. It of course may not be availed of where there has
been a valid proclamation. Since private respondent's petition before the
COMELEC is precisely directed at the annulment of the canvass and proclamation,
we perceive that inquiry into this issue is within the area allocated by the
Constitution and law to COMELEC . . . Really, were a victim of a proclamation to
be precluded from challenging the validity thereof after that proclamation and the
assumption of office thereunder, baneful effects may easily supervene.
It must be emphasized that the purpose of a disqualification proceeding is to
prevent the candidate from running or, if elected. From serving, or to prosecute
him for violation of the election laws. Obviously, the fact that a candidate has been
proclaimed elected does not signify that his disqualification is deemed condoned
and may no longer be the subject of a separate investigation .
Accordingly, the petition is granted. The assailed resolutions of the COMELEC
declaring petitioner Lonzanida disqualified to run for mayor in the 1998 mayoral
elections are hereby set aside.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 201716               January 8, 2013
MAYOR ABELARDO ABUNDO, SR., Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ERNESTO R. VEGA, Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
In this Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, petitioner Abelardo Abundo, Sr.
(Abundo) assails and seeks to nullify (1) the February 8, 2012 Resolution1 of the
Second Division, Commission on Elections (COMELEC), in EAC (AE) No. A-25-
2010 and (2) the May 10, 2012 Resolution2 of the COMELEC en banc affirming
that division’s disposition. The assailed issuances, in turn, affirmed the Decision of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Virac, Catanduanes, Branch 43, dated August 9,
2010, in Election Case No. 55 declaring Abundo as ineligible, under the three-term
limit rule, to run in the 2010 elections for the position of, and necessarily to sit as,
Mayor of Viga, Catanduanes.
The antecedent facts are undisputed.
For four (4) successive regular elections, namely, the 2001, 2004, 2007 and 2010
national and local elections, Abundo vied for the position of municipal mayor of
Viga, Catanduanes. In both the 2001 and 2007 runs, he emerged and was
proclaimed as the winning mayoralty candidate and accordingly served the
corresponding terms as mayor. In the 2004 electoral derby, however, the Viga
municipal board of canvassers initially proclaimed as winner one Jose Torres
(Torres), who, in due time, performed the functions of the office of mayor. Abundo
protested Torres’ election and proclamation. Abundo was eventually declared the
winner of the 2004 mayoralty electoral contest, paving the way for his assumption
of office starting May 9, 2006 until the end of the 2004-2007 term on June 30,
2007, or for a period of a little over one year and one month.
Then came the May 10, 2010 elections where Abundo and Torres again opposed
each other. When Abundo filed his certificate of candidacy3 for the mayoralty seat
relative to this electoral contest, Torres lost no time in seeking the former’s
disqualification to run, the corresponding petition,4 docketed as SPA Case No. 10-
128 (DC), predicated on the three-consecutive term limit rule. On June 16, 2010,
the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution5 finding for Abundo, who in the
meantime bested Torres by 219 votes6 and was accordingly proclaimed 2010
mayor-elect of Viga, Catanduanes.
Meanwhile, on May 21, 2010, or before the COMELEC could resolve the adverted
disqualification case Torres initiated against Abundo, herein private respondent
Ernesto R. Vega (Vega) commenced a quo warranto7 action before the RTC-Br. 43
in Virac, Catanduanes, docketed as Election Case No. 55, to unseat Abundo on
essentially the same grounds Torres raised in his petition to disqualify.
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
By Decision8 of August 9, 2010 in Election Case No. 55, the RTC declared Abundo
ineligible to serve as municipal mayor, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, Decision is, hereby, rendered GRANTING the petition and
declaring Abelardo Abundo, Sr. ineligible to serve as municipal mayor of Viga,
Catanduanes.
SO ORDERED. 9 essence the following: first, there was no involuntary interruption of Abundo’s
In so ruling, the trial court, citing Aldovino, Jr. v. COMELEC,10 found Abundo to
have already served three consecutive mayoralty terms, to wit, 2001-2004, 2004-
2007 and 2007-2010, and, hence, disqualified for another, i.e., fourth, consecutive
term. Abundo, the RTC noted, had been declared winner in the aforesaid 2004
elections consequent to his protest and occupied the position of and actually
served as Viga mayor for over a year of the remaining term, i.e., from May 9, 2006
to June 30, 2007, to be exact. To the RTC, the year and a month service
constitutes a complete and full service of Abundo’s second term as mayor.
Therefrom, Abundo appealed to the COMELEC, his recourse docketed as EAC
(AE) No. A-25-2010.
The Ruling of the COMELEC
On February 8, 2012, in EAC (AE) No. A-25-2010, the COMELEC’s Second
Division rendered the first assailed Resolution, the dispositive portion of which
reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court
Branch 73, Virac, Catanduanes is AFFIRMED and the appeal is DISMISSED for
lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.11
Just like the RTC, the COMELEC’s Second Division ruled against Abundo on the
strength of Aldovino, Jr. and held that service of the unexpired portion of a term by
a protestant who is declared winner in an election protest is considered as service
for one full term within the contemplation of the three-term limit rule.
In time, Abundo sought but was denied reconsideration by the COMELEC en banc
per its equally assailed Resolution of May 10, 2012. The fallo of the COMELEC en
banc’s Resolution reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the motion for reconsideration is DENIED for
lack of merit. The Resolution of the Commission (Second Division) is hereby
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.12
In affirming the Resolution of its Second Division, the COMELEC en banc held in
2004-2007 term service which would be an exception to the three-term limit rule as
he is considered never to have lost title to the disputed office after he won in his
election protest; and second, what the Constitution prohibits is for an elective
official to be in office for the same position for more than three consecutive terms
and not to the service of the term.
Hence, the instant petition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order (TRO) and/or preliminary injunction.
Intervening Events
In the meantime, following the issuance by the COMELEC of its May 10, 2012
Resolution denying Abundo’s motion for reconsideration, the following events
transpired:
1. On June 20, 2012, the COMELEC issued an Order13 declaring its May 10, 2012
Resolution final and executory. The following day, June 21, 2012, the COMELEC
issued an Entry of Judgment.14
2. On June 25, 2012, Vega filed a Motion for Execution15 with the RTC-Br. 43 in
Virac, Catanduanes.
3. On June 27, 2012, the COMELEC, acting on Vega’s counsel’s motion16 filed a
day earlier, issued an Order17 directing the bailiff of ECAD (COMELEC) to
personally deliver the entire records to said RTC.
On June 29, 2012, the COMELEC ECAD Bailiff personally delivered the entire
records of the instant case to, and were duly received by, the clerk of court of RTC-
Br. 43.
4. On June 29, 2012, or on the same day of its receipt of the case records, the
RTC-Br. 43 in Virac, Catanduanes granted Vega’s Motion for Execution through an
Order18 of even date. And a Writ of Execution19 was issued on the same day.
5. On July 2, 2012, Sheriff Q. Tador, Jr. received the Writ of Execution and served
the same at the office of Mayor Abundo on the same day via substituted service.
6. On July 3, 2012, the Court issued a TRO20 enjoining the enforcement of the
assailed COMELEC Resolutions.
7. On July 4, 2012, Vega received the Court’s July 3, 2012 Resolution21 and a copy
of the TRO. On the same day, Vice-Mayor Emeterio M. Tarin and First Councilor
Cesar O. Cervantes of Viga, Catanduanes took their oaths of office22 as mayor and
vice-mayor of Viga, Catanduanes, respectively.
8. On July 5, 2012, Vega received a copy of Abundo’s Seventh (7th) Most
Extremely Urgent Manifestation and Motion23 dated June 28, 2012 praying for the
issuance of a TRO and/or status quo ante Order. On the same day, Vice-Mayor
Emeterio M. Tarin and First Councilor Cesar O. Cervantes––who had taken their
oaths of office the day before—assumed the posts of mayor and vice-mayor of
Viga, Catanduanes.24
9. On July 6, 2012, Vega interposed a Motion (To Admit Attached
Manifestation)25 and Manifestation with Leave to Admit26 dated July 5, 2012 stating
that the TRO thus issued by the Court has become functus officio owing to the
execution of the RTC’s Decision in Election Case No. 55.
10. On July 10, 2012, Vega filed his Comment/Opposition with Leave to the
Petitioner’s Prayer for the Issuance of a Status Quo Ante Order27 reiterating the
argument that since Vice-Mayor Emeterio M. Tarin and First Councilor Cesar O.
Cervantes already assumed the posts of Mayor and Vice-Mayor of Viga,
Catanduanes, then a Status Quo Ante Order would serve no purpose.
11. On July 12, 2012, Abundo filed his Most Urgent Manifestation and Motion to
Convert the July 3, 2012 TRO into a Status Quo Ante Order (In View of the
Unreasonable and Inappropriate Progression of Events).28
It is upon the foregoing backdrop of events that Abundo was dislodged from his
post as incumbent mayor of Viga, Catanduanes. To be sure, the speed which
characterized Abundo’s ouster despite the supervening issuance by the Court of a
TRO on July 3, 2012 is not lost on the Court. While it is not clear whether Vice-
Mayor Tarin and First Councilor Cervantes knew of or put on notice about the TRO
either before they took their oaths of office on July 4, 2012 or before assuming the
posts of mayor and vice-mayor on July 5, 2012, the confluence of events following
the issuance of the assailed COMELEC en banc irresistibly tends to show that the
TRO––issued as it were to maintain the status quo, thus averting the premature
ouster of Abundo pending this Court’s resolution of his appeal––appears to have
been trivialized.
On September 11, 2012, Vega filed his Comment on Abundo’s petition, followed
not long after by public respondent COMELEC’s Consolidated Comment.29
The Issues
Abundo raises the following grounds for the allowance of the petition:
6.1 The Commission En Banc committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction when it declared the arguments in Abundo’s motion
for reconsideration as mere rehash and reiterations of the claims he raised prior to
the promulgation of the Resolution.
6.2 The Commission En Banc committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction when it declared that Abundo has consecutively
served for three terms despite the fact that he only served the remaining one year
and one month of the second term as a result of an election protest.30
First Issue:
Arguments in Motion for Reconsideration Not Mere Reiteration
The COMELEC en banc denied Abundo’s motion for reconsideration on the basis
that his arguments in said motion are mere reiterations of what he already brought
up in his appeal Brief before the COMELEC Second Division. In this petition,
petitioner claims otherwise.
Petitioner’s assertion is devoid of merit.
A comparison of Abundo’s arguments in the latter’s Brief vis-à-vis those in his
Motion for Reconsideration (MR) reveals that the arguments in the MR are
elucidations and amplications of the same issues raised in the brief. First, in his
Brief, Abundo raised the sole issue of lack of jurisdiction of the RTC to consider the
quo warranto case since the alleged violation of the three-term limit has already
been rejected by the COMELEC First Division in SPA Case No. 10-128 (DC), while
in his MR, Abundo raised the similar ground of the conclusiveness of the
COMELEC’s finding on the issue of his qualification to run for the current term.
Second, in his Brief, Abundo assailed RTC’s reliance on Aldovino, Jr., while in his
MR, he argued that the Court’s pronouncement in Aldovino, Jr., which dealt with
preventive suspension, is not applicable to the instant case as it involves only a
partial service of the term. Abundo argued in his Brief that his situation cannot be
equated with the case of preventive suspension as held in Aldovino, Jr., while in
his MR, he argued before that the almost two years which he did not sit as mayor
during the 2004-2007 term is an interruption in the continuity of his service for the
full term.
Thus, COMELEC did not err in ruling that the issues in the MR are a rehash of
those in the Brief.
Core Issue:
Whether or not Abundo is deemed to have served three consecutive terms
The pivotal determinative issue then is whether the service of a term less than the
full three years by an elected official arising from his being declared as the duly
elected official upon an election protest is considered as full service of the term for
purposes of the application of the three consecutive term limit for elective local
officials.
On this core issue, We find the petition meritorious. The consecutiveness of what
otherwise would have been Abundo’s three successive, continuous mayorship was
effectively broken during the 2004-2007 term when he was initially deprived of title
to, and was veritably disallowed to serve and occupy, an office to which he, after
due proceedings, was eventually declared to have been the rightful choice of the
electorate.
The three-term limit rule for elective local officials, a disqualification rule, is found in
Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which
shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for
more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his
service for the full term for which he was elected. (Emphasis supplied.)
and is reiterated in Sec. 43(b) of Republic Act No. (RA) 7160, or the Local
Government Code (LGC) of 1991, thusly:
Sec. 43. Term of Office. —
xxxx
(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in
the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall
not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for
which the elective official concerned was elected. (Emphasis Ours.)
To constitute a disqualification to run for an elective local office pursuant to the
aforequoted constitutional and statutory provisions, the following requisites must
concur:
(1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the
same local government post; and
(2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.31
Judging from extant jurisprudence, the three-term limit rule, as applied to the
different factual milieus, has its complicated side. We shall revisit and analyze the
various holdings and relevant pronouncements of the Court on the matter.
As is clearly provided in Sec. 8, Art. X of the Constitution as well as in Sec. 43(b) of
the LGC, voluntary renunciation of the office by the incumbent elective local official
for any length of time shall NOT, in determining service for three consecutive
terms, be considered an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for
which the elective official concerned was elected. In Aldovino, Jr., however, the
Court stated the observation that the law "does not textually state that voluntary
renunciation is the only actual interruption of service that does not affect ‘continuity
of service for a full term’ for purposes of the three-term limit rule."32
As stressed in Socrates v. Commission on Elections,33 the principle behind the
three-term limit rule covers only consecutive terms and that what the Constitution
prohibits is a consecutive fourth term. Put a bit differently, an elective local official
cannot, following his third consecutive term, seek immediate reelection for a fourth
term,34 albeit he is allowed to seek a fresh term for the same position after the
election where he could have sought his fourth term but prevented to do so by
reason of the prohibition.
There has, in fine, to be a break or interruption in the successive terms of the
official after his or her third term. An interruption usually occurs when the official
does not seek a fourth term, immediately following the third. Of course, the basic
law is unequivocal that a "voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time
shall NOT be considered an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term
for which the elective official concerned was elected." This qualification was made
as a deterrent against an elective local official intending to skirt the three-term limit
rule by merely resigning before his or her third term ends. This is a voluntary
interruption as distinguished from involuntary interruption which may be brought
about by certain events or causes.
While appearing to be seemingly simple, the three-term limit rule has engendered
a host of disputes resulting from the varying interpretations applied on local
officials who were elected and served for three terms or more, but whose terms or
service was punctuated by what they view as involuntary interruptions, thus
entitling them to a, but what their opponents perceive as a proscribed, fourth term.
Involuntary interruption is claimed to result from any of these events or causes:
succession or assumption of office by operation of law, preventive suspension,
declaration of the defeated candidate as the winner in an election contest,
declaration of the proclaimed candidate as the losing party in an election contest,
proclamation of a non-candidate as the winner in a recall election, removal of the
official by operation of law, and other analogous causes.
This brings us to an examination of situations and jurisprudence wherein such
consecutive terms were considered or not considered as having been "involuntarily
interrupted or broken."
(1) Assumption of Office by Operation of Law
35
In Borja, Jr. v. Commission on Elections and Jose T. Capco, Jr.  (1998) and
Montebon v. Commission on Elections36 (2008), the Court delved on the effects of
"assumption to office by operation of law" on the three-term limit rule. This
contemplates a situation wherein an elective local official fills by succession a
higher local government post permanently left vacant due to any of the following
contingencies, i.e., when the supposed incumbent refuses to assume office, fails to
qualify, dies, is removed from office, voluntarily resigns or is otherwise
permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office.37
In Borja, Jr., Jose T. Capco, Jr. (Capco) was elected vice-mayor of Pateros on
January 18, 1988 for a term ending June 30, 1992. On September 2, 1989, Capco
became mayor, by operation of law, upon the death of the incumbent mayor,
Cesar Borja. Capco was then elected and served as mayor for terms 1992-1995
and 1995-1998. When Capco expressed his intention to run again for the
mayoralty position during the 1998 elections, Benjamin U. Borja, Jr., who was then
also a candidate for mayor, sought Capco’s disqualification for violation of the
three-term limit rule.
Finding for Capco, the Court held that for the disqualification rule to apply, "it is not
enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local
office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the same number
of times before the disqualification can apply."38 There was, the Court ruled, no
violation of the three-term limit, for Capco "was not elected to the office of the
mayor in the first term but simply found himself thrust into it by operation of
law"39 when a permanent vacancy occurred in that office.
The Court arrived at a parallel conclusion in the case of Montebon. There,
Montebon had been elected for three consecutive terms as municipal councilor of
Tuburan, Cebu in 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007. However, in January
2004, or during his second term, Montebon succeeded and assumed the position
of vice-mayor of Tuburan when the incumbent vice-mayor retired. When Montebon
filed his certificate of candidacy again as municipal councilor, a petition for
disqualification was filed against him based on the three-term limit rule. The Court
ruled that Montebon’s assumption of office as vice-mayor in January 2004 was an
interruption of his continuity of service as councilor. The Court emphasized that
succession in local government office is by operation of law and as such, it is an
involuntary severance from office. Since the law no less allowed Montebon to
vacate his post as councilor in order to assume office as vice-mayor, his
occupation of the higher office cannot, without more, be deemed as a voluntary
renunciation of his position as councilor.
(2) Recall Election
With reference to the effects of recall election on the continuity of service,
Adormeo v. Commission on Elections40 (2002) and the aforementioned case of
Socrates (2002) provide guidance.
In Adormeo, Ramon Talaga, Jr. (Talaga) was elected and served as mayor of
Lucena City during terms 1992-1995 and 1995-1998. During the 1998 elections,
Talaga lost to Bernard G. Tagarao. However, before Tagarao’s 1998-2001 term
ended, a recall election was conducted in May 2000 wherein Talaga won and
served the unexpired term of Tagarao until June 2001. When Talaga ran for mayor
in 2001, his candidacy was challenged on the ground he had already served as
mayor for three consecutive terms for violation of the three term-limit rule. The
Court held therein that the remainder of Tagarao’s term after the recall election
during which Talaga served as mayor should not be considered for purposes of
applying the three-term limit rule. The Court emphasized that the continuity of
Talaga’s mayorship was disrupted by his defeat during the 1998 elections.
A similar conclusion was reached by the Court in Socrates. The petitioners in that
case assailed the COMELEC Resolution which declared Edward Hagedorn
qualified to run for mayor in a recall election. It appeared that Hagedorn had been
elected and served as mayor of Puerto Princesa City for three consecutive terms:
in 1992-1995, 1995-1998 and 1998-2001. Obviously aware of the three-term limit
principle, Hagedorn opted not to vie for the same mayoralty position in the 2001
elections, in which Socrates ran and eventually won. However, midway into his
term, Socrates faced recall proceedings and in the recall election held, Hagedorn
run for the former’s unexpired term as mayor. Socrates sought Hagedorn’s
disqualification under the three-term limit rule.
In upholding Hagedorn’s candidacy to run in the recall election, the Court ruled:
x x x After Hagedorn ceased to be mayor on June 30, 2001, he became a private
citizen until the recall election of September 24, 2002 when he won by 3,018 votes
over his closest opponent, Socrates.
From June 30, 2001 until the recall election on September 24, 2002, the mayor of
Puerto Princesa was Socrates. During the same period, Hagedorn was simply a
private citizen. This period is clearly an interruption in the continuity of Hagedorn’s
service as mayor, not because of his voluntary renunciation, but because of a legal
prohibition.41
The Court likewise emphasized in Socrates that "an elective local official cannot
seek immediate reelection for a fourth term. The prohibited election refers to the
next regular election for the same office following the end of the third consecutive
term and, hence, any subsequent election, like recall election, is no longer covered
x x x."42
(3) Conversion of a Municipality into a City
On the other hand, the conversion of a municipality into a city does not constitute
an interruption of the incumbent official’s continuity of service. The Court said so in
Latasa v. Commission on Elections43 (2003).
Latasa is cast against the ensuing backdrop: Arsenio A. Latasa was elected and
served as mayor of the Municipality of Digos, Davao del Sur for terms 1992-1995,
1995-1998, and 1998-2001. During his third term, Digos was converted into a
component city, with the corresponding cityhood law providing the holdover of
elective officials. When Latasa filed his certificate of candidacy as mayor for the
2001 elections, the Court declared Latasa as disqualified to run as mayor of Digos
City for violation of the three-term limit rule on the basis of the following
ratiocination:
This Court believes that (Latasa) did involuntarily relinquish his office as municipal
mayor since the said office has been deemed abolished due to the conversion.
However, the very instant he vacated his office as municipal mayor, he also
assumed office as city mayor. Unlike in Lonzanida, where petitioner therein, for
even just a short period of time, stepped down from office, petitioner Latasa never
ceased from acting as chief executive of the local government unit. He never
ceased from discharging his duties and responsibilities as chief executive of Digos.
(Emphasis supplied.)
(4) Period of Preventive Suspension
In 2009, in the case Aldovino Jr., the Court espoused the doctrine that the period
during which a local elected official is under preventive suspension cannot be
considered as an interruption of the continuity of his service. The Court explained
why so:
Strict adherence to the intent of the three-term limit rule demands that preventive
suspension should not be considered an interruption that allows an elective
official’s stay in office beyond three terms. A preventive suspension cannot simply
be a term interruption because the suspended official continues to stay in office
although he is barred from exercising the functions and prerogatives of the office
within the suspension period. The best indicator of the suspended official’s
continuity in office is the absence of a permanent replacement and the lack of the
authority to appoint one since no vacancy exists.44 (Emphasis supplied.)
(5) Election Protest
With regard to the effects of an election protest vis-à-vis the three-term limit rule,
jurisprudence presents a more differing picture. The Court’s pronouncements in
Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections45 (1999), Ong v. Alegre46 (2006), Rivera III
v. Commission on Elections47 (2007) and Dizon v. Commission on
Elections48 (2009), all protest cases, are illuminating.
In Lonzanida, Romeo Lonzanida was elected and had served as municipal mayor
of San Antonio, Zambales in terms 1989-1992, 1992-1995 and 1995-1998.
However, his proclamation relative to the 1995 election was protested and was
eventually declared by the RTC and then by COMELEC null and void on the
ground of failure of elections. On February 27, 1998, or about three months before
the May 1998 elections, Lonzanida vacated the mayoralty post in light of a
COMELEC order and writ of execution it issued. Lonzanida’s opponent assumed
office for the remainder of the term. In the May 1998 elections, Lonzanida again
filed his certificate of candidacy. His opponent, Efren Muli, filed a petition for
disqualification on the ground that Lonzanida had already served three
consecutive terms in the same post. The Court, citing Borja Jr., reiterated the two
(2) conditions which must concur for the three-term limit to apply: "1) that the
official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local
government post and 2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms."49
In view of Borja, Jr., the Court ruled that the foregoing requisites were absent in
the case of Lonzanida. The Court held that Lonzanida cannot be considered as
having been duly elected to the post in the May 1995 elections since his
assumption of office as mayor "cannot be deemed to have been by reason of a
valid election but by reason of a void proclamation." And as a corollary point, the
Court stated that Lonzanida did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term having
been ordered to vacate his post before the expiration of the term, a situation which
amounts to an involuntary relinquishment of office.This Court deviated from the
ruling in Lonzanida in Ong v. Alegre50 owing to a variance in the factual situations
attendant.
In that case, Francis Ong (Ong) was elected and served as mayor of San Vicente,
Camarines Norte for terms 1995-1998, 1998-2001, and 2001-2004. During the
1998 mayoralty elections, or during his supposed second term, the COMELEC
nullified Ong’s proclamation on the postulate that Ong lost during the 1998
elections. However, the COMELEC’s decision became final and executory on July
4, 2001, when Ong had fully served the 1998-2001 mayoralty term and was in fact
already starting to serve the 2001-2004 term as mayor-elect of the municipality of
San Vicente. In 2004, Ong filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position
as mayor, which his opponent opposed for violation of the three-term limit rule.
Ong invoked the ruling in Lonzanida and argued that he could not be considered
as having served as mayor from 1998-2001 because he was not duly elected to
the post and merely assumed office as a "presumptive winner." Dismissing Ong’s
argument, the Court held that his assumption of office as mayor for the term 1998-
2001 constitutes "service for the full term" and hence, should be counted for
purposes of the three-term limit rule. The Court modified the conditions stated in
Lonzanida in the sense that Ong’s service was deemed and counted as service for
a full term because Ong’s proclamation was voided only after the expiry of the
term. The Court noted that the COMELEC decision which declared Ong as not
having won the 1998 elections was "without practical and legal use and value"
promulgated as it was after the contested term has expired. The Court further
reasoned:
Petitioner Francis Ong’s contention that he was only a presumptive winner in the
1998 mayoralty derby as his proclamation was under protest did not make him less
than a duly elected mayor. His proclamation as the duly elected mayor in the 1998
mayoralty election coupled by his assumption of office and his continuous exercise
of the functions thereof from start to finish of the term, should legally be taken as
service for a full term in contemplation of the three-term rule.
The absurdity and the deleterious effect of a contrary view is not hard to discern.
Such contrary view would mean that Alegre would – under the three-term rule - be
considered as having served a term by virtue of a veritably meaningless electoral
protest ruling, when another actually served such term pursuant to a proclamation
made in due course after an election.51 (Emphasis supplied.)
The Court did not apply the ruling in Lonzanida and ruled that the case of Ong was
different, to wit:
The difference between the case at bench and Lonzanida is at once apparent. For
one, in Lonzanida, the result of the mayoralty election was declared a nullity for the
stated reason of "failure of election", and, as a consequence thereof, the
proclamation of Lonzanida as mayor-elect was nullified, followed by an order for
him to vacate the office of mayor. For another, Lonzanida did not fully serve the
1995-1998 mayoral term, there being an involuntary severance from office as a
result of legal processes. In fine, there was an effective interruption of the
continuity of service.52 (Emphasis supplied.)
Ong’s slight departure from Lonzanida would later find reinforcement in the
consolidated cases of Rivera III v. Commission on Elections53 and Dee v.
Morales.54 Therein, Morales was elected mayor of Mabalacat, Pampanga for the
following consecutive terms: 1995-1998, 1998-2001 and 2001-2004. In relation to
the 2004 elections, Morales again ran as mayor of the same town, emerged as
garnering the majority votes and was proclaimed elective mayor for term
commencing July 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007. A petition for quo warranto was later
filed against Morales predicated on the ground that he is ineligible to run for a
"fourth" term, having served as mayor for three consecutive terms. In his answer,
Morales averred that his supposed 1998-2001 term cannot be considered against
him, for, although he was proclaimed by the Mabalacat board of canvassers as
elected mayor vis-à-vis the 1998 elections and discharged the duties of mayor until
June 30, 2001, his proclamation was later nullified by the RTC of Angeles City and
his closest rival, Anthony Dee, proclaimed the duly elected mayor. Pursuing his
point, Morales parlayed the idea that he only served as a mere caretaker.
The Court found Morales’ posture untenable and held that the case of Morales
presents a factual milieu similar with Ong, not with Lonzanida. For ease of
reference, the proclamation of Francis Ong, in Ong, was nullified, but after he, like
Morales, had served the three-year term from the start to the end of the term.
Hence, the Court concluded that Morales exceeded the three-term limit rule, to wit:
Here, respondent Morales was elected for the term July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001.
He assumed the position. He served as mayor until June 30, 2001. He was mayor
for the entire period notwithstanding the Decision of the RTC in the electoral
protest case filed by petitioner Dee ousting him (respondent) as mayor. To
reiterate, as held in Ong v. Alegre, such circumstance does not constitute an
interruption in serving the full term.
xxxx
Respondent Morales is now serving his fourth term. He has been mayor of
Mabalacat continuously without any break since July 1, 1995. In just over a month,
by June 30, 2007, he will have been mayor of Mabalacat for twelve (12)
continuous years.55 (Emphasis supplied.)
The Court ruled in Rivera that the fact of being belatedly ousted, i.e., after the
expiry of the term, cannot constitute an interruption in Morales’ service of the full
term; neither can Morales, as he argued, be considered merely a "caretaker of the
office" or a mere "de facto officer" for purposes of applying the three-term limit rule.
56
In a related 2009 case of Dizon v. Commission on Elections,  the Court would
again find the same Mayor Morales as respondent in a disqualification proceeding
when he ran again as a mayoralty candidate during the 2007 elections for a term
ending June 30, 2010. Having been unseated from his post by virtue of this Court’s
ruling in Rivera, Morales would argue this time around that the three-term limit rule
was no longer applicable as to his 2007 mayoralty bid. This time, the Court ruled in
his favor, holding that for purposes of the 2007 elections, the three-term limit rule
was no longer a disqualifying factor as against Morales. The Court wrote:
Our ruling in the Rivera case served as Morales’ involuntary severance from office
with respect to the 2004-2007 term. Involuntary severance from office for any
length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of
continuity of service. Our decision in the Rivera case was promulgated on 9 May
2007 and was effective immediately. The next day, Morales notified the vice
mayor’s office of our decision. The vice mayor assumed the office of the mayor
from 17 May 2007 up to 30 June 2007. The assumption by the vice mayor of the
office of the mayor, no matter how short it may seem to Dizon, interrupted Morales’
continuity of service. Thus, Morales did not hold office for the full term of 1 July
2004 to 30 June 2007.57 (Emphasis supplied)
To summarize, hereunder are the prevailing jurisprudence on issues affecting
consecutiveness of terms and/or involuntary interruption, viz:
1. When a permanent vacancy occurs in an elective position and the official merely
assumed the position pursuant to the rules on succession under the LGC, then his
service for the unexpired portion of the term of the replaced official cannot be
treated as one full term as contemplated under the subject constitutional and
statutory provision that service cannot be counted in the application of any term
limit (Borja, Jr.). If the official runs again for the same position he held prior to his
assumption of the higher office, then his succession to said position is by operation
of law and is considered an involuntary severance or interruption (Montebon).
2. An elective official, who has served for three consecutive terms and who did not
seek the elective position for what could be his fourth term, but later won in a recall
election, had an interruption in the continuity of the official’s service. For, he had
become in the interim, i.e., from the end of the 3rd term up to the recall election, a
private citizen (Adormeo and Socrates).
3. The abolition of an elective local office due to the conversion of a municipality to
a city does not, by itself, work to interrupt the incumbent official’s continuity of
service (Latasa).
4. Preventive suspension is not a term-interrupting event as the elective officer’s
continued stay and entitlement to the office remain unaffected during the period of
suspension, although he is barred from exercising the functions of his office during
this period (Aldovino, Jr.).
5. When a candidate is proclaimed as winner for an elective position and assumes
office, his term is interrupted when he loses in an election protest and is ousted
from office, thus disenabling him from serving what would otherwise be the
unexpired portion of his term of office had the protest been dismissed (Lonzanida
and Dizon). The break or interruption need not be for a full term of three years or
for the major part of the 3-year term; an interruption for any length of time,
provided the cause is involuntary, is sufficient to break the continuity of service
(Socrates, citing Lonzanida).
6. When an official is defeated in an election protest and said decision becomes
final after said official had served the full term for said office, then his loss in the
election contest does not constitute an interruption since he has managed to serve
the term from start to finish. His full service, despite the defeat, should be counted
in the application of term limits because the nullification of his proclamation came
after the expiration of the term (Ong and Rivera).
The Case of Abundo
Abundo argues that the RTC and the COMELEC erred in uniformly ruling that he
had already served three consecutive terms and is, thus, barred by the
constitutional three-term limit rule to run for the current 2010-2013 term. In gist,
Abundo arguments run thusly:
1. Aldovino, Jr. is not on all fours with the present case as the former dealt with
preventive suspension which does not interrupt the continuity of service of a term;
2. Aldovino, Jr. recognizes that the term of an elected official can be interrupted so
as to remove him from the reach of the constitutional three-term limitation;
3. The COMELEC misinterpreted the meaning of "term" in Aldovino, Jr. by its
reliance on a mere portion of the Decision and not on the unified logic in the
disquisition;
4. Of appropriate governance in this case is the holding in Lonzanida58 and Rivera
III v. Commission on Elections.59
5. The COMELEC missed the point when it ruled that there was no interruption in
the service of Abundo since what he considered as an "interruption" of his 2004-
2007 term occurred before his term started; and
6. To rule that the term of the protestee (Torres) whose proclamation was
adjudged invalid was interrupted while that of the protestant (Abundo) who was
eventually proclaimed winner was not so interrupted is at once absurd as it is
illogical.
Both respondents Vega and the COMELEC counter that the ratio decidendi of
Aldovino, Jr. finds application in the instant case. The COMELEC ruled that
Abundo did not lose title to the office as his victory in the protest case confirmed
his entitlement to said office and he was only unable to temporarily discharge the
functions of the office during the pendency of the election protest.
We note that this present case of Abundo deals with the effects of an election
protest, for which the rulings in Lonzanida, Ong, Rivera and Dizon appear to be
more attuned than the case of Aldovino Jr., the interrupting effects of the
imposition of a preventive suspension being the very lis mota in the Aldovino, Jr.
case. But just the same, We find that Abundo’s case presents a different factual
backdrop.
Unlike in the abovementioned election protest cases wherein the individuals
subject of disqualification were candidates who lost in the election protest and
each declared loser during the elections, Abundo was the winner during the
election protest and was declared the rightful holder of the mayoralty post. Unlike
Mayor Lonzanida and Mayor Morales, who were both unseated toward the end of
their respective terms, Abundo was the protestant who ousted his opponent and
had assumed the remainder of the term.
Notwithstanding, We still find this Court’s pronouncements in the past as
instructive, and consider several doctrines established from the 1998 case of
Borja, Jr. up to the most recent case of Aldovino Jr. in 2009, as potent aids in
arriving at this Court’s conclusion.
The intention behind the three-term limit rule was not only to abrogate the
"monopolization of political power" and prevent elected officials from breeding
"proprietary interest in their position"60 but also to "enhance the people’s freedom
of choice."61 In the words of Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, "while people should be
protected from the evils that a monopoly of power may bring about, care should be
taken that their freedom of choice is not unduly curtailed."62
In the present case, the Court finds Abundo’s case meritorious and declares that
the two-year period during which his opponent, Torres, was serving as mayor
should be considered as an interruption, which effectively removed Abundo’s case
from the ambit of the three-term limit rule.
It bears to stress at this juncture that Abundo, for the 2004 election for the term
starting July 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007, was the duly elected mayor. Otherwise how
explain his victory in his election protest against Torres and his consequent
proclamation as duly elected mayor. Accordingly, the first requisite for the
application of the disqualification rule based on the three-term limit that the official
has been elected is satisfied.
This thus brings us to the second requisite of whether or not Abundo had served
for "three consecutive terms," as the phrase is juridically understood, as mayor of
Viga, Catanduanes immediately before the 2010 national and local elections.
Subsumed to this issue is of course the question of whether or not there was an
effective involuntary interruption during the three three-year periods, resulting in
the disruption of the continuity of Abundo’s mayoralty.
The facts of the case clearly point to an involuntary interruption during the July
2004-June 2007 term.
There can be no quibbling that, during the term 2004-2007, and with the
enforcement of the decision of the election protest in his favor, Abundo assumed
the mayoralty post only on May 9, 2006 and served the term until June 30, 2007 or
for a period of a little over one year and one month. Consequently, unlike Mayor
Ong in Ong and Mayor Morales in Rivera, it cannot be said that Mayor Abundo
was able to serve fully the entire 2004-2007 term to which he was otherwise
entitled.
63
A "term," as defined in Appari v. Court of Appeals,  means, in a legal sense, "a
fixed and definite period of time which the law describes that an officer may hold
an office."64 It also means the "time during which the officer may claim to hold
office as a matter of right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents
shall succeed one another."65 It is the period of time during which a duly elected
official has title to and can serve the functions of an elective office. From
paragraph (a) of Sec. 43, RA 7160,66 the term for local elected officials is three (3)
years starting from noon of June 30 of the first year of said term.
In the present case, during the period of one year and ten months, or from June
30, 2004 until May 8, 2006, Abundo cannot plausibly claim, even if he wanted to,
that he could hold office of the mayor as a matter of right. Neither can he assert
title to the same nor serve the functions of the said elective office. The reason is
simple: during that period, title to hold such office and the corresponding right to
assume the functions thereof still belonged to his opponent, as proclaimed election
winner. Accordingly, Abundo actually held the office and exercised the functions as
mayor only upon his declaration, following the resolution of the protest, as duly
elected candidate in the May 2004 elections or for only a little over one year and
one month. Consequently, since the legally contemplated full term for local elected
officials is three (3) years, it cannot be said that Abundo fully served the term
2004-2007. The reality on the ground is that Abundo actually served less.
Needless to stress, the almost two-year period during which Abundo’s opponent
actually served as Mayor is and ought to be considered an involuntary interruption
of Abundo’s continuity of service. An involuntary interrupted term, cannot, in the
context of the disqualification rule, be considered as one term for purposes of
counting the three-term threshold.67
The notion of full service of three consecutive terms is related to the concepts of
interruption of service and voluntary renunciation of service. The word interruption
means temporary cessation, intermission or suspension.68 To interrupt is to
obstruct, thwart or prevent.69 When the Constitution and the LGC of 1991 speak of
interruption, the reference is to the obstruction to the continuance of the service by
the concerned elected official by effectively cutting short the service of a term or
giving a hiatus in the occupation of the elective office. On the other hand, the word
"renunciation" connotes the idea of waiver or abandonment of a known right. To
renounce is to give up, abandon, decline or resign.70 Voluntary renunciation of the
office by an elective local official would thus mean to give up or abandon the title to
the office and to cut short the service of the term the concerned elected official is
entitled to.
In its assailed Resolution, the COMELEC en banc, applying Aldovino, Jr.,71 held:
It must be stressed that involuntary interruption of service which jurisprudence
deems an exception to the three-term limit rule, implies that the service of the term
has begun before it was interrupted. Here, the respondent did not lose title to the
office. As the assailed Resolution states:
In the case at bar, respondent cannot be said to have lost his title to the office. On
the contrary, he actively sought entitlement to the office when he lodged the
election protest case. And respondent-appellant’s victory in the said case is a final
confirmation that he was validly elected for the mayoralty post of Viga,
Catanduanes in 2004-2007. At most, respondent-appellant was only unable to
temporarily discharge the functions of the office to which he was validly elected
during the pendency of the election protest, but he never lost title to the said
office.72 (Emphasis added.)
The COMELEC’s Second Division, on the other hand, pronounced that the actual
length of service by the public official in a given term is immaterial by reckoning
said service for the term in the application of the three-term limit rule, thus:
As emphasized in the case of Aldovino, "this formulation—no more than three
consecutive terms—is a clear command suggesting the existence of an inflexible
rule." Therefore we cannot subscribe to the argument that since respondent
Abundo served only a portion of the term, his 2004-2007 "term" should not be
considered for purposes of the application of the three term limit rule. When the
framers of the Constitution drafted and incorporated the three term limit rule, it is
clear that reference is to the term, not the actual length of the service the public
official may render. Therefore, one’s actual service of term no matter how long or
how short is immaterial.73
In fine, the COMELEC ruled against Abundo on the theory that the length of the
actual service of the term is immaterial in his case as he was only temporarily
unable to discharge his functions as mayor.
The COMELEC’s case disposition and its heavy reliance on Aldovino, Jr. do not
commend themselves for concurrence. The Court cannot simply find its way clear
to understand the poll body’s determination that Abundo was only temporarily
unable to discharge his functions as mayor during the pendency of the election
protest.
As previously stated, the declaration of being the winner in an election protest
grants the local elected official the right to serve the unexpired portion of the term.
Verily, while he was declared winner in the protest for the mayoralty seat for the
2004-2007 term, Abundo’s full term has been substantially reduced by the actual
service rendered by his opponent (Torres). Hence, there was actual involuntary
interruption in the term of Abundo and he cannot be considered to have served the
full 2004-2007 term.
This is what happened in the instant case. It cannot be overemphasized that
pending the favorable resolution of his election protest, Abundo was relegated to
being an ordinary constituent since his opponent, as presumptive victor in the 2004
elections, was occupying the mayoralty seat. In other words, for almost two years
or from July 1, 2004—the start of the term—until May 9, 2006 or during which his
opponent actually assumed the mayoralty office, Abundo was a private citizen
warming his heels while awaiting the outcome of his protest. Hence, even if
declared later as having the right to serve the elective position from July 1, 2004,
such declaration would not erase the fact that prior to the finality of the election
protest, Abundo did not serve in the mayor’s office and, in fact, had no legal right
to said position.
Aldovino Jr. cannot possibly lend support to respondent’s cause of action, or to
COMELEC’s resolution against Abundo. In Aldovino Jr., the Court succinctly
defines what temporary inability or disqualification to exercise the functions of an
elective office means, thus:
On the other hand, temporary inability or disqualification to exercise the functions
of an elective post, even if involuntary, should not be considered an effective
interruption of a term because it does not involve the loss of title to office or at least
an effective break from holding office; the office holder, while retaining title, is
simply barred from exercising the functions of his office for a reason provided by
law.74
We rule that the above pronouncement on preventive suspension does not apply
to the instant case. Verily, it is erroneous to say that Abundo merely was
temporarily unable or disqualified to exercise the functions of an elective post. For
one, during the intervening period of almost two years, reckoned from the start of
the 2004-2007 term, Abundo cannot be said to have retained title to the mayoralty
office as he was at that time not the duly proclaimed winner who would have the
legal right to assume and serve such elective office. For another, not having been
declared winner yet, Abundo cannot be said to have lost title to the office since one
cannot plausibly lose a title which, in the first place, he did not have. Thus, for all
intents and purposes, even if the belated declaration in the election protest
accords him title to the elective office from the start of the term, Abundo was not
entitled to the elective office until the election protest was finally resolved in his
favor.1âwphi1
Consequently, there was a hiatus of almost two years, consisting of a break and
effective interruption of his service, until he assumed the office and served barely
over a year of the remaining term. At this juncture, We observe the apparent
similarities of Mayor Abundo’s case with the cases of Mayor Talaga in Adormeo
and Mayor Hagedorn in Socrates as Mayors Talaga and Hagedorn were not
proclaimed winners since they were non-candidates in the regularelections. They
were proclaimed winners during the recall elections and clearly were not able to
fully serve the terms of the deposed incumbent officials. Similar to their cases
where the Court deemed their terms as involuntarily interrupted, Abundo also
became or was a private citizen during the period over which his opponent was
serving as mayor. If in Lonzanida, the Court ruled that there was interruption in
Lonzanida’s service because of his subsequent defeat in the election protest, then
with more reason, Abundo’s term for 2004-2007 should be declared interrupted
since he was not proclaimed winner after the 2004 elections and was able to
assume the office and serve only for a little more than a year after winning the
protest.
As aptly stated in Latasa, to be considered as interruption of service, the "law
contemplates a rest period during which the local elective official steps down from
office and ceases to exercise power or authority over the inhabitants of the
territorial jurisdiction of a particular local government unit."75 Applying the said
principle in the present case, there is no question that during the pendency of the
election protest, Abundo ceased from exercising power or authority over the good
people of Viga, Catanduanes.
Consequently, the period during which Abundo was not serving as mayor should
be considered as a rest period or break in his service because, as earlier stated,
prior to the judgment in the election protest, it was Abundo’s opponent, Torres,
who was exercising such powers by virtue of the still then valid proclamation.
As a final note, We reiterate that Abundo’s case differs from other cases involving
the effects of an election protest because while Abundo was, in the final reckoning,
the winning candidate, he was the one deprived of his right and opportunity to
serve his constituents. To a certain extent, Abundo was a victim of an imperfect
election system. While admittedly the Court does not possess the mandate to
remedy such imperfections, the Constitution has clothed it with enough authority to
establish a fortress against the injustices it may bring.
In this regard, We find that a contrary ruling would work damage and cause grave
injustice to Abundo––an elected official who was belatedly declared as the winner
and assumed office for only a short period of the term. If in the cases of Lonzanida
and Dizon, this Court ruled in favor of a losing candidate––or the person who was
adjudged not legally entitled to hold the contested public office but held it
anyway––We find more reason to rule in favor of a winning candidate-protestant
who, by popular vote, deserves title to the public office but whose opportunity to
hold the same was halted by an invalid proclamation.
Also, more than the injustice that may be committed against Abundo is the
injustice that may likewise be committed against the people of Viga, Catanduanes
by depriving them of their right to choose their leaders. Like the framers of the
Constitution, We bear in mind that We "cannot arrogate unto ourselves the right to
decide what the people want"76 and hence, should, as much as possible, "allow the
people to exercise their own sense of proportion and rely on their own strength to
curtail the power when it overreaches itself."77 For democracy draws strength from
the choice the people make which is the same choice We are likewise bound to
protect.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTLY GRANTED. Accordingly, the
assailed February 8, 2012 Resolution of the Commission on Elections Second
Division and May 10, 2012 Resolution of the Commission on Elections en banc in
EAC (AE) No. A-25-2010 and the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Virac, Catanduanes, Branch 43, dated August 9, 2010, in Election Case No. 55,
are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Petitioner Abelardo Abundo, Sr. is DECLARED ELIGIBLE for the position of Mayor
of Viga, Catanduanes to which he was duly elected in the May 2010 elections and
is accordingly ordered IMMEDIATELY REINSTATED to said position. Withal,
Emeterio M. Tarin and Cesar O. Cervantes are ordered to immediately vacate the
positions of Mayor and Vice-Mayor of Viga, Catanduanes, respectively, and shall
revert to their original positions of Vice-Mayor and First Councilor, respectively,
upon receipt of this Decision.
The TRO issued by the Court on July 3, 2012 is hereby LIFTED.
This Decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 112889 April 18, 1995
BIENVENIDO O. MARQUEZ, JR., petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EDUARDO T. RODRIGUEZ, respondents.
VITUG, J.:
The Court is called upon, in this petition for certiorari, to resolve the conflicting
claims of the parties on the meaning of the term "fugitive from justice as that
phrase is so used under the provisions of Section 40(e) of the Local Government
Code (Republic Act No. 7160). That law states:
Sec. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for
any elective local position:
xxx xxx xxx
(e) Fugitive from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad(.)
Bienvenido Marquez, a defeated candidate for the elective position for the elective
position in the Province of Quezon in the 11th May 1992 elections filed this petition
for certiorari  praying for the reversal of the resolution of the Commission on
Elections ("COMELEC") which dismissed his petition for quo warranto against the
winning candidate, herein private respondent Eduardo Rodriguez, for being
allegedly a fugitive from justice.
It is averred that at the time private respondent filed his certificate of candidacy, a
criminal charge against him for ten (10) counts of insurance fraud or grand theft of
personal property was still pending before the Municipal Court of Los Angeles
Judicial District, County of Los Angeles, State of California, U.S.A. A warrant
issued by said court for his arrest, it is claimed, has yet to be served on private
respondent on account of his alleged "flight" from that country.
Before the 11th May 1992 elections, a petition for cancellation (SPA 92-065) of
respondent's certificate of candidacy, on the ground of the candidate's
disqualification under Section 40(e) of the Local Government Code, was filed by
petitioner with the COMELEC. On 08 May 1992, the COMELEC dismissed the
petition.
Petitioner's subsequent recourse to this Court (in G.R. No. 105310) from the 08th
May 1992 resolution of COMELEC was dismissed without prejudice, however, to
the filing in due time of a possible post-election quo warranto proceeding against
private respondent. The Court, in its resolution of 02 June 1992, held:
Evidently, the matter elevated to this Court was a pre-proclamation controversy.
Since the private respondent had already been proclaimed as the duly elected
Governor of the Province of Quezon, the petition below for disqualification has
ceased to be a pre-proclamation controversy. In Casimiro vs. Commission on
Elections, G.R. Nos. 84462-63 and Antonio vs. Commission on Elections, G.R.
Nos. 84678-79, jointly decided on 29 March 1989, 171 SCRA 468, this court held
that a pre-proclamation controversy is no longer viable at this point of time and
should be dismissed. The proper remedy of the petitioner is to pursue the
disqualification suit in a separate proceeding.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the petition, without prejudice to
the filing of the appropriate proceedings in the proper forum, if so desired, within
ten (10) days from notice. 1
Private respondent was proclaimed Governor-elect of Quezon on 29 May 1992.
Forthwith, petitioner instituted quo warranto proceedings (EPC 92-28) against
private respondent before the COMELEC. In its 02 February 1993 resolution, the
COMELEC (Second Division) dismissed the petition. The COMELEC En Banc, on
02 December 1993, denied a reconsideration of the resolution.
Hence, this petition for certiorari, the core issue of which, such as to be expected,
focuses on whether private respondent who, at the time of the filing of his
certificate of candidacy (and to date), is said to be facing a criminal charge before
a foreign court and evading a warrant for his arrest comes within the term "fugitive
from justice" contemplated by Section 40(e) of the Local Government Code and,
therefore, disqualified from being a candidate for, and thereby ineligible from
holding on to, an elective local office.
Petitioner's position is perspicuous and to the point. The law, he asseverates,
needs no further interpretation and construction. Section 40(e) of Republic Act No.
7160, is rather clear, he submits, and it disqualifies "fugitive from justice" includes
not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those
who, after being charged flee to avoid prosecution. This definition truly finds
support from jurisprudence (Philippine Law Dictionary, Third Edition, p. 399, by
F.B. Moreno; Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, p. 671; King vs. Noe, 244 S.C.
344, 137 S.E. 2d 102, 103; Hughes vs. PFlanz, 138 Federal Reporter 980; Tobin
vs. Casaus, 275 Pacific Reporter, 2d., p. 792), and it may be so conceded as
expressing the general and ordinary connotation of the term.
In turn, private respondent would have the Court respect the conclusions of
the Oversight Committee which, conformably with Section 5332 of R.A. 7160, was
convened by the President to "formulate and issue the appropriate rules and
regulations necessary for the efficient and effective implementation of any and all
provisions of the Code to ensure compliance with the principles of Local
Autonomy.
Here are some excerpts from the committee's deliberations:
CHAIRMAN MERCADO. Session is resumed.
So, we are in agreement to retain Line 12, Page 36, as is. So next, Page 39.
CHAIRMAN DE PEDRO. Kay Benny Marquez.
REP. CUENCO: What does he want?
CHAIRMAN DE PEDRO. Kung puwede i-retain lang iyan. Bahala na kung
kuwestiyunin ang constitutionality nito before the Supreme Court later on.
REP. CUENCO. Anong nakalagay diyan?
CHAIRMAN DE PEDRO. Iyong disqualification to run for public office.
Any person who is a fugitive from justice in criminal or nonpolitical cases here or
abroad.
Mabigat yung abroad. One who is facing criminal charges with the warrant of
arrest pending, unserved. . .
HONORABLE SAGUISAG. I think that is even a good point, ano — what is a
fugitive? It is not defined. We have loose understanding. . .
CHAIRMAN DE PEDRO. So isingit na rin sa definition of terms iyong fugitive.
Si Benny umalis na, with the understanding na okay na sa atin ito.
THE CHAIRMAN. Whether we have this rule or not she can run. She is not a
fugitive from justice. Mrs. Marcos can run at this point and I have held that for a
long time ago. So can. . .
MS. DOCTOR. Mr. Chairman. . .
THE CHAIRMAN. Yes.
MS. DOCTOR. Let's move to. . .
THE CHAIRMAN. Wait, wait, wait. Can we just agree on the wording, this is very
important. Manny, can you come up?
MR. REYES. Let's use the word conviction by final judgment.
THE CHAIRMAN. Fugitive means somebody who is convicted by final judgment.
Okay,. Fugitive means somebody who is convicted by final judgment. Insert that on
Line 43 after the semi-colon. Is that approved? No objection, approved (TSN,
Oversight Committee, 07 May 1991).
xxx xxx xxx
THE CHAIRMAN. Andy, saan ba naman itong amendment on page 2? Sino ba
ang gumawa nito? Okay, on page 2, lines 43 and 44, "fugitive from justice". What
"fugitive"? Sino ba ang gumawa nito, ha?
MR. SANCHEZ. Yes, I think, well, last time, Mr. Chairman, we agree to clarify the
word "fugitive".
THE CHAIRMAN. "Fugitive from justice means a person" ba ito, ha?
MR. SANCHEZ. Means a person...
THE CHAIRMAN. Ha?
HON. REYES. A person who has been convicted.
THE CHAIRMAN; Yes, fugitive from justice, oo. Fugitive from justice shall mean or
means one who has been convicted by final judgment. It means one who has been
convicted by final judgment.
HON. DE PEDRO. Kulang pa rin ang ibig sabihin niyan.
THE CHAIRMAN. Ano? Sige, tingnan natin.
HON. DE PEDRO. Kung nasa loob ng presuhan, fugitive pa rin siya?
THE CHAIRMAN. O, tama na yan, fugitive from justice. He has been convicted by
final judgment, meaning that if he is simply in jail and because he put up, post bail,
but the case is still being reviewed, that is not yet conviction by final judgment. 3
The Oversight Committee evidently entertained serious apprehensions on the
possible constitutional infirmity of Section 40(e) of Republic Act No. 7160 if the
disqualification therein meant were to be so taken as to embrace those who merely
were facing criminal charges. A similar concern was expressed by Senator R. A. V.
Saguisag who, during the bicameral conference committee of the Senate and the
House of Representatives, made this reservation:
. . . de ipa-refine lang natin 'yung language especially 'yung, the scope of fugitive.
Medyo bothered ako doon, a. 4
The Oversight Committee finally came out with Article 73 of the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991. It provided:
Art. 73. Disqualifications. — The following persons shall be disqualified from
running for any elective local position:
(a) . . .
(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad. Fugitive
from justice refers to a person who has been convicted by final
judgment.5 (Emphasis supplied)
Private respondent reminds us that the construction placed upon law by the
officials in charge of its enforcement deserves great and considerable weight
(Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corp. vs. CA, 182 SCRA 166, 181).
The Court certainly agrees; however, when there clearly is no obscurity and
ambiguity in an enabling law, it must merely be made to apply as it is so written.
An administrative rule or regulation can neither expand nor constrict the law but
must remain congruent to it. The Court believes and thus holds, albeit with some
personal reservations of the  ponente  (expressed during the Court's en
banc deliberations), that Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the
Local Government Code of 1991, to the extent that it confines the term "fugitive
from justice" to refer only to a person (the fugitive) "who has been convicted by
final judgment." is an inordinate and undue circumscription of the law.
Unfortunately, the COMELEC did not make any definite finding on whether or not,
in fact, private respondent is a "fugitive from justice" as such term must be
interpreted and applied in the light of the Court's opinion. The omission is
understandable since the COMELEC dismissed outrightly the petition for quo
warranto on the basis instead of Rule 73 of the Rules and Regulations
promulgated by the Oversight Committee. The Court itself, not being a trier of
facts, is thus constrained to remand the case to the COMELEC for a determination
of this unresolved factual matter.
WHEREFORE, the questioned resolutions of the Commission on Elections are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the case is hereby REMANDED to the
Commission which is DIRECTED to proceed and resolve the case with dispatch
conformably with the foregoing opinion. No special pronouncement on costs.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, Padilla, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Kapunan and Francisco, JJ., concur.
 
Separate Opinions
DAVIDE JR., J.,  concurring:
Section 65 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881) states that the
qualifications for elective provincial, city, municipal, and barangay officials shall be
those provided for in the Local Government Code. The quondam Local
Government Code was B.P. Blg. 337, which was superseded by R.A. No. 7160,
otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991. Section 39 of the latter
provides for the qualifications and election of local elective officials. Section 40
enumerates those who are disqualified from running for any elective local position,
among whom is a:
(e) Fugitive from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad.
The term "fugitive from justice" refers not only to those who flee after conviction to
avoid punishment but also to those who, after being charged, flee to avoid
prosecution. In his ponencia, Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug finds the definition given to
it by the Oversight Committee, i.e., "a person who has been convicted by final
judgment," as appearing in Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing
the Local Government Code of 1991, as inordinate and as undue circumscription
of the law. I agree.
But this is only one side of the coin. I further submit that it also unreasonably
expands the scope of the disqualification in the 1991 Local Government Code
because it disqualifies all those who have been convicted by final judgment,
regardless of the extent of the penalty imposed and of whether they have served
or are serving their sentences or have evaded service of sentence by jumping bail
or leaving for another country. The definition thus disregards the true and accepted
meaning of the word fugitive. This new definition is unwarranted for nothing in the
legislative debates has been shown to sustain it and the clear language of the law
leaves no room for a re-examination of the meaning of the term.
I do not share the doubt of Mr. Justice Vitug on the constitutionality of the
disqualification based on the presumption of innocence clause of the Bill of Rights.
There are certain fundamental considerations which do not support the
applications of the presumption
Firstly, Section 1, Article V of the Constitution recognizes the authority of Congress
to determine who are disqualified from exercising the right of suffrage. Since the
minimum requirement of a candidate for a public office is that he must be a
qualified voter, it logically follows that Congress has the plenary power to
determine who are disqualified to seek election for a public office.
Secondly, a public office is a public trust. Section 1, Article XI of the Constitution
expressly provides:
Sec. 1. Public office is public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times
be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity,
loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
A public office is not property. (ISAGANI A. CRUZ, Constitutional Law, 1993 ed.,
101; JOAQUIN BERNAS, The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, A
Commentary, 1987 ed., 40, citing Cornejo vs. Gabriel, 41 Phil. 188 [1920]).
Accordingly, stricter qualifications for public office may thus be required by law.
Thirdly, the disqualification in guestion does not, in reality, involve the issue of
presumption of innocence. Elsewise stated, one is not disqualified because he is
presumed guilty by the filing of an information or criminal complaint against him.
He is disqualified because he is a "fugitive from justice," i.e., he was not brought
within the jurisdiction of the court because he had successfully evaded arrest; or if
he was brought within the jurisdiction of the court and was tried and convicted, he
has successfully evaded service of sentence because he had jumped bail or
escaped. The disqualification then is based on his flight from justice. In the face of
the settled doctrine that flight is an indication of guilt, it may even be truly said that
it is not the challenged disqualifying provision which overcomes the presumption of
innocence but rather the disqualified person himself who has proven his guilt.
Finally, Dumlao vs. COMELEC (95 SCRA 392 [1980]) cannot be invoked to cast
doubt on the validity of the challenged disqualification. Dumlao struck out as
violative of the constitutional presumption of innocence that portion of the second
paragraph, Section 4 of B.P. Blg. 52 providing that "the filing of charges for the
commission of such crimes before a civil court or military tribunal after preliminary
investigation shall be  prima facie evidence of such fact." It is clear that the law
challenged therein did in fact establish a presumption of guilt from the mere filing
of the information or criminal complaint, in violation of the constitutional right to
presumption of innocence.
G.R. No. 192221               November 13, 2012
CASIMIRA S. DELA CRUZ, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOHN LLOYD M. PACETE, Respondents.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
With the adoption of automated election system in our country, one of the
emerging concerns is the application of the law on nuisance candidates under a
new voting system wherein voters indicate their choice of candidates by shading
the oval corresponding to the name of their chosen candidate printed on the
ballots, instead of writing the candidate's name on the appropriate space provided
in the ballots as in previous manual elections. If the name of a nuisance candidate
whose certificate of candidacy had been cancelled by the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) was still included or printed in the official ballots on election
day,should the votes cast for such nuisance candidate be considered stray or
counted in favor of the bona fide candidate?
The Case
In this petition for certiorari with prayer for injunctive relief/s under Rule 65 in
conjunction with Section 2, Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, filed on May 31, 2010, Casimira S. Dela Cruz (petitioner) assails
COMELEC Resolution No. 88441 considering as stray the votes cast in favor of
certain candidates who were either disqualified or whose COCs had been
cancelled/denied due course but whose names still appeared in the official ballots
or certified lists of candidates for the May 10, 2010 elections.
Petitioner prays for the following reliefs:
1. Upon the filing of the instant Petition, a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ
of Preliminary Injunction be issued enjoining the taking of oath and assumption into
office of Private Respondent John Lloyd Pacete as Vice-Mayor of the Municipality
of Bugasong;
2. After the Petition is submitted for resolution, a decision be rendered granting the
instant Petition and:
(a) declaring as null and void the portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 8844
considering as stray the votes cast in favor of the disqualified nuisance candidate
Aurelio N. Dela Cruz;
(b) ordering that the votes cast in favor of Aurelio N. Dela Cruz be counted and
tallied in favor of Petitioner Casimira S. Dela Cruz pursuant to COMELEC
Resolution No. 4116; and
(c) requiring the Regional Trial Court of the Province of Antique where the
Petitioner’s Election Protest is pending to proclaim as Vice-Mayor of the
Municipality of Bugasong the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes
after the votes in favor of nuisance candidate Aurelio N. Dela Cruz is counted and
tallied to the votes garnered by Petitioner Casimira S. Dela Cruz.
3. Permanently enjoining the taking of oath and assumption into office of Private
Respondent if Petitioner is proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of the Municipality of
Bugasong, Province of Antique.
Other just and equitable reliefs are likewise prayed for.2
Factual Antecedents
In the 2001, 2004 and 2007 elections, petitioner ran for and was elected member
of the Sangguniang Bayan(SB) of Bugasong, Antique. On November 28, 2009,
petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy3 for the position of Vice-Mayor of the
Municipality of Bugasong, Province of Antique under the ticket of the National
People’s Coalition (NPC). Subsequently, Aurelio N. Dela Cruz (Aurelio) also filed a
certificate of candidacy4 for the same position.
On December 6, 2009, petitioner filed a petition5 to declare Aurelio a nuisance
candidate on the ground that he filed his certificate of candidacy for the vice-
mayoralty position to put the election process in mockery and to cause confusion
among voters due to the similarity of his surname with petitioner’s surname.
Petitioner emphasized that she is considered a very strong candidate for the said
position having been elected as member of the SB for three consecutive terms
under the ticket of the NPC and obtained the fifth (2001), fourth (2004) and third
(2007) highest number of votes. In contrast, Aurelio is an unknown in the political
scene with no prior political experience as an elective official and no political party
membership. Being a retiree and having no known business, Aurelio has no
sufficient source of income but since the 2007 elections petitioner’s opponents
have been prodding him to run for the same position as petitioner in order to sow
confusion and thwart the will of the voters of Bugasong. Petitioner further cited
Aurelio’s miserable showing in the previous local elections when he ran and
garnered only 126 and 6 votes forthe positionsof SB member (May 2007) and
barangay captain of Barangay Maray, Bugasong (November 2007), respectively.
Citing Bautista v. COMELEC,6 petitioner asserted that these circumstances clearly
demonstrate Aurelio’s lack of a bona fide intention and capability to run for the
position of Vice-Mayor, thus preventing a faithful determination of the true will of
the electorate.
On January 29, 2010, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution7 declaring
Aurelio as a nuisance candidate and cancelling his certificate of candidacy for the
vice-mayoralty position in Bugasong.
Despite the declaration of Aurelio as a nuisance candidate, however, his name
was not deleted in the Certified List of Candidates8 and Official Sample
Ballot9 issued by the COMELEC. The names of the candidates for Vice-Mayor,
including Aurelio and respondent John Lloyd M. Pacete, appeared on the Official
Sample Ballot as follows:
VICE-MAYOR
Vote for not more than 1
O 1. DELA CRUZ, O 2. DELA CRUZ, O 3. PACETE, John  
Aurelio N. Casimira Lloyd M.
"REL" (IND.) S. "MIRAY" (NPC) "BINGBING" (NP)
Consequently, petitioner filed on March 23, 2010, an Urgent Ex-Parte Omnibus
Motion10 praying, among other things, that COMELEC issue an order directing the
deletion of Aurelio’s name from the Official List of Candidates for the position of
Vice-Mayor, the Official Ballots, and other election paraphernalia to be used in
Bugasong for the May 2010 elections. She also prayed that in the event Aurelio’s
name can no longer be deleted in time for the May 10, 2010 elections, the
COMELEC issue an order directing that all votes cast in favor of Aurelio be
credited in her favor, in accordance with COMELEC Resolution No. 4116 dated
May 7, 2001.
On May 1, 2010, the COMELEC En Banc issued Resolution No. 884411 listing the
names of disqualified candidates, including Aurelio, and disposing as follows:
NOW THEREFORE, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, as
follows:
1. to delete the names of the foregoing candidates from the certified list of
candidates; and
2. to consider stray the votes of said candidates, if voted upon.12 (Emphasis
supplied)
On May 10, 2010, the first automated national and local elections proceeded as
scheduled. Aurelio’s name remained in the official ballots.
During the canvassing of the votes by the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBOC)
of Bugasong on May 13, 2010, petitioner insisted that the votes cast in favor of
Aurelio be counted in her favor. However, the MBOC refused, citing Resolution No.
8844. The Statement of Votes by Precinct for Vice-Mayor of Antique-
Bugasong13 showed the following results of the voting:
TOTAL RANK
DELA CRUZ, AURELIO N. 532 3
DELA CRUZ, CASIMIRA S. 6389 2
PACETE, JOHN LLOYD M. 6428 1
Consequently, on May 13, 2010, private respondent John Lloyd M. Pacete was
proclaimed Vice-Mayor of Bugasong by the MBOC of Bugasong.14
On May 21, 2010, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court of the Province of
Antique an election protest praying for (1) the tallying in her favor of the 532 votes
cast for Aurelio; (2) the annulment of respondent Pacete’s proclamation as Vice-
Mayor of Bugasong; and (3) her proclamation as winning candidate for the position
of Vice-Mayor of Bugasong.
Petitioner’s Arguments
Considering that private respondent won by a margin of only thirty-nine (39) votes
over petitioner’s 6,389 votes, petitioner contends that she would have clearly won
the elections for Vice-Mayor of Bugasong had the MBOC properly tallied or added
the votes cast for Aurelio to her votes. Thus, petitioner insists she would have
garnered a total of 6,921 votes as against the 6,428 votes of private respondent.
By issuing a directive to consider the votes cast for Aurelio as stray votes instead
of counting the same in favor of petitioner in accordance with COMELEC
Resolution No. 4116, the COMELEC’s First Division gravely abused its discretion.
Petitioner argues that Resolution No. 8844 violates her constitutional right to equal
protection of the laws because there is no substantial difference between the
previous manual elections and the automated elections conducted in 2010 to
justify non-observance of Resolution No. 4116 issued in 2001,particularly on the
matter of votes cast for a candidate who was declared a nuisance candidate in a
final judgment where such nuisance candidate has the same name with that of the
bona fide candidate. Moreover, in contrast to the assailed resolution, COMELEC
Resolution No. 4116 properly recognized the substantial distinctions between and
among (a) disqualified candidates, (b) nuisance candidates whose names are
similar to those of the bona fide candidates, (c) nuisance candidates who do not
have similar names with those of the bona fide candidates, and (d) candidates who
had voluntarily withdrawn their certificates of candidacy. As a result of the failure of
the COMELEC’s First Division to make these important distinctions when it issued
Resolution No. 8844 that applies to disqualified candidates, nuisance candidates
and all other candidates whose certificates of candidacy had been cancelled or
denied course, petitioner’s right to due process was clearly violated, and only
made possible the very evil that is sought to be corrected by the former rule not to
consider the votes cast for the nuisance candidate as stray but count them in favor
of the bona fide candidate.
Respondents’ Arguments
COMELEC maintains that there is a presumption of validity with respect to its
exercise of supervisory or regulatory authority in the conduct of elections. Also, the
time-honored rule is that a statute is presumed to be constitutional and that the
party assailing it must discharge the burden of clearly and convincingly proving its
invalidity. Thus, to strike down a law as unconstitutional, there must be a clear and
unequivocal showing that what the law prohibits, the statute permits. In this case,
petitioner miserably failed to prove a clear breach of the Constitution; she merely
invokes a violation of the equal protection clause and due process of law without
any basis.
On the claim of equal protection violation, COMELEC contends that there is a
substantial distinction between a manual election where Resolution No. 4116
applies, and an automated election governed by Resolution No. 8844. While the
votes for the nuisance candidate were not considered stray but counted in favor of
the bona fide candidate, this is no longer the rule for automated elections.
COMELEC cites the following factors which changed the previous rule: (1) the
official ballots in automated elections now contain the full names of the official
candidates so that when a voter shaded an oval, it was presumed that he carefully
read the name adjacent to it and voted for that candidate, regardless of whether
said candidate was later declared disqualified or nuisance; (2) since the names of
the candidates are clearly printed on the ballots, unlike in manual elections when
these were only listed in a separate sheet of paper attached to the ballot secrecy
folder, the voter’s intention is clearly to vote for the candidate corresponding to the
shaded oval; (3) the rules on appreciation of ballots under Section 211, Article
XVIII of the Omnibus Election Code apply only to elections where the names of
candidates are handwritten in the ballots; and (4) with the use of the automated
election system where the counting of votes is delegated to the Precinct Count
Optical Scan (PCOS) machines, pre-proclamation controversies, including
complaints regarding the appreciation of ballots and allegations of misreading the
names of the candidates written, were flaws which the automation rectified. Aside
from being germane to the purpose of our election laws, Resolution No. 8844 is
not limited to existing conditions as it is applicable to all persons of the same class
even in succeeding elections, and covered all disqualified and nuisance
candidates without distinction.
Lastly, COMELEC asserts there is no violation of the right to due process. For
public office is not a property right and no one has a vested right to any public
office.
On his part, private respondent Pacete asserts that petitioner cannot validly claim
the votes cast for Aurelio in view of the rule provided in Section 211 (24) of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881, which cannot be supplanted by Resolution No. 4116. He also
cites an annotation on election law,15 invoking this Court’s ruling in Kare v.
COMELEC16 that the aforesaid provision when read together with Section 72, are
understood to mean that "any vote cast in favor of a candidate, whose
disqualification has already been declared final regardless of the ground therefor,
shall be considered stray."
Private respondent also points out the fact that on May 4, 2010, COMELEC
caused the publication of Resolution No. 8844 in two newspapers of general
circulation in the country. There was thus an earnest effort on the part of
COMELEC to disseminate the information, especially to the voters in Bugasong,
Antique, that the name of Aurelio was printed on the official ballots as one of the
candidates for Vice-Mayor. Said voters were amply forewarned about the status of
Aurelio’s candidacy and the consequences that will obtain should he still be voted
for. Additionally, the petitioner and Aurelio bear different first names, female and
male, respectively; petitioner and her political party engaged in a massive voter
education during the campaign period, emphasizing to her supporters that she was
given the corresponding number ("2") in the official ballots, and the voters should
be very circumspect in filling up their ballots because in case of error in filling up
the same, they will not be given replacement ballots. As to the Judicial Affidavits of
those who voted for petitioner attesting to the fact of mistakenly shading the oval
beside the name of Aurelio in the ballots, which was attached to the petition,
petitioner in effect would want this Court to sit in judgment as trier of facts.
Ruling of the Court
The petition is meritorious.
The only question that may be raised in a petition for certiorari under Section 2,
Rule 64 of the Revised Rules of Court is whether or not the COMELEC acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.17 For a
petition for certiorari to prosper, there must be a clear showing of caprice and
arbitrariness in the exercise of discretion. There is also grave abuse of discretion
when there is a contravention of the Constitution, the law or existing
jurisprudence.18
COMELEC being a specialized agency tasked with the supervision of elections all
over the country, its factual findings, conclusions, rulings and decisions rendered
on matters falling within its competence shall not be interfered with by this Court in
the absence of grave abuse of discretion or any jurisdictional infirmity or error of
law.19 In this case, Resolution No. 8844 issued by COMELEC clearly contravened
existing law and jurisprudence on the legal effect of declaration of a candidate as a
nuisance candidate, especially in the case of nuisance candidates who have the
same surnames as those of bona fide candidates.
Private respondent argues that no grave abuse of discretion can be imputed on
COMELEC when it issued Resolution No. 8844 which is simply consistent with the
rule laid down in Section 211 (24), Article XVIII and Section 72, Article IX of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code (OEC). Said
provisions state:
SEC. 72. Effects of Disqualification cases and priority. -- The Commission and the
courts shall give priority to cases of disqualification by reason of violation of this
Act to the end that a final decision shall be rendered not later than seven days
before the election in which the disqualification is sought.Any candidate who has
been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the
votes cast for him shall not be counted. Nevertheless, if for any reason, a
candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified
and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, his
violation of the provisions of the preceding sections shall not prevent his
proclamation and assumption of office.
SEC. 211. Rules for the appreciation of ballots. – In the reading and appreciation
of ballots, every ballot shall be presumed to be valid unless there is clear and good
reason to justify its rejection. The board of election inspectors shall observe the
following rules, bearing in mind that the object of the election is to obtain the
expression of the voter’s will:
xxxx
24. Any vote cast in favor of a candidate who has been disqualified by final
judgment shall be considered as stray and shall not be counted but it shall not
invalidate the ballot.
Private respondent cites the case of Kare v. COMELEC20 where this Court,
construing the above provisions, stated:
According to the Comelec, Section 211 (24) of the OEC is a clear legislative policy
that is contrary to the rule that the second placer cannot be declared winner.
We disagree.
The provision that served as the basis of Comelec’s Decision to declare the
second placer as winner in the mayoral race should be read in relation with other
provisions of the OEC. Section 72 thereof, as amended by RA 6646, provides as
follows:
xxxx
When read together,these provisions are understood to mean that any vote cast in
favor of a candidate, whose disqualification has already been declared final
regardless of the ground therefor, shall be considered stray. The Comelec
misconstrued this provision by limiting it only to disqualification by conviction in a
final judgment.
Obviously, the disqualification of a candidate is not only by conviction in a final
judgment; the law lists other grounds for disqualification. It escapes us why the
Comelec insists that Section 211(24) of the OEC is strictly for those convicted by a
final judgment. Such an interpretation is clearly inconsistent with the other
provisions of the election code.21 (Emphasis supplied; italics not ours)
Private respondent thus suggests that regardless of the ground for disqualification,
the votes cast for the disqualified candidate should result in considering the votes
cast for him as stray as explicitly mandated by Section 211(24) in relation to
Section 72 of the OEC.
We disagree.
It bears to stress that Sections 211 (24) and 72 applies to all disqualification cases
and not to petitions to cancel or deny due course to a certificate of candidacy such
as Sections 69 (nuisance candidates) and 78 (material representation shown to be
false). Notably, such facts indicating that a certificate of candidacy has been filed
"to put the election process in mockery or disrepute, or to cause confusion among
the voters by the similarity of the names of the registered candidates, or other
circumstances or acts which clearly demonstrate that the candidate has no bona
fide intention to run for the office for which the certificate of candidacy has been
filed and thus prevent a faithful determination of the true will of the electorate" are
not among those grounds enumerated in Section 68 (giving money or material
consideration to influence or corrupt voters or public officials performing electoral
functions, election campaign overspending and soliciting, receiving or making
prohibited contributions) of the OEC or Section 4022 of Republic Act No. 7160
(Local Government Code of 1991).
In Fermin v. COMELEC,23 this Court distinguished a petition for disqualification
under Section 68 and a petition to cancel or deny due course to a certificate of
candidacy (COC) under Section 78. Said proceedings are governed by different
rules and have distinct outcomes.
At this point, we must stress that a "Section 78" petition ought not to be
interchanged or confused with a "Section 68" petition. They are different remedies,
based on different grounds, and resulting in different eventualities. Private
respondent’s insistence, therefore, that the petition it filed before the COMELEC in
SPA No. 07-372 is in the nature of a disqualification case under Section 68, as it is
in fact captioned a "Petition for Disqualification," does not persuade the Court.
xxxx
To emphasize, a petition for disqualification, on the one hand, can be premised on
Section 12 or 68 of the OEC, or Section 40 of the LGC. On the other hand, a
petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC can only be grounded on a
statement of a material representation in the said certificate that is false. The
petitions also have different effects. While a person who is disqualified under
Section 68 is merely prohibited to continue as a candidate, the person whose
certificate is cancelled or denied due course under Section 78 is not treated as a
candidate at all, as if he/she never filed a CoC. Thus, in Miranda v. Abaya, this
Court made the distinction that a candidate who is disqualified under Section 68
can validly be substituted under Section 77 of the OEC because he/she remains a
candidate until disqualified; but a person whose CoC has been denied due course
or cancelled under Section 78 cannot be substituted because he/she is never
considered a candidate.24 (Additional emphasis supplied)
Clearly, a petition to cancel or deny due course to a COC under Section 69 as in
Section 78 cannot be treated in the same manner as a petition to disqualify under
Section 68 as what COMELEC did when it applied the rule provided in Section 72
that the votes cast for a disqualified candidate be considered stray, to those
registered candidates whose COC’s had been cancelled or denied due course.
Strictly speaking, a cancelled certificate cannot give rise to a valid candidacy, and
much less to valid votes. Said votes cannot be counted in favor of the candidate
whose COC was cancelled as he/she is not treated as a candidate at all, as if
he/she never filed a COC. But should these votes cast for the candidate whose
COC was cancelled or denied due course be considered stray?
COMELEC Resolution No. 4116 issued in relation to the finality of resolutions or
decisions in special action cases, provides:
This pertains to the finality of decisions or resolutions of the commission en banc
or division, particularly on special actions (disqualification cases).
special action cases refer to the following:
(a) petition to deny due course to a certificate of candidacy;
(b) petition to declare a candidate as a nuisance candidate;
(c) petition to disqualify a candidate; and
(d) petition to postpone or suspend an election.
Considering the foregoing and in order to guide field officials on the finality of
decisions or resolutions on special action cases (disqualification cases) the
Commission, RESOLVES, as it is hereby RESOLVED, as follows:
(1) the decision or resolution of the En Banc of the Commission on disqualification
cases shall become final and executory after five (5) days from its promulgation
unless restrained by the Supreme Court;
xxx
(4) the decision or resolution of the En Banc on nuisance candidates, particularly
whether the nuisance candidate has the same name as the bona fide candidate
shall be immediately executory;
(5) the decision or resolution of a DIVISION on nuisance candidate, particularly
where the nuisance candidate has the same name as the bona fide candidate shall
be immediately executory after the lapse of five (5) days unless a motion for
reconsideration is seasonably filed. In which case, the votes cast shall not be
considered stray but shall be counted and tallied for the bona fide candidate.
All resolutions, orders and rules inconsistent herewith are hereby modified or
repealed. (Emphasis supplied)25
The foregoing rule regarding the votes cast for a nuisance candidate declared as
such under a final judgment was applied by this Court in Bautista v.
COMELEC26 where the name of the nuisance candidate Edwin Bautista (having the
same surname with the bona fide candidate) still appeared on the ballots on
election day because while the COMELEC rendered its decision to cancel Edwin
Bautista’s COC on April 30, 1998, it denied his motion for reconsideration only on
May 13, 1998 or three days after the election. We said that the votes for
candidates for mayor separately tallied on orders of the COMELEC Chairman was
for the purpose of later counting the votes and hence are not really stray votes.
These separate tallies actually made the will of the electorate determinable despite
the apparent confusion caused by a potential nuisance candidate.
But since the COMELEC decision declaring Edwin Bautista a nuisance candidate
was not yet final on electionday, this Court also considered those factual
circumstances showing that the votes mistakenly deemed as "stray votes" refer to
only the legitimate candidate (petitioner Efren Bautista) and could not have been
intended for Edwin Bautista. We further noted that the voters had constructive as
well as actual knowledge of the action of the COMELEC delisting Edwin Bautista
as a candidate for mayor.
A stray vote is invalidated because there is no way of determining the real intention
of the voter. This is, however, not the situation in the case at bar. Significantly, it
has also been established that by virtue of newspaper releases and other forms of
notification, the voters were informed of the COMELEC’s decision to declare Edwin
Bautista a nuisance candidate.27
In the more recent case of Martinez III v. House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal,28 this Court likewise applied the rule in COMELEC Resolution No. 4116
not to consider the votes cast for a nuisance candidate stray but to count them in
favor of the bona fide candidate notwithstanding that the decision to declare him as
such was issued only after the elections.
As illustrated in Bautista, the pendency of proceedings against a nuisance
candidate on election day inevitably exposes the bona fide candidate to the
confusion over the similarity of names that affects the voter’s will and frustrates the
same. It may be that the factual scenario in Bautista is not exactly the same as in
this case, mainly because the Comelec resolution declaring Edwin Bautista a
nuisance candidate was issued before and not after the elections, with the
electorate having been informed thereof through newspaper releases and other
forms of notification on the day of election. Undeniably, however, the adverse
effect on the voter’s will was similarly present in this case, if not worse, considering
the substantial number of ballots with only "MARTINEZ" or
"C. MARTINEZ" written on the line for Representative - over five thousand - which
have been declared as stray votes, the invalidated ballots being more than
sufficient to overcome private respondent’s lead of only 453 votes after the
recount.29
Here, Aurelio was declared a nuisance candidate long before the May 10, 2010
elections. On the basis of Resolution No. 4116, the votes cast for him should not
have been considered stray but counted in favor of petitioner. COMELEC’s
changing of the rule on votes cast for nuisance candidates resulted in the
invalidation of significant number of votes and the loss of petitioner to private
respondent by a slim margin. We observed in Martinez:
Bautista upheld the basic rule that the primordial objective of election laws is to
give effect to, rather than frustrate, the will of the voter. The inclusion of nuisance
candidates turns the electoral exercise into an uneven playing field where the bona
fide candidate is faced with the prospect of having a significant number of votes
cast for him invalidated as stray votes by the mere presence of another candidate
with a similar surname. Any delay on the part of the COMELEC increases the
probability of votes lost in this manner. While political campaigners try to minimize
stray votes by advising the electorate to write the full name of their candidate on
the ballot, still, election woes brought by nuisance candidates persist.
The Court will not speculate on whether the new automated voting system to be
implemented in the May 2010 elections will lessen the possibility of confusion over
the names of candidates. What needs to be stressed at this point is the apparent
failure of the HRET to give weight to relevant circumstances that make the will of
the electorate determinable, following the precedent in Bautista. x x x30
COMELEC justified the issuance of Resolution No. 8844 to amend the former rule
in Resolution No. 4116 by enumerating those changes brought about by the new
automated election system to the form of official ballots, manner of voting and
counting of votes. It said that the substantial distinctions between manual and
automated elections validly altered the rules on considering the votes cast for the
disqualified or nuisance candidates. As to the rulings in Bautista and Martinez III,
COMELEC opines that these find no application in the case at bar because the
rules on appreciation of ballotsapply only to elections where the names of
candidates are handwritten in the ballots.
The Court is not persuaded.
In Martinez III, we took judicial notice of the reality that, especially in local
elections, political rivals or operators benefited from the usually belated decisions
by COMELEC on petitions to cancel or deny due course to COCs of potential
nuisance candidates. In such instances, political campaigners try to minimize stray
votes by advising the electorate to write the full name of their candidate on the
ballot, but still, election woes brought by nuisance candidates persist.31
As far as COMELEC is concerned, the confusion caused by similarity of surnames
of candidates for the same position and putting the electoral process in mockery or
disrepute, had already been rectified by the new voting system where the voter
simply shades the oval corresponding to the name of their chosen candidate.
However, as shown in this case, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8844 on May 1,
2010, nine days before the elections, with sufficient time to delete the names of
disqualified candidates not just from the Certified List of Candidates but also from
the Official Ballot. Indeed, what use will it serve if COMELEC orders the names of
disqualified candidates to be deleted from list of official candidates if the official
ballots still carry their names?
We hold that the rule in Resolution No. 4116 considering the votes cast for a
nuisance candidate declared as such in a final judgment, particularly where such
nuisance candidate has the same surname as that of the legitimate candidate,
notstray but counted in favor of the latter, remains a good law. As earlier
discussed, a petition to cancel or deny a COC under Section 69 of the OEC should
be distinguished from a petition to disqualify under Section 68. Hence, the legal
effect of such cancellation of a COC of a nuisance candidate cannot be equated
with a candidate disqualified on grounds provided in the OEC and Local
Government Code.
Moreover, private respondent admits that the voters were properly informed of the
cancellation of COC of Aurelio because COMELEC published the same before
election day. As we pronounced in Bautista, the voters’ constructive knowledge of
such cancelled candidacy made their will more determinable, as it is then more
logical to conclude that the votes cast for Aurelio could have been intended only
for the legitimate candidate, petitioner. The possibility of confusion in names of
candidates if the names of nuisance candidates remained on the ballots on
election day, cannot be discounted or eliminated, even under the automated voting
system especially considering that voters who mistakenly shaded the oval beside
the name of the nuisance candidate instead of the bona fide candidate they
intended to vote for could no longer ask for replacement ballots to correct the
same.1âwphi1
Finally, upholding the former rule in Resolution No. 4116 is more consistent with
the rule well-ensconced in our jurisprudence that laws and statutes governing
election contests especially appreciation of ballots must be liberally construed to
the end that the will of the electorate in the choice of public officials may not be
defeated by technical infirmities.32 Indeed, as our electoral experience had
demonstrated, such infirmities and delays in the delisting of nuisance candidates
from both the Certified List of Candidates and Official Ballots only made possible
the very evil sought to be prevented by the exclusion of nuisance candidates
during elections.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GIVEN DUE COURSE and the writ prayed
for, accordingly GRANTED. COMELEC Resolution No. 8844 dated May 1, 2010
insofar as it orders that the votes cast for candidates listed therein, who were
declared nuisance candidates and whose certificates of candidacy have been
either cancelled or set aside, be considered stray, is hereby declared NULL and
VOID. Consequently, the 532 votes cast for Aurelio N. Del a Cruz during the
elections of May 10, 2010 should have been counted in favor of Casimira S. Dela
Cruz and not considered stray votes, making her total garnered votes 6,921 as
against the 6,428 votes of private respondent John Lloyd M. Pacete who was the
declared winner.
Petitioner Casimira S. Dela Cruz is hereby DECLARED the duly elected Vice-
Mayor of the Municipality of Bugasong, Province of Antique in the May 10, 2010
elections.
This Decision is immediately executory.
Let a copy of this Decision be served personally upon the parties and the
Commission on Elections.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 206666               January 21, 2015
ATTY. ALICIA RISOS-VIDAL, Petitioner,
ALFREDO S. LIM Petitioner-Intervenor,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSEPH EJERCITO
ESTRADA, Respondents.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Before the Court are (1) a Petition for Certiorari filed under Rule 64, in relation to
Rule 65, both of the Revised Rules of Court, by Atty. Alicia Risos-Vidal (Risos-
Vidal), which essentially prays for the issuance of the writ of certiorari annulling
and setting aside the April 1, 20131 and April 23, 20132 Resolutions of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC), Second Division and En bane,
respectively, in SPA No. 13-211 (DC), entitled "Atty. Alicia Risos-Vidal v. Joseph
Ejercito Estrada" for having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (2) a Petition-in-Intervention3 filed
by Alfredo S. Lim (Lim), wherein he prays to be declared the 2013 winning
candidate for Mayor of the City of Manila in view of private respondent former
President Joseph Ejercito Estrada’s (former President Estrada) disqualification to
run for and hold public office.
The Facts
The salient facts of the case are as follows:
On September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted former President Estrada,
a former President of the Republic of the Philippines, for the crime of plunder in
Criminal Case No. 26558, entitled "People of the Philippines v. Joseph Ejercito
Estrada, et al." The dispositive part of the graft court’s decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in
Criminal Case No. 26558 finding the accused, Former President Joseph Ejercito
Estrada, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of PLUNDER, defined in
and penalized by Republic Act No. 7080, as amended. On the other hand, for
failure of the prosecution to prove and establish their guilt beyond reasonable
doubt, the Court finds the accused Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada and Atty. Edward S.
Serapio NOT GUILTY of the crime of plunder, and accordingly, the Court hereby
orders their ACQUITTAL.
The penalty imposable for the crime of plunder under Republic Act No. 7080, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659, is Reclusion Perpetua to Death. There being
no aggravating or mitigating circumstances, however, the lesser penalty shall be
applied in accordance with Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code. Accordingly, the
accused Former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada is hereby sentenced to suffer
the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and the accessory penalties of civil interdiction
during the period of sentence and perpetual absolute disqualification.
The period within which accused Former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada has
been under detention shall be credited to him in full as long as he agrees
voluntarily in writing to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon
convicted prisoners.
Moreover, in accordance with Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7080, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7659, the Court hereby declares the forfeiture in favor of the
government of the following:
(1) The total amount of Five Hundred Forty[-]Two Million Seven Hundred
Ninety[-]One Thousand Pesos (₱545,291,000.00), with interest and income
earned, inclusive of the amount of Two Hundred Million Pesos (₱200,000,000.00),
deposited in the name and account of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation.
(2) The amount of One Hundred Eighty[-]Nine Million Pesos (₱189,000,000.00),
inclusive of interests and income earned, deposited in the Jose Velarde account.
(3) The real property consisting of a house and lot dubbed as "Boracay Mansion"
located at #100 11th Street, New Manila, Quezon City.
The cash bonds posted by accused Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada and Atty. Edward S.
Serapio are hereby ordered cancelled and released to the said accused or their
duly authorized representatives upon presentation of the original receipt
evidencing payment thereof and subject to the usual accounting and auditing
procedures. Likewise, the hold-departure orders issued against the said accused
are hereby recalled and declared functus oficio.4
On October 25, 2007, however, former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (former
President Arroyo) extended executive clemency, by way of pardon, to former
President Estrada. The full text of said pardon states:
MALACAÑAN PALACE
MANILA
By the President of the Philippines
PARDON
WHEREAS, this Administration has a policy of releasing inmates who have
reached the age of seventy (70),
WHEREAS, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has been under detention for six and a half
years,
WHEREAS, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed to no longer seek any
elective position or office,
IN VIEW HEREOF and pursuant to the authority conferred upon me by the
Constitution, I hereby grant executive clemency to JOSEPH EJERCITO
ESTRADA, convicted by the Sandiganbayan of Plunder and imposed a penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua. He is hereby restored to his civil and political rights.
The forfeitures imposed by the Sandiganbayan remain in force and in full, including
all writs and processes issued by the Sandiganbayan in pursuance hereof, except
for the bank account(s) he owned before his tenure as President.
Upon acceptance of this pardon by JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, this pardon
shall take effect.
Given under my hand at the City of Manila, this 25th Day of October, in the year of
Our Lord, two thousand and seven.
Gloria M. Arroyo (sgd.)
By the President:
IGNACIO R. BUNYE (sgd.)
Acting Executive Secretary5
On October 26, 2007, at 3:35 p.m., former President Estrada "received and
accepted"6 the pardon by affixing his signature beside his handwritten notation
thereon.
On November 30, 2009, former President Estrada filed a Certificate of
Candidacy7 for the position of President. During that time, his candidacy earned
three oppositions in the COMELEC: (1) SPA No. 09-024 (DC), a "Petition to Deny
Due Course and Cancel Certificate of Candidacy" filed by Rev. Elly Velez B. Lao
Pamatong, ESQ; (2) SPA No. 09-028 (DC), a petition for "Disqualification as
Presidential Candidate" filed by Evilio C. Pormento (Pormento); and (3) SPA No.
09-104 (DC), a "Petition to Disqualify Estrada Ejercito, Joseph M.from Running as
President due to Constitutional Disqualification and Creating Confusion to the
Prejudice of Estrada, Mary Lou B" filed by Mary Lou Estrada. In separate
Resolutions8 dated January 20, 2010 by the COMELEC, Second Division,
however, all three petitions were effectively dismissed on the uniform grounds that
(i) the Constitutional proscription on reelection applies to a sitting president; and (ii)
the pardon granted to former President Estrada by former President Arroyo
restored the former’s right to vote and be voted for a public office. The subsequent
motions for reconsideration thereto were denied by the COMELEC En banc.
After the conduct of the May 10, 2010 synchronized elections, however, former
President Estrada only managed to garner the second highest number of votes.
Of the three petitioners above-mentioned, only Pormento sought recourse to this
Court and filed a petition for certiorari, which was docketed as G.R. No. 191988,
entitled "Atty. Evilio C. Pormento v. Joseph ‘ERAP’ Ejercito Estrada and
Commission on Elections." But in a Resolution9 dated August 31, 2010, the Court
dismissed the aforementioned petition on the ground of mootness considering that
former President Estrada lost his presidential bid.
On October 2, 2012, former President Estrada once more ventured into the
political arena, and filed a Certificate of Candidacy,10 this time vying for a local
elective post, that ofthe Mayor of the City of Manila.
On January 24, 2013, Risos-Vidal, the petitioner in this case, filed a Petition for
Disqualification against former President Estrada before the COMELEC. The
petition was docketed as SPA No. 13-211 (DC). Risos Vidal anchored her petition
on the theory that "[Former President Estrada] is Disqualified to Run for Public
Office because of his Conviction for Plunder by the Sandiganbayan in Criminal
Case No. 26558 entitled ‘People of the Philippines vs. Joseph Ejercito Estrada’
Sentencing Him to Suffer the Penalty of Reclusion Perpetuawith Perpetual
Absolute Disqualification."11 She relied on Section 40 of the Local Government
Code (LGC), in relation to Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC), which
state respectively, that:
Sec. 40, Local Government Code:
SECTION 40. Disqualifications.- The following persons are disqualified from
running for any elective local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or
for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2)
years after serving sentence; (b) Those removed from office as a result of an
administrative case;
(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the
Republic;
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or nonpolitical cases here or abroad;
(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right
to reside abroad and continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this
Code; and
(g) The insane or feeble minded. (Emphasis supplied.)
Sec. 12, Omnibus Election Code:
Section 12. Disqualifications. - Any person who has been declared by competent
authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgmentfor
subversion, insurrection, rebellion, or for any offense for which he has been
sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime involving
moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any public
office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty. (Emphases
supplied.)
In a Resolution dated April 1, 2013,the COMELEC, Second Division, dismissed the
petition for disqualification, the fallo of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for
utter lack of merit.12
The COMELEC, Second Division, opined that "[h]aving taken judicial cognizance
of the consolidated resolution for SPA No. 09-028 (DC) and SPA No. 09-104 (DC)
and the 10 May 2010 En Banc resolution affirming it, this Commission will not be
labor the controversy further. Moreso, [Risos-Vidal] failed to present cogent proof
sufficient to reverse the standing pronouncement of this Commission declaring
categorically that [former President Estrada’s] right to seek public office has been
effectively restored by the pardon vested upon him by former President Gloria M.
Arroyo. Since this Commission has already spoken, it will no longer engage in
disquisitions of a settled matter lest indulged in wastage of government
resources."13
The subsequent motion for reconsideration filed by Risos-Vidal was denied in a
Resolution dated April 23, 2013.
On April 30, 2013, Risos-Vidal invoked the Court’s jurisdiction by filing the present
petition. She presented five issues for the Court’s resolution, to wit:
I. RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT
RESPONDENT ESTRADA’S PARDON WAS NOT CONDITIONAL;
II. RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN NOT FINDING THAT
RESPONDENT ESTRADA IS DISQUALIFIED TO RUN AS MAYOR OF MANILA
UNDER SEC. 40 OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENTCODE OF 1991 FOR HAVING
BEEN CONVICTED OF PLUNDER, AN OFFENSE INVOLVING MORAL
TURPITUDE;
III. RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN DISMISSING THE
PETITION FOR DISQUALIFICATION ON THE GROUND THAT THE CASE
INVOLVES THE SAME OR SIMILAR ISSUES IT ALREADY RESOLVED IN THE
CASES OF "PORMENTO VS. ESTRADA", SPA NO. 09-028 (DC) AND IN "RE:
PETITION TO DISQUALIFY ESTRADA EJERCITO, JOSEPH M. FROM
RUNNING AS PRESIDENT, ETC.," SPA NO. 09-104 (DC);
IV. RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN NOT RULING THAT
RESPONDENT ESTRADA’S PARDON NEITHER RESTORED HIS RIGHT OF
SUFFRAGE NOR REMITTED HIS PERPETUAL ABSOLUTE DISQUALIFICATION
FROM SEEKING PUBLIC OFFICE; and
V. RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN NOT HAVING
EXERCISED ITS POWER TO MOTU PROPRIO DISQUALIFY RESPONDENT
ESTRADA IN THE FACE OF HIS PATENT DISQUALIFICATION TO RUN FOR
PUBLIC OFFICE BECAUSE OF HIS PERPETUAL AND ABSOLUTE
DISQUALIFICATION TO SEEK PUBLIC OFFICE AND TO VOTE RESULTING
FROM HIS CRIMINAL CONVICTION FOR PLUNDER.14
While this case was pending beforethe Court, or on May 13, 2013, the elections
were conducted as scheduled and former President Estrada was voted into office
with 349,770 votes cast in his favor. The next day, the local board of canvassers
proclaimed him as the duly elected Mayor of the City of Manila.
On June 7, 2013, Lim, one of former President Estrada’s opponents for the
position of Mayor, moved for leave to intervene in this case. His motion was
granted by the Court in a Resolution15 dated June 25, 2013. Lim subscribed to
Risos-Vidal’s theory that former President Estrada is disqualified to run for and
hold public office as the pardon granted to the latter failed to expressly remit his
perpetual disqualification. Further, given that former President Estrada is
disqualified to run for and hold public office, all the votes obtained by the latter
should be declared stray, and, being the second placer with 313,764 votes to his
name, he (Lim) should be declared the rightful winning candidate for the position of
Mayor of the City of Manila.
The Issue
Though raising five seemingly separate issues for resolution, the petition filed by
Risos-Vidal actually presents only one essential question for resolution by the
Court, that is, whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling that former President Estrada is
qualified to vote and be voted for in public office as a result of the pardon granted
to him by former President Arroyo.
In her petition, Risos-Vidal starts her discussion by pointing out that the pardon
granted to former President Estrada was conditional as evidenced by the latter’s
express acceptance thereof. The "acceptance," she claims, is an indication of the
conditional natureof the pardon, with the condition being embodied in the third
Whereas Clause of the pardon, i.e., "WHEREAS, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has
publicly committed to no longer seek any elective position or office." She explains
that the aforementioned commitment was what impelled former President Arroyo
to pardon former President Estrada, without it, the clemency would not have been
extended. And any breach thereof, that is, whenformer President Estrada filed his
Certificate of Candidacy for President and Mayor of the City of Manila, he
breached the condition of the pardon; hence, "he ought to be recommitted to
prison to serve the unexpired portion of his sentence x x x and disqualifies him as
a candidate for the mayoralty [position] of Manila."16
Nonetheless, Risos-Vidal clarifies that the fundamental basis upon which former
President Estrada mustbe disqualified from running for and holding public elective
office is actually the proscription found in Section 40 of the LGC, in relation to
Section 12 ofthe OEC. She argues that the crime of plunder is both an offense
punishable by imprisonment of one year or more and involving moral turpitude;
such that former President Estrada must be disqualified to run for and hold public
elective office.
Even with the pardon granted to former President Estrada, however, Risos-Vidal
insists that the same did not operate to make available to former President Estrada
the exception provided under Section 12 of the OEC, the pardon being merely
conditional and not absolute or plenary. Moreover, Risos-Vidal puts a premium on
the ostensible requirements provided under Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised
Penal Code, to wit:
ART. 36. Pardon; its effects.– A pardon shall not work the restoration of the right to
hold publicoffice, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored
by the terms of the pardon.
A pardon shall in no case exempt the culprit from the payment of the civil
indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence.
xxxx
ART. 41. Reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal – Their accessory penalties.–
The penalties of reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal shall carry with them
that of civil interdiction for life or during the period of the sentence as the case may
be, and that of perpetual absolute disqualification which the offender shall suffer
even though pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have
been expressly remitted in the pardon. (Emphases supplied.)
She avers that in view of the foregoing provisions of law, it is not enough that a
pardon makes a general statement that such pardon carries with it the restoration
of civil and political rights. By virtue of Articles 36 and 41, a pardon restoring civil
and political rights without categorically making mention what specific civil and
political rights are restored "shall not work to restore the right to hold public office,
or the right of suffrage; nor shall it remit the accessory penalties of civil interdiction
and perpetual absolute disqualification for the principal penalties of reclusion
perpetua and reclusion temporal."17 In other words, she considers the above
constraints as mandatory requirements that shun a general or implied restoration
of civil and political rights in pardons.
Risos-Vidal cites the concurring opinions of Associate Justices Teodoro R. Padilla
and Florentino P. Feliciano in Monsanto v. Factoran, Jr.18 to endorse her position
that "[t]he restoration of the right to hold public office to one who has lost such right
by reason of conviction in a criminal case, but subsequently pardoned, cannot be
left to inference, no matter how intensely arguable, but must be statedin express,
explicit, positive and specific language."
Applying Monsantoto former President Estrada’s case, Risos-Vidal reckons that
"such express restoration is further demanded by the existence of the condition in
the [third] [W]hereas [C]lause of the pardon x x x indubitably indicating that the
privilege to hold public office was not restored to him."19
On the other hand, the Office ofthe Solicitor General (OSG) for public respondent
COMELEC, maintains that "the issue of whether or not the pardon extended to
[former President Estrada] restored his right to run for public office had already
been passed upon by public respondent COMELEC way back in 2010 via its
rulings in SPA Nos. 09-024, 09-028 and 09-104, there is no cogent reason for it to
reverse its standing pronouncement and declare [former President Estrada]
disqualified to run and be voted as mayor of the City of Manila in the absence of
any new argument that would warrant its reversal. To be sure, public respondent
COMELEC correctly exercised its discretion in taking judicial cognizance of the
aforesaid rulings which are known toit and which can be verified from its own
records, in accordance with Section 2, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court on the
courts’ discretionary power to take judicial notice of matters which are of public
knowledge, orare capable of unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known
to them because of their judicial functions."20
Further, the OSG contends that "[w]hile at first glance, it is apparent that [former
President Estrada’s] conviction for plunder disqualifies him from running as mayor
of Manila under Section 40 of the [LGC], the subsequent grant of pardon to him,
however, effectively restored his right to run for any public office."21 The restoration
of his right to run for any public office is the exception to the prohibition under
Section 40 of the LGC, as provided under Section 12 of the OEC. As to the
seeming requirement of Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code, i.e., the
express restoration/remission of a particular right to be stated in the pardon, the
OSG asserts that "an airtight and rigid interpretation of Article 36 and Article 41 of
the [RPC] x x x would be stretching too much the clear and plain meaning of the
aforesaid provisions."22 Lastly, taking into consideration the third Whereas Clause
of the pardon granted to former President Estrada, the OSG supports the position
that it "is not an integral part of the decree of the pardon and cannot therefore
serve to restrict its effectivity."23
Thus, the OSG concludes that the "COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed
Resolutions."24
For his part, former President Estrada presents the following significant arguments
to defend his stay in office: that "the factual findings of public respondent
COMELEC, the Constitutional body mandated to administer and enforce all laws
relative to the conduct of the elections, [relative to the absoluteness of the pardon,
the effects thereof, and the eligibility of former President Estrada to seek public
elective office] are binding [and conclusive] on this Honorable Supreme Court;"
that he "was granted an absolute pardon and thereby restored to his full civil and
political rights, including the right to seek public elective office such as the mayoral
(sic) position in the City of Manila;" that "the majority decision in the case of
Salvacion A. Monsanto v. Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr.,which was erroneously cited
by both Vidal and Lim as authority for their respective claims, x x x reveal that
there was no discussion whatsoever in the ratio decidendi of the Monsanto case
as to the alleged necessity for an expressed restoration of the ‘right to hold public
office in the pardon’ as a legal prerequisite to remove the subject perpetual special
disqualification;" that moreover, the "principal question raised in this Monsanto
case is whether or not a public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon
by the Chief Executive, is entitled to reinstatement toher former position without
need of a new appointment;" that his "expressed acceptance [of the pardon] is not
proof that the pardon extended to [him] is conditional and not absolute;" that this
case is a mere rehash of the casesfiled against him during his candidacy for
President back in 2009-2010; that Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code
"cannot abridge or diminish the pardoning power of the President expressly
granted by the Constitution;" that the text of the pardon granted to him
substantially, if not fully, complied with the requirement posed by Article 36 of the
Revised Penal Code as it was categorically stated in the said document that he
was "restored to his civil and political rights;" that since pardon is an act of grace, it
must be construed favorably in favor of the grantee;25 and that his disqualification
will result in massive disenfranchisement of the hundreds of thousands of
Manileños who voted for him.26
The Court's Ruling
The petition for certiorari lacks merit.
Former President Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored allhis
civil and political rights, which naturally includes the right to seek public elective
office, the focal point of this controversy. The wording of the pardon extended to
former President Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and unqualified. It is likewise
unfettered by Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. The only reasonable,
objective, and constitutional interpretation of the language of the pardon is that the
same in fact conforms to Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. Recall that
the petition for disqualification filed by Risos-Vidal against former President
Estrada, docketed as SPA No. 13-211 (DC), was anchored on Section 40 of the
LGC, in relation to Section 12 of the OEC, that is, having been convicted of a crime
punishable by imprisonment of one year or more, and involving moral turpitude,
former President Estrada must be disqualified to run for and hold public elective
office notwithstanding the fact that he is a grantee of a pardon that includes a
statement expressing "[h]e is hereby restored to his civil and political rights." Risos-
Vidal theorizes that former President Estrada is disqualified from running for Mayor
of Manila inthe May 13, 2013 Elections, and remains disqualified to hold any local
elective post despite the presidential pardon extended to him in 2007 by former
President Arroyo for the reason that it (pardon) did not expressly provide for the
remission of the penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification, particularly the
restoration of his (former President Estrada) right to vote and bevoted upon for
public office. She invokes Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code as the
foundations of her theory.
It is insisted that, since a textual examination of the pardon given to and accepted
by former President Estrada does not actually specify which political right is
restored, it could be inferred that former President Arroyo did not deliberately
intend to restore former President Estrada’s rights of suffrage and to hold public
office, orto otherwise remit the penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification. Even
if her intention was the contrary, the same cannot be upheld based on the pardon’s
text.
The pardoning power of the President cannot be limited by legislative action.
The 1987 Constitution, specifically Section 19 of Article VII and Section 5 of Article
IX-C, provides that the President of the Philippines possesses the power to grant
pardons, along with other acts of executive clemency, to wit:
Section 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this
Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and
remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.
He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority
of all the Members of the Congress.
xxxx
Section 5. No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence for violation of
election laws, rules, and regulations shall be granted by the President without the
favorable recommendation of the Commission.
It is apparent from the foregoing constitutional provisions that the only instances in
which the President may not extend pardon remain to be in: (1) impeachment
cases; (2) cases that have not yet resulted in a final conviction; and (3) cases
involving violations of election laws, rules and regulations in which there was no
favorable recommendation coming from the COMELEC. Therefore, it can be
argued that any act of Congress by way of statute cannot operate to delimit the
pardoning power of the President.
In Cristobal v. Labrador27 and Pelobello v. Palatino,28 which were decided under
the 1935 Constitution,wherein the provision granting pardoning power to the
President shared similar phraseology with what is found in the present 1987
Constitution, the Court then unequivocally declared that "subject to the limitations
imposed by the Constitution, the pardoning power cannot be restricted or
controlled by legislative action." The Court reiterated this pronouncement in
Monsanto v. Factoran, Jr.29 thereby establishing that, under the present
Constitution, "a pardon, being a presidential prerogative, should not be
circumscribed by legislative action." Thus, it is unmistakably the long-standing
position of this Court that the exercise of the pardoning power is discretionary in
the President and may not be interfered with by Congress or the Court, except only
when it exceeds the limits provided for by the Constitution.
This doctrine of non-diminution or non-impairment of the President’s power of
pardon by acts of Congress, specifically through legislation, was strongly adhered
to by an overwhelming majority of the framers of the 1987 Constitution when they
flatly rejected a proposal to carve out an exception from the pardoning power of
the President in the form of "offenses involving graft and corruption" that would be
enumerated and defined by Congress through the enactment of a law. The
following is the pertinent portion lifted from the Record of the Commission (Vol. II):
MR. ROMULO. I ask that Commissioner Tan be recognized to introduce an
amendment on the same section.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Tan is recognized.
SR. TAN. Madam President, lines 7 to 9 state:
However, the power to grant executive clemency for violations of corrupt practices
laws may be limited by legislation.
I suggest that this be deletedon the grounds that, first, violations of corrupt
practices may include a very little offense like stealing ₱10; second, which I think is
more important, I get the impression, rightly or wrongly, that subconsciously we are
drafting a constitution on the premise that all our future Presidents will bebad and
dishonest and, consequently, their acts will be lacking in wisdom. Therefore, this
Article seems to contribute towards the creation of an anti-President Constitution
or a President with vast responsibilities but no corresponding power except to
declare martial law. Therefore, I request that these lines be deleted.
MR. REGALADO. Madam President,may the Committee react to that?
THE PRESIDENT. Yes, please.
MR. REGALADO. This was inserted here on the resolution of Commissioner
Davide because of the fact that similar to the provisions on the Commission on
Elections, the recommendation of that Commission is required before executive
clemency isgranted because violations of the election laws go into the very political
life of the country.
With respect to violations of our Corrupt Practices Law, we felt that it is also
necessary to have that subjected to the same condition because violation of our
Corrupt Practices Law may be of such magnitude as to affect the very economic
systemof the country. Nevertheless, as a compromise, we provided here that it will
be the Congress that will provide for the classification as to which convictions will
still require prior recommendation; after all, the Congress could take into account
whether or not the violation of the Corrupt Practices Law is of such magnitude as
to affect the economic life of the country, if it is in the millions or billions of dollars.
But I assume the Congress in its collective wisdom will exclude those petty crimes
of corruption as not to require any further stricture on the exercise of executive
clemency because, of course, there is a whale of a difference if we consider a
lowly clerk committing malversation of government property or funds involving one
hundred pesos. But then, we also anticipate the possibility that the corrupt practice
of a public officer is of such magnitude as to have virtually drained a substantial
portion of the treasury, and then he goes through all the judicial processes and
later on, a President who may have close connections with him or out of
improvident compassion may grant clemency under such conditions. That is why
we left it to Congress to provide and make a classification based on substantial
distinctions between a minor act of corruption or an act of substantial proportions.
SR. TAN. So, why do we not just insert the word GROSS or GRAVE before the
word "violations"?
MR. REGALADO. We feel that Congress can make a better distinction because
"GRAVE" or "GROSS" can be misconstrued by putting it purely as a policy.
MR. RODRIGO. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Rodrigo is recognized.
MR. RODRIGO. May I speak in favor of the proposed amendment?
THE PRESIDENT. Please proceed.
MR. RODRIGO. The power to grant executive clemency is essentially an executive
power, and that is precisely why it is called executive clemency. In this sentence,
which the amendment seeks to delete, an exception is being made. Congress,
which is the legislative arm, is allowed to intrude into this prerogative of the
executive. Then it limits the power of Congress to subtract from this prerogative of
the President to grant executive clemency by limiting the power of Congress to
only corrupt practices laws. There are many other crimes more serious than these.
Under this amendment, Congress cannot limit the power of executive clemency in
cases of drug addiction and drug pushing which are very, very serious crimes that
can endanger the State; also, rape with murder, kidnapping and treason. Aside
from the fact that it is a derogation of the power of the President to grant executive
clemency, it is also defective in that it singles out just one kind of crime. There are
far more serious crimes which are not included.
MR. REGALADO. I will just make one observation on that. We admit that the
pardoning power is anexecutive power. But even in the provisions on the
COMELEC, one will notice that constitutionally, it is required that there be a
favorable recommendation by the Commission on Elections for any violation of
election laws.
At any rate, Commissioner Davide, as the principal proponent of that and as a
member of the Committee, has explained in the committee meetings we had why
he sought the inclusion of this particular provision. May we call on Commissioner
Davide to state his position.
MR. DAVIDE. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Davide is recognized.
MR. DAVIDE. I am constrained to rise to object to the proposal. We have just
approved the Article on Accountability of Public Officers. Under it, it is mandated
that a public office is a public trust, and all government officers are under obligation
to observe the utmost of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, to lead
modest lives and to act with patriotism and justice.
In all cases, therefore, which would go into the verycore of the concept that a
public office is a public trust, the violation is itself a violation not only of the
economy but the moral fabric of public officials. And that is the reason we now
want that if there is any conviction for the violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, which, in effect, is a violation of the public trust character of the
public office, no pardon shall be extended to the offender, unless some limitations
are imposed.
Originally, my limitation was, it should be with the concurrence of the convicting
court, but the Committee left it entirely to the legislature to formulate the
mechanics at trying, probably, to distinguish between grave and less grave or
serious cases of violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Perhaps this
is now the best time, since we have strengthened the Article on Accountability of
Public Officers, to accompany it with a mandate that the President’s right to grant
executive clemency for offenders or violators of laws relating to the concept of a
public office may be limited by Congress itself.
MR. SARMIENTO. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Sarmiento is recognized.
MR. SARMIENTO. May I briefly speak in favor of the amendment by deletion.
Madam President, over and over again, we have been saying and arguing before
this Constitutional Commission that we are emasculating the powers of the
presidency, and this provision to me is another clear example of that. So, I speak
against this provision. Even the 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions do not provide for
this kind of provision.
I am supporting the amendment by deletion of Commissioner Tan.
MR. ROMULO. Commissioner Tingson would like to be recognized.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Tingson is recognized.
MR. TINGSON. Madam President, I am also in favor of the amendment by deletion
because I am in sympathy with the stand of Commissioner Francisco "Soc"
Rodrigo. I do believe and we should remember that above all the elected or
appointed officers of our Republic, the leader is the President. I believe that the
country will be as the President is, and if we systematically emasculate the power
of this presidency, the time may come whenhe will be also handcuffed that he will
no longer be able to act like he should be acting.
So, Madam President, I am in favor of the deletion of this particular line.
MR. ROMULO. Commissioner Colayco would like to be recognized.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Colayco is recognized.
MR. COLAYCO. Thank you very much, Madam President.
I seldom rise here to object to or to commend or to recommend the approval of
proposals, but now I find that the proposal of Commissioner Tan is worthy of
approval of this body.
Why are we singling out this particular offense? There are other crimes which cast
a bigger blot on the moral character of the public officials.
Finally, this body should not be the first one to limit the almost absolute power of
our Chief Executive in deciding whether to pardon, to reprieve or to commute the
sentence rendered by the court.
I thank you.
THE PRESIDENT. Are we ready to vote now?
MR. ROMULO. Commissioner Padilla would like to be recognized, and after him
will be Commissioner Natividad.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Padilla is recognized.
MR. PADILLA. Only one sentence, Madam President. The Sandiganbayan has
been called the Anti-Graft Court, so if this is allowed to stay, it would mean that the
President’s power togrant pardon or reprieve will be limited to the cases decided
by the Anti-Graft Court, when as already stated, there are many provisions inthe
Revised Penal Code that penalize more serious offenses.
Moreover, when there is a judgment of conviction and the case merits the
consideration of the exercise of executive clemency, usually under Article V of the
Revised Penal Code the judge will recommend such exercise of clemency. And so,
I am in favor of the amendment proposed by Commissioner Tan for the deletion of
this last sentence in Section 17.
THE PRESIDENT. Are we ready to vote now, Mr. Floor Leader?
MR. NATIVIDAD. Just one more.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Natividad is recognized.
MR. NATIVIDAD. I am also against this provision which will again chip more
powers from the President. In case of other criminals convicted in our society, we
extend probation to them while in this case, they have already been convicted and
we offer mercy. The only way we can offer mercy to them is through this executive
clemency extended to them by the President. If we still close this avenue to them,
they would be prejudiced even worse than the murderers and the more vicious
killers in our society. I do not think they deserve this opprobrium and punishment
under the new Constitution.
I am in favor of the proposed amendment of Commissioner Tan.
MR. ROMULO. We are ready tovote, Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Is this accepted by the Committee?
MR. REGALADO. The Committee, Madam President, prefers to submit this to the
floor and also because of the objection of the main proponent, Commissioner
Davide. So we feel that the Commissioners should vote on this question.
VOTING
THE PRESIDENT. As many as are in favor of the proposed amendment of
Commissioner Tan to delete the last sentence of Section 17 appearing on lines 7,
8 and 9, please raise their hand. (Several Members raised their hand.)
As many as are against, please raise their hand. (Few Members raised their hand.)
The results show 34 votes in favor and 4 votes against; the amendment is
approved.30 (Emphases supplied.)
The proper interpretation of Articles
36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.
The foregoing pronouncements solidify the thesis that Articles 36 and 41 of the
Revised Penal Code cannot, in any way, serve to abridge or diminish the exclusive
power and prerogative of the President to pardon persons convicted of violating
penal statutes.
The Court cannot subscribe to Risos-Vidal’s interpretation that the said Articles
contain specific textual commands which must be strictly followed in order to free
the beneficiary of presidential grace from the disqualifications specifically
prescribed by them.
Again, Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 36. Pardon; its effects.– A pardon shall not work the restoration of the right to
hold publicoffice, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored
by the terms of the pardon.
A pardon shall in no case exempt the culprit from the payment of the civil
indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence.
xxxx
ART. 41. Reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal – Their accessory penalties.–
The penalties of reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal shall carry with them
that of civil interdiction for life or during the period of the sentence as the case may
be, and that of perpetual absolute disqualification which the offender shall suffer
even though pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have
been expressly remitted in the pardon. (Emphases supplied.)
A rigid and inflexible reading of the above provisions of law, as proposed by Risos-
Vidal, is unwarranted, especially so if it will defeat or unduly restrict the power of
the President to grant executive clemency.
It is well-entrenched in this jurisdiction that where the words of a statute are clear,
plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied
without attempted interpretation. Verba legis non est recedendum. From the words
of a statute there should be no departure.31 It is this Court’s firm view that the
phrase in the presidential pardon at issue which declares that former President
Estrada "is hereby restored to his civil and political rights" substantially complies
with the requirement of express restoration.
The Dissent of Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen agreed with Risos Vidal that there
was no express remission and/or restoration of the rights of suffrage and/or to hold
public office in the pardon granted to former President Estrada, as required by
Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.
Justice Leonen posits in his Dissent that the aforementioned codal provisions must
be followed by the President, as they do not abridge or diminish the President’s
power to extend clemency. He opines that they do not reduce the coverage of the
President’s pardoning power. Particularly, he states:
Articles 36 and 41 refer only to requirements of convention or form. They only
provide a procedural prescription. They are not concerned with areas where or the
instances when the President may grant pardon; they are only concerned with how
he or she is to exercise such power so that no other governmental instrumentality
needs to intervene to give it full effect.
All that Articles 36 and 41 do is prescribe that, if the President wishes to include in
the pardon the restoration of the rights of suffrage and to hold public office, or the
remission of the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification,he or she
should do so expressly. Articles 36 and 41 only ask that the President state his or
her intentions clearly, directly, firmly, precisely, and unmistakably. To belabor the
point, the President retains the power to make such restoration or remission,
subject to a prescription on the manner by which he or she is to state it.32
With due respect, I disagree with the overbroad statement that Congress may
dictate as to how the President may exercise his/her power of executive clemency.
The form or manner by which the President, or Congress for that matter, should
exercise their respective Constitutional powers or prerogatives cannot be
interfered with unless it is so provided in the Constitution. This is the essence of
the principle of separation of powers deeply ingrained in our system of government
which "ordains that each of the three great branches of government has exclusive
cognizance of and is supreme in matters falling within its own constitutionally
allocated sphere."33 Moreso, this fundamental principle must be observed if
noncompliance with the form imposed by one branch on a co-equal and coordinate
branch will result into the diminution of an exclusive Constitutional prerogative.
For this reason, Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code should be construed
in a way that will give full effect to the executive clemency granted by the
President, instead of indulging in an overly strict interpretation that may serve to
impair or diminish the import of the pardon which emanated from the Office of the
President and duly signed by the Chief Executive himself/herself. The said codal
provisions must be construed to harmonize the power of Congress to define
crimes and prescribe the penalties for such crimes and the power of the President
to grant executive clemency. All that the said provisions impart is that the pardon
of the principal penalty does notcarry with it the remission of the accessory
penalties unless the President expressly includes said accessory penalties in the
pardon. It still recognizes the Presidential prerogative to grant executive clemency
and, specifically, to decide to pardon the principal penalty while excluding its
accessory penalties or to pardon both. Thus, Articles 36 and 41 only clarify the
effect of the pardon so decided upon by the President on the penalties imposedin
accordance with law.
A close scrutiny of the text of the pardon extended to former President Estrada
shows that both the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua and its accessory
penalties are included in the pardon. The first sentence refers to the executive
clemency extended to former President Estrada who was convicted by the
Sandiganbayan of plunder and imposed a penalty of reclusion perpetua. The latter
is the principal penalty pardoned which relieved him of imprisonment. The
sentence that followed, which states that "(h)e is hereby restored to his civil and
political rights," expressly remitted the accessory penalties that attached to the
principal penalty of reclusion perpetua. Hence, even if we apply Articles 36 and 41
of the Revised Penal Code, it is indubitable from the textof the pardon that the
accessory penalties of civil interdiction and perpetual absolute disqualification were
expressly remitted together with the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua.
In this jurisdiction, the right toseek public elective office is recognized by law as
falling under the whole gamut of civil and political rights.
Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9225,34 otherwise known as the "Citizenship
Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003," reads as follows:
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities.– Those who retain or reacquire
Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be
subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the
Philippines and the following conditions: (1) Those intending to exercise their right
of suffrage must meet the requirements under Section 1, Article V of the
Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as "The Overseas Absentee
Voting Act of 2003" and other existing laws;
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the
qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and
existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any
public officer authorized to administer an oath;
(3) Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and swear an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and its duly constituted authorities
prior to their assumption of office: Provided, That they renounce their oath of
allegiance to the country where they took that oath; (4) Those intending to practice
their profession in the Philippines shall apply with the proper authority for a license
or permit to engage in such practice; and
(5) That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office in the
Philippines cannot be exercised by, or extended to, those who:
(a) are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the country of which
theyare naturalized citizens; and/or
(b) are in active service as commissioned or non commissioned officers in the
armed forces of the country which they are naturalized citizens. (Emphases
supplied.)
No less than the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which the
Philippines is a signatory, acknowledges the existence of said right. Article 25(b) of
the Convention states: Article 25
Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the
distinctions mentioned in Article 2 and without unreasonable restrictions:
xxxx
(b) To vote and to be electedat genuine periodic elections which shall be by
universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the
free expression of the will of the electors[.] (Emphasis supplied.)
Recently, in Sobejana-Condon v. Commission on Elections,35 the Court
unequivocally referred to the right to seek public elective office as a political right,
to wit:
Stated differently, it is an additional qualification for elective office specific only to
Filipino citizens who re-acquire their citizenship under Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225.
It is the operative act that restores their right to run for public office. The petitioner’s
failure to comply there with in accordance with the exact tenor of the law, rendered
ineffectual the Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship she executed
on September 18, 2006. As such, she is yet to regain her political right to seek
elective office. Unless she executes a sworn renunciation of her Australian
citizenship, she is ineligible to run for and hold any elective office in the
Philippines. (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, from both law and jurisprudence, the right to seek public elective office is
unequivocally considered as a political right. Hence, the Court reiterates its earlier
statement that the pardon granted to former President Estrada admits no other
interpretation other than to mean that, upon acceptance of the pardon granted
tohim, he regained his FULL civil and political rights – including the right to seek
elective office.
On the other hand, the theory of Risos-Vidal goes beyond the plain meaning of
said penal provisions; and prescribes a formal requirement that is not only
unnecessary but, if insisted upon, could be in derogation of the constitutional
prohibition relative to the principle that the exercise of presidential pardon cannot
be affected by legislative action.
Risos-Vidal relied heavily on the separate concurring opinions in Monsanto v.
Factoran, Jr.36 to justify her argument that an absolute pardon must expressly state
that the right to hold public office has been restored, and that the penalty of
perpetual absolute disqualification has been remitted.
This is incorrect.
Her reliance on said opinions is utterly misplaced. Although the learned views of
Justices Teodoro R. Padilla and Florentino P. Feliciano are to be respected, they
do not form partof the controlling doctrine nor to be considered part of the law of
the land. On the contrary, a careful reading of the majority opinion in Monsanto,
penned by no less than Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan, reveals no statement that
denotes adherence to a stringent and overly nuanced application of Articles 36 and
41 of the Revised Penal Code that will in effect require the President to use a
statutorily prescribed language in extending executive clemency, even if the intent
of the President can otherwise be deduced from the text or words used in the
pardon. Furthermore, as explained above, the pardon here is consistent with, and
not contrary to, the provisions of Articles 36 and 41.
The disqualification of former President Estrada under Section 40 of the LGC in
relation to Section 12 of the OEC was removed by his acceptance of the absolute
pardon granted to him.
Section 40 of the LGC identifies who are disqualified from running for any elective
local position. Risos-Vidal argues that former President Estrada is disqualified
under item (a), to wit:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or
for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2)
years after serving sentence[.] (Emphasis supplied.)
Likewise, Section 12 of the OEC provides for similar prohibitions, but it provides for
an exception, to wit:
Section 12. Disqualifications. – x x x unless he has been given plenary pardon or
granted amnesty. (Emphasis supplied.)
As earlier stated, Risos-Vidal maintains that former President Estrada’s conviction
for plunder disqualifies him from running for the elective local position of Mayor of
the City of Manila under Section 40(a) of the LGC. However, the subsequent
absolute pardon granted to former President Estrada effectively restored his right
to seek public elective office. This is made possible by reading Section 40(a) of the
LGC in relation to Section 12 of the OEC.
While it may be apparent that the proscription in Section 40(a) of the LGC is
worded in absolute terms, Section 12 of the OEC provides a legal escape from the
prohibition – a plenary pardon or amnesty. In other words, the latter provision
allows any person who has been granted plenary pardon or amnesty after
conviction by final judgment of an offense involving moral turpitude, inter alia, to
run for and hold any public office, whether local or national position.
Take notice that the applicability of Section 12 of the OEC to candidates running
for local elective positions is not unprecedented. In Jalosjos, Jr. v. Commission on
Elections,37 the Court acknowledged the aforementioned provision as one of the
legal remedies that may be availed of to disqualify a candidate in a local election
filed any day after the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy, but not later
than the date of proclamation.38 The pertinent ruling in the Jalosjos case is quoted
as follows:
What is indisputably clear is that false material representation of Jalosjos is a
ground for a petition under Section 78. However, since the false material
representation arises from a crime penalized by prision mayor, a petition under
Section 12 ofthe Omnibus Election Code or Section 40 of the Local Government
Code can also be properly filed. The petitioner has a choice whether to anchor his
petition on Section 12 or Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, or on Section
40 of the Local Government Code. The law expressly provides multiple remedies
and the choice of which remedy to adopt belongs to petitioner.39 (Emphasis
supplied.)
The third preambular clause of the pardon did not operate to make the pardon
conditional.
Contrary to Risos-Vidal’s declaration, the third preambular clause of the pardon,
i.e., "[w]hereas, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed to no longer seek
any elective position or office," neither makes the pardon conditional, nor militate
against the conclusion that former President Estrada’s rights to suffrage and to
seek public elective office have been restored.
This is especially true as the pardon itself does not explicitly impose a condition or
limitation, considering the unqualified use of the term "civil and political rights"as
being restored. Jurisprudence educates that a preamble is not an essential part of
an act as it is an introductory or preparatory clause that explains the reasons for
the enactment, usually introduced by the word "whereas."40 Whereas clauses do
not form part of a statute because, strictly speaking, they are not part of the
operative language of the statute.41 In this case, the whereas clause at issue is not
an integral part of the decree of the pardon, and therefore, does not by itself alone
operate to make the pardon conditional or to make its effectivity contingent upon
the fulfilment of the aforementioned commitment nor to limit the scope of the
pardon.
On this matter, the Court quotes with approval a relevant excerpt of COMELEC
Commissioner Maria Gracia Padaca’s separate concurring opinion in the assailed
April 1, 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC in SPA No. 13-211 (DC), which
captured the essence of the legal effect of preambular paragraphs/whereas
clauses, viz:
The present dispute does not raise anything which the 20 January 2010 Resolution
did not conclude upon. Here, Petitioner Risos-Vidal raised the same argument with
respect to the 3rd "whereas clause" or preambular paragraph of the decree of
pardon. It states that "Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed to no longer
seek any elective position or office." On this contention, the undersigned reiterates
the ruling of the Commission that the 3rd preambular paragraph does not have any
legal or binding effect on the absolute nature of the pardon extended by former
President Arroyo to herein Respondent. This ruling is consistent with the traditional
and customary usage of preambular paragraphs. In the case of Echegaray v.
Secretary of Justice, the Supreme Court ruled on the legal effect of preambular
paragraphs or whereas clauses on statutes. The Court stated, viz.:
Besides, a preamble is really not an integral part of a law. It is merely an
introduction to show its intent or purposes. It cannot be the origin of rights and
obligations. Where the meaning of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the
preamble can neither expand nor restrict its operation much less prevail over its
text.
If former President Arroyo intended for the pardon to be conditional on
Respondent’s promise never to seek a public office again, the former ought to
have explicitly stated the same in the text of the pardon itself. Since former
President Arroyo did not make this an integral part of the decree of pardon, the
Commission is constrained to rule that the 3rd preambular clause cannot be
interpreted as a condition to the pardon extended to former President
Estrada.42 (Emphasis supplied.)
Absent any contrary evidence, former President Arroyo’s silence on former
President Estrada’s decision torun for President in the May 2010 elections against,
among others, the candidate of the political party of former President Arroyo, after
the latter’s receipt and acceptance of the pardon speaks volume of her intention to
restore him to his rights to suffrage and to hold public office.
Where the scope and import of the executive clemency extended by the President
is in issue, the Court must turn to the only evidence available to it, and that is the
pardon itself. From a detailed review ofthe four corners of said document, nothing
therein gives an iota of intimation that the third Whereas Clause is actually a
limitation, proviso, stipulation or condition on the grant of the pardon, such that the
breach of the mentioned commitment not to seek public office will result ina
revocation or cancellation of said pardon. To the Court, what it is simply is a
statement of fact or the prevailing situation at the time the executive clemency was
granted. It was not used as a condition to the efficacy orto delimit the scope of the
pardon.
Even if the Court were to subscribe to the view that the third Whereas Clausewas
one of the reasons to grant the pardon, the pardon itself does not provide for the
attendant consequence of the breach thereof. This Court will be hard put to discern
the resultant effect of an eventual infringement. Just like it will be hard put to
determine which civil or political rights were restored if the Court were to take the
road suggested by Risos-Vidal that the statement "[h]e is hereby restored to his
civil and political rights" excludes the restoration of former President Estrada’s
rights to suffrage and to hold public office. The aforequoted text ofthe executive
clemency granted does not provide the Court with any guide asto how and where
to draw the line between the included and excluded political rights.
Justice Leonen emphasizes the point that the ultimate issue for resolution is not
whether the pardon is contingent on the condition that former President Estrada
will not seek janother elective public office, but it actually concerns the coverage of
the pardon – whether the pardon granted to former President Estrada was so
expansive as to have restored all his political rights, inclusive of the rights of
suffrage and to hold public office. Justice Leonen is of the view that the pardon in
question is not absolute nor plenary in scope despite the statement that former
President Estrada is "hereby restored to his civil and political rights," that is, the
foregoing statement restored to former President Estrada all his civil and political
rights except the rights denied to him by the unremitted penalty of perpetual
absolute disqualification made up of, among others, the rights of suffrage and to
hold public office. He adds that had the President chosen to be so expansive as to
include the rights of suffrage and to hold public office, she should have been more
clear on her intentions.
However, the statement "[h]e is hereby restored to his civil and political rights," to
the mind of the Court, iscrystal clear – the pardon granted to former President
Estrada was absolute, meaning, it was not only unconditional, it was unrestricted in
scope, complete and plenary in character, as the term "political rights"adverted to
has a settled meaning in law and jurisprudence.
With due respect, I disagree too with Justice Leonen that the omission of the
qualifying word "full" can be construed as excluding the restoration of the rights of
suffrage and to hold public office. There appears to be no distinction as to the
coverage of the term "full political rights" and the term "political rights" used alone
without any qualification. How to ascribe to the latter term the meaning that it is
"partial" and not "full" defies one’s understanding. More so, it will be extremely
difficult to identify which of the political rights are restored by the pardon, when the
text of the latter is silent on this matter. Exceptions to the grant of pardon cannot
be presumed from the absence of the qualifying word "full" when the pardon
restored the "political rights" of former President Estrada without any exclusion or
reservation.
Therefore, there can be no other conclusion but to say that the pardon granted to
former President Estrada was absolute in the absence of a clear, unequivocal and
concrete factual basis upon which to anchor or support the Presidential intent to
grant a limited pardon.
To reiterate, insofar as its coverageis concerned, the text of the pardon can
withstand close scrutiny even under the provisions of Articles 36 and 41 of the
Revised Penal Code.
The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed Resolutions.
In light of the foregoing, contrary to the assertions of Risos-Vidal, the COMELEC
did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in issuing the assailed Resolutions.
The Court has consistently held that a petition for certiorariagainst actions of the
COMELEC is confined only to instances of grave abuse of discretion amounting to
patentand substantial denial of due process, because the COMELEC is presumed
to be most competent in matters falling within its domain.43
As settled in jurisprudence, grave abuse of discretion is the arbitrary exercise of
power due to passion, prejudice or personal hostility; or the whimsical, arbitrary, or
capricious exercise of power that amounts to an evasion or refusal to perform a
positive duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law. For an act to
be condemned as having been done with grave abuse of discretion, such an
abuse must be patent and gross.44
The arguments forwarded by Risos-Vidal fail to adequately demonstrate any
factual or legal bases to prove that the assailed COMELEC Resolutions were
issued in a "whimsical, arbitrary or capricious exercise of power that amounts to an
evasion orrefusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by law" or were so "patent
and gross" as to constitute grave abuse of discretion.
On the foregoing premises and conclusions, this Court finds it unnecessary to
separately discuss Lim's petition-in-intervention, which substantially presented the
same arguments as Risos-Vidal's petition.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and petition-inintervention are
DISMISSED. The Resolution dated April 1, 2013 of the Commission on Elections,
Second Division, and the Resolution dated April 23, 2013 of the Commission on
Elections, En bane, both in SPA No. 13-211 (DC), are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 195649               April 16, 2013
CASAN MACODE MAQUILING, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ROMMEL ARNADO y CAGOCO, LINOG G.
BALUA, Respondents.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ.:
THE CASE
This is a Petition for Certiorari ender Rule 64 in conjunction with Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court to review the Resolutions of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC). The Resolution1 in SPA No. 10-1 09(DC) of the COMELEC First
Division dated 5 October 201 0 is being assailed for applying Section 44 of the
Local Government Code while the Resolution2 of the COMELEC En Banc dated 2
February 2011 is being questioned for finding that respondent Rommel Arnado y
Cagoco (respondent Arnado/Arnado) is solely a Filipino citizen qualified to run for
public office despite his continued use of a U.S. passport.
FACTS
Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen.3 However, as a consequence
of his subsequent naturalization as a citizen of the United States of America, he
lost his Filipino citizenship. Arnado applied for repatriation under Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 9225 before the Consulate General of the Philippines in San Franciso,
USA and took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on 10 July
2008.4 On the same day an Order of Approval of his Citizenship Retention and Re-
acquisition was issued in his favor.5
The aforementioned Oath of Allegiance states:
I, Rommel Cagoco Arnado, solemnly swear that I will support and defend the
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders
promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines and I hereby
declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and
will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I impose this obligation
upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion.6
On 3 April 2009 Arnado again took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic and
executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign citizenship, which states:
I, Rommel Cagoco Arnado, do solemnly swear that I absolutely and perpetually
renounce all allegiance and fidelity to the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA of which
I am a citizen, and I divest myself of full employment of all civil and political rights
and privileges of the United States of America.
I solemnly swear that all the foregoing statement is true and correct to the best of
my knowledge and belief.7
On 30 November 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte, which contains, among others, the following
statements:
I am a natural born Filipino citizen / naturalized Filipino citizen.
I am not a permanent resident of, or immigrant to, a foreign country.
I am eligible for the office I seek to be elected to.
I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and will
maintain true faith and allegiance thereto. I will obey the laws, legal orders and
decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities.
I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or
purpose of evasion.8
On 28 April 2010, respondent Linog C. Balua (Balua), another mayoralty
candidate, filed a petition to disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his certificate of
candidacy for municipal mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in connection with
the 10 May 2010 local and national elections.9
Respondent Balua contended that Arnado is not a resident of Kauswagan, Lanao
del Norte and that he is a foreigner, attaching thereto a certification issued by the
Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April 2010 indicating the nationality of Arnado as
"USA-American."10To further bolster his claim of Arnado’s US citizenship, Balua
presented in his Memorandum a computer-generated travel record11 dated 03
December 2009 indicating that Arnado has been using his US Passport No.
057782700 in entering and departing the Philippines. The said record shows that
Arnado left the country on 14 April 2009 and returned on 25 June 2009, and again
departed on 29 July 2009, arriving back in the Philippines on 24 November 2009.
Balua likewise presented a certification from the Bureau of Immigration dated 23
April 2010, certifying that the name "Arnado, Rommel Cagoco" appears in the
available Computer Database/Passenger manifest/IBM listing on file as of 21 April
2010, with the following pertinent travel records:
DATE OF Arrival : 01/12/2010
NATIONALITY : USA-AMERICAN
PASSPORT : 057782700
DATE OF Arrival : 03/23/2010
NATIONALITY : USA-AMERICAN
PASSPORT : 05778270012
On 30 April 2010, the COMELEC (First Division) issued an Order13 requiring the
respondent to personally file his answer and memorandum within three (3) days
from receipt thereof.
After Arnado failed to answer the petition, Balua moved to declare him in default
and to present evidence ex-parte.
Neither motion was acted upon, having been overtaken by the 2010 elections
where Arnado garnered the highest number of votes and was subsequently
proclaimed as the winning candidate for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.
It was only after his proclamation that Arnado filed his verified answer, submitting
the following documents as evidence:14
1. Affidavit of Renunciation and Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines dated 03 April 2009;
2. Joint-Affidavit dated 31 May 2010 of Engr. Virgil Seno, Virginia Branzuela,
Leoncio Daligdig, and Jessy Corpin, all neighbors of Arnado, attesting that Arnado
is a long-time resident of Kauswagan and that he has been conspicuously and
continuously residing in his family’s ancestral house in Kauswagan;
3. Certification from the Punong Barangay of Poblacion, Kauswagan, Lanao del
Norte dated 03 June 2010 stating that Arnado is a bona fide resident of his
barangay and that Arnado went to the United States in 1985 to work and returned
to the Philippines in 2009;
4. Certification dated 31 May 2010 from the Municipal Local Government
Operations Office of Kauswagan stating that Dr. Maximo P. Arnado, Sr. served as
Mayor of Kauswagan, from January 1964 to June 1974 and from 15 February
1979 to 15 April 1986; and
5. Voter Certification issued by the Election Officer of Kauswagan certifying that
Arnado has been a registered voter of Kauswagan since 03 April 2009.
THE RULING OF THE COMELEC FIRST DIVISION
Instead of treating the Petition as an action for the cancellation of a certificate of
candidacy based on misrepresentation,15 the COMELEC First Division considered
it as one for disqualification. Balua’s contention that Arnado is a resident of the
United States was dismissed upon the finding that "Balua failed to present any
evidence to support his contention,"16 whereas the First Division still could "not
conclude that Arnado failed to meet the one-year residency requirement under the
Local Government Code."17
In the matter of the issue of citizenship, however, the First Division disagreed with
Arnado’s claim that he is a Filipino citizen.18
We find that although Arnado appears to have substantially complied with the
requirements of R.A. No. 9225, Arnado’s act of consistently using his US passport
after renouncing his US citizenship on 03 April 2009 effectively negated his
Affidavit of Renunciation.
xxxx
Arnado’s continued use of his US passport is a strong indication that Arnado had
no real intention to renounce his US citizenship and that he only executed an
Affidavit of Renunciation to enable him to run for office. We cannot turn a blind eye
to the glaring inconsistency between Arnado’s unexplained use of a US passport
six times and his claim that he re-acquired his Philippine citizenship and
renounced his US citizenship. As noted by the Supreme Court in the Yu case, "a
passport is defined as an official document of identity and nationality issued to a
person intending to travel or sojourn in foreign countries." Surely, one who truly
divested himself of US citizenship would not continue to avail of privileges
reserved solely for US nationals.19
The dispositive portion of the Resolution rendered by the COMELEC
First Division reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for disqualification and/or to
cancel the certificate of candidacy of Rommel C. Arnado is hereby GRANTED.
Rommel C. Arnado’s proclamation as the winning candidate for Municipal Mayor of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Nore is hereby ANNULLED. Let the order of succession
under Section 44 of the Local Government Code of 1991 take effect.20
The Motion for Reconsideration and
the Motion for Intervention
Arnado sought reconsideration of the resolution before the COMELEC En Banc on
the ground that "the evidence is insufficient to justify the Resolution and that the
said Resolution is contrary to law."21 He raised the following contentions:22
1. The finding that he is not a Filipino citizen is not supported by the evidence
consisting of his Oath of Allegiance and the Affidavit of Renunciation, which show
that he has substantially complied with the requirements of R.A. No. 9225;
2. The use of his US passport subsequent to his renunciation of his American
citizenship is not tantamount to a repudiation of his Filipino citizenship, as he did
not perform any act to swear allegiance to a country other than the Philippines;
3. He used his US passport only because he was not informed of the issuance of
his Philippine passport, and that he used his Philippine passport after he obtained
it;
4. Balua’s petition to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Arnado was filed out of
time, and the First Division’s treatment of the petition as one for disqualification
constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction;23
5. He is undoubtedly the people’s choice as indicated by his winning the elections;
6. His proclamation as the winning candidate ousted the COMELEC from
jurisdiction over the case; and
7. The proper remedy to question his citizenship is through a petition for quo
warranto, which should have been filed within ten days from his proclamation.
Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling (Maquiling), another candidate for mayor of
Kauswagan, and who garnered the second highest number of votes in the 2010
elections, intervened in the case and filed before the COMELEC En Banc a Motion
for Reconsideration together with an Opposition to Arnado’s Amended Motion for
Reconsideration. Maquiling argued that while the First Division correctly
disqualified Arnado, the order of succession under Section 44 of the Local
Government Code is not applicable in this case. Consequently, he claimed that the
cancellation of Arnado’s candidacy and the nullification of his proclamation,
Maquiling, as the legitimate candidate who obtained the highest number of lawful
votes, should be proclaimed as the winner.
Maquiling simultaneously filed his Memorandum with his Motion for Intervention
and his Motion for Reconsideration. Arnado opposed all motions filed by Maquiling,
claiming that intervention is prohibited after a decision has already been rendered,
and that as a second-placer, Maquiling undoubtedly lost the elections and thus
does not stand to be prejudiced or benefitted by the final adjudication of the case.
RULING OF THE COMELEC EN BANC
In its Resolution of 02 February 2011, the COMELEC En Banc held that under
Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, the Commission "shall continue with the trial
and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest even after the proclamation of the
candidate whose qualifications for office is questioned."
As to Maquiling’s intervention, the COMELEC En Banc also cited Section 6 of R.A.
No. 6646 which allows intervention in proceedings for disqualification even after
elections if no final judgment has been rendered, but went on further to say that
Maquiling, as the second placer, would not be prejudiced by the outcome of the
case as it agrees with the dispositive portion of the Resolution of the First Division
allowing the order of succession under Section 44 of the Local Government Code
to take effect.
The COMELEC En Banc agreed with the treatment by the First Division of the
petition as one for disqualification, and ruled that the petition was filed well within
the period prescribed by law,24 having been filed on 28 April 2010, which is not
later than 11 May 2010, the date of proclamation.
However, the COMELEC En Banc reversed and set aside the ruling of the First
Division and granted Arnado’s Motion for Reconsideration, on the following
premises:
First:
By renouncing his US citizenship as imposed by R.A. No. 9225, the respondent
embraced his Philippine citizenship as though he never became a citizen of
another country. It was at that time, April 3, 2009, that the respondent became a
pure Philippine Citizen again.
xxxx
The use of a US passport … does not operate to revert back his status as a dual
citizen prior to his renunciation as there is no law saying such. More succinctly, the
use of a US passport does not operate to "un-renounce" what he has earlier on
renounced. The First Division’s reliance in the case of In Re: Petition for Habeas
Corpus of Willy Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, et al. is misplaced. The petitioner in the
said case is a naturalized citizen who, after taking his oath as a naturalized
Filipino, applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport. Strict policy is
maintained in the conduct of citizens who are not natural born, who acquire their
citizenship by choice, thus discarding their original citizenship. The Philippine State
expects strict conduct of allegiance to those who choose to be its citizens. In the
present case, respondent is not a naturalized citizen but a natural born citizen who
chose greener pastures by working abroad and then decided to repatriate to
supposedly help in the progress of Kauswagan. He did not apply for a US passport
after his renunciation. Thus the mentioned case is not on all fours with the case at
bar.
xxxx
The respondent presented a plausible explanation as to the use of his US
passport. Although he applied for a Philippine passport, the passport was only
issued on June 18, 2009. However, he was not notified of the issuance of his
Philippine passport so that he was actually able to get it about three (3) months
later. Yet as soon as he was in possession of his Philippine passport, the
respondent already used the same in his subsequent travels abroad. This fact is
proven by the respondent’s submission of a certified true copy of his passport
showing that he used the same for his travels on the following dates: January 31,
2010, April 16, 2010, May 20, 2010, January 12, 2010, March 31, 2010 and June
4, 2010. This then shows that the use of the US passport was because to his
knowledge, his Philippine passport was not yet issued to him for his use. As
probably pressing needs might be undertaken, the respondent used whatever is
within his control during that time.25
In his Separate Concurring Opinion, COMELEC Chairman Sixto Brillantes cited
that the use of foreign passport is not one of the grounds provided for under
Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 63 through which Philippine citizenship may
be lost.
"The application of the more assimilative principle of continuity of citizenship is
more appropriate in this case. Under said principle, once a person becomes a
citizen, either by birth or naturalization, it is assumed that he desires to continue to
be a citizen, and this assumption stands until he voluntarily denationalizes or
expatriates himself. Thus, in the instant case respondent after reacquiring his
Philippine citizenship should be presumed to have remained a Filipino despite his
use of his American passport in the absence of clear, unequivocal and competent
proof of expatriation. Accordingly, all doubts should be resolved in favor of
retention of citizenship."26
On the other hand, Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento dissented, thus:
Respondent evidently failed to prove that he truly and wholeheartedly abandoned
his allegiance to the United States. The latter’s continued use of his US passport
and enjoyment of all the privileges of a US citizen despite his previous renunciation
of the afore-mentioned citizenship runs contrary to his declaration that he chose to
retain only his Philippine citizenship. Respondent’s submission with the twin
requirements was obviously only for the purpose of complying with the
requirements for running for the mayoralty post in connection with the May 10,
2010 Automated National and Local Elections.
Qualifications for elective office, such as citizenship, are continuing requirements;
once any of them is lost during his incumbency, title to the office itself is deemed
forfeited. If a candidate is not a citizen at the time he ran for office or if he lost his
citizenship after his election to office, he is disqualified to serve as such. Neither
does the fact that respondent obtained the plurality of votes for the mayoralty post
cure the latter’s failure to comply with the qualification requirements regarding his
citizenship.
Since a disqualified candidate is no candidate at all in the eyes of the law, his
having received the highest number of votes does not validate his election. It has
been held that where a petition for disqualification was filed before election against
a candidate but was adversely resolved against him after election, his having
obtained the highest number of votes did not make his election valid. His ouster
from office does not violate the principle of vox populi suprema est lex because the
application of the constitutional and statutory provisions on disqualification is not a
matter of popularity. To apply it is to breath[e] life to the sovereign will of the
people who expressed it when they ratified the Constitution and when they elected
their representatives who enacted the law.27
THE PETITION BEFORE THE COURT
Maquiling filed the instant petition questioning the propriety of declaring Arnado
qualified to run for public office despite his continued use of a US passport, and
praying that Maquiling be proclaimed as the winner in the 2010 mayoralty race in
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.
Ascribing both grave abuse of discretion and reversible error on the part of the
COMELEC En Banc for ruling that Arnado is a Filipino citizen despite his continued
use of a US passport, Maquiling now seeks to reverse the finding of the
COMELEC En Banc that Arnado is qualified to run for public office.
Corollary to his plea to reverse the ruling of the COMELEC En Banc or to affirm
the First Division’s disqualification of Arnado, Maquiling also seeks the review of
the applicability of Section 44 of the Local Government Code, claiming that the
COMELEC committed reversible error in ruling that "the succession of the vice
mayor in case the respondent is disqualified is in order."
There are three questions posed by the parties before this Court which will be
addressed seriatim as the subsequent questions hinge on the result of the first.
The first question is whether or not intervention is allowed in a disqualification
case.
The second question is whether or not the use of a foreign passport after
renouncing foreign citizenship amounts to undoing a renunciation earlier made.
A better framing of the question though should be whether or not the use of a
foreign passport after renouncing foreign citizenship affects one’s qualifications to
run for public office.
The third question is whether or not the rule on succession in the Local
Government Code is applicable to this case.
OUR RULING
Intervention of a rival candidate in a
disqualification case is proper when
there has not yet been any
proclamation of the winner.
Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling intervened at the stage when respondent
Arnado filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the First Division Resolution before
the COMELEC En Banc. As the candidate who garnered the second highest
number of votes, Maquiling contends that he has an interest in the disqualification
case filed against Arnado, considering that in the event the latter is disqualified, the
votes cast for him should be considered stray and the second-placer should be
proclaimed as the winner in the elections.
It must be emphasized that while the original petition before the COMELEC is one
for cancellation of the certificate of candidacy and / or disqualification, the
COMELEC First Division and the COMELEC En Banc correctly treated the petition
as one for disqualification.
The effect of a disqualification case is enunciated in Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646:
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been declared by
final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him
shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final
judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the
winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue
with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the
complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the
suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his
guilt is strong.
Mercado v. Manzano28
clarified the right of intervention in a disqualification case. In that case, the Court
said:
That petitioner had a right to intervene at that stage of the proceedings for the
disqualification against private respondent is clear from Section 6 of R.A. No.
6646, otherwise known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, which provides: Any
candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be
voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a
candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified
and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the
Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry,
or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the
pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate
whenever the evidence of guilt is strong. Under this provision, intervention may be
allowed in proceedings for disqualification even after election if there has yet been
no final judgment rendered.29
Clearly then, Maquiling has the right to intervene in the case. The fact that the
COMELEC En Banc has already ruled that Maquiling has not shown that the
requisites for the exemption to the second-placer rule set forth in Sinsuat v.
COMELEC30 are present and therefore would not be prejudiced by the outcome of
the case, does not deprive Maquiling of the right to elevate the matter before this
Court.
Arnado’s claim that the main case has attained finality as the original petitioner and
respondents therein have not appealed the decision of the COMELEC En Banc,
cannot be sustained. The elevation of the case by the intervenor prevents it from
attaining finality. It is only after this Court has ruled upon the issues raised in this
instant petition that the disqualification case originally filed by Balua against
Arnado will attain finality.
The use of foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is a
positive and voluntary act of representation as to one’s nationality and
citizenship; it does not divest Filipino citizenship regained by repatriation
but it recants the Oath of Renunciation required to qualify one to run for an
elective position.
Section 5(2) of The Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003 provides:
Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full
civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities
under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:
xxxx
(2)Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for
holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at
the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath.
x x x31
Rommel Arnado took all the necessary steps to qualify to run for a public office. He
took the Oath of Allegiance and renounced his foreign citizenship. There is no
question that after performing these twin requirements required under Section 5(2)
of R.A. No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003, he
became eligible to run for public office.
Indeed, Arnado took the Oath of Allegiance not just only once but twice: first, on 10
July 2008 when he applied for repatriation before the Consulate General of the
Philippines in San Francisco, USA, and again on 03 April 2009 simultaneous with
the execution of his Affidavit of Renunciation. By taking the Oath of Allegiance to
the Republic, Arnado re-acquired his Philippine citizenship. At the time, however,
he likewise possessed American citizenship. Arnado had therefore become a dual
citizen.
After reacquiring his Philippine citizenship, Arnado renounced his American
citizenship by executing an Affidavit of Renunciation, thus completing the
requirements for eligibility to run for public office.
By renouncing his foreign citizenship, he was deemed to be solely a Filipino
citizen, regardless of the effect of such renunciation under the laws of the foreign
country.32
However, this legal presumption does not operate permanently and is open to
attack when, after renouncing the foreign citizenship, the citizen performs positive
acts showing his continued possession of a foreign citizenship.33
Arnado himself subjected the issue of his citizenship to attack when, after
renouncing his foreign citizenship, he continued to use his US passport to travel in
and out of the country before filing his certificate of candidacy on 30 November
2009. The pivotal question to determine is whether he was solely and exclusively a
Filipino citizen at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy, thereby rendering
him eligible to run for public office.
Between 03 April 2009, the date he renounced his foreign citizenship, and 30
November 2009, the date he filed his COC, he used his US passport four times,
actions that run counter to the affidavit of renunciation he had earlier executed. By
using his foreign passport, Arnado positively and voluntarily represented himself as
an American, in effect declaring before immigration authorities of both countries
that he is an American citizen, with all attendant rights and privileges granted by
the United States of America.
The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath that can simply be
professed at any time, only to be violated the next day. It requires an absolute and
perpetual renunciation of the foreign citizenship and a full divestment of all civil and
political rights granted by the foreign country which granted the citizenship.
Mercado v. Manzano34 already hinted at this situation when the Court declared:
His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made
under oath. Should he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring
the loss of his Philippine citizenship through expatriation in appropriate
proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, we sustained the denial of entry into the
country of petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as a naturalized
citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared in
commercial documents executed abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A
similar sanction can be taken against anyone who, in electing Philippine
citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality, but subsequently does some act
constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.
While the act of using a foreign passport is not one of the acts enumerated in
Commonwealth Act No. 63 constituting renunciation and loss of Philippine
citizenship,35 it is nevertheless an act which repudiates the very oath of
renunciation required for a former Filipino citizen who is also a citizen of another
country to be qualified to run for a local elective position.
When Arnado used his US passport on 14 April 2009, or just eleven days after he
renounced his American citizenship, he recanted his Oath of Renunciation36 that
he "absolutely and perpetually renounce(s) all allegiance and fidelity to the
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA"37 and that he "divest(s) himself of full
employment of all civil and political rights and privileges of the United States of
America."38
We agree with the COMELEC En Banc that such act of using a foreign passport
does not divest Arnado of his Filipino citizenship, which he acquired by
repatriation. However, by representing himself as an American citizen, Arnado
voluntarily and effectively reverted to his earlier status as a dual citizen. Such
reversion was not retroactive; it took place the instant Arnado represented himself
as an American citizen by using his US passport.
This act of using a foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is
fatal to Arnado’s bid for public office, as it effectively imposed on him a
disqualification to run for an elective local position.
Arnado’s category of dual citizenship is that by which foreign citizenship is
acquired through a positive act of applying for naturalization. This is distinct from
those considered dual citizens by virtue of birth, who are not required by law to
take the oath of renunciation as the mere filing of the certificate of candidacy
already carries with it an implied renunciation of foreign citizenship.39 Dual citizens
by naturalization, on the other hand, are required to take not only the Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines but also to personally renounce
foreign citizenship in order to qualify as a candidate for public office.
By the time he filed his certificate of candidacy on 30 November 2009, Arnado was
a dual citizen enjoying the rights and privileges of Filipino and American
citizenship. He was qualified to vote, but by the express disqualification under
Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code,40 he was not qualified to run for a
local elective position.
In effect, Arnado was solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen only for a period of
eleven days, or from 3 April 2009 until 14 April 2009, on which date he first used
his American passport after renouncing his American citizenship.
This Court has previously ruled that:
Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed
not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during
the officer's entire tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his title
may be seasonably challenged. x x x.41
The citizenship requirement for elective public office is a continuing one. It must be
possessed not just at the time of the renunciation of the foreign citizenship but
continuously. Any act which violates the oath of renunciation opens the citizenship
issue to attack.
We agree with the pronouncement of the COMELEC First Division that "Arnado’s
act of consistently using his US passport effectively negated his "Affidavit of
Renunciation."42 This does not mean, that he failed to comply with the twin
requirements under R.A. No. 9225, for he in fact did.
It was after complying with the requirements that he performed positive acts which
effectively disqualified him from running for an elective public office pursuant to
Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991.
The purpose of the Local Government Code in disqualifying dual citizens from
running for any elective public office would be thwarted if we were to allow a
person who has earlier renounced his foreign citizenship, but who subsequently
represents himself as a foreign citizen, to hold any public office.
Arnado justifies the continued use of his US passport with the explanation that he
was not notified of the issuance of his Philippine passport on 18 June 2009, as a
result of which he was only able to obtain his Philippine passport three (3) months
later.43
The COMELEC En Banc differentiated Arnado from Willy Yu, the Portuguese
national who sought naturalization as a Filipino citizen and later applied for the
renewal of his Portuguese passport. That Arnado did not apply for a US passport
after his renunciation does not make his use of a US passport less of an act that
violated the Oath of Renunciation he took. It was still a positive act of
representation as a US citizen before the immigration officials of this country.
The COMELEC, in ruling favorably for Arnado, stated "Yet, as soon as he was in
possession of his Philippine passport, the respondent already used the same in his
subsequent travels abroad."44 We cannot agree with the COMELEC. Three months
from June is September. If indeed, Arnado used his Philippine passport as soon as
he was in possession of it, he would not have used his US passport on 24
November 2009.
Besides, Arnado’s subsequent use of his Philippine passport does not correct the
fact that after he renounced his foreign citizenship and prior to filing his certificate
of candidacy, he used his US passport. In the same way that the use of his foreign
passport does not undo his Oath of Renunciation, his subsequent use of his
Philippine passport does not undo his earlier use of his US passport.
Citizenship is not a matter of convenience. It is a badge of identity that comes with
attendant civil and political rights accorded by the state to its citizens. It likewise
demands the concomitant duty to maintain allegiance to one’s flag and country.
While those who acquire dual citizenship by choice are afforded the right of
suffrage, those who seek election or appointment to public office are required to
renounce their foreign citizenship to be deserving of the public trust. Holding public
office demands full and undivided allegiance to the Republic and to no other.
We therefore hold that Arnado, by using his US passport after renouncing his
American citizenship, has recanted the same Oath of Renunciation he took.
Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code applies to his situation. He is
disqualified not only from holding the public office but even from becoming a
candidate in the May 2010 elections.
We now resolve the next issue.
Resolving the third issue necessitates revisiting Topacio v. Paredes45 which is the
jurisprudential spring of the principle that a second-placer cannot be proclaimed as
the winner in an election contest. This doctrine must be re-examined and its
soundness once again put to the test to address the ever-recurring issue that a
second-placer who loses to an ineligible candidate cannot be proclaimed as the
winner in the elections.
The Facts of the case are as follows:
On June 4, 1912, a general election was held in the town of Imus, Province of
Cavite, to fill the office of municipal president. The petitioner, Felipe Topacio, and
the respondent, Maximo Abad, were opposing candidates for that office. Topacio
received 430 votes, and Abad 281. Abad contested the election upon the sole
ground that Topacio was ineligible in that he was reelected the second time to the
office of the municipal president on June 4, 1912, without the four years required
by Act No. 2045 having intervened.46
Abad thus questioned the eligibility of To p a c i o on the basis of a statutory
prohibition for seeking a second re-election absent the four year interruption.
The often-quoted phrase in Topacio v. Paredes is that "the wreath of victory cannot
be transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the sole
question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots."47
This phrase is not even the ratio decidendi; it is a mere obiter dictum. The Court
was comparing "the effect of a decision that a candidate is not entitled to the office
because of fraud or irregularities in the elections x x x with that produced by
declaring a person ineligible to hold such an office."
The complete sentence where the phrase is found is part of a comparison and
contrast between the two situations, thus:
Again, the effect of a decision that a candidate is not entitled to the office because
of fraud or irregularities in the elections is quite different from that produced by
declaring a person ineligible to hold such an office. In the former case the court,
after an examination of the ballots may find that some other person than the
candidate declared to have received a plurality by the board of canvassers actually
received the greater number of votes, in which case the court issues its mandamus
to the board of canvassers to correct the returns accordingly; or it may find that the
manner of holding the election and the returns are so tainted with fraud or illegality
that it cannot be determined who received a plurality of the legally cast ballots. In
the latter case, no question as to the correctness of the returns or the manner of
casting and counting the ballots is before the deciding power, and generally the
only result can be that the election fails entirely. In the former, we have a contest in
the strict sense of the word, because of the opposing parties are striving for
supremacy. If it be found that the successful candidate (according to the board of
canvassers) obtained a plurality in an illegal manner, and that another candidate
was the real victor, the former must retire in favor of the latter. In the other case,
there is not, strictly speaking, a contest, as the wreath of victory cannot be
transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the sole
question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots. In
the one case the question is as to who received a plurality of the legally cast
ballots; in the other, the question is confined to the personal character and
circumstances of a single individual.48 (Emphasis supplied)
Note that the sentence where the phrase is found starts with "In the other case,
there is not, strictly speaking, a contest" in contrast to the earlier statement, "In the
former, we have a contest in the strict sense of the word, because of the opposing
parties are striving for supremacy."
The Court in Topacio v. Paredes cannot be said to have held that "the wreath of
victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate
when the sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally
cast ballots."
A proper reading of the case reveals that the ruling therein is that since the Court
of First Instance is without jurisdiction to try a disqualification case based on the
eligibility of the person who obtained the highest number of votes in the election,
its jurisdiction being confined "to determine which of the contestants has been duly
elected" the judge exceeded his jurisdiction when he "declared that no one had
been legally elected president of the municipality of Imus at the general election
held in that town on 4 June 1912" where "the only question raised was whether or
not Topacio was eligible to be elected and to hold the office of municipal
president."
The Court did not rule that Topacio was disqualified and that Abad as the second
placer cannot be proclaimed in his stead. The Court therein ruled:
For the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion and so hold that the respondent
judge exceeded his jurisdiction in declaring in those proceedings that no one was
elected municipal president of the municipality of Imus at the last general election;
and that said order and all subsequent proceedings based thereon are null and
void and of no effect; and, although this decision is rendered on respondents'
answer to the order to show cause, unless respondents raised some new and
additional issues, let judgment be entered accordingly in 5 days, without costs. So
ordered.49
On closer scrutiny, the phrase relied upon by a host of decisions does not even
have a legal basis to stand on. It was a mere pronouncement of the Court
comparing one process with another and explaining the effects thereof. As an
independent statement, it is even illogical.
Let us examine the statement:
"x x x the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible candidate to
any other candidate when the sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving a
plurality of the legally cast ballots."
What prevents the transfer of the wreath of victory from the ineligible candidate to
another candidate?
When the issue being decided upon by the Court is the eligibility of the one
receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots and ineligibility is thereafter
established, what stops the Court from adjudging another eligible candidate who
received the next highest number of votes as the winner and bestowing upon him
that "wreath?"
An ineligible candidate who receives the highest number of votes is a wrongful
winner. By express legal mandate, he could not even have been a candidate in the
first place, but by virtue of the lack of material time or any other intervening
circumstances, his ineligibility might not have been passed upon prior to election
date. Consequently, he may have had the opportunity to hold himself out to the
electorate as a legitimate and duly qualified candidate. However, notwithstanding
the outcome of the elections, his ineligibility as a candidate remains unchanged.
Ineligibility does not only pertain to his qualifications as a candidate but necessarily
affects his right to hold public office. The number of ballots cast in his favor cannot
cure the defect of failure to qualify with the substantive legal requirements of
eligibility to run for public office.
The popular vote does not cure the
ineligibility of a candidate.
The ballot cannot override the constitutional and statutory requirements for
qualifications and disqualifications of candidates. When the law requires certain
qualifications to be possessed or that certain disqualifications be not possessed by
persons desiring to serve as elective public officials, those qualifications must be
met before one even becomes a candidate. When a person who is not qualified is
voted for and eventually garners the highest number of votes, even the will of the
electorate expressed through the ballot cannot cure the defect in the qualifications
of the candidate. To rule otherwise is to trample upon and rent asunder the very
law that sets forth the qualifications and disqualifications of candidates. We might
as well write off our election laws if the voice of the electorate is the sole
determinant of who should be proclaimed worthy to occupy elective positions in
our republic.
This has been, in fact, already laid down by the Court in Frivaldo v.
COMELEC50 when we pronounced:
x x x. The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this
patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and employment only to
the citizens of this country. The qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot
be erased by the electorate alone.
The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of
ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the
candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule requires strict application when the
deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the
Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and
renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state.51 (Emphasis supplied)
This issue has also been jurisprudentially clarified in Velasco v.
COMELEC52 where the Court ruled that the ruling in Quizon and Saya-ang cannot
be interpreted without qualifications lest "Election victory x x x becomes a magic
formula to bypass election eligibility requirements."53
We have ruled in the past that a candidate’s victory in the election may be
considered a sufficient basis to rule in favor of the candidate sought to be
disqualified if the main issue involves defects in the candidate’s certificate of
candidacy. We said that while provisions relating to certificates of candidacy are
mandatory in terms, it is an established rule of interpretation as regards election
laws, that mandatory provisions requiring certain steps before elections will be
construed as directory after the elections, to give effect to the will of the people.
We so ruled in Quizon v. COMELEC and Saya-ang v. COMELEC:
The present case perhaps presents the proper time and opportunity to fine-tune
our above ruling. We say this with the realization that a blanket and unqualified
reading and application of this ruling can be fraught with dangerous significance for
the rule of law and the integrity of our elections. For one, such blanket/unqualified
reading may provide a way around the law that effectively negates election
requirements aimed at providing the electorate with the basic information to make
an informed choice about a candidate’s eligibility and fitness for office.
The first requirement that may fall when an unqualified reading is made is Section
39 of the LGC which specifies the basic qualifications of local government officials.
Equally susceptive of being rendered toothless is Section 74 of the OEC that sets
out what should be stated in a COC. Section 78 may likewise be emasculated as
mere delay in the resolution of the petition to cancel or deny due course to a COC
can render a Section 78 petition useless if a candidate with false COC data wins.
To state the obvious, candidates may risk falsifying their COC qualifications if they
know that an election victory will cure any defect that their COCs may have.
Election victory then becomes a magic formula to bypass election eligibility
requirements. (Citations omitted)
What will stop an otherwise disqualified individual from filing a seemingly valid
COC, concealing any disqualification, and employing every strategy to delay any
disqualification case filed against him so he can submit himself to the electorate
and win, if winning the election will guarantee a disregard of constitutional and
statutory provisions on qualifications and disqualifications of candidates?
It is imperative to safeguard the expression of the sovereign voice through the
ballot by ensuring that its exercise respects the rule of law. To allow the sovereign
voice spoken through the ballot to trump constitutional and statutory provisions on
qualifications and disqualifications of candidates is not democracy or
republicanism. It is electoral anarchy. When set rules are disregarded and only the
electorate’s voice spoken through the ballot is made to matter in the end, it
precisely serves as an open invitation for electoral anarchy to set in.1âwphi1
Maquiling is not a second-placer as
he obtained the highest number of
votes from among the qualified
candidates.
With Arnado’s disqualification, Maquiling then becomes the winner in the election
as he obtained the highest number of votes from among the qualified candidates.
We have ruled in the recent cases of Aratea v. COMELEC54 and Jalosjos v.
COMELEC55 that a void COC cannot produce any legal effect.
Thus, the votes cast in favor of the ineligible candidate are not considered at all in
determining the winner of an election.
Even when the votes for the ineligible candidate are disregarded, the will of the
electorate is still respected, and even more so. The votes cast in favor of an
ineligible candidate do not constitute the sole and total expression of the sovereign
voice. The votes cast in favor of eligible and legitimate candidates form part of that
voice and must also be respected.
As in any contest, elections are governed by rules that determine the qualifications
and disqualifications of those who are allowed to participate as players. When
there are participants who turn out to be ineligible, their victory is voided and the
laurel is awarded to the next in rank who does not possess any of the
disqualifications nor lacks any of the qualifications set in the rules to be eligible as
candidates.
There is no need to apply the rule cited in Labo v. COMELEC56 that when the
voters are well aware within the realm of notoriety of a candidate’s disqualification
and still cast their votes in favor said candidate, then the eligible candidate
obtaining the next higher number of votes may be deemed elected. That rule is
also a mere obiter that further complicated the rules affecting qualified candidates
who placed second to ineligible ones.
The electorate’s awareness of the candidate’s disqualification is not a prerequisite
for the disqualification to attach to the candidate. The very existence of a
disqualifying circumstance makes the candidate ineligible. Knowledge by the
electorate of a candidate’s disqualification is not necessary before a qualified
candidate who placed second to a disqualified one can be proclaimed as the
winner. The second-placer in the vote count is actually the first-placer among the
qualified candidates.
That the disqualified candidate has already been proclaimed and has assumed
office is of no moment. The subsequent disqualification based on a substantive
ground that existed prior to the filing of the certificate of candidacy voids not only
the COC but also the proclamation.
Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 provides:
Section 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been declared
by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for
him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final
judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the
winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue
with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the
complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the
suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his
guilt is strong.
There was no chance for Arnado’s proclamation to be suspended under this rule
because Arnado failed to file his answer to the petition seeking his disqualification.
Arnado only filed his Answer on 15 June 2010, long after the elections and after he
was already proclaimed as the winner.
The disqualifying circumstance surrounding Arnado’s candidacy involves his
citizenship. It does not involve the commission of election offenses as provided for
in the first sentence of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, the effect of
which is to disqualify the individual from continuing as a candidate, or if he has
already been elected, from holding the office.
The disqualifying circumstance affecting Arnado is his citizenship. As earlier
discussed, Arnado was both a Filipino and an American citizen when he filed his
certificate of candidacy. He was a dual citizen disqualified to run for public office
based on Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code.
Section 40 starts with the statement "The following persons are disqualified from
running for any elective local position." The prohibition serves as a bar against the
individuals who fall under any of the enumeration from participating as candidates
in the election.
With Arnado being barred from even becoming a candidate, his certificate of
candidacy is thus rendered void from the beginning. It could not have produced
any other legal effect except that Arnado rendered it impossible to effect his
disqualification prior to the elections because he filed his answer to the petition
when the elections were conducted already and he was already proclaimed the
winner.
To hold that such proclamation is valid is to negate the prohibitory character of the
disqualification which Arnado possessed even prior to the filing of the certificate of
candidacy. The affirmation of Arnado's disqualification, although made long after
the elections, reaches back to the filing of the certificate of candidacy. Arnado is
declared to be not a candidate at all in the May 201 0 elections.
Arnado being a non-candidate, the votes cast in his favor should not have been
counted. This leaves Maquiling as the qualified candidate who obtained the
highest number of votes. Therefore, the rule on succession under the Local
Government Code will not apply.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of
the COMELEC En Bane dated 2 February 2011 is hereby ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE. Respondent ROMMEL ARNADO y CAGOCO is disqualified from running
for any local elective position. CASAN MACODE MAQUILING is hereby
DECLARED the duly elected Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in the 10 May
2010 elections.
This Decision is immediately executory.
Let a copy of this Decision be served personally upon the parties and the
Commission on Elections.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 210164, August 18, 2015
ROMMEL C. ARNADO, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND
FLORANTE CAPITAN, Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Only natural-born Filipinos who owe total and undivided allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines could run for and hold elective public office.
Before this Court is a Petition for Certiorari1 filed under Rule 64 in relation to Rule
65 of the Rules of Court assailing the Per Curiam  Resolution2 dated December 9,
2013 of respondent Commission on Elections (Comelec) En Banc in SPA No. 13-
309 (DC), which affirmed the Resolution3 dated September 6, 2013 of the Comelec
Second Division. The Comelec, relying on our ruling in Maquiling v. Commission
on Elections,4 disqualified petitioner Rommel C. Arnado (Arnado) from running in
the May 13, 2013 elections, set aside his proclamation as elected mayor of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte, and declared respondent Florante T. Capitan
(Capitan) as the duly elected mayor of said municipality.
Factual Antecedents
Petitioner Arnado is a natural-born Filipino citizen who lost his Philippine
citizenship after he was naturalized as citizen of the United States of America
(USA). Subsequently, and in preparation for his plans to run for public office in the
Philippines, Arnado applied for repatriation under Republic Act No. 92255 (RA
9225) before the Consul General of the Philippines in San Franciso, USA. He took
an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on July 10, 2008 and, on
even date, an Order of Approval of Citizenship Retention and Re acquisition was
issued in his favor. On April 3, 2009, Arnado executed an Affidavit of Renunciation
of his foreign citizenship.
On November 30, 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) for the
mayoralty post of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte for the May 10, 2010 national and
local elections.
Linog C. Balua (Balua), another mayoralty candidate, however, filed a petition to
disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his CoC on the ground, among others, that
Arnado remained a US citizen because he continued to use his US passport for
entry to and exit from the Philippines after executing aforesaid Affidavit of
Renunciation.
While Balua's petition remained pending, the May 10, 2010 elections proceeded
where Arnado garnered the highest number of votes for the mayoralty post of
Kauswagan. He was proclaimed the winning candidate.
On October 5, 2010, the Comelec First Division issued a Resolution holding that
Arnado's continued use of his US passport effectively negated his April 3, 2009
Affidavit of Renunciation. Thus, he was disqualified to run for public office for
failure to comply with the requirements of RA 9225. The Comelec First Division
accordingly nullified his proclamation and held that the rule on succession should
be followed.
Arnado moved for reconsideration. In the meantime, Casan Macode Maquiling
(Maquiling), another mayoralty candidate who garnered the second highest
number of votes, intervened in the case. He argued that the Comelec First Division
erred in applying the rule on succession.
On February 2, 2011, the Comelec En Banc rendered a Resolution reversing the
ruling of the Comelec First Division. It held that Arnado's use of his US passport
did not operate to revert his status to dual citizenship. The Comelec En Banc found
merit in Arnado's explanation that he continued to use his US passport because he
did not yet know that he had been issued a Philippine passport at the time of the
relevant foreign trips. The Comelec En Banc further noted that, after receiving his
Philippine passport, Arnado used the same for his subsequent trips.
Maquiling then sought recourse to this Court by filing a petition docketed as G.R
No. 195649.
While G.R No. 195649 was pending, the period for the filing of CoCs for local
elective officials for the May 13, 2013 elections officially began. On October 1,
2012, Arnado filed his CoC6 for the same position. Respondent Capitan also filed
his CoC for the mayoralty post of Kauswagan.
On April 16, 2013, this Court rendered its Decision in Maquiling. Voting 10-5, it
annulled and set aside the Comelec En Banc's February 2, 2011 Resolution,
disqualified Arnado from running for elective position, and declared Maquiling as
the duly elected mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao Del Norte in the May 10, 2010
elections. In so ruling, the majority of the Members of the Court opined that in his
subsequent use of his US passport, Arnado effectively disavowed or recalled his
April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation. Thus:
We agree with the pronouncement of the COMELEC First Division that "Arnado's
act of consistently using his US passport effectively negated his "Affidavit of
Renunciation." Tills does not mean that he failed to comply with the twin
requirements under R.A. No. 9225, for he in fact did. It was after complying with
the requirements that he perfonned positive acts which effectively disqualified him
from running for an elective public office pursuant to Section 40(d) of the Local
Government Code of 1991.
The purpose of the Local Government Code in disqualifying dual citizens from
running for any elective public office would be thwarted if we were to allow a
person who has earlier renounced his foreign citizenship, but who subsequently
represents himself as a foreign citizen, to hold any public office.
xxxx
We therefore hold that Arnado, by using his US passport after renouncing his
American citizenship, has recanted the same Oath of Renunciation he took.
Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code applies to his situation. He is
disqualified not only from holding the public office but even from becoming a
candidate in the May 2010 elections.7

The issuance of this Court's April 16, 2013 Decision sets the stage for the present
controversy.
On May 9, 2013 or shortly after the Court issued its Decision in Maquiling, Arnado
executed an Affidavit Affirming Rommel C. Arnado's "Affidavit of Renunciation
Dated April3, 2009."8
The following day or on May 10, 2013, Capitan, Arnado's lone rival for the
mayoralty post, filed a Petition9 seeking to disqualify him from running for municipal
mayor of Kauswagan and/or to cancel his CoC based on the ruling of this Court
in Maquiling. The case was docketed as SPA No. 13-309 (DC) and was raffled to
the Comelec's Second Division. The resolution of said petition was, however,
overtaken by the May 13, 2013 elections where Arnado garnered 8,902 votes
(84% of the total votes cast) while Capitan obtained 1,707 (16% of the total votes
cast) votes only.
On May 14, 2013, Arnado was proclaimed as the winning candidate.
Unfazed, Capitan filed another Petition10 this time seeking to nullify Arnado's
proclamation. He argued that with the April 16, 2013 Decision of this Court
in Maquiling, there is no doubt that Arnado is disqualified from running for any local
elective office. Hence, Arnado's proclamation is void and without any legal effect.
Ruling of the Comelec Second Division
On September 6, 2013, the Comelec Second Division promulgated a Resolution
granting the petition in SPA No. 13-309 (DC) and disqualify Arnado from running in
the May 13, 2013 elections. Following Maquiling, it ratiocinated that at the time he
filed his CoC on October 1, 2012, Arnado still failed to comply with the requirement
of RA 9225 of making a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship. While he executed the April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation, the
same was deemed withdrawn or recalled when he subsequently traveled abroad
using his US passport, as held in Maquiling.
The Comelec Second Division also noted that Arnado failed to execute another
Affidavit of Renunciation for purposes of the May 13, 2013 elections. While a May
9, 2013 Affidavit Affirming Rommel C. Arnado's "Affidavit of Renunciation dated
April 3, 2009" was submitted in evidence, the same would not suffice because it
should have been executed on or before the filing of the CoC on October 1, 2012.
The dispositive portion of the Comelec Second Division's Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is granted. Respondent
Rommel Cagoco Arnado is disqualified from running in the 13 May 2013 National
and Local Elections.
SO ORDERED.11
Ruling of the Comelec En Banc
Aggrieved, Arnado filed a Verified Motion for Reconsideration.12 He argued that the
Comelec Second Division erred in applying Maquiling claiming that the said case is
not on all fours with the present controversy; that Capitan's Petition was filed
beyond the 25-day reglementary period reckoned from the filing of the CoC sought
to be cancelled; and, that the Comelec must uphold the sovereign will of the
people of Kauswagan who expressed, thru the ballots, their overwhelming support
for him as their mayor. Arnado prayed that the Comelec Second Division's
September 6, 2013 Resolution be reversed and that he be declared as eligible to
run for mayor ofKauswagan.
On December 9, 2013, the Comelec En Banc affirmed the ruling of the Comelec
Second Division. It accordingly annulled the proclamation of Arnado and declared
Capitan as the duly elected mayor of Kauswagan. The dispositive portion of the
Comelec En Banc's Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant motion for reconsideration is
hereby DISMISSED. The Proclamation of Private Respondent Rommel C. Arnado
as the duly elected mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte is hereby ANNULLED
and SET ASIDE. FLORANTE T. CAPITAN is hereby DECLARED the duly elected
Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte inthe May 13, 2013 Elections.
SO ORDERED.13
Hence, on December 16, 2013 Arnado filed the instant Petition with ancillary
prayer for injunctive relief to maintain the status quo ante. On December
26, 2013, Arnado filed an Urgent Motion for Issuance of Status Quo Ante Order or
Temporary Restraining Order14 in view of the issuance by the Comelec En Banc of
a Writ of Execution to implement its December 9, 2013 Resolution.
On January 14, 2014, this Court issued a Resolution15 requiring the respondents to
file their respective comments on the petition. In the same Resolution, this Court
granted Arnado's ancillary relief for temporary restraining order.
Capitan thus filed an Urgent Motion to Lift and/or Dissolve Temporary Restraining
Order dated January 14, 2014,16 contending that the acts sought to be restrained
by Arnado are already fait accompli. He alleged that the Comelec En Banc  had
already issued a Writ of Execution17 and pursuant thereto a Special Municipal
Board of Canvassers was convened. It proclaimed him to be the duly elected
mayor of Kauswagan and on January 2, 2014 he took his oath of office. Since
then, he has assumed and performed the duties and functions of his office.
In a Resolution18 dated February 25, 2014, this Court ordered the issuance of a
Status Quo Ante Order directing the parties to allow Arnado to continue performing
his functions as mayor of Kauswagan pending resolution of this case.
Issues
In support of his Petition, Arnado raises the following issues:
I
WHETHER x x x THE COMELEC EN BANC AND 2ND DIVISION VIOLATED
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS AND COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN FAILING TO DISMISS THE PETITIONS OF RESPONDENT
CAPITAN ON THE GROUND OF FORUM-SHOPPING AND/OR LATE FILING,
ETC.
II
WHETHER x x x THE COMELEC EN BANC VIOLATED DUE PROCESS AND
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION BY ALLOWING COM. ELIAS
YUSOPH TO REVIEW THE DECISION HE WROTE FOR THE 2ND DIVISION.
III
WHETHER x x x THE COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN DISENFRANCHISING 84% OF THE VOTERS OF KAUSWAGAN
IN THE MAY 2013 ELECTIONS.
IV
WHETHER x x x THE COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN DISQUALIFYING PETITIONER WHO HAS FULLY COMPLIED
WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF RA 9225 BEFORE THE FILING OF HIS COC
ON OCTOBER 1, 2012.19
Arnado claims that the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion and violated
his right to procedural due process in not dismissing Capitan's Petition in SPA No.
13-309 (DC). He avers that Capitan is guilty of forum-shopping because the latter
subsequently filed a similar case docketed as SPC No. 13-019. In addition, SPA
No. 13-309 (DC) was filed beyond the 25-day prescriptive period reckoned from
the time of the filing of his CoC on October 1, 2012.
Arnado likewise claims that the proceeding before the Comelec is peppered with
procedural infirmities. He asserts that the Comelec violated its own rules in
deciding SPA No. 13-309 (DC) without first resolving Capitan's motion to
consolidate; that SPA No. 13-309 (DC) was not set for trial and no hearing for the
reception of evidence was ever conducted; and, that the Comelec did not follow its
own rules requiring the issuance of a notice of promulgation of resolutions.
Arnado further claims that the Comelec En Banc not only committed grave abuse
of discretion but also violated his constitutional right to due process when it
allowed Commissioner Elias R. Yusoph (Commissioner Yusoph) to participate in
the review of the Decision he penned for the Second Division. Furthermore, the
Comelec En Banc committed grave abuse of discretion when it disqualified him
from running in the May 13, 2013 elections, thereby disenfranchising 84% of the
voters of Kauswagan who all voted for him.
Finally, Arnado avers that further inquiry and examination of the notarial register of
his former counsel, Atty. Thomas Dean M. Quijano, revealed that he executed an
Affidavit of Renunciation with Oath of Allegiance20 on November 30, 2009. Hence,
at the time he filed his CoC on October 1, 2012, he is a citizen of the Philippines
who does not owe allegiance to any other country and, therefore, is qualified to run
for mayor of Kauswagan in the May 13, 2013 elections.
Our Ruling
The Petition is devoid of merit.
Petition for certiorari is limited to the
determination of whether the respondent
tribunal acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
In a petition for certiorari under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
the primordial issue to be resolved is whether the respondent tribunal committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the
assailed resolution. And as a matter of policy, this Court will not interfere with the
resolutions of the Comelec unless it is shown that it had committed grave abuse of
discretion.21 Thus, in the absence of grave abuse of discretion, a Rule 64 petition
will not prosper. Jurisprudence, on the other hand, defines grave abuse of
discretion as the "capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent
to lack of jurisdiction."22 "Mere abuse of discretion is not enough; it must be
grave."23  Grave abuse of discretion has likewise been defined as an act done
contrary to the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence.24
In this case, and as will be discussed below, there is no showing that the
Comelec En Banc acted capriciously or whimsically in issuing its December 9,
2013 Resolution. Neither did it act contrary to law or jurisprudence.
Arnado's allegations that Capitan
violated the rule against forumshopping
and that the latter's petition in
SPA No.13-309(DC) was filed late,
unsubstantiated and erroneous.
There is forum-shopping when two or more actions or proceedings, founded on the
same cause, are instituted by a party on the supposition that one or the other court
would make a favorable disposition.25cralawred It exists when the elements of litis
pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res
judicata in the other.26 Thus, there is forum-shopping when in both actions there
exist: (1) identity of parties, or at least such parties as would represent the same
interests in both actions; (2) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the
relief being founded on the same facts; and (3) the identity of the two preceding
particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless
of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under
consideration.27
Here, Arnado failed to substantiate his claim of forum-shopping. He merely made a
general averment that in resolving the petitions of Capitan in SPA No. 13-309 (OC)
and SPC No. 13-019, the Comelec En Banc, as well as its Second Division, failed
to comply with this Court's Revised Circular No. 28-91,28 without demonstrating
how forum-shopping was supposed to be present. He has not shown that the
petitions in SPA No. 13-309 (DC) and SPC No. 13-019 involved the same parties,
issues, and reliefs. In fact, Arnado did not even bother to submit to this Court a
copy of the Petition in SPC No. 13-019 (annulment of proclamation case). As the
party insisting that Capitan committed forum-shopping, Arnado bears the burden of
establishing the same. After all, it is settled that he who alleges has the burden of
proving it; mere allegation is not sufficient.29
Besides, and as correctly observed by the Solicitor General, the parties in SPA No.
13-309 (DC) and SPC No. 13-019 are not the same. In the first case, the parties
are only Capitan and Arnado. In the second case, the Municipal Board of
Canvassers of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte is impleaded as respondent. There is
also dissimilitude in the reliefs sought. The former case sought to disqualify Arnado
and/or to cancel his CoC while the latter case prayed for the annulment of
Arnado's proclamation as mayor of Kauswagan.
With regard to the alleged tardiness in the filing of Capitan's Petition in SPA No.
13-309 (DC), it appears that Arnado either failed to grasp the import of Capitan's
allegations therein or he made a deliberate partial misrepresentation in stating that
the same is one for cancellation of CoC. A copy30 thereof annexed to Arnado's
herein petition states that it is a petition "to disqualify and/or cancel the certificate
of candidacy" of Arnado. The allegations therein state in no uncertain terms that it
is one for disqualification based on Arnado's failure to comply with the requisites of
RA 9225 and on the ruling of this Court in Maquiling. Thus, the Comelec Second
Division appropriately treated it as a petition for disqualification with the alternative
prayer to cancel Arnado's CoC. It is elementary that the nature of the action is
determined by the allegations in the petition.31
Under Section 3, Rule 25 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure,32 a petition for
disqualification should be filed "any day after the last day for filing of certificates of
candidacy but not later than the date of proclamation." Here, Arnado was
proclaimed as the winning candidate on May 14, 2013.33 Thus, the petition in SPA
No. 13-309 (DC) was seasonably filed on May 10, 2013.34
The other procedural lapses allegedly
committed by the Comelec are likewise
unsubstantiated. Assuming the allegations of
Arnado to be true, the Comelec did not commit
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
Arnado's claim that the Comelec gravely abused its discretion in deciding SPA No.
13-309 (DC) without first resolving Capitan's motion to consolidate likewise lacks
substantiation. In the first place, Arnado has not attached a copy of said motion to
his petition. This alone is sufficient ground for the dismissal of his Rule 64 Petition,
filed in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, for not being accompanied by
pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto.35 Also, it was Capitan
who filed the motion for consolidation. Not being the movant, Arnado is not in a
position to question the alleged inaction of the Comelec on said motion. And even
assuming that he has, by filing a Verified Motion for Reconsideration with the
Comelec En Banc and subsequently appealing to this Court despite the still
unresolved motion for consolidation, Arnado effectively abandoned said motion for
consolidation. In Cayago v. Hon. Lina,36 it was held that once a party elevates the
case before the appellate tribunal, the appellant is deemed to have abandoned the
unresolved motion which remains pending with the tribunal of origin. "[I]t is not right
for a party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular
matter to secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards make a volte face and deny
that same jurisdiction."37
In any case, under Section 9, Rule 3 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure,
consolidation is only permissive. It is not mandatory. Section 9 reads:
Sec. 9. Consolidation of Cases.- When an action or proceeding involves a question
of law and fact which is similar to or common with that of another action or
proceeding, the same may be consolidated with the action or proceeding bearing
the lower docket number.
In Muñoz v. Comelec,38 this Court accentuated "that the term 'may' is indicative of
a mere possibility, an opportunity or an option. The grantee of that opportunity is
vested with a right or faculty which he has the option to exercise. If he chooses to
exercise the right, he must comply with the conditions attached thereto, which in
this case require that the cases to be consolidated must involve similar questions
of law and fact."39 In this case, the consolidation of SPA No. 13-309 (DC) and SPC
No. 13-019 does not appear to be necessary. As earlier mentioned, said cases do
not even involve the same parties and reliefs sought. Hence, no grave abuse of
discretion can be attributed to the Comelec in not consolidating them.
Arnado's protestation that the Comelec violated its own rules when it decided SPA
No. 13-309 (DC) without setting it for trial likewise deserves scant consideration. 
The proceedings in a special action for disqualification of candidates under Rule
25 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure are summary in nature where a trial type
proceeding may be dispensed with.40  In Diangka v. Comelec,41 this Court held
that:
Again, our ingrained jurisprudence is that technical rules of evidence should not be
rigorously applied in administrative proceedings specially where the law calls for
the proceeding to be summary in character. Pursuant to Section 4, Rule 25 of the
1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure, petitions for disqualifications are subject to
summary hearings. In relation thereto, Section 3, Rule 17 of the said Rules
provides that it remains in the sound discretion of the COMELEC whether
clarification questions are to be asked the witnesses-affiants, and whether the
adverse party is to be granted opportunity to cross-examine said witnesses
affiants. Furthermore, when the COMELEC en banc reviews and evaluates a
party's petition, or as in the case at bar, a party's answer and the supporting
papers attached thereto, the same is tantamount to a fair "hearing" of his case.42
Arnado's claim that the Comelec En Banc
committed grave abuse of discretion and violated
his right to due process in allowing Commissioner
Yusoph to participate in the deliberation of the assailed
Comelec En Banc Resolution is likewise bereft of
substantiation.
Arnado's claim that Commissioner Yusoph penned both the September 6, 2013
Resolution of the Comelec Second Division and the December 9, 2013 Resolution
of the Comelec  En Banc is not correct. While Commissioner Yusoph, together with
Commissioners Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca and Luie Tito F. Guia, signed said
Resolution, there is nothing therein which would indicate that Commissioner
Yusoph was the writer or the ponente of said Resolution. The September 6, 2013
Resolution of the Comelec Second Division does not state who the ponente is. The
same goes true with the questioned December 9, 2013 Per Curiam Resolution43 of
the Comelec En Banc. As a per curiam resolution, it was arrived at by the
Comelec En Banc as a whole and without any particular ponente. Hence, we need
not belabor Arnado's claim of denial of due process as his basis therefor lacks
factual moorings.
Arnado has not yet satisfied the twin
requirements of Section 5(2) of RA 9225 at
the time he filed his CoC for the May 13, 2013
elections; subsequent compliance does not suffice.
Under Section 4(d) of the Local Government Code, a person with "dual citizenship"
is disqualified from running for any elective local position.  In Mercado v.
anzano,44 it was clarified that the phrase "dual citizenship" in said Section 4(d)
must be understood as referring to "dual allegiance.''45 Subsequent, Congress
enacted RA 9225 allowing natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost
their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization abroad to reacquire
Philippine citizenship and to enjoy full civil and political rights upon compliance with
the requirements of the law. They may now run for public office in the Philippines
provided that they: (1) meet the qualifications for holding such public office as
required by the Constitution and existing laws; and, (2) make a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships before any public officer authorized
to administer an oath46 prior to or at the time of filing of their CoC. Thus:
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities- Those who retain or re-acquire
Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be
subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the
Philippines and the following conditions:
xxxx

(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the
qualification for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and
existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any
public officer authorized to administer an oath;
In the case at bench, the Comelec Second Division, as affirmed by the
Comelec En Banc, ruled that Arnado failed to comply with the second requisite of
Section 5 (2) of RA 9225 because, as held in Maquiling v. Commission on
Elections,47 his April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation was deemed withdrawn
when he used his US passport after executing said affidavit. Consequently, at the
time he filed his CoC on October 1, 2012 for purposes of the May 13, 2013
elections, Arnado had yet to comply with said second requirement. The Comelec
also noted that while Arnado submitted an affidavit dated May 9, 2013, affirming
his April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation, the same would not suffice for having
been belatedly executed.
The Comelec En Banc did not err, nor did it commit grave abuse of discretion, in
upholding the Resolution of the Comelec Second Division disqualifying Arnado
from running for public office. It is worth noting that the reason for Arnado's
disqualification to run for public office during the 2010 elections — being a
candidate without total and undivided allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines -
still subsisted when he filed his CoC for the 2013 elections on October 1, 2012.
The Comelec En Banc merely adhered to the ruling of this Court in Maquiling lest it
would be committing grave abuse of discretion had it departed therefrom.
Moreover, it cannot be validly argued that Arnado should be given the opportunity
to correct the deficiency in his qualification because at the time this Court
promulgated its Decision in Maquiling on April 16, 2013, the period for filing the
CoC for local elective office had already lapsed. Or, as Justice Arturo D. Brion puts
it in his Dissenting Opinion, "[t]o the extent that Arnado was denied the chance to
submit a replacement oath of renunciation in 2013, then there was an unfair and
abusive denial of opportunity equivalent to grave abuse of discretion." Besides,
shortly after learning of the Court's April 16, 2013 ruling in Maquiling or on May 9,
2013, Arnado substantially complied therewith by executing an affidavit affirming
his April3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation.
The ruling in Maquiling is indeed novel in the sense that it was the first case
dealing with the effect of the use of a foreign passport on the qualification to run for
public office of a natural-born Filipino citizen who was naturalized abroad and
subsequently availed of the privileges under RA 9225. It was settled in that case
that the use of a foreign passport amounts to repudiation or recantation of the oath
of renunciation. Yet, despite the issue being novel and of first impression, plus the
fact that Arnado could not have divined the possible adverse consequences of
using his US passport, the Court in Maquiling did not act with leniency or
benevolence towards Arnado. Voting 10-5, the Court ruled that matters dealing
with qualifications for public elective office must be strictly complied with.
Otherwise stated, the Court in Maquiling did not consider the novelty of the issue
as to excuse Arnado from strictly complying with the eligibility requirements to run
for public office or to simply allow him to correct the deficiency in his qualification
by submitting another oath of renunciation. Thus, it is with more reason that in this
case, we should similarly require strict compliance with the qualifications to run for
local elective office.
The circumstances surrounding the qualification of Arnado to run for public office
during the May 10, 2010 and May 13, 2013 elections, to reiterate for emphasis, are
the same. Arnado's use of his US passport in 2009 invalidated his oath of
renunciation resulting in his disqualification to run for mayor of Kauswagan in the
2010 elections. Since then and up to the time he filed his CoC for the 2013
elections, Arnado had not cured the defect in his qualification. Maquiling, therefore,
is binding on and applicable to this case following the salutary doctrine of stare
decisis et non quieta movere, which means to adhere to precedents, and not to
unsettle things which are established.48 Under the doctrine, "[w]hen the court has
once laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will
adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases where facts are substantially
the same."49 It enjoins adherence to judicial precedents and bars relitigation of the
same issue.50
It may not be amiss to add that as early as 2010, the year when Balua filed a
petition to disqualify him, Arnado has gotten wind that the use of his US passport
might pose a problem to his candidacy. In other words, when Arnado filed his CoC
on October 1, 2012, he was not totally unaware that the use of his US passport
after he had executed the Affidavit of Renunciation might have an impact on his
qualification and candidacy. In fact, at that time, Maquiling had already reached
this Court. But despite the petitions filed against him questioning his qualification to
run for public office in 2010, Arnado filed his CoC on October 1, 2012 unmindful of
any possible legal setbacks in his candidacy for the 2013 elections and without
executing another Affidavit of Renunciation. In short, the argument that Arnado
should be given the opportunity to correct the deficiency in his CoC
since Maquiling was promulgated after the lapse of the period for filing a CoC for
the 2013 elections, is totally bereft of merit. Consistent with our April 16, 2013
ruling in Maquiling, Arnado should be made to face the consequences of his
inaction since he could have remedied it at the time he filed his CoC on October 1,
2012 or even before that. There is no law prohibiting him from executing an
Affidavit of Renunciation every election period if only to avert possible questions
about his qualifications.
The alleged November 30, 2009
Affidavit of Renunciation with Oath of
Allegiance cannot be given any
probative weight.
As to the alleged recently discovered November 30, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation
with Oath of Allegiance, the same is highly suspect. As correctly pointed out by the
Solicitor General, the original or certified true copy thereof was not presented. In
addition, such crucial evidence sufficient to alter the outcome of the case was
never presented before the Comelec much less in the Maquiling case.  Curiously,
it only surfaced for the first time in this petition. In Jacot v. Dal,51 this Court
disallowed the belated presentation of similar evidence on due process
considerations. Thus:
As a rule, no question will be entertained on appeal unless it has been raised in
the proceedings below. Points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought
to the attention of the lower court, administrative agency or quasi- judicial body
need not be considered by a reviewing court, as they cannot be raised for the first
time at that late stage. Basic considerations of fairness and due process impel this
rule. Courts have neither the time nor the resources to accommodate parties who
chose to go to trial haphazardly.
Likewise, this Court does not countenance the late submission of evidence.
Petitioner should have offered the Affidavit dated 7 February 2007 during the
proceedings before the COMELEC.
Section 1 of Rule 43 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides that "In the
absence of any applicable provisions of these Rules, the pertinent provisions of the
Rules of Court in the Philippines shall be applicable by analogy or in suppletory
character and effect." Section 34 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court
categorically enjoins the admission of evidence not formally presented:
SEC. 34. Offer of evidence.- The court shall consider no evidence which has not
been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be
specified.
Since the said Affidavit was not formally offered before the COMELEC, respondent
had no opportunity to examine and controvert it. To admit this document would be
contrary to due process. Additionally, the piecemeal presentation of evidence is
not in accord with orderly justice.52
Moreover, in Maquiling it was mentioned that Arnado used his US passport on
January 12, 2010 and March 23, 2010. Thus:
Balua likewise presented a certification from the Bureau of Immigration dated 23
April 201 0, certifying that the name "Arnado, Rommel Cagoco" appears in the
available Computer Database/Passenger manifest/IBM listing on file as of 21 April
2010, with the following pertinent travel records:
DATE OF :01/12/2010
Arrival
NATIONALITY :USA-AMERICAN
PASSPORT :057782700
DATE OF :03/23/2010
Arrival
NATIONALITY :USA-AMERICAN
PASSPORT :05778270053
Despite the existence of such statement in Maquiling, We are puzzled why Arnado
never bothered to correct or refute it. He neither alleged nor presented evidence in
this petition to prove that he did not travel abroad on those dates using his US
passport.
Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, however, dissents and maintains the same position
he had taken in Maquiling that Arnado's use of his US passport in 2009 is an
isolated act justified by the circumstances at that time. At any rate, Arnado started
to use his Philippine passport in his travels abroad beginning December 11, 2009
and thenceforth. This, according to J. Leonen, is borne out by Arnado's Philippine
passport.
With due respect to my esteemed colleague, it appears that J. Leonen is not only
reviving an issue that had already been settled with finality in the Maquiling case,
but he is also going beyond the issues raised in this petition. To reiterate for clarity,
Arnado's argument in this case-that he is qualified to run for mayor as he has
satisfied the requirements of Sec. 5(2) of RA 9225 relative to the May 13, 2013
elections- is premised only on the alleged newly discovered November 30, 2009
Affidavit. Nothing more. He does not claim in this case that his use of US passport
in his travel abroad in 2009 is an isolated act, as J. Leonen insists. In Vazquez v.
De Borja,54 it was held that courts do not have jurisdiction over issues neither
raised in the pleading nor tried with the express or implied consent of the parties.
They cannot render judgment based on issues that have never been raised before
them. Equally settled is the rule that "points of law, theories, issues, and
arguments not brought to the attention of the lower [tribunal] need not be, and
ordinarily will not be, considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot be raised
for the first time at such late stage. Basic considerations of due process underlie
this rule."55 The same goes true with J. Brion's theory that what was cancelled by
virtue of Maquiling was only the April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation where
Arnado expressly renounced any foreign citizenship; not the July 10, 2008 Oath of
Allegiance which carried with it an implied abdication of foreign citizenship. For J.
Brion, "[t]he requirement of an express renunciation x x x does not negate the
effect of, or make any less real, the prior implicit renunciation of citizenship and
allegiance made upon taking the oath of allegiance." Again, this was never raised
in this petition. At any rate, the execution of an Oath of Allegiance is required by
Section 356 of RA 9225. For those who avail themselves of RA 9225 and intend to
run for public office, Section 5(2) thereof provides the additional requirement of
making a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships prior
to or at the time of filing of their CoC. Definitely, the provisions of Section 5(2) are
not useless or meaningless surplusage. When the law expressly requires an
explicit renunciation, an implicit one would be insufficient. Furthermore, even
assuming that Arnado's 2008 implied renunciation is sufficient, the same has also
been negated by his use of his US passport in 2009, following the ruling
in Maquiling.
Otherwise, we would give more weight to an implied renunciation than to an
express one specifically required by law.
Besides, the Decision of this Court in Maquiling holding that Arnado's use of his
US passport effectively recanted his Affidavit of Renunciation has already become
final and immutable. We can no longer resurrect in this case the issues that have
already been resolved there with fmality.
In maintaining that Arnado used his Philippine passport in travelling abroad in the
first quarter of 2010, J. Leonen relies on the copy thereof attached to the rollo of
the Maquiling case. But said copy of Arnado's Philippine passport57 is a mere
"CERTIFIED TRUE COPY FROM THE MACIDNE COPY ON FILE" as attested to
by Rosario P. Palacio, Records Officer Ill of the Comelec.58 This is clearly stamped
on aforesaid copy of Arnado's Philippine passport. A machine copy or photocopy is
a mere secondary evidence.59 As such, it cannot be admitted in evidence until and
unless the offeror has proven the due execution and the subsequent loss or
unavailability of the original.60 In this case, however, Arnado's Philippine passport
is not missing. Thus, said photocopy of Arnado's Philippine passport cannot sway
us to depart from the uncontroverted certification of the Bureau ofimmigration that
Arnado used his US passport on January 12, 2010 and March 23, 2010.
Consequently, even assuming that the recently discovered November 30, 2009
Affidavit of Renunciation with Oath of Allegiance is true and authentic, Arnado
once more performed positive acts on January 12, 2010 and March 23, 2010,
which effectively negated the alleged November 30, 2009 Affidavit resulting in his
disqualification to run for an elective public office.
Landslide election victory cannot
override eligibility requirements.
In Maquiling, this Court emphasized that popular vote does not cure the ineligibility
of a candidate. Thus, while in this case Arnado won by landslide majority during
the 2013 elections, garnering 84% of the total votes cast, the same "cannot
override the constitutional and statutory requirements for qualifications and
disqualifications."61 In Velasco v. Comelec,62 this Court pronounced that election
victory cannot be used as a magic formula to bypass election eligibility
requirements; otherwise, certain provisions of laws pertaining to elections will
become toothless. One of which is Section 39 of the Local Government Code of
1991, which specifies the basic positive qualifications of local government officials.
If in Velasco the Court ruled that popular vote cannot override the required
qualifications under Section 39,63a fortiori, there is no reason why the Court should
not follow the same policy when it comes to disqualifications enumerated under
Section 4064 of the same law. After all, "[t]he qualifications set out in [Section 39]
are roughly half of the requirements for election to local public offices. The other
half is contained in the succeeding section which lays down the circumstances that
disqualify local candidates."65
Finally, this case is strikingly similar to the case of Lopez v. Comelec.66 In that
case, petitioner Lopez was also a natural-born Filipino who lost his Philippine
citizenship after he became a naturalized US citizen. He later reacquired his
Philippine citizenship by virtue of RA 9225. Thereafter, Lopez filed his candidacy
for Chairman of Barangay Bagacay, San Dionisio, Iloilo in the
synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections held on October 29,
2007 without first making a personal and sworn renunciation of his foreign
citizenship. In spite of the fact that Lopez won in the elections, this Court still
affmned the Resolution of the Comelec disqualifying Lopez as a candidate for a
local elective position for his failure to comply with the requirements of Section 5(2)
of RA 9225. Thus:
While it is true that petitioner won the elections, took his oath and began to
discharge the functions of Barangay Chairman, his victory cannot cure the defect
of his candidacy. Garnering the most number of votes does not validate the
election of a disqualified candidate because the application of the constitutional
and statutory provisions on disqualification is not a matter of popularity.67
In fine, this Court finds no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Comelec En
Banc in sustaining the Resolution of the Comelec Second Division disqualifying
Arnado from running in the May 13, 2013 elections and in accordingly setting aside
his proclamation as elected mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and
proclaiming Capitan as the duly elected mayor of said municipality.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby DISMISSED and the assailed
Comelec Resolutions are AFFIRMED. The Status Quo Ante Order issued by this
Court is LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 209835, September 22, 2015
ROGELIO BATIN CABALLERO, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
AND JONATHAN ENRIQUE V. NANUD, JR., Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before us is a petition for certiorari with prayer for issuance of a temporary
restraining order seeking to set aside the Resolution1 dated November 6, 2013 of
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc which affirmed in toto the
Resolution2 dated May 3, 2013 of the COMELEC First Division canceling the
Certificate of Candidacy (COC) of petitioner Rogelio Batin Caballero.
Petitioner3 and private respondent Jonathan Enrique V. Nanud, Jr.4 were both
candidates for the mayoralty position of the Municipality of Uyugan, Province of
Batanes in the May 13, 2013 elections. Private respondent filed a Petition5 to deny
due course to or cancellation of petitioner's certificate of candidacy alleging that
the latter made a false representation when he declared in his COC that he was
eligible to run for Mayor of Uyugan, Batanes despite being a Canadian citizen and
a nonresident thereof.
During the December 10, 2012 conference, petitioner, through counsel, manifested
that he was not properly served with a copy of the petition and the petition was
served by registered mail not in his address in Barangay Imnajbu, Uyugan,
Batanes. He, however, received a copy of the petition during the conference.
Petitioner did not file an Answer but filed a Memorandum controverting private
respondent's substantial allegations in his petition.
Petitioner argued that prior to the filing of his COC on October 3, 2012, he took an
Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before the Philippine Consul
General in Toronto, Canada on September 13, 2012 and became a dual Filipino
and Canadian citizen pursuant to Republic Act (RA) No. 9225, otherwise known as
the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003. Thereafter, he renounced
his Canadian citizenship and executed an Affidavit of Renunciation before a Notary
Public in Batanes on October 1, 2012 to conform with Section 5(2) of RA No.
9225.6 He claimed that he did not lose his domicile of origin in Uyugan, Batanes
despite becoming a Canadian citizen as he merely left Uyugan temporarily to
pursue a brighter future for him and his family; and that he went back to Uyugan
during his vacation while working in Nigeria, California, and finally in Canada.
On May 3, 2013, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution finding that
petitioner made a material misrepresentation in his COC when he declared that he
is a resident of Barangay Imnajbu, Uyugan, Batanes within one year prior to the
election. The decretal portion of the resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby
RESOLVES to GRANT the instant Petition. The Certificate of Candidacy of
respondent Caballero is hereby CANCELLED.7chanrobleslaw
The COMELEC First Division did not discuss the procedural deficiency raised by
petitioner as he was already given a copy of the petition and also in consonance
with the Commission's constitutional duty of determining the qualifications of
petitioner to run for elective office. It found that while petitioner complied with the
requirements of RA No. 9225 since he had taken his Oath of Allegiance to the
Philippines and had validly renounced his Canadian citizenship, he failed to
comply with the other requirements provided under RA No. 9225 for those seeking
elective office, i.e., persons who renounced their foreign citizenship must still
comply with the one year residency requirement provided for under Section 39 of
the Local Government Code. Petitioner's naturalization as a Canadian citizen
resulted in the abandonment of his domicile of origin in Uyugan, Batanes; thus,
having abandoned his domicile of origin, it is incumbent upon him to prove that he
was able to reestablish his domicile in Uyugan for him to be eligible to run for
elective office in said locality which he failed to do.
Elections were subsequently held on May 13, 2013 and the election returns
showed that petitioner won over private respondent.8 Private respondent filed an
Urgent Ex-parte Motion to Defer Proclamation.9
On May 14, 2013, petitioner was proclaimed Mayor of Uyugan, Batanes.
On May 16, 2013, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the COMELEC
En Banc assailing the May 3, 2013 Resolution issued by the COMELEC's First
Division canceling his COC.
On May 17, 2013, private respondent filed a Petition to Annul Proclamation.10
On November 6, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc issued its assailed Resolution
denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner filed with us the instant petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance
of a temporary restraining order.
In the meantime, private respondent filed a Motion for Execution11 of the May 3,
2013 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division as affirmed by the En Banc and
prayed for the cancellation of petitioner's COC, the appropriate correction of the
certificate of canvas to reflect that all votes in favor of petitioner are stray votes,
declaration of nullity of petitioner's proclamation and proclamation of private
respondent as the duly-elected Mayor of Uyugan, Batanes in the May 13, 2013
elections.
On December 12, 2013, COMELEC Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. issued a Writ
of Execution.12 Private respondent took his Oath of Office13 on December 20, 2013.
In the instant petition for certiorari, petitioner raises the following assignment of
errors, to wit:
THE COMELEC EN BANC GRAVELY ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE CLEAR
IMPORT OF PROCEDURAL RULES PROVIDED FOR UNDER COMELEC
RESOLUTION NO. 9523 PROMULGATED ON 25 SEPTEMBER 2012.
THE COMELEC EN BANC GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT PETITIONER
ABANDONED HIS PHILIPPINE DOMICILE WHEN HE WORKED IN SEVERAL
FOREIGN COUNTRIES FOR "GREENER PASTURE."
EVEN ASSUMING THAT PETITIONER HAS ABANDONED HIS PHILIPPINE
DOMICILE WHEN HE BECAME A CANADIAN CITIZEN, HIS REACQUISITION
OF HIS FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP, TAKING OATH OF ALLEGIANCE TO THE
PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT NINE (9) MONTHS PRIOR TO HIS ELECTION ON
13 MAY 2013, IS A SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH THE LAW ON
RESIDENCY.14chanrobleslaw
Petitioner contends that when private respondent filed a petition to deny due
course or to cancel his COC with the Office of the Municipal Election Officer of
Uyugan, Batanes, a copy thereof was not personally served on him; that private
respondent later sent a copy of the petition to him by registered mail without an
attached affidavit stating the reason on why registered mail as a mode of service
was resorted to. Petitioner argues that private respondent violated Section 4,
paragraphs (1)15 and (4),16 Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as
amended by COMELEC Resolution No. 9523, thus, his petition to deny due course
or cancel petitioner's certificate of candidacy should have been denied outright.
We are not convinced.
While private respondent failed to comply with the above-mentioned requirements,
the settled rule, however, is that the COMELEC Rules of Procedure are subject to
liberal construction. Moreover, the COMELEC may exercise its power to suspend
its own rules as provided under Section 4, Rule 1 of their Rules of Procedure.
Sec. 4. Suspension of the Rules. - In the interest of justice and in order to obtain
speedy disposition of all matters pending before the Commission, these rules or
any portion thereof may be suspended by the Commission.chanrobleslaw
Under this authority, the Commission is similarly enabled to cope with all situations
without concerning itself about procedural niceties that do not square with the need
to do justice, in any case without further loss of time, provided that the right of the
parties to a full day in court is not substantially impaired.17
In Hayudini v. COMELEC,18 we sustained the COMELEC's liberal treatment of
respondent's petition to deny due course or cancel petitioner's COC despite its
failure to comply with Sections 2 and 4 of Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, as amended by Resolution No. 9523, i.e., pertaining to the period to file
petition and to provide sufficient explanation as to why his petition was not served
personally on petitioner, respectively, and held that:
As a general rule, statutes providing for election contests are to be liberally
construed in order that the will of the people in the choice of public officers may not
be defeated by mere technical objections. Moreover, it is neither fair nor just to
keep in office, for an indefinite period, one whose right to it is uncertain and under
suspicion. It is imperative that his claim be immediately cleared, not only for the
benefit of the winner but for the sake of public interest, which can only be achieved
by brushing aside technicalities of procedure that protract and delay the trial of an
ordinary action. This principle was reiterated in the cases of Tolentino v.
Commission on Elections and De Castro v. Commission on Elections, where the
Court held that "in exercising its powers and jurisdiction, as defined by its mandate
to protect the integrity of elections, the COMELEC must not be straitjacketed by
procedural rules in resolving election disputes."
Settled is the rule that the COMELEC Rules of Procedure are subject to liberal
construction. The COMELEC has the power to liberally interpret or even suspend
its rules of procedure in the interest of justice, including obtaining a speedy
disposition of all matters pending before it. This liberality is for the purpose of
promoting the effective and efficient implementation of its objectives - ensuring the
holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections, as well as
achieving just, expeditious, and inexpensive determination and disposition of every
action and proceeding brought before the COMELEC. Unlike an ordinary civil
action, an election contest is imbued with public interest. It involves not only the
adjudication of private and pecuniary interests of rival candidates, but also the
paramount need of dispelling the uncertainty which beclouds the real choice of the
electorate. And the tribunal has the corresponding duty to ascertain, by all means
within its command, whom the people truly chose as their rightful
leader.19chanrobleslaw

Here, we find that the issue raised,  i.e., whether petitioner had been a resident of
Uyugan, Batanes at least one (1) year before the elections held on May 13, 2013
as he represented in his COC, pertains to his qualification and eligibility to run for
public office, therefore imbued with public interest, which justified the COMELEC's
suspension of its own rules. We adopt the COMELEC's s ratiocination in accepting
the petition, to wit:
This Commission recognizes the failure of petitioner to comply strictly with the
procedure for filing a petition to deny due course to or cancel certificate of
candidacy set forth in Section 4, Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure as
amended by COMELEC Resolution No. 9523, which requires service of a copy of
the petition to respondent prior to its filing. But then, we should also consider the
efforts exerted by petitioner in serving a copy of his petition to respondent after
being made aware that such service is necessary. We should also take note of the
impossibility for petitioner to personally serve a copy of the petition to respondent
since he was in Canada at the time of its filing as shown in respondent's travel
records.
The very purpose of prior service of the petition to respondent is to afford the latter
an opportunity to answer the allegations contained in the petition even prior to the
service of summons by the Commission to him. In this case, respondent was given
a copy of the petition during the conference held on 10 December 2012 and was
ultimately accorded the occasion to rebut all the allegations against him. He even
filed a Memorandum containing his defenses to petitioner's allegations. For all
intents and purposes, therefore, respondent was never deprived of due process
which is the very essence of this Commission's Rules of Procedure.
Even the Supreme Court acknowledges the need for procedural rules to bow to
substantive considerations "through a liberal construction aimed at promoting their
objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action
and proceeding, x x x
xxxx
When a case is impressed with public interest, a relaxation of the application of the
rules is in order, x x x.
Unquestionably, the instant case is impressed with public interest which warrants
the relaxation of the application of the [R]ules of [P]rocedure, consistent with the
ruling of the Supreme Court in several cases.20chanrobleslaw
Petitioner next claims that he did not abandon his Philippine domicile. He argues
that he was born and baptized in Uyugan, Batanes; studied and had worked
therein for a couple of years, and had paid his community tax certificate; and, that
he was a registered voter and had exercised his right of suffrage and even built his
house therein. He also contends that he usually comes back to Uyugan, Batanes
during his vacations from work abroad, thus, his domicile had not been lost.
Petitioner avers that the requirement of the law in fixing the residence qualification
of a candidate running for public office is not strictly on the period of residence in
the place where he seeks to be elected but on the acquaintance by the candidate
on his constituents' vital needs for their common welfare; and that his nine months
of actual stay in Uyugan, Batanes prior to his election is a substantial compliance
with the law. Petitioner insists that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in
canceling his COC.
We are not persuaded.
RA No. 9225, which is known as the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act
of 2003, declares that natural-born citizens of the Philippines, who have lost their
Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign
country, can re-acquire or retain his Philippine citizenship under the conditions of
the law.21 The law does not provide for residency requirement for the reacquisition
or retention of Philippine citizenship; nor does it mention any effect of such
reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship on the current residence of the
concerned natural-born Filipino.22
RA No. 9225 treats citizenship independently of residence.23 This is only logical
and consistent with the general intent of the law to allow for dual citizenship. Since
a natural-born Filipino may hold, at the same time, both Philippine and foreign
citizenships, he may establish residence either in the Philippines or in the foreign
country of which he is also a citizen.24 However, when a natural-born Filipino with
dual citizenship seeks for an elective public office, residency in the Philippines
becomes material. Section 5(2) of FLA No. 9225 provides:
SEC. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. - Those who retain or reacquire
Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be
subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the
Philippines and the following conditions:
xxxx
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the
qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and
existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any
public officer authorized to administer an oath.
chanrobleslaw
Republic Act No. 7160, which is known as the Local Government Code of
1991,  provides, among others, for the qualifications of an elective local official.
Section 39 thereof states:
SEC. 39. Qualifications. - (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the
Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city or province or, in
the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod,
or sanggunian bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a resident therein
for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to
read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.chanrobleslaw
Clearly, the Local Government Code requires that the candidate must be a
resident of the place where he seeks to be elected at least one year immediately
preceding the election day. Respondent filed the petition for cancellation of
petitioner's COC on the ground that the latter made material misrepresentation
when he declared therein that he is a resident of Uyugan, Batanes for at least one
year immediately preceeding the day of elections.
The term "residence" is to be understood not in its common acceptation as
referring to "dwelling" or "habitation," but rather to "domicile" or legal
residence,25 that is, "the place where a party actually or constructively has his
permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time,
eventually intends to return and remain (animus manendi)."26 A domicile of origin is
acquired by every person at birth. It is usually the place where the child's parents
reside and continues until the same is abandoned by acquisition of new domicile
(domicile of choice). It consists not only in the intention to reside in a fixed place
but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such
intention.27
Petitioner was a natural born Filipino who was born and raised in Uyugan,
Batanes. Thus, it could be said that he had his domicile of origin in Uyugan,
Batanes. However, he later worked in Canada and became a Canadian citizen.
In Coquilla v. COMELEC28 we ruled that naturalization in a foreign country may
result in an abandonment of domicile in the Philippines. This holds true in
petitioner's case as permanent resident status in Canada is required for the
acquisition of Canadian citizenship.29 Hence, petitioner had effectively abandoned
his domicile in the Philippines and transferred his domicile of choice in Canada.
His frequent visits to Uyugan, Batanes during his vacation from work in Canada
cannot be considered as waiver of such abandonment.
The next question is what is the effect of petitioner's retention of his Philippine
citizenship under RA No. 9225 on his residence or domicile?
In Japzon v. COMELEC,30 wherein respondent Ty reacquired his Philippine
citizenship under RA No. 9225 and run for Mayor of General Macarthur, Eastern
Samar and whose residency in the said place was put in issue, we had the
occasion to state, thus:
[Petitioner's] reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act
No. 9225 had no automatic impact or effect on his residence/domicile. He
could still retain his domicile in the USA, and he did not necessarily regain his
domicile in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines. Ty
merely had the option to again establish his domicile in the Municipality of General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines, said place becoming his new domicile of
choice. The length of his residence therein shall be determined from the time he
made it his domicile of choice, and it shall not retroact to the time of his
birth.31chanrobleslaw
Hence, petitioner's retention of his Philippine citizenship under RA No. 9225 did
not automatically make him regain his residence in Uyugan, Batanes. He must still
prove that after becoming a Philippine citizen on September 13, 2012, he had
reestablished Uyugan, Batanes as his new domicile of choice which is reckoned
from the time he made it as such.
The COMELEC found that petitioner failed to present competent evidence to prove
that he was able to reestablish his residence in Uyugan within a period of one year
immediately preceding the May 13, 2013 elections. It found that it was only after
reacquiring his Filipino citizenship by virtue of RA No. 9225 on September 13,
2012 that petitioner can rightfully claim that he re-established his domicile in
Uyugan, Batanes, if such was accompanied by physical presence thereat, coupled
with an actual intent to reestablish his domicile there. However, the period from
September 13, 2012 to May 12, 2013 was even less than the one year residency
required by law.
Doctrinally entrenched is the rule that in a petition for certiorari, findings of fact of
administrative bodies, such as respondent COMELEC in the instant case, are final
unless grave abuse of discretion has marred such factual determinations/~ Clearly,
where there is no proof of grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, fraud or error of
law in the questioned Resolutions, we may not review the factual findings of
COMELEC, nor substitute its own findings on the sufficiency of evidence.33
Records indeed showed that petitioner failed to prove that he had been a resident
of Uyugan, Batanes for at least one year immediately preceding the day of
elections as required under Section 39 of the Local Government Code.
Petitioner's argument that his nine (9) months of actual stay in Uyugan, Batanes,
prior to the May 13, 2013 local elections is a substantial compliance with the law, is
not persuasive. In Aquino v. Commission on Elections,34 we held:
x x x A democratic government is necessarily a government of laws. In a
republican government those laws are themselves ordained by the people.
Through their representatives, they dictate the qualifications necessary for service
in government positions. And as petitioner clearly lacks one of the essential
qualifications for running for membership in the House of Representatives, not
even the will of a majority or plurality of the voters of the Second District of Makati
City would substitute for a requirement mandated by the fundamental law
itself.35chanrobleslaw
Petitioner had made a material misrepresentation by stating in his COC that he is a
resident of Uyugan, Batanes for at least one (1) year immediately proceeding the
day of the election, thus, a ground for a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code. Section 74, in relation to Section 78, of the OEC governs the
cancellation of, and grant or denial of due course to COCs, to wit:
SEC. 74.  Contents of certificate of candidacy.  - The certificate of candidacy shall
state that the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated
therein and that he is eligible for said office; if for Member of the Batasang
Pambansa, the province, including its component cities, highly urbanized city or
district or sector which he seeks to represent; the political party to which he
belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his post office address for all
election purposes; his profession or occupation; that he will support and defend the
Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto;
that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees promulgated by the duly
constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a
foreign country; that the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily,
without mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the
certificate of candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge.
xxxx
SEC. 78.  Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. - A
verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy
may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material
representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The
petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the
filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and
hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.chanrobleslaw
We have held that in order to justify the cancellation of COC under Section 78, it is
essential that the false representation mentioned therein pertains to a material
matter for the sanction imposed by this provision would affect the substantive
rights of a candidate - the right to run for the elective post for which he filed the
certificate of candidacy.36 We concluded that material representation contemplated
by Section 78 refers to qualifications for elective office, such as the requisite
residency, age, citizenship or any other legal qualification necessary to run for a
local elective office as provided for in the Local Government Code.37 Furthermore,
aside from the requirement of materiality, the misrepresentation must consist of a
deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise
render a candidate ineligible.38 We, therefore, find no grave abuse of discretion
committed by the COMELEC in canceling petitioner's COC for material
misrepresentation.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. The Resolution dated May
3, 2013 of the COMELEC First Division and the Resolution dated November 6,
2013 of the COMELEC En Banc and are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 195229               October 9, 2012
EFREN RACEL ARA TEA, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSiON ON ELECTIONS and ESTELA D. ANTlPOLO, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a special civil action for certiorari1  seeking to review and nullify the
Resolution2 dated 2  February 2011 and the Order3 dated 12 January 2011 of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc in Dra. Sigrid S. Rodolfo v.
Romeo D. Lonzanida, docketed as SPA No. 09-158 (DC). The petition asserts that
the COMELEC issued the Resolution and Order with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The Facts
Romeo D. Lonzanida (Lonzanida) and Estela D. Antipolo (Antipolo) were
candidates for Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales in the May 2010 National and
Local Elections. Lonzanida filed his certificate of candidacy on 1 December
2009.4 On 8 December 2009, Dra. Sigrid S. Rodolfo (Rodolfo) filed a petition under
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code to disqualify Lonzanida and to deny due
course or to cancel Lonzanida’s certificate of candidacy on the ground that
Lonzanida was elected, and had served, as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales for
four (4) consecutive terms immediately prior to the term for the May 2010
elections. Rodolfo asserted that Lonzanida made a false material representation in
his certificate of candidacy when Lonzanida certified under oath that he was
eligible for the office he sought election. Section 8, Article X of the 1987
Constitution5 and Section 43(b) of the Local Government Code6 both prohibit a local
elective official from being elected and serving for more than three consecutive
terms for the same position.
The COMELEC Second Division rendered a Resolution7 on 18 February 2010
cancelling Lonzanida’s certificate of candidacy. Pertinent portions of the 18
February 2010 Resolution read:
Respondent Lonzanida never denied having held the office of mayor of San
Antonio, Zambales for more than nine consecutive years. Instead he raised
arguments to forestall or dismiss the petition on the grounds other than the main
issue itself. We find such arguments as wanting. Respondent Lonzanida, for
holding the office of mayor for more than three consecutive terms, went against the
three-term limit rule; therefore, he could not be allowed to run anew in the 2010
elections. It is time to infuse new blood in the political arena of San Antonio.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED.
The Certificate of Candidacy of Respondent Romeo D. Lonzanida for the position
of mayor in the municipality of San Antonio, Zambales is hereby CANCELLED. His
name is hereby ordered STRICKEN OFF the list of Official Candidates for the
position of Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales in May 10, 2010 elections.
SO ORDERED.8
Lonzanida’s motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc remained
pending during the May 2010 elections. Lonzanida and Efren Racel Aratea
(Aratea) garnered the highest number of votes and were respectively proclaimed
Mayor and Vice-Mayor.
Aratea took his oath of office as Acting Mayor before Regional Trial Court (RTC)
Judge Raymond C. Viray of Branch 75, Olongapo City on 5 July 2010.9 On the
same date, Aratea wrote the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG)
and requested for an opinion on whether, as Vice-Mayor, he was legally required
to assume the Office of the Mayor in view of Lonzanida’s disqualification. DILG
Legal Opinion No. 117, S. 201010 stated that Lonzanida was disqualified to hold
office by reason of his criminal conviction. As a consequence of Lonzanida’s
disqualification, the Office of the Mayor was deemed permanently vacant. Thus,
Aratea should assume the Office of the Mayor in an acting capacity without
prejudice to the COMELEC’s resolution of Lonzanida’s motion for reconsideration.
In another letter dated 6 August 2010, Aratea requested the DILG to allow him to
take the oath of office as Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales. In his response dated
24 August 2010, then Secretary Jesse M. Robredo allowed Aratea to take an oath
of office as "the permanent Municipal Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales without
prejudice however to the outcome of the cases pending before the [COMELEC]."11
On 11 August 2010, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution12 disqualifying
Lonzanida from running for Mayor in the May 2010 elections. The COMELEC En
Banc’s resolution was based on two grounds: first, Lonzanida had been elected
and had served as Mayor for more than three consecutive terms without
interruption; and second, Lonzanida had been convicted by final judgment of ten
(10) counts of falsification under the Revised Penal Code. Lonzanida was
sentenced for each count of falsification to imprisonment of four (4) years and one
(1) day of prisión correccional as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day
of prisión mayor  as maximum. The judgment of conviction became final on 23
October 2009 in the Decision of this Court in Lonzanida v. People,13 before
Lonzanida filed his certificate of candidacy on 1 December 2009. Pertinent
portions of the 11 August 2010 Resolution read:
Prescinding from the foregoing premises, Lonzanida, for having served as Mayor
of San Antonio, Zambales for more than three (3) consecutive terms and for
having been convicted by a final judgment of a crime punishable by more than one
(1) year of imprisonment, is clearly disqualified to run for the same position in the
May 2010 Elections.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby
DENIED.
SO ORDERED.14
On 25 August 2010, Antipolo filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit
Attached Petition-in-Intervention.15 She claimed her right to be proclaimed as
Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales because Lonzanida ceased to be a candidate
when the COMELEC Second Division, through its 18 February 2010 Resolution,
ordered the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy and the striking out of his
name from the list of official candidates for the position of Mayor of San Antonio,
Zambales in the May 2010 elections.
In his Comment filed on 26 January 2011, Aratea asserted that Antipolo, as the
candidate who received the second highest number of votes, could not be
proclaimed as the winning candidate. Since Lonzanida’s disqualification was not
yet final during election day, the votes cast in his favor could not be declared stray.
Lonzanida’s subsequent disqualification resulted in a permanent vacancy in the
Office of Mayor, and Aratea, as the duly-elected Vice-Mayor, was mandated by
Section 4416 of the Local Government Code to succeed as Mayor.
The COMELEC’s Rulings
The COMELEC En Banc issued an Order dated 12 January 2011, stating:
Acting on the "Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Attached Petition-in-
Intervention" filed by Estela D. Antipolo (Antipolo) and pursuant to the power of this
Commission to suspend its Rules or any portion thereof in the interest of justice,
this Commission hereby RESOLVES to:
1. GRANT the aforesaid Motion;
2. ADMIT the Petition-in-Intervention filed by Antipolo;
3. REQUIRE the Respondent, ROMEO DUMLAO LONZANIDA, as well as EFREN
RACEL ARATEA, proclaimed Vice-Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales, to file their
respective Comments on the Petition-in- Intervention within a non-extendible
period of five (5) days from receipt thereof;
4. SET the above-mentioned Petition-in-Intervention for hearing on January 26,
2011 at 10:00 a.m. COMELEC Session Hall, 8th Floor, Palacio del Gobernador,
Intramuros, Manila.
WHEREFORE, furnish copies hereof the parties for their information and
compliance.
SO ORDERED.17
In its Resolution dated 2 February 2011, the COMELEC En Banc no longer
considered Lonzanida’s qualification as an issue: "It is beyond cavil that Lonzanida
is not eligible to hold and discharge the functions of the Office of the Mayor of San
Antonio, Zambales. The sole issue to be resolved at this juncture is how to fill the
vacancy resulting from Lonzanida’s disqualification."18 The Resolution further
stated:
We cannot sustain the submission of Oppositor Aratea that Intervenor Antipolo
could never be proclaimed as the duly elected Mayor of Antipolo [sic] for being a
second placer in the elections. The teachings in the cases of Codilla vs. De
Venecia and Nazareno and Domino vs. COMELEC, et al., while they remain sound
jurisprudence find no application in the case at bar. What sets this case apart from
the cited jurisprudence is that the notoriety of Lonzanida’s disqualification and
ineligibility to hold public office is established both in fact and in law on election day
itself. Hence, Lonzanida’s name, as already ordered by the Commission on
February 18, 2010 should have been stricken off from the list of official candidates
for Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Commission hereby:
1. Declares NULL and VOID the proclamation of respondent ROMEO D.
LONZANIDA;
2. GRANTS the Petition for Intervention of Estela D. Antipolo;
3. Orders the immediate CONSTITUTION of a Special Municipal Board of
Canvassers to PROCLAIM Intervenor Estela D. Antipolo as the duly elected Mayor
of San Antonio, Zambales;
4. Orders Vice-Mayor Efren Racel Aratea to cease and desist from discharging the
functions of the Office of the Mayor, and to cause a peaceful turn-over of the said
office to Antipolo upon her proclamation; and
5. Orders the Office of the Executive Director as well as the Regional Election
Director of Region III to cause the implementation of this Resolution and
disseminate it to the Department of Interior and Local Government.
SO ORDERED.19
Aratea filed the present petition on 9 February 2011.
The Issues
The manner of filling up the permanent vacancy in the Office of the Mayor of San
Antonio, Zambales is dependent upon the determination of Lonzanida’s removal.
Whether Lonzanida was disqualified under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election
Code, or made a false material representation under Section 78 of the same
Code that resulted in his certificate of candidacy being void ab initio, is
determinative of whether Aratea or Antipolo is the rightful occupant to the Office of
the Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales.
The dissenting opinions reverse the COMELEC’s 2 February 2011 Resolution and
12 January 2011 Order. They hold that Aratea, the duly elected Vice-Mayor of San
Antonio, Zambales, should be declared Mayor pursuant to the Local Government
Code’s rule on succession.
The dissenting opinions make three grave errors: first, they ignore prevailing
jurisprudence that a false representation in the certificate of candidacy as to
eligibility in the number of terms elected and served is a material fact that is a
ground for a petition to cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section 78; second,
they ignore that a false representation as to eligibility to run for public office due to
the fact that the candidate suffers from perpetual special disqualification  is a
material fact that is a ground for a petition to cancel a certificate of candidacy
under Section 78; and third, they resort to a strained statutory construction to
conclude that the violation of the three-term limit rule cannot be a ground for
cancellation of a certificate of candidacy under Section 78, even when it is clear
and plain that violation of the three-term limit rule is an ineligibility affecting the
qualification of a candidate to elective office.
The dissenting opinions tread on dangerous ground when they assert that a
candidate’s eligibility to the office he seeks election must be strictly construed to
refer only to the details, i.e., age, citizenship, or residency, among others, which
the law requires him to state in his COC, and which he must swear under oath to
possess. The dissenting opinions choose to view a false certification of a
candidate’s eligibility on the three-term limit rule not as a ground for false material
representation under Section 78 but as a ground for disqualification under Section
68 of the same Code. This is clearly contrary to well-established jurisprudence.
The Court’s Ruling
We hold that Antipolo, the alleged "second placer," should be proclaimed Mayor
because Lonzanida’s certificate of candidacy was void ab initio. In short,
Lonzanida was never a candidate at all. All votes for Lonzanida were stray votes.
Thus, Antipolo, the only qualified candidate, actually garnered the highest number
of votes for the position of Mayor.
Qualifications and Disqualifications
Section 65 of the Omnibus Election Code points to the Local Government Code for
the qualifications of elective local officials. Paragraphs (a) and (c) of Section 39
and Section 40 of the Local Government Code provide in pertinent part:
Sec. 39. Qualifications. ‒ (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the
Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city or province x x x;
a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the
election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.
xxxx
(c) Candidates for the position of mayor or vice-mayor of independent component
cities, component cities, or municipalities must be at least twenty-one (21) years of
age on election day.
xxxx
Sec. 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons are disqualified from running for
any elective local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral
turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of
imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence;
(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;
(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the
Republic;
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad;
(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right
to reside abroad and continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this
Code; and
(g) The insane or feeble-minded. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code provides:
Sec. 12. Disqualification. — Any person who has been declared by competent
authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for
subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for which he was
sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime involving
moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office,
unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.
The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed
upon the declaration by competent authority that said insanity or incompetence
had been removed or after the expiration of a period of five years from his service
of sentence, unless within the same period he again becomes disqualified.
(Emphasis supplied)
The grounds for disqualification for a petition under Section 68 of the Omnibus
Election Code are specifically enumerated:
Sec. 68. Disqualifications. ‒ Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he
is a party is declared by final decision by a competent court guilty of, or found by
the Commission of having (a) given money or other material consideration to
influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing
electoral functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his
candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that
allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or made any contribution
prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; (e) violated any of Sections
80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, subparagraph 6, shall be
disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding
the office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign
country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless
said person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign
country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election
laws. (Emphasis supplied)
A petition for disqualification under Section 68 clearly refers to "the commission of
prohibited acts and possession of a permanent resident status in a foreign
country."20 All the offenses mentioned in Section 68 refer to election offenses
under the Omnibus Election Code, not to violations of other penal laws.
There is absolutely nothing in the language of Section 68 that would justify
including violation of the three-term limit rule, or conviction by final judgment of the
crime of falsification under the Revised Penal Code, as one of the grounds or
offenses covered under Section 68. In Codilla, Sr. v. de Venecia,21 this Court ruled:
[T]he jurisdiction of the COMELEC to disqualify candidates is limited to those
enumerated in Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code. All other election
offenses are beyond the ambit of COMELEC jurisdiction. They are criminal and not
administrative in nature. x x x
Clearly, the violation by Lonzanida of the three-term limit rule, or his conviction by
final judgment of the crime of falsification under the Revised Penal Code, does not
constitute a ground for a petition under Section 68.
False Material Representation
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code states that a certificate of candidacy may
be denied or cancelled when there is false material representation of the
contents of the certificate of candidacy:
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. ‒ A
verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy
may be filed by the person exclusively on the ground that any material
representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is
false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the
time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due
notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election. (Emphasis
supplied)
Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code details the contents of the certificate
of candidacy:
Sec. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. ‒ The certificate of candidacy shall
state that the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated
therein and that he is eligible for said office; if for Member of the Batasang
Pambansa, the province, including its component cities, highly urbanized city or
district or sector which he seeks to represent; the political party to which he
belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his post office address for all
election purposes; his profession or occupation; that he will support and defend the
Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto;
that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees promulgated by the duly
constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a
foreign country; that the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily,
without mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the
certificate of candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge.
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
A candidate for mayor in the 2010 local elections was thus required to provide 12
items of information in the certificate of candidacy:22 name; nickname or stage
name; gender; age; place of birth; political party that nominated the candidate; civil
status; residence/address; profession or occupation; post office address for
election purposes; locality of which the candidate is a registered voter; and period
of residence in the Philippines before 10 May 2010. The candidate also certifies
four statements: a statement that the candidate is a natural born or naturalized
Filipino citizen; a statement that the candidate is not a permanent resident of, or
immigrant to, a foreign country; a statement that the candidate is eligible for the
office he seeks election; and a statement of the candidate’s allegiance to the
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines.23 The certificate of candidacy should
also be under oath, and filed within the period prescribed by law.
The conviction of Lonzanida by final judgment, with the penalty of prisión
mayor, disqualifies him perpetually from holding any public office, or from
being elected to any public office. This perpetual disqualification took effect
upon the finality of the judgment of conviction, before Lonzanida filed his
certificate of candidacy. The pertinent provisions of the Revised Penal Code are
as follows:
Art. 27. Reclusion perpetua. — x x x
Prisión mayor and temporary disqualification. — The duration of the penalties
of prisión mayor and temporary disqualification shall be from six years and
one day to twelve years, except when the penalty of disqualification is
imposed as an accessory penalty, in which case, it shall be that of the
principal penalty.
xxxx
Art. 30. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification.
— The penalties of perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification for public
office shall produce the following effects:
1. The deprivation of the public offices and employments which the offender
may have held, even if conferred by popular election.
2. The deprivation of the right to vote in any election for any popular elective
office or to be elected to such office.
3. The disqualification for the offices or public employments and for the
exercise of any of the rights mentioned.
In case of temporary disqualification, such disqualification as is comprised in
paragraphs 2 and 3 of this article shall last during the term of the sentence.
4. The loss of all rights to retirement pay or other pension for any office formerly
held.
Art. 31. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary special disqualification.
— The penalties of perpetual or temporary special disqualification for public
office, profession or calling shall produce the following effects:
1. The deprivation of the office, employment, profession or calling affected.
2. The disqualification for holding similar offices or employments either perpetually
or during the term of the sentence, according to the extent of such disqualification.
Art. 32. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary special disqualification
for the exercise of the right of suffrage. — The perpetual or temporary special
disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage shall deprive the
offender perpetually or during the term of the sentence, according to the
nature of said penalty, of the right to vote in any popular election for any public
office or to be elected to such office. Moreover, the offender shall not be
permitted to hold any public office during the period of his disqualification.
Art. 42. Prisión mayor — Its accessory penalties. — The penalty of prision mayor
shall carry with it that of temporary absolute disqualification and that
of perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage which the offender
shall suffer although pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall
have been expressly remitted in the pardon. (Emphasis supplied)
The penalty of prisión mayor  automatically carries with it, by operation of law,24 the
accessory penalties of temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special
disqualification. Under Article 30 of the Revised Penal Code, temporary absolute
disqualification produces the effect of "deprivation of the right to vote in any
election for any popular elective office or to be elected to such office.” The duration
of temporary absolute disqualification is the same as that of the principal penalty
of prisión mayor. On the other hand, under Article 32 of the Revised Penal
Code, perpetual special disqualification means that "the offender shall not be
permitted to hold any public office during the period of his
disqualification,” which is perpetually.  Both temporary absolute disqualification
and perpetual special disqualification constitute ineligibilities to hold elective public
office. A person suffering from these ineligibilities is ineligible to run for
elective public office, and commits a false material representation if he
states in his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to so run.
In Lacuna v. Abes  (Lacuna),25 the Court, speaking through Justice J.B.L. Reyes,
explained the import of the accessory penalty of perpetual special
disqualification:
On the first defense of respondent-appellee Abes, it must be remembered that
appellee’s conviction of a crime penalized with prision mayor which carried the
accessory penalties of temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special
disqualification from the right of suffrage (Article 42, Revised Penal Code); and
Section 99 of the Revised Election Code disqualifies a person from voting if he had
been sentenced by final judgment to suffer one year or more of imprisonment.
The accessory penalty of temporary absolute disqualification disqualifies the
convict for public office and for the right to vote, such disqualification to last only
during the term of the sentence (Article 27, paragraph 3, & Article 30, Revised
Penal Code) that, in the case of Abes, would have expired on 13 October 1961.
But this does not hold true with respect to the other accessory penalty of perpetual
special disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage. This accessory
penalty deprives the convict of the right to vote or to be elected to or hold public
office perpetually, as distinguished from temporary special disqualification, which
lasts during the term of the sentence. Article 32, Revised Penal Code, provides:
Art. 32. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary special disqualification
for the exercise of the right of suffrage. — The perpetual or temporary special
disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage shall deprive the offender
perpetually or during the term of the sentence, according to the nature of said
penalty, of the right to vote in any popular election for any public office or to be
elected to such office. Moreover, the offender shall not be permitted to hold any
public office during the period of disqualification.
The word "perpetually" and the phrase "during the term of the sentence" should be
applied distributively to their respective antecedents; thus, the word "perpetually"
refers to the perpetual kind of special disqualification, while the phrase "during the
term of the sentence" refers to the temporary special disqualification. The duration
between the perpetual and the temporary (both special) are necessarily different
because the provision, instead of merging their durations into one period, states
that such duration is "according to the nature of said penalty" — which means
according to whether the penalty is the perpetual or the temporary special
disqualification. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, Lacuna  instructs that the accessory penalty of perpetual special
disqualification "deprives the convict of the right to vote or to be elected to or
hold public office perpetually.”
The accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification takes effect
immediately once the judgment of conviction becomes final. The effectivity of
this accessory penalty does not depend on the duration of the principal penalty, or
on whether the convict serves his jail sentence or not. The last sentence of Article
32 states that "the offender shall not be permitted to hold any public office during
the period of his [perpetual special] disqualification." Once the judgment of
conviction becomes final, it is immediately executory. Any public office that the
convict may be holding at the time of his conviction becomes vacant upon finality
of the judgment, and the convict becomes ineligible to run for any elective
public office perpetually. In the case of Lonzanida, he became ineligible
perpetually to hold, or to run for, any elective public office from the time the
judgment of conviction against him became final. The judgment of
conviction was promulgated on 20 July 2009 and became final on 23 October
2009, before Lonzanida filed his certificate of candidacy on 1 December 2009
.  26
Perpetual special disqualification is a ground for a petition under Section 78 of
the Omnibus Election Code because this accessory penalty is an ineligibility,
which means that the convict is not eligible to run for public office, contrary to the
statement that Section 74 requires him to state under oath in his certificate of
candidacy. As this Court held in Fermin v. Commission on Elections,27 the false
material representation may refer to "qualifications or eligibility.” One who
suffers from perpetual special disqualification is ineligible to run for public office. If
a person suffering from perpetual special disqualification files a certificate of
candidacy stating under oath that "he is eligible to run for (public) office," as
expressly required under Section 74, then he clearly makes a false material
representation that is a ground for a petition under Section 78. As this Court
explained in Fermin:
Lest it be misunderstood, the denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC
is not based on the lack of qualifications but on a finding that the candidate made a
material representation that is false, which may relate to the qualifications
required of the public office he/she is running for. It is noted that the
candidate states in his/her CoC that he/she is eligible for the office he/she
seeks. Section 78 of the OEC, therefore, is to be read in relation to the
constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications or eligibility  for
public office. If the candidate subsequently states a material representation
in the CoC that is false, the COMELEC, following the law, is empowered to
deny due course to or cancel such certificate. Indeed, the Court has already
likened a proceeding under Section 78 to a quo warranto proceeding under
Section 253 of the OEC since they both deal with the eligibility or qualification of a
candidate, with the distinction mainly in the fact that a "Section 78" petition is filed
before proclamation, while a petition for quo warranto is filed after proclamation of
the winning candidate.28 (Emphasis supplied)
Latasa, Rivera and Ong:
The Three-Term Limit Rule as a Ground for Ineligibility
Section 74 requires the candidate to certify that he is eligible for the public
office he seeks election. Thus, Section 74 states that "the certificate of
candidacy shall state that the person filing x x x is eligible for said office.”
The three-term limit rule, enacted to prevent the establishment of political
dynasties and to enhance the electorate’s freedom of choice,29 is found both in the
Constitution30 and the law.31 After being elected and serving for three consecutive
terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate reelection for the same
office in the next regular election32 because he is ineligible. One who has an
ineligibility to run for elective public office is not "eligible for [the] office." As used in
Section 74, the word "eligible"33 means having the right to run for elective public
office, that is, having all the qualifications and none of the ineligibilities to run for
the public office.
In Latasa v. Commission on Elections,34 petitioner Arsenio Latasa was elected
mayor of the Municipality of Digos, Davao del Sur in 1992, 1995, and 1998. The
Municipality of Digos was converted into the City of Digos during Latasa’s third
term. Latasa filed his certificate of candidacy for city mayor for the 2001 elections.
Romeo Sunga, Latasa’s opponent, filed before the COMELEC a "petition to deny
due course, cancel certificate of candidacy and/or disqualification" under Section
78 on the ground that Latasa falsely represented in his certificate of candidacy that
he is eligible to run as mayor of Digos City. Latasa argued that he did not make
any false representation. In his certificate of candidacy, Latasa inserted a footnote
after the phrase "I am eligible" and indicated "*Having served three (3) term[s] as
municipal mayor and now running for the first time as city mayor." The COMELEC
First Division cancelled Latasa’s certificate of candidacy for violation of the three-
term limit rule but not for false material representation. This Court affirmed the
COMELEC En Banc’s denial of Latasa’s motion for reconsideration.
We cancelled Marino Morales’ certificate of candidacy in Rivera III v. Commission
on Elections (Rivera).35 We held that Morales exceeded the maximum three-term
limit, having been elected and served as Mayor of Mabalacat for four consecutive
terms (1995 to 1998, 1998 to 2001, 2001 to 2004, and 2004 to 2007). We declared
him ineligible as a candidate for the same position for the 2007 to 2010 term.
Although we did not explicitly rule that Morales’ violation of the three-term limit rule
constituted false material representation, we nonetheless granted the petition to
cancel Morales’ certificate of candidacy under Section 78. We also affirmed the
cancellation of Francis Ong’s certificate of candidacy in Ong v. Alegre,36 where the
"petition to disqualify, deny due course and cancel" Ong’s certificate of candidacy
under Section 78 was predicated on the violation of the three-term limit rule.
Loong, Fermin and Munder:
When Possession of a Disqualifying Condition
is Not a Ground for a Petition for Disqualification
It is obvious from a reading of the laws and jurisprudence that there is an overlap
in the grounds for eligibility and ineligibility vis-à-vis  qualifications and
disqualifications. For example, a candidate may represent that he is a resident of a
particular Philippine locality37 when he is actually a permanent resident of another
country.38 In cases of such overlap, the petitioner should not be constrained in his
choice of remedy when the Omnibus Election Code explicitly makes available
multiple remedies.39 Section 78 allows the filing of a petition to deny due course or
to cancel a certificate of candidacy before the election, while Section 253 allows
the filing of a petition for quo warranto after the election. Despite the overlap of the
grounds, one should not confuse a petition for disqualification using grounds
enumerated in Section 68 with a petition to deny due course or to cancel a
certificate of candidacy under Section 78.
The distinction between a petition under Section 68 and a petition under Section
78 was discussed in Loong v. Commission on Elections40 with respect to the
applicable prescriptive period. Respondent Nur Hussein Ututalum filed a petition
under Section 78 to disqualify petitioner Benjamin Loong for the office of Regional
Vice-Governor of the Autonomous Government of Muslim Mindanao for false
representation as to his age. The petition was filed 16 days after the election, and
clearly beyond the prescribed 25 day period from the last day of filing certificates of
candidacy. This Court ruled that Ututalum’s petition was one based on false
representation under Section 78, and not for disqualification under Section 68.
Hence, the 25-day prescriptive period provided in Section 78 should be strictly
applied. We recognized the possible gap in the law:
It is true that the discovery of false representation as to material facts required to
be stated in a certificate of candidacy, under Section 74 of the Code, may be made
only after the lapse of the 25-day period prescribed by Section 78 of the Code,
through no fault of the person who discovers such misrepresentations and who
would want the disqualification of the candidate committing the misrepresentations.
It would seem, therefore, that there could indeed be a gap between the time of the
discovery of the misrepresentation, (when the discovery is made after the 25-day
period under Sec. 78 of the Code has lapsed) and the time when the proclamation
of the results of the election is made. During this so-called "gap" the would-be
petitioner (who would seek the disqualification of the candidate) is left with nothing
to do except to wait for the proclamation of the results, so that he could avail of a
remedy against the misrepresenting candidate, that is, by filing a petition for quo
warranto against him. Respondent Commission sees this "gap" in what it calls a
procedural gap which, according to it, is unnecessary and should be remedied.
At the same time, it can not be denied that it is the purpose and intent of the
legislative branch of the government to fix a definite time within which petitions of
protests related to eligibility of candidates for elective offices must be filed, as seen
in Sections 78 and 253 of the Code. Respondent Commission may have seen the
need to remedy this so-called “procedural gap", but it is not for it to prescribe what
the law does not provide, its function not being legislative. The question of whether
the time to file these petitions or protests is too short or ineffective is one for the
Legislature to decide and remedy.41
In Fermin v. Commission on Elections,42 the issue of a candidate’s possession of
the required one-year residency requirement was raised in a petition for
disqualification under Section 68 instead of a petition to deny due course or to
cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section 78. Despite the question of the
one-year residency being a proper ground under Section 78, Dilangalen, the
petitioner before the COMELEC in Fermin, relied on Section 5(C)(1) and 5(C)(3)(a)
(4) of COMELEC Resolution No. 780043 and filed the petition under Section 68.
In Fermin, we ruled that "a COMELEC rule or resolution cannot supplant or vary
legislative enactments that distinguish the grounds for disqualification from
those of ineligibility, and the appropriate proceedings to raise the said
grounds."44 A petition for disqualification can only be premised on a ground
specified in Section 12 or 68 of the Omnibus Election Code or Section 40 of the
Local Government Code. Thus, a petition questioning a candidate’s possession of
the required one-year residency requirement, as distinguished from permanent
residency or immigrant status in a foreign country, should be filed under Section
78, and a petition under Section 68 is the wrong remedy.
In Munder v. Commission on Elections,45 petitioner Alfais Munder filed a certificate
of candidacy for Mayor of Bubong, Lanao del Sur on 26 November 2009.
Respondent Atty. Tago Sarip filed a petition for Munder’s disqualification on 13
April 2010. Sarip claimed that Munder misrepresented that he was a registered
voter of Bubong, Lanao del Sur, and that he was eligible to register as a voter in
2003 even though he was not yet 18 years of age at the time of the voter’s
registration. Moreover, Munder’s certificate of candidacy was not accomplished in
full as he failed to indicate his precinct and did not affix his thumb-mark. The
COMELEC Second Division dismissed Sarip’s petition and declared that his
grounds are not grounds for disqualification under Section 68 but for denial or
cancellation of Munder’s certificate of candidacy under Section 78. Sarip’s petition
was filed out of time as he had only 25 days after the filing of Munder’s certificate
of candidacy, or until 21 December 2009, within which to file his petition.
The COMELEC En Banc, however, disqualified Munder. In reversing the
COMELEC Second Division, the COMELEC En Banc did not rule on the propriety
of Sarip’s remedy but focused on the question of whether Munder was a registered
voter of Bubong, Lanao del Sur. This Court reinstated the COMELEC Second
Division’s resolution. This Court ruled that the ground raised in the petition, lack of
registration as voter in the locality where he was running as a candidate, is
inappropriate for a petition for disqualification. We further declared that with our
ruling in Fermin, we had already rejected the claim that lack of substantive
qualifications of a candidate is a ground for a petition for disqualification under
Section 68. The only substantive qualification the absence of which is a ground for
a petition under Section 68 is the candidate’s permanent residency or immigrant
status in a foreign country.
The dissenting opinions place the violation of the three-term limit rule as a
disqualification under Section 68 as the violation allegedly is "a status,
circumstance or condition which bars him from running for public office despite the
possession of all the qualifications under Section 39 of the [Local Government
Code]." In so holding the dissenting opinions write in the law what is not found in
the law. Section 68 is explicit as to the proper grounds for disqualification under
said Section. The grounds for filing a petition for disqualification under Section 68
are specifically enumerated in said Section. However, contrary to the specific
enumeration in Section 68 and contrary to prevailing jurisprudence, the dissenting
opinions add to the enumerated grounds the violation of the three-term limit rule
and falsification under the Revised Penal Code, which are obviously not found in
the enumeration in Section 68.
The dissenting opinions equate Lonzanida’s possession of a disqualifying
condition (violation of the three-term limit rule) with the grounds for disqualification
under Section 68. Section 68 is explicit as to the proper grounds for
disqualification: the commission of specific prohibited acts under the Omnibus
Election Code and possession of a permanent residency or immigrant status in a
foreign country. Any other false representation regarding a material fact should be
filed under Section 78, specifically under the candidate’s certification of his
eligibility. In rejecting a violation of the three-term limit as a condition for eligibility,
the dissenting opinions resort to judicial legislation, ignoring the verba
legis  doctrine and well-established jurisprudence on this very issue.
In a certificate of candidacy, the candidate is asked to certify under oath his
eligibility, and thus qualification, to the office he seeks election. Even though the
certificate of candidacy does not specifically ask the candidate for the number of
terms elected and served in an elective position, such fact is material in
determining a candidate’s eligibility, and thus qualification for the office. Election to
and service of the same local elective position for three consecutive terms renders
a candidate ineligible from running for the same position in the succeeding
elections. Lonzanida misrepresented his eligibility because he knew full well that
he had been elected, and had served, as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales for
more than three consecutive terms yet he still certified that he was eligible to run
for mayor for the next succeeding term. Thus, Lonzanida’s representation that he
was eligible for the office that he sought election constitutes false material
representation as to his qualification or eligibility for the office.
Legal Duty of COMELEC
to Enforce Perpetual Special Disqualification
Even without a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, the
COMELEC is under a legal duty to cancel the certificate of candidacy of anyone
suffering from perpetual special disqualification to run for public office by virtue of a
final judgment of conviction. The final judgment of conviction is judicial notice to
the COMELEC of the disqualification of the convict from running for public office.
The law itself bars the convict from running for public office, and the
disqualification is part of the final judgment of conviction. The final judgment of the
court is addressed not only to the Executive branch, but also to other government
agencies tasked to implement the final judgment under the law.
Whether or not the COMELEC is expressly mentioned in the judgment to
implement the disqualification, it is assumed that the portion of the final judgment
on disqualification to run for elective public office is addressed to the COMELEC
because under the Constitution the COMELEC is duty bound to "enforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election."46 The
disqualification of a convict to run for elective public office under the Revised Penal
Code, as affirmed by final judgment of a competent court, is part of
the enforcement and administration of "all the laws" relating to the conduct of
elections.
Effect of a Void Certificate of Candidacy
A cancelled certificate of candidacy void ab initio  cannot give rise to a valid
candidacy, and much less to valid votes.47 We quote from the COMELEC’s 2
February 2011 Resolution with approval:
As early as February 18, 2010, the Commission speaking through the Second
Division had already ordered the cancellation of Lonzanida’s certificate of
candidacy, and had stricken off his name in the list of official candidates for the
mayoralty post of San Antonio, Zambales. Thereafter, the Commission En Banc in
its resolution dated August 11, 2010 unanimously affirmed the resolution
disqualifying Lonzanida. Our findings were likewise sustained by the Supreme
Court no less. The disqualification of Lonzanida is not simply anchored on one
ground. On the contrary, it was emphasized in our En Banc resolution that
Lonzanida’s disqualification is two-pronged: first, he violated the constitutional fiat
on the three-term limit; and second, as early as December 1, 2009, he is known to
have been convicted by final judgment for ten (10) counts of Falsification under
Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code. In other words, on election day, respondent
Lonzanida’s disqualification is notoriously known in fact and in law. Ergo, since
respondent Lonzanida was  never a candidate  for the position of Mayor [of] San
Antonio, Zambales, the votes cast for him should be considered stray votes.
Consequently, Intervenor Antipolo, who remains as the sole qualified candidate for
the mayoralty post and obtained the highest number of votes, should now be
proclaimed as the duly elected Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales.48 (Boldfacing and
underscoring in the original; italicization supplied)
Lonzanida's certificate of candidacy was cancelled because he was ineligible or
not qualified to run for Mayor.1âwphi1 Whether his certificate of candidacy is
cancelled before or after the elections is immaterial because the cancellation on
such ground means he was never a candidate from the very beginning, his
certificate of candidacy being void ab initio. There was only one qualified candidate
for Mayor in the May 201 0 elections - Anti polo, who therefore received the
highest number of votes.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The Resolution dated 2 February 2011
and the Order dated 12 January 2011 of the COMELEC En Bane in SPA No. 09-
158 (DC) are AFFIRMED. The COMELEC En Bane is DIRECTED to constitute a
Special Municipal Board of Canvassers to proclaim Estela D. Antipolo as the duly
elected Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales. Petitioner Efren Racel Aratea
is ORDERED to cease and desist from discharging the functions of the Office of
the Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 193237               October 9, 2012
DOMINADOR G. JALOSJOS, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and AGAPITO J. CARDINO, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 193536
AGAPITO J. CARDINO, Petitioner,
vs.
DOMINADOR G. JALOSJOS, JR., and COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
These are two special civil actions for certiorari1 questioning the resolutions of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in SPA No. 09-076 (DC). In G.R. No.
193237, Dominador G. Jalosjos, Jr. (Jalosjos) seeks to annul the 10 May 2010
Resolution2 of the COMELEC First Division and the 11 August 2010 Resolution3 of
the COMELEC En Banc, which both ordered the cancellation of his certificate of
candidacy on the ground of false material representation. In G.R. No. 193536,
Agapito J. Cardino (Cardino) challenges the 11 August 2010 Resolution of the
COMELEC En Banc, which applied the rule on succession under the Local
Government Code in filling the vacancy in the Office of the Mayor of Dapitan City,
Zamboanga del Norte created by the cancellation of Jalosjos’ certificate of
candidacy.
The Facts
Both Jalosjos and Cardino were candidates for Mayor of Dapitan City, Zamboanga
del Norte in the May 2010 elections. Jalosjos was running for his third term.
Cardino filed on 6 December 2009 a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code to deny due course and to cancel the certificate of candidacy of
Jalosjos. Cardino asserted that Jalosjos made a false material representation in
his certificate of candidacy when he declared under oath that he was eligible for
the Office of Mayor.
Cardino claimed that long before Jalosjos filed his certificate of candidacy, Jalosjos
had already been convicted by final judgment for robbery and sentenced to prisión
mayor by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18 (RTC) of Cebu City, in Criminal
Case No. CCC-XIV-140-CEBU. Cardino asserted that Jalosjos has not yet served
his sentence. Jalosjos admitted his conviction but stated that he had already been
granted probation. Cardino countered that the RTC revoked Jalosjos’ probation in
an Order dated 19 March 1987. Jalosjos refuted Cardino and stated that the RTC
issued an Order dated 5 February 2004 declaring that Jalosjos had duly complied
with the order of probation. Jalosjos further stated that during the 2004 elections
the COMELEC denied a petition for disqualification filed against him on the same
grounds.4
The COMELEC En Banc narrated the circumstances of Jalosjos’ criminal record
as follows:
As backgrounder, Jalosjos and three (3) others were accused of the crime of
robbery on January 22, 1969 in Cebu City. On April 30, 1970, Judge Francisco Ro.
Cupin of the then Circuit Criminal Court of Cebu City found him and his co-
accused guilty of robbery and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of prision
correccional minimum to prision mayor maximum. Jalosjos appealed this decision
to the Court of Appeals but his appeal was dismissed on August 9, 1973. It was
only after a lapse of several years or more specifically on June 17, 1985 that
Jalosjos filed a Petition for Probation before the RTC Branch 18 of Cebu City
which was granted by the court. But then, on motion filed by his Probation Officer,
Jalosjos’ probation was revoked by the RTC Cebu City on March 19, 1987 and the
corresponding warrant for his arrest was issued. Surprisingly, on December 19,
2003, Parole and Probation Administrator Gregorio F. Bacolod issued a
Certification attesting that respondent Jalosjos, Jr., had already fulfilled the terms
and conditions of his probation. This Certification was the one used by respondent
Jalosjos to secure the dismissal of the disqualification case filed against him by
Adasa in 2004, docketed as SPA No. 04-235.
This prompted Cardino to call the attention of the Commission on the decision of
the Sandiganbayan dated September 29, 2008 finding Gregorio F. Bacolod, former
Administrator of the Parole and Probation Administration, guilty of violating Section
3(e) of R.A. 3019 for issuing a falsified Certification on December 19, 2003
attesting to the fact that respondent Jalosjos had fully complied with the terms and
conditions of his probation. A portion of the decision of the Sandiganbayan is
quoted hereunder:
The Court finds that the above acts of the accused gave probationer Dominador
Jalosjos, Jr., unwarranted benefits and advantage because the subject
certification, which was issued by the accused without adequate or official support,
was subsequently utilized by the said probationer as basis of the Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration and to Lift Warrant of Arrest that he filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu City, which prompted the said court to issue the Order dated
February 5, 2004 in Crim. Case No. CCC-XIV-140-CEBU, declaring that said
probationer has complied with the order of probation and setting aside its Order of
January 16, 2004 recalling the warrant or [sic] arrest; and that said Certification
was also used by the said probationer and became the basis for the Commission
on Elections to deny in its Resolution of August 2, 2004 the petition or [sic] private
complainant James Adasa for the disqualification of the probationer from running
for re-election as Mayor of Dapitan City in the National and Local Elections of
2004.5
The COMELEC’s Rulings
On 10 May 2010, the COMELEC First Division granted Cardino’s petition and
cancelled Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy. The COMELEC First Division
concluded that "Jalosjos has indeed committed material misrepresentation in his
certificate of candidacy when he declared, under oath, that he is eligible for the
office he seeks to be elected to when in fact he is not by reason of a final judgment
in a criminal case, the sentence of which he has not yet served."6 The COMELEC
First Division found that Jalosjos’ certificate of compliance of probation was
fraudulently issued; thus, Jalosjos has not yet served his sentence. The penalty
imposed on Jalosjos was the indeterminate sentence of one year, eight months
and twenty days of prisión correccional as minimum, to four years, two months and
one day of prisión mayor as maximum. The COMELEC First Division ruled that
Jalosjos "is not eligible by reason of his disqualification as provided for in Section
40(a) of Republic Act No. 7160."7
On 11 August 2010, the COMELEC En Banc denied Jalosjos’ motion for
reconsideration. The pertinent portions of the 11 August 2010 Resolution read:
With the proper revocation of Jalosjos’ earlier probation and a clear showing that
he has not yet served the terms of his sentence, there is simply no basis for
Jalosjos to claim that his civil as well as political rights have been violated. Having
been convicted by final judgment,
Jalosjos is disqualified to run for an elective position or to hold public office. His
proclamation as the elected mayor in the May 10, 2010 election does not deprive
the Commission of its authority to resolve the present petition to its finality, and to
oust him from the office he now wrongfully holds.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration is denied
for utter lack of merit. Jalosjos is hereby OUSTED from office and ordered to
CEASE and DESIST from occupying and discharging the functions of the Office of
the Mayor of Dapitan City, Zamboanga. Let the provisions of the Local
Government Code on succession apply.
SO ORDERED.8
Jalosjos filed his petition on 25 August 2010, docketed as G.R. No. 193237, while
Cardino filed his petition on 17 September 2010, docketed as G.R. No. 193536.
On 22 February 2011, this Court issued a Resolution dismissing G.R. No. 193237.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Petition for Certiorari is
DISMISSED. The assailed Resolution dated May 10, 2010 and Resolution dated
August 11, 2010 of the Commission on Elections in SPA Case No. 09-076 (DC)
are hereby AFFIRMED.9
Cardino filed a Manifestation on 17 March 2011 praying that this Court take judicial
notice of its resolution in G.R. No. 193237. Jalosjos filed a Motion for
Reconsideration10 on 22 March 2011. On 29 March 2011, this Court resolved11 to
consolidate G.R. No. 193536 with G.R. No. 193237.Jalosjos then filed a
Manifestation on 1 June 2012 which stated that "he has resigned from the position
of Mayor of the City of Dapitan effective 30 April 2012, which resignation was
accepted by the Provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Norte, Atty. Rolando E.
Yebes."12 Jalosjos’ resignation was made "in deference with the provision of the
Omnibus Election Code in relation to his candidacy as Provincial Governor of
Zamboanga del Sur in May 2013."13
These cases are not rendered moot by Jalosjos’ resignation. In resolving Jalosjos’
Motion for Reconsideration in G.R. No. 193237 and Cardino’s Petition in G.R. No.
193536, we address not only Jalosjos’ eligibility to run for public office and the
consequences of the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy, but also
COMELEC’s constitutional duty to enforce and administer all laws relating to the
conduct of elections.
The Issues
In G.R. No. 193237, Jalosjos argues that the COMELEC committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it (1) ruled that
Jalosjos’ probation was revoked; (2) ruled that Jalosjos was disqualified to run as
candidate for Mayor of Dapitan City, Zamboanga del Norte; and (3) cancelled
Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy without making a finding that Jalosjos committed
a deliberate misrepresentation as to his qualifications, as Jalosjos relied in good
faith upon a previous COMELEC decision declaring him eligible for the same
position from which he is now being ousted. Finally, the Resolutions dated 10 May
2010 and 11 August 2010 were issued in violation of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure.
In G.R. No. 193536, Cardino argues that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it added to the
dispositive portion of its 11 August 2010 Resolution that the provisions of the Local
Government Code on succession should apply.
This Court’s Ruling
The perpetual special disqualification against Jalosjos arising from his criminal
conviction by final judgment is a material fact involving eligibility which is a proper
ground for a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. Jalosjos’
certificate of candidacy was void from the start since he was not eligible to run for
any public office at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy. Jalosjos was never
a candidate at any time, and all votes for Jalosjos were stray votes. As a result of
Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy being void ab initio, Cardino, as the only qualified
candidate, actually garnered the highest number of votes for the position of Mayor.
The dissenting opinions affirm with modification the 10 May 2010 Resolution of the
COMELEC First Division and the 11 August 2010 Resolution of the COMELEC En
Banc. The dissenting opinions erroneously limit the remedy against Jalosjos to
disqualification under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code and apply the rule
on succession under the Local Government Code.
A false statement in a certificate of candidacy that a candidate is eligible to run for
public office is a false material representation which is a ground for a petition under
Section 78 of the same Code. Sections 74 and 78 read:
Sec. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. – The certificate of candidacy shall
state that the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated
therein and that he is eligible for said office; if for Member of the Batasang
Pambansa, the province, including its component cities, highly urbanized city or
district or sector which he seeks to represent; the political party to which he
belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his post office address for all
election purposes; his profession or occupation; that he will support and defend the
Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto;
that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees promulgated by the duly
constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a
foreign country; that the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily,
without mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the
certificate of candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge.
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. – A
verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy
may be filed by the person exclusively on the ground that any material
representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The
petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the
filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and
hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 74 requires the candidate to state under oath in his certificate of candidacy
"that he is eligible for said office." A candidate is eligible if he has a right to run for
the public office.14 If a candidate is not actually eligible because he is barred by
final judgment in a criminal case from running for public office, and he still states
under oath in his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to run for public office,
then the candidate clearly makes a false material representation that is a ground
for a petition under Section 78.
A sentence of prisión mayor by final judgment is a ground for disqualification under
Section 40 of the Local Government Code and under Section 12 of the Omnibus
Election Code. It is also a material fact involving the eligibility of a candidate under
Sections 74 and 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. Thus, a person can file a
petition under Section 40 of the Local Government Code or under either Section
12 or Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. The pertinent provisions read:
Section 40, Local Government Code:
Sec. 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons are disqualified from running for
any elective local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or
for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2)
years after serving sentence;
(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;
(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the
Republic;
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad;
(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right
to reside abroad and continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this
Code; and
(g) The insane or feeble-minded.
Section 12, Omnibus Election Code:
Sec. 12. Disqualifications. — Any person who has been declared by competent
authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for
subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for which he was sentenced to
a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime involving moral turpitude,
shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been
given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.
The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed
upon the declaration by competent authority that said insanity or incompetence
had been removed or after the expiration of a period of five years from his service
of sentence, unless within the same period he again becomes disqualified.
Section 68, Omnibus Election Code:
Sec. 68. Disqualifications. — Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which
he is a party is declared by final decision by a competent court guilty of, or found
by the Commission of having (a) given money or other material consideration to
influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral
functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in
his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d)
solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96,
97 and 104; or (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d,
e, k, v, and cc, sub-paragraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a
candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a
permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to
run for any elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived his
status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with
the residence requirement provided for in the election laws.
Revised Penal Code:
Art. 27. Reclusion perpetua. — x x x
Prisión mayor and temporary disqualification. — The duration of the penalties of
prisión mayor and temporary disqualification shall be from six years and one day to
twelve years, except when the penalty of disqualification is imposed as an
accessory penalty, in which case, it shall be that of the principal penalty.
xxxx
Art. 30. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification.
— The penalties of perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification for public office
shall produce the following effects:
1. The deprivation of the public offices and employments which the offender may
have held, even if conferred by popular election.
2. The deprivation of the right to vote in any election for any popular elective office
or to be elected to such office.
3. The disqualification for the offices or public employments and for the exercise of
any of the rights mentioned.
In case of temporary disqualification, such disqualification as is comprised in
paragraphs 2 and 3 of this article shall last during the term of the sentence.
4. The loss of all rights to retirement pay or other pension for any office formerly
held.
Art. 31. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary special disqualification.
— The penalties of perpetual or temporary special disqualification for public office,
profession or calling shall produce the following effects:
1. The deprivation of the office, employment, profession or calling affected.
2. The disqualification for holding similar offices or employments either perpetually
or during the term of the sentence, according to the extent of such disqualification.
Art. 32. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary special disqualification
for the exercise of the right of suffrage. — The perpetual or temporary special
disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage shall deprive the offender
perpetually or during the term of the sentence, according to the nature of said
penalty, of the right to vote in any popular election for any public office or to be
elected to such office. Moreover, the offender shall not be permitted to hold any
public office during the period of his disqualification.
Art. 42. Prisión mayor — its accessory penalties. — The penalty of prisión mayor
shall carry with it that of temporary absolute disqualification and that of perpetual
special disqualification from the right of suffrage which the offender shall suffer
although pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been
expressly remitted in the pardon. (Emphasis supplied)
The penalty of prisión mayor automatically carries with it, by operation of law,15 the
accessory penalties of temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special
disqualification. Under Article 30 of the Revised Penal Code, temporary absolute
disqualification produces the effect of "deprivation of the right to vote in any
election for any popular elective office or to be elected to such office." The duration
of the temporary absolute disqualification is the same as that of the principal
penalty. On the other hand, under Article 32 of the Revised Penal Code perpetual
special disqualification means that "the offender shall not be permitted to hold any
public office during the period of his disqualification," which is perpetually. Both
temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special disqualification constitute
ineligibilities to hold elective public office. A person suffering from these
ineligibilities is ineligible to run for elective public office, and commits a false
material representation if he states in his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible
to so run.
In Lacuna v. Abes,16 the Court, speaking through Justice J.B.L. Reyes, explained
the import of the accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification:
On the first defense of respondent-appellee Abes, it must be remembered that
appellee’s conviction of a crime penalized with prisión mayor which carried the
accessory penalties of temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special
disqualification from the right of suffrage (Article 42, Revised Penal Code); and
Section 99 of the Revised Election Code disqualifies a person from voting if he had
been sentenced by final judgment to suffer one year or more of imprisonment.
The accessory penalty of temporary absolute disqualification disqualifies the
convict for public office and for the right to vote, such disqualification to last only
during the term of the sentence (Article 27, paragraph 3, & Article 30, Revised
Penal Code) that, in the case of Abes, would have expired on 13 October 1961.
But this does not hold true with respect to the other accessory penalty of perpetual
special disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage. This accessory
penalty deprives the convict of the right to vote or to be elected to or hold public
office perpetually, as distinguished from temporary special disqualification, which
lasts during the term of the sentence. Article 32, Revised Penal Code, provides:
Art. 32. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary special disqualification
for the exercise of the right of suffrage. — The perpetual or temporary special
disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage shall deprive the offender
perpetually or during the term of the sentence, according to the nature of said
penalty, of the right to vote in any popular election for any public office or to be
elected to such office. Moreover, the offender shall not be permitted to hold any
public office during the period of disqualification.
The word "perpetually" and the phrase "during the term of the sentence" should be
applied distributively to their respective antecedents; thus, the word "perpetually"
refers to the perpetual kind of special disqualification, while the phrase "during the
term of the sentence" refers to the temporary special disqualification. The duration
between the perpetual and the temporary (both special) are necessarily different
because the provision, instead of merging their durations into one period, states
that such duration is "according to the nature of said penalty" — which means
according to whether the penalty is the perpetual or the temporary special
disqualification. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, Lacuna instructs that the accessory penalty of perpetual special
disqualification "deprives the convict of the right to vote or to be elected to or hold
public office perpetually."
The accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification takes effect
immediately once the judgment of conviction becomes final. The effectivity of this
accessory penalty does not depend on the duration of the principal penalty, or on
whether the convict serves his jail sentence or not. The last sentence of Article 32
states that "the offender shall not be permitted to hold any public office during the
period of his perpetual special disqualification." Once the judgment of conviction
becomes final, it is immediately executory. Any public office that the convict may
be holding at the time of his conviction becomes vacant upon finality of the
judgment, and the convict becomes ineligible to run for any elective public office
perpetually. In the case of Jalosjos, he became ineligible perpetually to hold, or to
run for, any elective public office from the time his judgment of conviction became
final.
Perpetual special disqualification is a ground for a petition under Section 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code because this accessory penalty is an ineligibility, which
means that the convict is not eligible to run for public office, contrary to the
statement that Section 74 requires him to state under oath. As used in Section 74,
the word "eligible" means having the right to run for elective public office, that is,
having all the qualifications and none of the ineligibilities to run for public office. As
this Court held in Fermin v. Commission on Elections,17 the false material
representation may refer to "qualifications or eligibility." One who suffers from
perpetual special disqualification is ineligible to run for public office. If a person
suffering from perpetual special disqualification files a certificate of candidacy
stating under oath that "he is eligible to run for (public) office," as expressly
required under Section 74, then he clearly makes a false material representation
that is a ground for a petition under Section 78. As this Court explained in Fermin:
Lest it be misunderstood, the denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC
is not based on the lack of qualifications but on a finding that the candidate made a
material representation that is false, which may relate to the qualifications required
of the public office he/she is running for. It is noted that the candidate states in
his/her CoC that he/she is eligible for the office he/she seeks. Section 78 of the
OEC, therefore, is to be read in relation to the constitutional and statutory
provisions on qualifications or eligibility for public office. If the candidate
subsequently states a material representation in the CoC that is false, the
COMELEC, following the law, is empowered to deny due course to or cancel such
certificate. Indeed, the Court has already likened a proceeding under Section 78 to
a quo warranto proceeding under Section 253 of the OEC since they both deal
with the eligibility or qualification of a candidate, with the distinction mainly in the
fact that a "Section 78" petition is filed before proclamation, while a petition for quo
warranto is filed after proclamation of the winning candidate.18 (Emphasis supplied)
Conviction for robbery by final judgment with the penalty of prisión mayor, to which
perpetual special disqualification attaches by operation of law, is not a ground for a
petition under Section 68 because robbery is not one of the offenses enumerated
in Section 68. Insofar as crimes are concerned, Section 68 refers only to election
offenses under the Omnibus Election Code and not to crimes under the Revised
Penal Code. For ready reference, we quote again Section 68 of the Omnibus
Election Code:
Sec. 68. Disqualifications. — Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which
he is a party is declared by final decision by a competent court guilty of, or found
by the Commission of having (a) given money or other material consideration to
influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral
functions;
(b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election
campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received
or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e)
violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, sub-
paragraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been
elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or an
immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office
under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident
or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement
provided for in the election laws. (Emphasis supplied)
There is absolutely nothing in the language of Section 68 that will justify including
the crime of robbery as one of the offenses enumerated in this Section. All the
offenses enumerated in Section 68 refer to offenses under the Omnibus Election
Code. The dissenting opinion of Justice Reyes gravely errs when it holds that
Jalosjos’ conviction for the crime of robbery under the Revised Penal Code is a
ground for "a petition for disqualification under Section 68 of the OEC and not for
cancellation of COC under Section 78 thereof." This Court has already ruled that
offenses punished in laws other than in the Omnibus Election Code cannot be a
ground for a petition under Section 68. In Codilla, Sr. v. de Venecia,19 the Court
declared:
The jurisdiction of the COMELEC to disqualify candidates is limited to those
enumerated in Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code. All other election
offenses are beyond the ambit of COMELEC jurisdiction.They are criminal and not
administrative in nature. (Emphasis supplied)
A candidate for mayor during the 2010 local elections certifies under oath four
statements: (1) a statement that the candidate is a natural born or naturalized
Filipino citizen; (2) a statement that the candidate is not a permanent resident of,
or immigrant to, a foreign country; (3) a statement that the candidate is eligible for
the office he seeks election; and (4) a statement of the candidate’s allegiance to
the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines.20
We now ask: Did Jalosjos make a false statement of a material fact in his
certificate of candidacy when he stated under oath that he was eligible to run for
mayor? The COMELEC and the dissenting opinions all found that Jalosjos was not
eligible to run for public office. The COMELEC concluded that Jalosjos made a
false material representation that is a ground for a petition under Section 78. The
dissenting opinion of Justice Reyes, however, concluded that the ineligibility of
Jalosjos is a disqualification which is a ground for a petition under Section 68 and
not under Section 78. The dissenting opinion of Justice Brion concluded that the
ineligibility of Jalosjos is a disqualification that is not a ground under Section 78
without, however, saying under what specific provision of law a petition against
Jalosjos can be filed to cancel his certificate of candidacy.
What is indisputably clear is that the false material representation of Jalosjos is a
ground for a petition under Section 78. However, since the false material
representation arises from a crime penalized by prisión mayor, a petition under
Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code or Section 40 of the Local Government
Code can also be properly filed. The petitioner has a choice whether to anchor his
petition on Section 12 or Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, or on Section
40 of the Local Government Code. The law expressly provides multiple remedies
and the choice of which remedy to adopt belongs to the petitioner.
The COMELEC properly cancelled Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy. A void
certificate of candidacy on the ground of ineligibility that existed at the time of the
filing of the certificate of candidacy can never give rise to a valid candidacy, and
much less to valid votes.21 Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy was cancelled because
he was ineligible from the start to run for Mayor. Whether his certificate of
candidacy is cancelled before or after the elections is immaterial because the
cancellation on such ground means he was never a valid candidate from the very
beginning, his certificate of candidacy being void ab initio. Jalosjos’ ineligibility
existed on the day he filed his certificate of candidacy, and the cancellation of his
certificate of candidacy retroacted to the day he filed it. Thus, Cardino ran
unopposed. There was only one qualified candidate for Mayor in the May 2010
elections – Cardino – who received the highest number of votes.
Decisions of this Court holding that the second-placer cannot be proclaimed
winner if the first-placer is disqualified or declared ineligible22 should be limited to
situations where the certificate of candidacy of the first-placer was valid at the time
of filing but subsequently had to be cancelled because of a violation of law that
took place, or a legal impediment that took effect, after the filing of the certificate of
candidacy. If the certificate of candidacy is void ab initio, then legally the person
who filed such void certificate of candidacy was never a candidate in the elections
at any time. All votes for such non-candidate are stray votes and should not be
counted. Thus, such non-candidate can never be a first-placer in the elections. If a
certificate of candidacy void ab initio is cancelled on the day, or before the day, of
the election, prevailing jurisprudence holds that all votes for that candidate are
stray votes.23 If a certificate of candidacy void ab initio is cancelled one day or more
after the elections, all votes for such candidate should also be stray votes because
the certificate of candidacy is void from the very beginning. This is the more
equitable and logical approach on the effect of the cancellation of a certificate of
candidacy that is void ab initio. Otherwise, a certificate of candidacy void ab initio
can operate to defeat one or more valid certificates of candidacy for the same
position.
Even without a petition under either Section 12 or Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code, or under Section 40 of the Local Government Code, the COMELEC
is under a legal duty to cancel the certificate of candidacy of anyone suffering from
the accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification to run for public office by
virtue of a final judgment of conviction. The final judgment of conviction is notice to
the COMELEC of the disqualification of the convict from running for public office.
The law itself bars the convict from running for public office, and the
disqualification is part of the final judgment of conviction. The final judgment of the
court is addressed not only to the Executive branch, but also to other government
agencies tasked to implement the final judgment under the law.
Whether or not the COMELEC is expressly mentioned in the judgment to
implement the disqualification, it is assumed that the portion of the final judgment
on disqualification to run for elective public office is addressed to the COMELEC
because under the Constitution the COMELEC is duty bound to "enforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election."24 The
disqualification of a convict to run for public office under the Revised Penal Code,
as affirmed by final judgment of a competent court, is part of the enforcement and
administration of "all laws" relating to the conduct of elections.
To allow the COMELEC to wait for a person to file a petition to cancel the
certificate of candidacy of one suffering from perpetual special disqualification will
result in the anomaly that these cases so grotesquely exemplify. Despite a prior
perpetual special disqualification, Jalosjos was elected and served twice as mayor.
The COMELEC will be grossly remiss in its constitutional duty to "enforce and
administer all laws" relating to the conduct of elections if it does not motu proprio
bar from running for public office those suffering from perpetual special
disqualification by virtue of a final judgment.
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration in G.R. No. 193237 is DENIED,
and the Petition in G.R. No. 193536 is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated 10 May
2010 and 11 August 2010 of the COMELEC First Division and the COMELEC En
Bane, respectively, in SPA No. 09-076 (DC), are AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that Agapito J. Cardino ran unopposed in the May 2010 elections
and thus received the highest number of votes for Mayor. The COMELEC En Bane
is DIRECTED to constitute a Special City Board of Canvassers to proclaim Agapito
J. Cardino as the duly elected Mayor of Dapitan City, Zamboanga del Norte.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Secretaries of the Department of
Justice and the Department of Interior and Local Government so they can cause
the arrest of, and enforce the jail sentence on, Dominador G. Jalosjos, Jr. due to
his conviction for the crime of robbery in a final judgment issued by the Regional
Trial Court (Branch 18) of Cebu City in Criminal Case No. CCC-XIV-140-CEBU.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 189698               December 1, 2009
ELEAZAR P. QUINTO and GERINO A. TOLENTINO, JR., Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
In our predisposition to discover the "original intent" of a statute, courts become the
unfeeling pillars of the status quo. Little do we realize that statutes or even
constitutions are bundles of compromises thrown our way by their framers. Unless
we exercise vigilance, the statute may already be out of tune and irrelevant to our
day.1 It is in this light that we should address the instant case.
Before the Court is a petition for prohibition and certiorari, with prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction,
assailing Section 4(a) of Resolution No. 8678 of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC). In view of pressing contemporary events, the petition begs for
immediate resolution.
The Antecedents
This controversy actually stems from the law authorizing the COMELEC to use an
automated election system (AES).
On December 22, 1997, Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8436, entitled
"AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS TO USE AN
AUTOMATED ELECTION SYSTEM IN THE MAY 11, 1998 NATIONAL OR LOCAL
ELECTIONS AND IN SUBSEQUENT NATIONAL AND LOCAL ELECTORAL
EXERCISES, PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES."
Section 11 thereof reads:
SEC. 11. Official Ballot.- The Commission shall prescribe the size and form of the
official ballot which shall contain the titles of the positions to be filled and/or the
propositions to be voted upon in an initiative, referendum or plebiscite. Under each
position, the names of candidates shall be arranged alphabetically by surname and
uniformly printed using the same type size. A fixed space where the chairman of
the Board of Election inspectors shall affix his/her signature to authenticate the
official ballot shall be provided.
Both sides of the ballots may be used when necessary.
For this purpose, the deadline for the filing of certificate of candidacy/petition for
registration/manifestation to participate in the election shall not be later than one
hundred twenty (120) days before the elections: - Provided, That, any elective
official, whether national or local, running for any office other than the one which
he/she is holding in a permanent capacity, except for president and vice president,
shall be deemed resigned only upon the start of the campaign period
corresponding to the position for which he/she is running: Provided, further, That,
unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect upon the start
of the aforesaid campaign period: Provided, finally, That, for purposes of the May
11, 1998 elections, the deadline for filing of the certificate of candidacy for the
positions of President, Vice President, Senators and candidates under the Party-
List System as well as petitions for registration and/or manifestation to participate
in the Party-List System shall be on February 9, 1998 while the deadline for the
filing of certificate of candidacy for other positions shall be on March 27, 1998.
The official ballots shall be printed by the National Printing Office and/or the
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas at the price comparable with that of private printers
under proper security measures which the Commission shall adopt. The
Commission may contract the services of private printers upon certification by the
National Printing Office/Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas that it cannot meet the printing
requirements. Accredited political parties and deputized citizens' arms of the
Commission may assign watchers in the printing, storage and distribution of official
ballots.
To prevent the use of fake ballots, the Commission through the Committee shall
ensure that the serial number on the ballot stub shall be printed in magnetic ink
that shall be easily detectable by inexpensive hardware and shall be impossible to
reproduce on a photocopying machine and that identification marks, magnetic
strips, bar codes and other technical and security markings, are provided on the
ballot.
The official ballots shall be printed and distributed to each city/municipality at the
rate of one (1) ballot for every registered voter with a provision of additional four (4)
ballots per precinct.2
Almost a decade thereafter, Congress amended the law on January 23, 2007 by
enacting R.A. No. 9369, entitled "AN ACT AMENDING REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8436,
ENTITLED "AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS TO
USE AN AUTOMATED ELECTION SYSTEM IN THE MAY 11, 1998 NATIONAL
OR LOCAL ELECTIONS AND IN SUBSEQUENT NATIONAL AND LOCAL
ELECTORAL EXERCISES, TO ENCOURAGE TRANSPARENCY, CREDIBILITY,
FAIRNESS AND ACCURACY OF ELECTIONS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE
BATAS PAMPANSA BLG. 881, AS AMEMDED, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7166 AND
OTHER RELATED ELECTION LAWS, PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES." Section 13 of the amendatory law modified Section 11
of R.A. No. 8436, thus:
SEC. 13. Section 11 of Republic Act No. 8436 is hereby amended to read as
follows:
Section 15. Official Ballot.- The Commission shall prescribe the format of the
electronic display and/or the size and form of the official ballot, which shall contain
the titles of the position to be filled and/or the propositions to be voted upon in an
initiative, referendum or plebiscite. Where practicable, electronic displays must be
constructed to present the names of all candidates for the same position in the
same page or screen, otherwise, the electronic displays must be constructed to
present the entire ballot to the voter, in a series of sequential pages, and to ensure
that the voter sees all of the ballot options on all pages before completing his or
her vote and to allow the voter to review and change all ballot choices prior to
completing and casting his or her ballot. Under each position to be filled, the
names of candidates shall be arranged alphabetically by surname and uniformly
indicated using the same type size. The maiden or married name shall be listed in
the official ballot, as preferred by the female candidate. Under each proposition to
be vote upon, the choices should be uniformly indicated using the same font and
size.
A fixed space where the chairman of the board of election inspectors shall affix
his/her signature to authenticate the official ballot shall be provided.
For this purpose, the Commission shall set the deadline for the filing of certificate
of candidacy/petition of registration/manifestation to participate in the election. Any
person who files his certificate of candidacy within this period shall only be
considered as a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his
certificate of candidacy: Provided, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a
candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the aforesaid campaign
period: Provided, finally, That any person holding a public appointive office or
position, including active members of the armed forces, and officers and
employees in government-owned or -controlled corporations, shall be
considered ipso facto resigned from his/her office and must vacate the same at the
start of the day of the filing of his/her certificate of candidacy.
Political parties may hold political conventions to nominate their official candidates
within thirty (30) days before the start of the period for filing a certificate of
candidacy.
With respect to a paper-based election system, the official ballots shall be printed
by the National Printing Office and/or the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas at the price
comparable with that of private printers under proper security measures which the
Commission shall adopt. The Commission may contract the services of private
printers upon certification by the National Printing Office/Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas that it cannot meet the printing requirements. Accredited political parties
and deputized citizens' arms of the Commission shall assign watchers in the
printing, storage and distribution of official ballots.
To prevent the use of fake ballots, the Commission through the Committee shall
ensure that the necessary safeguards, such as, but not limited to, bar codes,
holograms, color shifting ink, microprinting, are provided on the ballot.
The official ballots shall be printed and distributed to each city/municipality at the
rate of one ballot for every registered voter with a provision of additional three
ballots per precinct.3
Pursuant to its constitutional mandate to enforce and administer election laws,
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8678,4 the Guidelines on the Filing of
Certificates of Candidacy (CoC) and Nomination of Official Candidates of
Registered Political Parties in Connection with the May 10, 2010 National and
Local Elections. Sections 4 and 5 of Resolution No. 8678 provide:
SEC. 4. Effects of Filing Certificates of Candidacy.- a) Any person holding a public
appointive office or position including active members of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, and other officers and employees in government-owned or controlled
corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing
of his certificate of candidacy.
b) Any person holding an elective office or position shall not be considered
resigned upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy for the same or any other
elective office or position.
SEC. 5. Period for filing Certificate of Candidacy.- The certificate of candidacy shall
be filed on regular days, from November 20 to 30, 2009, during office hours,
except on the last day, which shall be until midnight.
Alarmed that they will be deemed ipso facto resigned from their offices the moment
they file their CoCs, petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr., who
hold appointive positions in the government and who intend to run in the coming
elections,5 filed the instant petition for prohibition and certiorari, seeking the
declaration of the afore-quoted Section 4(a) of Resolution No. 8678 as null and
void.
The Petitioners' Contention
Petitioners contend that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it
issued the assailed Resolution. They aver that the advance filing of CoCs for the
2010 elections is intended merely for the purpose of early printing of the official
ballots in order to cope with time limitations. Such advance filing does not
automatically make the person who filed the CoC a candidate at the moment of
filing. In fact, the law considers him a candidate only at the start of the campaign
period. Petitioners then assert that this being so, they should not be deemed ipso
facto resigned from their government offices when they file their CoCs, because at
such time they are not yet treated by law as candidates. They should be
considered resigned from their respective offices only at the start of the campaign
period when they are, by law, already considered as candidates.6
Petitioners also contend that Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369, the basis of the assailed
COMELEC resolution, contains two conflicting provisions. These must be
harmonized or reconciled to give effect to both and to arrive at a declaration that
they are not ipso facto resigned from their positions upon the filing of their CoCs.7
Petitioners further posit that the provision considering them as ipso facto resigned
from office upon the filing of their CoCs is discriminatory and violates the equal
protection clause in the Constitution.8
The Respondent's Arguments
On the procedural aspect of the petition, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
representing respondent COMELEC, argues that petitioners have no legal
standing to institute the suit." Petitioners have not yet filed their CoCs, hence, they
are not yet affected by the assailed provision in the COMELEC resolution. The
OSG further claims that the petition is premature or unripe for judicial
determination." Petitioners have admitted that they are merely planning to file their
CoCs for the coming 2010 elections. Their interest in the present controversy is
thus merely speculative and contingent upon the filing of the same. The OSG
likewise contends that petitioners availed of the wrong remedy. They are
questioning an issuance of the COMELEC made in the exercise of the latter's rule-
making power. Certiorari under Rule 65 is then an improper remedy.9
On the substantive aspect, the OSG maintains that the COMELEC did not gravely
abuse its discretion in phrasing Section 4(a) of Resolution No. 8678 for it merely
copied what is in the law. The OSG, however, agrees with petitioners that there is
a conflict in Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 that should be resolved. According to the
OSG, there seems to be no basis to consider appointive officials as ipso facto
resigned and to require them to vacate their positions on the same day that they
file their CoCs, because they are not yet considered as candidates at that time.
Further, this - deemed resigned- provision existed in Batas Pambansa Bilang (B.P.
Blg.) 881, and no longer finds a place in our present election laws with the
innovations brought about by the automated system.10
Our Ruling
I.
At first glance, the petition suffers from an incipient procedural defect. What
petitioners assail in their petition is a resolution issued by the COMELEC in the
exercise of its quasi-legislative power. Certiorari under Rule 65, in relation to Rule
64, cannot be availed of, because it is a remedy to question decisions, resolutions
and issuances made in the exercise of a judicial or quasi-judicial
function.11 Prohibition is also an inappropriate remedy, because what petitioners
actually seek from the Court is a determination of the proper construction of a
statute and a declaration of their rights thereunder. Obviously, their petition is one
for declaratory relief,12 over which this Court does not exercise original
jurisdiction.13
However, petitioners raise a challenge on the constitutionality of the questioned
provisions of both the COMELEC resolution and the law. Given this scenario, the
Court may step in and resolve the instant petition.
The transcendental nature and paramount importance of the issues raised and the
compelling state interest involved in their early resolution the period for the filing of
CoCs for the 2010 elections has already started and hundreds of civil servants
intending to run for elective offices are to lose their employment, thereby causing
imminent and irreparable damage to their means of livelihood and, at the same
time, crippling the government's manpowerfurther dictate that the Court must, for
propriety, if only from a sense of obligation, entertain the petition so as to expedite
the adjudication of all, especially the constitutional, issues.
In any event, the Court has ample authority to set aside errors of practice or
technicalities of procedure and resolve the merits of a case. Repeatedly stressed
in our prior decisions is the principle that the Rules were promulgated to provide
guidelines for the orderly administration of justice, not to shackle the hand that
dispenses it. Otherwise, the courts would be consigned to being mere slaves to
technical rules, deprived of their judicial discretion.14
II.
To put things in their proper perspective, it is imperative that we trace the brief
history of the assailed provision. Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 is
a reproduction of the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A.
No. 9369, which for ready reference is quoted as follows:
For this purpose, the Commission shall set the deadline for the filing of certificate
of candidacy/petition for registration/manifestation to participate in the election.
Any person who files his certificate of candidacy within this period shall only be
considered as a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his
certificate of candidacy: Provided, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a
candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the aforesaid campaign
period: Provided, finally, That any person holding a public appointive office or
position, including active members of the armed forces, and officers and
employees in government-owned or -controlled corporations, shall be
considered ipso facto resigned from his/her office and must vacate the same at the
start of the day of the filing of his/her certificate of candidacy.15
Notably, this proviso is not present in Section 11 of R.A. No. 8436, the law
amended by R.A. No. 9369. The proviso was lifted from Section 66 of B.P. Blg.
881 or the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) of the Philippines, which reads:
Sec. 66. Candidates holding appointive office or position.- Any person holding a
public appointive office or position, including active members of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines, and officers and employees in government-owned or controlled
corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing
of his certificate of candidacy.
It may be recalled-in inverse chronology-that earlier, Presidential Decree No. 1296,
or the 1978 Election Code, contained a similar provision, thus'
SECTION 29. Candidates holding appointive office or position. - Every person
holding a public appointive office or position, including active members of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees in government-
owned or controlled corporations, shall ipso facto cease in his office or position on
the date he files his certificate of candidacy. Members of the Cabinet shall continue
in the offices they presently hold notwithstanding the filing of certificate of
candidacy, subject to the pleasure of the President of the Philippines.
Much earlier, R.A. No. 6388, or the Election Code of 1971, likewise stated in its
Section 23 the following:
SECTION 23. Candidates Holding Appointive Office or Position. - Every person
holding a public appointive office or position, including active members of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines and every officer or employee in government-
owned or controlled corporations, shall ipso facto cease in his office or position on
the date he files his certificate of candidacy: Provided, That the filing of a certificate
of candidacy shall not affect whatever civil, criminal or administrative liabilities
which he may have incurred.
Going further back in history, R.A. No. 180, or the Revised Election Code
approved on June 21, 1947, also provided that
SECTION 26. Automatic cessation of appointive officers and employees who are
candidates. - Every person holding a public appointive office or position shall ipso
facto cease in his office or position on the date he files his certificate of candidacy.
During the Commonwealth era, Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 725, entitled "AN
ACT TO PROVIDE FOR THE NEXT ELECTION FOR PRESIDENT AND VICE-
PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, SENATORS AND MEMBERS OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, AND APPROPRIATING THE NECESSARY
FUNDS THEREFOR," approved on January 5, 1946, contained, in the last
paragraph of its Section 2, the following:
A person occupying any civil office by appointment in the government or any of its
political subdivisions or agencies or government-owned or controlled corporations,
whether such office by appointive or elective, shall be considered to have resigned
from such office from the moment of the filing of such certificate of candidacy.
Significantly, however, C.A. No. 666, entitled "AN ACT TO PROVIDE FOR THE
FIRST ELECTION FOR PRESIDENT AND VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE
PHILIPPINES, SENATORS, AND MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, UNDER THE CONSTITUTION AND THE AMENDMENTS
THEREOF," enacted without executive approval on June 22, 1941, the precursor
of C.A. No. 725, only provided for automatic resignation of elective, but not
appointive, officials.
Nevertheless, C.A. No. 357, or the Election Code approved on August 22, 1938,
had, in its Section 22, the same verbatim provision as Section 26 of R.A. No. 180.
The earliest recorded Philippine law on the subject is Act No. 1582, or the Election
Law enacted by the Philippine Commission in 1907, the last paragraph of Section
29 of which reads:
Sec. 29. Penalties upon officers.- x x x.
No public officer shall offer himself as a candidate for election, nor shall he be
eligible during the time that he holds said public office to election, at any municipal,
provincial or Assembly election, except for reelection to the position which he may
be holding, and no judge of the Court of First Instance, justice of the peace,
provincial fiscal, or officer or employee of the Bureau of Constabulary or of the
Bureau of Education shall aid any candidate or influence in any manner or take
any part in any municipal, provincial, or Assembly election under penalty of being
deprived of his office and being disqualified to hold any public office whatever for a
term of five years: Provided, however, That the foregoing provisions shall not be
construed to deprive any person otherwise qualified of the right to vote at any
election.
From this brief historical excursion, it may be gleaned that the second proviso in
the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369- that any person holding a
public appointive office or position, including active members of the armed forces,
and officers, and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall
be considered ipso facto resigned from his/her office and must vacate the same at
the start of the day of the filing of his/her certificate of candidacy- traces its roots to
the period of the American occupation.
In fact, during the deliberations of Senate Bill No. 2231, the bill later to be
consolidated with House Bill No. 5352 and enacted as R.A. No. 9369, Senator
Richard Gordon, the principal author of the bill, acknowledged that the said proviso
in the proposed legislative measure is an old provision which was merely copied
from earlier existing legislation, thus'
Senator Osmeña.- May I just opine here and perhaps obtain the opinion of the
good Sponsor.- This reads like, "ANY PERSON HOLDING [means currently] A
PUBLIC APPOINTIVE POSITION" SHALL BE CONSIDERED IPSO FACTO
RESIGNED- [which means that the prohibition extends only to appointive officials]
"INCLUDING ACTIVE MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES, OFFICERS AND
EMPLOYEES"- This is a prohibition, Mr. President.- This means if one is chairman
of SSS or PDIC, he is deemed ipso facto resigned when he files his certificate of
candidacy.- Is that the intention
Senator Gordon.- This is really an old provision, Mr. President.
Senator Osmeña.- It is in bold letters, so I think it was a Committee amendment.
Senator Gordon.- No, it has always been there.
Senator Osmeña.- I see.
Senator Gordon.- I guess the intention is not to give them undue advantage,
especially certain people.
16
Senator Osmeña.- All right.
In that Senate deliberation, however, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago
expressed her concern over the inclusion of the said provision in the new law,
given that the same would be disadvantageous and unfair to potential candidates
holding appointive positions, while it grants a consequent preferential treatment to
elective officials, thus'
Senator Santiago.- On page 15, line 31, I know that this is a losing cause, so I
make this point more as a matter of record than of any feasible hope that it can
possibly be either accepted or if we come to a division of the House, it will be
upheld by the majority.
I am referring to page 15, line 21.- The proviso begins: "PROVIDED FINALLY,
THAT ANY PERSON HOLDING A PUBLIC APPOINTIVE OFFICE - SHALL BE
CONSIDERED IPSO FACTO RESIGNED FROM HIS/HER OFFICE."
The point that I made during the appropriate debate in the past in this Hall is that
there is, for me, no valid reason for exempting elective officials from this inhibition
or disqualification imposed by the law.- If we are going to consider appointive
officers of the government, including AFP members and officers of government-
owned and controlled corporations, or any other member of the appointive sector
of the civil service, why should it not apply to the elective sector for, after all, even
senators and congressmen are members of the civil service as well
Further, it is self-serving for the Senate, or for the Congress in general, to give an
exception to itself which is not available to other similarly situated officials of
government. Of course, the answer is, the reason why we are special is that we
are elected. Since we are imposing a disqualification on all other government
officials except ourselves, I think, it is the better part of delicadeza to inhibit
ourselves as well, so that if we want to stay as senators, we wait until our term
expires. But if we want to run for some other elective office during our term, then
we have to be considered resigned just like everybody else. That is my proposed
amendment. But if it is unacceptable to the distinguished Sponsor, because of
sensitivity to the convictions of the rest of our colleagues, I will understand.
Senator Gordon. Mr. President, I think the suggestion is well-thought of.- It is a
good policy.- However, this is something that is already in the old law which was
upheld by the Supreme court in a recent case that the rider was not upheld and
that it was valid.17
The obvious inequality brought about by the provision on automatic resignation of
appointive civil servants must have been the reason why Senator Recto proposed
the inclusion of the following during the period of amendments: "ANY PERSON
WHO FILES HIS CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY WITHIN THIS PERIOD SHALL
ONLY BE CONSIDERED AS A CANDIDATE AT THE START OF THE
CAMPAIGN PERIOD FOR WHICH HE FILED HIS COC."18 The said proviso
seems to mitigate the situation of disadvantage afflicting appointive officials by
considering persons who filed their CoCs as candidates only at the start of the
campaign period, thereby, conveying the tacit intent that persons holding
appointive positions will only be considered as resigned at the start of the
campaign period when they are already treated by law as candidates.
Parenthetically, it may be remembered that Section 67 of the OEC and Section 11
of R.A. No. 8436 contained a similar provision on automatic resignation of elective
officials upon the filing of their CoCs for any office other than that which they hold
in a permanent capacity or for President or Vice-President. However, with the
enactment of R.A. No. 9006, or the Fair Election Act,19 in 2001, this provision was
repealed by Section 1420 of the said act. There was, thus, created a situation of
obvious discrimination against appointive officials who were deemed ipso facto
resigned from their offices upon the filing of their CoCs, while elective officials were
not.
᳠This situation was incidentally addressed by the Court in Farv.
᳠ The Executive
Secretary21 when it ruled that
Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006
Is Not Violative of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Constitution
The petitioners' contention, that the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election
Code pertaining to elective officials gives undue benefit to such officials as against
the appointive ones and violates the equal protection clause of the constitution, is
tenuous.
The equal protection of the law clause in the Constitution is not absolute, but is
subject to reasonable classification.- If the groupings are characterized by
substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and
regulated differently from the other. The Court has explained the nature of the
equal protection guarantee in this manner:
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or
class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality.- It
is not intended to prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it
is directed or by territory within which it is to operate.- It does not demand absolute
equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike,
under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and
liabilities enforced.- The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation
which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies
alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a
distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not.
Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive
officials. The former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate.
They are elected to an office for a definite term and may be removed therefrom
only upon stringent conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials hold their
office by virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing authority.- Some
appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to
security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority.
Another substantial distinction between the two sets of officials is that under
Section 55, Chapter 8, Title I, Subsection A. Civil Service Commission, Book V of
the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292), appointive officials, as
officers and employees in the civil service, are strictly prohibited from engaging in
any partisan political activity or take part in any election except to vote.- Under the
same provision, elective officials, or officers or employees holding political offices,
are obviously expressly allowed to take part in political and electoral activities.
By repealing Section 67 but retaining Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code,
the legislators deemed it proper to treat these two classes of officials differently
with respect to the effect on their tenure in the office of the filing of the certificates
of candidacy for any position other than those occupied by them.- Again, it is not
within the power of the Court to pass upon or look into the wisdom of this
classification.
Since the classification justifying Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, i.e., elected
officials vis-a-vis appointive officials, is anchored upon material and significant
distinctions and all the persons belonging under the same classification are
similarly treated, the equal protection clause of the Constitution is, thus, not
infringed.22
However, it must be remembered that the Court, in Fari᳼/i>, was intently focused
on the main issue of whether the repealing clause in the Fair Election Act was a
constitutionally proscribed rider, in that it unwittingly failed to ascertain with stricter
scrutiny the impact of the retention of the provision on automatic resignation of
persons holding appointive positions (Section 66) in the OEC, vis-୶ is the equal
protection clause.- Moreover, the Court's vision in Fari᳼/i> was shrouded by the fact
᳠that petitioners therein, Faret
᳠ al., never posed a direct challenge to the
᳠constitutionality of Section 66 of the OEC. Faret
᳠ al. rather merely questioned, on
constitutional grounds, the repealing clause, or Section 14 of the Fair Election Act.
The Court's afore-quoted declaration in Fari᳼/i> may then very well be considered
as an obiter dictum.
III.
The instant case presents a rare opportunity for the Court, in view of the
constitutional challenge advanced by petitioners, once and for all, to settle the
issue of whether the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A.
No. 9369, a reproduction of Section 66 of the OEC, which, as shown above, was
based on provisions dating back to the American occupation, is violative of the
equal protection clause.
But before delving into the constitutional issue, we shall first address the issues on
legal standing and on the existence of an actual controversy.
Central to the determination of locus standi is the question of whether a party has
alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the
court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.23 In this
case, petitioners allege that they will be directly affected by COMELEC Resolution
No. 8678 for they intend, and they all have the qualifications, to run in the 2010
elections. The OSG, for its part, contends that since petitioners have not yet filed
their CoCs, they are not yet candidates; hence, they are not yet directly affected by
the assailed provision in the COMELEC resolution.
The Court, nevertheless, finds that, while petitioners are not yet candidates, they
have the standing to raise the constitutional challenge, simply because they are
qualified voters. A restriction on candidacy, such as the challenged measure
herein, affects the rights of voters to choose their public officials. The rights of
voters and the rights of candidates do not lend themselves to neat separation; laws
that affect candidates always have at least some theoretical, correlative effect on
voters.24 The Court believes that both candidates and voters may challenge, on
grounds of equal protection, the assailed measure because of its impact on voting
rights.25
In any event, in recent cases, this Court has relaxed the stringent direct injury test
and has observed a liberal policy allowing ordinary citizens, members of Congress,
and civil organizations to prosecute actions involving the constitutionality or validity
of laws, regulations and rulings.26
We have also stressed in our prior decisions that the exercise by this Court of
judicial power is limited to the determination and resolution of actual cases and
controversies.27 The Court, in this case, finds that an actual case or controversy
exists between the petitioners and the COMELEC, the body charged with the
enforcement and administration of all election laws. Petitioners have alleged in a
precise manner that they would engage in the very acts that would trigger the
enforcement of the provisionthey would file their CoCs and run in the 2010
elections. Given that the assailed provision provides for ipso facto resignation upon
the filing of the CoC, it cannot be said that it presents only a speculative or
hypothetical obstacle to petitioners' candidacy.28
IV.
Having hurdled what the OSG posed as obstacles to judicial review, the Court now
delves into the constitutional challenge.
It is noteworthy to point out that the right to run for public office touches on two
fundamental freedoms, those of expression and of association. This premise is
best explained in Mancuso v. Taft,29 viz.:
Freedom of expression guarantees to the individual the opportunity to write a letter
to the local newspaper, speak out in a public park, distribute handbills advocating
radical reform, or picket an official building to seek redress of grievances. All of
these activities are protected by the First Amendment if done in a manner
consistent with a narrowly defined concept of public order and safety. The choice
of means will likely depend on the amount of time and energy the individual wishes
to expend and on his perception as to the most effective method of projecting his
message to the public. But interest and commitment are evolving phenomena.
What is an effective means for protest at one point in time may not seem so
effective at a later date. The dilettante who participates in a picket line may decide
to devote additional time and resources to his expressive activity. As his
commitment increases, the means of effective expression changes, but the
expressive quality remains constant. He may decide to lead the picket line, or to
publish the newspaper. At one point in time he may decide that the most effective
way to give expression to his views and to get the attention of an appropriate
audience is to become a candidate for public office-means generally considered
among the most appropriate for those desiring to effect change in our
governmental systems. He may seek to become a candidate by filing in a general
election as an independent or by seeking the nomination of a political party. And in
the latter instance, the individual's expressive activity has two dimensions: besides
urging that his views be the views of the elected public official, he is also
attempting to become a spokesman for a political party whose substantive
program extends beyond the particular office in question. But Cranston has said
that a certain type of its citizenry, the public employee, may not become a
candidate and may not engage in any campaign activity that promotes himself as a
candidate for public office. Thus the city has stifled what may be the most
important expression an individual can summon, namely that which he would be
willing to effectuate, by means of concrete public action, were he to be selected by
the voters.
It is impossible to ignore the additional fact that the right to run for office also
affects the freedom to associate. In Williams v. Rhodes, supra, the Court used
strict review to invalidate an Ohio election system that made it virtually impossible
for third parties to secure a place on the ballot. The Court found that the First
Amendment protected the freedom to associate by forming and promoting a
political party and that that freedom was infringed when the state effectively denied
a party access to its electoral machinery. The Cranston charter provision before us
also affects associational rights, albeit in a slightly different way. An individual may
decide to join or participate in an organization or political party that shares his
beliefs. He may even form a new group to forward his ideas. And at some juncture
his supporters and fellow party members may decide that he is the ideal person to
carry the group's standard into the electoral fray. To thus restrict the options
available to political organization as the Cranston charter provision has done is to
limit the effectiveness of association; and the freedom to associate is intimately
related with the concept of making expression effective. Party access to the ballot
becomes less meaningful if some of those selected by party machinery to carry the
party's programs to the people are precluded from doing so because those
nominees are civil servants.
Whether the right to run for office is looked at from the point of view of individual
expression or associational effectiveness, wide opportunities exist for the individual
who seeks public office. The fact of candidacy alone may open previously closed
doors of the media. The candidate may be invited to discuss his views on radio talk
shows; he may be able to secure equal time on television to elaborate his
campaign program; the newspapers may cover his candidacy; he may be invited to
debate before various groups that had theretofore never heard of him or his views.
In short, the fact of candidacy opens up a variety of communicative possibilities
that are not available to even the most diligent of picketers or the most loyal of
party followers. A view today, that running for public office is not an interest
protected by the First Amendment, seems to us an outlook stemming from an
earlier era when public office was the preserve of the professional and the wealthy.
Consequently we hold that candidacy is both a protected First Amendment right
and a fundamental interest. Hence any legislative classification that significantly
burdens that interest must be subjected to strict equal protection review.30
Here, petitioners' interest in running for public office, an interest protected by
Sections 4 and 8 of Article III of the Constitution, is breached by the proviso in
Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369. It is now the opportune time for the Court to strike
down the said proviso for being violative of the equal protection clause and for
being overbroad.
In considering persons holding appointive positions as ipso facto resigned from
their posts upon the filing of their CoCs, but not considering as resigned all other
civil servants, specifically the elective ones, the law unduly discriminates against
the first class. The fact alone that there is substantial distinction between those
who hold appointive positions and those occupying elective posts, does not justify
such differential treatment.
In order that there can be valid classification so that a discriminatory governmental
act may pass the constitutional norm of equal protection, it is necessary that the
four (4) requisites of valid classification be complied with, namely:
(1) It must be based upon substantial distinctions;
(2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It must apply equally to all members of the class.
The first requirement means that there must be real and substantial differences
between the classes treated differently. As illustrated in the fairly recent Mirasol v.
Department of Public Works and Highways,31 a real and substantial distinction
exists between a motorcycle and other motor vehicles sufficient to justify its
classification among those prohibited from plying the toll ways. Not all motorized
vehicles are created equal a two-wheeled vehicle is less stable and more easily
overturned than a four-wheel vehicle.
Nevertheless, the classification would still be invalid if it does not comply with the
second requirement if it is not germane to the purpose of the law. Justice Isagani
A. Cruz (Ret.), in his treatise on constitutional law, explains,
The classification, even if based on substantial distinctions, will still be invalid if it is
not germane to the purpose of the law. To illustrate, the accepted difference in
physical stamina between men and women will justify the prohibition of the latter
from employment as miners or stevedores or in other heavy and strenuous work.
On the basis of this same classification, however, the law cannot provide for a
lower passing average for women in the bar examinations because physical
strength is not the test for admission to the legal profession. Imported cars may be
taxed at a higher rate than locally assembled automobiles for the protection of the
national economy, but their difference in origin is no justification for treating them
differently when it comes to punishing violations of traffic regulations. The source
of the vehicle has no relation to the observance of these rules.32
The third requirement means that the classification must be enforced not only for
the present but as long as the problem sought to be corrected continues to exist.
And, under the last requirement, the classification would be regarded as invalid if
all the members of the class are not treated similarly, both as to rights conferred
and obligations imposed.33
Applying the four requisites to the instant case, the Court finds that the differential
treatment of persons holding appointive offices as opposed to those holding
elective ones is not germane to the purposes of the law.
The obvious reason for the challenged provision is to prevent the use of a
governmental position to promote one's candidacy, or even to wield a dangerous
or coercive influence on the electorate. The measure is further aimed at promoting
the efficiency, integrity, and discipline of the public service by eliminating the
danger that the discharge of official duty would be motivated by political
considerations rather than the welfare of the public.34 The restriction is also justified
by the proposition that the entry of civil servants to the electoral arena, while still in
office, could result in neglect or inefficiency in the performance of duty because
they would be attending to their campaign rather than to their office work.
If we accept these as the underlying objectives of the law, then the assailed
provision cannot be constitutionally rescued on the ground of valid classification.
Glaringly absent is the requisite that the classification must be germane to the
purposes of the law. Indeed, whether one holds an appointive office or an elective
one, the evils sought to be prevented by the measure remain. For example, the
Executive Secretary, or any Member of the Cabinet for that matter, could wield the
same influence as the Vice-President who at the same time is appointed to a
Cabinet post (in the recent past, elected Vice-Presidents were appointed to take
charge of national housing, social welfare development, interior and local
government, and foreign affairs). With the fact that they both head executive
offices, there is no valid justification to treat them differently when both file their
CoCs for the elections. Under the present state of our law, the Vice-President, in
the example, running this time, let us say, for President, retains his position during
the entire election period and can still use the resources of his office to support his
campaign.
As to the danger of neglect, inefficiency or partisanship in the discharge of the
functions of his appointive office, the inverse could be just as true and compelling.
The public officer who files his certificate of candidacy would be driven by a greater
impetus for excellent performance to show his fitness for the position aspired for.
Mancuso v. Taft,35 cited above, explains that the measure on automatic
resignation, which restricts the rights of civil servants to run for officea right
inextricably linked to their freedom of expression and association, is not
reasonably necessary to the satisfaction of the state interest. Thus, in striking
down a similar measure in the United States, Mancuso succinctly declares'
In proceeding to the second stage of active equal protection review, however, we
do see some contemporary relevance of the Mitchell decision. National Ass'n of
Letter Carriers, supra. In order for the Cranston charter provision to withstand strict
scrutiny, the city must show that the exclusion of all government employees from
candidacy is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest. And, as stated
in Mitchell and other cases dealing with similar statutes, see Wisconsin State
Employees, supra; Broadrick, supra, government at all levels has a substantial
interest in protecting the integrity of its civil service. It is obviously conceivable that
the impartial character of the civil service would be seriously jeopardized if people
in positions of authority used their discretion to forward their electoral ambitions
rather than the public welfare. Similarly if a public employee pressured other fellow
employees to engage in corrupt practices in return for promises of post-election
reward, or if an employee invoked the power of the office he was seeking to extract
special favors from his superiors, the civil service would be done irreparable injury.
Conversely, members of the public, fellow-employees, or supervisors might
themselves request favors from the candidate or might improperly adjust their own
official behavior towards him. Even if none of these abuses actually materialize,
the possibility of their occurrence might seriously erode the public's confidence in
its public employees. For the reputation of impartiality is probably as crucial as the
impartiality itself; the knowledge that a clerk in the assessor's office who is running
for the local zoning board has access to confidential files which could provide
pressure points for furthering his campaign is destructive regardless of whether the
clerk actually takes advantage of his opportunities. For all of these reasons we find
that the state indeed has a compelling interest in maintaining the honesty and
impartiality of its public work force.
We do not, however, consider the exclusionary measure taken by Cranston-a flat
prohibition on office-seeking of all kinds by all kinds of public employees-as even
reasonably necessary to satisfaction of this state interest. As Justice Marshall
pointed out in Dunn v. Blumstein, [s]tatutes affecting constitutional rights must be
drawn with precision. For three sets of reasons we conclude that the Cranston
charter provision pursues its objective in a far too heavy-handed manner and
hence must fall under the equal protection clause. First, we think the nature of the
regulation-a broad prophylactic rule-may be unnecessary to fulfillment of the city's
objective. Second, even granting some sort of prophylactic rule may be required,
the provision here prohibits candidacies for all types of public office, including
many which would pose none of the problems at which the law is aimed. Third, the
provision excludes the candidacies of all types of public employees, without any
attempt to limit exclusion to those employees whose positions make them
vulnerable to corruption and conflicts of interest.
There is thus no valid justification to treat appointive officials differently from the
elective ones. The classification simply fails to meet the test that it should be
germane to the purposes of the law. The measure encapsulated in the second
proviso of the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and in Section 66 of
the OEC violates the equal protection clause.
V.
The challenged provision also suffers from the infirmity of being overbroad.
First, the provision pertains to all civil servants holding appointive posts without
distinction as to whether they occupy high positions in government or not.
Certainly, a utility worker in the government will also be considered as ipso facto
resigned once he files his CoC for the 2010 elections. This scenario is absurd for,
indeed, it is unimaginable how he can use his position in the government to wield
influence in the political world.
While it may be admitted that most appointive officials who seek public elective
office are those who occupy relatively high positions in government, laws cannot
be legislated for them alone, or with them alone in mind. For the right to seek
public elective office is universal, open and unrestrained, subject only to the
qualification standards prescribed in the Constitution and in the laws. These
qualifications are, as we all know, general and basic so as to allow the widest
participation of the citizenry and to give free rein for the pursuit of one's highest
aspirations to public office. Such is the essence of democracy.
Second, the provision is directed to the activity of seeking any and all public
offices, whether they be partisan or nonpartisan in character, whether they be in
the national, municipal or barangay level. Congress has not shown a compelling
state interest to restrict the fundamental right involved on such a sweeping scale.36
Specific evils require specific treatments, not through overly broad measures that except the public employee who works in Cranston but aspires to office in another
unduly restrict guaranteed freedoms of the citizenry. After all, sovereignty resides local jurisdiction, most probably his town of residence. Here again the charter
in the people, and all governmental power emanates from them. precludes candidacies which can pose only a remote threat to the civil service.
Finally, the charter does not limit its prohibition to partisan office-seeking, but
Mancuso v. Taft,37 on this point, instructs sterilizes also those public employees who would seek nonpartisan elective office.
The statute reviewed in Mitchell was limited to partisan political activity, and since
that time other courts have found the partisan-nonpartisan distinction a material
As to approaches less restrictive than a prophylactic rule, there exists the device of
one. See Kinnear, supra; Wisconsin State Employees, supra; Gray v. Toledo,
the leave of absence. Some system of leaves of absence would permit the public
supra. While the line between nonpartisan and partisan can often be blurred by
employee to take time off to pursue his candidacy while assuring him his old job
systems whose true characters are disguised by the names given them by their
should his candidacy be unsuccessful. Moreover, a leave of absence policy would
architects, it seems clear that the concerns of a truly partisan office and the
eliminate many of the opportunities for engaging in the questionable practices that
temptations it fosters are sufficiently different from those involved in an office
the statute is designed to prevent. While campaigning, the candidate would feel no
removed from regular party politics to warrant distinctive treatment in a charter of
conflict between his desire for election and his publicly entrusted discretion, nor
this sort.
any conflict between his efforts to persuade the public and his access to
confidential documents. But instead of adopting a reasonable leave of absence
policy, Cranston has chosen a provision that makes the public employee cast off The third and last area of excessive and overinclusive coverage of the Cranston
the security of hard-won public employment should he desire to compete for charter relates not to the type of office sought, but to the type of employee seeking
elected office. the office. As Justice Douglas pointed out in his dissent in Mitchell, 330 U.S. at
120-126, 67 S.Ct. 556, restrictions on administrative employees who either
participate in decision-making or at least have some access to information
The city might also promote its interest in the integrity of the civil service by
concerning policy matters are much more justifiable than restrictions on industrial
enforcing, through dismissal, discipline, or criminal prosecution, rules or statutes
employees, who, but for the fact that the government owns the plant they work in,
that treat conflict of interests, bribery, or other forms of official corruption. By thus
are, for purposes of access to official information, identically situated to all other
attacking the problem directly, instead of using a broad prophylactic rule, the city
industrial workers. Thus, a worker in the Philadelphia mint could be distinguished
could pursue its objective without unduly burdening the First Amendment rights of
from a secretary in an office of the Department of Agriculture; so also could a
its employees and the voting rights of its citizens. Last term in Dunn v. Blumstein,
the Supreme Court faced an analogous question when the State of Tennessee janitor in the public schools of Cranston be distinguished from an assistant
comptroller of the same city. A second line of distinction that focuses on the type of
asserted that the interest of ballot box purity justified its imposition of one year and
employee is illustrated by the cases of Kinnear and Minielly, supra. In both of these
three month residency requirements before a citizen could vote. Justice Marshall
cases a civil service deputy decided to run for the elected office of sheriff. The
stated, inter alia, that Tennessee had available a number of criminal statutes that
courts in both cases felt that the no-candidacy laws in question were much too
could be used to punish voter fraud without unnecessary infringement on the
broad and indicated that perhaps the only situation sensitive enough to justify a flat
newcomer's right to vote. Similarly, it appears from the record in this case that the
rule was one in which an inferior in a public office electorally challenged his
Cranston charter contains some provisions that might be used against
immediate superior. Given all these considerations, we think Cranston has not
opportunistic public employees.
given adequate attention to the problem of narrowing the terms of its charter to
deal with the specific kinds of conflict-of-interest problems it seeks to avoid.
Even if some sort of prophylactic rule is necessary, we cannot say that Cranston
has put much effort into tailoring a narrow provision that attempts to match the
We also do not find convincing the arguments that after-hours campaigning will
prohibition with the problem. The charter forbids a Cranston public employee from
drain the energy of the public employee to the extent that he is incapable of
running for any office, anywhere. The prohibition is not limited to the local offices of
performing his job effectively and that inevitable on-the-job campaigning and
Cranston, but rather extends to statewide offices and even to national offices. It is
discussion of his candidacy will disrupt the work of others. Although it is
difficult for us to see that a public employee running for the United States
indisputable that the city has a compelling interest in the performance of official
Congress poses quite the same threat to the civil service as would the same
work, the exclusion is not well-tailored to effectuate that interest. Presumably the
employee if he were running for a local office where the contacts and information
city could fire the individual if he clearly shirks his employment responsibilities or
provided by his job related directly to the position he was seeking, and hence
disrupts the work of others. Also, the efficiency rationale common to both
where the potential for various abuses was greater. Nor does the Cranston charter
arguments is significantly underinclusive. It applies equally well to a number of
non-political, extracurricular activities that are not prohibited by the Cranston
charter. Finally, the connection between after-hours campaigning and the state
interest seems tenuous; in many cases a public employee would be able to
campaign aggressively and still continue to do his job well.38
Incidentally, Clements v. Fashing39 sustained as constitutional a provision on the
automatic resignation of District Clerks, County Clerks, County Judges, County
Treasurers, Criminal District Attorneys, County Surveyors, Inspectors of Hides and
Animals, County Commissioners, Justices of the Peace, Sheriffs, Assessors and
Collectors of Taxes, District Attorneys, County Attorneys, Public Weighers, and
Constables if they announce their candidacy or if they become candidates in any
general, special or primary election.
In Clements, it may be readily observed that a provision treating differently
particular officials, as distinguished from all others, under a classification that is
germane to the purposes of the law, merits the stamp of approval from American
courts. Not, however, a general and sweeping provision, and more so one violative
of the second requisite for a valid classification, which is on its face
unconstitutional.
On a final note, it may not be amiss to state that the Americans, from whom we
copied the provision in question, had already stricken down a similar measure for
being unconstitutional. It is high-time that we, too, should follow suit and, thus,
uphold fundamental liberties over age-old, but barren, restrictions to such
freedoms.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The second
proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369, Section 66
of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678
are declared as UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 189698               February 22, 2010
ELEAZAR P. QUINTO and GERINO A. TOLENTINO, JR., Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PUNO, C.J.:
Upon a careful review of the case at bar, this Court resolves to grant the
respondent Commission on Elections’ (COMELEC) motion for reconsideration, and
the movants-intervenors’ motions for reconsideration-in-intervention, of this Court’s
December 1, 2009 Decision (Decision).1
The assailed Decision granted the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by
Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr. and declared as unconstitutional the
second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No.
9369,2 Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code3 and Section 4(a) of COMELEC
Resolution No. 8678,4 mainly on the ground that they violate the equal protection
clause of the Constitution and suffer from overbreadth. The assailed Decision thus
paved the way for public appointive officials to continue discharging the powers,
prerogatives and functions of their office notwithstanding their entry into the
political arena.
In support of their respective motions for reconsideration, respondent COMELEC
and movants-intervenors submit the following arguments:
(1) The assailed Decision is contrary to, and/or violative of, the constitutional
proscription against the participation of public appointive officials and members of
the military in partisan political activity;
(2) The assailed provisions do not violate the equal protection clause when they
accord differential treatment to elective and appointive officials, because such
differential treatment rests on material and substantial distinctions and is germane
to the purposes of the law;
(3) The assailed provisions do not suffer from the infirmity of overbreadth; and
(4) There is a compelling need to reverse the assailed Decision, as public safety
and interest demand such reversal.
We find the foregoing arguments meritorious.
I.
Procedural Issues
First, we shall resolve the procedural issues on the timeliness of the COMELEC’s
motion for reconsideration which was filed on December 15, 2009, as well as the
propriety of the motions for reconsideration-in-intervention which were filed after
the Court had rendered its December 1, 2009 Decision.
i. Timeliness of COMELEC’s Motion for Reconsideration
Pursuant to Section 2, Rule 56-A of the 1997 Rules of Court,5 in relation to Section
1, Rule 52 of the same rules,6 COMELEC had a period of fifteen days from receipt
of notice of the assailed Decision within which to move for its reconsideration.
COMELEC received notice of the assailed Decision on December 2, 2009, hence,
had until December 17, 2009 to file a Motion for Reconsideration.
The Motion for Reconsideration of COMELEC was timely filed. It was filed on
December 14, 2009. The corresponding Affidavit of Service (in substitution of the
one originally submitted on December 14, 2009) was subsequently filed on
December 17, 2009 – still within the reglementary period.
ii. Propriety of the Motions for Reconsideration-in-Intervention
Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court provides:
A person who has legal interest in the matter in litigation or in the success of either
of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely
affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court
or of an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the
action. The court shall consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or
prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and whether or not
the intervenor’s rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding.
Pursuant to the foregoing rule, this Court has held that a motion for intervention
shall be entertained when the following requisites are satisfied: (1) the would-be
intervenor shows that he has a substantial right or interest in the case; and (2)
such right or interest cannot be adequately pursued and protected in another
proceeding.7
Upon the other hand, Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court provides the time
within which a motion for intervention may be filed, viz.:
SECTION 2. Time to intervene.– The motion for intervention may be filed at any
time before rendition of judgment by the trial court. A copy of the pleading-in-
intervention shall be attached to the motion and served on the original parties.
(italics supplied)
This rule, however, is not inflexible. Interventions have been allowed even beyond
the period prescribed in the Rule, when demanded by the higher interest of justice.
Interventions have also been granted to afford indispensable parties, who have not
been impleaded, the right to be heard even after a decision has been rendered by
the trial court,8 when the petition for review of the judgment has already been
submitted for decision before the Supreme Court,9 and even where the assailed
order has already become final and executory.10 In Lim v. Pacquing,11 the motion
for intervention filed by the Republic of the Philippines was allowed by this Court to
avoid grave injustice and injury and to settle once and for all the substantive issues
raised by the parties.
In fine, the allowance or disallowance of a motion for intervention rests on the
sound discretion of the court12 after consideration of the appropriate
circumstances.13 We stress again that Rule 19 of the Rules of Court is a rule of
procedure whose object is to make the powers of the court fully and completely
available for justice.14 Its purpose is not to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and
promote the administration of justice.15
We rule that, with the exception of the IBP – Cebu City Chapter, all the movants-
intervenors may properly intervene in the case at bar.
First, the movants-intervenors have each sufficiently established a substantial right
or interest in the case.
As a Senator of the Republic, Senator Manuel A. Roxas has a right to challenge
the December 1, 2009 Decision, which nullifies a long established law; as a voter,
he has a right to intervene in a matter that involves the electoral process; and as a
public officer, he has a personal interest in maintaining the trust and confidence of
the public in its system of government.
On the other hand, former Senator Franklin M. Drilon and Tom V. Apacible are
candidates in the May 2010 elections running against appointive officials who, in
view of the December 1, 2009 Decision, have not yet resigned from their posts and
are not likely to resign from their posts. They stand to be directly injured by the
assailed Decision, unless it is reversed.
Moreover, the rights or interests of said movants-intervenors cannot be adequately
pursued and protected in another proceeding. Clearly, their rights will be
foreclosed if this Court’s Decision attains finality and forms part of the laws of the
land.
With regard to the IBP – Cebu City Chapter, it anchors its standing on the
assertion that "this case involves the constitutionality of elections laws for this
coming 2010 National Elections," and that "there is a need for it to be allowed to
intervene xxx so that the voice of its members in the legal profession would also be
heard before this Highest Tribunal as it resolves issues of transcendental
importance."16
Prescinding from our rule and ruling case law, we find that the IBP-Cebu City
Chapter has failed to present a specific and substantial interest sufficient to clothe
it with standing to intervene in the case at bar. Its invoked interest is, in character,
too indistinguishable to justify its intervention.
We now turn to the substantive issues.
II.
Substantive Issues
The assailed Decision struck down Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, the second
proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act (RA) 9369, and
Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, on the following grounds:
(1) They violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because of the
differential treatment of persons holding appointive offices and those holding
elective positions;
(2) They are overbroad insofar as they prohibit the candidacy of all civil servants
holding appointive posts: (a) without distinction as to whether or not they occupy
high/influential positions in the government, and (b) they limit these civil servants’
activity regardless of whether they be partisan or nonpartisan in character, or
whether they be in the national, municipal or barangay level; and
(3) Congress has not shown a compelling state interest to restrict the fundamental
right of these public appointive officials.
We grant the motions for reconsideration. We now rule that Section 4(a) of
Resolution 8678, Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, and the second
proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of RA 9369 are not unconstitutional,
and accordingly reverse our December 1, 2009 Decision.
III.
Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution 8678 Compliant with Law
Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution 8678 is a faithful reflection of the present
state of the law and jurisprudence on the matter, viz.:
Incumbent Appointive Official. - Under Section 13 of RA 9369, which reiterates
Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, any person holding a public appointive
office or position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
and officers and employees in government-owned or -controlled corporations, shall
be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of
candidacy.
Incumbent Elected Official. – Upon the other hand, pursuant to Section 14 of RA
9006 or the Fair Election Act,17 which repealed Section 67 of the Omnibus Election
Code18 and rendered ineffective Section 11 of R.A. 8436 insofar as it considered
an elected official as resigned only upon the start of the campaign period
corresponding to the positions for which they are running,19 an elected official is not
deemed to have resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of
candidacy for the same or any other elected office or position. In fine, an elected
official may run for another position without forfeiting his seat.
These laws and regulations implement Section 2(4), Article IX-B of the 1987
Constitution, which prohibits civil service officers and employees from engaging in
any electioneering or partisan political campaign.
The intention to impose a strict limitation on the participation of civil service officers
and employees in partisan political campaigns is unmistakable. The exchange
between Commissioner Quesada and Commissioner Foz during the deliberations
of the Constitutional Commission is instructive:
MS. QUESADA.
xxxx
Secondly, I would like to address the issue here as provided in Section 1 (4), line
12, and I quote: "No officer or employee in the civil service shall engage, directly or
indirectly, in any partisan political activity." This is almost the same provision as in
the 1973 Constitution. However, we in the government service have actually
experienced how this provision has been violated by the direct or indirect partisan
political activities of many government officials.
So, is the Committee willing to include certain clauses that would make this
provision more strict, and which would deter its violation?
MR. FOZ. Madam President, the existing Civil Service Law and the implementing
rules on the matter are more than exhaustive enough to really prevent officers and
employees in the public service from engaging in any form of partisan political
activity. But the problem really lies in implementation because, if the head of a
ministry, and even the superior officers of offices and agencies of government will
themselves violate the constitutional injunction against partisan political activity,
then no string of words that we may add to what is now here in this draft will really
implement the constitutional intent against partisan political activity. x x x20 (italics
supplied)
To emphasize its importance, this constitutional ban on civil service officers and
employees is presently reflected and implemented by a number of statutes.
Section 46(b)(26), Chapter 7 and Section 55, Chapter 8 – both of Subtitle A, Title I,
Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 – respectively provide in relevant part:
Section 44. Discipline: General Provisions:
xxxx
(b) The following shall be grounds for disciplinary action:
xxxx
(26) Engaging directly or indirectly in partisan political activities by one holding a
non-political office.
xxxx
Section 55. Political Activity. — No officer or employee in the Civil Service
including members of the Armed Forces, shall engage directly or indirectly in any
partisan political activity or take part in any election except to vote nor shall he use
his official authority or influence to coerce the political activity of any other person
or body. Nothing herein provided shall be understood to prevent any officer or
employee from expressing his views on current political problems or issues, or
from mentioning the names of his candidates for public office whom he supports:
Provided, That public officers and employees holding political offices may take part
in political and electoral activities but it shall be unlawful for them to solicit
contributions from their subordinates or subject them to any of the acts involving
subordinates prohibited in the Election Code.
Section 261(i) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (the Omnibus Election Code) further
makes intervention by civil service officers and employees in partisan political
activities an election offense, viz.:
SECTION 261. Prohibited Acts. — The following shall be guilty of an election
offense:
xxxx
(i) Intervention of public officers and employees. — Any officer or employee in the
civil service, except those holding political offices; any officer, employee, or
member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, or any police force, special forces,
home defense forces, barangay self-defense units and all other para-military units
that now exist or which may hereafter be organized who, directly or indirectly,
intervenes in any election campaign or engages in any partisan political activity,
except to vote or to preserve public order, if he is a peace officer.
The intent of both Congress and the framers of our Constitution to limit the
participation of civil service officers and employees in partisan political activities is
too plain to be mistaken.
But Section 2(4), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution and the implementing
statutes apply only to civil servants holding apolitical offices. Stated differently, the
constitutional ban does not cover elected officials, notwithstanding the fact that
"[t]he civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and
agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters."21 This is because elected public officials, by
the very nature of their office, engage in partisan political activities almost all year
round, even outside of the campaign period.22 Political partisanship is the inevitable
essence of a political office, elective positions included.23
The prohibition notwithstanding, civil service officers and employees are allowed to
vote, as well as express their views on political issues, or mention the names of
certain candidates for public office whom they support. This is crystal clear from
the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, viz.:
MS. AQUINO: Mr. Presiding Officer, my proposed amendment is on page 2,
Section 1, subparagraph 4, lines 13 and 14. On line 13, between the words "any"
and "partisan," add the phrase ELECTIONEERING AND OTHER; and on line 14,
delete the word "activity" and in lieu thereof substitute the word CAMPAIGN.
May I be allowed to explain my proposed amendment?
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Treñas): Commissioner Aquino may proceed.
MS. AQUINO: The draft as presented by the Committee deleted the phrase
"except to vote" which was adopted in both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions. The
phrase "except to vote" was not intended as a guarantee to the right to vote but as
a qualification of the general prohibition against taking part in elections.
Voting is a partisan political activity. Unless it is explicitly provided for as an
exception to this prohibition, it will amount to disenfranchisement. We know that
suffrage, although plenary, is not an unconditional right. In other words, the
Legislature can always pass a statute which can withhold from any class the right
to vote in an election, if public interest so required. I would only like to reinstate the
qualification by specifying the prohibited acts so that those who may want to vote
but who are likewise prohibited from participating in partisan political campaigns or
electioneering may vote.
MR. FOZ: There is really no quarrel over this point, but please understand that
there was no intention on the part of the Committee to disenfranchise any
government official or employee. The elimination of the last clause of this provision
was precisely intended to protect the members of the civil service in the sense that
they are not being deprived of the freedom of expression in a political contest. The
last phrase or clause might have given the impression that a government
employee or worker has no right whatsoever in an election campaign except to
vote, which is not the case. They are still free to express their views although the
intention is not really to allow them to take part actively in a political campaign.24
IV.
Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, Section 13 of RA 9369, and Section 66 of the
Omnibus Election Code Do Not Violate the Equal Protection Clause
We now hold that Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, Section 66 of the Omnibus
Election Code, and the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of RA
9369 are not violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
i. Fariñas, et al. v. Executive Secretary, et al. is Controlling
In truth, this Court has already ruled squarely on whether these deemed-resigned
provisions challenged in the case at bar violate the equal protection clause of the
Constitution in Fariñas, et al. v. Executive Secretary, et al.25
In Fariñas, the constitutionality of Section 14 of the Fair Election Act, in relation to
Sections 66 and 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, was assailed on the ground,
among others, that it unduly discriminates against appointive officials. As Section
14 repealed Section 67 (i.e., the deemed-resigned provision in respect of elected
officials) of the Omnibus Election Code, elected officials are no longer considered
ipso facto resigned from their respective offices upon their filing of certificates of
candidacy. In contrast, since Section 66 was not repealed, the limitation on
appointive officials continues to be operative – they are deemed resigned when
they file their certificates of candidacy.
The petitioners in Fariñas thus brought an equal protection challenge against
Section 14, with the end in view of having the deemed-resigned provisions "apply
equally" to both elected and appointive officials. We held, however, that the legal
dichotomy created by the Legislature is a reasonable classification, as there are
material and significant distinctions between the two classes of officials.
Consequently, the contention that Section 14 of the Fair Election Act, in relation to
Sections 66 and 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, infringed on the equal
protection clause of the Constitution, failed muster. We ruled:
The petitioners' contention, that the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election
Code pertaining to elective officials gives undue benefit to such officials as against
the appointive ones and violates the equal protection clause of the constitution, is
tenuous.
The equal protection of the law clause in the Constitution is not absolute, but is
subject to reasonable classification. If the groupings are characterized by
substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and
regulated differently from the other. The Court has explained the nature of the
equal protection guarantee in this manner:
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or
class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is
not intended to prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is
directed or by territory within which it is to operate. It does not demand absolute
equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike,
under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and
liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which
applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all
persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction
between those who fall within such class and those who do not.
Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive
officials. The former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate.
They are elected to an office for a definite term and may be removed therefrom
only upon stringent conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials hold their
office by virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some
appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to
security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority.
Another substantial distinction between the two sets of officials is that under
Section 55, Chapter 8, Title I, Subsection A. Civil Service Commission, Book V of
the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292), appointive officials, as
officers and employees in the civil service, are strictly prohibited from engaging in
any partisan political activity or take (sic) part in any election except to vote. Under
the same provision, elective officials, or officers or employees holding political
offices, are obviously expressly allowed to take part in political and electoral
activities.
By repealing Section 67 but retaining Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code,
the legislators deemed it proper to treat these two classes of officials differently
with respect to the effect on their tenure in the office of the filing of the certificates
of candidacy for any position other than those occupied by them. Again, it is not
within the power of the Court to pass upon or look into the wisdom of this
classification.
Since the classification justifying Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, i.e., elected
officials vis-à-vis appointive officials, is anchored upon material and significant
distinctions and all the persons belonging under the same classification are
similarly treated, the equal protection clause of the Constitution is, thus, not
infringed.26
The case at bar is a crass attempt to resurrect a dead issue. The miracle is that
our assailed Decision gave it new life. We ought to be guided by the doctrine of
stare decisis et non quieta movere. This doctrine, which is really "adherence to
precedents," mandates that once a case has been decided one way, then another
case involving exactly the same point at issue should be decided in the same
manner.27 This doctrine is one of policy grounded on the necessity for securing
certainty and stability of judicial decisions. As the renowned jurist Benjamin
Cardozo stated in his treatise The Nature of the Judicial Process:
It will not do to decide the same question one way between one set of litigants and
the opposite way between another. "If a group of cases involves the same point,
the parties expect the same decision. It would be a gross injustice to decide
alternate cases on opposite principles. If a case was decided against me yesterday
when I was a defendant, I shall look for the same judgment today if I am plaintiff.
To decide differently would raise a feeling of resentment and wrong in my breast; it
would be an infringement, material and moral, of my rights." Adherence to
precedent must then be the rule rather than the exception if litigants are to have
faith in the even-handed administration of justice in the courts.28
Our Fariñas ruling on the equal protection implications of the deemed-resigned
provisions cannot be minimalized as mere obiter dictum. It is trite to state that an
adjudication on any point within the issues presented by the case cannot be
considered as obiter dictum.29 This rule applies to all pertinent questions that are
presented and resolved in the regular course of the consideration of the case and
lead up to the final conclusion, and to any statement as to the matter on which the
decision is predicated.30 For that reason, a point expressly decided does not lose
its value as a precedent because the disposition of the case is, or might have
been, made on some other ground; or even though, by reason of other points in
the case, the result reached might have been the same if the court had held, on
the particular point, otherwise than it did.31 As we held in Villanueva, Jr. v. Court of
Appeals, et al.:32
… A decision which the case could have turned on is not regarded as obiter dictum
merely because, owing to the disposal of the contention, it was necessary to
consider another question, nor can an additional reason in a decision, brought
forward after the case has been disposed of on one ground, be regarded as dicta.
So, also, where a case presents two (2) or more points, any one of which is
sufficient to determine the ultimate issue, but the court actually decides all such
points, the case as an authoritative precedent as to every point decided, and none
of such points can be regarded as having the status of a dictum, and one point
should not be denied authority merely because another point was more dwelt on
and more fully argued and considered, nor does a decision on one proposition
make statements of the court regarding other propositions dicta.33 (italics supplied)
ii. Classification Germane to the Purposes of the Law
The Fariñas ruling on the equal protection challenge stands on solid ground even if
reexamined.
To start with, the equal protection clause does not require the universal application
of the laws to all persons or things without distinction.34 What it simply requires is
equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification.35 The test
developed by jurisprudence here and yonder is that of reasonableness,36 which
has four requisites:
(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions;
(2) It is germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.37
Our assailed Decision readily acknowledged that these deemed-resigned
provisions satisfy the first, third and fourth requisites of reasonableness. It,
however, proffers the dubious conclusion that the differential treatment of
appointive officials vis-à-vis elected officials is not germane to the purpose of the
law, because "whether one holds an appointive office or an elective one, the evils
sought to be prevented by the measure remain," viz.:
… For example, the Executive Secretary, or any Member of the Cabinet for that
matter, could wield the same influence as the Vice-President who at the same time
is appointed to a Cabinet post (in the recent past, elected Vice-Presidents were
appointed to take charge of national housing, social welfare development, interior
and local government, and foreign affairs). With the fact that they both head
executive offices, there is no valid justification to treat them differently when both
file their [Certificates of Candidacy] for the elections. Under the present state of our
law, the Vice-President, in the example, running this time, let us say, for President,
retains his position during the entire election period and can still use the resources
of his office to support his campaign.38
Sad to state, this conclusion conveniently ignores the long-standing rule that to
remedy an injustice, the Legislature need not address every manifestation of the
evil at once; it may proceed "one step at a time."39 In addressing a societal
concern, it must invariably draw lines and make choices, thereby creating some
inequity as to those included or excluded.40 Nevertheless, as long as "the bounds
of reasonable choice" are not exceeded, the courts must defer to the legislative
judgment.41 We may not strike down a law merely because the legislative aim
would have been more fully achieved by expanding the class.42 Stated differently,
the fact that a legislative classification, by itself, is underinclusive will not render it
unconstitutionally arbitrary or invidious.43 There is no constitutional requirement
that regulation must reach each and every class to which it might be applied;44 that
the Legislature must be held rigidly to the choice of regulating all or none.
Thus, any person who poses an equal protection challenge must convincingly
show that the law creates a classification that is "palpably arbitrary or
capricious."45 He must refute all possible rational bases for the differing treatment,
whether or not the Legislature cited those bases as reasons for the
enactment,46 such that the constitutionality of the law must be sustained even if the
reasonableness of the classification is "fairly debatable."47 In the case at bar, the
petitioners failed – and in fact did not even attempt – to discharge this heavy
burden. Our assailed Decision was likewise silent as a sphinx on this point even
while we submitted the following thesis:
... [I]t is not sufficient grounds for invalidation that we may find that the statute’s
distinction is unfair, underinclusive, unwise, or not the best solution from a public-
policy standpoint; rather, we must find that there is no reasonably rational reason
for the differing treatment.48
In the instant case, is there a rational justification for excluding elected officials
from the operation of the deemed resigned provisions? I submit that there is.
An election is the embodiment of the popular will, perhaps the purest expression of
the sovereign power of the people.49 It involves the choice or selection of
candidates to public office by popular vote.50 Considering that elected officials are
put in office by their constituents for a definite term, it may justifiably be said that
they were excluded from the ambit of the deemed resigned provisions in utmost
respect for the mandate of the sovereign will. In other words, complete deference
is accorded to the will of the electorate that they be served by such officials until
the end of the term for which they were elected. In contrast, there is no such
expectation insofar as appointed officials are concerned.
The dichotomized treatment of appointive and elective officials is therefore
germane to the purposes of the law. For the law was made not merely to preserve
the integrity, efficiency, and discipline of the public service; the Legislature, whose
wisdom is outside the rubric of judicial scrutiny, also thought it wise to balance this
with the competing, yet equally compelling, interest of deferring to the sovereign
will.51 (emphasis in the original)
In fine, the assailed Decision would have us "equalize the playing field" by
invalidating provisions of law that seek to restrain the evils from running riot. Under
the pretext of equal protection, it would favor a situation in which the evils are
unconfined and vagrant, existing at the behest of both appointive and elected
officials, over another in which a significant portion thereof is contained. The
absurdity of that position is self-evident, to say the least.
The concern, voiced by our esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Nachura, in his
dissent, that elected officials (vis-à-vis appointive officials) have greater political
clout over the electorate, is indeed a matter worth exploring – but not by this Court.
Suffice it to say that the remedy lies with the Legislature. It is the Legislature that is
given the authority, under our constitutional system, to balance competing interests
and thereafter make policy choices responsive to the exigencies of the times. It is
certainly within the Legislature’s power to make the deemed-resigned provisions
applicable to elected officials, should it later decide that the evils sought to be
prevented are of such frequency and magnitude as to tilt the balance in favor of
expanding the class. This Court cannot and should not arrogate unto itself the
power to ascertain and impose on the people the best state of affairs from a public
policy standpoint.
iii. Mancuso v. Taft Has Been Overruled
Finding no Philippine jurisprudence to prop up its equal protection ruling, our
assailed Decision adverted to, and extensively cited, Mancuso v. Taft.52 This was a
decision of the First Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals promulgated in
March 1973, which struck down as unconstitutional a similar statutory provision.
Pathetically, our assailed Decision, relying on Mancuso, claimed:
(1) The right to run for public office is "inextricably linked" with two fundamental
freedoms – freedom of expression and association;
(2) Any legislative classification that significantly burdens this fundamental right
must be subjected to strict equal protection review; and
(3) While the state has a compelling interest in maintaining the honesty and
impartiality of its public work force, the deemed-resigned provisions pursue their
objective in a far too heavy-handed manner as to render them unconstitutional.
It then concluded with the exhortation that since "the Americans, from whom we
copied the provision in question, had already stricken down a similar measure for
being unconstitutional[,] it is high-time that we, too, should follow suit."
Our assailed Decision’s reliance on Mancuso is completely misplaced. We cannot
blink away the fact that the United States Supreme Court effectively overruled
Mancuso three months after its promulgation by the United States Court of
Appeals. In United States Civil Service Commission, et al. v. National Association
of Letter Carriers AFL-CIO, et al.53 and Broadrick, et al. v. State of Oklahoma, et
al.,54 the United States Supreme Court was faced with the issue of whether
statutory provisions prohibiting federal55 and state56 employees from taking an
active part in political management or in political campaigns were unconstitutional
as to warrant facial invalidation. Violation of these provisions results in dismissal
from employment and possible criminal sanctions.
The Court declared these provisions compliant with the equal protection clause. It
held that (i) in regulating the speech of its employees, the state as employer has
interests that differ significantly from those it possesses in regulating the speech of
the citizenry in general; (ii) the courts must therefore balance the legitimate interest
of employee free expression against the interests of the employer in promoting
efficiency of public services; (iii) if the employees’ expression interferes with the
maintenance of efficient and regularly functioning services, the limitation on
speech is not unconstitutional; and (iv) the Legislature is to be given some
flexibility or latitude in ascertaining which positions are to be covered by any
statutory restrictions.57 Therefore, insofar as government employees are
concerned, the correct standard of review is an interest-balancing approach, a
means-end scrutiny that examines the closeness of fit between the governmental
interests and the prohibitions in question.58
Letter Carriers elucidated on these principles, as follows:
Until now, the judgment of Congress, the Executive, and the country appears to
have been that partisan political activities by federal employees must be limited if
the Government is to operate effectively and fairly, elections are to play their
proper part in representative government, and employees themselves are to be
sufficiently free from improper influences. The restrictions so far imposed on
federal employees are not aimed at particular parties, groups, or points of view, but
apply equally to all partisan activities of the type described. They discriminate
against no racial, ethnic, or religious minorities. Nor do they seek to control political
opinions or beliefs, or to interfere with or influence anyone's vote at the polls.
But, as the Court held in Pickering v. Board of Education,59 the government has an
interest in regulating the conduct and ‘the speech of its employees that differ(s)
significantly from those it possesses in connection with regulation of the speech of
the citizenry in general. The problem in any case is to arrive at a balance between
the interests of the (employee), as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public
concern and the interest of the (government), as an employer, in promoting the
efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.’ Although
Congress is free to strike a different balance than it has, if it so chooses, we think
the balance it has so far struck is sustainable by the obviously important interests
sought to be served by the limitations on partisan political activities now contained
in the Hatch Act.
It seems fundamental in the first place that employees in the Executive Branch of
the Government, or those working for any of its agencies, should administer the
law in accordance with the will of Congress, rather than in accordance with their
own or the will of a political party. They are expected to enforce the law and
execute the programs of the Government without bias or favoritism for or against
any political party or group or the members thereof. A major thesis of the Hatch Act
is that to serve this great end of Government-the impartial execution of the laws-it
is essential that federal employees, for example, not take formal positions in
political parties, not undertake to play substantial roles in partisan political
campaigns, and not run for office on partisan political tickets. Forbidding activities
like these will reduce the hazards to fair and effective government.
There is another consideration in this judgment: it is not only important that the
Government and its employees in fact avoid practicing political justice, but it is also
critical that they appear to the public to be avoiding it, if confidence in the system
of representative Government is not to be eroded to a disastrous extent.
Another major concern of the restriction against partisan activities by federal
employees was perhaps the immediate occasion for enactment of the Hatch Act in
1939. That was the conviction that the rapidly expanding Government work force
should not be employed to build a powerful, invincible, and perhaps corrupt
political machine. The experience of the 1936 and 1938 campaigns convinced
Congress that these dangers were sufficiently real that substantial barriers should
be raised against the party in power-or the party out of power, for that matter-using
the thousands or hundreds of thousands of federal employees, paid for at public
expense, to man its political structure and political campaigns.
A related concern, and this remains as important as any other, was to further serve
the goal that employment and advancement in the Government service not depend
on political performance, and at the same time to make sure that Government
employees would be free from pressure and from express or tacit invitation to vote
in a certain way or perform political chores in order to curry favor with their
superiors rather than to act out their own beliefs. It may be urged that prohibitions
against coercion are sufficient protection; but for many years the joint judgment of
the Executive and Congress has been that to protect the rights of federal
employees with respect to their jobs and their political acts and beliefs it is not
enough merely to forbid one employee to attempt to influence or coerce another.
For example, at the hearings in 1972 on proposed legislation for liberalizing the
prohibition against political activity, the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission
stated that ‘the prohibitions against active participation in partisan political
management and partisan political campaigns constitute the most significant
safeguards against coercion . . ..’ Perhaps Congress at some time will come to a
different view of the realities of political life and Government service; but that is its
current view of the matter, and we are not now in any position to dispute it. Nor, in
our view, does the Constitution forbid it.
Neither the right to associate nor the right to participate in political activities is
absolute in any event.60 x x x
xxxx
As we see it, our task is not to destroy the Act if we can, but to construe it, if
consistent with the will of Congress, so as to comport with constitutional limitations.
(italics supplied)
Broadrick likewise definitively stated that the assailed statutory provision is
constitutionally permissible, viz.:
Appellants do not question Oklahoma's right to place even-handed restrictions on
the partisan political conduct of state employees. Appellants freely concede that
such restrictions serve valid and important state interests, particularly with respect
to attracting greater numbers of qualified people by insuring their job security, free
from the vicissitudes of the elective process, and by protecting them from ‘political
extortion.’ Rather, appellants maintain that however permissible, even
commendable, the goals of s 818 may be, its language is unconstitutionally vague
and its prohibitions too broad in their sweep, failing to distinguish between conduct
that may be proscribed and conduct that must be permitted. For these and other
reasons, appellants assert that the sixth and seventh paragraphs of s 818 are void
in toto and cannot be enforced against them or anyone else.
We have held today that the Hatch Act is not impermissibly vague.61 We have little
doubt that s 818 is similarly not so vague that ‘men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning.’62 Whatever other problems there are with s 818,
it is all but frivolous to suggest that the section fails to give adequate warning of
what activities it proscribes or fails to set out ‘explicit standards' for those who must
apply it. In the plainest language, it prohibits any state classified employee from
being ‘an officer or member’ of a ‘partisan political club’ or a candidate for ‘any paid
public office.’ It forbids solicitation of contributions ‘for any political organization,
candidacy or other political purpose’ and taking part ‘in the management or affairs
of any political party or in any political campaign.’ Words inevitably contain germs
of uncertainty and, as with the Hatch Act, there may be disputes over the meaning
of such terms in s 818 as ‘partisan,’ or ‘take part in,’ or ‘affairs of’ political parties.
But what was said in Letter Carriers, is applicable here: ‘there are limitations in the
English language with respect to being both specific and manageably brief, and it
seems to us that although the prohibitions may not satisfy those intent on finding
fault at any cost, they are set out in terms that the ordinary person exercising
ordinary common sense can sufficiently understand and comply with, without
sacrifice to the public interest.' x x x
xxxx
[Appellants] nevertheless maintain that the statute is overbroad and purports to
reach protected, as well as unprotected conduct, and must therefore be struck
down on its face and held to be incapable of any constitutional application. We do
not believe that the overbreadth doctrine may appropriately be invoked in this
manner here.
xxxx
The consequence of our departure from traditional rules of standing in the First
Amendment area is that any enforcement of a statute thus placed at issue is totally
forbidden until and unless a limiting construction or partial invalidation so narrows it
as to remove the seeming threat or deterrence to constitutionally protected
expression. Application of the overbreadth doctrine in this manner is, manifestly,
strong medicine. It has been employed by the Court sparingly and only as a last
resort. x x x
x x x But the plain import of our cases is, at the very least, that facial over-breadth
adjudication is an exception to our traditional rules of practice and that its function,
a limited one at the outset, attenuates as the otherwise unprotected behavior that it
forbids the State to sanction moves from ‘pure speech’ toward conduct and that
conduct-even if expressive-falls within the scope of otherwise valid criminal laws
that reflect legitimate state interests in maintaining comprehensive controls over
harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct. Although such laws, if too broadly
worded, may deter protected speech to some unknown extent, there comes a point
where that effect-at best a prediction-cannot, with confidence, justify invalidating a
statute on its face and so prohibiting a State from enforcing the statute against
conduct that is admittedly within its power to proscribe. To put the matter another
way, particularly where conduct and not merely speech is involved, we believe that
the overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but substantial as well, judged
in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep. It is our view that s 818 is not
substantially overbroad and that whatever overbreadth may exist should be cured
through case-by-case analysis of the fact situations to which its sanctions,
assertedly, may not be applied.
Unlike ordinary breach-of-the peace statutes or other broad regulatory acts, s 818
is directed, by its terms, at political expression which if engaged in by private
persons would plainly be protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. But
at the same time, s 818 is not a censorial statute, directed at particular groups or
viewpoints. The statute, rather, seeks to regulate political activity in an even-
handed and neutral manner. As indicted, such statutes have in the past been
subject to a less exacting overbreadth scrutiny. Moreover, the fact remains that s
818 regulates a substantial spectrum of conduct that is as manifestly subject to
state regulation as the public peace or criminal trespass. This much was
established in United Public Workers v. Mitchell, and has been unhesitatingly
reaffirmed today in Letter Carriers. Under the decision in Letter Carriers, there is
no question that s 818 is valid at least insofar as it forbids classified employees
from: soliciting contributions for partisan candidates, political parties, or other
partisan political purposes; becoming members of national, state, or local
committees of political parties, or officers or committee members in partisan
political clubs, or candidates for any paid public office; taking part in the
management or affairs of any political party's partisan political campaign; serving
as delegates or alternates to caucuses or conventions of political parties;
addressing or taking an active part in partisan political rallies or meetings; soliciting
votes or assisting voters at the polls or helping in a partisan effort to get voters to
the polls; participating in the distribution of partisan campaign literature; initiating or
circulating partisan nominating petitions; or riding in caravans for any political party
or partisan political candidate.
x x x It may be that such restrictions are impermissible and that s 818 may be
susceptible of some other improper applications. But, as presently construed, we
do not believe that s 818 must be discarded in toto because some persons’
arguably protected conduct may or may not be caught or chilled by the statute.
Section 818 is not substantially overbroad and it not, therefore, unconstitutional on
its face. (italics supplied)
It bears stressing that, in his Dissenting Opinion, Mr. Justice Nachura does not
deny the principles enunciated in Letter Carriers and Broadrick. He would hold,
nonetheless, that these cases cannot be interpreted to mean a reversal of
Mancuso, since they "pertain to different types of laws and were decided based on
a different set of facts," viz.:
In Letter Carriers, the plaintiffs alleged that the Civil Service Commission was
enforcing, or threatening to enforce, the Hatch Act’s prohibition against "active
participation in political management or political campaigns." The plaintiffs desired
to campaign for candidates for public office, to encourage and get federal
employees to run for state and local offices, to participate as delegates in party
conventions, and to hold office in a political club.
In Broadrick, the appellants sought the invalidation for being vague and overbroad
a provision in the (sic) Oklahoma’s Merit System of Personnel Administration Act
restricting the political activities of the State’s classified civil servants, in much the
same manner as the Hatch Act proscribed partisan political activities of federal
employees. Prior to the commencement of the action, the appellants actively
participated in the 1970 reelection campaign of their superior, and were
administratively charged for asking other Corporation Commission employees to
do campaign work or to give referrals to persons who might help in the campaign,
for soliciting money for the campaign, and for receiving and distributing campaign
posters in bulk.
Mancuso, on the other hand, involves, as aforesaid, an automatic resignation
provision. Kenneth Mancuso, a full time police officer and classified civil service
employee of the City of Cranston, filed as a candidate for nomination as
representative to the Rhode Island General Assembly. The Mayor of Cranston
then began the process of enforcing the resign-to-run provision of the City Home
Rule Charter.
Clearly, as the above-cited US cases pertain to different types of laws and were
decided based on a different set of facts, Letter Carriers and Broadrick cannot be
interpreted to mean a reversal of Mancuso. x x x (italics in the original)
We hold, however, that his position is belied by a plain reading of these cases.
Contrary to his claim, Letter Carriers, Broadrick and Mancuso all concerned the
constitutionality of resign-to-run laws, viz.:
(1) Mancuso involved a civil service employee who filed as a candidate for
nomination as representative to the Rhode Island General Assembly. He assailed
the constitutionality of §14.09(c) of the City Home Rule Charter, which prohibits
"continuing in the classified service of the city after becoming a candidate for
nomination or election to any public office."
(2) Letter Carriers involved plaintiffs who alleged that the Civil Service Commission
was enforcing, or threatening to enforce, the Hatch Act’s prohibition against "active
participation in political management or political campaigns"63 with respect to
certain defined activities in which they desired to engage. The plaintiffs relevant to
this discussion are:
(a) The National Association of Letter Carriers, which alleged that its members
were desirous of, among others, running in local elections for offices such as
school board member, city council member or mayor;
(b) Plaintiff Gee, who alleged that he desired to, but did not, file as a candidate for
the office of Borough Councilman in his local community for fear that his
participation in a partisan election would endanger his job; and
(c) Plaintiff Myers, who alleged that he desired to run as a Republican candidate in
the 1971 partisan election for the mayor of West Lafayette, Indiana, and that he
would do so except for fear of losing his job by reason of violation of the Hatch Act.
The Hatch Act defines "active participation in political management or political
campaigns" by cross-referring to the rules made by the Civil Service Commission.
The rule pertinent to our inquiry states:
30. Candidacy for local office: Candidacy for a nomination or for election to any
National, State, county, or municipal office is not permissible. The prohibition
against political activity extends not merely to formal announcement of candidacy
but also to the preliminaries leading to such announcement and to canvassing or
soliciting support or doing or permitting to be done any act in furtherance of
candidacy. The fact that candidacy, is merely passive is immaterial; if an employee
acquiesces in the efforts of friends in furtherance of such candidacy such
acquiescence constitutes an infraction of the prohibitions against political activity.
(italics supplied)
Section 9(b) requires the immediate removal of violators and forbids the use of
appropriated funds thereafter to pay compensation to these persons.64
(3) Broadrick was a class action brought by certain Oklahoma state employees
seeking a declaration of unconstitutionality of two sub-paragraphs of Section 818
of Oklahoma’s Merit System of Personnel Administration Act. Section 818 (7), the
paragraph relevant to this discussion, states that "[n]o employee in the classified
service shall be … a candidate for nomination or election to any paid public
office…" Violation of Section 818 results in dismissal from employment, possible
criminal sanctions and limited state employment ineligibility.
Consequently, it cannot be denied that Letter Carriers and Broadrick effectively
overruled Mancuso. By no stretch of the imagination could Mancuso still be held
operative, as Letter Carriers and Broadrick (i) concerned virtually identical resign-
to-run laws, and (ii) were decided by a superior court, the United States Supreme
Court. It was thus not surprising for the First Circuit Court of Appeals – the same
court that decided Mancuso – to hold categorically and emphatically in Magill v.
Lynch65 that Mancuso is no longer good law. As we priorly explained:
Magill involved Pawtucket, Rhode Island firemen who ran for city office in 1975.
Pawtucket’s "Little Hatch Act" prohibits city employees from engaging in a broad
range of political activities. Becoming a candidate for any city office is specifically
proscribed,66 the violation being punished by removal from office or immediate
dismissal. The firemen brought an action against the city officials on the ground
that that the provision of the city charter was unconstitutional. However, the court,
fully cognizant of Letter Carriers and Broadrick, took the position that Mancuso had
since lost considerable vitality. It observed that the view that political candidacy
was a fundamental interest which could be infringed upon only if less restrictive
alternatives were not available, was a position which was no longer viable, since
the Supreme Court (finding that the government’s interest in regulating both the
conduct and speech of its employees differed significantly from its interest in
regulating those of the citizenry in general) had given little weight to the argument
that prohibitions against the coercion of government employees were a less drastic
means to the same end, deferring to the judgment of Congress, and applying a
"balancing" test to determine whether limits on political activity by public
employees substantially served government interests which were "important"
enough to outweigh the employees’ First Amendment rights.67
It must be noted that the Court of Appeals ruled in this manner even though the
election in Magill was characterized as nonpartisan, as it was reasonable for the
city to fear, under the circumstances of that case, that politically active bureaucrats
might use their official power to help political friends and hurt political foes. Ruled
the court:
The question before us is whether Pawtucket's charter provision, which bars a city
employee's candidacy in even a nonpartisan city election, is constitutional. The
issue compels us to extrapolate two recent Supreme Court decisions, Civil Service
Comm'n v. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers and Broadrick v. Oklahoma. Both dealt
with laws barring civil servants from partisan political activity. Letter Carriers
reaffirmed United Public Workers v. Mitchell, upholding the constitutionality of the
Hatch Act as to federal employees. Broadrick sustained Oklahoma's "Little Hatch
Act" against constitutional attack, limiting its holding to Oklahoma's construction
that the Act barred only activity in partisan politics. In Mancuso v. Taft, we
assumed that proscriptions of candidacy in nonpartisan elections would not be
constitutional. Letter Carriers and Broadrick compel new analysis.
xxxx
What we are obligated to do in this case, as the district court recognized, is to
apply the Court’s interest balancing approach to the kind of nonpartisan election
revealed in this record. We believe that the district court found more residual vigor
in our opinion in Mancuso v. Taft than remains after Letter Carriers. We have
particular reference to our view that political candidacy was a fundamental interest
which could be trenched upon only if less restrictive alternatives were not
available. While this approach may still be viable for citizens who are not
government employees, the Court in Letter Carriers recognized that the
government's interest in regulating both the conduct and speech of its employees
differs significantly from its interest in regulating those of the citizenry in general.
Not only was United Public Workers v. Mitchell "unhesitatingly" reaffirmed, but the
Court gave little weight to the argument that prohibitions against the coercion of
government employees were a less drastic means to the same end, deferring to
the judgment of the Congress. We cannot be more precise than the Third Circuit in
characterizing the Court's approach as "some sort of 'balancing' process".68 It
appears that the government may place limits on campaigning by public
employees if the limits substantially serve government interests that are
"important" enough to outweigh the employees' First Amendment rights. x x x
(italics supplied)
Upholding thus the constitutionality of the law in question, the Magill court detailed
the major governmental interests discussed in Letter Carriers and applied them to
the Pawtucket provision as follows:
In Letter Carriers[,] the first interest identified by the Court was that of an efficient
government, faithful to the Congress rather than to party. The district court
discounted this interest, reasoning that candidates in a local election would not
likely be committed to a state or national platform. This observation undoubtedly
has substance insofar as allegiance to broad policy positions is concerned. But a
different kind of possible political intrusion into efficient administration could be
thought to threaten municipal government: not into broad policy decisions, but into
the particulars of administration favoritism in minute decisions affecting welfare, tax
assessments, municipal contracts and purchasing, hiring, zoning, licensing, and
inspections. Just as the Court in Letter Carriers identified a second governmental
interest in the avoidance of the appearance of "political justice" as to policy, so
there is an equivalent interest in avoiding the appearance of political preferment in
privileges, concessions, and benefits. The appearance (or reality) of favoritism that
the charter's authors evidently feared is not exorcised by the nonpartisan character
of the formal election process. Where, as here, party support is a key to successful
campaigning, and party rivalry is the norm, the city might reasonably fear that
politically active bureaucrats would use their official power to help political friends
and hurt political foes. This is not to say that the city's interest in visibly fair and
effective administration necessarily justifies a blanket prohibition of all employee
campaigning; if parties are not heavily involved in a campaign, the danger of
favoritism is less, for neither friend nor foe is as easily identified.
A second major governmental interest identified in Letter Carriers was avoiding the
danger of a powerful political machine. The Court had in mind the large and
growing federal bureaucracy and its partisan potential. The district court felt this
was only a minor threat since parties had no control over nominations. But in fact
candidates sought party endorsements, and party endorsements proved to be
highly effective both in determining who would emerge from the primary election
and who would be elected in the final election. Under the prevailing customs,
known party affiliation and support were highly significant factors in Pawtucket
elections. The charter's authors might reasonably have feared that a politically
active public work force would give the incumbent party, and the incumbent
workers, an unbreakable grasp on the reins of power. In municipal elections
especially, the small size of the electorate and the limited powers of local
government may inhibit the growth of interest groups powerful enough to
outbalance the weight of a partisan work force. Even when nonpartisan issues and
candidacies are at stake, isolated government employees may seek to influence
voters or their co-workers improperly; but a more real danger is that a central party
structure will mass the scattered powers of government workers behind a single
party platform or slate. Occasional misuse of the public trust to pursue private
political ends is tolerable, especially because the political views of individual
employees may balance each other out. But party discipline eliminates this
diversity and tends to make abuse systematic. Instead of a handful of employees
pressured into advancing their immediate superior's political ambitions, the entire
government work force may be expected to turn out for many candidates in every
election. In Pawtucket, where parties are a continuing presence in political
campaigns, a carefully orchestrated use of city employees in support of the
incumbent party's candidates is possible. The danger is scarcely lessened by the
openness of Pawtucket's nominating procedure or the lack of party labels on its
ballots.
The third area of proper governmental interest in Letter Carriers was ensuring that
employees achieve advancement on their merits and that they be free from both
coercion and the prospect of favor from political activity. The district court did not
address this factor, but looked only to the possibility of a civil servant using his
position to influence voters, and held this to be no more of a threat than in the most
nonpartisan of elections. But we think that the possibility of coercion of employees
by superiors remains as strong a factor in municipal elections as it was in Letter
Carriers. Once again, it is the systematic and coordinated exploitation of public
servants for political ends that a legislature is most likely to see as the primary
threat of employees' rights. Political oppression of public employees will be rare in
an entirely nonpartisan system. Some superiors may be inclined to ride herd on
the politics of their employees even in a nonpartisan context, but without party
officials looking over their shoulders most supervisors will prefer to let employees
go their own ways.
In short, the government may constitutionally restrict its employees' participation in
nominally nonpartisan elections if political parties play a large role in the
campaigns. In the absence of substantial party involvement, on the other hand, the
interests identified by the Letter Carriers Court lose much of their force. While the
employees' First Amendment rights would normally outbalance these diminished
interests, we do not suggest that they would always do so. Even when parties are
absent, many employee campaigns might be thought to endanger at least one
strong public interest, an interest that looms larger in the context of municipal
elections than it does in the national elections considered in Letter Carriers. The
city could reasonably fear the prospect of a subordinate running directly against his
superior or running for a position that confers great power over his superior. An
employee of a federal agency who seeks a Congressional seat poses less of a
direct challenge to the command and discipline of his agency than a fireman or
policeman who runs for mayor or city council. The possibilities of internal
discussion, cliques, and political bargaining, should an employee gather
substantial political support, are considerable. (citations omitted)
The court, however, remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings
in respect of the petitioners’ overbreadth charge. Noting that invalidating a statute
for being overbroad is "not to be taken lightly, much less to be taken in the dark,"
the court held:
The governing case is Broadrick, which introduced the doctrine of "substantial"
overbreadth in a closely analogous case. Under Broadrick, when one who
challenges a law has engaged in constitutionally unprotected conduct (rather than
unprotected speech) and when the challenged law is aimed at unprotected
conduct, "the overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but substantial as
well, judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep." Two major
uncertainties attend the doctrine: how to distinguish speech from conduct, and how
to define "substantial" overbreadth. We are spared the first inquiry by Broadrick
itself. The plaintiffs in that case had solicited support for a candidate, and they
were subject to discipline under a law proscribing a wide range of activities,
including soliciting contributions for political candidates and becoming a candidate.
The Court found that this combination required a substantial overbreadth
approach. The facts of this case are so similar that we may reach the same result
without worrying unduly about the sometimes opaque distinction between speech
and conduct.
The second difficulty is not so easily disposed of. Broadrick found no substantial
overbreadth in a statute restricting partisan campaigning. Pawtucket has gone
further, banning participation in nonpartisan campaigns as well. Measuring the
substantiality of a statute's overbreadth apparently requires, inter alia, a rough
balancing of the number of valid applications compared to the number of
potentially invalid applications. Some sensitivity to reality is needed; an invalid
application that is far-fetched does not deserve as much weight as one that is
probable. The question is a matter of degree; it will never be possible to say that a
ratio of one invalid to nine valid applications makes a law substantially overbroad.
Still, an overbreadth challenger has a duty to provide the court with some idea of
the number of potentially invalid applications the statute permits. Often, simply
reading the statute in the light of common experience or litigated cases will
suggest a number of probable invalid applications. But this case is different.
Whether the statute is overbroad depends in large part on the number of elections
that are insulated from party rivalry yet closed to Pawtucket employees. For all the
record shows, every one of the city, state, or federal elections in Pawtucket is
actively contested by political parties. Certainly the record suggests that parties
play a major role even in campaigns that often are entirely nonpartisan in other
cities. School committee candidates, for example, are endorsed by the local
Democratic committee.
The state of the record does not permit us to find overbreadth; indeed such a step
is not to be taken lightly, much less to be taken in the dark. On the other hand, the
entire focus below, in the short period before the election was held, was on the
constitutionality of the statute as applied. Plaintiffs may very well feel that further
efforts are not justified, but they should be afforded the opportunity to demonstrate
that the charter forecloses access to a significant number of offices, the candidacy
for which by municipal employees would not pose the possible threats to
government efficiency and integrity which Letter Carriers, as we have interpreted it,
deems significant. Accordingly, we remand for consideration of plaintiffs'
overbreadth claim. (italics supplied, citations omitted)
Clearly, Letter Carriers, Broadrick, and Magill demonstrate beyond doubt that
Mancuso v. Taft, heavily relied upon by the ponencia, has effectively been
overruled.69 As it is no longer good law, the ponencia’s exhortation that "[since] the
Americans, from whom we copied the provision in question, had already stricken
down a similar measure for being unconstitutional[,] it is high-time that we, too,
should follow suit" is misplaced and unwarranted.70
Accordingly, our assailed Decision’s submission that the right to run for public
office is "inextricably linked" with two fundamental freedoms – those of expression
and association – lies on barren ground. American case law has in fact never
recognized a fundamental right to express one’s political views through
candidacy,71 as to invoke a rigorous standard of review.72 Bart v. Telford73 pointedly
stated that "[t]he First Amendment does not in terms confer a right to run for public
office, and this court has held that it does not do so by implication either." Thus,
one’s interest in seeking office, by itself, is not entitled to constitutional
protection.74 Moreover, one cannot bring one’s action under the rubric of freedom
of association, absent any allegation that, by running for an elective position, one
is advancing the political ideas of a particular set of voters.75
Prescinding from these premises, it is crystal clear that the provisions challenged
in the case at bar, are not violative of the equal protection clause. The deemed-
resigned provisions substantially serve governmental interests (i.e., (i) efficient civil
service faithful to the government and the people rather than to party; (ii)
avoidance of the appearance of "political justice" as to policy; (iii) avoidance of the
danger of a powerful political machine; and (iv) ensuring that employees achieve
advancement on their merits and that they be free from both coercion and the
prospect of favor from political activity). These are interests that are important
enough to outweigh the non-fundamental right of appointive officials and
employees to seek elective office.1avvphi1
En passant, we find it quite ironic that Mr. Justice Nachura cites Clements v.
Fashing76 and Morial, et al. v. Judiciary Commission of the State of Louisiana, et
al.77 to buttress his dissent. Maintaining that resign-to-run provisions are valid only
when made applicable to specified officials, he explains:
…U.S. courts, in subsequent cases, sustained the constitutionality of resign-to-run
provisions when applied to specified or particular officials, as distinguished from all
others,78 under a classification that is germane to the purposes of the law. These
resign-to-run legislations were not expressed in a general and sweeping provision,
and thus did not violate the test of being germane to the purpose of the law, the
second requisite for a valid classification. Directed, as they were, to particular
officials, they were not overly encompassing as to be overbroad. (emphasis in the
original)
This reading is a regrettable misrepresentation of Clements and Morial. The
resign-to-run provisions in these cases were upheld not because they referred to
specified or particular officials (vis-à-vis a general class); the questioned provisions
were found valid precisely because the Court deferred to legislative judgment and
found that a regulation is not devoid of a rational predicate simply because it
happens to be incomplete. In fact, the equal protection challenge in Clements
revolved around the claim that the State of Texas failed to explain why some public
officials are subject to the resign-to-run provisions, while others are not. Ruled the
United States Supreme Court:
Article XVI, § 65, of the Texas Constitution provides that the holders of certain
offices automatically resign their positions if they become candidates for any other
elected office, unless the unexpired portion of the current term is one year or less.
The burdens that § 65 imposes on candidacy are even less substantial than those
imposed by § 19. The two provisions, of course, serve essentially the same state
interests. The District Court found § 65 deficient, however, not because of the
nature or extent of the provision's restriction on candidacy, but because of the
manner in which the offices are classified. According to the District Court, the
classification system cannot survive equal protection scrutiny, because Texas has
failed to explain sufficiently why some elected public officials are subject to § 65
and why others are not. As with the case of § 19, we conclude that § 65 survives a
challenge under the Equal Protection Clause unless appellees can show that there
is no rational predicate to the classification scheme.
The history behind § 65 shows that it may be upheld consistent with the "one step
at a time" approach that this Court has undertaken with regard to state regulation
not subject to more vigorous scrutiny than that sanctioned by the traditional
principles. Section 65 was enacted in 1954 as a transitional provision applying only
to the 1954 election. Section 65 extended the terms of those offices enumerated in
the provision from two to four years. The provision also staggered the terms of
other offices so that at least some county and local offices would be contested at
each election. The automatic resignation proviso to § 65 was not added until 1958.
In that year, a similar automatic resignation provision was added in Art. XI, § 11,
which applies to officeholders in home rule cities who serve terms longer than two
years. Section 11 allows home rule cities the option of extending the terms of
municipal offices from two to up to four years.
Thus, the automatic resignation provision in Texas is a creature of the State's
electoral reforms of 1958. That the State did not go further in applying the
automatic resignation provision to those officeholders whose terms were not
extended by § 11 or § 65, absent an invidious purpose, is not the sort of
malfunctioning of the State's lawmaking process forbidden by the Equal Protection
Clause. A regulation is not devoid of a rational predicate simply because it
happens to be incomplete. The Equal Protection Clause does not forbid Texas to
restrict one elected officeholder's candidacy for another elected office unless and
until it places similar restrictions on other officeholders. The provision's language
and its history belie any notion that § 65 serves the invidious purpose of denying
access to the political process to identifiable classes of potential candidates.
(citations omitted and italics supplied)
Furthermore, it is unfortunate that the dissenters took the Morial line that "there is
no blanket approval of restrictions on the right of public employees to become
candidates for public office" out of context. A correct reading of that line readily
shows that the Court only meant to confine its ruling to the facts of that case, as
each equal protection challenge would necessarily have to involve weighing
governmental interests vis-à-vis the specific prohibition assailed. The Court held:
The interests of public employees in free expression and political association are
unquestionably entitled to the protection of the first and fourteenth amendments.
Nothing in today's decision should be taken to imply that public employees may be
prohibited from expressing their private views on controversial topics in a manner
that does not interfere with the proper performance of their public duties. In today's
decision, there is no blanket approval of restrictions on the right of public
employees to become candidates for public office. Nor do we approve any general
restrictions on the political and civil rights of judges in particular. Our holding is
necessarily narrowed by the methodology employed to reach it. A requirement that
a state judge resign his office prior to becoming a candidate for non-judicial office
bears a reasonably necessary relation to the achievement of the state's interest in
preventing the actuality or appearance of judicial impropriety. Such a requirement
offends neither the first amendment's guarantees of free expression and
association nor the fourteenth amendment's guarantee of equal protection of the
laws. (italics supplied)
Indeed, the Morial court even quoted Broadrick and stated that:
In any event, the legislature must have some leeway in determining which of its
employment positions require restrictions on partisan political activities and which
may be left unregulated. And a State can hardly be faulted for attempting to limit
the positions upon which such restrictions are placed. (citations omitted)
V.
Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, Section 13 of RA 9369, and Section 66 of the
Omnibus Election Code Do Not Suffer from Overbreadth
Apart from nullifying Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, Section 13 of RA 9369, and
Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code on equal protection ground, our assailed
Decision struck them down for being overbroad in two respects, viz.:
(1) The assailed provisions limit the candidacy of all civil servants holding
appointive posts without due regard for the type of position being held by the
employee seeking an elective post and the degree of influence that may be
attendant thereto;79 and
(2) The assailed provisions limit the candidacy of any and all civil servants holding
appointive positions without due regard for the type of office being sought, whether
it be partisan or nonpartisan in character, or in the national, municipal or barangay
level.
Again, on second look, we have to revise our assailed Decision.
i. Limitation on Candidacy Regardless of Incumbent Appointive Official’s Position,
Valid
According to the assailed Decision, the challenged provisions of law are overly
broad because they apply indiscriminately to all civil servants holding appointive
posts, without due regard for the type of position being held by the employee
running for elective office and the degree of influence that may be attendant
thereto.
Its underlying assumption appears to be that the evils sought to be prevented are
extant only when the incumbent appointive official running for elective office holds
an influential post.
Such a myopic view obviously fails to consider a different, yet equally plausible,
threat to the government posed by the partisan potential of a large and growing
bureaucracy: the danger of systematic abuse perpetuated by a "powerful political
machine" that has amassed "the scattered powers of government workers" so as
to give itself and its incumbent workers an "unbreakable grasp on the reins of
power."80 As elucidated in our prior exposition:81
Attempts by government employees to wield influence over others or to make use
of their respective positions (apparently) to promote their own candidacy may
seem tolerable – even innocuous – particularly when viewed in isolation from other
similar attempts by other government employees. Yet it would be decidedly
foolhardy to discount the equally (if not more) realistic and dangerous possibility
that such seemingly disjointed attempts, when taken together, constitute a veiled
effort on the part of an emerging central party structure to advance its own agenda
through a "carefully orchestrated use of [appointive and/or elective] officials"
coming from various levels of the bureaucracy.
…[T]he avoidance of such a "politically active public work force" which could give
an emerging political machine an "unbreakable grasp on the reins of power" is
reason enough to impose a restriction on the candidacies of all appointive public
officials without further distinction as to the type of positions being held by such
employees or the degree of influence that may be attendant thereto. (citations
omitted)
ii. Limitation on Candidacy Regardless of Type of Office Sought, Valid
The assailed Decision also held that the challenged provisions of law are overly
broad because they are made to apply indiscriminately to all civil servants holding
appointive offices, without due regard for the type of elective office being sought,
whether it be partisan or nonpartisan in character, or in the national, municipal or
barangay level.
This erroneous ruling is premised on the assumption that "the concerns of a truly
partisan office and the temptations it fosters are sufficiently different from those
involved in an office removed from regular party politics [so as] to warrant
distinctive treatment,"82 so that restrictions on candidacy akin to those imposed by
the challenged provisions can validly apply only to situations in which the elective
office sought is partisan in character. To the extent, therefore, that such restrictions
are said to preclude even candidacies for nonpartisan elective offices, the
challenged restrictions are to be considered as overbroad.
Again, a careful study of the challenged provisions and related laws on the matter
will show that the alleged overbreadth is more apparent than real. Our exposition
on this issue has not been repudiated, viz.:
A perusal of Resolution 8678 will immediately disclose that the rules and
guidelines set forth therein refer to the filing of certificates of candidacy and
nomination of official candidates of registered political parties, in connection with
the May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections.83 Obviously, these rules and
guidelines, including the restriction in Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, were issued
specifically for purposes of the May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections, which,
it must be noted, are decidedly partisan in character. Thus, it is clear that the
restriction in Section 4(a) of RA 8678 applies only to the candidacies of appointive
officials vying for partisan elective posts in the May 10, 2010 National and Local
Elections. On this score, the overbreadth challenge leveled against Section 4(a) is
clearly unsustainable.
Similarly, a considered review of Section 13 of RA 9369 and Section 66 of the
Omnibus Election Code, in conjunction with other related laws on the matter, will
confirm that these provisions are likewise not intended to apply to elections for
nonpartisan public offices.
The only elections which are relevant to the present inquiry are the elections for
barangay offices, since these are the only elections in this country which involve
nonpartisan public offices.84
In this regard, it is well to note that from as far back as the enactment of the
Omnibus Election Code in 1985, Congress has intended that these nonpartisan
barangay elections be governed by special rules, including a separate rule on
deemed resignations which is found in Section 39 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Said provision states:
Section 39. Certificate of Candidacy. – No person shall be elected punong
barangay or kagawad ng sangguniang barangay unless he files a sworn certificate
of candidacy in triplicate on any day from the commencement of the election
period but not later than the day before the beginning of the campaign period in a
form to be prescribed by the Commission. The candidate shall state the barangay
office for which he is a candidate.
xxxx
Any elective or appointive municipal, city, provincial or national official or
employee, or those in the civil or military service, including those in government-
owned or-controlled corporations, shall be considered automatically resigned upon
the filing of certificate of candidacy for a barangay office.
Since barangay elections are governed by a separate deemed resignation rule,
under the present state of law, there would be no occasion to apply the restriction
on candidacy found in Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, and later
reiterated in the proviso of Section 13 of RA 9369, to any election other than a
partisan one. For this reason, the overbreadth challenge raised against Section 66
of the Omnibus Election Code and the pertinent proviso in Section 13 of RA 9369
must also fail. 85
In any event, even if we were to assume, for the sake of argument, that Section 66
of the Omnibus Election Code and the corresponding provision in Section 13 of RA
9369 are general rules that apply also to elections for nonpartisan public offices,
the overbreadth challenge would still be futile. Again, we explained:
In the first place, the view that Congress is limited to controlling only partisan
behavior has not received judicial imprimatur, because the general proposition of
the relevant US cases on the matter is simply that the government has an interest
in regulating the conduct and speech of its employees that differs significantly from
those it possesses in connection with regulation of the speech of the citizenry in
general.86
Moreover, in order to have a statute declared as unconstitutional or void on its face
for being overly broad, particularly where, as in this case, "conduct" and not "pure
speech" is involved, the overbreadth must not only be real, but substantial as well,
judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.87
In operational terms, measuring the substantiality of a statute’s overbreadth would
entail, among other things, a rough balancing of the number of valid applications
compared to the number of potentially invalid applications.88 In this regard, some
sensitivity to reality is needed; an invalid application that is far-fetched does not
deserve as much weight as one that is probable.89 The question is a matter of
degree.90 Thus, assuming for the sake of argument that the partisan-nonpartisan
distinction is valid and necessary such that a statute which fails to make this
distinction is susceptible to an overbreadth attack, the overbreadth challenge
presently mounted must demonstrate or provide this Court with some idea of the
number of potentially invalid elections (i.e. the number of elections that were
insulated from party rivalry but were nevertheless closed to appointive employees)
that may in all probability result from the enforcement of the statute.91
The state of the record, however, does not permit us to find overbreadth.
Borrowing from the words of Magill v. Lynch, indeed, such a step is not to be taken
lightly, much less to be taken in the dark,92 especially since an overbreadth finding
in this case would effectively prohibit the State from ‘enforcing an otherwise valid
measure against conduct that is admittedly within its power to proscribe.’93
This Court would do well to proceed with tiptoe caution, particularly when it comes
to the application of the overbreadth doctrine in the analysis of statutes that
purportedly attempt to restrict or burden the exercise of the right to freedom of
speech, for such approach is manifestly strong medicine that must be used
sparingly, and only as a last resort.94
In the United States, claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained only
where, in the judgment of the court, the possibility that protected speech of others
may be muted and perceived grievances left to fester (due to the possible
inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes) outweighs the possible harm to society
in allowing some unprotected speech or conduct to go unpunished.95 Facial
overbreadth has likewise not been invoked where a limiting construction could be
placed on the challenged statute, and where there are readily apparent
constructions that would cure, or at least substantially reduce, the alleged
overbreadth of the statute.96
In the case at bar, the probable harm to society in permitting incumbent appointive
officials to remain in office, even as they actively pursue elective posts, far
outweighs the less likely evil of having arguably protected candidacies blocked by
the possible inhibitory effect of a potentially overly broad statute.a1f
In this light, the conceivably impermissible applications of the challenged statutes –
which are, at best, bold predictions – cannot justify invalidating these statutes in
toto and prohibiting the State from enforcing them against conduct that is, and has
for more than 100 years been, unquestionably within its power and interest to
proscribe.97 Instead, the more prudent approach would be to deal with these
conceivably impermissible applications through case-by-case adjudication rather
than through a total invalidation of the statute itself.98
Indeed, the anomalies spawned by our assailed Decision have taken place. In his
Motion for Reconsideration, intervenor Drilon stated that a number of high-ranking
Cabinet members had already filed their Certificates of Candidacy without
relinquishing their posts.99 Several COMELEC election officers had likewise filed
their Certificates of Candidacy in their respective provinces.100 Even the Secretary
of Justice had filed her certificate of substitution for representative of the first
district of Quezon province last December 14, 2009101 – even as her position as
Justice Secretary includes supervision over the City and Provincial
Prosecutors,102 who, in turn, act as Vice-Chairmen of the respective Boards of
Canvassers.103 The Judiciary has not been spared, for a Regional Trial Court
Judge in the South has thrown his hat into the political arena. We cannot allow the
tilting of our electoral playing field in their favor.
For the foregoing reasons, we now rule that Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678 and
Section 13 of RA 9369, which merely reiterate Section 66 of the Omnibus Election
Code, are not unconstitutionally overbroad.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court RESOLVES to GRANT the respondent’s and the
intervenors’ Motions for Reconsideration; REVERSE and SET ASIDE this Court’s
December 1, 2009 Decision; DISMISS the Petition; and ISSUE this Resolution
declaring as not UNCONSTITUTIONAL (1) Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution
No. 8678, (2) the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic
Act No. 9369, and (3) Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 191084               March 25, 2010
JOSELITO R. MENDOZA, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND ROBERTO M.
PAGDANGANAN, Respondents.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
When the language of the law is clear and explicit, there is no room for
interpretation, only application. And if statutory construction be necessary, the
statute should be interpreted to assure its being in consonance with, rather than
repugnant to, any constitutional command or prescription.1 It is upon these basic
principles that the petition must be granted.
The factual and procedural antecedents are not in dispute.
Petitioner Joselito R. Mendoza was proclaimed the winner of the 2007
gubernatorial election for the province of Bulacan, besting respondent Roberto M.
Pagdanganan by a margin of 15,732 votes. On 1 June 2007, respondent filed the
Election Protest which, anchored on the massive electoral fraud allegedly
perpetrated by petitioner, was raffled to the Second Division of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) as EPC No. 2007-44. With petitioner’s filing of his Answer
with Counter-Protest on 18 June 2007, the COMELEC proceeded to conduct the
preliminary conference and to order a revision of the ballots from the contested
precincts indicated in said pleadings.
Upon the evidence adduced and the memoranda subsequently filed by the parties,
the COMELEC Second Division went on to render the 1 December 2009
Resolution, which annulled and set aside petitioner’s proclamation as governor of
Bulacan and proclaimed respondent duly elected to said position by a winning
margin of 4,321 votes. Coupled with a directive to the Department of Interior and
Local Government to implement the same, the resolution ordered petitioner to
immediately vacate said office, to cease and desist from discharging the functions
pertaining thereto and to cause a peaceful turn-over thereof to respondent.
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing
resolution with the COMELEC En Banc. Against respondent’s Motion for Execution
of Judgment Pending Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner also filed an
Opposition to the Motion for Execution before the COMELEC Second Division. On
8 February 2010, however, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution,
effectively disposing of the foregoing motions/incidents in this wise:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Commission En Banc DENIES the
Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit. The Resolution of the Commission
(Second Division) promulgated on December 1, 2009 ANNULLING the
proclamation of JOSELITO R. MENDOZA as the duly elected Governor of Bulacan
and DECLARING ROBERTO M. PAGDANGANAN as duly elected to said Office is
AFFIRMED with modification.
Considering the proximity of the end of the term of office involved, this Resolution
is declared immediately executory.
ACCORDINGLY, the Commission En Banc hereby ISSUES a WRIT OF
EXECUTION directing the Provincial Election Supervisor of Bulacan, in
coordination with the DILG Provincial Operations Officer to implement the
Resolution of the Commission (Second Division) dated December 1, 2009 and this
Resolution of the Commission En Banc by ordering JOSELITO R. MENDOZA to
CEASE and DESIST from performing the functions of Governor of the Province of
Bulacan and to VACATE said office in favor of ROBERTO M. PAGDANGANAN.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Secretary of the Department of
Interior and Local Government, the Provincial Election Supervisor of Bulacan, and
the DILG Provincial Operations Officer of the Province of Bulacan. (Underscoring
supplied)
On 11 February 2010, petitioner filed before the COMELEC an Urgent Motion to
Recall the Resolution Promulgated on February 8, 2010 on the following grounds:
(a) lack of concurrence of the majority of the members of the Commission pursuant
to Section 5, Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure; (b) lack of re-hearing
pursuant to Section 6, Rule 18 of the Rules; and (c) lack of notice for the
promulgation of the resolution pursuant to Section 5, Rule 18 of said Rules.
Invoking Section 13, Rule 18 of the same Rules, petitioner additionally argued that
the resolution pertained to an ordinary action and, as such, can only become final
and executory after 30 days from its promulgation.
On 12 February 2010, petitioner filed the instant Petition for Certiorari with an
Urgent Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or a Status
Quo Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction. Directed against the 8 February
2010 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc, the petition is noticeably anchored on
the same grounds raised in petitioner’s urgent motion to recall the same resolution
before the COMELEC. In addition, the petitioner disputes the appreciation and
result of the revision of the contested ballots.
In the meantime, it appears that the COMELEC En Banc issued a 10 February
2010 Order, scheduling the case for re-hearing on 15 February 2010, on the
ground that "there was no majority vote of the members obtained in the Resolution
of the Commission En Banc promulgated on February 8, 2010." At said scheduled
re-hearing, it further appears that the parties agreed to submit the matter for
resolution by the COMELEC En Banc upon submission of their respective
memoranda, without further argument. As it turned out, the deliberations which
ensued again failed to muster the required majority vote since, with three (3)
Commissioners not taking part in the voting, and only one dissent therefrom, the
assailed 1 December 2009 Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division only
garnered three concurrences.
In their respective Comments thereto, both respondent and the Office of the
Solicitor General argue that, in addition to its premature filing, the petition at bench
violated the rule against forum shopping. Claiming that he received the 10
February 2010 Order of the COMELEC En Banc late in the morning of 12 February
2010 or when the filing of the petition was already underway, petitioner argued
that: (a) he apprised the Court of the pendency of his Urgent Motion to Recall the
Resolution Promulgated on 8 February 2010; and, (b) that the writ of execution
ensconced in said resolution compelled him to resort to the petition
for certiorari before us.
On 4 March 2010, the COMELEC En Banc issued an Order for the issuance of a
Writ of Execution directing the implementation of the 1 December 2009 Resolution
of the COMELEC Second Division. While the COMELEC Electoral Contests
Adjudication Department (ECAD) issued the corresponding Writ of Execution on 5
March 2010, the record shows that COMELEC En Banc issued an Order on the
same date, directing the ECAD to deliver said 4 March 2010 Order and 5 March
2010 Writ of Execution by personal service to the parties. Aggrieved, petitioner
filed the following motions with the COMELEC En Banc on 5 March 2010, viz.: (a)
Urgent Motion to Declare Null and Void and Recall Latest En Banc Resolution
Dated March 4, 2010; and, (b) Urgent Motion to Set Aside 4 March 2010 En Banc
Resolution Granting Protestant’s Motion for Execution Pending Motion for
Reconsideration.
On 8 March 2010, petitioner filed before us a Supplement to the Petition with a
Most Urgent Reiterating Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
or a Status Quo Order. Contending that respondent’s protest should have been
dismissed when no majority vote was obtained after the re-hearing in the case,
petitioner argues that: (a) the 4 March 2010 Order and 5 March 2010 Writ of
Execution are null and void; (b) no valid decision can be rendered by the
COMELEC En Banc without the appreciation of the original ballots; (c) the
COMELEC ignored the Court’s ruling in the recent case of Corral v. Commission
on Elections;2 and (d) the foregoing circumstances are indicative of the
irregularities which attended the adjudication of the case before the Division and
En Banc levels of the COMELEC.
Despite receipt of respondent’s Most Respectful Urgent Manifestation which once
again called attention to petitioner’s supposed forum shopping, the Court issued a
Resolution dated 9 March 2010 granting the Status Quo Ante Order sought in the
petition. With respondent’s filing of a Manifestation and Comment to said
supplemental pleading on 10 March 2010, petitioner filed a Manifestation with
Motion to Appreciate Ballots Invalidated as Written by One Person and Marked
Ballot on 12 March 2010.
The submissions, as measured by the election rules, dictate that we grant the
petition, set aside and nullify the assailed resolutions and orders, and order the
dismissal of respondent’s election protest.
The Preliminaries
More than the justifications petitioner proffers for the filing of the petition at bench,
the public interest involved in the case militates against the dismissal of the
pleading on technical grounds like forum shopping. On the other hand, to rule that
petitioner should have filed a new petition to challenge the 4 March 2010 Order of
the COMELEC En Banc is to disregard the liberality traditionally accorded
amended and supplemental pleadings and the very purpose for which
supplemental pleadings are allowed under Section 6, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure.3 More importantly, such a course of action would clearly be
violative of the injunction against multiplicity of suits enunciated in a long catena of
decisions handed down by this Court.
The Main Matter
Acting on petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the 1 December 2009
Resolution issued by the COMELEC Second Division, the COMELEC En Banc, as
stated, initially issued the Resolution dated 8 February 2010, denying the motion
for lack of merit and declaring the same resolution immediately executory.
However, even before petitioner’s filing of his Urgent Motion to Recall the
Resolution Promulgated on 8 February 2010 and the instant Petition for Certiorari
with an Urgent Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or a
Status Quo Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction, the record shows that the
COMELEC En Banc issued the 10 February 2010 Resolution, ordering the re-
hearing of the case on the ground that "there was no majority vote of the members
obtained in the Resolution of the Commission En Banc promulgated on February
8, 2010." Having conceded one of the grounds subsequently raised in petitioner’s
Urgent Motion to Recall the Resolution Promulgated on February 8, 2010, the
COMELEC En Banc significantly failed to obtain the votes required under Section
5(a), Rule 3 of its own Rules of Procedure4 for a second time.
The failure of the COMELEC En Banc to muster the required majority vote even
after the 15 February 2010 re-hearing should have caused the dismissal of
respondent’s Election Protest. Promulgated on 15 February 1993 pursuant to
Section 6, Article IX-A and Section 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution, the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure is clear on this matter. Without any trace of
ambiguity, Section 6, Rule 18 of said Rule categorically provides as follows:
Sec. 6. Procedure if Opinion is Equally Divided. – When the Commission en banc
is equally divided in opinion, or the necessary majority cannot be had, the case
shall be reheard, and if on rehearing no decision is reached, the action or
proceeding shall be dismissed if originally commenced in the Commission; in
appealed cases, the judgment or order appealed from shall stand affirmed; and in
all incidental matters, the petition or motion shall be denied.
The propriety of applying the foregoing provision according to its literal tenor
cannot be gainsaid. As one pertaining to the election of the provincial governor of
Bulacan, respondent’s Election Protest was originally commenced in the
COMELEC, pursuant to its exclusive original jurisdiction over the case. Although
initially raffled to the COMELEC Second Division, the elevation of said election
protest on motion for reconsideration before the Commission En Banc cannot, by
any stretch of the imagination, be considered an appeal. Tersely put, there is no
appeal within the COMELEC itself. As aptly observed in the lone dissent penned
by COMELEC Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento, respondent’s Election Protest
was filed with the Commission "at the first instance" and should be, accordingly,
considered an action or proceeding "originally commenced in the Commission."
The dissent reads Section 6 of COMELEC Rule 18 to mean exactly the opposite of
what it expressly states. Thus was made the conclusion to the effect that since no
decision was reached by the COMELEC En Banc, then the decision of the Second
Division should stand, which is squarely in the face of the Rule that when the
Commission En Banc is equally divided in opinion, or the necessary majority
cannot be had, the case shall be re-heard, and if on re-hearing, no decision is
reached, the action or proceeding shall be dismissed if originally commenced in
the Commission. The reliance is on Section 3, Article IX(C) of the Constitution
which provides:
Section 3. The Commission on Elections may sit En Banc or in two divisions, and
shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election
cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be
heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of
decisions shall be decided by the Commission En Banc.
The dissent reasons that it would be absurd that for a lack of the necessary
majority in the motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc, the
original protest action should be dismissed as this would render nugatory the
constitutional mandate to authorize and empower a division of the COMELEC to
decide election cases.
We cannot, in this case, get out of the square cover of Section 6, Rule 18 of the
COMELEC Rules. The provision is not violative of the Constitution.
The Rule, in fact, was promulgated obviously pursuant to the Constitutional
mandate in the first sentence of Section 3 of Article IX(C). Clearly too, the Rule
was issued "in order to expedite disposition of election cases" such that even the
absence of a majority in a Commission En Banc opinion on a case under
reconsideration does not result in a non-decision. Either the judgment or order
appealed from "shall stand affirmed" or the action originally commenced in the
Commission "shall be dismissed."
It is easily evident in the second sentence of Section 3 of Article IX(C) that all
election cases before the COMELEC are passed upon in one integrated procedure
that consists of a hearing and a decision "in division" and when necessitated by a
motion for reconsideration, a decision "by the Commission En Banc."
What is included in the phrase "all such election cases" may be seen in Section
2(2) of Article IX(C) of the Constitution which states:
Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and
functions:
xxxx
(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections,
returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and
appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal of officials
decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay
officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.
Section 2(2) read in relation to Section 3 shows that however the jurisdiction of the
COMELEC is involved, either in the exercise of "exclusive original jurisdiction" or
an "appellate jurisdiction," the COMELEC will act on the case in one whole and
single process: to repeat, in division, and if impelled by a motion for
reconsideration, en banc.
There is a difference in the result of the exercise of jurisdiction by the COMELEC
over election contests. The difference inheres in the kind of jurisdiction invoked,
which in turn, is determined by the case brought before the COMELEC. When a
decision of a trial court is brought before the COMELEC for it to exercise appellate
jurisdiction, the division decides the appeal but, if there is a motion for
reconsideration, the appeal proceeds to the banc where a majority is needed for a
decision. If the process ends without the required majority at the banc, the
appealed decision stands affirmed. Upon the other hand, and this is what
happened in the instant case, if what is brought before the COMELEC is an
original protest invoking the original jurisdiction of the Commission, the protest, as
one whole process, is first decided by the division, which process is continued in
the banc if there is a motion for reconsideration of the division ruling. If no majority
decision is reached in the banc, the protest, which is an original action, shall be
dismissed. There is no first instance decision that can be deemed affirmed.
It is easy to understand the reason for the difference in the result of the two
protests, one as original action and the other as an appeal, if and when the protest
process reaches the COMELEC En Banc. In a protest originally brought before the
COMELEC, no completed process comes to the banc. It is the banc which will
complete the process. If, at that completion, no conclusive result in the form of a
majority vote is reached, the COMELEC has no other choice except to dismiss the
protest. In a protest placed before the Commission as an appeal, there has been a
completed proceeding that has resulted in a decision. So that when the
COMELEC, as an appellate body, and after the appellate process is completed,
reaches an inconclusive result, the appeal is in effect dismissed and resultingly,
the decision appealed from is affirmed.1avvphi1
To repeat, Rule 18, Section 6 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure follows, is in
conformity with, and is in implementation of Section 3 of Article IX(C) of the
Constitution.
G.R. No. 154512             November 12, 2002
VICTORINO DENNIS M. SOCRATES, Mayor of Puerto Princesa City, petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE PREPARATORY RECALL
ASSEMBLY (PRA) of Puerto Princesa City, PRA Interim Chairman Punong
Bgy. MARK DAVID HAGEDORN, PRA Interim Secretary Punong Bgy.
BENJAMIN JARILLA, PRA Chairman and Presiding Officer Punong Bgy.
EARL S. BUENVIAJE and PRA Secretary Punong Bgy. CARLOS ABALLA,
JR. respondents.
-----------------------------

Indeed, the grave abuse of discretion of the COMELEC is patent in the fact that G.R. No. 154683             November 12, 2002
despite the existence in its books of the clearly worded Section 6 of Rule 18, which
incidentally has been acknowledged by this Court in the recent case of Marcoleta VICENTE S. SANDOVAL, JR., petitioner,
v. COMELEC,5 it completely ignored and disregarded its very own decree and vs.
proceeded with the questioned Resolution of 8 February 2010 and Order of 4 THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
March 2010, in all, annulling the proclamation of petitioner Joselito R. Mendoza as
the duly elected governor of Bulacan, declaring respondent Roberto M.
Pagdanganan as the duly elected governor, and ordering petitioner Joselito R. -----------------------------
Mendoza to cease and desist from performing the functions of the Governor of
Bulacan and to vacate said office in favor of respondent Roberto M. G.R. Nos. 155083-84             November 12, 2002
Pagdanganan.1avvphi1
MA. FLORES P. ADOVO, MERCY E. GILO and BIENVENIDO OLLAVE,
The grave abuse of discretion of the COMELEC is underscored by the fact that the SR., petitioners,
protest that petitioner Pagdanganan filed on 1 June 2007 overstayed with the vs.
COMELEC until the present election year when the end of the term of the THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and EDWARD S.
contested office is at hand and there was hardly enough time for the re-hearing HAGEDORN, respondents.
that was conducted only on 15 February 2010. As the hearing time at the division
had run out, and the re-hearing time at the banc was fast running out, the DECISION
unwanted result came about: incomplete appreciation of ballots; invalidation of
ballots on general and unspecific grounds; unrebutted presumption of validity of CARPIO, J.:
ballots.
The Case
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The questioned Resolution of the
COMELEC promulgated on 8 February 2010 in EPC No. 2007-44 entitled "Roberto
Before us are consolidated petitions for certiorari1 seeking the reversal of the
M. Pagdanganan v. Joselito R. Mendoza," the Order issued on 4 March 2010, and
resolutions issued by the Commission on Elections ("COMELEC" for brevity) in
the consequent Writ of Execution dated 5 March 2010 are NULLIFIED and SET
relation to the recall election for mayor of Puerto Princesa City, Palawan.
ASIDE. The election protest of respondent Roberto M. Pagdanganan is hereby
DISMISSED.
The Antecedents
SO ORDERED.
On July 2, 2002, 312 out of 528 members of the then incumbent barangay officials
of the Puerto Princesa convened themselves into a Preparatory Recall Assembly
("PRA" for brevity) at the Gymnasium of Barangay San Jose from 9:00 a.m. to
12:00 noon. The PRA was convened to initiate the recall2 of Victorino Dennis M.
Socrates ("Socrates" for brevity) who assumed office as Puerto Princesa's mayor
on June 30, 2001. The members of the PRA designated Mark David M. Hagedorn,
president of the Association of Barangay Captains, as interim chair of the PRA.
On the same date, the PRA passed Resolution No. 01-02 ("Recall Resolution" for
brevity) which declared its loss of confidence in Socrates and called for his recall.
The PRA requested the COMELEC to schedule the recall election for mayor within
30 days from receipt of the Recall Resolution.
On July 16, 2002, Socrates filed with the COMELEC a petition, docketed as E.M.
No. 02-010 (RC), to nullify and deny due course to the Recall Resolution.
On August 14, 2002, the COMELEC en banc3 promulgated a resolution dismissing
for lack of merit Socrates' petition. The COMELEC gave due course to the Recall
Resolution and scheduled the recall election on September 7, 2002.
On August 21, 2002, the COMELEC en banc promulgated Resolution No. 5673
prescribing the calendar of activities and periods of certain prohibited acts in
connection with the recall election. The COMELEC fixed the campaign period from
August 27, 2002 to September 5, 2002 or a period of 10 days.
On August 23, 2002, Edward M. Hagedorn ("Hagedorn" for brevity) filed his
certificate of candidacy for mayor in the recall election.
On August 17, 2002, Ma. Flores F. Adovo ("Adovo" for brevity) and Merly E. Gilo
("Gilo" for brevity) filed a petition before the COMELEC, docketed as SPA No. 02-
492, to disqualify Hagedorn from running in the recall election and to cancel his
certificate of candidacy. On August 30, 2002, a certain Bienvenido Ollave, Sr.
("Ollave" for brevity) filed a petition-in-intervention in SPA No. 02-492 also seeking
to disqualify Hagedorn. On the same date, a certain Genaro V. Manaay filed
another petition, docketed as SPA No. 02-539, against Hagedorn alleging
substantially the same facts and involving the same issues. The petitions were all
anchored on the ground that "Hagedorn is disqualified from running for a fourth
consecutive term, having been elected and having served as mayor of the city for
three (3) consecutive full terms immediately prior to the instant recall election for
the same post." Subsequently, SPA Nos. 02-492 and 02-539 were consolidated.
In a resolution promulgated on September 20, 2002, the COMELEC's First
Division4 dismissed for lack of merit SPA Nos. 02-492 and 02-539. The COMELEC
declared Hagedorn qualified to run in the recall election. The COMELEC also reset
the recall election from September 7, 2002 to September 24, 2002.
On September 23, 2002, the COMELEC en banc promulgated a resolution
denying the motion for reconsideration of Adovo and Gilo. The COMELEC affirmed
the resolution declaring Hagedorn qualified to run in the recall election.
Hence, the instant consolidated petitions.
G.R. No. 154512
Petitioner Socrates seeks to nullify the COMELEC en banc resolution dated
August 14, 2002 in E.M. No. 02-010 (RC) which gave due course to the Recall
Resolution and scheduled the recall election on September 7, 2002.
Socrates alleges that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in upholding the
Recall Resolution. Socrates cites the following circumstances as legal infirmities
attending the convening of the PRA and its issuance of the Recall Resolution: (1)
not all members of the PRA were notified of the meeting to adopt the resolution;
(2) the proof of service of notice was palpably and legally deficient; (3) the
members of the PRA were themselves seeking a new electoral mandate from their
respective constituents; (4) the adoption of the resolution was exercised with grave
abuse of authority; and (5) the PRA proceedings were conducted in a manner that
violated his and the public's constitutional right to information.
G.R. No. 154683
Petitioner Vicente S. Sandoval, Jr. seeks to annul COMELEC Resolution No. 5673
dated August 21, 2002 insofar as it fixed the recall election on September 7, 2002,
giving the candidates only a ten-day campaign period. He prayed that the
COMELEC be enjoined from holding the recall election on September 7, 2002 and
that a new date be fixed giving the candidates at least an additional 15 days to
campaign.
In a resolution dated September 3, 2002, the Court en banc enjoined the
COMELEC from implementing Resolution No. 5673 insofar as it fixed the date of
the recall election on September 7, 2002. The Court directed the COMELEC to
give the candidates an additional fifteen 15 days from September 7, 2002 within
which to campaign.
Accordingly, on September 9, 2002, the COMELEC en banc issued Resolution No.
5708 giving the candidates an additional 15 days from September 7, 2002 within
which to campaign. Thus, the COMELEC reset the recall election to September
24, 2002.
G.R. Nos. 155083-84
Petitioners Adovo, Gilo and Ollave assail the COMELEC's resolutions dated
September 20, 2002 and September 23, 2002 in SPA Nos. 02-492 and 02-539
declaring Hagedorn qualified to run for mayor in the recall election. They likewise
prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to enjoin the proclamation
of the winning candidate in the recall election.
Petitioners argue that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in upholding
Hagedorn's qualification to run for mayor in the recall election despite the
constitutional and statutory prohibitions against a fourth consecutive term for
elective local officials.
In a resolution dated September 24, 2002, the Court ordered the COMELEC to
desist from proclaiming any winning candidate in the recall election until further
orders from the Court. Petitioners were required to post a P20,000 bond.
On September 27, 2002, Socrates filed a motion for leave to file an attached
petition for intervention seeking the same reliefs as those sought by Adovo, Gilo
and Ollave.
In the meantime, Hagedorn garnered the highest number of votes in the recall
election with 20,238 votes. Rival candidates Socrates and Sandoval obtained
17,220 votes and 13,241 votes, respectively.
Hagedorn filed motions to lift the order restraining the COMELEC from proclaiming
the winning candidate and to allow him to assume office to give effect to the will of
the electorate.
On October 1, 2002, the Court granted Socrates' motion for leave to file a petition
for intervention.
The Issues
The issues for resolution of the Court are:
1. In G.R. No. 154512, whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion in giving due course to the Recall Resolution and scheduling the recall
election for mayor of Puerto Princesa.
2. In G.R. Nos.155083-84, whether Hagedorn is qualified to run for mayor in the
recall election of Puerto Princesa on September 24, 2002.
In G.R. No. 154683, the issue of whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse
of discretion in fixing a campaign period of only 10 days has become moot. Our
Resolution of September 3, 2002 and COMELEC Resolution No. 5708 granted an
additional 15 days for the campaign period as prayed for by petitioner.
First Issue: Validity of the Recall Resolution.
Petitioner Socrates argues that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion in upholding the Recall Resolution despite the absence of notice to 130
PRA members and the defective service of notice to other PRA members. The
COMELEC, however, found that –
"On various dates, in the month of June 2002, the proponents for the Recall of
incumbent City Mayor Victorino Dennis M. Socrates sent notices of the convening
of the PRA to the members thereof pursuant to Section 70 of the Local
Government Code. Copies of the said notice are in Volumes I and II entitled
Notices to PRA. Likewise, Proof of Service for each of the said notices were
attached to the Petition and marked as Annex "G" of Volumes II and III of the
Petition.
Notices were likewise posted in conspicuous places particularly at the Barangay
Hall. Photos establishing the same were attached to the Petition and marked as
Annex "H". The proponents likewise utilized the broadcast mass media in the
dissemination of the convening of the PRA.
Notices of the convening of the Puerto Princesa PRA were also sent to the
following: [a list of 25 names of provincial elective officials, print and broadcast
media practitioners, PNP officials, COMELEC city, regional and national officials,
and DILG officials].
xxx
The City Election Officer of Puerto Princesa City in her Certification dated 10 July
2002 certified that upon a 'thorough and careful verification of the signatures
appearing in PRA Resolution 01-02, x x x the majority of all members of the PRA
concerned approved said resolution.' She likewise certified 'that not a single
member/signatory of the PRA complained or objected as to the veracity and
authenticity of their signatures.'
The Provincial Election Supervisor of Palawan, Atty. Urbano Arlando, in his
Indorsement dated 10 July 2002, stated, 'upon proper review, all documents
submitted are found in order.'
The Acting Director IV, Region IV, in his study dated 30 July 2002 submitted the
following recommendations:
'This Office, after evaluating the documents filed, finds the instant Petition sufficient
in form and substance. That the PRA was validly constituted and that the majority
of all members thereof approved Resolution No. 01-02 calling for the recall of
Mayor Victorino Dennis M. Socrates.'
x x x ."
This Court is bound by the findings of fact of the COMELEC on matters within the
competence and expertise of the COMELEC, unless the findings are patently
erroneous. In Malonzo v. COMELEC,5 which also dealt with alleged defective
service of notice to PRA members, we ruled that –
"Needless to state, the issue of propriety of the notices sent to the PRA members
is factual in nature, and the determination of the same is therefore a function of the
COMELEC. In the absence of patent error, or serious inconsistencies in the
findings, the Court should not disturb the same. The factual findings of the
COMELEC, based on its own assessments and duly supported by gathered
evidence, are conclusive upon the court, more so, in the absence of a
substantiated attack on the validity of the same."
In the instant case, we do not find any valid reason to hold that the COMELEC's
findings of fact are patently erroneous.
Socrates also claims that the PRA members had no authority to adopt the Recall
Resolution on July 2, 2002 because a majority of PRA members were seeking a
new electoral mandate in the barangay elections scheduled on July 15, 2002. This
argument deserves scant consideration considering that when the PRA members
adopted the Recall Resolution their terms of office had not yet expired. They were
all de jure sangguniang barangay members with no legal disqualification to
participate in the recall assembly under Section 70 of the Local Government Code.
Socrates bewails that the manner private respondents conducted the PRA
proceedings violated his constitutional right to information on matters of public
concern. Socrates, however, admits receiving notice of the PRA meeting and of
even sending his representative and counsel who were present during the entire
PRA proceedings. Proponents of the recall election submitted to the COMELEC
the Recall Resolution, minutes of the PRA proceedings, the journal of the PRA
assembly, attendance sheets, notices sent to PRA members, and authenticated
master list of barangay officials in Puerto Princesa. Socrates had the right to
examine and copy all these public records in the official custody of the COMELEC.
Socrates, however, does not claim that the COMELEC denied him this right. There
is no legal basis in Socrates' claim that respondents violated his constitutional right
to information on matters of public concern.
Thus, we rule that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
upholding the validity of the Recall Resolution and in scheduling the recall election
on September 24, 2002.
Second Issue: Hagedorn's qualification to run for mayor
in the recall election of September 24, 2002.
The three-term limit rule for elective local officials is found in Section 8, Article X of
the Constitution, which states:
"Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials,
which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall
serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office
for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of
his service for the full term for which he was elected."
This three-term limit rule is reiterated in Section 43 (b) of RA No. 7160, otherwise
known as the Local Government Code, which provides:
"Section 43. Term of Office. – (a) x x x
(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in
the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall
not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for
which the elective official was elected."
These constitutional and statutory provisions have two parts. The first part
provides that an elective local official cannot serve for more than three consecutive
terms. The clear intent is that only consecutive terms count in determining the
three-term limit rule. The second part states that voluntary renunciation of office for
any length of time does not interrupt the continuity of service. The clear intent is
that involuntary severance from office for any length of time interrupts continuity of
service and prevents the service before and after the interruption from being joined
together to form a continuous service or consecutive terms.
After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate
reelection for a fourth term. The prohibited election refers to the next regular
election for the same office following the end of the third consecutive term. Any
subsequent election, like a recall election, is no longer covered by the prohibition
for two reasons. First, a subsequent election like a recall election is no longer an
immediate reelection after three consecutive terms. Second, the intervening period
constitutes an involuntary interruption in the continuity of service.
When the framers of the Constitution debated on the term limit of elective local
officials, the question asked was whether there would be no further election after
three terms, or whether there would be "no immediate reelection" after three terms.
This is clear from the following deliberations of the Constitutional Commission:
"THE PRESIDENT: The Acting Floor Leader is recognized.
MR. ROMULO:6 We are now ready to discuss the two issues, as indicated on the
blackboard, and these are Alternative No. I where there is no further election after
a total of three terms and Alternative No. 2 where there is no immediate reelection
after three successive terms."7
The Journal of the Constitutional Commission reports the following manifestation
on the term of elective local officials:
"MANIFESTATION OF MR. ROMULO
Upon resumption of session, Mr. Romulo manifested that the Body would proceed
to the consideration of two issues on the term of Representatives and local
officials, namely: 1) Alternative No. 1 (no further reelection after a total of three
terms), and 2) Alternative No. 2 (no immediate reelection after three successive
terms)."8
The framers of the Constitution used the same "no immediate reelection" question
in voting for the term limits of Senators9 and Representatives of the House.10
Clearly, what the Constitution prohibits is an immediate reelection for a fourth term
following three consecutive terms. The Constitution, however, does not prohibit a
subsequent reelection for a fourth term as long as the reelection is not immediately
after the end of the third consecutive term. A recall election mid-way in the term
following the third consecutive term is a subsequent election but not an immediate
reelection after the third term.
Neither does the Constitution prohibit one barred from seeking immediate
reelection to run in any other subsequent election involving the same term of
office. What the Constitution prohibits is a consecutive fourth term. The debates in
the Constitutional Commission evidently show that the prohibited election referred
to by the framers of the Constitution is the immediate reelection after the third term,
not any other subsequent election.
If the prohibition on elective local officials is applied to any election within the
three-year full term following the three-term limit, then Senators should also be
prohibited from running in any election within the six-year full term following their
two-term limit. The constitutional provision on the term limit of Senators is worded
exactly like the term limit of elective local officials, thus:
"No Senator shall serve for more than two consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was
elected."11
In the debates on the term limit of Senators, the following exchange in the
Constitutional Convention is instructive:
"GASCON:12 I would like to ask a question with regard to the issue after the
second term. We will allow the Senator to rest for a period of time before he can
run again?
DAVIDE:13 That is correct.
GASCON: And the question that we left behind before - if the Gentleman will
remember - was: How long will that period of rest be? Will it be one election which
is three years or one term which is six years?
DAVIDE: If the Gentleman will remember, Commissioner Rodrigo expressed the
view that during the election following the expiration of the first 12 years, whether
such election will be on the third or on the sixth year thereafter, this particular
member of the Senate can run. So, it is not really a period of hibernation for six
years. That was the Committee's stand.
GASCON: So, effectively, the period of rest would be three years at the
least."14 (Emphasis supplied)
The framers of the Constitution thus clarified that a Senator can run after only
three years15 following his completion of two terms. The framers expressly
acknowledged that the prohibited election refers only to the immediate reelection,
and not to any subsequent election, during the six-year period following the two
term limit. The framers of the Constitution did not intend "the period of rest" of an
elective official who has reached his term limit to be the full extent of the
succeeding term.
In the case of Hagedorn, his candidacy in the recall election on September 24,
2002 is not an immediate reelection after his third consecutive term which ended
on June 30, 2001. The immediate reelection that the Constitution barred Hagedorn
from seeking referred to the regular elections in 2001. Hagedorn did not seek
reelection in the 2001 elections.
Hagedorn was elected for three consecutive terms in the 1992, 1995 and 1998
elections and served in full his three consecutive terms as mayor of Puerto
Princesa. Under the Constitution and the Local Government Code, Hagedorn
could no longer run for mayor in the 2001 elections. The Constitution and the Local
Government Code disqualified Hagedorn, who had reached the maximum three-
term limit, from running for a fourth consecutive term as mayor. Thus, Hagedorn
did not run for mayor in the 2001 elections.16 Socrates ran and won as mayor of
Puerto Princesa in the 2001 elections. After Hagedorn ceased to be mayor on
June 30, 2001, he became a private citizen until the recall election of September
24, 2002 when he won by 3,018 votes over his closest opponent, Socrates.
From June 30, 2001 until the recall election on September 24, 2002, the mayor of
Puerto Princesa was Socrates. During the same period, Hagedorn was simply a
private citizen. This period is clearly an interruption in the continuity of Hagedorn's
service as mayor, not because of his voluntary renunciation, but because of a legal
prohibition. Hagedorn's three consecutive terms ended on June 30, 2001.
Hagedorn's new recall term from September 24, 2002 to June 30, 2004 is not a
seamless continuation of his previous three consecutive terms as mayor. One
cannot stitch together Hagedorn's previous three-terms with his new recall term to
make the recall term a fourth consecutive term because factually it is not. An
involuntary interruption occurred from June 30, 2001 to September 24, 2002 which
broke the continuity or consecutive character of Hagedorn's service as mayor.
In Lonzanida v. Comelec,17 the Court had occasion to explain interruption of
continuity of service in this manner:
"x x x The second sentence of the constitutional provision under scrutiny states,
"Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be considered as
an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which he was
elected." The clear intent of the framers of the constitution to bar any attempt to
circumvent the three-term limit by a voluntary renunciation of office and at the
same time respect the people's choice and grant their elected official full service of
a term is evident in this provision. Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel
the renounced term in the computation of the three-term limit; conversely,
involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term
provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service. x x x."
(Emphasis supplied)
In Hagedorn's case, the nearly 15-month period he was out of office, although
short of a full term of three years, constituted an interruption in the continuity of his
service as mayor. The Constitution does not require the interruption or hiatus to be
a full term of three years. The clear intent is that interruption "for any length of
time," as long as the cause is involuntary, is sufficient to break an elective local
official's continuity of service.
In the recent case of Adormeo v. Comelec and Talaga,18 a unanimous Court
reiterated the rule that an interruption consisting of a portion of a term of office
breaks the continuity of service of an elective local official. In Adormeo, Ramon Y.
Talaga, Jr. had served two consecutive full terms as mayor of Lucena City. In his
third bid for election as mayor in 1998, Talaga lost to Bernard G. Tagarao.
However, in the recall election of May 12, 2000, Talaga won and served the
unexpired term of Tagarao from May 12, 2000 to June 30, 2001. When Talaga ran
again for mayor in the 2001 elections, Raymundo Adormeo, the other candidate for
mayor, petitioned for Talaga's disqualification on the ground that Talaga had
already served three consecutive terms as mayor.
Thus, the issue in Adormeo was whether Talaga's recall term was a continuation of
his previous two terms so that he was deemed to have already served three
consecutive terms as mayor. The Court ruled that Talaga was qualified to run in
the 2001 elections, stating that the period from June 30, 1998 to May 12, 2000
when Talaga was out of office interrupted the continuity of his service as mayor.
Talaga's recall term as mayor was not consecutive to his previous two terms
because of this interruption, there having been a break of almost two years during
which time Tagarao was the mayor.
We held in Adormeo that the period an elective local official is out of office
interrupts the continuity of his service and prevents his recall term from being
stitched together as a seamless continuation of his previous two consecutive
terms. In the instant case, we likewise hold that the nearly 15 months Hagedorn
was out of office interrupted his continuity of service and prevents his recall term
from being stitched together as a seamless continuation of his previous three
consecutive terms. The only difference between Adormeo and the instant case is
the time of the interruption. In Adormeo, the interruption occurred after the first two
consecutive terms. In the instant case, the interruption happened after the first
three consecutive terms. In both cases, the respondents were seeking election for
a fourth term.
In Adormeo, the recall term of Talaga began only from the date he assumed office
after winning the recall election. Talaga's recall term did not retroact to include the
tenure in office of his predecessor. If Talaga's recall term was made to so retroact,
then he would have been disqualified to run in the 2001 elections because he
would already have served three consecutive terms prior to the 2001 elections.
One who wins and serves a recall term does not serve the full term of his
predecessor but only the unexpired term. The period of time prior to the recall
term, when another elective official holds office, constitutes an interruption in
continuity of service. Clearly, Adormeo established the rule that the winner in the
recall election cannot be charged or credited with the full term of three years for
purposes of counting the consecutiveness of an elective official's terms in office.
In the same manner, Hagedorn's recall term does not retroact to include the tenure
in office of Socrates. Hagedorn can only be disqualified to run in the September
24, 2002 recall election if the recall term is made to retroact to June 30, 2001, for
only then can the recall term constitute a fourth consecutive term. But to consider
Hagedorn's recall term as a full term of three years, retroacting to June 30, 2001,
despite the fact that he won his recall term only last September 24, 2002, is to
ignore reality. This Court cannot declare as consecutive or successive terms of
office which historically and factually are not.
Worse, to make Hagedorn's recall term retroact to June 30, 2001 creates a legal
fiction that unduly curtails the freedom of the people to choose their leaders
through popular elections. The concept of term limits is in derogation of the
sovereign will of the people to elect the leaders of their own choosing. Term limits
must be construed strictly to give the fullest possible effect to the sovereign will of
the people. As this Court aptly stated in Borja, Jr. v. Comelec:
"Thus, a consideration of the historical background of Art. X, §8 of the Constitution
reveals that the members of the Constitutional Commission were as much
concerned with preserving the freedom of choice of the people as they were with
preventing the monopolization of political power. Indeed, they rejected a proposal
put forth by Commissioner Edmundo F. Garcia that after serving three consecutive
terms or nine years there should be no further reelection for local and legislative
officials. Instead, they adopted the alternative proposal of Commissioner Christian
Monsod that such officials be simply barred from running for the same position in
the succeeding election following the expiration of the third consecutive term.
Monsod warned against 'prescreening candidates [from] whom the people will
choose' as a result of the proposed absolute disqualification, considering that the
draft constitution contained provisions 'recognizing people's power.'"19 (Emphasis
supplied)
A necessary consequence of the interruption of continuity of service is the start of
a new term following the interruption. An official elected in recall election serves
the unexpired term of the recalled official. This unexpired term is in itself one term
for purposes of counting the three-term limit. This is clear from the following
discussion in the Constitutional Commission:
"SUAREZ:20 For example, a special election is called for a Senator, and the
Senator newly elected would have to serve the unexpired portion of the term.
Would that mean that serving the unexpired portion of the term is already
considered one term? So, half a term, which is actually the correct statement, plus
one term would disqualify the Senator concerned from running? Is that the
meaning of this provision on disqualification, Madam President?
DAVIDE: Yes, because we speak of 'term,' and if there is a special election, he will
serve only for the unexpired portion of that particular term plus one more term for
the Senator and two more terms for the Members of the Lower House."21
Although the discussion referred to special elections for Senators and
Representatives of the House, the same principle applies to a recall election of
local officials. Otherwise, an elective local official who serves a recall term can
serve for more than nine consecutive years comprising of the recall term plus the
regular three full terms. A local official who serves a recall term should know that
the recall term is in itself one term although less than three years. This is the
inherent limitation he takes by running and winning in the recall election.
In summary, we hold that Hagedorn is qualified to run in the September 24, 2002
recall election for mayor of Puerto Princesa because:
1. Hagedorn is not running for immediate reelection following his three consecutive
terms as mayor which ended on June 30, 2001;
2. Hagedorn's continuity of service as mayor was involuntarily interrupted from
June 30, 2001 to September 24, 2002 during which time he was a private citizen;
3. Hagedorn's recall term from September 24, 2002 to June 30, 2004 cannot be
made to retroact to June 30, 2001 to make a fourth consecutive term because
factually the recall term is not a fourth consecutive term; and
4. Term limits should be construed strictly to give the fullest possible effect to the
right of the electorate to choose their leaders.
WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 154512, 154683 and 155083-84 are
DISMISSED. The temporary restraining order issued by this Court on September
24, 2002 enjoining the proclamation of the winning candidate for mayor of Puerto
Princesa in the recall election of September 24, 2002 is lifted. No costs.
SO ORDERED. 4. Ordering respondent Barbara Ruby Talaga to cease and desist from discharging
the functions of the Office of the Mayor;
G.R. No. 196804               October 9, 2012
5. In view of the permanent vacancy in the Office of the Mayor of Lucena City, the
MAYOR BARBARA RUBY C. TALAGA, Petitioner, proclaimed Vice-Mayor is ORDERED to succeed as Mayor as provided under
vs. Section 44 of the Local Government Code;
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and RODERICK A. ALCALA, Respondents.
6. DIRECTING the Clerk of Court of the Commission to furnish copies of this
x-----------------------x Resolution to the Office of the President of the Philippines, the Department of
Interior and Local Government, the Department of Finance and the Secretary of
the Sangguniang Panglunsod of Lucena City.
G.R. No. 197015

Let the Department of Interior and Local Government and the Regional Election
PHILIP M. CASTILLO, Petitioner,
Director of Region IV of COMELEC implement this resolution.
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, BARBARA RUBY TALAGA and RODERICK A.
ALCALA, Respondents. SO ORDERED.1

DECISION Antecedents

BERSAMIN, J.:
In focus in these consolidated special civil actions are the disqualification of a
substitute who was proclaimed the winner of a mayoralty election; and the
ascertainment of who should assume the office following the substitute’s
disqualification.
The consolidated petitions for certiorari seek to annul and set aside the En Banc
Resolution issued on May 20, 2011 in SPC No. 10-024 by the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC), the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. REVERSING and SETTING ASIDE the January 11, 2011 Resolution of the
Second Division;
2. GRANTING the petition in intervention of Roderick A. Alcala;
3. ANNULLING the election and proclamation of respondent Barbara C. Talaga as
mayor of Lucena City and CANCELLING the Certificate of Canvass and
Proclamation issued therefor;
On November 26, 2009 and December 1, 2009, Ramon Talaga (Ramon) and
Philip M. Castillo (Castillo) respectively filed their certificates of candidacy (CoCs)
for the position of Mayor of Lucena City to be contested in the scheduled May 10,
2010 national and local elections.2
Ramon, the official candidate of the Lakas-Kampi-CMD,3 declared in his CoC that
he was eligible for the office he was seeking to be elected to.
Four days later, or on December 5, 2009, Castillo filed with the COMELEC a
petition denominated as In the Matter of the Petition to Deny Due Course to or
Cancel Certificate of Candidacy of Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr. as Mayor for Having
Already Served Three (3) Consecutive Terms as a City Mayor of Lucena, which
was docketed as SPA 09-029 (DC).4 He alleged
therein that Ramon, despite knowing that he had been elected and had served
three consecutive terms as Mayor of Lucena City, still filed his CoC for Mayor of
Lucena City in the May 10, 2010 national and local elections.
The pertinent portions of Castillo’s petition follow:
1. Petitioner is of legal age, Filipino, married, and a resident of Barangay Mayao
Crossing, Lucena City but may be served with summons and other processes of
this Commission at the address of his counsel at 624 Aurora Blvd., Lucena City
4301;
2. Respondent Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr. is likewise of legal age, married, and a
resident of Barangay Ibabang Iyam, Lucena City and with postal address at the
Office of the City Mayor, City Hall, Lucena City, where he may be served with
summons and other processes of this Commission;
3. Petitioner, the incumbent city vice-mayor of Lucena having been elected during
the 2007 local elections, is running for city mayor of Lucena under the Liberal party
this coming 10 May 2010 local elections and has filed his certificate of candidacy
for city mayor of Lucena;
4. Respondent was successively elected mayor of Lucena City in 2001, 2004, and
2007 local elections based on the records of the Commission on Elections of
Lucena City and had fully served the aforesaid three (3) terms without any
voluntary and involuntary interruption;
5. Except the preventive suspension imposed upon him from 13 October 2005 to
14 November 2005 and from 4 September 2009 to 30 October 2009 pursuant to
Sandiganbayan 4th Division Resolution in Criminal Case No. 27738 dated 3
October 2005, the public service as city mayor of the respondent is continuous and
uninterrupted under the existing laws and jurisprudence;
6. There is no law nor jurisprudence to justify the filing of the certificate of
candidacy of the respondent, hence, such act is outrightly unconstitutional, illegal,
and highly immoral;
7. Respondent, knowing well that he was elected for and had fully served three (3)
consecutive terms as a city mayor of Lucena, he still filed his Certificate of
Candidacy for City Mayor of Lucena for this coming 10 May 2010 national and
local elections;
8. Under the Constitution and existing Election Laws, New Local Government
Code of the Philippines, and jurisprudence the respondent is no longer entitled and
is already disqualified to be a city mayor for the fourth consecutive term;
9. The filing of the respondent for the position of city mayor is highly improper,
unlawful and is potentially injurious and prejudicial to taxpayers of the City of
Lucena; and
10. It is most respectfully prayed by the petitioner that the respondent be declared
disqualified and no longer entitled to run in public office as city mayor of Lucena
City based on the existing law and jurisprudence.5
The petition prayed for the following reliefs, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that the Certificate of
Candidacy filed by the respondent be denied due course to or cancel the same
and that he be declared as a disqualified candidate under the existing Election
Laws and by the provisions of the New Local Government Code.6 (Emphasis
supplied.)
Ramon countered that that the Sandiganbayan had preventively suspended him
from office during his second and third terms; and that the three-term limit rule did
not then apply to him pursuant to the prevailing jurisprudence7 to the effect that an
involuntary separation from office amounted to an interruption of continuity of
service for purposes of the application of the three-term limit rule.
In the meantime, on December 23, 2009, the Court promulgated the ruling in
Aldovino, Jr. v. Commission on Elections,8 holding that preventive suspension,
being a mere temporary incapacity, was not a valid ground for avoiding the effect
of the three-term limit rule. Thus, on December 30, 2009, Ramon filed in the
COMELEC a Manifestation with Motion to Resolve, taking into account the
intervening ruling in Aldovino. Relevant portions of his Manifestation with Motion to
Resolve are quoted herein, viz:
4. When respondent filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Mayor of
Lucena City, the rule that ‘where the separation from office is caused by reasons
beyond the control of the officer – i.e. involuntary – the service of term is deemed
interrupted’ has not yet been overturned by the new ruling of the Supreme Court.
As a matter of fact, the prevailing rule then of the Honorable Commission in [sic]
respect of the three (3)-term limitation was its decision in the case of Aldovino, et
al. vs. Asilo where it stated:
"Thus, even if respondent was elected during the 2004 elections, which was
supposedly his third and final term as city councilor, the same cannot be treated as
a complete service or full term in office since the same was interrupted when he
was suspended by the Sandiganbayan Fourth Division. And the respondent
actually heeded the suspension order since he did not receive his salary during the
period October 16-31 and November 1-15 by reason of his actual suspension from
office. And this was further bolstered by the fact that the DILG issued a
Memorandum directing him, among others, to reassume his position." (Emphasis
supplied.)
5. Clearly, there was no misrepresentation on the part of respondent as would
constitute a ground for the denial of due course to and/or the cancellation of
respondent’s certificate of candidacy at the time he filed the same. Petitioner’s
ground for the denial of due course to and/or the cancellation of respondent’s
certificate of candidacy thus has no basis, in fact and in law, as there is no ground
to warrant such relief under the Omnibus Election Code and/or its implementing
laws.
6. Pursuant, however, to the new ruling of the Supreme Court in respect of the
issue on the three (3)-term limitation, respondent acknowledges that he is now
DISQUALIFIED to run for the position of Mayor of Lucena City having served three
(3) (albeit interrupted) terms as Mayor of Lucena City prior to the filing of his
certificate of candidacy for the 2010 elections.
7. In view of the foregoing premises and new jurisprudence on the matter,
respondent respectfully submits the present case for decision declaring him as
DISQUALIFIED to run for the position of Mayor of Lucena City.9
Notwithstanding his express recognition of his disqualification to run as Mayor of
Lucena City in the May 10, 2010 national and local elections, Ramon did not
withdraw his CoC.
Acting on Ramon’s Manifestation with Motion to Resolve, the COMELEC First
Division issued a Resolution on April 19, 2010,10 disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED.
Accordingly, Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr. is hereby declared DISQUALIFIED to run for
Mayor of Lucena City for the 10 May 2010 National and Local Elections.
SO ORDERED.
Initially, Ramon filed his Verified Motion for Reconsideration against the April 19,
2010 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division.11 Later on, however, he filed at
9:00 a.m. of May 4, 2010 an Ex-parte Manifestation of Withdrawal of the Pending
Motion for Reconsideration.12 At 4:30 p.m. on the same date, Barbara Ruby filed
her own CoC for Mayor of Lucena City in substitution of Ramon, attaching thereto
the Certificate of Nomination and Acceptance (CONA) issued by Lakas-Kampi-
CMD, the party that had nominated Ramon.13
On May 5, 2010, the COMELEC En Banc, acting on Ramon’s Ex parte
Manifestation of Withdrawal, declared the COMELEC First Division’s Resolution
dated April 19, 2010 final and executory.14
On election day on May 10, 2010, the name of Ramon remained printed on the
ballots but the votes cast in his favor were counted in favor of Barbara Ruby as his
substitute candidate, resulting in Barbara Ruby being ultimately credited with
44,099 votes as against Castillo’s 39,615 votes.15
Castillo promptly filed a petition in the City Board of Canvassers (CBOC) seeking
the suspension of Barbara Ruby’s proclamation.16
It was only on May 13, 2010 when the COMELEC En Banc, upon the
recommendation of its Law Department,17 gave due course to Barbara Ruby’s CoC
and CONA through Resolution No. 8917, thereby including her in the certified list
of candidates.18 Consequently, the CBOC proclaimed Barbara Ruby as the newly-
elected Mayor of Lucena City.19
On May 20, 2010, Castillo filed a Petition for Annulment of Proclamation with the
COMELEC,20 docketed as SPC 10-024. He alleged that Barbara Ruby could not
substitute Ramon because his CoC had been cancelled and denied due course;
and Barbara Ruby could not be considered a candidate because the COMELEC
En Banc had approved her substitution three days after the elections; hence, the
votes cast for Ramon should be considered stray.
In her Comment on the Petition for Annulment of Proclamation,21 Barbara Ruby
maintained the validity of her substitution. She countered that the COMELEC En
Banc did not deny due course to or cancel Ramon’s COC, despite a declaration of
his disqualification, because there was no finding that he had committed
misrepresentation, the ground for the denial of due course to or cancellation of his
COC. She prayed that with her valid substitution, Section 12 of Republic Act No.
900622 applied, based on which the votes cast for Ramon were properly counted in
her favor.
On July 26, 2010, Roderick Alcala (Alcala), the duly-elected Vice Mayor of Lucena
City, sought to intervene,23 positing that he should assume the post of Mayor
because Barbara Ruby’s substitution had been invalid and Castillo had clearly lost
the elections.
On January 11, 2011, the COMELEC Second Division dismissed Castillo’s petition
and Alcala’s petition-in-intervention,24 holding:
In the present case, Castillo was notified of Resolution 8917 on May 13, 2010 as it
was the basis for the proclamation of Ruby on that date. He, however, failed to file
any action within the prescribed period either in the Commission or the Supreme
Court assailing the said resolution. Thus, the said resolution has become final and
executory. It cannot anymore be altered or reversed.
xxxx
x x x. A close perusal of the petition filed by Castillo in SPA 10-029 (Dc) shows that
it was actually for the disqualification of Ramon for having served three
consecutive terms, which is a ground for his disqualification under the Constitution
in relation to Section 4(b)3 of Resolution 8696. There was no mention therein that
Ramon has committed material representation that would be a ground for the
cancellation or denial of due course to the CoC of Ramon under Section 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code. The First Division, in fact, treated the petition as one for
disqualification as gleaned from the body of the resolution and its dispositive
portion quoted above. This treatment of the First Division of the petition as one for
disqualification only is affirmed by the fact that its members signed Resolution No.
8917 where it was clearly stated that the First Division only disqualified Ramon.
Having been disqualified only, the doctrine laid down in Miranda v. Abaya is not
applicable. Ramon was rightly substituted by Ruby. As such, the votes for Ramon
cannot be considered as stray votes but should be counted in favor of Ruby since
the substituted and the substitute carry the same surname – Talaga, as provided in
Section 12 of Republic Act No. 9006.
xxxx
Moreover, there is no provision in the Omnibus Election Code or any election laws
for that matter which requires that the substitution and the Certificate of Candidacy
of the substitute should be approved and given due course first by the Commission
or the Law Department before it can be considered as effective. All that Section 77
of the Omnibus Election Code as implemented by Section 13 of Resolution No.
8678 requires is that it should be filed with the proper office. The respondent is
correct when she argued that in fact even the BEI can receive a CoC of a
substitute candidate in case the cause for the substitution happened between the
day before the election and mid-day of election day. Thus, even if the approval of
the substitution was made after the election, the substitution became effective on
the date of the filing of the CoC with the Certificate of Nomination and Acceptance.
There being no irregularity in the substitution by Ruby of Ramon as candidate for
mayor of Lucena City, the counting of the votes of Ramon in favor of Ruby is
proper. The proclamation, thus, of Ruby as mayor elect of Lucena City is in order.
Hence, we find no cogent reason to annul the proclamation of respondent Barbara
Ruby C. Talaga as the duly elected Mayor of the City of Lucena after the elections
conducted on May 10, 2010.25
Acting on Castillo and Alcala’s respective motions for reconsideration, the
COMELEC En Banc issued the assailed Resolution dated May 20, 2011 reversing
the COMELEC Second Division’s ruling.26
Pointing out that: (a) Resolution No. 8917 did not attain finality for being issued
without a hearing as a mere incident of the COMELEC’s ministerial duty to receive
the COCs of substitute candidates; (b) Resolution No. 8917 was based on the
wrong facts; and (c) Ramon’s disqualification was resolved with finality only on
May 5, 2010, the COMELEC En Banc concluded that Barbara Ruby could not
have properly substituted Ramon but had simply become an additional candidate
who had filed her COC out of time; and held that Vice Mayor Alcala should
succeed to the position pursuant to Section 44 of the Local Government Code
(LGC).27
Issues
The core issue involves the validity of the substitution by Barbara Ruby as
candidate for the position of Mayor of Lucena City in lieu of Ramon, her husband.
Ancillary to the core issue is the determination of who among the contending
parties should assume the contested elective position.
Ruling
The petitions lack merit.
1.
Existence of a valid CoC is a condition
sine qua non for a valid substitution
The filing of a CoC within the period provided by law is a mandatory requirement
for any person to be considered a candidate in a national or local election. This is
clear from Section 73 of the Omnibus Election Code, to wit:
Section 73. Certificate of candidacy — No person shall be eligible for any elective
public office unless he files a sworn certificate of candidacy within the period fixed
herein.
Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code specifies the contents of a COC, viz:
Section 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy.—The certificate of candidacy shall
state that the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated
therein and that he is eligible for said office; if for Member of the Batasang
Pambansa, the province, including its component cities, highly urbanized city or
district or sector which he seeks to represent; the political party to which he
belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his post office address for all
election purposes; his profession or occupation; that he will support and defend the
Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto;
that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees promulgated by the duly
constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a
foreign country; that the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily,
without mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the
certificate of candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge. x x x
The evident purposes of the requirement for the filing of CoCs and in fixing the
time limit for filing them are, namely: (a) to enable the voters to know, at least 60
days prior to the regular election, the candidates from among whom they are to
make the choice; and (b) to avoid confusion and inconvenience in the tabulation of
the votes cast. If the law does not confine to the duly-registered candidates the
choice by the voters, there may be as many persons voted for as there are voters,
and votes may be cast even for unknown or fictitious persons as a mark to identify
the votes in favor of a candidate for another office in the same election.28 Moreover,
according to Sinaca v. Mula,29 the CoC is:
x x x in the nature of a formal manifestation to the whole world of the candidate’s
political creed or lack of political creed. It is a statement of a person seeking to run
for a public office certifying that he announces his candidacy for the office
mentioned and that he is eligible for the office, the name of the political party to
which he belongs, if he belongs to any, and his post-office address for all election
purposes being as well stated.
Accordingly, a person’s declaration of his intention to run for public office and his
affirmation that he possesses the eligibility for the position he seeks to assume,
followed by the timely filing of such declaration, constitute a valid CoC that render
the person making the declaration a valid or official candidate.
There are two remedies available to prevent a candidate from running in an
electoral race. One is through a petition for disqualification and the other through a
petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. The Court
differentiated the two remedies in Fermin v. Commission on Elections,30 thuswise:
x x x A petition for disqualification, on the one hand, can be premised on Section
12 or 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, or Section 40 of the Local Government
Code. On the other hand, a petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC can
only be grounded on a statement of a material representation in the said certificate
that is false. The petitions also have different effects. While a person who is
disqualified under Section 68 is merely prohibited to continue as a candidate, the
person whose certificate is cancelled or denied due course under Section 78 is not
treated as a candidate at all, as if he/she never filed a CoC.31
Inasmuch as the grounds for disqualification under Section 68 of the Omnibus
Election Code (i.e., prohibited acts of candidates, and the fact of a candidate’s
permanent residency in another country when that fact affects the residency
requirement of a candidate) are separate and distinct from the grounds for the
cancellation of or denying due course to a COC (i.e., nuisance candidates under
Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code; and material misrepresentation under
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code), the Court has recognized in Miranda v.
Abaya32 that the following circumstances may result from the granting of the
petitions, to wit:
(1) A candidate may not be qualified to run for election but may have filed a valid
CoC;
(2) A candidate may not be qualified and at the same time may not have filed a
valid CoC; and
(3) A candidate may be qualified but his CoC may be denied due course or
cancelled.
In the event that a candidate is disqualified to run for a public office, or dies, or
withdraws his CoC before the elections, Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code
provides the option of substitution, to wit:
Section 77. Candidates in case of death, disqualification or withdrawal. — If after
the last day for the filing of certificates of candidacy, an official candidate of a
registered or accredited political party dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any
cause, only a person belonging to, and certified by, the same political party may
file a certificate of candidacy to replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was
disqualified. The substitute candidate nominated by the political party concerned
may file his certificate of candidacy for the office affected in accordance with the
preceding sections not later than mid-day of the day of the election. If the death,
withdrawal or disqualification should occur between the day before the election
and mid-day of election day, said certificate may be filed with any board of election
inspectors in the political subdivision where he is a candidate, or, in the case of
candidates to be voted for by the entire electorate of the country, with the
Commission.
Nonetheless, whether the ground for substitution is death, withdrawal or
disqualification of a candidate, Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code
unequivocally states that only an official candidate of a registered or accredited
party may be substituted.
Considering that a cancelled CoC does not give rise to a valid candidacy,33 there
can be no valid substitution of the candidate under Section 77 of the Omnibus
Election Code. It should be clear, too, that a candidate who does not file a valid
CoC may not be validly substituted, because a person without a valid CoC is not
considered a candidate in much the same way as any person who has not filed a
CoC is not at all a candidate.34
Likewise, a candidate who has not withdrawn his CoC in accordance with Section
73 of the Omnibus Election Code may not be substituted. A withdrawal of
candidacy can only give effect to a substitution if the substitute candidate submits
prior to the election a sworn CoC as required by Section 73 of the Omnibus
Election Code.35
2.
Declaration of Ramon’s disqualification
rendered his CoC invalid; hence, he was not
a valid candidate to be properly substituted
In the light of the foregoing rules on the CoC, the Court concurs with the
conclusion of the COMELEC En Banc that the Castillo petition in SPA 09-029 (DC)
was in the nature of a petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC under
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.
In describing the nature of a Section 78 petition, the Court said in Fermin v.
Commission on Elections:36
Lest it be misunderstood, the denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC
is not based on the lack of qualifications but on a finding that the candidate made a
material representation that is false, which may relate to the qualifications required
of the public office he/she is running for. It is noted that the candidate states in
his/her CoC that he/she is eligible for the office he/she seeks. Section 78 of the
OEC, therefore, is to be read in relation to the constitutional and statutory
provisions on qualifications or eligibility for public office. If the candidate
subsequently states a material representation in the CoC that is false, the
COMELEC, following the law, is empowered to deny due course to or cancel such
certificate. Indeed, the Court has already likened a proceeding under Section 78 to
a quo warranto proceeding under Section 253 of the OEC since they both deal
with the eligibility or qualification of a candidate, with the distinction mainly in the
fact that a "Section 78" petition is filed before proclamation, while a petition for quo
warranto is filed after proclamation of the winning candidate.
Castillo’s petition contained essential allegations pertaining to a Section 78
petition, namely: (a) Ramon made a false representation in his CoC; (b) the false
representation referred to a material matter that would affect the substantive right
of Ramon as candidate (that is, the right to run for the election for which he filed
his certificate); and (c) Ramon made the false representation with the intention to
deceive the electorate as to his qualification for public office or deliberately
attempted to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact that would otherwise render him
ineligible.37 The petition expressly challenged Ramon’s eligibility for public office
based on the prohibition stated in the Constitution and the Local Government Code
against any person serving three consecutive terms, and specifically prayed that
"the Certificate of Candidacy filed by the respondent Ramon be denied due course
to or cancel the same and that he be declared as a disqualified candidate."38
The denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC under Section 78
involves a finding not only that a person lacks a qualification but also that he made
a material representation that is false.39 A petition for the denial of due course to or
cancellation of CoC that is short of the requirements will not be granted. In Mitra v.
Commission on Elections,40 the Court stressed that there must also be a deliberate
attempt to mislead, thus:
The false representation under Section 78 must likewise be a "deliberate attempt
to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact that would otherwise render a candidate
ineligible." Given the purpose of the requirement, it must be made with the
intention to deceive the electorate as to the would-be candidate’s qualifications for
public office. Thus, the misrepresentation that Section 78 addresses cannot be the
result of a mere innocuous mistake, and cannot exist in a situation where the intent
to deceive is patently absent, or where no deception on the electorate results. The
deliberate character of the misrepresentation necessarily follows from a
consideration of the consequences of any material falsity: a candidate who falsifies
a material fact cannot run; if he runs and is elected, he cannot serve; in both
cases, he can be prosecuted for violation of the election laws.
It is underscored, however, that a Section 78 petition should not be interchanged
or confused with a Section 68 petition. The remedies under the two sections are
different, for they are based on different grounds, and can result in different
eventualities.41 A person who is disqualified under Section 68 is prohibited to
continue as a candidate, but a person whose CoC is cancelled or denied due
course under Section 78 is not considered as a candidate at all because his status
is that of a person who has not filed a CoC.42 Miranda v. Abaya43 has clarified that a
candidate who is disqualified under Section 68 can be validly substituted pursuant
to Section 77 because he remains a candidate until disqualified; but a person
whose CoC has been denied due course or cancelled under Section 78 cannot be
substituted because he is not considered a candidate.1âwphi1
To be sure, the cause of Ramon’s ineligibility (i.e., the three-term limit) is enforced
both by the Constitution and statutory law. Article X, Section 8 of the 1987
Constitution provides:
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials,
which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall
serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office
for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of
his service for the full term for which he was elected.
Section 43 of the Local Government Code reiterates the constitutional three-term
limit for all elective local officials, to wit:
Section 43. Term of Office. – (a) x x x
(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in
the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall
not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for
which the elective official concerned was elected. (Emphasis supplied.)
The objective of imposing the three-term limit rule was "to avoid the evil of a single
person accumulating excessive power over a particular territorial jurisdiction as a
result of a prolonged stay in the same office." The Court underscored this objective
in Aldovino, Jr. v. Commission on Elections,44 stating:
x x x The framers of the Constitution specifically included an exception to the
people’s freedom to choose those who will govern them in order to avoid the evil of
a single person accumulating excessive power over a particular territorial
jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay in the same office. To allow petitioner
Latasa to vie for the position of city mayor after having served for three
consecutive terms as a municipal mayor would obviously defeat the very intent of
the framers when they wrote this exception. Should he be allowed another three
consecutive terms as mayor of the City of Digos, petitioner would then be possibly
holding office as chief executive over the same territorial jurisdiction and
inhabitants for a total of eighteen consecutive years. This is the very scenario
sought to be avoided by the Constitution, if not abhorred by it.
To accord with the constitutional and statutory proscriptions, Ramon was
absolutely precluded from asserting an eligibility to run as Mayor of Lucena City for
the fourth consecutive term. Resultantly, his CoC was invalid and ineffectual ab
initio for containing the incurable defect consisting in his false declaration of his
eligibility to run. The invalidity and inefficacy of his CoC made his situation even
worse than that of a nuisance candidate because the nuisance candidate may
remain eligible despite cancellation of his CoC or despite the denial of due course
to the CoC pursuant to Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code.45
Ramon himself specifically admitted his ineligibility when he filed his Manifestation
with Motion to Resolve on December 30, 2009 in the COMELEC.46 That sufficed to
render his CoC invalid, considering that for all intents and purposes the
COMELEC’s declaration of his disqualification had the effect of announcing that he
was no candidate at all.
We stress that a non-candidate like Ramon had no right to pass on to his
substitute. As Miranda v. Abaya aptly put it:
Even on the most basic and fundamental principles, it is readily understood that
the concept of a substitute presupposes the existence of the person to be
substituted, for how can a person take the place of somebody who does not exist
or who never was. The Court has no other choice but to rule that in all the
instances enumerated in Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code, the existence
of a valid certificate of candidacy seasonably filed is a requisite sine qua non.
All told, a disqualified candidate may only be substituted if he had a valid certificate
of candidacy in the first place because, if the disqualified candidate did not have a
valid and seasonably filed certificate of candidacy, he is and was not a candidate
at all. If a person was not a candidate, he cannot be substituted under Section 77
of the Code. Besides, if we were to allow the so-called "substitute" to file a "new"
and "original" certificate of candidacy beyond the period for the filing thereof, it
would be a crystalline case of unequal protection of the law, an act abhorred by
our Constitution.47 (Emphasis supplied)
3.
Granting without any qualification of petition in
SPA No. 09-029(DC) manifested COMELEC’s intention to
declare Ramon disqualified and to cancel his CoC
That the COMELEC made no express finding that Ramon committed any
deliberate misrepresentation in his CoC was of little consequence in the
determination of whether his CoC should be deemed cancelled or not.
In Miranda v. Abaya,48 the specific relief that the petition prayed for was that the
CoC "be not given due course and/or cancelled." The COMELEC categorically
granted "the petition" and then pronounced — in apparent contradiction — that
Joel Pempe Miranda was "disqualified." The
Court held that the COMELEC, by granting the petition without any qualification,
disqualified Joel Pempe Miranda and at the same time cancelled Jose Pempe
Miranda’s CoC. The Court explained:
The question to settle next is whether or not aside from Joel "Pempe" Miranda
being disqualified by the Comelec in its May 5, 1998 resolution, his certificate of
candidacy had likewise been denied due course and cancelled.
The Court rules that it was.
Private respondent’s petition in SPA No. 98-019 specifically prayed for the
following:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the Certificate of Candidacy filed by
respondent for the position of Mayor for the City of Santiago be not given due
course and/or cancelled.
Other reliefs just and equitable in the premises are likewise prayed for.
(Rollo, p. 31; Emphasis ours.)
In resolving the petition filed by private respondent specifying a very particular
relief, the Comelec ruled favorably in the following manner:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Commission (FIRST DIVISION)
GRANTS the Petition. Respondent JOSE "Pempe" MIRANDA is hereby
DISQUALIFIED from running for the position of mayor of Santiago City, Isabela, in
the May 11, 1998 national and local elections.
SO ORDERED.
(p.43, Rollo; Emphasis ours.)
From a plain reading of the dispositive portion of the Comelec resolution of May 5,
1998 in SPA No. 98-019, it is sufficiently clear that the prayer specifically and
particularly sought in the petition was GRANTED, there being no qualification on
the matter whatsoever. The disqualification was simply ruled over and above the
granting of the specific prayer for denial of due course and cancellation of the
certificate of candidacy. x x x.49
xxxx
x x x. There is no dispute that the complaint or petition filed by private respondent
in SPA No. 98-019 is one to deny due course and to cancel the certificate of
candidacy of Jose "Pempe" Miranda (Rollo, pp. 26-31). There is likewise no
question that the said petition was GRANTED without any qualification
whatsoever. It is rather clear, therefore, that whether or not the Comelec granted
any further relief in SPA No. 98-019 by disqualifying the candidate, the fact
remains that the said petition was granted and that the certificate of candidacy of
Jose "Pempe" Miranda was denied due course and cancelled. x x x.50
The crucial point of Miranda v. Abaya was that the COMELEC actually granted the
particular relief of cancelling or denying due course to the CoC prayed for in the
petition by not subjecting that relief to any qualification.
Miranda v. Abaya applies herein. Although Castillo’s petition in SPA No. 09-029
(DC) specifically sought both the disqualification of Ramon and the denial of due
course to or cancellation of his CoC, the COMELEC categorically stated in the
Resolution dated April 19, 2010 that it was granting the petition. Despite the
COMELEC making no finding of material misrepresentation on the part of Ramon,
its granting of Castillo’s petition without express qualifications manifested that the
COMELEC had cancelled Ramon’s CoC based on his apparent ineligibility. The
Resolution dated April 19, 2010 became final and executory because Castillo did
not move for its reconsideration, and because Ramon later withdrew his motion for
reconsideration filed in relation to it.
4.
Elected Vice Mayor must succeed
and assume the position of Mayor
due to a permanent vacancy in the office
On the issue of who should assume the office of Mayor of Lucena City, Castillo
submits that the doctrine on the rejection of the second-placer espoused in Labo,
Jr. v. Commission on Elections51 should not apply to him because Ramon’s
disqualification became final prior to the elections.52 Instead, he cites Cayat v.
Commission on Elections,53 where the Court said:
x x x In Labo there was no final judgment of disqualification before the elections.
The doctrine on the rejection of the second placer was applied in Labo and a host
of other cases because the judgment declaring the candidate’s disqualification in
Labo and the other cases had not become final before the elections. To repeat,
Labo and the other cases applying the doctrine on the rejection of the second
placer have one common essential condition — the disqualification of the
candidate had not become final before the elections. This essential condition does
not exist in the present case.
Thus, in Labo, Labo’s disqualification became final only on 14 May 1992, three
days after the 11 May 1992 elections. On election day itself, Labo was still legally a
candidate. In the present case, Cayat was disqualified by final judgment 23 days
before the 10 May 2004 elections. On election day, Cayat was no longer legally a
candidate for mayor. In short, Cayat’s candidacy for Mayor of Buguias, Benguet
was legally non-existent in the 10 May 2004 elections.
The law expressly declares that a candidate disqualified by final judgment before
an election cannot be voted for, and votes cast for him shall not be counted. This is
a mandatory provision of law. Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, The Electoral
Reforms Law of 1987, states:
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case.— Any candidate who has been declared by
final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him
shall not be
counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an
election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of
votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and
hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or
any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
(Emphasis added)
Section 6 of the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 covers two situations. The first is
when the disqualification becomes final before the elections, which is the situation
covered in the first sentence of Section 6. The second is when the disqualification
becomes final after the elections, which is the situation covered in the second
sentence of Section 6.
The present case falls under the first situation. Section 6 of the Electoral Reforms
Law governing the first situation is categorical: a candidate disqualified by final
judgment before an election cannot be voted for, and votes cast for him shall not
be counted. The Resolution disqualifying Cayat became final on 17 April 2004,
way before the 10 May 2004 elections. Therefore, all the 8,164 votes cast in
Cayat’s favor are stray. Cayat was never a candidate in the 10 May 2004
elections. Palileng’s proclamation is proper because he was the sole and only
candidate, second to none.54
Relying on the pronouncement in Cayat, Castillo asserts that he was entitled to
assume the position of Mayor of Lucena City for having obtained the highest
number of votes among the remaining qualified candidates.
It would seem, then, that the date of the finality of the COMELEC resolution
declaring Ramon disqualified is decisive. According to Section 10, Rule 19 of the
COMELEC’s Resolution No. 8804,55 a decision or resolution of a Division becomes
final and executory after the lapse of five days following its promulgation unless a
motion for reconsideration is seasonably filed. Under Section 8, Rule 20 of
Resolution No. 8804, the decision of the COMELEC En Banc becomes final and
executory five days after its promulgation and receipt of notice by the parties.
The COMELEC First Division declared Ramon disqualified through its Resolution
dated April 19, 2010, the copy of which Ramon received on the same
date.56 Ramon filed a motion for reconsideration on April 21, 201057 in accordance
with Section 7 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8696,58 but withdrew the motion on
May 4, 2010,59 ostensibly to allow his substitution by Barbara Ruby. On his part,
Castillo did not file any motion for reconsideration. Such circumstances indicated
that there was no more pending matter that could have effectively suspended the
finality of the ruling in due course. Hence, the Resolution dated April 19, 2010
could be said to have attained finality upon the lapse of five days from its
promulgation and receipt of it by the parties. This happened probably on April 24,
2010. Despite such finality, the COMELEC En Banc continued to act on the
withdrawal by Ramon of his motion for reconsideration through the May 5, 2010
Resolution declaring the April 19, 2010 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division
final and executory.
Yet, we cannot agree with Castillo’s assertion that with Ramon’s disqualification
becoming final prior to the May 10, 2010 elections, the ruling in Cayat was
applicable in his favor. Barbara Ruby’s filing of her CoC in substitution of Ramon
significantly differentiated this case from the factual circumstances obtaining in
Cayat. Rev. Fr. Nardo B. Cayat, the petitioner in Cayat, was disqualified on April
17, 2004, and his disqualification became final before the May 10, 2004 elections.
Considering that no substitution of Cayat was made, Thomas R. Palileng, Sr., his
rival, remained the only candidate for the mayoralty post in Buguias, Benguet. In
contrast, after Barbara Ruby substituted Ramon, the May 10, 2010 elections
proceeded with her being regarded by the electorate of Lucena City as a bona fide
candidate. To the electorate, she became a contender for the same position vied
for by Castillo, such that she stood on the same footing as Castillo. Such standing
as a candidate negated Castillo’s claim of being the candidate who obtained the
highest number of votes, and of being consequently entitled to assume the office
of Mayor.
Indeed, Castillo could not assume the office for he was only a second
placer.1âwphi1 Labo, Jr. should be applied. There, the Court emphasized that the
candidate obtaining the second highest number of votes for the contested office
could not assume the office despite the disqualification of the first placer because
the second placer was "not the choice of the sovereign will."60 Surely, the Court
explained, a minority or defeated candidate could not be deemed elected to the
office.61 There was to be no question that the second placer lost in the election,
was repudiated by the electorate, and could not assume the vacated position.62 No
law imposed upon and compelled the people of Lucena City to accept a loser to be
their political leader or their representative.63
The only time that a second placer is allowed to take the place of a disqualified
winning candidate is when two requisites concur, namely: (a) the candidate who
obtained the highest number of votes is disqualified; and (b) the electorate was
fully aware in fact and in law of that candidate’s disqualification as to bring such
awareness within the realm of notoriety but the electorate still cast the plurality of
the votes in favor of the ineligible candidate.64 Under this sole exception, the
electorate may be said to have waived the validity and efficacy of their votes by
notoriously misapplying their franchise or throwing away their votes, in which case
the eligible candidate with the second highest number of votes may be deemed
elected.65 But the exception did not apply in favor of Castillo simply because the
second element was absent. The electorate of Lucena City were not the least
aware of the fact of Barbara Ruby’s ineligibility as the substitute. In fact, the
COMELEC En Banc issued the Resolution finding her substitution invalid only on
May 20, 2011, or a full year after the decisions.
On the other hand, the COMELEC En Banc properly disqualified Barbara Ruby
from assuming the position of Mayor of Lucena City. To begin with, there was no
valid candidate for her to substitute due to Ramon’s ineligibility. Also, Ramon did
not voluntarily withdraw his CoC before the elections in accordance with Section
73 of the Omnibus Election Code. Lastly, she was not an additional candidate for
the position of Mayor of Lucena City because her filing of her CoC on May 4, 2010
was beyond the period fixed by law. Indeed, she was not, in law and in fact, a
candidate.66
A permanent vacancy in the office of Mayor of Lucena City thus resulted, and such
vacancy should be filled pursuant to the law on succession defined in Section 44 of
the LGC, to wit:67
Section 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice-Governor,
Mayor, and Vice-Mayor. – If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the
governor or mayor, the vice-governor or vice-mayor concerned shall become the
governor or mayor. x x x
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petitions in these consolidated cases;
AFFIRMS the Resolution issued on May 20, 2011 by the COMELEC En Banc; and
ORDERS the petitioners to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 199612               January 22, 2013
RENATO M. FEDERICO, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, COMELEC EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR and
OSMUNDO M. MALIGAYA, Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, in relation to Rule 64, of the Rules of
Court, assailing the December 21, 2011 Resolution1 of the Commission on
Elections (Comelec) En Bane. in SPC No. 10-082, entitled In Re: Petition to Annul
the Proclamation of Respondent Renato M. Federico, Osmundo M. Maligaya v.
Renato M. Federico and the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Santo Tomas,
Batangas.
The Facts
Edna Sanchez (Edna) and private respondent Osmundo M. Maligaya (Maligaya)
were candidates for the position of municipal mayor of Sto. Tomas, Batangas, in
the May 10, 2010 Automated National and Local Elections. Maligaya was the
Liberal Party’s official mayoralty candidate.2
On April 27, 2010, Armando Sanchez, husband of Edna and the gubernatorial
candidate for the province of Batangas, died. Two days later, or on April 29,
2010,3 Edna withdrew her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position of mayor.
She then filed a new COC and the corresponding Certificate of Nomination and
Acceptance (CONA) for the position of governor as substitute candidate for her
deceased husband.
On May 5, 2010, petitioner Renato M. Federico (Federico) filed with the Office of
the Election Officer of Sto. Tomas, Batangas, his COC4 and CONA5 as official
candidate of the Nationalista Party and as substitute candidate for mayor, in view
of the withdrawal of Edna.
On May 7, 2010, the Comelec Law Department referred the Affidavit of
Withdrawal, the COC and the CONA of Edna, as substitute candidate for her late
husband, and those of Federico, as substitute candidate for her, to the Comelec
En Banc for its consideration.6
On the same day, May 7, 2010, Maligaya filed his Petition to Deny Due Course
and to Cancel Certificate of Candidacy7 of Federico before the Comelec, docketed
as SPA No. 10-137 (DC). Maligaya sought to have Federico declared ineligible to
run as substitute candidate for Edna because the period to file the COC for
substitute candidates had already lapsed after December 14, 2009, pursuant to
Section 13 of Comelec Resolution No. 8678.8
In Resolution No. 8889,9 dated May 8, 2010, the COMELEC En Banc gave due
course to the COC of Edna as substitute gubernatorial candidate in the Batangas
province and to that of Federico as substitute mayoralty candidate in Sto. Tomas.
By that time, however, the official ballots had already been printed. Expectedly, on
May 10, 2010, the day of elections, the name "SANCHEZ, Edna P." was retained
in the list of candidates for Mayor of Sto. Tomas, and garnered the highest number
of votes - 28,389 against Maligaya’s 22,577 votes.10
On May 11, 2010, the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBOC) printed the
Certificate of Canvass of Votes and Proclamation of Winning
Candidates11 (COCVP) showing "SANCHEZ Edna P." as the winning mayoralty
candidate. The printed COCVP, reads:
WE, THE UNDERSIGNED MEMBERS of the CITY/MUNICIPAL BOARD OF
CANVASSERS do hereby certify under oath that we have duly canvassed the
votes cast in 81 precincts in the city/municipality for the Candidates therein for
city/municipality offices in the elections held on May 10, 2010. Attached hereto and
forming part hereof is a Statement of Votes by Precinct (CEF No. 20-A-1) obtained
by each candidate for the offices of Mayor and Vice-Mayor.
That after such canvass, it appears that SANCHEZ, Edna P. obtained 28389 votes
for the office of City/Municipality Mayor, the same being the highest number of
votes legally cast for said office; and SILVA, Armenius O. obtained 25532 votes for
the office of City/Municipality Vice Mayor, the same being the highest number of
votes legally cast for said office.
ON THE BASIS OF THE FOREGOING, we hereby proclaim the above candidates
as the duly elected City/Municipality Mayor and City/Municipality Vice Mayor.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we have signed these presents in SANTO TOMAS,
Province of Batangas this Tue May 11, 14:09:55 PHT 2010.
[Emphases and underscoring supplied]
This action of MBOC prompted Maligaya to file his Petition to Annul Proclamation
of Respondent Edna Sanchez,12 docketed as SPC No. 10-022, on May 20, 2010.
This petition was, however, later withdrawn, as agreed upon by the parties, and
the case was dismissed by the Comelec First Division.13
A second print-out14 of the COCVP was issued by the MBOC bearing the same
time and date with the same number of votes garnered by Edna being credited to
Federico. The second print-out reads:
WE, THE UNDERSIGNED MEMBERS of the CITY/MUNICIPAL BOARD OF
CANVASSERS do hereby certify under oath that we have duly canvassed the
votes cast in 81 precincts in the city/municipality for the Candidates therein for
city/municipality offices in the elections held on May 10, 2010. Attached hereto and
forming part hereof is a Statement of Votes by Precinct (CEF No. 20-A-1) obtained
by each candidate for the offices of Mayor and Vice-Mayor.
That after such canvass, it appears that FEDERICO, Renato M. obtained 28389
votes for the office of City/Municipality Mayor, the same being the highest number
of votes legally cast for said office; and SILVA, Armenius O. obtained 25532 votes
for the office of City/Municipality Vice Mayor, the same being the highest number
of votes legally cast for said office.
ON THE BASIS OF THE FOREGOING, we hereby proclaim the above candidates
as the duly elected City/Municipality Mayor and City/Municipality Vice Mayor.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we have signed these presents in SANTO TOMAS,
Province of Batangas this Tue May 11, 14:09:55 PHT 2010.
[Emphases and underscoring supplied]
On June 1, 2010, upon learning of the proclamation of Federico as the winning
mayoralty candidate by the MBOC, Maligaya filed his Petition to Annul
Proclamation of Respondent Renato M. Federico15 as mayor of Sto. Tomas,
Batangas, docketed as SPC No. 10-082. The petition was predicated on the
alleged illegal act of the MBOC in issuing a falsified and patently antedated second
COCVP in the name of Federico without reconvening, without due notice, and
without annulling the first COCVP issued in favor of Edna.
In his answer to the petition, Federico raised, among others, the defenses that the
petition was an erroneous remedy, having no basis under the rules; that it was not
based on valid grounds; and that it should not have been given due course as it
was belatedly filed.16
The members of the MBOC likewise filed an answer, claiming good faith when
they proclaimed Federico as winner considering that the substitutions of Edna and
Federico were valid under Comelec Resolution No. 8889.17
Meanwhile, Maligaya’s petition to deny due course and to cancel the COC of
Federico was denied by the Comelec Second Division in its Resolution,18 dated
October 19, 2010. It gave due course to Federico’s COC and CONA on the basis
of the Comelec En Banc’s Resolution No. 8889 which upheld Federico’s
substitution.
In its Resolution,19 dated June 21, 2011, the Comelec First Division denied
Maligaya’s petition to annul the proclamation of Federico for having been filed out
of time, as it was filed beyond the ten (10) day period from the day of proclamation
as provided for under Section 6, Rule 4 of Comelec Resolution 8804.20 Further, it
held that Federico’s filing of candidacy for mayor, vice Edna, was valid.
Maligaya then filed his Verified Partial Motion for Reconsideration,21 dated June 27,
2011, insisting that his petition had not yet prescribed and that Federico’s
substitution was null and void with his COC and CONA filed after December 14,
2009, the deadline provided for under Section 13 of Comelec Resolution No. 8678.
He further claimed that the generation of a second print-out of the COCVP bearing
the same time and date with the same number of votes garnered by Edna being
credited to Federico was questionable for it was impossible for Federico to be
proclaimed as the winning candidate because the Canvassing and Consolidating
System (CCS) had already printed a COCVP with the name of Edna, as the
winner.
The said partial motion for reconsideration was elevated to the Comelec En Banc
for proper disposition.
In his Comment22 on Maligaya’s partial motion for reconsideration, Federico
pointed out that his substitution of Edna had already been upheld with finality and,
thus, could no longer be questioned. He prayed for the dismissal of the case.
In the hearing of August 25, 2011, the Comelec En Banc considered the case
submitted for resolution.
On August 31, 2011, Federico filed a motion for reconsideration23 of the Comelec
En Banc’s Order given in the August 25, 2011 hearing, claiming that the case was
barred by forum shopping and litis pendentia. Pending his motion, he elevated the
matter to the Supreme Court on September 9, 2011 by way of a Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition, docketed as G.R. No. 198283. This petition was
subsequently dismissed by the Court on October 4, 2011 for being premature in
view of the pendency of the partial motion for reconsideration before the Comelec
En Banc.24
On December 21, 2011, the Comelec En Banc issued the assailed Resolution
granting Maligaya’s partial motion for reconsideration. Thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant Partial Motion for
Reconsideration is GRANTED. The proclamation of respondent Federico is hereby
ANNULLED. Accordingly:
1. The Executive Director is ordered to constitute a Special Municipal Board of
Canvassers for the municipality of Sto. Tomas, Batangas;
2. The Special Municipal Board of Canvassers is ordered to immediately notify the
parties, reconvene and proclaim petitioner OSMUNDO M. MALIGAYA as the duly
elected Mayor of Sto. Tomas, Batangas; and
3. The Law Department is directed to conduct an investigation on the members of
the (Old) Municipal Board of Canvassers of Sto. Tomas, Batangas for possible
violation of Section 32 pars. (c) and (f) Article VI of COMELEC Resolution No.
8809.
Let the Executive Director implement this resolution.
SO ORDERED.25
The Comelec En Banc ruled that the petition for the annulment of Federico’s
proclamation filed on June 1, 2011 was within the prescribed ten (10) day period. It
explained that the period for the filing of the said petition should be reckoned from
May 27, 2011, when Maligaya discovered the existence of the second COCVP and
not on May 11, 2011, the proclamation date. The Comelec En Banc was of the
view that the annulment of Federico’s proclamation was in order because of his
invalid substitution of Edna, as his substitute COC was filed beyond the deadline
and due to the illegality of the proceedings of the MBOC in generating the second
COCVP without authority from the Comelec and without notice to the parties, in
violation of Comelec Resolution No. 8804.
Hence, Federico filed the present Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order, dated December 23,
2011, before this Court anchored on the following
GROUNDS
(I)
The validity of Petitioner’s substitution as mayoralty candidate is already a settled
fact.
A. Petitioner validly substituted Edna Sanchez pursuant to Section 77 of the
Omnibus Election Code.
B. The validity of Petitioner’s substitution was already decided with finality by the
Comelec.
C. Resolution No. 8889 is valid. The Comelec, in issuing Resolution No. 8889,
passed upon all matters and issues laid before it in the case. Moreover, after
Resolution No. 8889 was issued, it was in force and had to be complied with.
(II)
The proclamation of Petitioner was regular and done in accordance with law.
A. The votes cast for "SANCHEZ, Edna P." were legally considered votes for
Petitioner.
B. The petition to annul Petitioner’s proclamation was filed out of time.
(III)
Private Respondent cannot validly be proclaimed as elected mayor because he
was the losing candidate.26
In the meantime, on December 29, 2011, the Comelec En Banc issued Minute
Resolution No. 11-1306 constituting the special MBOC pursuant to its December
21, 2011 Resolution.27
On January 16, 2012, the Comelec En Banc issued a Writ of Execution ordering
Federico to vacate the position as mayor and to cease and desist from performing
the functions of the said office.28
On January 17, 2012, the Special MBOC issued a notice to convene on January
24, 2012 at the Comelec’s Session Hall for the purpose of proclaiming Maligaya as
the duly elected mayor.29
In its Resolution, dated January 17, 2012, the Court required the respondents in
this case to comment on Federico’s petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from
notice, to which Maligaya and the Comelec complied. In the same Resolution, the
Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) enjoining the Comelec from
constituting and reconvening the Special MBOC and from proclaiming Maligaya as
mayor of Sto. Tomas, Batangas.30
Pending resolution of the case, on February 28, 2012, Vice-Mayor Armenius Silva
(Intervenor Silva) of Sto. Tomas, Batangas, filed his Motion for Leave to
Intervene,31 praying essentially that as Federico failed to qualify, he should be
adjudged as his legal successor as mayor, under Section 44 of the Local
Government Code32 (LGC).
Both the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and Maligaya opposed the motion to
intervene, both arguing that he (Maligaya) was the only mayoralty candidate left to
be voted for given the withdrawal of Edna and Federico’s invalid substitution.
Maligaya, then, was not a second placer but the sole and only placer in the
elections. Hence, the doctrine of the second-placer would not apply to him.
The Issues
From the pleadings of the parties, the principal issues presented for resolution are:
(1) whether Federico could validly substitute Edna who withdrew her candidacy for
the mayoralty position; (2) whether Maligaya’s Petition to Annul Proclamation of
Federico as mayor of Sto. Tomas, Batangas, docketed as SPC No. 10-082, was
filed on time; and (3) granting that Federico was disqualified, whether he should be
succeeded by Intervenor Silva under the LGC or replaced by Maligaya.
Essentially, the issue thrust upon the Court is whether the Comelec gravely
abused its discretion when it annulled Federico’s proclamation as the winning
candidate on the ground that his substitution as mayoralty candidate was void.
Federico insists that his substitution of Edna was valid and had long been final in
view of Comelec Resolution No. 8889. He likewise argues that his proclamation as
mayor of Sto. Tomas, Batangas, was valid and regular and, hence, it must be
upheld.
The Court’s Ruling
The Court agrees with the position taken by the OSG representing public
respondent Comelec En Banc. The electoral commission committed no grave
abuse of discretion when it came out with its December 21, 2011 Resolution,33 in
SPC No. 10-082, granting Maligaya’s partial motion for reconsideration. The Court
shall discuss the issues in seriatim.
Federico’s substitution of Edna Sanchez
as mayoralty candidate was not valid
In its assailed December 21, 2011 Resolution, the Comelec En Banc annulled
Federico’s proclamation as mayor of Sto. Tomas, Batangas, on the ground that his
substitution of Edna was invalid, the substitute COC and CONA having been filed
after the December 14, 2009 deadline provided for under Section 13 of Comelec
Resolution No. 8678.
Federico argues that Comelec Resolution No. 8678 cannot prevail over the
provisions of Section 77 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 881, the Omnibus Election
Code (OEC), prescribing the rules on substitution of an official candidate of a
registered political party who dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause after
the last day for the filing of his COC. The law provides:
Sec. 77. Candidates in case of death, disqualification or withdrawal of another. - If
after the last day for the filing of certificates of candidacy, an official candidate of a
registered or accredited political party dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any
cause, only a person belonging to, and certified by, the same political party may
file a certificate of candidacy to replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was
disqualified. The substitute candidate nominated by the political party concerned
may file his certificate of candidacy for the office affected in accordance with the
preceding sections not later than mid-day of the day of the election. If the death,
withdrawal or disqualification should occur between the day before the election
and mid-day of election day, said certificate may be filed with any board of election
inspectors in the political subdivision where he is a candidate, or, in the case of
candidates to be voted for by the entire electorate of the country, with the
Commission. (Emphasis supplied)
Federico posits that he timely filed his COC as it was not later than midday of the
day of the election. He argues that the law makes no distinction between the
different causes for substitution – death, disqualification or withdrawal. Regardless
of the cause of substitution, the deadline for the filing of a substitute COC is "not
later than mid-day of the election." Accordingly, he asserts that he validly
substituted Edna having filed his COC and CONA on May 5, 2010 or five (5) days
before the elections and having complied with all the procedural requirements for a
valid substitution.
Federico’s argument is not well-taken.
The Comelec is empowered by law to prescribe such rules so as to make
efficacious and successful the conduct of the first national automated election.
On January 23, 2007, Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9369, An Act
Amending Republic Act No. 8436, Entitled ‘An Act Authorizing The Commission
On Elections To Use An Automated Election System In The May 11, 1998 National
Or Local Elections And In Subsequent National And Local Electoral Exercises,’ To
Encourage Transparency, Credibility, Fairness And Accuracy Of Elections,
Amending For The Purpose Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, As Amended, Republic Act
No. 7166 And Other Related Elections Laws, Providing Funds Therefor And For
Other Purposes. Section 13 of said law partially provides:
SEC. 13. Section 11 of Republic Act No. 8436 is hereby amended to read as
follows:
SEC.15. Official Ballot. - The Commission shall prescribe the format of the
electronic display and/or the size and form of the official ballot, which shall contain
the titles of the position to be filled and/or the proposition to be voted upon in an
initiative, referendum or plebiscite. Where practicable, electronic displays must be
constructed to present the names of all candidates for the same position in the
same page or screen, otherwise, the electronic displays must be constructed to
present the entire ballot to the voter, in a series of sequential pages, and to ensure
that the voter sees all of the ballot options on all pages before completing his or
her vote and to allow the voter to review and change all ballot choices prior to
completing and casting his or her ballot.
Under each position to be filled, the names of candidates shall be arranged
alphabetically by surname and uniformly indicated using the same type size. The
maiden or married name shall be listed in the official ballot, as preferred by the
female candidate. Under each proposition to be vote upon, the choices should be
uniformly indicated using the same font and size.
A fixed space where the chairman of the board of election inspector shall affix
her/her signature to authenticate the official ballot shall be provided.
For this purpose, the Commission shall set the deadline for the filing of certificate
of candidacy/petition of registration/manifestation to participate in the election. Any
person who files his certificate of candidacy within this period shall only be
considered as a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his
certificate of candidacy: Provided, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a
candidate shall effect only upon that start of the aforesaid campaign period:
Provided, finally, That any person holding a public appointive office or position,
including active members of the armed forces, and officers, and employees in
government-owned or-controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto
resigned from his/her office and must vacate the same at the start of the day of the
filing of his/her certification of candidacy. (Emphasis supplied)
Under said provision, "the Comelec, which has the constitutional mandate to
enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election,"34 has been empowered to set the dates for certain pre-election
proceedings. In the exercise of such constitutional and legislated power, especially
to safeguard and improve on the Automated Election System (AES), Comelec
came out with Resolution No. 8678.
As automated elections had been mandated by law, there was a need for the early
printing of the ballots. So that all candidates would be accommodated in the
ballots, the early filing of COCs was necessary. If there would be late filing and
approval of COCs, the names of aspiring candidates would not be included in the
ballot, the only document to be read by the Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS)
machines.
The Law, Rules and Regulations
on Substitution
With regard to substitutions, Congress and the Comelec came out with laws and
rules addressing anticipated problems in such cases. Thus, under Section 12 of
R.A. No. 9006, in order to obviate confusion, the name of the substitute candidate
should, as much as possible, bear the same surname as that of the substituted
candidate. Section 12 reads:
Section 12. Substitution of Candidates. – In case of valid substitutions after the
official ballots have been printed, the votes cast for the substituted candidates shall
be considered as stray votes but shall not invalidate the whole ballot. For this
purpose, the official ballots shall provide spaces where the voters may write the
name of the substitute candidates if they are voting for the latter: Provided,
however, That if the substitute candidate of the same family name, this provision
shall not apply. [Emphases supplied]
Regarding the May 10, 2010 automated elections, the Comelec came out with
Resolution No. 8678. On substitution, Section 13 thereof provides:
SEC. 13. Substitution of Candidates, in case of death, disqualification or
withdrawal of another. - If after the last day for the filing of certificate of candidacy,
an official candidate of a registered political party dies, withdraws or is disqualified
for any cause, he may be substituted by a candidate belonging to, and nominated
by, the same political party. No substitute shall be allowed for any independent
candidate.
The substitute for a candidate who withdrew may file his certificate of candidacy as
herein provided for the office affected not later than December 14, 2009.
The substitute for a candidate who died or suffered permanent incapacity or
disqualified by final judgment, may file his certificate of candidacy up to mid-day of
election day. If the death or permanent disability should occur between the day
before the election and mid-day of election day, the substitute candidate may file
the certificate with any board of election inspectors in the political subdivision
where he is a candidate, or in the case of a candidate for President, Vice-President
or Senator, with the Law Department of the Commission on Elections in Manila.
No person who has withdrawn his candidacy for a position shall be eligible as
substitute candidate for any other position after the deadline for filing of certificates
of candidacy. [Emphasis and underscoring supplied]
As correctly pointed out by the OSG, it is clear from the foregoing that different
deadlines were set to govern the specific circumstances that would necessitate the
substitution of a candidate due to death, disqualification or withdrawal. In case of
death or disqualification, the substitute had until midday of the election day to file
the COC. In case of withdrawal, which is the situation at bench, the substitute
should have filed a COC by December 14, 2009.
The reason for the distinction can easily be divined. Unlike death or
disqualification, withdrawal is voluntary. Generally, a candidate has sufficient time
to ponder on his candidacy and to withdraw while the printing has not yet started. If
a candidate withdraws after the printing, the name of the substitute candidate can
no longer be accommodated in the ballot and a vote for the substitute will just be
wasted.
When Batangas Governor Armando Sanchez died on April 27, 2010, Edna
withdrew her candidacy as mayor and substituted her late husband as
gubernatorial candidate for the province on April 29, 2010. The party actually had
the option to substitute another candidate for Governor aside from Edna. By
fielding Edna as their substitute candidate for Governor, the party knew that she
had to withdraw her candidacy for Mayor. Considering that the deadline for
substitution in case of withdrawal had already lapsed, no person could substitute
her as mayoralty candidate. The sudden death of then Governor Armando
Sanchez and the substitution by his widow in the gubernatorial race could not
justify a belated substitution in the mayoralty race.
Comelec Resolution No. 8889
not binding on Maligaya
Federico asserts that Resolution No. 8889, which gave due course to the COC of
Edna, as gubernatorial candidate; and his COC, as mayoralty candidate, was valid
as the Comelec passed upon all matters and issues laid before it in the case.
According to him, the legal presumption was that official duty had been regularly
performed. The resolution was an operative fact by which the Comelec denied
Maligaya’s petition to deny due course to the COC of Federico, and on the basis of
which the MBOC counted the votes for Edna as votes cast for Federico.
As far as Maligaya is concerned, the resolution was void as it lacked legal basis as
Federico’s substitution was invalid, his COC having been filed only on May 5,
2010, or after December 14, 2009, the deadline provided for under Section 13 of
Comelec Resolution No. 8678. No reason was mentioned in the resolution why his
COC was given due course except that the withdrawal "merely caused a vacuum
in mayoralty contest."35 The resolution reads:
Mrs. Edna P. Sanchez is qualified to substitute for her deceased husband. And this
substitution is not contrary to law or our rules. She is stepping up from her
candidacy as Mayor to Governor, and such action merely caused a vacuum in
mayoralty contest. The rule being cited by the Law Department that the substitute
for a candidate who withdrew may file his certificate of candidacy as herein
provided for the office affected not later than December 14, 2009, is far from
germane considering that the vacancy arose by reason of the death of Governor
Sanchez.
To stress, the vacancy in the mayoralty race in Sto. Tomas, Batangas, was due to
the withdrawal of Edna as mayoralty candidate, not due to the death of Armando
Sanchez.
Accordingly, the Court agrees with the OSG that Resolution No. 8889 was void as
it was in contravention of the guidelines set forth under Resolution No. 8678. With
respect to Federico, it cannot be regarded as a valid source of any right, like the
right to be voted for public office. Indeed, a void judgment can never be final and
executory and may be assailed at any time.36
"Where a proclamation is null and void, the proclamation is no proclamation at all
and the proclaimed candidate's assumption of office cannot deprive the Comelec
of the power to declare such nullity and annul the proclamation."37
More importantly, Resolution No. 8889 was merely an administrative issuance,
based on documents forwarded to the Comelec. It was not a result of an
adversarial proceeding, where the parties were heard and allowed to adduce
evidence. In issuing Resolution No. 8889, the Comelec did not bother to notify the
parties who would have been affected. It was, thus, not a decision in an actual
case or controversy which ripened into finality.
Unquestionably, parties who had no participation therein were not bound by the
resolution. Federico cannot invoke res judicata, one of the requirements of which is
identity of parties. Stated differently, as Maligaya was not a party in the said
proceeding, Resolution No. 8889 was not binding on him.
The second COCVP in favor of
Federico had no legal basis.
Without question, the votes garnered by Edna could not be credited to Federico as
he was never a legitimate candidate. As there was an invalid substitution, there
could not be a valid proclamation. In effect, the second COCVP in his name had
no legal basis. Granting that those who voted for Edna had in mind to vote for
Federico, nonetheless, the fact that there was no compliance with the rules cannot
be ignored.
x x x. In a choice between provisions on material qualifications of elected officials,
on the one hand, and the will of the electorate in any given locality, on the other,
we believe and so hold that we cannot choose the electorate will. The balance
must always tilt in favor of upholding and enforcing the law. To rule otherwise is to
slowly gnaw at the rule of law.38
It was alleged that the MBOC of Sto. Tomas, Batangas, raised the hands of
Federico as the winner. As correctly pointed out by Maligaya, however, this was
impossible because the CCS printed the name of Edna Sanchez as the winner on
the first COCVP. Thereafter, the MBOC came out with a second COCVP, this time,
with the name of Federico on it with the same number of votes as that of Edna,
and generated on the very same date and the very same time as the first COCVP -
a physical impossibility.
Maligaya’s Petition to Annul
the Proclamation of Federico
was filed on time
Maligaya became aware of the issuance of the second COCVP in favor of
Federico only on May 27, 2010. From that day, he had ten (10) days to question
the dubious proceeding in the MBOC under Section 6 of Resolution No. 8804.
Considering that Maligaya filed his petition to annul Federico’s May 10, 2010
proclamation on June 1, 2010, it was indeed filed on time.
It has been argued that there is no evidence that Maligaya became aware of the
issuance of the second COCVP in favor of Federico only on May 27, 2010. In this
regard, the Court believes that the actions taken by Maligaya after the elections
and the separate proclamations of Edna and Federico strongly indicate that he
was telling the truth. Indeed, there is no rhyme or reason why he should file a
petition questioning the proclamation of Edna if he had knowledge of the
subsequent proclamation of Federico. The Court adopts with approbation his
reasoning on the matter. Thus:
5.35. Private respondent pursued and prosecuted this case with the knowledge
that it was Edna Sanchez who was proclaimed, until he came to know of the
alleged proclamation of respondent Federico on May 27, 2010. Consequently, he
filed another petition on June 1, 2010, this time against Federico, to annul his
proclamation. The June 1, 2010 petition was filed within ten days from the
knowledge of the alleged proclamation of Federico.
5.36. The filing of SPC NO. 10-022 demonstrates that private respondent Maligaya
believed in good faith that it was Edna Sanchez that was proclaimed and that he
did not initially know that there was a COCVP in the name of Federico. SPC No.
10-022 is also a proof that petitioner did not dilly dally in protecting his rights.
There simply is no reason and it runs counter to human conduct for Maligaya to file
a petition for annulment of proclamation of Edna Sanchez if he knew all along that
it was Federico who was proclaimed.
5.37. In the same manner, the filing of the present petition against Federico shows
that the proclamation of Federico was fraudulent or at least made surreptitiously.
Had Maligaya known of the proclamation of Federico, he should have outrightly
filed the petition for annulment of proclamation against Federico. But because it
was made without any notice to the herein private respondent, he only knew of it
on May 27, 2010, thus, the petition on June 1, 2010. Private respondent did not
certainly sleep on his rights as he filed the proper petition within the prescribed
period. He could not be penalized for belated filing when, as shown above, the
COCVP of Federico was surreptitiously accomplished. Thus, the Comelec En
Banc did not commit grave abuse of discretion in upholding the interest of herein
private respondent Maligaya.39 [Emphasis and underscoring in the original]
Accordingly, the Comelec did not abuse its discretion when it annulled the actions
of the MBOC and the proclamation of Federico. Such exercise is within its powers
under the law to administer and enforce election laws.
x x x, The statutory power of supervision and control by the COMELEC over the
boards of canvassers includes the power to revise or reverse the action of the
boards, as well as to do what the boards should have done. Such power includes
the authority to initiate motu propio such steps or actions as may be required
pursuant to law, like reviewing the actions of the board; conducting an inquiry
affecting the genuineness of election returns beyond the election records of the
polling places involved; annulling canvass or proclamations based on incomplete
returns or on incorrect or tampered returns; invalidating a canvass or proclamation
made in an unauthorized meeting of the board of canvassers either because it
lacked a quorum or because the board did not meet at all; requiring the board to
convene.401âwphi1
There being no valid substitution,
the candidate with the highest number
of votes should be proclaimed as the
duly elected mayor
As Federico's substitution was not valid, there was only one qualified candidate in
the mayoralty race in Sto. Tomas, Batangas Maligaya. Being the only candidate,
he received the highest number of votes. Accordingly, he should be proclaimed as
the duly elected mayor in the May 10,2010 elections.41
Considering that Maligaya was the winner, the position of Intervenor Silva that he
be considered the legal successor of Federico, whom he claims failed to qualify,
has no legal basis. There is simply no vacancy. When there is no vacancy, the rule
on succession under Section 4442 of the LGC cannot be invoked.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
The Motion for Leave to Intervene filed by Armenius Silva is DENIED.
The Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Court is ordered lifted.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 205136               December 2, 2014
OLIVIA DA SILVA CERAFICA, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
For the consideration of the Court is the Special Civil Action for Certiorari under
Rule 64 of the Revised Rules of Court, assailing the ruling of respondent
Commission on Elections (Comelec) which cancelled the Certificate of Candidacy
(COC) of Kimberly Da Silva Cerafica (Kimberly) and denied the substitution of
Kimberly by petitioner Olivia Da Silva Cerafica (Olivia).
On 1 October 2012, Kimberly filed her COC for Councilor, City of Taguig for the
2013 Elections. Her COC stated that she was born on 29 October 1992, or that
she will be twenty (20) years of age on the day of the elections,1 in contravention of
the requirement that one must be at least twenty-three (23) years of age on the
day of the elections as set out in Sec. 9 (c) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8487
(Charter of the City of Taguig).2 As such, Kimberly was summoned to a clarificatory
hearing due to the age qualification.
Instead of attending the hearing,Kimberly opted to file a sworn Statement of
Withdrawal of COC on 17 December 2012.3 Simultaneously, Olivia filed her own
COC as a substitute of Kimberly. Owing to these events, the clarificatory hearing
no longer pushed through.
In a Memorandum dated 18 December 2012, Director Esmeralda Amora-Ladra
(Director Amora-Ladra) of the Comelec Law Department recommended the
cancellation of Kimberly’s COC, and consequently, the denial of the substitution of
Kimberly by Olivia. Relying on Comelec Resolution No. 9551,4 Director Amora-
Ladra opined that it is as if no COC was filed by Kimberly; thus, she cannot be
substituted.
In a Special En Banc Meeting of the Comelec on 3 January 2013,5 the Comelec
adopted the recommendation of Director Amora-Ladra, cancelled Kimberly’s COC,
and denied the substitution of Kimberly by Olivia as an effect of the cancellation of
Kimberly’s COC, viz:6
The Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to approve the foregoing
recommendation of Director Esmeralda-AmoraLadra, Law Department, as follows:
1. To cancelthe Certificate of Candidacy (COC) of aspirant Kimberly Da Silva
Cerafica without prejudice to any civil, criminal or administrative liability that she
may have incurred pursuant to Section 14 of COMELEC Resolution 9518; and
2. To deny the substitution of Kimberly Da Silva Cerafica by Olivia Da Silva
Cerafica as an effect of the cancellation of the COC of Kimberly.
Let the Law Department implement this resolution.
SO ORDERED.
Olivia then filed the present petition for certiorari with Prayer for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order, Status Quo AnteOrder, and/or Writ of Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction, raising the following issues:7
I.
WHETHER PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS ACTED
WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS
OF JURISDICTION AND CONTRARY TO LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN
ISSUING THE ASSAILED MINUTE RESOLUTION RESULTING IN THE
CANCELLATION OF THE CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY (COC) OF ASPIRANT
KIMBERLY DA SILVA CERAFICA AND THE DENIAL OF THE SUBSTITUTION
OF KIMBERLY DA SILVA CERAFICA BY OLIVIA DA SILVA CERAFICA AS AN
EFFECT OF THE CANCELLATION OF THE COC OF KIMBERLY.
II.
WHETHER PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS ACTED
WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS
OF JURISDICTION AND CONTRARY TO LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT
RULED THAT THERE WAS NO VALID SUBSTITUTION BY PETITIONER FOR
KIMBERLY RESULTING IN THE MOTU PROPRIO DENIAL OF PETITIONER’S
CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY.
III.
WHETHER PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS ACTED
WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS
OF JURISDICTION AND CONTRARY TO LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN
ISSUING THE ASSAILED RESOLUTION WITHOUT GIVING PETITIONER AN
OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD, THEREBY RESULTING IN THE MOTU
PROPRIODENIAL OF THE SUBSTITUTION OF KIMBERLY DA SILVA
CERAFICA BY OLIVIA DA SILVA CERAFICA.
In its Comment8 filed on 22 April 2013, respondent Comelec argued that Olivia
cannot substitute Kimberly as the latter was never an official candidate because
she was not eligible for the post by reason of her age, and that, moreover, the
COC that Kimberly filed was invalid because it contained a material
misrepresentation relating to her eligibility for the office she seeks to be elected
to.9 The Comelec further averred that it can cancel Kimberly’s COC motu proprioas
it may look into patent defects in the COCs, such as Kimberly’s failure to comply
with the age requirement.10
In her Reply11 filed on 10 May 2013, Oliviacountered that although Kimberly may
not be qualified to run for election because of her age, it cannot be denied that she
still filed a valid COC and was, thus, an official candidate who may be
substituted.12 Olivia also claimed that there was no ground to cancel or deny
Kimberly’s COC on the ground of lack of qualification and material
misrepresentation because she did not misrepresent her birth dateto qualify for the
position of councilor, and as there was no deliberate attempt to mislead the
electorate, which is precisely why she withdrew her COC upon learning that she
was not qualified.13
At the outset, we note that a verification with the Comelec database yields the
finding that Olivia was not among the official candidates14 for the 2013 Elections
and, thus, was not voted for.15 As such, a ruling on the present petition would no
longer be of practical use or value. Even if we were to resolve the petition for the
purpose of determining Olivia’s legal status as a legitimate and qualified candidate
for public office, such purpose has been rendered inconsequential as a result of
the proclamation of the winning councilors for the 2013 elections.16
Be that as it may, the Court deems it opportune to address the merits of the case,
if only to caution the Comelec against the precipitate cancellation of COCs.
In Albaña v. Comelec,17 we held that where the issues have become moot and
academic, there is no justiciable controversy, thereby rendering the resolution of
the same of no practical use or value. Nonetheless, courts will decide a question
otherwise moot and academic if it is capable of repetition, yet evading review. In
this case, we find it necessary to resolve the issues raised in the petition in order to
prevent a repetition thereof and, thus, enhance free, orderly, and peaceful
elections.
VALID SUBSTITUTION
In declaring that Kimberly, being under age, could not be considered to have filed
a valid COC and, thus, could not be validly substituted by Olivia, we find that the
Comelec gravely abused its discretion.
Firstly, subject to its authority over nuisance candidates18 and its power to deny
due course to or cancel COCs under Sec. 78, Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 881,
the Comelec has the ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge receipt of
COCs.19
In Cipriano v. Comelec,20 we ruled that the Comelec has no discretion to give or
not to give due couse to COCs. We emphasized that the duty of the Comelec to
give due course to COCs filed in due form is ministerial in character, and that
whilethe Comelec may look into patent defects in the COCs, it may not go into
matters not appearing on their face. The question of eligibility or ineligibility of a
candidate is thus beyond the usual and proper cognizance of the Comelec.
Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881) provides for the
procedure of substitution of candidates, to wit:
Sec. 77. Candidates in case of death, disqualification or withdrawal of another. – If
after the last day for the filing of certificates of candidacy, an official candidate of a
registered or accredited political party dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any
cause, only a person belonging to, and certified by, the same political party may
file a certificate of candidacy to replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was
disqualified. The substitute candidate nominated by the political party concerned
may file his certificate of candidacy for the office affected in accordance with the
preceding sections not later than mid-day of election day of the election.
If the death, withdrawal or disqualification should occur between the day before the
election and mid-day of election day, said certificate may be filed with any board of
election inspectors in the political subdivision where he is candidate or, in case of
candidates to be voted for by the entire electorate of the country, with the
Commission.
Under the express provision of Sec. 77 of B. P. Blg. 881, not just any person, but
only "an official candidate of a registered or accredited political party" may be
substituted.21 In the case at bar, Kimberly was an official nominee of the Liberal
Party;22 thus, she can be validly substituted.
The next question then is whether Olivia complied with all of the requirements for a
valid substitution; we answer in the affirmative. First, there was a valid withdrawal
of Kimberly’s COC after the last day for the filing of COCs; second, Olivia belongs
to and is certified to by the same political party to which Kimberly belongs;23 and
third, Olivia filed her COC not later than mid-day of election day.24
In Luna v. Comelec,25 where the candidate, who was also under age, withdrew his
COC before election day and was substituted by a qualified candidate, we
declared that suchsubstitution was valid. The Court eloquently explained:
Substitution of Luna for Hans Roger was Valid
Luna contends that Hans Roger filed a valid certificate of candidacy and,
subsequently, upon Hans Roger’s withdrawal of his certificate of candidacy, there
was a valid substitution by Luna. On the other hand, the COMELEC ruled that
Hans Roger, being under age, could not be considered tohave filed a valid
certificate of candidacy and, therefore, is not a valid candidate who could be
substituted by Luna.
When a candidate files his certificate of candidacy, the COMELEC has a
ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge its receipt. Section 76 of the Omnibus
Election Code(Election Code) provides:
Sec. 76. Ministerial duty of receiving and acknowledging receipt. – The
Commission, provincial election supervisor, election registrar or officer designated
by the Commission or the board of election inspectors under the succeeding
section shall have the ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge receipt of the
certificate of candidacy.
In this case, when Hans Roger filed his certificate of candidacy on 5 January 2004,
the COMELEC had the ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge receipt of
Hans Roger’s certificate of candidacy. Thus, the COMELEC had the ministerial
duty to give due course to Hans Rogers certificate of candidacy.
On 15 January 2004, Hans Roger withdrew his certificate of candidacy. The
Election Code allows a person who has filed a certificate of candidacy to withdraw
the same prior to the election by submitting a written declaration under oath. There
is no provision of law which prevents a candidate from withdrawing his certificate
of candidacy before the election.
On the same date, Luna filed her certificate of candidacy as substitute for Hans
Roger. Section 77 of the Election Code prescribes the rules on substitution of an
official candidate of a registered political party who dies, withdraws, or is
disqualified for any cause after the last day for the filing of certificate of candidacy.
Section 77 of the Election Code provides:
Sec. 77. Candidates in case of death, disqualification or withdrawal of another. – If
after the last day for the filing of certificates of candidacy, an official candidate of a
registered or accredited politicalparty dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any
cause, only a person belonging to, and certified by, the same political party may
file a certificate of candidacy to replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was
disqualified. The substitute candidate nominated by the political party concerned
may file his certificate of candidacy for the office affected in accordance with the
preceding sections not later thanmid-day of election day of the election. If the
death, withdrawal or disqualification should occur between the day before the
election and midday of election day, said certificate may be filed with any board of
election inspectors in the political subdivision where he is candidate or, in case of
candidates to be voted for by the entire electorate of the country, with the
Commission.
Since Hans Roger withdrew his certificate of candidacy and the COMELEC found
that Luna complied with all the procedural requirements for a valid substitution,
Luna can validly substitute for Hans Roger.
The COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in declaring that Hans Roger, being under age, could not be
considered to have filed a valid certificate of candidacy and, thus, could not be
validly substituted by Luna. The COMELEC may not, by itself, without the proper
proceedings, deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy filed in due
form. In Sanchez vs. Del Rosario, the Court ruled that the question of eligibility or
ineligibility of a candidate for non-age is beyond the usual and proper cognizance
of the COMELEC.
Section 74 of the Election Code provides that the certificate of candidacy shall
state, among others, the date of birth of the person filing the certificate. Section 78
of the Election Code provides that in case a person filing a certificate of candidacy
has committed false material representation, a verified petition to deny due course
to or cancel the certificate of candidacy of said person may be filed at any time not
later than 25 days from the time of filing of the certificate of candidacy.
If Hans Roger made a material misrepresentation as to his date of birth or age in
his certificate of candidacy, his eligibility may only be impugned through a verified
petition to deny due course to or cancel such certificate of candidacy under
Section 78 of the Election Code.
In this case, there was no petition to deny due course to or cancel the certificate of
candidacyof Hans Roger. The COMELEC only declared that Hans Roger did not
file a valid certificate of candidacy and, thus, was not a valid candidate in the
petition to deny due course to or cancel Luna’s certificate of candidacy. In effect,
the COMELEC, without the proper proceedings, cancelled Hans Roger’s certificate
of candidacy and declared the substitution by Luna invalid.
It would have been different if there was a petition to deny due course to or cancel
Hans Roger’s certificate of candidacy.1âwphi1 For if the COMELEC cancelled
Hans Roger’s certificate of candidacy after the proper proceedings, then he is no
candidate at all and there can be no substitution of a person whose certificate of
candidacy has been cancelled and denied due course. However, Hans Roger’s
certificate of candidacy was never cancelled or denied due course by the
COMELEC.
Moreover, Hans Roger already withdrew his certificate of candidacy before the
COMELEC declared that he was not a valid candidate. Therefore, unless Hans
Roger’s certificate of candidacy was denied due course or cancelled in accordance
with Section 78 of the Election Code, Hans Roger’s certificate of candidacy was
valid and he may be validly substituted by Luna.26 (Emphases supplied.)
LACK OF DUE PROCESS
Moreover, in simply relying on the Memorandum of Director Amora Ladra in
cancelling Kimberly’s COC and denying the latter’s substitution by Olivia, and
absent any petition to deny due course to or cancel said COC, the Court finds that
the Comelec once more gravely abused its discretion. The Court reminds the
Comelec that, inthe exercise of it adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers, the
Constitution27 mandates it to hear and decide cases first by Division and, upon
motion for reconsideration, by the En Banc.
Where a power rests in judgment or discretion, so that it is of judicial nature or
character, but does not involve the exercise of functions of a judge, or is conferred
upon an officer other than a judicial officer, it is deemed quasi-judicial.28 As
cancellation proceedings involve the exercise of quasi judicial functions of the
Comelec, the Comelec in Division should have first decided this case.
29
In Bautista v. Comelec, et al.,  where the Comelec Law Department
recommended the cancellation of a candidate’s COC for lack of qualification, and
which recommendation was affirmed by the Comelec En Banc, the Court held that
the Comelec En Banc cannot short cut the proceedings by acting on the case
without a prior action by a division because it denies due process to the candidate.
The Court held:
A division of the COMELEC should have first heard this case. The COMELEC en
banc can only act on the case if there is a motion for reconsideration of the
decision of the COMELEC division. Hence, the COMELEC en banc acted without
jurisdiction when it ordered the cancellation of Bautista’s certificate of candidacy
without first referring the case to a division for summary hearing.
xxxx
Under Section 3, Rule 23 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure, a petition for
the denial or cancellation of a certificate of candidacy must be heard summarily
after due notice. It isthus clear that cancellation proceedings involve the exercise
of the quasi-judicial functions of the COMELEC which the COMELEC in
divisionshould first decide. More so in this case where the cancellation
proceedings originated not from a petition but from a report of the election officer
regarding the lack of qualification of the candidate in the barangay election. The
COMELEC en bane cannot short cut the proceedings by acting on the case
without a prior action by a division because it denies due process to the
candidate.30 (Emphasis supplied.)
The determination of whether a candidate is eligible for the position he is seeking
involves a determination of fact where parties must be allowed to adduce evidence
in support of their contentions.31 We thus caution the Comelec against its practice
of impetuous cancellation of COCs via minute resolutions adopting the
recommendations of its Law Department when the situation properly calls for the
case's referral to a Division for summary hearing.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, with the cautionary counsel that cancellation
of certificate of candidacy is a quasi-judicial process, and accordingly is heard by
the Commission on Elections in Division and En Banc on appeal, we DISMISS the
present petition for being moot and academic.
SO ORDERED.
January 19, 2016
G.R. No. 215995
VICE-MAYOR MARCELINA S. ENGLE, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC and WINSTON B.
MENZON, Respondents.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Challenged in this petition for certiorari  and prohibition under Rule 64 in relation to
Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is the Resolution1 of the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc  dated January 20, 2015 which upheld the
Resolution2 of the COMELEC Second Division dated July 5, 2013, denying due
course to and/or cancelling petitioner's certificate of candidacy; annulling her
proclamation as the duly-elected Vice-Mayor of Babatngon, Leyte; and proclaiming
private respondent in her stead.
Petitioner and private respondent vied for the position of Vice-Mayor of the
Municipality of Babatngon, Province of Leyte in the May 13, 2013 Automated
Synchronized National, Local and ARMM Regional Elections (the May 13, 2013
Elections, for brevity). Petitioner’s late husband, James L. Engle, was originally a
candidate for said contested position; however, he died of cardiogenic shock on
February 2, 2013.3 Due to this development, petitioner filed her certificate of
candidacy4 on February 22, 2013 as a substitute candidate for her deceased
spouse.
In response, private respondent filed, on February 25, 2013, a Petition to Deny
Due Course and/or Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy5 (COC) of petitioner
arguing in the main that the latter misrepresented that she is qualified to substitute
her husband, who was declared an independent candidate by the COMELEC. It
would appear that James L. Engle’s Certificate of Nomination and Acceptance
(CONA) was signed by Lakas Christian Muslim Democrats (Lakas-CMD) Leyte
Chapter President, Ferdinand Martin G. Romualdez (Romualdez). However,
Lakas-CMD failed to submit to the COMELEC Law Department the authorization of
Romualdez to sign the CONAs of Lakas-CMD candidates in Babatngon as
prescribed by Section 6(3) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9518. Thus, the
COMELEC Law Department considered all Lakas-CMD candidates whose CONAs
were signed by Romualdez as independent candidates.6 For this reason, private
respondent charged petitioner with violation of Section 15, COMELEC Resolution
No. 9518 which disallows the substitution of an independent candidate. He argued
that petitioner’s declaration that she was a member of the political party, Lakas-
CMD, was intended to deceive the electorate that she was qualified to substitute
her husband. Additionally, private respondent claimed that “[t]he false
representation of the [petitioner] that she is qualified for public office consisted of a
deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact that would otherwise render
a candidate ineligible.”7
In petitioner’s Verified Answer,8 she countered that: (1) the ground relied upon in
private respondent’s petition was not the ground contemplated by Section 1, Rule
23 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9523; (2) the COMELEC did not issue an official
declaration that petitioner’s husband was an independent candidate; and (3)
James L. Engle’s CONA was signed by an authorized person acting on behalf of
LAKAS-CMD.
With regard to her first counter-argument, petitioner posited that, under Section 1,
Rule 23 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9523, the exclusive ground for denial or
cancellation of a COC is the falsity of a material representation contained therein
that is required by law. Private respondent’s assertion that petitioner’s statement in
her COC regarding her affiliation with a political party was such a false
representation is “absurd” considering that her CONA was signed by Senator
Ramon “Bong” Revilla, Jr. and Mr. Raul L. Lambino, President and Senior Deputy
Secretary-General of Lakas-CMD, respectively. Assuming the veracity of private
respondent’s allegations, his contention that petitioner is disqualified to run as a
substitute is not a proper subject of a petition to deny due course or to cancel a
COC. The qualification or disqualification of a candidate is allegedly covered by
Sections 12, 68, 69 and 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. In petitioner’s view, the
petition to cancel her COC is dismissible according to the second paragraph of
Section 1 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9523 which provides that “[a] petition to
Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy invoking grounds other
than those stated above or grounds for disqualification, or combining grounds for a
separate remedy, shall be summarily dismissed.”
As for petitioner’s counter-arguments on the substantive issues, she contended
that there was no official declaration from the COMELEC that her deceased
husband was an independent candidate. Private respondent’s reliance on a mere
print out of the COMELEC website listing her husband as an independent
candidate was misplaced as the same cannot be considered authoritative as
opposed to official documents that showed James L. Engle’s nomination by Lakas-
CMD and his acceptance of said nomination to run for the position of Vice-Mayor
of Babatngon, Leyte under the banner of Lakas-CMD. Moreover, petitioner
stressed that Romualdez was authorized to sign James L. Engle’s CONA. She
attached to her Verified Answer a copy of the Authority to Sign Certificates of
Nomination and Acceptance dated September 11, 2012 which was signed by
Ramon “Bong” Revilla, Jr. (National President) and Jose S. Aquino II (Secretary-
General) of Lakas-CMD in favor of Romualdez.
The petition to deny due course or cancel petitioner’s COC was still pending with
the COMELEC Second Division when the May 13, 2013 Elections were held.
James L. Engle’s name remained on the ballot. On May 15, 2013, the Municipal
Board of Canvassers issued a certificate of canvass of votes and proclamation of
winning candidates for Babatngon Mayor and Vice-Mayor9 wherein petitioner was
declared as the duly-elected Vice-Mayor of Babatngon, Leyte. Petitioner was
credited with the Six Thousand Six Hundred Fifty Seven (6,657) votes cast for her
husband as against private respondent’s Three Thousand Five Hundred Fifteen
(3,515) votes.10
It was only on July 5, 2013 did the COMELEC Second Division promulgate the
assailed Resolution which denied due course to and cancelled petitioner’s COC
resulting in the annulment of petitioner’s previous proclamation as duly-elected
Vice-Mayor of Babatngon, Leyte and the declaration of private respondent as
winner of the contested position. The dispositive portion of the July 5, 2013
Resolution is reproduced here:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Commission
hereby RESOLVES to DENY DUE COURSE to and/or CANCEL the Certificate of
Candidacy filed by Respondent MARCELINA S. ENGLE for the position of Vice-
Mayor of Babatngon, Leyte, for the 13 May 2013 National and Local Elections.
Moreover, Respondent MARCELINA S. ENGLE’s proclamation as the duly-
elected Vice-Mayor of Babatngon, Leyte is hereby ANNULLED. Accordingly:
1. The Executive Director is ordered to constitute a Special Municipal Board of
Canvassers for the municipality of Babatngon, Leyte; and
2. The Special Municipal Board of Canvassers is ordered to immediately notify the
parties, reconvene and proclaim Petitioner WINSTON B. MENZON as the duly-
elected Vice-Mayor of Babatngon, Leyte.
Let the Executive Director implement this Resolution.11
According to the COMELEC Second Division, the substitution of petitioner as a
candidate in place of her deceased husband for the position of Vice-Mayor of
Babatngon, Leyte was not a material misrepresentation which may be a ground for
cancellation of her COC under Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the
Omnibus Election Code (OEC). Citing jurisprudence, the COMELEC Second
Division ruled that the false representation contemplated under the law refers to a
material fact affecting a candidate’s qualification for office such as citizenship or
residence.
Despite the foregoing finding, the COMELEC Second Division nonetheless found
sufficient basis to cancel petitioner’s COC on the ground that she could not have
validly substituted her husband, who was deemed an independent candidate for
failure of Lakas-CMD to submit to the COMELEC Law Department Romualdez’s
authority to sign CONAs for and on behalf of the party on or before October 1,
2012 in violation of Section 6 (3) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9518. The
COMELEC Second Division noted that the purported authorization of Romualdez
to sign CONAs for Lakas-CMD candidates in Leyte was belatedly submitted in
connection with the proceedings on the petition to deny due course to, or cancel
petitioner’s COC.
Finally, on the point on who should be declared the winning candidate for the
position of Vice-Mayor of Babatngon, the COMELEC Second Division held that
private respondent, the second placer, should be declared the winner in line with
jurisprudence stating that if the COC of the winning candidate is void ab initio  then
the votes of the disqualified or ineligible candidate should be considered stray.
Aggrieved, petitioner moved for reconsideration of the aforementioned ruling of the
COMELEC Second Division with the COMELEC En Banc. However, the latter
tribunal denied petitioner’s plea in the assailed January 20, 2015 Resolution, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration
is DENIED for LACK OF MERIT. The Resolution of the Commission (Second
Division) is AFFIRMED.12
Appealing now to this Court for relief, petitioner offers the following arguments in
support of her petition:
I FILED BY MENZON AND PENALIZED THE PETITIONER FOR AN OMISSION
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMELEC EN BANC AND ITS SECOND
DIVISION ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT GRANTED THE PETITION
FILED BY MENZON DESPITE ITS FINDING THAT ENGLE DID NOT COMMIT
ANY MATERIAL MISREPRESENTATION IN HER CERTIFICATE OF
CANDIDACY.
II
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMELEC EN BANC AND ITS SECOND
DIVISION ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT GRANTED THE PETITION
FILED BY MENZON EVEN THOUGH NO LEGAL GROUND EXISTS TO DENY
DUE COURSE TO OR CANCEL ENGLE’S CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY
GIVEN THE ABSENCE OF MATERIAL MISREPRESENTATION IN THIS CASE.
III
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMELEC EN BANC AND ITS SECOND
DIVISION ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT DENIED DUE COURSE TO
AND CANCELLED PETITIONER’S CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY EVEN
THOUGH THE PETITION FILED BY MENZON IS CLEARLY THE WRONG
LEGAL REMEDY TO ASSAIL THE SUPPOSED INVALIDITY OF PETITIONER’S
SUBSTITUTION THUS VIOLATING ENGLE’S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO
DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
IV
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMELEC EN BANC AND ITS SECOND
DIVISION ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT DECLARED THAT
ROMUALDEZ HAS NO AUTHORITY TO SIGN THE CONA OF LAKAS-CMD’s
CANDIDATES IN LEYTE.
V
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMELEC EN BANC AND ITS SECOND
DIVISION ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT GRANTED THE PETITION
DONE BY ANOTHER PARTY AS THIS RUN CONTRARY TO THE PRINCIPLE
OF RES INTER ALIOS ACTA.
VI
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMELEC EN BANC  AND ITS SECOND
DIVISION  ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT DECLARED THAT
PETITIONER ENGLE CANNOT VALIDLY SUBSTITUTE HER DECEASED
HUSBAND, JAMES L. ENGLE, AS THE LAKAS-CMD CANDIDATE FOR THE
POSITION OF VICEMAYOR OF BABATNGON, LEYTE.
VII
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMELEC EN BANC  AND ITS SECOND
DIVISION  ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT DISREGARDED AND
BYPASSED THE WILL OF THE ELECTORATE BY IGNORING THE
OVERWHELMING AND PROMINENT NUMBER OF VOTES OBTAINED BY
ENGLE DURING THE RECENTLY CONCLUDED MAY 13, 2013 NATIONAL AND
LOCAL ELECTIONS.
VIII
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMELEC EN BANC  AND ITS SECOND
DIVISION  ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT ORDERED THE
PROCLAMATION OF MENZON, THE CANDIDATE WHO OBTAINED THE
SECOND HIGHEST NUMBER OF VOTES, FOR THE POSITION OF VICE-
MAYOR OF BABATNGON, LEYTE.13
During the pendency of this petition, the COMELEC En Banc issued on February
3, 2015 a Writ of Execution14 in SPA Case No. 13-232 (DC) (F) in response to a
motion filed by private respondent which set the stage for the immediate
implementation of the assailed COMELEC Resolutions which are the subject
matter of this case.
On February 26, 2015, the COMELEC filed its Comment15 wherein it raised the
following counter-arguments:
I.
THE NAME AND SPECIMEN SIGNATURES OF THE PARTY OFFICIAL
AUTHORIZED TO SIGN THE CONA SHOULD BE TRANSMITTED TO THE
COMELEC WITHIN THE PERIOD PROVIDED IN RESOLUTION NO. [9518].
II.
POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE CANDIDATES THEMSELVES KNEW OF
RESOLUTION NO. 9518 AS IT WAS THE GUIDELINES PROMULGATED FOR
THE CONDUCT OF THE MAY 2013 NATIONAL AND LOCAL ELECTIONS.
III.
OTHER CANDIDATES WERE SIMILARLY DEEMED INDEPENDENT
CANDIDATES FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH RESOLUTION NO. 9518.
IV.
THE PROSCRIPTION AGAINST THE SUBSTITUTION OF AN INDEPENDENT
CANDIDATE WHO DIES PRIOR TO THE ELECTION IS A LEGAL PRINCIPLE.
V.
PETITIONER COULD NOT BE VOTED FOR IN THE MAY 2013 NATIONAL AND
LOCAL ELECTIONS.
VI.
PETITIONER WAS NOT DENIED DUE PROCESS WHEN HER COC WAS
CANCELLED BY THE COMELEC.
VII.
NO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WAS COMMITTED BY COMELEC IN
CANCELLING PETITIONER’S COC.16
Private respondent likewise filed his Comment/Opposition17 on March 17, 2015. In
his pleading, private respondent identified the following issues that should be
resolved in this case:
I. Whether or not petitioner Engle can validly substitute for her late husband James
Engle who was an independent candidate for Vice-Mayor of Babatngon, Leyte;
II. Whether or not private respondent (sic) the Commission En Banc erred in
ordering the proclamation of private respondent Menzon as the candidate who
obtained the second highest number of votes, for the position of Vice-Mayor of
Babatngon, Leyte;
III. Whether or not the Commission En Banc erred in granting private respondent’s
Petition in the absence of a finding of material misrepresentation of this case; [and]
IV. Whether or not petitioner’s prayer for issuance of temporary restraining order
and/or status quo ante order and/or preliminary injunction is meritorious.18
From the parties’ submissions, it is apparent that this case rests upon the
resolution of the following core issues:
I foreign country; that the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily,
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER’S COC WAS VALIDLY CANCELLED BY THE
COMELEC
II
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER CAN VALIDLY SUBSTITUTE HER HUSBAND
JAMES L. ENGLE AFTER HIS UNEXPECTED DEMISE
III
WHETHER OR NOT PRIVATE RESPONDENT CAN BE VALIDLY PROCLAIMED
AS VICE-MAYOR OF BABATNGON, LEYTE DESPITE HAVING PLACED ONLY
SECOND IN THE MAY 13, 2013 ELECTIONS
We grant the petition.
Under Section 78 of the OEC, a petition to deny due course to, or cancel a COC
may be filed on the exclusive ground of false material representation in said COC.
For reference, we quote the full provision here:
Section 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. – A
verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy
may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material
representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The
petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the
filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and
hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.
Section 74 of the OEC in turn enumerates the items that should be stated in a
COC, to wit:
Section 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy.  - The certificate of candidacy shall
state that the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated
therein and that he is eligible for said office; if for Member of the Batasang
Pambansa, the province, including its component cities, highly urbanized city or
district or sector which he seeks to represent; the political party to which he
belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his post office address for all
election purposes; his profession or occupation; that he will support and defend the
Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto;
that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees promulgated by the duly
constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a
without mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the
certificate of candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge.
Unless a candidate has officially changed his name through a court approved
proceeding, a [candidate] shall use in a certificate of candidacy the name by which
he has been baptized, or if has not been baptized in any church or religion, the
name registered in the office of the local civil registrar or any other name allowed
under the provisions of existing law or, in the case of a Muslim, his Hadji name
after performing the prescribed religious pilgrimage: Provided, That when there are
two or more candidates for an office with the same name and surname, each
candidate, upon being made aware or such fact, shall state his paternal and
maternal surname, except the incumbent who may continue to use the name and
surname stated in his certificate of candidacy when he was elected. He may also
include one nickname or stage name by which he is generally or popularly known
in the locality.
The person filing a certificate of candidacy shall also affix his latest photograph,
passport size; a statement in duplicate containing his bio-data and program of
government not exceeding one hundred words, if he so desires.
Based on the letter of the foregoing provisions, we agree with the COMELEC
Second Division finding, implicitly affirmed by the COMELEC En Banc, that there
was no false material representation in petitioner’s COC under Section 78, in
relation to Section 74, of the OEC.
We quote with approval the following disquisition in the COMELEC Second
Division’s Resolution dated July 5, 2013:
The false representation which is a ground for a denial of due course to and/or
cancellation of a candidate’s COC refers to a material fact relating to the
candidate’s qualification for office such as one’s citizenship or residence. Thus,
citing Salcedo II v. COMELEC and Lluz v. COMELEC, the Supreme Court, in the
case of [Ugdoracion], Jr. v. COMELEC, et al., ruled as follows:
In case there is a material misrepresentation in the certificate of candidacy, the
Comelec is authorized to deny due course to or cancel such certificate upon the
filing of a petition by any person pursuant to Section 78. x x x.
xxxx
As stated in the law, in order to justify the cancellation of the certificate of
candidacy under Section 78, it is essential that the false representation
mentioned therein pertain[s] to a material matter for the sanction imposed by
this provision would affect the substantive rights of a candidate the right to run for
the elective post for which he filed the certificate of candidacy. Although the law
does not specify what would be considered as a material representation, the court
has interpreted this phrase in a line of decisions applying Section 78 of [B.P. 881].
xxxx
Therefore, it may be concluded that the material misrepresentation contemplated
by Section 78 of the Code refer[s] to qualifications for elective
office.1avvphi1 This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that the consequences
imposed upon a candidate guilty of having made a false representation in [the]
certificate of candidacy are grave to prevent the candidate from running or, if
elected, from serving, or to prosecute him for violation of the election laws. It could
not have been the intention of the law to deprive a person of such a basic and
substantive political right to be voted for a public office upon just any innocuous
mistake.19
Undeniably, private respondent failed to demonstrate that petitioner made a false
statement regarding her qualifications or concealed any disqualification for the
office to which she sought to be elected in her COC to warrant its cancellation
under Section 78.
The records also show that when petitioner’s husband filed his certificate of
candidacy on October 4, 2012 with the Office of the Election Officer in Babatngon,
Leyte he clearly indicated therein that he was a nominee of Lakas-CMD and
attached thereto not only the CONA signed by Romualdez but also the Authority to
Sign Certificates of Nomination and Acceptance dated September 12, 2012 in
favor of Romualdez signed by Lakas-CMD President Revilla and Lakas-CMD
Secretary-General Aquino. In Sinaca v. Mula,20 we held:
A certificate of candidacy is in the nature of a formal manifestation to the whole
world of the candidate's political creed or lack of political creed. It is a statement of
a person seeking to run for a public office certifying that he announces his
candidacy for the office mentioned and that he is eligible for the office, the name of
the political party to which he belongs, if he belongs to any, and his post-office
address for all election purposes being as well stated.
Verily, it was publicly known that James L. Engle was a member of Lakas-CMD.
As far as the party and his wife were concerned, James L. Engle, as a member of
Lakas-CMD, may be substituted as a candidate upon his death. There was no
evidence on record that the party or petitioner had notice or knowledge of the
COMELEC’s classification of James L. Engle as an independent candidate prior to
February 22, 2013 when petitioner filed her COC as a substitute for her deceased
husband. The only document in the record indicating that Lakas-CMD had been
notified of James L. Engle’s designation as an independent candidate is the Letter
dated March 21, 2013 sent by the COMELEC Law Department to
Romualdez21 stating that James L. Engle was declared an independent candidate
due to the failure of Lakas-CMD to submit the authority of Romualdez to sign
James L. Engle’s CONA to the Law Department as required under Section 6(3) of
COMELEC Resolution No. 9518 and in view thereof petitioner’s COC as her
husband’s substitute was denied due course.
First, the COMELEC Law Department’s “ruling” was issued only after the filing of
petitioner’s COC. Second, with respect to the denial of due course to James L.
Engle’s COC as a nominee of Lakas-CMD and to petitioner’s COC as his
substitute, the COMELEC Law Department’s letter is not binding and at most,
recommendatory. It is settled in jurisprudence that the denial of due course or
cancellation of one’s COC is not within the administrative powers of the
COMELEC, but rather calls for the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions.22 We
have also previously held that the COMELEC, in the exercise of its adjudicatory or
quasi-judicial powers, is mandated by the Constitution to hear and decide such
cases first by Division and, upon motion for reconsideration, by the En Banc.23 In
resolving cases to deny due course to or cancel certificates of candidacy, the
COMELEC cannot merely rely on the recommendations of its Law Department but
must conduct due proceedings through one of its divisions.24 Returning to the case
at bar, the COMELEC Second Division only formally ruled on the status of James
L. Engle as an independent candidate and the invalidity of petitioner’s substitution
on July 5, 2013, months after the May 13, 2013 Elections.
Under these premises, the COMELEC correctly did not cancel petitioner’s COC on
the ground of false material representation as there was none.
This brings us to the second issue. Despite finding that there was no false material
representation in petitioner’s COC, the COMELEC nonetheless cancelled the
same on the ground of invalidity of petitioner’s substitution for her husband as
candidate for Vice-Mayor of Babatngon, Leyte. The COMELEC anchored its action
on the fact that Romualdez’s authority to sign James L. Engle’s CONA was
belatedly submitted and thus, the latter should be considered an independent
candidate who cannot be substituted under Section 7725 of the OEC and Section
15 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9518.26
It is on this point that the Court sees fit to overturn the COMELEC’s disposition of
the present case.
The COMELEC relies heavily on Section 6 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9518,
which reads:
Section 6. Filing of Certificate of Nomination and Acceptance of Official
Candidates of a Political Party / Coalition of Political Parties. - The Certificate
of Nomination and Acceptance (CONA) of the official candidates of the duly
registered political party or coalition of political parties shall be, in five (5) legible
copies, attached to and filed simultaneously with the Certificate of Candidacy. The
CONA shall also be stamped received in the same manner as the Certificate of
Candidacy.
The CONA, sample form attached, shall be duly signed and attested to under
oath, either by the Party President, Chairman, Secretary-General or any other
duly authorized officer of the nominating party and shall bear the acceptance
of the nominee as shown by his signature in the space provided therein.
For this purpose, all duly registered political parties or coalition of political
parties shall, not later than October 1, 2012, submit to the Law Department,
the names and specimen signatures of the authorized signatories of their
official party nominations.
No duly registered political party or coalition of political parties shall be allowed to
nominate more than the number of candidates required to be voted for in a
particular elective position; otherwise, in such a situation, all of the nominations
shall be denied due course by the Commission. (Emphases supplied.)
The Commission stressed that the belated filing of Romualdez’s authority to sign
James L. Engle’s COC only in connection with the proceedings for cancellation of
petitioner’s own COC is fatal to petitioner’s cause in view of the categorical
directive in the above provision that said authority must be submitted to its Law
Department on or before October 1, 2012.
This Court recognizes that the COMELEC is empowered by law to prescribe such
rules so as to make efficacious and successful the conduct of
elections.27 However, it is a long standing principle in jurisprudence that rules and
regulations for the conduct of elections are mandatory before the election, but
when they are sought to be enforced after the election they are held to be directory
only, if that is possible, especially where, if they are held to be mandatory, innocent
voters will be deprived of their votes without any fault on their part.28 Over time, we
have qualified this doctrine to refer only to matters of form and cannot be applied
to the substantial qualifications of candidates. This was discussed at length
in Mitra v. Commission on Elections,29 thus:
We have applied in past cases the principle that the manifest will of the people as
expressed through the ballot must be given fullest effect; in case of doubt, political
laws must be interpreted to give life and spirit to the popular mandate. Thus, we
have held that while provisions relating to certificates of candidacy are in
mandatory terms, it is an established rule of interpretation as regards election
laws, that mandatory provisions, requiring certain steps before elections, will be
construed as directory after the elections, to give effect to the will of the people.
Quite recently, however, we warned against a blanket and unqualified reading and
application of this ruling, as it may carry dangerous significance to the rule of law
and the integrity of our elections. For one, such blanket/unqualified reading may
provide a way around the law that effectively negates election requirements aimed
at providing the electorate with the basic information for an informed choice about
a candidate’s eligibility and fitness for office. Short of adopting a clear cut standard,
we thus made the following clarification:
We distinguish our ruling in this case from others that we have made in the past by
the clarification that COC defects beyond matters of form  and that involve material
misrepresentations  cannot avail of the benefit of our ruling that COC mandatory
requirements before elections are considered merely directory after the people
shall have spoken. A mandatory and material election law requirement involves
more than the will of the people in any given locality. Where a material COC
misrepresentation under oath  is made, thereby violating both our election and
criminal laws, we are faced as well with an assault on the will of the people of the
Philippines as expressed in our laws. In a choice between provisions on material
qualifications of elected officials, on the one hand, and the will of the electorate in
any given locality, on the other, we believe and so hold that we cannot choose the
electorate will.
Earlier, Frivaldo v. COMELEC  provided the following test:
[T]his Court has repeatedly stressed the importance of giving effect to the
sovereign will in order to ensure the survival of our democracy. In any action
involving the possibility of a reversal of the popular electoral choice, this Court
must exert utmost effort to resolve the issues in a manner that would give effect to
the will of the majority, for it is merely sound public policy to cause elective offices
to be filled by those who are the choice of the majority. To successfully
challenge a winning candidate's qualifications, the petitioner must clearly
demonstrate that the ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to constitutional
and legal principles that overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving
effect to the apparent will of the people would ultimately create greater
prejudice to the very democratic institutions and juristic traditions that our
Constitution and laws so zealously protect and promote. (Citations omitted,
underscoring supplied.)
As may be recalled, petitioner’s deceased husband’s name remained on the ballot
notwithstanding his death even before the campaign period for the local elections
began on March 29, 2013.30 Yet, he received almost twice the number of votes as
the second placer, private respondent, in a decisive victory. Since the people of
Babatngon, Leyte could not have possibly meant to waste their votes on a
deceased candidate, we conclude that petitioner was the undisputed choice of the
electorate as Vice-Mayor on the apparent belief that she may validly substitute her
husband. That belief was not contradicted by any official or formal ruling by the
COMELEC prior to the elections.
We held in Rulloda v. Commission on Elections31 that:
Technicalities and procedural niceties in election cases should not be made to
stand in the way of the true will of the electorate. Laws governing election contests
must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in the choice of
public officials may not be defeated by mere technical objections.
Election contests involve public interest, and technicalities and procedural barriers
must yield if they constitute an obstacle to the determination of the true will of the
electorate in the choice of their elective officials. The Court frowns upon any
interpretation of the law that would hinder in any way not only the free and
intelligent casting of the votes in an election but also the correct ascertainment of
the results.
We had the occasion to rule in Sinaca  that “an election in which the voters have
fully, fairly, and honestly expressed their will is not invalid even though an improper
method is followed in the nomination of candidates.”32 In the same case, we
proceeded to enumerate examples of formal defects in a COC that may be treated
with liberality once the electorate has spoken in an election, to wit:
It has been held that the provisions of the election law regarding certificates of
candidacy, such as signing and swearing on the same, as well as the information
required to be stated therein, are considered mandatory prior to the elections.
Thereafter, they are regarded as merely directory. With respect to election laws, it
is an established rule of interpretation that mandatory provisions requiring certain
steps before election will be construed as directory after the elections, to give
effect to the will of the electorate. Thus, even if the certificate of candidacy was not
duly signed or if it does not contain the required data, the proclamation of the
candidate as winner may not be nullified on such ground. The defects in the
certificate should have been questioned before the election; they may not be
questioned after the election without invalidating the will of the electorate, which
should not be done. In Guzman v. Board of Canvassers, the Court held that the
“will of the people cannot be frustrated by a technicality that the certificate of
candidacy had not been properly sworn to. This legal provision is mandatory and
non-compliance therewith before the election would be fatal to the status of the
candidate before the [election], but after the people have expressed their will, the
result of the election cannot be defeated by the fact that the candidate has not
sworn to his certificate of candidacy.”33
Applying these jurisprudential precedents, we find that the late submission of
Romualdez’s authority to sign the CONA of James L. Engle to the COMELEC was
a mere technicality that cannot be used to defeat the will of the electorate in a fair
and honest election.
The Court has likewise ruled in the past that non-compliance with formal
requirements laid down in election laws when not used as a means for fraudulent
practice will be considered a harmless irregularity.34 Allowing the belated
submission of Romualdez’s authority to sign CONAs will not result in the situation
proscribed by Section 77 of the OEC – that an independent candidate will be
invalidly substituted. In the case at bar, neither the COMELEC nor private
respondent contended that James L. Engle was not in fact a bona fide  member of
Lakas-CMD. The record is bereft of any allegation that the authority in favor of
Romualdez was inexistent, forged or in any way defective. The only issue was that
it was not submitted within the prescribed deadline. Nonetheless, said authority
was submitted as early as October 4, 2012 to the local election officer and
subsequently to the COMELEC itself in the course of the proceedings on private
respondent’s petition to deny due course to, or cancel petitioner’s COC, thereby
putting election officials on notice that such authority exists even before the
conduct of the May 13, 2013 Elections.
We distinguish this case from Federico v. Commission on Elections,35 wherein we
strictly applied election rules on substitution, particularly the deadline to file
certificates of candidacy for substitutes of candidates who voluntarily withdraw
from the electoral race. In Federico, a liberal interpretation of the rule would have
led to a violation of the clear policy that no substitution for a voluntarily withdrawing
candidate can be made beyond the mandated deadline. In the case at bar, the
intention behind setting a deadline for the filing by political parties of an authority to
sign CONAs was to give the COMELEC reasonable opportunity to determine who
are members of political parties and who are independent candidates. This is so
the COMELEC may prevent a violation of Section 77 of the OEC which reserves
the right to field a substitute candidate to duly registered political parties. A
relaxation of the rules in the present case would not result in the evil sought to be
prevented. On the contrary, it is the strict application of the rules that would lead to
the iniquitous situation that a candidate who was in fact a member of a political
party would be considered an independent, thus infringing the right of the
nominating political party to replace him in the event of death, withdrawal or
disqualification pursuant to election laws.
To be sure, we have held that a political party has the right to identify who its
members are.36 From the evidence it can be concluded that James L. Engle was
not an independent candidate but indeed a nominee of Lakas-CMD and he may be
validly substituted by his wife, who was nominated by the same political party, in
light of his unexpected demise prior to the elections.
The COMELEC En Banc in its Resolution dated January 20, 2015 asserted that it
cannot ignore Lakas-CMD's non-compliance with Section 6 of COMELEC
Resolution No. 9518 since the COMELEC En Banc  issued Minute Resolution No.
12-1133 dated December 11, 2012 applying said provision strictly against the
Liberal Party in the case of its local candidates for Camiguin who were similarly
declared independent candidates for failure to submit the authority to sign CONAs
before October 1, 2012. While we laud the COMELEC's attempt to apply the rule
equally among the political parties, it has only itself to blame for the present
situation. It bears stressing here that election rules regarding formal matters are
deemed mandatory before the elections and only directory after the elections. In
the case of the Liberal Party candidates in Camiguin, the COMELEC En
Banc  rendered a formal ruling on their status as independent candidates, months
before the election, such that the Liberal Party was officially notified that its
candidates in Camiguin can no longer be substituted in the event of their death,
withdrawal or disqualification. Thus, the mandatory application of the rules was
justified. In petitioner's case, no official pronouncement was made by the
COMELEC regarding her husband's status as an independent candidate and the
validity of her filing a COC as his substitute until July 5, 2013, long after the
elections were held. Indeed, it behooved the COMELEC to similarly resolve
petitioner's case prior to the elections had it wanted to treat all political parties
equally.
In light of the foregoing discussion that petitioner may validly substitute her
husband in the May 13, 2013 Elections, it is no longer necessary to resolve the
third issue on whether the COMELEC properly proclaimed private respondent, the
second-placer in the vice-mayoral race of Babatngon, in place of petitioner, as well
as the rest of the issues raised in the pleadings.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed
Resolution dated July 5, 2013 of the COMELEC Second Division and the
Resolution dated January 20, 2015 of the COMELEC En Banc in SPA 13-232
(DC) (F) are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Marcelina S. Engle is
declared the duly-elected Vice-Mayor of Babatngon, Leyte during the May 13,
2013 Elections.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 136781               October 6, 2000
VETERANS FEDERATION PARTY, ALYANSANG BAYANIHAN NG MGA
MAGSASAKA, MANGGAGAWANG BUKID AT MANGINGISDA, ADHIKAIN AT
KILUSAN NG ORDINARYONG TAO PARA SA LUPA, PABAHAY AT
KAUNLARAN, and LUZON FARMERS PARTY, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, PAG-ASA, SENIOR CITIZENS, AKAP
AKSYON, PINATUBO, NUPA, PRP, AMIN, PAG-ASA, MAHARLIKA, OCW-
UNIFIL, PCCI, AMMA-KATIPUNAN, KAMPIL, BANTAY-BAYAN, AFW, ANG
LAKAS OCW, WOMEN-POWER, INC., FEJODAP, CUP, VETERANS CARE, 4L,
AWATU, PMP, ATUCP, NCWP, ALU, BIGAS, COPRA, GREEN, ANAKBAYAN,
ARBA, MINFA, AYOS, ALL COOP, PDP-LABAN, KATIPUNAN, ONEWAY
PRINT, AABANTE KA PILIPINAS -- All Being Party-List Parties/Organizations
-- and Hon. MANUEL B. VILLAR, JR. in His Capacity as Speaker of the House
of Representatives, respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 136786               October 6, 2000
AKBAYAN! (CITIZENS' ACTION PARTY), ADHIKAIN AT KILUSAN NG
ORDINARYONG TAO PARA SA LUPA, PABAHAY AT KAUNLARAN (AKO),
and ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES
(APEC), petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC), HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
represented by Speaker Manuel B. Villar, PAG-ASA, SENIOR CITIZENS,
AKAP, AKSYON, PINATUBO, NUPA, PRP, AMIN, MAHARLIKA, OCW, UNIFIL,
PCCI, AMMA-KATIPUNAN, KAMPIL, BANTAY-BAYAN, AFW, ANG LAKAS
OCW, WOMENPOWER INC., FEJODAP, CUP, VETERANS CARE, FOUR "L",
AWATU, PMP, ATUCP, NCWP, ALU, BIGAS, COPRA, GREEN, ANAK-BAYAN,
ARBA, MINFA, AYOS, ALL COOP, PDP-LABAN, KATIPUNAN, ONEWAY
PRINT, AABANTE KA PILIPINAS, respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 136795               October 6, 2000
ALAGAD (PARTIDO NG MARALITANG-LUNGSOD), NATIONAL
CONFEDERATION OF SMALL COCONUT FARMERS' ORGANIZATIONS
(NCSFCO), and LUZON FARMERS' PARTY (BUTIL), petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, SENIOR CITIZENS, AKAP, AKSYON,
PINATUBO, NUPA, PRP, AMIN, PAG-ASA, MAHARLIKA, OCW, UNIFIL, PCCI,
AMMA-KATIPUNAN, KAMPIL, BANTAY-BAYAN, AFW, ANG LAKAS OCW,
WOMENPOWER INC., FEJODAP, CUP, VETERANS CARE, 4L, AWATU, PMP,
ATUCP, NCWP, ALU, BIGAS, COPRA, GREEN, ANAK-BAYAN, ARBA, MINFA,
AYOS, ALL COOP, PDP-LABAN, KATIPUNAN, ONEWAY PRINT, and
AABANTE KA PILIPINAS, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:*
Prologue
To determine the winners in a Philippine-style party-list election, the Constitution
and Republic Act (RA) No. 7941 mandate at least four inviolable parameters.
These are:
First, the twenty percent allocation - the combined number of all party-list
congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the
House of Representatives, including those elected under the party list.
Second, the two percent threshold - only those parties garnering a minimum of two
percent of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are "qualified" to have
a seat in the House of Representatives;
Third, the three-seat limit - each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes
it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one "qualifying"
and two additional seats.
Fourth, proportional representation - the additional seats which a qualified party is
entitled to shall be computed "in proportion to their total number of votes."
Because the Comelec violated these legal parameters, the assailed Resolutions
must be struck down for having been issued in grave abuse of discretion. The poll
body is mandated to enforce and administer election-related laws. It has no power
to contravene or amend them. Neither does it have authority to decide the wisdom,
propriety or rationality of the acts of Congress.
Its bounden duty is to craft rules, regulations, methods and formulas to implement
election laws -- not to reject, ignore, defeat, obstruct or circumvent them.
In fine, the constitutional introduction of the party-list system - a normal feature of
parliamentary democracies - into our presidential form of government, modified by
unique Filipino statutory parameters, presents new paradigms and novel
questions, which demand innovative legal solutions convertible into mathematical
formulations which are, in turn, anchored on time-tested jurisprudence.
The Case
Before the Court are three consolidated Petitions for Certiorari (with applications
for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction)
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, assailing (1) the October 15, 1998
Resolution1 of the Commission on Elections (Comelec), Second Division, in
Election Matter 98-065;2 and (2) the January 7, 1999 Resolution3 of the Comelec en
banc, affirming the said disposition. The assailed Resolutions ordered the
proclamation of thirty-eight (38) additional party-list representatives "to complete
the full complement of 52 seats in the House of Representatives as provided under
Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. 7941."
The Facts and the Antecedents
Our 1987 Constitution introduced a novel feature into our presidential system of
government -- the party-list method of representation. Under this system, any
national, regional or sectoral party or organization registered with the Commission
on Elections may participate in the election of party-list representatives who, upon
their election and proclamation, shall sit in the House of Representatives as
regular members.4 In effect, a voter is given two (2) votes for the House -- one for a
district congressman and another for a party-list representative.5
Specifically, this system of representation is mandated by Section 5, Article VI of
the Constitution, which provides:
"Sec. 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than
two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be
elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as
provided by law, shall be elected by a party-list system of registered national, (a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.

(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total (b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of
number of representatives including those under the party-list. For three the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each;
consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one half of the seats Provided, That those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be
allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes; Provided,
selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural finally, That each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than
communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, three (3) seats.
except the religious sector."
Pursuant to Section 18 of RA 7941, the Comelec en banc promulgated Resolution
Complying with its constitutional duty to provide by law the "selection or election" of No. 2847, prescribing the rules and regulations governing the election of party-list
party-list representatives, Congress enacted RA 7941 on March 3, 1995. Under representatives through the party-list system.
this statute’s policy declaration, the State shall "promote proportional
representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives Election of the Fourteen Party-List Representatives
through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to On May 11, 1998, the first election for party-list representation was held
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who simultaneously with the national elections. A total of one hundred twenty-three
lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the (123) parties, organizations and coalitions participated. On June 26, 1998, the
formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as Comelec en banc proclaimed thirteen (13) party-list representatives from twelve
a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives. Towards this end, (12) parties and organizations, which had obtained at least two percent of the total
the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to number of votes cast for the party-list system. Two of the proclaimed
attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in representatives belonged to Petitioner APEC, which obtained 5.5 percent of the
the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win votes. The proclaimed winners and the votes cast in their favor were as follows:6
seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible." (italics
ours.)
Number of
Party/Organization/ Percentage
The requirements for entitlement to a party-list seat in the House are prescribed by Votes Nominees
Coalition Total Votes
this law (RA 7941) in this wise: Obtained
1. APEC 503,487 5.5% Rene M. Silos
"Sec. 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. -- The party-list representatives Melvyn D. Eballe
shall constitute twenty per centum (20%) of the total number of the members of the
2. ABA 321,646 3.51% Leonardo Q.
House of Representatives including those under the party-list.
Montemayor
For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political parties on 3. ALAGAD 312,500 3.41% Diogenes S. Osabel
the basis of party representation in the House of Representatives at the start of the 4. VETERANS
Tenth Congress of the Philippines shall not be entitled to participate in the party-list FEDERATION 304,802 3.33% Eduardo P. Pilapil
system.
5. PROMDI 255,184 2.79% Joy A.G. Young
In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote, the following procedure 6. AKO 239,042 2.61% Ariel A. Zartiga
shall be observed:
7. NCSCFO 238,303 2.60% Gorgonio P. Unde
8. ABANSE! PINAY 235,548 2.57% Patricia M. Sarenas
 9. AKBAYAN 232,376 2.54% Loreta Ann P.
Rosales
10. BUTIL 215,643 2.36% Benjamin A. Cruz
11. SANLAKAS 194,617 2.13% Renato B. Magtubo
12. COOP-NATCCO 189,802 2.07% Cresente C. Paez
After passing upon the results of the special elections held on July 4, 18, and 25,
1998, the Comelec en banc further determined that COCOFED (Philippine
Coconut Planters’ Federation, Inc.) was entitled to one party-list seat for having
garnered 186,388 votes, which were equivalent to 2.04 percent of the total votes
cast for the party-list system. Thus, its first nominee, Emerito S. Calderon, was
proclaimed on September 8, 1998 as the 14th party-list representative.7
On July 6, 1998, PAG-ASA (People’s Progressive Alliance for Peace and Good
Government Towards Alleviation of Poverty and Social Advancement) filed with
the Comelec a "Petition to Proclaim [the] Full Number of Party-List
Representatives provided by the Constitution." It alleged that the filling up of the
twenty percent membership of party-list representatives in the House of
Representatives, as provided under the Constitution, was mandatory. It further
claimed that the literal application of the two percent vote requirement and the
three-seat limit under RA 7941 would defeat this constitutional provision, for only
25 nominees would be declared winners, short of the 52 party-list representatives
who should actually sit in the House.
Thereafter, nine other party-list organizations8 filed their respective Motions for
Intervention, seeking the same relief as that sought by PAG-ASA on substantially
the same grounds. Likewise, PAG-ASA’s Petition was joined by other party-list
organizations in a Manifestation they filed on August 28, 1998. These
organizations were COCOFED, Senior Citizens, AKAP, AKSYON, PINATUBO,
NUPA, PRP, AMIN, PCCI, AMMA-KATIPUNAN, OCW-UNIFIL, KAMPIL,
MAHARLIKA, AFW, Women Power, Inc., Ang Lakas OCW, FEJODAP, CUP,
Veterans Care, Bantay Bayan, 4L, AWATU, PMP, ATUCP, ALU and BIGAS.
On October 15, 1998, the Comelec Second Division promulgated the present
assailed Resolution granting PAG-ASA's Petition. It also ordered the proclamation
of herein 38 respondents who, in addition to the 14 already sitting, would thus total
52 party-list representatives. It held that "at all times, the total number of
congressional9 seats must be filled up by eighty (80%) percent district
representatives and twenty (20%) percent party-list representatives." In allocating
the 52 seats, it disregarded the two percent-vote requirement prescribed under
Section 11 (b) of RA 7941. Instead, it identified three "elements of the party-list
system," which should supposedly determine "how the 52 seats should be filled
up." First, "the system was conceived to enable the marginalized sectors of the
Philippine society to be represented in the House of Representatives." Second,
"the system should represent the broadest sectors of the Philippine society." Third,
"it should encourage [the] multi-party system." (Boldface in the original.)
Considering these elements, but ignoring the two percent threshold requirement of
RA 7941, it concluded that "the party-list groups ranked Nos. 1 to 51 x x x should
have at least one representative." It thus disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the Constitution, the
Omnibus Election Code (B.P. 881), Republic Act No. 7941 and other election laws,
the Commission (Second Division) hereby resolves to GRANT the instant petition
and motions for intervention, to include those similarly situated.
ACCORDINGLY, the nominees from the party-list hereinbelow enumerated based
on the list of names submitted by their respective parties, organizations and
coalitions are PROCLAIMED as party-list representatives, to wit:
1. SENIOR CITIZENS
2. AKAP
3. AKSYON
4. PINATUBO
5. NUPA
6. PRP
7. AMIN
8. PAG-ASA
9. MAHARLIKA
10. OCW-UNIFIL
11. FCL
12. AMMA-KATIPUNAN
13. KAMPIL
14. BANTAY BAYAN 35. PDP-LABAN

15. AFW 36. KATIPUNAN

16. ANG LAKAS OCW 37. ONEWAY PRINT

17. WOMENPOWER, INC. 38. AABANTE KA PILIPINAS

18. FEJODAP to complete the full complement of 52 seats in the House of Representatives as
provided in Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. 7941."
19. CUP
The foregoing disposition sums up a glaring bit of inconsistency and flip-flopping.
20. VETERANS CARE In its Resolution No. 2847 dated June 25, 1996, the Comelec en banc had
unanimously promulgated a set of "Rules and Regulations Governing the Election
of x x x Party-List Representatives Through the Party-List System." Under these
21. 4L
Rules and Regulations, one additional seat shall be given for every two percent of
the vote, a formula the Comelec illustrated in its Annex "A." It apparently relied on
22. AWATU this method when it proclaimed the 14 incumbent party-list solons (two for APEC
and one each for the 12 other qualified parties). However, for inexplicable reasons,
23. PMP it abandoned said unanimous Resolution and proclaimed, based on its three
"elements," the "Group of 38" private respondents.10
24. ATUCP
The twelve (12) parties and organizations, which had earlier been proclaimed
25. NCWP winners on the basis of having obtained at least two percent of the votes cast for
the party-list system, objected to the proclamation of the 38 parties and filed
26. ALU separate Motions for Reconsideration. They contended that (1) under Section 11
(b) of RA 7941, only parties, organizations or coalitions garnering at least two
percent of the votes for the party-list system were entitled to seats in the House of
27. BIGAS
Representatives; and (2) additional seats, not exceeding two for each, should be
allocated to those which had garnered the two percent threshold in proportion to
28. COPRA the number of votes cast for the winning parties, as provided by said Section 11.

29. GREEN Ruling of the Comelec En Banc

30. ANAKBAYAN Noting that all the parties -- movants and oppositors alike - had agreed that the
twenty percent membership of party-list representatives in the House "should be
31. ARBA filled up," the Comelec en banc resolved only the issue concerning the
apportionment or allocation of the remaining seats. In other words, the issue was:
32. MINFA Should the remaining 38 unfilled seats allocated to party-list solons be given (1) to
the thirteen qualified parties that had each garnered at least two percent of the
33. AYOS total votes, or (2) to the Group of 38 - herein private respondents - even if they had
not passed the two percent threshold?
34. ALL COOP
The poll body held that to allocate the remaining seats only to those who had
hurdled the two percent vote requirement "will mean the concentration of
representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives
to thirteen organizations representing two political parties, three coalitions and four
sectors: urban poor, veterans, women and peasantry x x x. Such strict application
of the 2% 'threshold' does not serve the essence and object of the Constitution and
the legislature -- to develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in
order to attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group
interests in the House of Representatives x x x." Additionally, it "will also prevent
this Commission from complying with the constitutional and statutory decrees for
party-list representatives to compose 20% of the House of Representatives."
Thus, in its Resolution dated January 7, 1999, the Comelec en banc, by a razor-
thin majority -- with three commissioners concurring11 and two
members12 dissenting -- affirmed the Resolution of its Second Division. It, however,
held in abeyance the proclamation of the 51st party (AABANTE KA PILIPINAS),
"pending the resolution of petitions for correction of manifest errors."
Without expressly declaring as unconstitutional or void the two percent vote
requirement imposed by RA 7941, the Commission blithely rejected and
circumvented its application, holding that there were more important
considerations than this statutory threshold.
Consequently, several petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with
prayers for the issuance of temporary restraining orders or writs of preliminary
injunction, were filed before this Court by the parties and organizations that had
obtained at least two per cent of the total votes cast for the party-list system.13 In
the suits, made respondents together with the Comelec were the 38 parties,
organizations and coalitions that had been declared by the poll body as likewise
entitled to party-list seats in the House of Representatives. Collectively, petitioners
sought the proclamation of additional representatives from each of their parties
and organizations, all of which had obtained at least two percent of the total votes
cast for the party-list system.
On January 12, 1999, this Court issued a Status Quo Order directing the Comelec
"to CEASE and DESIST from constituting itself as a National Board of Canvassers
on 13 January 1999 or on any other date and proclaiming as winners the
nominees of the parties, organizations and coalitions enumerated in the dispositive
portions of its 15 October 1998 Resolution or its 7 January 1999 Resolution, until
further orders from this Court."
On July 1, 1999, oral arguments were heard from the parties. Atty. Jeremias U.
Montemayor appeared for petitioners in GR No. 136781; Atty. Gregorio A.
Andolana, for petitioners in GR No. 136786; Atty. Rodante D. Marcoleta for
petitioners in GR No. 136795; Attys. Ricardo Blancaflor and Pete Quirino Quadra,
for all the private respondents; Atty. Porfirio V. Sison for Intervenor NACUSIP; and
Atty. Jose P. Balbuena for Respondent Comelec. Upon invitation of the Court,
retired Comelec Commissioner Regalado E. Maambong acted as amicus curiae.
Solicitor General Ricardo P. Galvez appeared, not for any party but also as a
friend of the Court.
Thereafter, the parties and the amici curiae were required to submit their
respective Memoranda in amplification of their verbal arguments.14
The Issues
The Court believes, and so holds, that the main question of how to determine the
winners of the subject party-list election can be fully settled by addressing the
following issues:
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives mentioned in
Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution, mandatory or is it merely a ceiling? In
other words, should the twenty percent allocation for party-list solons be filled up
completely and all the time?
2. Are the two percent threshold requirement and the three-seat limit provided in
Section 11 (b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
3. If the answer to Issue 2 is in the affirmative, how should the additional seats of a
qualified party be determined?
The Court’s Ruling
The Petitions are partly meritorious. The Court agrees with petitioners that the
assailed Resolutions should be nullified, but disagrees that they should all be
granted additional seats.
First Issue: Whether the Twenty Percent
Constitutional Allocation Is Mandatory
The pertinent provision15 of the Constitution on the composition of the House of
Representatives reads as follows:
"Sec. 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than
two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be
elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as
provided by law, shall be elected by a party-list system of registered national,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total
number of representatives including those under the party-list. For three
consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one half of the seats
allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by
selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law,
except the religious sector."
Determination of the Total Number of Party-List Lawmakers
Clearly, the Constitution makes the number of district representatives the
determinant in arriving at the number of seats allocated for party-list lawmakers,
who shall comprise "twenty per centum of the total number of representatives
including those under the party-list." We thus translate this legal provision into a
mathematical formula, as follows:
No. of district representatives
x .20 = No. of party-list representatives
.80
This formulation16 means that any increase in the number of district
representatives, as may be provided by law, will necessarily result in a
corresponding increase in the number of party-list seats. To illustrate, considering
that there were 208 district representatives to be elected during the 1998 national
elections, the number of party-list seats would be 52, computed as follows:
208
x .20 = 52
.80
The foregoing computation of seat allocation is easy enough to comprehend. The
problematic question, however, is this: Does the Constitution require all such
allocated seats to be filled up all the time and under all circumstances? Our short
answer is "No."
Twenty Percent Allocation a Mere Ceiling
The Constitution simply states that "[t]he party-list representatives shall constitute
twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those under the
party-list."
According to petitioners, this percentage is a ceiling; the mechanics by which it is
to be filled up has been left to Congress. In the exercise of its prerogative, the
legislature enacted RA 7941, by which it prescribed that a party, organization or
coalition participating in the party-list election must obtain at least two percent of
the total votes cast for the system in order to qualify for a seat in the House of
Representatives.
Petitioners further argue that the constitutional provision must be construed
together with this legislative requirement. If there is no sufficient number of
participating parties, organizations or coalitions which could hurdle the two percent
vote threshold and thereby fill up the twenty percent party-list allocation in the
House, then naturally such allocation cannot be filled up completely. The Comelec
cannot be faulted for the "incompleteness," for ultimately the voters themselves are
the ones who, in the exercise of their right of suffrage, determine who and how
many should represent them.
On the other hand, Public Respondent Comelec, together with the respondent
parties, avers that the twenty percent allocation for party-list lawmakers is
mandatory, and that the two percent vote requirement in RA 7941 is
unconstitutional, because its strict application would make it mathematically
impossible to fill up the House party-list complement.
We rule that a simple reading of Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, easily
conveys the equally simple message that Congress was vested with the broad
power to define and prescribe the mechanics of the party-list system of
representation. The Constitution explicitly sets down only the percentage of the
total membership in the House of Representatives reserved for party-list
representatives.
In the exercise of its constitutional prerogative, Congress enacted RA 7941. As
said earlier, Congress declared therein a policy to promote "proportional
representation" in the election of party-list representatives in order to enable
Filipinos belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors to contribute
legislation that would benefit them. It however deemed it necessary to require
parties, organizations and coalitions participating in the system to obtain at least
two percent of the total votes cast for the party-list system in order to be entitled to
a party-list seat. Those garnering more than this percentage could have "additional
seats in proportion to their total number of votes." Furthermore, no winning party,
organization or coalition can have more than three seats in the House of
Representatives. Thus the relevant portion of Section 11(b) of the law provides:
"(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%)
of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each;
Provided, That those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be
entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes; Provided,
finally, That each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than
three (3) seats."
Considering the foregoing statutory requirements, it will be shown presently that
Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution is not mandatory. It merely provides a
ceiling for party-list seats in Congress.
On the contention that a strict application of the two percent threshold may result in
a "mathematical impossibility," suffice it to say that the prerogative to determine
whether to adjust or change this percentage requirement rests in Congress.17 Our
task now, as should have been the Comelec’s, is not to find fault in the wisdom of
the law through highly unlikely scenarios of clinical extremes, but to craft an
innovative mathematical formula that can, as far as practicable, implement it within
the context of the actual election process.
Indeed, the function of the Supreme Court, as well as of all judicial and quasi-
judicial agencies, is to apply the law as we find it, not to reinvent or second-guess
it. Unless declared unconstitutional, ineffective, insufficient or otherwise void by the
proper tribunal, a statute remains a valid command of sovereignty that must be
respected and obeyed at all times. This is the essence of the rule of law.
Second Issue: The Statutory Requirement and Limitation
The Two Percent Threshold
In imposing a two percent threshold, Congress wanted to ensure that only those
parties, organizations and coalitions having a sufficient number of constituents
deserving of representation are actually represented in Congress. This intent can
be gleaned from the deliberations on the proposed bill. We quote below a pertinent
portion of the Senate discussion:
"SENATOR GONZALES: For purposes of continuity, I would want to follow up a
point that was raised by, I think, Senator Osmeña when he said that a political
party must have obtained at least a minimum percentage to be provided in this law
in order to qualify for a seat under the party-list system.
They do that in many other countries. A party must obtain at least 2 percent of the
votes cast, 5 percent or 10 percent of the votes cast. Otherwise, as I have said,
this will actually proliferate political party groups and those who have not really
been given by the people sufficient basis for them to represent their constituents
and, in turn, they will be able to get to the Parliament through the backdoor under
the name of the party-list system, Mr. President."18
A similar intent is clear from the statements of the bill sponsor in the House of
Representatives, as the following shows:
"MR. ESPINOSA. There is a mathematical formula which this computation is
based at, arriving at a five percent ratio which would distribute equitably the
number of seats among the different sectors. There is a mathematical formula
which is, I think, patterned after that of the party list of the other parliaments or
congresses, more particularly the Bundestag of Germany."19
Moreover, even the framers of our Constitution had in mind a minimum-vote
requirement, the specification of which they left to Congress to properly determine.
Constitutional Commissioner Christian S. Monsod explained:
"MR. MONSOD. x x x We are amenable to modifications in the minimum
percentage of votes. Our proposal is that anybody who has two-and-a-half percent
of the votes gets a seat. There are about 20 million who cast their votes in the last
elections. Two-and-a-half percent would mean 500,000 votes. Anybody who has a
constituency of 500,000 votes nationwide deserves a seat in the Assembly. If we
bring that down to two percent, we are talking about 400,000 votes. The average
vote per family is three. So, here we are talking about 134,000 families. We believe
that there are many sectors who will be able to get seats in the Assembly because
many of them have memberships of over 10,000. In effect, that is the operational
implication of our proposal. What we are trying to avoid is this selection of sectors,
the reserve seat system. We believe that it is our job to open up the system and
that we should not have within that system a reserve seat. We think that people
should organize, should work hard, and should earn their seats within that
system."20
The two percent threshold is consistent not only with the intent of the framers of
the Constitution and the law, but with the very essence of "representation." Under
a republican or representative state, all government authority emanates from the
people, but is exercised by representatives chosen by them.21 But to have
meaningful representation, the elected persons must have the mandate of a
sufficient number of people. Otherwise, in a legislature that features the party-list
system, the result might be the proliferation of small groups which are incapable of
contributing significant legislation, and which might even pose a threat to the
stability of Congress. Thus, even legislative districts are apportioned according to
"the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio"22 to ensure meaningful local representation.
All in all, we hold that the statutory provision on this two percent requirement is
precise and crystalline. When the law is clear, the function of courts is simple
application, not interpretation or circumvention.23
The Three-Seat-Per-Party Limit
An important consideration in adopting the party-list system is to promote and
encourage a multiparty system of representation. Again, we quote Commissioner
Monsod:
"MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I just want to say that we suggested or
proposed the party list system because we wanted to open up the political system
to a pluralistic society through a multiparty system. But we also wanted to avoid
the problems of mechanics and operation in the implementation of a concept that
has very serious shortcomings of classification and of double or triple votes. We
are for opening up the system, and we would like very much for the sectors to be
there. That is why one of the ways to do that is to put a ceiling on the number of
representatives from any single party that can sit within the 50 allocated under the
party list system. This way, we will open it up and enable sectoral groups, or
maybe regional groups, to earn their seats among the fifty. x x x."24
Consistent with the Constitutional Commission's pronouncements, Congress set
the seat-limit to three (3) for each qualified party, organization or coalition.
"Qualified" means having hurdled the two percent vote threshold. Such three-seat
limit ensures the entry of various interest-representations into the legislature; thus,
no single group, no matter how large its membership, would dominate the party-list
seats, if not the entire House.
We shall not belabor this point, because the validity of the three-seat limit is not
seriously challenged in these consolidated cases.
Third Issue: Method of Allocating Additional Seats
Having determined that the twenty percent seat allocation is merely a ceiling, and
having upheld the constitutionality of the two percent vote threshold and the three-
seat limit imposed under RA 7941, we now proceed to the method of determining
how many party-list seats the qualified parties, organizations and coalitions are
entitled to. The very first step - there is no dispute on this - is to rank all the
participating parties, organizations and coalitions (hereafter collectively referred to
as "parties") according to the votes they each obtained. The percentage of their
respective votes as against the total number of votes cast for the party-list system
is then determined. All those that garnered at least two percent of the total votes
cast have an assured or guaranteed seat in the House of Representatives.
Thereafter, "those garnering more than two percent of the votes shall be entitled to
additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes." The problem is how to
distribute additional seats "proportionally," bearing in mind the three-seat limit
further imposed by the law.
One Additional Seat Per Two Percent Increment
One proposed formula is to allocate one additional seat for every additional
proportion of the votes obtained equivalent to the two percent vote requirement for
the first seat.25 Translated in figures, a party that wins at least six percent of the
total votes cast will be entitled to three seats; another party that gets four percent
will be entitled to two seats; and one that gets two percent will be entitled to one
seat only. This proposal has the advantage of simplicity and ease of
comprehension. Problems arise, however, when the parties get very lop-sided
votes -- for example, when Party A receives 20 percent of the total votes cast;
Party B, 10 percent; and Party C, 6 percent. Under the method just described,
Party A would be entitled to 10 seats; Party B, to 5 seats and Party C, to 3 seats.
Considering the three-seat limit imposed by law, all the parties will each uniformly
have three seats only. We would then have the spectacle of a party garnering two
or more times the number of votes obtained by another, yet getting the same
number of seats as the other one with the much lesser votes. In effect, proportional
representation will be contravened and the law rendered nugatory by this
suggested solution. Hence, the Court discarded it.
The Niemeyer Formula
Another suggestion that the Court considered was the Niemeyer formula, which
was developed by a German mathematician and adopted by Germany as its
method of distributing party-list seats in the Bundestag. Under this formula, the
number of additional seats to which a qualified party would be entitled is
determined by multiplying the remaining number of seats to be allocated by the
total number of votes obtained by that party and dividing the product by the total
number of votes garnered by all the qualified parties. The integer portion of the
resulting product will be the number of additional seats that the party concerned is
entitled to. Thus:
 No. of remaining seats Niemeyer formula would violate the principle of "proportional representation," a
to be allocated basic tenet of our party-list system.
No. of additional
No. of votes of seats of party The Niemeyer formula, while no doubt suitable for Germany, finds no application in
x =
party concerned concerned the Philippine setting, because of our three-seat limit and the non-mandatory
(Integer.decimal) character of the twenty percent allocation. True, both our Congress and the
Total no. of votes of Bundestag have threshold requirements -- two percent for us and five for them.
qualified parties There are marked differences between the two models, however. As ably pointed
out by private respondents,26 one half of the German Parliament is filled up by
The next step is to distribute the extra seats left among the qualified parties in the party-list members. More important, there are no seat limitations, because German
descending order of the decimal portions of the resulting products. Based on the law discourages the proliferation of small parties. In contrast, RA 7941, as already
1998 election results, the distribution of party-list seats under the Niemeyer mentioned, imposes a three-seat limit to encourage the promotion of the multiparty
method would be as follows: system. This major statutory difference makes the Niemeyer formula completely
inapplicable to the Philippines.
Party Number of Guaranteed Additional Extra Total
Just as one cannot grow Washington apples in the Philippines or Guimaras
Votes Seats Seats
mangoes in the Arctic because of fundamental environmental differences, neither
1. APEC 503,487 1 5.73 1 7 can the Niemeyer formula be transplanted in toto here because of essential
variances between the two party-list models.
2. ABA 321,646 1 3.66 1 5
3. ALAGAD 312,500 1 3.55 4 The Legal and Logical Formula for the Philippines
4. VETERANS 304,802 1 3.47 4
FEDERATION It is now obvious that the Philippine style party-list system is a unique paradigm
which demands an equally unique formula. In crafting a legally defensible and
5. PROMDI 255,184 1 2.90 1 4 logical solution to determine the number of additional seats that a qualified party is
6. AKO 239,042 1 2.72 1 4 entitled to, we need to review the parameters of the Filipino party-list system.
7. NCSCFO 238,303 1 2.71 1 4
As earlier mentioned in the Prologue, they are as follows:
8. ABANSE! PINAY 235,548 1 2.68 1 4
9. AKBAYAN 232,376 1 2.64 4 First, the twenty percent allocation - the combined number of all party-list
congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the
10. BUTIL 215,643 1 2.45 3 House of Representatives, including those elected under the party list.
11. SANLAKAS 194,617 1 2.21 3
Second, the two percent threshold - only those parties garnering a minimum of two
12. COOP-NATCCO 189,802 1 2.16 3 percent of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are "qualified" to have
13. COCOFED 186,388 1 2.12 3 a seat in the House of Representatives;
Total 3,429,338 13 32 7 52
Third, the three-seat limit - each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes
it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one "qualifying"
However, since Section 11 of RA 7941 sets a limit of three (3) seats for each party, and two additional seats.
those obtaining more than the limit will have to give up their excess seats. Under
our present set of facts, the thirteen qualified parties will each be entitled to three Fourth, proportional representation - the additional seats which a qualified party is
seats, resulting in an overall total of 39. Note that like the previous proposal, the entitled to shall be computed "in proportion to their total number of votes."
The problem, as already stated, is to find a way to translate "proportional
representation" into a mathematical formula that will not contravene, circumvent or
amend the above-mentioned parameters.
After careful deliberation, we now explain such formula, step by step.
Step One. There is no dispute among the petitioners, the public and the private
respondents, as well as the members of this Court, that the initial step is to rank all
the participating parties, organizations and coalitions from the highest to the lowest
based on the number of votes they each received. Then the ratio for each party is
computed by dividing its votes by the total votes cast for all the parties participating
in the system. All parties with at least two percent of the total votes are guaranteed
one seat each. Only these parties shall be considered in the computation of
additional seats. The party receiving the highest number of votes shall thenceforth
be referred to as the "first" party.
Step Two. The next step is to determine the number of seats the first party is
entitled to, in order to be able to compute that for the other parties. Since the
distribution is based on proportional representation, the number of seats to be
allotted to the other parties cannot possibly exceed that to which the first party is
entitled by virtue of its obtaining the most number of votes.
For example, the first party received 1,000,000 votes and is determined to be
entitled to two additional seats. Another qualified party which received 500,000
votes cannot be entitled to the same number of seats, since it garnered only fifty
percent of the votes won by the first party. Depending on the proportion of its votes
relative to that of the first party whose number of seats has already been
predetermined, the second party should be given less than that to which the first
one is entitled.
The other qualified parties will always be allotted less additional seats than the first
party for two reasons: (1) the ratio between said parties and the first party will
always be less than 1:1, and (2) the formula does not admit of mathematical
rounding off, because there is no such thing as a fraction of a seat. Verily, an
arbitrary rounding off could result in a violation of the twenty percent allocation. An
academic mathematical demonstration of such incipient violation is not necessary
because the present set of facts, given the number of qualified parties and the
voting percentages obtained, will definitely not end up in such constitutional
contravention.
The Court has previously ruled in Guingona Jr. v. Gonzales27 that a fractional
membership cannot be converted into a whole membership of one when it would,
in effect, deprive another party's fractional membership. It would be a violation of
the constitutional mandate of proportional representation. We said further that "no
party can claim more than what it is entitled to x x x."
In any case, the decision on whether to round off the fractions is better left to the
legislature. Since Congress did not provide for it in the present law, neither will this
Court. The Supreme Court does not make the law; it merely applies it to a given
set of facts.
Formula for Determining Additional Seats for the First Party
Now, how do we determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to? The
only basis given by the law is that a party receiving at least two percent of the total
votes shall be entitled to one seat. Proportionally, if the first party were to receive
twice the number of votes of the second party, it should be entitled to twice the
latter's number of seats and so on. The formula, therefore, for computing the
number of seats to which the first party is entitled is as follows:
Number of votes
of first party
Proportion of votes of
= first party relative to
total votes for party-list system
Total votes for
party-list system
If the proportion of votes received by the first party without rounding it off is equal
to at least six percent of the total valid votes cast for all the party list groups, then
the first party shall be entitled to two additional seats or a total of three seats
overall. If the proportion of votes without a rounding off is equal to or greater than
four percent, but less than six percent, then the first party shall have one additional
or a total of two seats. And if the proportion is less than four percent, then the first
party shall not be entitled to any additional seat.
We adopted this six percent bench mark, because the first party is not always
entitled to the maximum number of additional seats. Likewise, it would prevent the
allotment of more than the total number of available seats, such as in an extreme
case wherein 18 or more parties tie for the highest rank and are thus entitled to
three seats each. In such scenario, the number of seats to which all the parties are
entitled may exceed the maximum number of party-list seats reserved in the
House of Representatives.1âwphi1
Applying the above formula, APEC, which received 5.5% of the total votes cast, is In simplified form, it is written as follows:
entitled to one additional seat or a total of two seats.
No. of votes of
Note that the above formula will be applicable only in determining the number of concerned party No. of
additional seats the first party is entitled to. It cannot be used to determine the Additional
additional
number of additional seats of the other qualified parties. As explained earlier, the seats
seats
use of the same formula for all would contravene the proportional representation for = x
allocated to
parameter. For example, a second party obtains six percent of the total number of concerned
the first
votes cast. According to the above formula, the said party would be entitled to two party No. of votes of party
additional seats or a total of three seats overall. However, if the first party received first party
a significantly higher amount of votes -- say, twenty percent -- to grant it the same
number of seats as the second party would violate the statutory mandate of
Thus, in the case of ABA, the additional number of seats it would be entitled to is
proportional representation, since a party getting only six percent of the votes will
computed as follows:
have an equal number of representatives as the one obtaining twenty percent. The
proper solution, therefore, is to grant the first party a total of three seats; and the
party receiving six percent, additional seats in proportion to those of the first party. No. of votes
of ABA
Formula for Additional Seats of Other Qualified Parties Additional seats No. of additional
for concerned = x seats allocated to
Step Three The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that the party (ABA) the first party
other qualified parties are entitled to, based on proportional representation. The No. of vites of
formula is encompassed by the following complex fraction: first party (APEC)

No. of votes of Substituting actual values would result in the following equation:
concerned party
321,646
Additional .64 or 0 additional seat,
seats x1 since
=
Total No. of votes for concerned = rounding off is not to be
for party-list system party (ABA) applied
Additional No. of additional 503,487
seats seats allocated
= x
for concerned to Applying the above formula, we find the outcome of the 1998 party-list election to
party the first party be as follows:
No. of votes of
first party
Organization Votes %age Initial Additional Total
Garnered of No. Seats
Total of
Votes Seats
Total No. of
for party list system 1. APEC 503,487 5.50% 1 1 2
2. ABA 321,646 3.51% 1 321,646 / 1
 503,487 * 1 Incidentally, if the first party is not entitled to any additional seat, then the ratio of
= 0.64 the number of votes for the other party to that for the first one is multiplied by zero.
The end result would be zero additional seat for each of the other qualified parties
3. ALAGAD 312,500 3.41% 1 312,500 / 1 as well.
503,487 * 1
= 0.62 The above formula does not give an exact mathematical representation of the
4. VETERANS 304,802 3.33% 1 304,802 / 1 number of additional seats to be awarded since, in order to be entitled to one
FEDERATION 503,487 * 1 additional seat, an exact whole number is necessary. In fact, most of the actual
= 0.61 mathematical proportions are not whole numbers and are not rounded off for the
reasons explained earlier. To repeat, rounding off may result in the awarding of a
5. PROMDI 255,184 2.79% 1 255,184 / 1 number of seats in excess of that provided by the law. Furthermore, obtaining
503,487 * 1 absolute proportional representation is restricted by the three-seat-per-party limit to
= 0.51 a maximum of two additional slots. An increase in the maximum number of
6. AKO 239,042 2.61% 1 239,042 / 1 additional representatives a party may be entitled to would result in a more
503,487 * 1 accurate proportional representation. But the law itself has set the limit: only two
= 0.47 additional seats. Hence, we need to work within such extant parameter.
7. NCSFO 238,303 2.60% 1 238,303 / 1
The net result of the foregoing formula for determining additional seats happily
503,487 * 1
coincides with the present number of incumbents; namely, two for the first party
= 0.47
(APEC) and one each for the twelve other qualified parties. Hence, we affirm the
8. ABANSE! 235,548 2.57% 1 321,646 / 1 legality of the incumbencies of their nominees, albeit through the use of a different
503,487 * 1 formula and methodology.
= 0.47
PINAY In his Dissent, Justice Mendoza criticizes our methodology for being too strict. We
say, however, that our formula merely translated the Philippine legal parameters
9. AKBAYAN! 232,376 2.54% 1 232,376 / 1 into a mathematical equation, no more no less. If Congress in its wisdom decides
503,487 * 1 to modify RA 7941 to make it "less strict," then the formula will also be modified to
= 0.46 reflect the changes willed by the lawmakers.
10. BUTIL 215,643 2.36% 1 215,643 /
503,487 * 1 Epilogue
= 0.43 1
11. SANLAKAS 194,617 2.13% 1 194,617 / 1 In sum, we hold that the Comelec gravely abused its discretion in ruling that the
503,487 * 1 thirty-eight (38) herein respondent parties, organizations and coalitions are each
= 0.39 entitled to a party-list seat, because it glaringly violated two requirements of RA
7941: the two percent threshold and proportional representation.
12. COOP- 189,802 2.07% 1 189,802 / 1
NATCCO 503,487 * 1 In disregarding, rejecting and circumventing these statutory provisions, the
= 0.38 Comelec effectively arrogated unto itself what the Constitution expressly and
13. COCOFED 186,388 2.04% 1 186,388 / 1 wholly vested in the legislature: the power and the discretion to define the
503,487 * 1 mechanics for the enforcement of the system. The wisdom and the propriety of
= 0.37 these impositions, absent any clear transgression of the Constitution or grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, are beyond judicial
review.28
Indeed, the Comelec and the other parties in these cases - both petitioners and
respondents - have failed to demonstrate that our lawmakers gravely abused their
discretion in prescribing such requirements. By grave abuse of discretion is meant
such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.29
The Comelec, which is tasked merely to enforce and administer election-related
laws,30 cannot simply disregard an act of Congress exercised within the bounds of
its authority. As a mere implementing body, it cannot judge the wisdom, propriety
or rationality of such act. Its recourse is to draft an amendment to the law and
lobby for its approval and enactment by the legislature.
Furthermore, a reading of the entire Constitution reveals no violation of any of its
provisions by the strict enforcement of RA 7941. It is basic that to strike down a law
or any of its provisions as unconstitutional, there must be a clear and unequivocal
showing that what the Constitution prohibits, the statute permits.31
Neither can we grant petitioners’ prayer that they each be given additional seats
(for a total of three each), because granting such plea would plainly and simply
violate the "proportional representation" mandated by Section 11 (b) of RA 7941.
The low turnout of the party-list votes during the 1998 elections should not be
interpreted as a total failure of the law in fulfilling the object of this new system of
representation. It should not be deemed a conclusive indication that the
requirements imposed by RA 7941 wholly defeated the implementation of the
system. Be it remembered that the party-list system, though already popular in
parliamentary democracies, is still quite new in our presidential system. We should
allow it some time to take root in the consciousness of our people and in the heart
of our tripartite form of republicanism. Indeed, the Comelec and the defeated
litigants should not despair.
Quite the contrary, the dismal result of the first election for party-list
representatives should serve as a challenge to our sectoral parties and
organizations. It should stir them to be more active and vigilant in their campaign
for representation in the State's lawmaking body. It should also serve as a clarion
call for innovation and creativity in adopting this novel system of popular
democracy.
With adequate information dissemination to the public and more active sectoral
parties, we are confident our people will be more responsive to future party-list
elections. Armed with patience, perseverance and perspicacity, our marginalized
sectors, in time, will fulfill the Filipino dream of full representation in Congress
under the aegis of the party-list system, Philippine style.
WHEREFORE, the Petitions are hereby partially GRANTED. The assailed
Resolutions of the Comelec are SET ASIDE and NULLIFIED. The proclamations of
the fourteen (14) sitting party-list representatives - two for APEC and one each for
the remaining twelve (12) qualified parties - are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as
to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 147589               June 25, 2003
ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY (under the acronym OFW),
represented herein by its Secretary-General, MOHAMMAD OMAR
FAJARDO, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; CITIZENS DRUG WATCH; MAMAMAYAN
AYAW SA DROGA; GO! GO! PHILIPPINES; THE TRUE MARCOS LOYALIST
ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES; PHILIPPINE LOCAL AUTONOMY;
CITIZENS MOVEMENT FOR JUSTICE, ECONOMY, ENVIRONMENT AND
PEACE; CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE BUILDERS ASSOCIATION; SPORTS &
HEALTH ADVANCEMENT FOUNDATION, INC.; ANG LAKAS NG OVERSEAS
CONTRACT WORKERS (OCW); BAGONG BAYANI ORGANIZATION and
others under "Organizations/Coalitions" of Omnibus Resolution No. 3785;
PARTIDO NG MASANG PILIPINO; LAKAS NUCD-UMDP; NATIONALIST
PEOPLE'S COALITION; LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO; AKSYON
DEMOKRATIKO; PDP-LABAN; LIBERAL PARTY; NACIONALISTA PARTY;
ANG BUHAY HAYAANG YUMABONG; and others under "Political Parties" of
Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 147613               June 25, 2003
BAYAN MUNA, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; NATIONALIST PEOPLE'S COALITION (NPC);
LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO (LDP); PARTIDO NG MASANG
PILIPINO (PMP); LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP, LIBERAL PARTY; MAMAMAYANG
AYAW SA DROGA; CREBA; NATIONAL FEDERATION OF SUGARCANE
PLANTERS; JEEP; and BAGONG BAYANI ORGANIZATION, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Before the Court are Motions for proclamation filed by various party-list
participants. The ultimate question raised is this: Aside from those already validly
proclaimed1 pursuant to earlier Resolutions of this Court, are there other party-list
candidates that should be proclaimed winners? The answer to this question is
circumscribed by the eight-point guideline given in our June 26, 2001 Decision in
these consolidated cases, as well as by the four unique parameters of the
Philippine party-list system:
Comelec’s First Partial
Compliance Report
In its First Partial Compliance Report dated July 27, 2001, Comelec recommended
that the following party-list participants be deemed to have hurdled the eight-point
guideline referred to in the aforementioned Court Decision:

"First, the twenty percent allocation -- the combined number of all party-list 1. BAYAN MUNA (BAYAN MUNA)
congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the
House of Representatives, including those elected under the party-list.
2. AKBAYAN! CITIZENS ACTION PARTY (AKBAYAN!)
"Second, the two percent threshold -- only those parties garnering a minimum of
two percent of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are ‘qualified’ to 3. LUZON FARMERS PARTY (BUTIL)
have a seat in the House of Representatives.
4. ANAK MINDANAO (AMIN)
"Third, the three-seat limit -- each qualified party, regardless of the number of
votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one 5. ALYANSANG BAYANIHAN NG MGA MAGSASAKA, MANGGAGAWANG
‘qualifying’ and two additional seats. BUKID AT MANGINGISDA (ABA)

"Fourth, proportional representation -- the additional seats which a qualified party 6. PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA (PM)
is entitled to shall be computed ‘in proportion to their total number of votes."2
7. SANLAKAS
The Antecedents
It also recommended the disqualification of the following party-list participants for
To fully understand the matter on hand, we deem it wise to recapitulate some their failure to pass the guidelines:
relevant antecedents.
 MAMAMAYAN AYAW SA DROGA (MAD)
On June 26, 2001, the Court promulgated in these consolidated cases its Decision  ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES (APEC)
requiring Comelec to do the following:  VETERANS FEDERATION PARTY (VFP)
 ABAG PROMDI (PROMDI)
"x x x [I]mmediately conduct summary evidentiary hearings on the qualifications of  NATIONALIST PEOPLE’S COALITION (NPC)
the party-list participants in the light of the guidelines enunciated in this Decision.  LAKAS NUCD-UMDP (LAKAS)
Considering the extreme urgency of determining the winners in the last party-list  CITIZENS BATTLE AGAINST CORRUPTION (CIBAC)
elections, the Comelec is directed to begin its hearings for the parties and  LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO (LDP)
organizations that appear to have garnered such number of votes as to qualify for  BUHAY HAYAANG YUMABONG (BUHAY)
seats in the House of Representatives. The Comelec is further directed to submit  COCOFED-PHILIPPINE COCONUT PRODUCERS FEDERATION, INC.
to this Court its compliance report within 30 days from notice hereof. (COCOFED)
 COOPERATIVE NATCCO NETWORK PARTY (COOP-NATCCO)
"The Resolution of this Court dated May 9, 2001, directing the Comelec ‘to refrain  NATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF IRRIGATORS ASSOCIATION (NCIA)
from proclaiming any winner’ during the last party-list election, shall remain in force  ASOSASYON PARA SA KAUNLARAN NG INDUSTRIYA NG AKLAT,
until after the Comelec itself will have complied and reported its compliance with INC. (AKLAT)
the foregoing disposition."3
  THE TRUE MARCOS LOYALIST (FOR GOD, COUNTRY, AND PEOPLE)
ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES (MARCOS LOYALIST)
 CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE AND BUILDERS ASSOCIATION, INC.
(CREBA)
 BIGKIS PINOY FOUNDATION (BIGKIS)
 AKSYON DEMOKRATIKO (AKSYON)
In response to this Report, the Court issued its August 14, 2001 Resolution which
partially lifted its May 9, 2001 Temporary Restraining Order (TRO). The Court did
so to enable Comelec to proclaim Bayan Muna as the first "winner in the last party-
list election, with the caveat that all proclamations should be made in accordance
not only with the Decision of the Court in the instant case but also with Veterans
Federation Party v. Comelec, GR Nos. 136781, 136786, and 136795, October 6,
2000, on how to determine and compute the winning parties and nominees in the
party-list elections."
In another Resolution dated August 24, 2001, the Court again partially lifted its
May 9, 2001 TRO to enable the Comelec to proclaim Akbayan and Butil "as
winning party-list groups, in accordance not only with the Decision of the Court in
the instant case but also with Veterans Federation Party v. Comelec, GR Nos.
136781, 136786, and 136795, October 6, 2000."
In its Consolidated Reply dated October 15, 2001, the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), on behalf of the Comelec, recommended that -- "except for the
modification that the APEC, BUHAY, COCOFED and CIBAC be declared as
having complied with the guidelines set forth in the June 26, 2001 Decision in the
instant cases [--] the Partial Compliance Report dated July 27, 2001 be
affirmed."4 But because of (1) the conflicting Comelec reports regarding the
qualifications of APEC and CIBAC and (2) the disparity in the percentage of votes
obtained by AMIN, the Court in a Resolution dated November 13, 2001, required
the parties to file within 20 days from notice their respective final position papers
on why APEC, CIBAC, and/or AMIN should or should not be proclaimed winners in
the last party-list elections.
Thereafter, in another Resolution dated January 29, 2002,5 the Court agreed to
qualify APEC and CIBAC, which had previously been disqualified by Comelec in its
First Compliance Report.
Thus, in the same Resolution, the Court once more lifted its May 9, 2001 TRO to
enable the Comelec to proclaim APEC and CIBAC as winners in the party-list
elections. The Court said:
"we accept Comelec’s submission, per the OSG, that APEC and CIBAC have
sufficiently met the 8-point guidelines of this Court and have garnered sufficient
votes to entitle them to seats in Congress. Since these issues are factual in
character, we are inclined to adopt the Commission’s findings, absent any patent
arbitrariness or abuse or negligence in its action. There is no substantial proof that
CIBAC is merely an arm of JIL, or that APEC is an extension of PHILRECA. The
OSG explained that these are separate entities with separate memberships.
Although APEC’s nominees are all professionals, its membership is composed not
only of professionals but also of peasants, elderly, youth and women. Equally
important, APEC addresses the issues of job creation, poverty alleviation and lack
of electricity. Likewise, CIBAC is composed of the underrepresented and
marginalized and is concerned with their welfare. CIBAC is particularly interested
in the youth and professional sectors."6
To summarize, after the Court had accepted and approved the First Partial
Compliance Report and its amendments, the following nominees were validly
proclaimed winners: BAYAN MUNA (Satur C. Ocampo, Crispin B. Beltran and Liza
L. Maza), AKBAYAN (Loretta Ann P. Rosales), BUTIL (Benjamin A. Cruz), APEC
(Ernesto C. Pablo) and CIBAC (Joel J. Villanueva).
Comelec’s Second Partial
Compliance Report
In its Second Compliance Report dated August 22, 2001 and received by this
Court on August 28, 2001, Comelec recommended that the following party-list
participants7 be deemed qualified under the Court’s guidelines:
10. ABANSE! PINAY
11. ADHIKAIN AT KILUSAN NG ORDINARYONG TAO PARA SA LUPA,
PABAHAY, AT HANAPBUHAY (AKO)
12. ALAGAD
13. SENIOR CITIZENS/ELDERY SECTORAL PARTY (ELDERLY)
14. ALL TRADE UNION CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES (ATUCP)
15. MARITIME PARTY (MARITIME)
16. ANG BAGONG BAYANI – OFW LABOR PARTY (OFW)
17. ANIBAN NG MGA MAGSASAKA, MANGINGISDA, AT MANGGAGAWA SA
AGRIKULTURA – KATIPUNAN (AMMMA)
18. ALYANSA NG NAGKAKAISANG KABATAAN NG SAMBAYANAN PARA SA
KAUNLARAN (ANAKBAYAN)
19. ALYANSA NG MGA MAY KAPANSANAN SA PILIPINAS (AKAP)
20. MINDANAO FEDERATION OF SMALL COCONUT FARMERS’
ORGANIZATION, INC. (MSCFO)
21. WOMENPOWER, INC. (WPI)
22. AGGRUPATION AND ALLIANCE OF FARMERS AND FISHERFOLKS OF
THE PHILIPPINES (AAAFPI)
23. ALL WORKERS ALLIANCE TRADE UNIONS (AWATU)
In the same Compliance Report, the poll body classified the following party-list
groups as unqualified:
 GREEN PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION (GREEN PHIL)
 PARTIDO NG MASANG PILIPINO (PMP)
 ANG LAKAS NG BAGONG KOOPERATIBA (ALAB)
 PARTIDO NG MARALITANG PILIPINO – PINATUBO PARTY (PMP-
PINATUBO)
 REBOLUSYONARYONG ALYANSANG MAKABANSA (RAM)
 BAYAN NG NAGTATAGUYOD NG DEMOKRATIKONG IDEOLOGIYA AT
LAYUNIN, INC. (BANDILA)
 BAGONG BAYANI ORGANIZATION (BAGONG BAYANI)
 KABATAAN NG MASANG PILIPINO (KAMPIL)
 AARANGKADA ANG MGA HANDA ORAS-ORAS (AHOY)
 PHILIPPINE MEDICAL ASSOCIATION (PMA)
 ALLIANCE TO ALLEVIATE THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
ORDER, INC. (AASENSO KA)
 PARTIDO DEMOKRATIKO SOSYALISTA NG PILIPINAS (PDSP)
 COOPERATIVE UNION OF THE PHILIPPINES (CUP)
 ATIN (FORMERLY ABANTE BISAYA)
 VOLUNTEERS AGAINST CRIME AND CORRUPTION (VACC)
 ASSOCIATION OF BUILDERS CONSULTANTS AND DESIGNERS, INC.
(ABCD)
 LIBERAL PARTY (LP)
 CITIZEN’S DRUGWATCH FOUNDATION, INC. (DRUGWATCH)
 ALAY SA BAYAN PARA SA KALAYAAN AT DEMOKRASYA (ABAKADA)
 ASOSASYON NG MGA TAGA INSURANCE SA PILIPINAS, INC. (ATIP)
 ANG LAKAS NG OVERSEAS CONTRACT WORKERS (OCW)
 NATIONAL FEDERATION OF SUGAR PLANTERS (NFSP)
 KABALIKAT NG BAYAN PARTY (KABALIKAT)
 PARTIDO DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO LAKAS NG BAYAN (PDP-
LABAN)
 BANTAY BAYAN FOUNDATION PARTY, INC. (BANTAY-BAYAN)
 ABANTE KILUSANG KOOPERATIBA SA GITNANG LUZON [AKK
COALITION]
 GREEN PHILIPPINES (GREEN)
 PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF DETECTIVE AND PROTECTIVE
AGENCY OPERATORS (PADPAO)
 ALLIANCE FOR GREATER ACHIEVEMENTS IN PEACE AND
PROSPERITY (AGAP)
 ALYANSA NG KOOPERATIBANG PANGKABUHAYAN PARTY
(ANGKOP)
 NATIONAL ALLIANCE FOR DEMOCRACY (NAD)
 PEOPLE POWER PARTY (PEOPLE POWER)
 PHILIPPINE TECHNOLOGICAL COUNCIL (PTC)
 PHILIPPINE LOCAL AUTONOMY MOVEMENT, INC. (PLAM)
 PROFESSIONAL CRIMINOLOGIST ASSOCIATION OF THE
PHILIPPINES (PCAP)
 CITIZENS MOVEMENT FOR JUSTICE, ECONOMY, ENVIRONMENT,
AND PEACE (JEEP)
Comelec’s Final Partial
Compliance Report
In its Final Partial Compliance Report dated September 27, 2001 and received by
the Court a day later, Comelec recommended that the following be considered as
qualified party-list participants:
24. NATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF TRICYCLE OPERATORS AND DRIVERS
ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES (NACTODAP)
25. NATIONAL FEDERATION OF SMALL COCONUT FARMERS
ORGANIZATION, INC. (SCFO)
26. TRIBAL COMMUNITIES ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES (TRICAP)
27. PILIPINONG MAY KAPANSANAN (PINOY MAY K)
groups:
28. VETERANS CARE AND WELFARE ORGANIZATION (VETERANS CARE)
29. UNION OF THE FILIPINO OVERSEAS WORKERS, INC. (OCW-UNIFIL)
30. DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE (DA)
31. PILIPINO WORKERS PARTY (PWP)
32. PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF RETIRED PERSONS (PARP)
33. ALLIANCE OF RETIRED POSTAL EMPLOYEES AND SENIOR CITIZENS,
INC. (ARPES)
34. AGRARIAN REFORM BENEFICIARIES ASSOCIATION, INC. (ARBA)
35. FEDERATION OF JEEPNEY OPERATORS AND DRIVERS ASSOCIATION
OF THE PHILIPPINES (FEJODAP)
36. GABAY NG MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO PARTY (GABAY-OFW)
37. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES OF SETTLERS (AASAHAN)
38. ALLIANCE FOR YOUTH SOLIDARITY (AYOS)
39. PARTY FOR OVERSEAS WORKERS AND EMPOWERMENT AND RE-
INTEGRATION (POWER)
40. KILOS KABATAAN PILIPINO (KILOS)
41. KALOOB-KA ISANG LOOB PARA SA MARANGAL NA PANINIRAHAN
(KALOOB)
42. ALYANSA NG MGA MAMAMAYAN AT MANDARAGAT SA LAWA NG
LAGUNA, INC. (ALYANSA)
43. DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION OF THE PHILIPPINES (DFP)
44. PARTIDO KATUTUBONG PILIPINO (KATUTUBO)
Further, the Comelec recommended the disqualification of the following party-list
 AALAGAHAN ANG ATING KALIKASAN (ALAS)
 PHILIPPINE SOCIETY OF AGRICULTURAL ENGINEERS (PSAE)
 PARTIDO PARA SA DEMOKRATIKONG REPORMA (PDR)
 CONSUMERS UNION OF THE PHILIPPINES (CONSUMERS)
 CONFEDERATION OF NON-STOCK SAVINGS AND LOAN
ASSOCIATION, INC. (CONSLA)
 PEOPLE’S PROGRESSIVE ALLIANCE FOR PEACE AND GOOD
GOVERNMENT TOWARDS ALLEVIATION OF POVERTY AND SOCIAL
ADVANCEMENT (PAG-ASA)
 AHONBAYAN, INC. (AHONBAYAN)
 ANGAT
 SAMA-SAMA KAYA NATIN ‘TO FOUNDATION, INC. (KASAMA)
 A PEACEFUL ORGANIZATION LEADERSHIP, FRIENDSHIP, SERVICE
MOVEMENT (APO)
 PHILIPPINE DENTAL ASSOCIATION (PDA)
 PUSYON (BISAYA) PILIPINO (PUSYON)
 SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS)
 CITIZEN’S ANTI-CRIME ASSISTANCE GROUP, INC. (CAAG)
 ASA AT SAMAHAN NG KARANIWANG PILIPINO (ASAKAPIL)
 BUSINESSMEN AND ENTREPRENEURS ASSOCIATION, INC. (BEA)
 UNITED ARCHITECTS OF THE PHILIPPINES (UAP)
 ABAY PAMILYA FOUNDATION, INC. (ABAY PAMILYA)
 PEOPLE’S REFORM PARTY (PRP)
 COALITION FOR CONSUMER PROTECTION AND WELFARE
(COALITION 349)
 RIZALIST PARTY (RP)
 NATIONAL URBAN POOR ASSEMBLY (NUPA)
 ALLIANCE FOR MERITOCRACY (AFM)
 BALIKATAN SA KABUHAYAN BUHAY COALITION (BSK)
 BANTAY DAGAT, INC. (BDI)
 CONFEDERATION OF HOME OWNERS ASSOCIATION FOR
REFORMS IN GOVERNANCE AND ENVIRONMENT, INC.
(HOMEOWNERS)
 PORT USERS CONFEDERATION, INC. (PUC)
 LABAN PARA SA KAPAYAPAAN, KATARUNGAN, AT KAUNLARAN
(KKK)
 BONDING IDEALISM FOR NATIONAL HUMAN INITIATIVE (BINHI)
 KATIPUNAN NG MGA BANTAY BAYAN SA PILIPINAS (KABAYAN)
 FEDERATION OF SONS AND DAUGHTERS OF PHIL. VETERANS, INC.
(LAHING VETERANO)
 PRIME MOVERS FOR PEACE AND PROGRESS (PRIMO)
 PROGRESSIVE ALLIANCE OF CITIZENS FOR DEMOCRACY (PACD)
 COUNCIL OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCERS (CAP)
 TAPAT FOUNDATION, INC. (TAPAT)
 ALLIANCE FOR ALLEVIATION OF NATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND
TRUST PARTY (AKA)
 ANG IPAGLABAN MO FOUNDATION (AIM)
 PHILIPPINE MINE SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENT (PMSEA)
 BICOL SARO PARTY (BSP)
 AABANTE KA PILIPINAS PARTY (SAGIP BAYAN MOVEMENT) (APIL)
 PHILIPPINE PEOPLE’S PARLIAMENT (PPP-YOUTH)
 SPORTS AND HEALTH ADVANCEMENT FOUNDATION, INC. (SHAF)
 KILUSAN TUNGO SA PAMBANSANG TANGKILIKAN, INC. (KATAPAT)
 CITIZENS’ FOUNDATION FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRIMES AND
INJUSTICES, INC. (CITIZEN)
 NACIONALISTA PARTY (NP) (Withdrew participation in the party-list
election)
 SANDIGANG MARALITA (SM)
 ONEWAY PRINTING TECHNICAL FOUNDATION, INC. (ONEWAY
PRINT)
 PHILIPPINE JURY MOVEMENT (JURY)
 ALTERNATIVE ACTION (AA)
 DEMOCRATIC WORKERS’ PARTY (DWP)
 SECURITY UNITED LEAGUE NATIONWIDE GUARDS, INC. (SULONG)
 ORGANISASYONG KAUGNAYAN NASYONAL SA PAG-UNLAD (O.K.
NAPU)
 PAMBANSANG SANGGUNIANG KATIPUNAN NG BARANGAY
KAGAWAD SA PILIPINAS (KATIPUNAN)
 NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR COMMUNITY ORGANIZER (NCCO)
 NATIONWIDE ASSOCIATION OF CONSUMERS, INC. (NACI)
 LUZVIMINDA ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION, INC. (LEDFI)
 TINDOG PARA HAN KABUBUWASON HAN WARAYNON (TINDOG
WARAY)
 FEDERATION OF LAND REFORM FARMERS OF THE PHILIPPINES
(FLRF)
 KATRIBU MINDANAO, INC. (KATRIBU)
 DEMOKRATIKONG UGNAYAN TAPAT SA SAMBAYANAN
(DUGTUNGAN)
 KATARUNGAN SA BAYAN TAGAPAGTANGGOL NG SAMBAYANAN
(KABATAS)
 GO! GO! PHILIPPINES MOVEMENT
 PAMBANSANG SAMAHANG LINGKOD NG BAYAN, INC. (PASALBA)
 PHILIPPINE REFORMIST SOCIETY (PRS)
 GABAYBAYAN (GAD)
 ALUHAY NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION, INC. (ALUHAI)
 ORGANIZED SUPPORT FOR THE MOVEMENT TO ENHANCE THE
NATIONAL AGENDA (OSMEÑA)
All these Compliance Reports have already been affirmed by this Court except
that, in regard to the First Compliance Report, it agreed -- as earlier stated -- to
add APEC and CIBAC to the list of qualified groups.
Other Significant
Orders and Pleadings
Under its Resolution No. NBC-02-001,8 Comelec motu proprio amended its
Compliance Reports by, inter alia, adding four more party-list participants (BUHAY,
COCOFED, NCIA and BAGONG BAYANI) to the list of qualified candidates for the
May 14, 2001 elections.
In its Comment dated November 15, 2002, the OSG opined that "Comelec acted
correctly in revising its Party-List Canvass Report No. 26, so as to reflect the
correct number of votes cast in favor of qualified party-list parties and
organizations."9 Consequently, it moved to lift our TRO with respect to COCOFED,
BUHAY, SANLAKAS and PM, because "[a]s shown in the revised COMELEC
Party-list Canvass Report No. 26, movants BUHAY, COCOFED, SANLAKAS and
PM received 4.25%, 3.35%, 2.21% and 3.17%, respectively, of the total votes
cast10 in the May 14, 2001 party-list election."11
It added that "the proclamation by the COMELEC of BUHAY, COCOFED,
SANLAKAS and PM (as well as all other qualified parties and organizations which
received at least 2% of the total votes cast in the same party-list election) as
winners in the said party-list is in order."12
However, in its November 25, 2002 Comment, the OSG contended that NCIA,
"which is not a qualified party or organization per the Comelec [First] Partial
Compliance Report dated July 27, 2001, cannot be proclaimed as winner in the
last party-list elections."13 It also recommended that ABA’s Motion to lift the TRO
with respect to its proclamation should be likewise granted, because it is a
"qualified party or organization that hurdled the 2% threshold in the last party-list
elections. For, ABA received 3.54% of the votes cast in the said party-list elections,
as shown in COMELEC Resolution No. NBC-02-001. ABA’s proclamation as
winner is therefore in order."14
Preparatory to resolving the present Motions and in observance of due process,
the Court resolved on February 18, 2003 to require the parties, including the OSG,
to submit their respective Position Papers on the following issues:
1) Whether Labo v. Comelec,15 Grego v. Comelec16 and related cases should be
deemed applicable to the determination of winners in party-list elections
2) Whether the votes cast for parties/organizations that were subsequently
disqualified for having failed to meet the eight-point guideline contained in our June
26, 2001 Decision should be deducted from the "total votes cast for the party-list
system" during the said elections
The Court’s Ruling
At the outset, the Court needs to pass upon the claims of the OSG that the initial
recommendation contained in Comelec’s First Compliance Report dated July 27,
2001, regarding BUHAY and COCOFED should be reconsidered, and that these
two party-list groups should be deemed qualified.
Qualification of
BUHAY and COCOFED
In recommending the disqualification of BUHAY for being "most probably merely
an extension of the El Shaddai," a religious group, Comelec said in the above-
mentioned Report:
"Upon hearing the case for BUHAY, the Commission determined that, based upon
BUHAY’s declarations of intent in its constitution, upon its avowed platform of
government – which both mirror the sentiments of the El Shaddai Movement – and
upon the circumstances surrounding its relationship with the El Shaddai
Movement, BUHAY is most probably merely an extension of the El Shaddai. In this
light, it is very likely that the relationship between the leader of the El Shaddai, and
the nominee of BUHAY is less a matter of serendipity than an attempt to
circumvent the statutory prohibition against sects or denominations from
participating in the party-list elections."17
In the same Report, Comelec also stated that COCOFED did not deserve a seat in
the House of Representatives, because it was allegedly an "adjunct of the
government." Explained the Commission:
"COCOFED is a sectoral party representing the peasantry. It is a non-stock, non-
profit organization of coconut farmers and producers, established in 1947. It has
no religious affiliations. However, the records indicate that it is an adjunct of the
government.
"COCOFED’s Amended By-Laws specifically provides that:
‘The Chairman of the Philippine Coconut Authority or his duly authorized
representative shall automatically be a member of the National Board.’
The Philippine Coconut Authority is an administrative agency of the government
which receives support and funding from the national government. Thus, to have
the Chairman of the Philippine Coconut Authority sit on the National Board of
COCOFED clearly amounts to ‘participation of the government in the affairs of
candidate’ which, as this Court has said, would be ‘unfair to the other parties,’ and
‘deleterious to the objectives of the law.’
"Furthermore, in the Articles of Incorporation of COCOFED, it declared, as one of
its primary purposes, the obtaining of ‘possible technical and financial assistance
for industry development from private or governmental sources.’"18
On the other hand, in its Consolidated Reply dated October 15, 2001, the OSG --
in representation of the poll agency -- argued that the above findings of the
Comelec in regard, inter alia, to BUHAY and COCOFED are "not supported by
substantial evidence" and, thus, "should be modified accordingly." This opinion is
buttressed by the OSG’s Comment dated November 15, 2002.19
The OSG stressed that the Comelec report on BUHAY was "merely anchored on
conjectures or speculations." On COCOFED, the OSG explained that the bylaws
making the chairman of the Philippine Coconut Authority an automatic member of
the COCOFED National Board "has already been deleted as early as May, 1988."
It added that while the primary purposes of COCOFED’s Articles of Incorporation
authorize the organization "to help explore and obtain possible technical and
financial assistance for industry development from private or governmental
sources x x x," this statement does not "by itself constitute such substantial
evidence to support a conclusion that the COCOFED is an entity funded or
assisted by the government."
We are convinced. For the same reasons that we concurred in the earlier
accreditation of APEC and CIBAC, we accept the OSG’s position that indeed
Comelec erred in disqualifying BUHAY and COCOFED.20
Therefore, we now add these two groups to the list of 44 qualified groups earlier
mentioned and thereby increase the total to 46.
We shall now take up the main question of which parties/organizations won during
the last party-list election.
Legal Effect of the Disqualifications on the "Total Votes Cast"
The instant Motions for proclamation contend that the disqualification of many
party-list organizations has reduced the "total number of votes cast for the party-list
elections." Because of this reduction, the two-percent benchmark required by law
has now been allegedly attained by movants. Hence, they now pray for their
proclamation as winners in the last party-list elections.
Recall that under Section 11(b)21 of RA 7941 (the Party-List Act), only those parties
garnering a minimum of two percent of the total votes cast for the party-list system
are entitled to have a seat in the House of Representatives. The critical question
now is this: To determine the "total votes cast for the party-list system," should the
votes tallied for the disqualified candidates be deducted? Otherwise stated, does
the clause "total votes cast for the party-list system" include only those ballots cast
for qualified party-list candidates?
To answer this question, there is a need to review related jurisprudence on the
matter, especially Labo v. Comelec22 and Grego v. Comelec,23 which were
mentioned in our February 18, 2003 Resolution.
Labo  and  Grego  Not Applicable
In Labo, the Court declared that "the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority
votes does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of
votes to be declared elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed
elected to the office."24 In other words, the votes cast for an ineligible or disqualified
candidate cannot be considered "stray."
However, "this rule would be different if the electorate, fully aware in fact and in law
of a candidate’s disqualification so as to bring such awareness within the realm of
notoriety, would nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible candidate. In
such case, the electorate may be said to have waived the validity and efficacy of
their votes by notoriously misapplying their franchise or throwing away their votes,
in which case, the eligible candidate obtaining the next higher number of votes
may be deemed elected."25 In short, the votes cast for a "notoriously disqualified"
candidate may be considered "stray" and excluded from the canvass.
The foregoing pronouncement was reiterated in Grego, which held that the
exception mentioned in Labo v. Comelec "is predicated on the concurrence of two
assumptions, namely: (1) the one who obtained the highest number of votes is
disqualified; and (2) the electorate is fully aware in fact and in law of a candidate’s
disqualification so as to bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety but
would nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible candidate."26
Note, however, that the foregoing pronouncements (1) referred to regular elections
for local offices and (2) involved the interpretation of Section 6 of RA 6646.27 They
were not meant to cover party-list elections, which are specifically governed by RA
7941. Section 10 of this latter law clearly provides that the votes cast for a party, a
sectoral organization or a coalition "not entitled to be voted for shall not be
counted":
"SEC. 10. Manner of Voting. – Every voter shall be entitled to two (2) votes: the
first vote is a vote for candidate for membership of the House of Representatives in
his legislative district, and the second, a vote for the party, organization, or
coalition he wants represented in the House of Representatives: Provided, That a
vote cast for a party, sectoral organization, or coalition not entitled to be voted for
shall not be counted: Provided, finally, That the first election under the party-list
system shall be held in May 1998." (Emphasis supplied)
The language of the law is clear; hence, there is room, not for interpretation, but
merely for application.28 Likewise, no recourse to extrinsic aids is warranted when
the language of the law is plain and unambiguous.29
Another reason for not applying Labo and Grego is that these cases involve single
elective posts, while the present controversy pertains to the acquisition of a
number of congressional seats depending on the total election results -- such that
even those garnering second, third, fourth or lesser places could be proclaimed
winners depending on their compliance with other requirements.
RA 7941 is a special statute governing the elections of party-list representatives
and is the controlling law in matters pertaining thereto. Since Labo and Section 6
of RA 6646 came into being prior to the enactment of RA 7941, the latter is a
qualification of the former ruling and law. On the other hand, Grego and other
related cases that came after the enactment of RA 7941 should be construed as
inapplicable to the latter.30
Subtracting the votes garnered by these disqualified party-list groups from the total
votes cast under the party-list system will reduce the base figure to 6,523,185. This
means that the two-percent threshold can be more easily attained by the qualified
marginalized and under-represented groups. Hence, disregarding the votes of
disqualified party-list participants will increase and broaden the number of
representatives from these sectors. Doing so will further concretize and give flesh
to the policy declaration in RA 7941, which we reproduce thus:
"SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. -- The State shall promote proportional
representation in the election of representation in the election of representatives to
the House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered, national
and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino
citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations
and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could
contribute to the enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as
a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives. Towards this end,
the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to
attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in
the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win
seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible."
Need for Patience and Perseverance
BAYAN MUNA contends that the deduction of votes obtained by party-list
candidates disqualified after the holding of the party-list elections will result in the
instability of the system. The reason is that qualified party-list candidates would be
encouraged to seek the disqualification of the other candidates for the sole
purpose of attaining the needed percentage of the votes cast. Although such
scenario may be possible, we believe that the perceived "instability" can be
alleviated because, (1) unlike in the past elections, Comelec now has the herein
qualified and disqualified participants’ list, which can be used for future elections;
and (2) in the light of recent jurisprudential developments, Comelec will now be
guided accordingly when accrediting new candidates for the next party-list
elections and will be able to set the period for accreditation in such time and
manner as to enable it to determine their qualifications long before the elections
are held.
Indeed, it takes patience and perseverance to have the marginalized and under-
represented sectors ably represented in Congress. The controversies churned
during the 1998 and the 2001 party-list elections should further embolden, not
distract, the nation in the process of implementing a genuine and sound Philippine-
style party-list system. At this point, the Court needs to stress what it said
in Veterans:
"[T]he dismal result of the first election for party-list representatives should serve
as a challenge to our sectoral parties and organizations. It should stir them to be
more active and vigilant in their campaign for representation in the State’s
lawmaking body. It should also serve as a clarion call for innovation and creativity
in adopting this novel system of popular democracy.
"With adequate information and dissemination to the public and more active
sectoral parties, we are confident our people will be more responsive to future
party-list elections. Armed with patience, perseverance and perspicacity, our
marginalized sectors, in time, will fulfill the Filipino dream of full representation in
Congress under the aegis of the party-list system, Philippine style."31
We also take this opportunity to emphasize that the formulas devised
in Veterans for computing the number of nominees that the party-list winners are
entitled to cannot be disregarded by the concerned agencies of government,
especially the Commission on Elections. These formulas ensure that the number
of seats allocated to the winning party-list candidates conform to the principle of
proportional representation mandated by the law.
The Party-List Winners
As discussed earlier, the votes obtained by disqualified party-list candidates are
not to be counted in determining the total votes cast for the party-list system. In the
present cases, the votes they obtained should be deducted from the canvass of
the total number of votes cast during the May 14, 2001 elections. Consequently,
following Section 12 of RA 7941, a new tally and ranking of qualified party-list
candidates is now in order, according to the percentage of votes they obtained as
compared with the total valid votes cast nationwide.
Accordingly, we will now tally and rank the qualified party-list participants during
the last elections, pursuant to the approved Comelec Compliance Reports32 and
our various Resolutions in these consolidated cases. Based on our foregoing
discussion, we will deduct the votes obtained by the 11633 disqualified candidates
from the total votes cast for the May 14, 2001 elections. The votes for these
disqualified groups total 8,595,630. Subtracting this figure from 15,118,815 (the
total votes cast as reported in the Compliance Reports) will result in a new total of
6,523,185 valid votes cast for the May 14, 2001 party-list elections. This new figure
representing the votes cast for the 46 qualified party-list participants will now be
the basis for computing the two-percent threshold for victory and the number of
seats the winners are entitled to.
To repeat, there are only 46 qualified party-list participants. Be it remembered that
the Commission recommended for qualification only 42 party-list candidates in its
three Compliance Reports. To this figure should be added the two participants we
approved in our January 29, 2002 Resolution, plus another two (BUHAY and
COCOFED) per our earlier discussion in this ruling. Table No. 1 below-lists the 46
qualified parties.
Table No. 134
Rank Party-List Votes Cast Percentage
 to Total Votes 29 PINOY MAY K 32,151 0.49
Group
Cast (%)
30 VETERANS CARE 31,694 0.49
1 BAYAN MUNA 1,708,253 26.19
31 OCW-UNIFIL 29,400 0.45
2 APEC 802,060 12.29
32 PWP 24,182 0.37
3 AKBAYAN! 377,852 5.79
33 DA 24,029 0.37
4 BUTIL 330,282 5.06
34 PARP 23,297 0.36
5 CIBAC 323,810 4.96
35 ARPES 22,497 0.34
6 BUHAY 290,760 4.46
36 ARBA 22,345 0.34
7 AMIN 252,051 3.86
37 FEJODAP 21,335 0.33
8 ABA 242,199 3.71
38 GABAY OFW 17,777 0.27
9 COCOFED 229,165 3.51
39 AASAHAN 16,787 0.26
10 PM 216,823 3.32
40 AYOS 15,871 0.24
11 SANLAKAS 151,017 2.31
41 POWER 13,050 0.20
12 ABANSE! PINAY 135,211 2.07
42 KILOS 11,170 0.17
13 AKO 126,012 1.93
43 KALOOB 9,137 0.14
14 ALAGAD 117,161 1.80
44 ALYANSA 7,882 0.12
15 ELDERLY 106,496 1.63
45 KATUTUBO 6,602 0.10
16 ATUCP 103,273 1.58
46 DFP 6,600 0.10
17 MARITIME 98,946 1.52
Total 6,523,185
18 OFW 97,085 1.49
19 AMMMA 65,735 1.01 The Winners and
Their Nominees
20 ANAKBAYAN 63,312 0.97
21 AKAP 54,925 0.84 Using simple mathematics, we find that only 12 of the 46 qualified parties obtained
22 MSCFO 49,914 0.76 at least two percent of the 6,523,185 total valid votes cast. Two percent of this
number is 130,464. Hence, only those qualified parties that obtained at least
23 WPI 46,831 0.72 130,464 votes may be declared winners. On this basis, the winners are as follows:
24 AAAFPI 43,882 0.67
Table No. 2
25 AWATU 42,149 0.65
26 NACTODAP 38,898 0.60 Percentage
Party-List
27 SCFO 37,470 0.57 Rank Votes Cast to Total Votes
Group
Cast (%)
28 TRICAP 35,807 0.55
1 BAYAN MUNA 1,708,253 26.19 Having obtained 26.19 percent, BAYAN MUNA is entitled to three (3)
seats.1âwphi1 This finding is pursuant to our ruling in Veterans, the pertinent
2 APEC 802,060 12.29 portions of which we reproduce as follows:
3 AKBAYAN! 377,852 5.79
"If the proportion of votes received by the first party without rounding it off is equal
4 BUTIL 330,282 5.06 to at least six percent of the total valid votes cast for all the party list groups, then
5 CIBAC 323,810 4.96 the first party shall be entitled to two additional seats or a total of three seats
overall. If the proportion of votes without a rounding off is equal to or greater than
6 BUHAY 290,760 4.46 four percent, but less than six percent, then the first party shall have one additional
7 AMIN 252,051 3.86 or a total of two seats. And if the proportion is less than four percent, then the first
party shall not be entitled to any additional seat."
8 ABA 242,199 3.71
9 COCOFED 229,165 3.51 x x x           x x x          x x x
10 PM 216,823 3.32
"Note that the above formula will be applicable only in determining the number of
11 SANLAKAS 151,017 2.31 additional seats the first party is entitled to. It cannot be used to determine the
12 ABANSE! PINAY 135,211 2.07 number of additional seats of the other qualified parties. As explained earlier, the
use of the same formula for all would contravene the proportional representation
parameter. For example, a second party obtains six percent of the total number of
We shall now determine the number of nominees each winning party is entitled to, votes cast. According to the above formula, the said party would be entitled to two
in accordance with the formula in Veterans. For purposes of determining the additional seats or a total of three seats overall. However, if the first party received
number of its nominees, BAYAN MUNA (the party that obtained the highest a significantly higher amount of votes -- say, twenty percent -- to grant it the same
number of votes) is considered the first party. The applicable formula35 is as number of seats as the second party would violate the statutory mandate of
follows: proportional representation, since a party getting only six percent of the votes will
have an equal number of representatives as the one obtaining twenty percent. The
Number of votes of first party proper solution, therefore, is to grant the first party a total of three seats; and the
party receiving six percent, additional seats in proportion to those of the first
Proportion of votes of first party relative party." 36
= to
total votes for party-list system As adverted to earlier, the issue of whether additional seats should be allocated to
Total votes for party-list APEC, AKBAYAN, BUTIL and CIBAC will not be addressed in this Resolution; a
system separate Motion (with Supplemental Motion) challenging their entitlement thereto
has been filed by BAYAN MUNA and is still pending completion as of this writing.
Applying this formula, we arrive at 26.19 percent: Hence, we shall compute only the additional seat or seats to be allocated, if any, to
the other qualified parties – BUHAY, AMIN, ABA, COCOFED, PM, SANLAKAS
and ABANSE! PINAY.
1,708,253
Applying the relevant formula in Veterans to BUHAY, we arrive at 0.51:
= 26.19%
Additional = Votes Cast for Qualified x Allotted Seats for First
6,523,185 Seats Party Party
 2. BUHAY – one qualifying seat only

3. AMIN – one qualifying seat only

Votes Cast for First Party
290,760 4. ABA – one qualifying seat only

= x 3 5. COCOFED – one qualifying seat only

1,708,253 6. PM – one qualifying seat only

= 0.51
7. SANLAKAS – one qualifying seat only

Since 0.51 is less than one, BUHAY is not entitled to any additional seat.37 It is 8. ABANSE! PINAY – one qualifying seat only
entitled to only one qualifying seat like all the other qualified parties that are ranked
below it, as shown in Table No. 3:
Epilogue
Table No. 3
The determination of the winners in the last party-list elections has been neither
easy nor simple. The novelty of the party-list system in our country necessarily
Additional demanded careful study and deliberation by the Court. Principles and precedents
Rank Party-List Votes Percentage(%)
Seats38 in other democracies of the world have not been very helpful, because our party-
list law (RA 7941) has earmarked unique parameters, giving rise to an equally
2 APEC 802,060 12.29 n/c
distinctive Philippine-style party-list system. Our difficulties have also been
3 AKBAYAN! 377,852 5.79 n/c aggravated by the less than firm actions of the Commission on Elections referred
to earlier, which had to be reversed based on the OSG’s later submissions.
4 BUTIL 330,282 5.06 n/c
5 CIBAC 323,810 4.96 n/c To help all concerned, especially the Commission on Elections, speed up the
6 BUHAY 290,760 4.46 0.51 process of determining the party-list winners in the future, we deem it wise to
summarize the implementing process we followed in this Resolution, as follows:
7 AMIN 252,051 3.86 0.44
8 ABA 242,199 3.71 0.42 1. After the promulgation of our Decision on June 26, 2001, we directed Comelec
to conduct a factual determination as to which of the various party-list candidates
9 COCOFED 229,165 3.51 0.40 had passed the eight-point guideline we instituted in that Decision. Although we
10 PM 216,823 3.32 0.38 gave Comelec only 30 days to undertake the work, it was able to submit its Final
Compliance Report only on September 27, 2001.
11 SANLAKAS 151,017 2.31 0.26
12 ABANSE! PINAY 135,211 2.07 0.24 2. Of the various parties and organizations39 which Comelec allowed to participate
in the 2001 party-list elections, it recommended -- in its three Compliance Reports
to the Court -- 42 to be qualified. Later on, four more groups were added, for a total
In sum, the above-named party-list winners, excluding those with a separate
of 46.
pending challenge, are entitled to the following congressional seats:
3. Next, we determined which of the 46 qualified parties garnered at least two
1. BAYAN MUNA – three (3) seats [one qualifying and two additional seats]
percent of the total votes cast for the party-list system. To do so, we subtracted the
votes obtained by the disqualified candidates from the "total votes cast." Those
parties, organizations and coalitions that had obtained at least two percent of this
balance were declared winners.
4. After identifying the winners, we determined, by using the formulas mandated in
Veterans v. Comelec, how many nominees each winning party was entitled to.
5. The foregoing process would have been finished long ago and the winners
proclaimed before the end of the year 2002, had Comelec been more resolute and
exacting in the factual determinations contained in its Compliance Reports.
6. In the interest of due process, the Court required Position Papers on the issue of
whether the votes of disqualified candidates should be deducted from the "total
votes cast" nationwide.
7. The two rollos of these two consolidated cases contain about 14,000 pages,
because almost all of the original party-list participants filed -- some repeatedly --
motions, pleas, position papers and so on, which all needed attention. Thus, the
Court had to devote an enormous amount of time and effort poring over,
understanding, and ruling upon these submissions.
8. In the interest of speedy justice, this matter was deliberated upon; and this
Resolution was discussed, finalized and promulgated by the Court within weeks
after it had received the last Position Paper mentioned in item 6 above.
IN THE FUTURE, the determination of the winners can truly be made much more
expeditiously, now that there are precedents to guide all concerned, especially the
Commission on Elections. For one thing, Comelec already has the herein base list
of 46 qualified parties. For another, given the lessons and experiences in these
proceedings, it can now more speedily, more carefully and more prudently pass
upon the qualifications of new candidates. Such process can even be done in
advance under such rules and regulations it may issue, consistent with the law and
with our Decisions and Resolutions here and in Veterans, to pre-qualify
participants well in advance of the elections.
In closing, the Court hopes that, with each bit of wisdom they learned and after the
arduous journey they experienced in our one-of-a-kind Philippine-style party-list
system, the marginalized and under-represented sectors of our country will be
accorded ever-widening opportunities to participate in nation-building, so that they
can help develop -- in peace and harmony -- a society that is just, humane,
progressive and free.
WHEREFORE, we HOLD that, having obtained at least two percent of the total
valid votes cast in the last party-list elections, the following qualified participants
are DECLARED elected with one nominee each: BUHAY, AMIN, ABA, COCOFED,
PM, SANLAKAS and ABANSE! PINAY. To enable the Commission on Elections to
proclaim -- upon finality of this Resolution -- these winners and their respective
nominees, we hereby partially LIFT our Temporary Restraining Order dated May 9,
2001, in regard to them only. It is made permanent in regard to the rest that did not
qualify and win.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 179271               April 21, 2009
BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT AND
TRANSPARENCY (BANAT), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (sitting as the National Board of
Canvassers), Respondent.
ARTS BUSINESS AND SCIENCE PROFESSIONALS, Intervenor.
AANGAT TAYO, Intervenor.
COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE PHILIPPINES,
INC. (SENIOR CITIZENS), Intervenor.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 179295               April 21, 2009
BAYAN MUNA, ADVOCACY FOR TEACHER EMPOWERMENT THROUGH
ACTION, COOPERATION AND HARMONY TOWARDS EDUCATIONAL
REFORMS, INC., and ABONO, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Petitioner in G.R. No. 179271 — Barangay Association for National Advancement
and Transparency (BANAT) — in a petition for certiorari and mandamus,1 assails
the Resolution2 promulgated on 3 August 2007 by the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) in NBC No. 07-041 (PL). The COMELEC’s resolution in NBC No. 07-
041 (PL) approved the recommendation of Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head of the
National Board of Canvassers (NBC) Legal Group, to deny the petition of BANAT
for being moot. BANAT filed before the COMELEC En Banc, acting as NBC,
a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by
the Constitution.
The following are intervenors in G.R. No. 179271: Arts Business and Science
Professionals (ABS), Aangat Tayo (AT), and Coalition of Associations of Senior
Citizens in the Philippines, Inc. (Senior Citizens).
Petitioners in G.R. No. 179295 — Bayan Muna, Abono, and Advocacy for Teacher
Empowerment Through Action, Cooperation and Harmony Towards Educational
Reforms (A Teacher) — in a petition for certiorari with mandamus and
prohibition,3 assails NBC Resolution No. 07-604 promulgated on 9 July 2007. NBC
No. 07-60 made a partial proclamation of parties, organizations and coalitions that
obtained at least two percent of the total votes cast under the Party-List System.
The COMELEC announced that, upon completion of the canvass of the party-list
results, it would determine the total number of seats of each winning party,
organization, or coalition in accordance with Veterans Federation Party v.
COMELEC5 (Veterans).
Estrella DL Santos, in her capacity as President and First Nominee of the Veterans
Freedom Party, filed a motion to intervene in both G.R. Nos. 179271 and 179295.
The Facts
The 14 May 2007 elections included the elections for the party-list representatives.
The COMELEC counted 15,950,900 votes cast for 93 parties under the Party-List
System.6
On 27 June 2002, BANAT filed a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List
Representatives Provided by the Constitution, docketed as NBC No. 07-041 (PL)
before the NBC. BANAT filed its petition because "[t]he Chairman and the
Members of the [COMELEC] have recently been quoted in the national papers that
the [COMELEC] is duty bound to and shall implement the Veterans ruling, that is,
would apply the Panganiban formula in allocating party-list seats."7 There were no
intervenors in BANAT’s petition before the NBC. BANAT filed a memorandum on
19 July 2007.
On 9 July 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the NBC, promulgated NBC Resolution
No. 07-60. NBC Resolution No. 07-60 proclaimed thirteen (13) parties as winners
in the party-list elections, namely: Buhay Hayaan Yumabong (BUHAY), Bayan
Muna, Citizens’ Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC), Gabriela’s Women Party
(Gabriela), Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives (APEC), A Teacher,
Akbayan! Citizen’s Action Party (AKBAYAN), Alagad, Luzon Farmers Party
(BUTIL), Cooperative-Natco Network Party (COOP-NATCCO), Anak Pawis,
Alliance of Rural Concerns (ARC), and Abono. We quote NBC Resolution No. 07-
60 in its entirety below:
WHEREAS, the Commission on Elections sitting en banc as National Board of
Canvassers, thru its Sub-Committee for Party-List, as of 03 July 2007, had
officially canvassed, in open and public proceedings, a total of fifteen million two
hundred eighty three thousand six hundred fifty-nine (15,283,659) votes under
the Party-List System of Representation, in connection with the National and Local
Elections conducted last 14 May 2007;
WHEREAS, the study conducted by the Legal and Tabulation Groups of the
National Board of Canvassers reveals that the projected/maximum total party-list
votes cannot go any higher than sixteen million seven hundred twenty three
thousand one hundred twenty-one (16,723,121) votes given the following
statistical data:
Projected/Maximum Party-List Votes for May 2007 Elections
i. Total party-list votes already canvassed/tabulated 15,283,659
ii. Total party-list votes remaining uncanvassed/ 1,337,032
untabulated (i.e. canvass deferred)
iii. Maximum party-list votes (based on 100% outcome) from 102,430
areas not yet submitted for canvass (Bogo, Cebu; Bais
City; Pantar, Lanao del Norte; and Pagalungan,
Maguindanao)
Maximum Total Party-List Votes 16,723,121
WHEREAS, Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7941 (Party-List System Act) provides
in part:
The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the
total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each:
provided, that those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be
entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes: provided,
finally, that each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than
three (3) seats.
WHEREAS, for the 2007 Elections, based on the above projected total of party-list CANCELLATION/REMOVAL OF REGISTRATION AND DISQUALIFICATION OF
votes, the presumptive two percent (2%) threshold can be pegged at three PARTY-LIST NOMINEE (With Prayer for the Issuance of Restraining Order) has
hundred thirty four thousand four hundred sixty-two (334,462) votes; been filed before the Commission, docketed as SPC No. 07-250, all the parties,
organizations and coalitions included in the aforementioned list are therefore
WHEREAS, the Supreme Court, in Citizen’s Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) entitled to at least one seat under the party-list system of representation in the
versus COMELEC, reiterated its ruling in Veterans Federation Party versus meantime.
COMELEC adopting a formula for the additional seats of each party, organization
or coalition receving more than the required two percent (2%) votes, stating that NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the Constitution, the
the same shall be determined only after all party-list ballots have been completely Omnibus Election Code, Executive Order No. 144, Republic Act Nos. 6646, 7166,
canvassed; 7941, and other election laws, the Commission on Elections, sitting en banc as the
National Board of Canvassers, hereby RESOLVES to PARTIALLY PROCLAIM,
WHEREAS, the parties, organizations, and coalitions that have thus far garnered subject to certain conditions set forth below, the following parties, organizations
at least three hundred thirty four thousand four hundred sixty-two and coalitions participating under the Party-List System:
(334,462) votes are as follows:
1 Buhay Hayaan Yumabong BUHAY
RANK PARTY/ORGANIZATION/ VOTES 2 Bayan Muna BAYAN MUNA
COALITION RECEIVED
3 Citizens Battle Against Corruption CIBAC
1 BUHAY 1,163,218
4 Gabriela Women’s Party GABRIELA
2 BAYAN MUNA 972,730
5 Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives APEC
3 CIBAC 760,260
6 Advocacy for Teacher Empowerment Through A TEACHER
4 GABRIELA 610,451 Action, Cooperation and Harmony Towards
5 APEC 538,971 Educational Reforms, Inc.

6 A TEACHER 476,036 7 Akbayan! Citizen’s Action Party AKBAYAN

7 AKBAYAN 470,872 8 Alagad ALAGAD

8 ALAGAD 423,076 9 Luzon Farmers Party BUTIL

9 BUTIL 405,052 10 Cooperative-Natco Network Party COOP-NATCCO

10 COOP-NATCO 390,029 11 Anak Pawis ANAKPAWIS

11 BATAS 386,361 12 Alliance of Rural Concerns ARC

12 ANAK PAWIS 376,036 13 Abono ABONO

13 ARC 338,194
This is without prejudice to the proclamation of other parties, organizations, or
14 ABONO 337,046 coalitions which may later on be established to have obtained at least two percent
(2%) of the total actual votes cast under the Party-List System.
WHEREAS, except for Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing
Sambayanan (BATAS), against which an URGENT PETITION FOR
The total number of seats of each winning party, organization or coalition shall be 4 GABRIELA 621,718
determined pursuant to Veterans Federation Party versus COMELEC formula
upon completion of the canvass of the party-list results. 5 APEC 622,489
6 A TEACHER 492,369
The proclamation of Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing
Sambayanan (BATAS) is hereby deferred until final resolution of SPC No. 07-250, 7 AKBAYAN 462,674
in order not to render the proceedings therein moot and academic.
8 ALAGAD 423,190
Finally, all proclamation of the nominees of concerned parties, organizations and 9 BUTIL 409,298
coalitions with pending disputes shall likewise be held in abeyance until final
resolution of their respective cases. 10 COOP-NATCO 412,920
11 ANAKPAWIS 370,165
Let the Clerk of the Commission implement this Resolution, furnishing a copy
thereof to the Speaker of the House of Representatives of the Philippines. 12 ARC 375,846
13 ABONO 340,151
SO ORDERED.8 (Emphasis in the original)

Pursuant to NBC Resolution No. 07-60, the COMELEC, acting as NBC,
promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-72, which declared the additional seats
allocated to the appropriate parties. We quote from the COMELEC’s interpretation
of the Veterans formula as found in NBC Resolution No. 07-72:
WHEREAS, on July 9, 2007, the Commission on Elections sitting en banc as the
National Board of Canvassers proclaimed thirteen (13) qualified parties,
organization[s] and coalitions based on the presumptive two percent (2%)
threshold of 334,462 votes from the projected maximum total number of party-list
votes of 16,723,121, and were thus given one (1) guaranteed party-list seat each;
WHEREAS, based on the above Report, Buhay Hayaan Yumabong (Buhay)
obtained the highest number of votes among the thirteen (13) qualified parties,
organizations and coalitions, making it the "first party" in accordance with Veterans
Federation Party versus COMELEC, reiterated in Citizen’s Battle Against
Corruption (CIBAC) versus COMELEC;
WHEREAS, qualified parties, organizations and coalitions participating under the
party-list system of representation that have obtained one guaranteed (1) seat may
be entitled to an additional seat or seats based on the formula prescribed by the
Supreme Court in Veterans;

WHEREAS, per Report of the Tabulation Group and Supervisory Committee of the WHEREAS, in determining the additional seats for the "first party", the correct
National Board of Canvassers, the projected maximum total party-list votes, as of formula as expressed in Veterans, is:
July 11, 2007, based on the votes actually canvassed, votes canvassed but not
included in Report No. 29, votes received but uncanvassed, and maximum votes Number of votes of first party
expected for Pantar, Lanao del Norte, is 16,261,369; and that the projected
maximum total votes for the thirteen (13) qualified parties, organizations and Proportion of votes of first
coalition[s] are as follows: = party relative to total votes for
party-list system
Total votes for party-list system
  Party-List Projected total number of votes
1 BUHAY 1,178,747 wherein the proportion of votes received by the first party (without rounding off)
shall entitle it to additional seats:
2 BAYAN MUNA 977,476
3 CIBAC 755,964
Proportion of votes received Additional seats
 by the first party A TEACHER 0.83 0
Equal to or at least 6% Two (2) additional seats AKBAYAN 0.78 0
Equal to or greater than 4% but less than 6% One (1) additional seat ALAGAD 0.71 0
Less than 4% No additional seat BUTIL 0.69 0
COOP-NATCO 0.69 0
WHEREAS, applying the above formula, Buhay obtained the following percentage:
ANAKPAWIS 0.62 0

1,178,747 ARC 0.63 0

ABONO 0.57 0
= 0.07248 or 7.2%

NOW THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the Constitution,

16,261,369
Omnibus Election Code, Executive Order No. 144, Republic Act Nos. 6646, 7166,
7941 and other elections laws, the Commission on Elections en banc sitting as the
which entitles it to two (2) additional seats. National Board of Canvassers, hereby RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to
proclaim the following parties, organizations or coalitions as entitled to additional
WHEREAS, in determining the additional seats for the other qualified parties, seats, to wit:
organizations and coalitions, the correct formula as expressed in Veterans and
reiterated in CIBAC is, as follows: Party List Additional Seats
BUHAY 2
No. of votes of
concerned party BAYAN MUNA 1
No. of additional
Additional seats for CIBAC 1
= x seats allocated
a concerned party
to first party GABRIELA 1
No. of votes of
APEC 1
first party

WHEREAS, applying the above formula, the results are as follows: This is without prejudice to the proclamation of other parties, organizations or
coalitions which may later on be established to have obtained at least two per cent
(2%) of the total votes cast under the party-list system to entitle them to one (1)
Party List Percentage Additional Seat guaranteed seat, or to the appropriate percentage of votes to entitle them to one
(1) additional seat.
BAYAN MUNA 1.65 1
CIBAC 1.28 1 Finally, all proclamation of the nominees of concerned parties, organizations and
coalitions with pending disputes shall likewise be held in abeyance until final
GABRIELA 1.05 1 resolution of their respective cases.
APEC 1.05 1
Let the National Board of Canvassers Secretariat implement this Resolution,
furnishing a copy hereof to the Speaker of the House of Representatives of the
Philippines.
SO ORDERED.9
Acting on BANAT’s petition, the NBC promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-88 on 3
August 2007, which reads as follows:
This pertains to the Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List
Representatives Provided by the Constitution filed by the Barangay Association for
National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT).
Acting on the foregoing Petition of the Barangay Association for National
Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) party-list, Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head,
National Board of Canvassers Legal Group submitted his comments/observations
and recommendation thereon [NBC 07-041 (PL)], which reads:
COMMENTS / OBSERVATIONS:
Petitioner Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency
(BANAT), in its Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives
Provided by the Constitution prayed for the following reliefs, to wit:
1. That the full number -- twenty percent (20%) -- of Party-List representatives as
mandated by Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution shall be proclaimed.
2. Paragraph (b), Section 11 of RA 7941 which prescribes the 2% threshold votes,
should be harmonized with Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution and with
Section 12 of the same RA 7941 in that it should be applicable only to the first
party-list representative seats to be allotted on the basis of their initial/first ranking.
3. The 3-seat limit prescribed by RA 7941 shall be applied; and
4. Initially, all party-list groups shall be given the number of seats corresponding to
every 2% of the votes they received and the additional seats shall be allocated in
accordance with Section 12 of RA 7941, that is, in proportion to the percentage of
votes obtained by each party-list group in relation to the total nationwide votes cast
in the party-list election, after deducting the corresponding votes of those which
were allotted seats under the 2% threshold rule. In fine, the formula/procedure
prescribed in the "ALLOCATION OF PARTY-LIST SEATS, ANNEX "A" of
COMELEC RESOLUTION 2847 dated 25 June 1996, shall be used for [the]
purpose of determining how many seats shall be proclaimed, which party-list
groups are entitled to representative seats and how many of their nominees shall
seat [sic].
5. In the alternative, to declare as unconstitutional Section 11 of Republic Act No.
7941 and that the procedure in allocating seats for party-list representative
prescribed by Section 12 of RA 7941 shall be followed.
R E C O M M E N D A T I O N:
The petition of BANAT is now moot and academic.
The Commission En Banc in NBC Resolution No. 07-60 promulgated July 9, 2007
re "In the Matter of the Canvass of Votes and Partial Proclamation of the Parties,
Organizations and Coalitions Participating Under the Party-List System During the
May 14, 2007 National and Local Elections" resolved among others that the total
number of seats of each winning party, organization or coalition shall be
determined pursuant to the  Veterans Federation Party versus  COMELEC formula
upon completion of the canvass of the party-list results."1awphi1
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the National Board of Canvassers
RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to approve and adopt the recommendation
of Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head, NBC Legal Group, to DENY the herein petition of
BANAT for being moot and academic.
Let the Supervisory Committee implement this resolution.
SO ORDERED.10
BANAT filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the ruling in NBC
Resolution No. 07-88. BANAT did not file a motion for reconsideration of NBC
Resolution No. 07-88.
On 9 July 2007, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher asked the COMELEC, acting
as NBC, to reconsider its decision to use the Veterans formula as stated in its NBC
Resolution No. 07-60 because the Veterans  formula is violative of the Constitution
and of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941). On the same day, the COMELEC
denied reconsideration during the proceedings of the NBC.11
Aside from the thirteen party-list organizations proclaimed on 9 July 2007, the
COMELEC proclaimed three other party-list organizations as qualified parties
entitled to one guaranteed seat under the Party-List System: Agricultural Sector
Alliance of the Philippines, Inc. (AGAP),12 Anak Mindanao (AMIN),13 and An
Waray.14 Per the certification15 by COMELEC, the following party-list organizations 3. Is the two percent threshold and "qualifier" votes prescribed by the same
have been proclaimed as of 19 May 2008: Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?

Party-List No. of Seat(s) 4. How shall the party-list representatives be allocated?16

1.1 Buhay 3 Bayan Muna, A Teacher, and Abono, on the other hand, raised the following
1.2 Bayan Muna 2 issues in their petition:
1.3 CIBAC 2
I. Respondent Commission on Elections, acting as National Board of Canvassers,
1.4 Gabriela 2 committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
when it promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-60 to implement the First-Party Rule
1.5 APEC 2
in the allocation of seats to qualified party-list organizations as said rule:
1.6 A Teacher 1
1.7 Akbayan 1 A. Violates the constitutional principle of proportional representation.

1.8 Alagad 1 B. Violates the provisions of RA 7941 particularly:

1.9 Butil 1
1.10 Coop-Natco [sic] 1 1. The 2-4-6 Formula used by the First Party Rule in allocating additional seats for
the "First Party" violates the principle of proportional representation under RA
1.11 Anak Pawis 1 7941.
1.12 ARC 1
2. The use of two formulas in the allocation of additional seats, one for the "First
1.13 Abono 1 Party" and another for the qualifying parties, violates Section 11(b) of RA 7941.
1.14 AGAP 1
3. The proportional relationships under the First Party Rule are different from those
1.15 AMIN 1 required under RA 7941;

The proclamation of Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing
Sambayanan (BATAS), against which an Urgent Petition for Cancellation/Removal
of Registration and Disqualification of Party-list Nominee (with Prayer for the
Issuance of Restraining Order) has been filed before the COMELEC, was deferred
pending final resolution of SPC No. 07-250.
Issues
BANAT brought the following issues before this Court:
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives provided in Section
5(2), Article VI of the Constitution mandatory or is it merely a ceiling?
2. Is the three-seat limit provided in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
C. Violates the "Four Inviolable Parameters" of the Philippine party-list system as
provided for under the same case of Veterans Federation Party, et al. v.
COMELEC.
II. Presuming that the Commission on Elections did not commit grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it implemented the
First-Party Rule in the allocation of seats to qualified party-list organizations, the
same being merely in consonance with the ruling in Veterans Federations Party, et
al. v. COMELEC, the instant Petition is a justiciable case as the issues involved
herein are constitutional in nature, involving the correct interpretation and
implementation of RA 7941, and are of transcendental importance to our nation.17
Considering the allegations in the petitions and the comments of the parties in
these cases, we defined the following issues in our advisory for the oral arguments
set on 22 April 2008:
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives in Section 5(2),
Article VI of the Constitution mandatory or merely a ceiling?
2. Is the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
3. Is the two percent threshold prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 to qualify for
one seat constitutional?
4. How shall the party-list representative seats be allocated?
5. Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from participating in the
party-list elections? If not, can the major political parties be barred from
participating in the party-list elections?18
The Ruling of the Court
The petitions have partial merit. We maintain that a Philippine-style party-list
election has at least four inviolable parameters as clearly stated in Veterans. For
easy reference, these are:
First, the twenty percent allocation — the combined number of all party-list
congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the
House of Representatives, including those elected under the party list;
Second,  the two percent threshold — only those parties garnering a minimum of
two percent of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are "qualified" to
have a seat in the House of Representatives;
Third, the three-seat limit — each qualified party, regardless of the number of
votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one
"qualifying" and two additional seats;
Fourth, proportional representation— the additional seats which a qualified party is
entitled to shall be computed "in proportion to their total number of votes."19
However, because the formula in Veterans has flaws in its mathematical
interpretation of the term "proportional representation," this Court is compelled to
revisit the formula for the allocation of additional seats to party-list organizations.
Number of Party-List Representatives:
The Formula Mandated by the Constitution
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides:
Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than
two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be
elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as
provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total
number of representatives including those under the party-list. For three
consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats
allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by
selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law,
except the religious sector.
The first paragraph of Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941 reads:
Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. — The party-list representatives
shall constitute twenty per centum (20%) of the total number of the members of the
House of Representatives including those under the party-list.
xxx
Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution states that the "House of
Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty
members, unless otherwise fixed by law." The House of Representatives shall be
composed of district representatives and party-list representatives. The
Constitution allows the legislature to modify the number of the members of the
House of Representatives.1avvphi1.zw+
Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution, on the other hand, states the ratio of
party-list representatives to the total number of representatives. We compute the
number of seats available to party-list representatives from the number of
legislative districts. On this point, we do not deviate from the first formula
in Veterans, thus:
Number of seats Number of seats available to
available to legislative districts x .20 = party-list representatives

.80
This formula allows for the corresponding increase in the number of seats
available for party-list representatives whenever a legislative district is created by
law. Since the 14th Congress of the Philippines has 220 district representatives,
there are 55 seats available to party-list representatives.
220
x .20 = 55
.80
After prescribing the ratio of the number of party-list representatives to the total
number of representatives, the Constitution left the manner of allocating the
seats available to party-list representatives to the wisdom of the legislature.
Allocation of Seats for Party-List Representatives:
The Statutory Limits Presented by the Two Percent Threshold
and the Three-Seat Cap
All parties agree on the formula to determine the maximum number of seats
reserved under the Party-List System, as well as on the formula to determine the
guaranteed seats to party-list candidates garnering at least two-percent of the total
party-list votes. However, there are numerous interpretations of the provisions of
R.A. No. 7941 on the allocation of "additional seats" under the Party-List
System. Veterans produced the First Party Rule,20 and Justice Vicente V.
Mendoza’s dissent in Veterans presented Germany’s Niemeyer formula21 as an
alternative.
The Constitution left to Congress the determination of the manner of allocating the
seats for party-list representatives. Congress enacted R.A. No. 7941, paragraphs
(a) and (b) of Section 11 and Section 12 of which provide:
Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. — x x x
In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote,22 the following procedure
shall be observed:
(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to
the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.
(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of
the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat
each: Provided, That those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the
votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number
of votes: Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or coalition shall be
entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
Section 12. Procedure in Allocating Seats for Party-List Representatives. — The
COMELEC shall tally all the votes for the parties, organizations, or coalitions on a
nationwide basis, rank them according to the number of votes received and
allocate party-list representatives proportionately according to the percentage of
votes obtained by each party, organization, or coalition as against the total
nationwide votes cast for the party-list system. (Emphasis supplied)
In G.R. No. 179271, BANAT presents two interpretations through three formulas to
allocate party-list representative seats.
The first interpretation allegedly harmonizes the provisions of Section 11(b) on the
2% requirement with Section 12 of R.A. No. 7941. BANAT described this
procedure as follows:
(a) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty percent (20%) of the total
Members of the House of Representatives including those from the party-list
groups as prescribed by Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, Section 11 (1st
par.) of RA 7941 and Comelec Resolution No. 2847 dated 25 June 1996. Since
there are 220 District Representatives in the 14th Congress, there shall be 55
Party-List Representatives. All seats shall have to be proclaimed.
(b) All party-list groups shall initially be allotted one (1) seat for every two per
centum (2%) of the total party-list votes they obtained; provided, that no party-list
groups shall have more than three (3) seats (Section 11, RA 7941).
(c) The remaining seats shall, after deducting the seats obtained by the party-list
groups under the immediately preceding paragraph and after deducting from their
total the votes corresponding to those seats, the remaining seats shall be allotted
proportionately to all the party-list groups which have not secured the maximum
three (3) seats under the 2% threshold rule, in accordance with Section 12 of RA
7941.23
Forty-four (44) party-list seats will be awarded under BANAT’s first interpretation.
The second interpretation presented by BANAT assumes that the 2% vote Table 1. Ranking of the participating parties from the highest to the lowest based
requirement is declared unconstitutional, and apportions the seats for party-list on the number of votes garnered during the elections.27
representatives by following Section 12 of R.A. No. 7941. BANAT states that the
COMELEC:
Votes
Rank Party Rank Party
Garnered
(a) shall tally all the votes for the parties, organizations, or coalitions on a
nationwide basis; 1 BUHAY 1,169,234 48 KALAHI
2 BAYAN MUNA 979,039 49 APOI
(b) rank them according to the number of votes received; and,
3 CIBAC 755,686 50 BP
(c) allocate party-list representatives proportionately according to the percentage
of votes obtained by each party, organization or coalition as against the total 4 GABRIELA 621,171 51 AHONBAYAN
nationwide votes cast for the party-list system.24 5 APEC 619,657 52 BIGKIS

BANAT used two formulas to obtain the same results: one is based on the 6 A TEACHER 490,379 53 PMAP
proportional percentage of the votes received by each party as against the total 7 AKBAYAN 466,112 54 AKAPIN
nationwide party-list votes, and the other is "by making the votes of a party-list with
a median percentage of votes as the divisor in computing the allocation of 8 ALAGAD 423,149 55 PBA
seats."25 Thirty-four (34) party-list seats will be awarded under BANAT’s second
interpretation. 9 COOP-NATCCO 409,883 56 GRECON
10 BUTIL 409,160 57 BTM
In G.R. No. 179295, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher criticize both the
COMELEC’s original 2-4-6 formula and the Veterans formula for systematically 11 BATAS 385,810 58 A SMILE
preventing all the party-list seats from being filled up. They claim that both 12 ARC 374,288 59 NELFFI
formulas do not factor in the total number of seats alloted for the entire Party-List
System. Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher reject the three-seat cap, but accept 13 ANAKPAWIS 370,261 60 AKSA
the 2% threshold. After determining the qualified parties, a second percentage is
generated by dividing the votes of a qualified party by the total votes of all qualified 14 ABONO 339,990 61 BAGO
parties only. The number of seats allocated to a qualified party is computed by 15 AMIN 338,185 62 BANDILA
multiplying the total party-list seats available with the second percentage. There
will be a first round of seat allocation, limited to using the whole integers as the 16 AGAP 328,724 63 AHON
equivalent of the number of seats allocated to the concerned party-list. After all the
qualified parties are given their seats, a second round of seat allocation is 17 AN WARAY 321,503 64 ASAHAN MO
conducted. The fractions, or remainders, from the whole integers are ranked from 18 YACAP 310,889 65 AGBIAG!
highest to lowest and the remaining seats on the basis of this ranking are allocated
until all the seats are filled up.26 19 FPJPM 300,923 66 SPI
20 UNI-MAD 245,382 67 BAHANDI
We examine what R.A. No. 7941 prescribes to allocate seats for party-list
representatives. 21 ABS 235,086 68 ADD
22 KAKUSA 228,999 69 AMANG
Section 11(a) of R.A. No. 7941 prescribes the ranking of the participating parties
from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during 23 KABATAAN 228,637 70 ABAY PARAK
the elections.
 24 ABA-AKO 218,818 71 BABAE KA party-list candidates for illustration purposes. The percentage of votes garnered by
each party is arrived at by dividing the number of votes garnered by each party by
25 ALIF 217,822 72 SB 15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for all party-list candidates.
26 SENIOR CITIZENS 213,058 73 ASAP
Table 2. The first 20 party-list candidates and their respective percentage of votes
27 AT 197,872 74 PEP garnered over the total votes for the party-list.28

28 VFP 196,266 75 ABA ILONGGO

Votes Garnered over
29 ANAD 188,521 76 VENDORS Votes
Rank Party Total Votes for Party- G
Garnered
List, in %
30 BANAT 177,028 77 ADD-TRIBAL
1 BUHAY 1,169,234 7.33% 1
31 ANG KASANGGA 170,531 78 ALMANA
2 BAYAN MUNA 979,039 6.14% 1
32 BANTAY 169,801 79 AANGAT KA PILIPINO
3 CIBAC 755,686 4.74% 1
33 ABAKADA 166,747 80 AAPS
4 GABRIELA 621,171 3.89% 1
34 1-UTAK 164,980 81 HAPI
5 APEC 619,657 3.88% 1
35 TUCP 162,647 82 AAWAS
6 A TEACHER 490,379 3.07% 1
36 COCOFED 155,920 83 SM
7 AKBAYAN 466,112 2.92% 1
37 AGHAM 146,032 84 AG
8 ALAGAD 423,149 2.65% 1
38 ANAK 141,817 85 AGING PINOY
9 COOP-NATCCO 409,883 2.57% 1
39 ABANSE! PINAY 130,356 86 APO
10 BUTIL 409,160 2.57% 1
40 PM 119,054 87 BIYAYANG BUKID
11 BATAS29 385,810 2.42% 1
41 AVE 110,769 88 ATS
12 ARC 374,288 2.35% 1
42 SUARA 110,732 89 UMDJ
13 ANAKPAWIS 370,261 2.32% 1
43 ASSALAM 110,440 90 BUKLOD FILIPINA
14 ABONO 339,990 2.13% 1
44 DIWA 107,021 91 LYPAD
15 AMIN 338,185 2.12% 1
45 ANC 99,636 92 AA-KASOSYO
16 AGAP 328,724 2.06% 1
46 SANLAKAS 97,375 93 KASAPI
17 AN WARAY 321,503 2.02% 1
47 ABC 90,058 TOTAL
  Total     1
The first clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 states that "parties, 18 YACAP 310,889 1.95% 0
organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes
cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each." This clause 19 FPJPM 300,923 1.89% 0
guarantees a seat to the two-percenters. In Table 2 below, we use the first 20
 20 UNI-MAD 245,382 1.54%
From Table 2 above, we see that only 17 party-list candidates received at least 2%
from the total number of votes cast for party-list candidates. The 17 qualified party-
list candidates, or the two-percenters, are the party-list candidates that are "entitled
to one seat each," or the guaranteed seat. In this first round of seat allocation, we
distributed 17 guaranteed seats.
The second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 provides that "those
garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional
seats in proportion to their total number of votes." This is where petitioners’
and intervenors’ problem with the formula in Veterans lies. Veterans interprets the
clause "in proportion to their total number of votes" to be in proportion to the
votes of the first party. This interpretation is contrary to the express language of
R.A. No. 7941.
We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued
operation of the two percent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as
found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional.
This Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible
to achieve the maximum number of available party list seats when the number of
available party list seats exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two percent
threshold in the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the
permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the House of Representatives shall
consist of party-list representatives.
To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50 million
votes cast for the 100 participants in the party list elections. A party that has two
percent of the votes cast, or one million votes, gets a guaranteed seat. Let us
further assume that the first 50 parties all get one million votes. Only 50 parties get
a seat despite the availability of 55 seats. Because of the operation of the two
percent threshold, this situation will repeat itself even if we increase the available
party-list seats to 60 seats and even if we increase the votes cast to 100 million.
Thus, even if the maximum number of parties get two percent of the votes for
every party, it is always impossible for the number of occupied party-list seats to
exceed 50 seats as long as the two percent threshold is present.
We therefore strike down the two percent threshold only in relation to the
distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b)
of R.A. No. 7941. The two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to
the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents
the attainment of "the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group
interests in the House of Representatives."30
In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under Section
11 of R.A. No. 7941, the following procedure shall be observed:
1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the
lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.
2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of
the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed
seat each.
3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in
paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number
of votes until all the additional seats are allocated.
4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3)
seats.
In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be
included because they have already been allocated, at one seat each, to every
two-percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as "additional
seats" are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the
guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in
R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats.
In declaring the two percent threshold unconstitutional, we do not limit our
allocation of additional seats in Table 3 below to the two-percenters. The
percentage of votes garnered by each party-list candidate is arrived at by dividing
the number of votes garnered by each party by 15,950,900, the total number of
votes cast for party-list candidates. There are two steps in the second round of
seat allocation. First, the percentage is multiplied by the remaining available seats,
38, which is the difference between the 55 maximum seats reserved under the
Party-List System and the 17 guaranteed seats of the two-percenters. The whole
integer of the product of the percentage and of the remaining available seats
corresponds to a party’s share in the remaining available seats. Second, we assign
one party-list seat to each of the parties next in rank until all available seats are
completely distributed. We distributed all of the remaining 38 seats in the second
round of seat allocation. Finally, we apply the three-seat cap to determine the
number of seats each qualified party-list candidate is entitled. Thus:
Table 3. Distribution of Available Party-List Seats
Rank Party Votes Votes Guaranteed Additional (B) p
 Garnered 22 KAKUSA 228,999 1.44% 0 1 1
over
Seat Seats 23 KABATAAN 228,637 1.43% 0 1 1
Total
(First (Second
Garnered Votes for 24 ABA-AKO 218,818 1.37% 0 1 1
Round) Round)
Party List,
(B) (C)
in % 25 ALIF 217,822 1.37% 0 1 1
(A)
SENIOR
26 213,058 1.34% 0 1 1
1 BUHAY 1,169,234 7.33% 1 2.79 CITIZENS
BAYAN 27 AT 197,872 1.24% 0 1 1
2 979,039 6.14% 1 2.33
MUNA
28 VFP 196,266 1.23% 0 1 1
3 CIBAC 755,686 4.74% 1 1.80
29 ANAD 188,521 1.18% 0 1 1
4 GABRIELA 621,171 3.89% 1 1.48
30 BANAT 177,028 1.11% 0 1 1
5 APEC 619,657 3.88% 1 1.48
ANG
31 170,531 1.07% 0 1 1
6 A Teacher 490,379 3.07% 1 1.17 KASANGGA
7 AKBAYAN 466,112 2.92% 1 1.11 32 BANTAY 169,801 1.06% 0 1 1
8 ALAGAD 423,149 2.65% 1 1.01 33 ABAKADA 166,747 1.05% 0 1 1
COOP- 34 1-UTAK 164,980 1.03% 0 1 1
931 409,883 2.57% 1 1
NATCCO
35 TUCP 162,647 1.02% 0 1 1
10 BUTIL 409,160 2.57% 1 1
36 COCOFED 155,920 0.98% 0 1 1
11 BATAS 385,810 2.42% 1 1
Total 17 55
12 ARC 374,288 2.35% 1 1
13 ANAKPAWIS 370,261 2.32% 1 1 Applying the procedure of seat allocation as illustrated in Table 3 above, there are
55 party-list representatives from the 36 winning party-list organizations. All 55
14 ABONO 339,990 2.13% 1 1 available party-list seats are filled. The additional seats allocated to the parties with
15 AMIN 338,185 2.12% 1 1 sufficient number of votes for one whole seat, in no case to exceed a total of three
seats for each party, are shown in column (D).
16 AGAP 328,724 2.06% 1 1
Participation of Major Political Parties in Party-List Elections
17 AN WARAY 321,503 2.02% 1 1
18 YACAP 310,889 1.95% 0 1 The Constitutional Commission adopted a multi-party system that allowed all
political parties to participate in the party-list elections. The deliberations of
19 FPJPM 300,923 1.89% 0 1 the Constitutional Commission clearly bear this out, thus:
20 UNI-MAD 245,382 1.54% 0 1
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I just want to say that we suggested or
21 ABS 235,086 1.47% 0 1 proposed the party list system because we wanted to open up the political system
to a pluralistic society through a multiparty system. x x x We are for opening up
the system, and we would like very much for the sectors to be there. That is
why one of the ways to do that is to put a ceiling on the number of
representatives from any single party that can sit within the 50 allocated
under the party list system. x x x.
xxx
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, the candidacy for the 198 seats is not limited to
political parties. My question is this: Are we going to classify for example Christian
Democrats and Social Democrats as political parties? Can they run under the party
list concept or must they be under the district legislation side of it only?
MR. VILLACORTA. In reply to that query, I think these parties that the
Commissioner mentioned can field candidates for the Senate as well as for the
House of Representatives. Likewise, they can also field sectoral candidates for
the 20 percent or 30 percent, whichever is adopted, of the seats that we are
allocating under the party list system.
MR. MONSOD. In other words, the Christian Democrats can field district
candidates and can also participate in the party list system?
MR. VILLACORTA. Why not? When they come to the party list system, they
will be fielding only sectoral candidates.
MR. MONSOD. May I be clarified on that? Can UNIDO participate in the party list
system?
MR. VILLACORTA. Yes, why not? For as long as they field candidates who
come from the different marginalized sectors that we shall designate in this
Constitution.
MR. MONSOD. Suppose Senator Tañada wants to run under BAYAN group and
says that he represents the farmers, would he qualify?
MR. VILLACORTA. No, Senator Tañada would not qualify.
MR. MONSOD. But UNIDO can field candidates under the party list system and
say Juan dela Cruz is a farmer. Who would pass on whether he is a farmer or not?
MR. TADEO. Kay Commissioner Monsod, gusto ko lamang linawin ito. Political
parties, particularly minority political parties, are not prohibited to participate
in the party list election if they can prove that they are also organized along
sectoral lines.
MR. MONSOD. What the Commissioner is saying is that all political parties can
participate because it is precisely the contention of political parties that they
represent the broad base of citizens and that all sectors are represented in them.
Would the Commissioner agree?
MR. TADEO. Ang punto lamang namin, pag pinayagan mo ang UNIDO na isang
political party, it will dominate the party list at mawawalang saysay din yung sector.
Lalamunin mismo ng political parties ang party list system. Gusto ko lamang
bigyan ng diin ang "reserve." Hindi ito reserve seat sa marginalized sectors. Kung
titingnan natin itong 198 seats, reserved din ito sa political parties.
MR. MONSOD. Hindi po reserved iyon kasi anybody can run there. But my
question to Commissioner Villacorta and probably also to Commissioner Tadeo is
that under this system, would UNIDO be banned from running under the party list
system?
MR. VILLACORTA. No, as I said, UNIDO may field sectoral candidates. On that
condition alone, UNIDO may be allowed to register for the party list system.
MR. MONSOD. May I inquire from Commissioner Tadeo if he shares that answer?
MR. TADEO. The same.
MR. VILLACORTA. Puwede po ang UNIDO, pero sa sectoral lines.
xxxx
MR. OPLE. x x x In my opinion, this will also create the stimulus for political parties
and mass organizations to seek common ground. For example, we have the PDP-
Laban and the UNIDO. I see no reason why they should not be able to make
common goals with mass organizations so that the very leadership of these parties
can be transformed through the participation of mass organizations. And if this is
true of the administration parties, this will be true of others like the Partido ng
Bayan which is now being formed. There is no question that they will be attractive
to many mass organizations. In the opposition parties to which we belong, there
will be a stimulus for us to contact mass organizations so that with their
participation, the policies of such parties can be radically transformed because this
amendment will create conditions that will challenge both the mass organizations
and the political parties to come together. And the party list system is certainly
available, although it is open to all the parties. It is understood that the parties will
enter in the roll of the COMELEC the names of representatives of mass
organizations affiliated with them. So that we may, in time, develop this excellent
system that they have in Europe where labor organizations and cooperatives, for
example, distribute themselves either in the Social Democratic Party and the
Christian Democratic Party in Germany, and their very presence there has a
transforming effect upon the philosophies and the leadership of those parties.
It is also a fact well known to all that in the United States, the AFL-CIO always vote
with the Democratic Party. But the businessmen, most of them, always vote with
the Republican Party, meaning that there is no reason at all why political parties
and mass organizations should not combine, reenforce, influence and interact with
each other so that the very objectives that we set in this Constitution for sectoral
representation are achieved in a wider, more lasting, and more institutionalized
way. Therefore, I support this [Monsod-Villacorta] amendment. It installs sectoral
representation as a constitutional gift, but at the same time, it challenges the sector
to rise to the majesty of being elected representatives later on through a party list
system; and even beyond that, to become actual political parties capable of
contesting political power in the wider constitutional arena for major political
parties.
x x x 32 (Emphasis supplied)
R.A. No. 7941 provided the details for the concepts put forward by the
Constitutional Commission. Section 3 of R.A. No. 7941 reads:
Definition of Terms. (a) The party-list system is a mechanism of proportional
representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives
from national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof
registered with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). Component parties or
organizations of a coalition may participate independently provided the coalition of
which they form part does not participate in the party-list system.
(b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties.
(c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology
or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government and
which, as the most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly
nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for
public office.
It is a national party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory
of at least a majority of the regions. It is a regional party when its constituency is
spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority of the cities and
provinces comprising the region.
(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the
sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the
special interests and concerns of their sector,
(e) A sectoral organization refers to a group of citizens or a coalition of groups of
citizens who share similar physical attributes or characteristics, employment,
interests or concerns.
(f) A coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly registered national, regional, sectoral
parties or organizations for political and/or election purposes.
Congress, in enacting R.A. No. 7941, put the three-seat cap to prevent any party
from dominating the party-list elections.
Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from
participating in the party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of the
Constitution clearly intended the major political parties to participate in party-list
elections through their sectoral wings. In fact, the members of the Constitutional
Commission voted down, 19-22, any permanent sectoral seats, and in the
alternative the reservation of the party-list system to the sectoral groups.33 In
defining a "party" that participates in party-list elections as either "a political party
or a sectoral party," R.A. No. 7941 also clearly intended that major political parties
will participate in the party-list elections. Excluding the major political parties in
party-list elections is manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of the
Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot engage in socio-
political engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion of major political parties
from the party-list elections in patent violation of the Constitution and the law.
Read together, R.A. No. 7941 and the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission state that major political parties are allowed to establish, or form
coalitions with, sectoral organizations for electoral or political purposes. There
should not be a problem if, for example, the Liberal Party participates in the party-
list election through the Kabataang Liberal ng Pilipinas (KALIPI), its sectoral youth
wing. The other major political parties can thus organize, or affiliate with, their
chosen sector or sectors. To further illustrate, the Nacionalista Party can establish
a fisherfolk wing to participate in the party-list election, and this fisherfolk wing can
field its fisherfolk nominees. Kabalikat ng Malayang Pilipino (KAMPI) can do the
same for the urban poor.
The qualifications of party-list nominees are prescribed in Section 9 of R.A. No. his separate opinion. On the formula to allocate party-list seats, the Court is
7941: unanimous in concurring with this ponencia.

Qualifications of Party-List Nominees.  — No person shall be nominated as party-
list representative unless he is a natural born citizen of the Philippines, a registered
voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year
immediately preceding the day of the elections, able to read and write, bona
fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least
ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25)
years of age on the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but
not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral
representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to
continue until the expiration of his term.
WHEREFORE, we PARTIALLY GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the
Resolution of the COMELEC dated 3 August 2007 in NBC No. 07-041 (PL) as well
as the Resolution dated 9 July 2007 in NBC No. 07-60. We declare
unconstitutional the two percent threshold in the distribution of additional party-list
seats. The allocation of additional seats under the Party-List System shall be in
accordance with the procedure used in Table 3 of this Decision. Major political
parties are disallowed from participating in party-list elections. This Decision is
immediately executory. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 203766               April 2, 2013

Under Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941, it is not necessary that the party-list ATONG PAGLAUM, INC., represented by its President, Mr. Alan
organization’s nominee "wallow in poverty, destitution and infirmity"34 as there is no Igot, Petitioner,
financial status required in the law. It is enough that the nominee of the sectoral vs.
party/organization/coalition belongs to the marginalized and underrepresented COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
sectors,35 that is, if the nominee represents the fisherfolk, he or she must be a
fisherfolk, or if the nominee represents the senior citizens, he or she must be a x-----------------------x
senior citizen.
G.R. Nos. 203818-19
Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 mandates the filling-up of the entire
20% allocation of party-list representatives found in the Constitution. The
Constitution, in paragraph 1, Section 5 of Article VI, left the determination of the AKO BICOL POLITICAL PARTY (AKB), Petitioner,
number of the members of the House of Representatives to Congress: "The House vs.
of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
members, unless otherwise fixed by law, x x x." The 20% allocation of party-list
representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list representatives cannot be more than x-----------------------x
20% of the members of the House of Representatives. However, we cannot allow
the continued existence of a provision in the law which will systematically prevent G.R. No. 203922
the constitutionally allocated 20% party-list representatives from being filled. The
three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number of seats that a qualified party-list ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES
organization may occupy, remains a valid statutory device that prevents any party (APEC),represented by its President Congressman Ponciano D.
from dominating the party-list elections. Seats for party-list representatives shall Payuyo, Petitioner,
thus be allocated in accordance with the procedure used in Table 3 above. vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
However, by a vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling
in Veterans disallowing major political parties from participating in the party-list x-----------------------x
elections, directly or indirectly. Those who voted to continue disallowing major
political parties from the party-list elections joined Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno in
G.R. No. 203936
AKSYON MAGSASAKA-PARTIDO TINIG NG MASA, represented by its G.R. No. 204002
President Michael Abas Kida, Petitioner,
vs. ALLIANCE FOR RURAL CONCERNS, Petitioner,
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent. vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203958
G.R. No. 204094
KAPATIRAN NG MGA NAKULONG NA WALANG SALA, INC.
(KAKUSA), Petitioner, ALLIANCE FOR NATIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY (ANAD), Petitioner,
vs. vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

x-----------------------x x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 203960 G.R. No. 204100

1st CONSUMERS ALLIANCE FOR RURAL ENERGY, INC. (1-CARE), Petitioner, 1-BRO PHILIPPINE GUARDIANS BROTHERHOOD, INC., (1BRO-PGBI)
vs. formerly PGBI, Petitioner,
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent. vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203976
G.R. No. 204122
ALLIANCE FOR RURAL AND AGRARIAN RECONSTRUCTION, INC.
(ARARO), Petitioner, 1 GUARDIANS NATIONALIST PHILIPPINES, INC.,
vs. (1GANAP/GUARDIANS), Petitioner,
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent. vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC composed of SIXTO S.
x-----------------------x BRILLANTES, JR., Chairman, RENE V. SARMIENTO,
Commissioner,LUCENITO N. TAGLE, Commissioner,ARMANDO C.
G.R. No. 203981 VELASCO, Commissioner,ELIAS R. YUSOPH, Commissioner, andCHRISTIAN
ROBERT S. LIM, Commissioner, Respondents.
ASSOCIATION FOR RIGHTEOUSNESS ADVOCACY ON LEADERSHIP (ARAL)
PARTY-LIST, represented herein by Ms. Lourdes L. Agustin, the party’s x-----------------------x
Secretary General, Petitioner,
vs. G.R. No. 204125
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
AGAPAY NG INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ALLIANCE, INC. (A-IPRA),
x-----------------------x represented by its Secretary General,Ronald D. Macaraig, Petitioner,
vs. G.R. No. 204158
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
ABROAD PARTY LIST, Petitioner,
x-----------------------x vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, CHAIRMAN SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR.,
G.R. No. 204126 COMMISSIONERS RENE V. SARMIENTO, ARMANDO C. VELASCO, ELIAS R.
YUSOPH, CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM, MARIA GRACIA CIELO M. PADACA,
LUCENITO TAGLE, AND ALL OTHER PERSONS ACTING ON THEIR
KAAGAPAY NG NAGKAKAISANG AGILANG PILIPINONG MAGSASAKA
BEHALF, Respondents.
(KAP), formerly known as AKO AGILA NG NAGKAKAISANG MAGSASAKA
(AKO AGILA), represented by its Secretary General, Leo R. San
Buenaventura, Petitioner, x-----------------------x
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent. G.R. No. 204174

x-----------------------x AANGAT TAYO PARTY LIST-PARTY, represented by its President Simeon T.

Silva, Jr., Petitioner,
G.R. No. 204139 vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
ALAB NG MAMAMAHAYAG (ALAM), represented by Atty. Berteni Cataluña
Causing, Petitioner, x-----------------------x
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent. G.R. No. 204216

x-----------------------x COCOFED-PHILIPPINE COCONUT PRODUCERS FEDERATION,

INC., Petitioner,
G.R. No. 204141 vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
BANTAY PARTY LIST, represented by Maria Evangelina F. Palparan,
President, Petitioner, x-----------------------x
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent. G.R. No. 204220

x-----------------------x ABANG LINGKOD PARTY-LIST, Petitioner,

vs.
G.R. No. 204153 COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.

PASANG MASDA NATIONWIDE PARTY by its President Roberto "Ka Obet" x-----------------------x
Martin, Petitioner,
vs. G.R. No. 204236
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondents.

x-----------------------x
FIRM 24-K ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioner, G.R. No. 204318
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent. UNITED MOVEMENT AGAINST DRUGS FOUNDATION (UNIMAD) PARTY-
LIST, Petitioner,
x-----------------------x vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
G.R. No. 204238
x-----------------------x
ALLIANCE OF BICOLNON PARTY (ABP), Petitioner,
vs. G.R. No. 204321
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
ANG AGRIKULTURA NATIN ISULONG (AANI), represented by its Secretary
x-----------------------x General Jose C. Policarpio, Jr., Petitioner,
vs.
G.R. No. 204239 COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

GREEN FORCE FOR THE ENVIRONMENT SONS AND DAUGHTERS OF x-----------------------x

MOTHER EARTH (GREENFORCE), Petitioner,
vs. G.R. No. 204323
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
BAYANI PARTYLIST as represented byHomer Bueno, Fitrylin Dalhani,Israel
x-----------------------x de Castro, Dante Navarroand Guiling Mamondiong, Petitioner,
vs.
G.R. No. 204240 COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, CHAIRMAN SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR.,
COMMISSIONERS RENE V. SARMIENTO, LUCENITO N. TAGLE, ARMANDO
C. VELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPH, CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM, and MARIA
AGRI-AGRA NA REPORMA PARA SA MAGSASAKA NG PILIPINAS
GRACIA CIELO M. PADACA, Respondents.
MOVEMENT (AGRI), represented by its Secretary General, Michael Ryan A.
Enriquez, Petitioner,
vs. x-----------------------x
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
G.R. No. 204341
x-----------------------x
ACTION LEAGUE OF INDIGENOUS MASSES(ALIM) PARTY-LIST, represented
G.R. No. 204263 herein by its President Fatani S. Abdul Malik, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
A BLESSED PARTY LIST A.K.A. BLESSEDFEDERATION OF FARMERS AND
FISHERMEN INTERNATIONAL, INC., Petitioner,
vs. x-----------------------x
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
G.R. No. 204356
x-----------------------x
BUTIL FARMERS PARTY, Petitioner, x-----------------------x
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent. G.R. No. 204370

x-----------------------x AKO AN BISAYA (AAB), represented by itsSecretary General, Rodolfo T.

Tuazon, Petitioner,
G.R. No. 204358 vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
ALLIANCE OF ADVOCATES IN MININGADVANCEMENT FOR NATIONAL
PROGRESS (AAMA), Petitioner, x-----------------------x
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent. G.R. No. 204374

x-----------------------x BINHI-PARTIDO NG MGA MAGSASAKA PARA SA MGA

MAGSASAKA, Petitioner,
G.R. No. 204359 vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
SOCIAL MOVEMENT FOR ACTIVEREFORM AND TRANSPARENCY (SMART),
represented by its Chairman, Carlito B. Cubelo, Petitioner, x-----------------------x
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent. G.R. No. 204379

x-----------------------x ALAGAD NG SINING (ASIN) represented by its President, Faye Maybelle

Lorenz, Petitioner,
G.R. No. 204364 vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
ADHIKAIN AT KILUSAN NG ORDINARYONG-TAO, PARA SA LUPA,
PABAHAY, HANAPBUHAY AT KAUNLARAN (AKO BUHAY), Petitioner, x-----------------------x
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., RENE G.R. No. 204394
V. SARMIENTO, LUCENITO N. TAGLE, ARMANDO C. VELASCO, ELIAS R.
YUSOPH, CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM, and MA. GRACIA CIELO M. PADACA, ASSOCIATION OF GUARD UTILITY HELPER, AIDER, RIDER,
in their capacities as Commissioners thereof, Respondents. DRIVER/DOMESTIC HELPER, JANITOR, AGENT AND NANNY OF THE
PHILIPPINES, INC. (GUARDJAN), Petitioner,
x-----------------------x vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
G.R. No. 204367
x-----------------------x
AKBAY KALUSUGAN INCORPORATION(AKIN), Petitioner,
vs. G.R. No. 204402
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
KALIKASAN PARTY-LIST, represented by its President, Clemente G. x-----------------------x
Bautista, Jr., and Secretary General, Frances Q. Quimpo, Petitioner,
vs. G.R. No. 204426
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
ASSOCIATION OF LOCAL ATHLETICS ENTREPRENEURS AND HOBBYISTS,
x-----------------------x INC. (ALA-EH), Petitioner,
vs.
G.R. No. 204408 COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., RENE
V. SARMIENTO, LUCENITO N. TAGLE, ARMANDO C. VELASCO, ELIAS R.
PILIPINO ASSOCIATION FOR COUNTRY-URBAN POOR YOUTH YUSOPH, CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM, and MA. GRACIA CIELO M. PADACA,
ADVANCEMENT AND WELFARE (PACYAW), Petitioner, in their respective capacities as COMELEC Chairperson and
vs. Commissioners, Respondents.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204428
G.R. No. 204410
ANG GALING PINOY (AG), represented by its Secretary General, Bernardo R.
1-UNITED TRANSPORT KOALISYON (1-UTAK), Petitioner, Corella, Jr., Petitioner,
vs. vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

x-----------------------x x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204421 G.R. No. 204435

COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE PHILIPPINES, 1 ALLIANCE ADVOCATING AUTONOMY PARTY (1AAAP), Petitioner,
INC. SENIOR CITIZEN PARTY-LIST, represented herein by its 1st nominee vs.
and Chairman, Francisco G. Datol, Jr., Petitioner, COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent. x-----------------------x

x-----------------------x G.R. No. 204436

G.R. No. 204425 ABYAN ILONGGO PARTY (AI), represented byits Party President, Rolex T.
Suplico, Petitioner,
COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE PHILIPPINES, vs.
INC., Petitioner, COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ANY OF ITS OFFICERS AND AGENTS, x-----------------------x
ACTING FOR AND IN ITS BEHALF, INCLUDING THE CHAIR AND
MEMBERSOF THE COMMISSION, Respondents. G.R. No. 204455
MANILA TEACHER SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioner, CARPIO, J.:
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent. The Cases

x-----------------------x These cases constitute 54 Petitions for Certiorari and Petitions for Certiorari and

Prohibition1 filed by 52 party-list groups and organizations assailing the
G.R. No. 204484 Resolutions issued by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) disqualifying
them from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections, either by denial of
PARTIDO NG BAYAN ANG BIDA (PBB), represented by its Secretary General, their petitions for registration under the party-list system, or cancellation of their
Roger M. Federazo, Petitioner, registration and accreditation as party-list organizations.
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent. This Court resolved to consolidate the 54 petitions in the Resolutions dated 13
November 2012,2 20 November 2012,3 27 November 2012,4 4 December 2012,5 11
x-----------------------x December 2012,6 and 19 February 2013.7

G.R. No. 204485 The Facts Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941)
and COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9366 and 9531, approximately 280 groups and
organizations registered and manifested their desire to participate in the 13 May
ALLIANCE OF ORGANIZATIONS, NETWORKS AND ASSOCIATIONS OF THE
2013 party-list elections.
PHILIPPINES, INC. (ALONA), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent. G.R. No. SPP No. Group Grounds for Denial
A. Via the COMELEC En Banc’s automatic review of the COMELEC
x-----------------------x Division’s resolutions approving registration of groups/organizations

G.R. No. 204486 Resolution dated 23 November 20128

204379 12-099 Alagad ng - The "artists" sector is not
1st KABALIKAT NG BAYAN GINHAWANG SANGKATAUHAN (1st (PLM) Sining (ASIN) considered marginalized and
KABAGIS), Petitioner, underrepresented;
vs. - Failure to prove track
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent. record; and
- Failure of the nominees to
x-----------------------x qualify under RA 7941 and
Ang Bagong Bayani.
G.R. No. 204490 Omnibus Resolution dated 27 November 20129
204455 12-041 Manila Teachers - A non-stock savings and
PILIPINAS PARA SA PINOY (PPP), Petitioner, (PLM) Savings and loan association cannot be
vs. Loan considered marginalized and
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent. Association, Inc. underrepresented; and
(Manila - The first and second
PERLAS-BERNABE,* Teachers) nominees are not teachers by
profession.
DECISION
3 204426 12-011 Association of - Failure to show that its
(PLM) Local Athletics members belong to the
Entrepreneurs marginalized; and
and Hobbyists, - Failure of the nominees to
Inc. (ALA-EH) qualify.
Resolution dated 27 November 201210
4 204435 12-057 1 Alliance - Failure of the nominees to
(PLM) Advocating qualify: although registering
Autonomy Party as a regional political party,
(1AAAP) two of the nominees are not
residents of the region; and
four of the five nominees do
not belong to the
marginalized and underrepresented.
Resolution dated 27 November 201211
5 204367 12-104 (PL) Akbay - Failure of the group to show
Kalusugan that its nominees belong to
(AKIN), Inc. the urban poor sector.
Resolution dated 29 November 201212
6 204370 12-011 (PP) Ako An Bisaya - Failure to represent a
(AAB) marginalized sector of
society, despite the formation
of a sectoral wing for the
benefit of farmers of Region
8;
- Constituency has district
representatives;
- Lack of track record in
representing peasants and
farmers; and
- Nominees are neither
farmers nor peasants.
Resolution dated 4 December 201213
7 204436 12-009 (PP), Abyan Ilonggo - Failure to show that the
12-165 Party (AI) party represents a
(PLM) marginalized and
underrepresented sector, as
the Province of Iloilo has
district representatives;
- Untruthful statements in the
memorandum; and
- Withdrawal of three of its
five nominees.
Resolution dated 4 December 201214
204485 12-175 (PL) Alliance of - Failure to establish that the
Organizations, group can represent 14
Networks and Associations of sectors; - The sectors of homeowners’
the Philippines, associations, entrepreneurs
Inc. (ALONA) and cooperatives are not
marginalized and
underrepresented; and
- The nominees do not belong
to the marginalized and
underrepresented.
B. Via the COMELEC En Banc’s review on motion for reconsideration
of the COMELEC Division’s resolutions denying registration of groups
and organizations
Resolution dated 7 November 201215
204139 12-127 (PL) Alab ng - Failure to prove track
Mamamahayag record as an organization;
(ALAM) - Failure to show that the
group actually represents the
marginalized and
underrepresented; and
- Failure to establish that the
group can represent all
sectors it seeks to represent.
Resolution dated 7 November 201216
204402 12-061 (PP) Kalikasan Party-List - The group reflects an
(KALIKASAN) advocacy for the
environment, and is not
representative of the
marginalized and
underrepresented;
- There is no proof that
majority of its members
belong to the marginalized
and underrepresented;
- The group represents
sectors with conflicting
interests; and
 - The nominees do not belong scheduled summary evidentiary hearings to determine whether the groups and
to the sector which the group organizations that filed manifestations of intent to participate in the 13 May 2013
claims to represent. party-list elections have continually complied with the requirements of R.A. No.
7941 and Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC23 (Ang Bagong
Resolution dated 14 November 201217 Bayani). The COMELEC disqualified the following groups and organizations from
11 204394 12-145 (PL) Association of - Failure to prove participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections:
Guard, Utility membership base and track
Helper, Aider, record; G.R. No. SPP Group Grounds for Denial
Rider, Driver/ - Failure to present activities No.
Domestic that sufficiently benefited its 24
Helper, intended constituency; and Resolution dated 10 October 2012
Janitor, Agent - The nominees do not belong 203818- 12-154 AKO Bicol Retained registration and
and to any of the sectors which 19 (PLM) Political Party accreditation as a political
Nanny of the the group seeks to represent. 12-177 (AKB) party, but denied participation
Philippines, Inc. (PLM) in the May 2013 party-list
(GUARDJAN) elections
Resolution dated 5 December 201218 - Failure to represent any
marginalized and
12 204490 12-073 Pilipinas Para sa - Failure to show that the underrepresented sector;
(PLM) Pinoy (PPP) group represents a - The Bicol region already
marginalized and has representatives in
underrepresented sector, as Congress; and
Region 12 has district - The nominees are not
representatives; and marginalized and
- Failure to show a track underrepresented.
record of undertaking 25
programs for the welfare of Omnibus Resolution dated 11 October 2012
the sector the group seeks to 203766 12-161 Atong Paglaum, Cancelled registration and
represent. (PLM) Inc. (Atong accreditation
Paglaum) - The nominees do not belong
In a Resolution dated 5 December 2012,19 the COMELEC En Banc affirmed the to the sectors which the party
COMELEC Second Division’s resolution to grant Partido ng Bayan ng Bida’s (PBB) represents; and
registration and accreditation as a political party in the National Capital Region. - The party failed to file its
However, PBB was denied participation in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections Statement of Contributions
because PBB does not represent any "marginalized and underrepresented" sector; and Expenditures for the
PBB failed to apply for registration as a party-list group; and PBB failed to establish 2010 Elections.
its track record as an organization that seeks to uplift the lives of the "marginalized 203981 12-187 Association for Cancelled registration and
and underrepresented."20 (PLM) Righteousness accreditation
These 13 petitioners (ASIN, Manila Teachers, ALA-EH, 1AAAP, AKIN, AAB, AI, Advocacy on - Failure to comply, and for
ALONA, ALAM, KALIKASAN, GUARDJAN, PPP, and PBB) were not able to Leadership violation of election laws;
secure a mandatory injunction from this Court. The COMELEC, on 7 January 2013 (ARAL) - The nominees do not
issued Resolution No. 9604,21 and excluded the names of these 13 petitioners in represent the sectors which
the printing of the official ballot for the 13 May 2013 party-list elections. the party represents; and
Pursuant to paragraph 222 of Resolution No. 9513, the COMELEC En Banc - There is doubt that the party
 is organized for religious 20426 12-257 Blessed Cancelled registration
purposes. (PLM) Federation of - Three of the seven
Farmers and nominees do not belong to
4 204002 12-188 Alliance for Cancelled registration and
Fishermen the sector of farmers and
(PLM) Rural Concerns accreditation
International, fishermen, the sector sought
(ARC) - Failure of the nominees to
Inc. (A to be represented; and
qualify; and
BLESSED - None of the nominees are
- Failure of the party to prove
Party-List) registered voters of Region
that majority of its members
XI, the region sought to be
belong to the sectors it seeks
represented.
to represent.
Resolution dated 16 October 201227
5 204318 12-220 United Cancelled registration and
(PLM) Movement accreditation 203960 12-260 1st Cancelled registration
Against Drugs - The sectors of drug (PLM) Consumers - The sector of rural energy
Foundation counsellors and lecturers, Alliance for consumers is not
(UNIMAD) veterans and the youth, are Rural Energy, marginalized and
not marginalized and Inc. (1-CARE) underrepresented;
underrepresented; - The party’s track record is
- Failure to establish track related to electric
record; and cooperatives and not rural
- Failure of the nominees to energy consumers; and
qualify as representatives of - The nominees do not belong
the youth and young urban to the sector of rural energy
professionals. consumers.
Omnibus Resolution dated 16 October 2012 26 Resolution dated 16 October 201228
6 204100 12-196 1-Bro Philippine Cancelled registration 203922 12-201 Association of Cancelled registration and
(PLM) Guardians - Failure to define the sector (PLM) Philippine accreditation
Brotherhood, it seeks to represent; and Electric - Failure to represent a
Inc. (1BRO-PGBI) - The nominees do not belong Cooperatives marginalized and
to a marginalized and (APEC) underrepresented sector; and
underrepresented sector. - The nominees do not belong
to the sector that the party
7 204122 12-223 1 Guardians Cancelled registration
claims to represent.
(PLM) Nationalist - The party is a military
Philippines, Inc. fraternity; Resolution dated 23 October 201229
(1GANAP/ - The sector of community
204174 12-232 Aangat Tayo Cancelled registration and
GUARDIANS) volunteer workers is too
(PLM) Party-List Party accreditation
broad to allow for meaningful
( AT ) - The incumbent
representation; and
representative in Congress
- The nominees do not appear
failed to author or sponsor
to belong to the sector of
bills that are beneficial to the
community volunteer
sectors that the party
workers.
represents (women, elderly,
 youth, urban poor); and and
- The nominees do not belong - Failure to show that five of
to the marginalized sectors its nine nominees work on
that the party seeks to uplifting the lives of the
represent. members of the sector.
Omnibus Resolution dated 24 October 2012 30 204126 12-263 Kaagapay ng Cancelled registration
(PLM) Nagkakaisang - The Manifestation of Intent
1 203976 12-288 Alliance for Cancelled registration and
Agilang and Certificate of Nomination
2 (PLM) Rural and accreditation
Pilipinong were not signed by an
Agrarian - The interests of the peasant
Magsasaka appropriate officer of the
Reconstruction, and urban poor sectors that
(KAP) party;
Inc. (ARARO) the party represents differ;
- Failure to show track record
- The nominees do not belong
for the farmers and peasants
to the sectors that the party
sector; and
seeks to represent;
- Failure to show that
- Failure to show that three of
nominees actually belong to
the nominees are bona fide
the sector, or that they have
party members; and
undertaken meaningful
- Lack of a Board resolution
activities for the sector.
to participate in the party-list
elections. 204364 12-180 Adhikain at Cancelled registration
(PLM) Kilusan ng - Failure to show that
Omnibus Resolution dated 24 October 2012 31
Ordinaryong nominees actually belong to
1 204240 12-279 Agri-Agra na Cancelled registration Tao Para sa the sector, or that they have
3 (PLM) Reporma Para sa - The party ceased to exist for Lupa, Pabahay, undertaken meaningful
Magsasaka ng more than a year immediately Hanapbuhay at activities for the sector.
Pilipinas after the May 2010 elections; Kaunlaran
Movement - The nominees do not belong (AKO-BAHAY)
(AGRI) to the sector of peasants and
204141 12-229 The True Cancelled registration
farmers that the party seeks to
(PLM) Marcos Loyalist - Failure to show that
represent;
(for God, majority of its members are
- Only four nominees were
Country and marginalized and
submitted to the COMELEC;
People) underrepresented; and
and
Association of - Failure to prove that two of
- Failure to show meaningful
the Philippines, its nominees actually belong
activities for its constituency.
Inc. (BANTAY) to the marginalized and
1 203936 12-248 Aksyon Cancelled registration underrepresented.
4 (PLM) Magsasaka-Partido Tinig - Failure to show that
204408 12-217 Pilipino Cancelled registration
ng majority of its members are
(PLM) Association for - Change of sector (from
Masa (AKMA-PTM) marginalized and
Country – Urban urban poor youth to urban
underrepresented;
Poor Youth poor) necessitates a new
- Failure to prove that four of
Advancement application;
its nine nominees actually
and Welfare - Failure to show track record
belong to the farmers sector;
 ( PA C YAW ) for the marginalized and summary hearing;
underrepresented; - Failure to show track record
- Failure to prove that for the marginalized and
majority of its members and underrepresented; and
officers are from the urban - The nominees did not
poor sector; and appear to be marginalized and
- The nominees are not underrepresented.
members of the urban poor
Resolution dated 7 November 201233
sector.
204094 12-185 Alliance for Cancelled registration and
1 204153 12-277 Pasang Masda Cancelled registration
(PLM) Nationalism and accreditation
9 (PLM) Nationwide - The party represents drivers
Democracy - Failure to represent an
Party (PASANG and operators, who may have
(ANAD) identifiable marginalized and
MASDA) conflicting interests; and
underrepresented sector;
- Nominees are either
- Only three nominees were
operators or former operators.
submitted to the COMELEC;
2 203958 12-015 Kapatiran ng Cancelled registration - The nominees do not
0 (PLM) mga Nakulong - Failure to prove that belong to the marginalized
na Walang Sala, na Walang Sala, and underrepresented; and
Inc. (KAKUSA) Inc. (KAKUSA) - Failure to submit its
majority of its officers and Statement of Contribution
members belong to the and Expenditures for the
marginalized and 2007 Elections.
underrepresented;
Omnibus Resolution dated 7 November 201234
- The incumbent
representative in Congress 204239 12-060 Green Force for Cancelled registration and
failed to author or sponsor (PLM) the Environment accreditation
bills that are beneficial to the Sons and - The party is an advocacy
sector that the party Daughters of group and does not represent
represents (persons Mother Earth the marginalized and
imprisoned without proof of (GREENFORCE) underrepresented;
guilt beyond reasonable - Failure to comply with the
doubt); track record requirement; and
- Failure to show track record - The nominees are not
for the marginalized and marginalized citizens.
underrepresented; and
204236 12-254 Firm 24-K Cancelled registration and
- The nominees did not
(PLM) Association, Inc. accreditation
appear to be marginalized and
(FIRM 24-K) - The nominees do not
underrepresented.
belong to the sector that the
Resolution dated 30 October 201232 party seeks to represent
(urban poor and peasants of
2 204428 12-256 Ang Galing Cancelled registration and
the National Capital Region);
1 (PLM) Pinoy (AG) accreditation
- Only two of its nominees
- Failure to attend the
reside in the National Capital
 Region; and (PLM) Bicolnon Party accreditation
- Failure to comply with the (ABP) - Defective registration and
track record requirement. accreditation dating back to
2010;
2 204341 12-269 Action League Cancelled registration and
- Failure to represent any
5 (PLM) of Indigenous accreditation
sector; and
Masses (ALIM) - Failure to establish that its
- Failure to establish that the
nominees are members of the
nominees are employed in the construction
indigenous people in the
industry, the
Mindanao and Cordilleras
sector it claims to represent.
sector that the party seeks to
represent; Resolution dated 7 November 201238
- Only two of the party’s
204323 12-210 Bayani Party Cancelled registration and
nominees reside in the
(PLM) List (BAYANI) accreditation
Mindanao and Cordilleras;
- Failure to prove a track
and
record of trying to uplift the
- Three of the nominees do
marginalized and
not appear to belong to the
underrepresented sector of
marginalized.
professionals; and
Resolution dated 7 November 201235 - One nominee was declared
unqualified to represent the
2 204358 12-204 Alliance of Cancelled registration
sector of professionals.
6 (PLM) Advocates in - The sector it represents is a
Mining specifically defined group Resolution dated 7 November 201239
Advancement which may not be allowed
204321 12-252 Ang Agrikultura Cancelled registration and
for National registration under the party-list system; and
(PLM) Natin Isulong accreditation
Progress - Failure to establish that the
(AANI) - Failure to establish a track
(AAMA) nominees actually belong to
record of enhancing the lives
the sector.
of the marginalized and
Resolution dated 7 November 201236 underrepresented farmers
which it claims to represent;
2 204359 12-272 Social Cancelled registration
and
7 (PLM) Movement for - The nominees are
- More than a majority of the
Active Reform disqualified from
party’s nominees do not
and representing the sectors that
belong to the farmers sector.
Transparency the party represents;
(SMART) - Failure to comply with the Resolution dated 7 November 201240
track record requirement; and
204125 12-292 Agapay ng Cancelled registration and
- There is doubt as to whether
(PLM) Indigenous accreditation
majority of its members are
Peoples Rights - Failure to prove that its five
marginalized and
Alliance, Inc. nominees are members of the
underrepresented.
(A-IPRA) indigenous people sector;
Resolution dated 7 November 201237 - Failure to prove that its five
nominees actively
2 204238 12-173 Alliance of Cancelled registration and
 participated in the claims to represent;
undertakings of the party; and - Failure to show a complete
- Failure to prove that its five nominees are track record of its activities
bona fide since its registration; and
members. - The nominees are not part
of any of the sectors which
Resolution dated 7 November 201241
the party seeks to represent.
3 204216 12-202 Philippine Cancelled registration and
Resolution dated 28 November 201244
2 (PLM) Coconut accreditation
Producers - The party is affiliated with 204374 12-228 Binhi-Partido ng Cancelled registration and
Federation, Inc. private and government (PLM) mga Magsasaka accreditation
(COCOFED) agencies and is not Para sa mga - The party receives
marginalized; Magsasaka assistance from the
- The party is assisted by the (BINHI) government through the
government in various Department of Agriculture;
projects; and and
- The nominees are not - Failure to prove that the
members of the marginalized group is marginalized and
sector of coconut farmers and underrepresented.
producers.
Resolution dated 28 November 201245
42
Resolution dated 7 November 2012
204356 12-136 Butil Farmers Cancelled registration and
3 204220 12-238 Abang Lingkod Cancelled registration (PLM) Party (BUTIL) accreditation
3 (PLM) Party-List - Failure to establish a track - Failure to establish that the
(ABANG record of continuously agriculture and cooperative
LINGKOD) representing the peasant sectors are marginalized and
farmers sector; underrepresented; and
- Failure to show that its - The party’s nominees
members actually belong to neither appear to belong to
the peasant farmers sector; the sectors they seek to
and represent, nor to have
- Failure to show that its actively participated in the
nominees are marginalized undertakings of the party.
and underrepresented, have
Resolution dated 3 December 201246
actively participated in
programs for the 204486 12-194 1st Cancelled registration and
advancement of farmers, and (PLM) Kabalikat ng accreditation
adhere to its advocacies. Bayan - Declaration of untruthful
Ginhawang statements;
Resolution dated 14 November 201243
Sangkatauhan - Failure to exist for at least
3 204158 12-158 Action Cancelled registration and (1st one year; and
4 (PLM) Brotherhood for Active accreditation - Failure to show that the KABAGIS) - None of its nominees
Dreamers, Inc. party is actually able to belong to the labor,
(ABROAD) represent all of the sectors it fisherfolk, and urban poor
 indigenous cultural (PLM) Leadership (ARAL)
communities sectors which it
204002 12-188 Alliance for Rural Concerns (ARC)
seeks to represent.
(PLM)
Resolution dated 4 December 201247
203922 12-201 Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives
3 204410 12-198 1-United Cancelled accreditation (PLM) (APEC)
8 (PLM) Transport - The party represents drivers
203960 12-260 1st
Koalisyon (1-UTAK) and operators, who may have
(PLM) Consumers Alliance for Rural Energy, Inc.
conflicting interests; and
(1-CARE)
- The party’s nominees do not
belong to any marginalized 203936 12-248 Aksyon Magsasaka-Partido Tinig ng Masa
and underrepresented sector. (PLM) (AKMA-PTM)
Resolution dated 4 December 201248 203958 12-015 Kapatiran ng mga Nakulong na Walang Sala,
(PLM) Inc. (KAKUSA)
3 204421, 12-157 Coalition of Cancelled registration
9 204425 (PLM), Senior Citizens - The party violated election 203976 12-288 Alliance for Rural and Agrarian Reconstruction,
12-191 in the laws because its nominees (PLM) Inc. (ARARO)
(PLM) Philippines, Inc. had a term-sharing
Resolution dated 20 November 2012
(SENIOR agreement.
CITIZENS) 204094 12-185 Alliance for Nationalism and Democracy
(PLM) (ANAD)
These 39 petitioners (AKB, Atong Paglaum, ARAL, ARC, UNIMAD, 1BRO-PGBI, 204125 12-292 Agapay ng Indigenous Peoples Rights Alliance,
1GANAP/GUARDIANS, A BLESSED Party-List, 1-CARE, APEC, AT, ARARO, (PLM) Inc. (A-IPRA)
AGRI, AKMA-PTM, KAP, AKO-BAHAY, BANTAY, PACYAW, PASANG MASDA,
KAKUSA, AG, ANAD, GREENFORCE, FIRM 24-K, ALIM, AAMA, SMART, ABP, 204100 12-196 1-Bro Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc.
BAYANI, AANI, A-IPRA, COCOFED, ABANG LINGKOD, ABROAD, BINHI, BUTIL, (PLM) (1BRO-PGBI)
1st KABAGIS, 1-UTAK, SENIOR CITIZENS) were able to secure a mandatory Resolution dated 27 November 2012
injunction from this Court, directing the COMELEC to include the names of these
39 petitioners in the printing of the official ballot for the 13 May 2013 party-list 204141 12-229 The True Marcos Loyalist (for God, Country
elections. (PLM) and People) Association of the Philippines, Inc.
Petitioners prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of (BANTAY)
preliminary injunction. This Court issued Status Quo Ante Orders in all petitions. 204240 12-279 Agri-Agra na Reporma Para sa Magsasaka ng
This Decision governs only the 54 consolidated petitions that were granted Status (PLM) Pilipinas Movement (AGRI)
Quo Ante Orders, namely:
204216 12-202 Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc.
(PLM) (COCOFED)
G.R. No. SPP No. Group
204158 12-158 Action Brotherhood for Active Dreamer, Inc.
Resolution dated 13 November 2012 (PLM) (ABROAD)
203818-19 12-154 AKO Bicol Political Party (AKB) Resolutions dated 4 December 2012
(PLM)
12-177 204122 12-223 1 Guardians Nationalist Philippines, Inc.
(PLM) (PLM) (1GANAP/GUARDIANS)

203981 12-187 Association for Righteousness Advocacy on 203766 12-161 Atong Paglaum, Inc. (Atong Paglaum)
 (PLM) 204394 12-145 (PL) Association of Guard, Utility Helper, Aider,
Rider, Driver/Domestic Helper, Janitor, Agent
204318 12-220 United Movement Against Drugs Foundation
and Nanny of the Philippines, Inc.
(PLM) (UNIMAD)
(GUARDJAN)
204263 12-257 Blessed Federation of Farmers and Fishermen
204408 12-217 Pilipino Association for Country – Urban Poor
(PLM) International, Inc. (A BLESSED Party-List)
(PLM) Youth Advancement and Welfare (PACYAW)
204174 12-232 Aangat Tayo Party-List Party (AT)
204428 12-256 Ang Galing Pinoy (AG)
(PLM)
(PLM)
204126 12-263 Kaagapay ng Nagkakaisang Agilang Pilipinong
204490 12-073 Pilipinas Para sa Pinoy (PPP)
(PLM) Magsasaka (KAP)
(PLM)
204364 12-180 Adhikain at Kilusan ng Ordinaryong Tao Para sa
204379 12-099 Alagad ng Sining (ASIN)
(PLM) Lupa, Pabahay, Hanapbuhay at Kaunlaran
(PLM)
(AKO-BAHAY)
204367 12-104 (PL) Akbay Kalusugan (AKIN)
204139 12-127 (PL) Alab ng Mamamahayag (ALAM)
204426 12-011 Association of Local Athletics Entrepreneurs
204220 12-238 Abang Lingkod Party-List (ABANG
(PLM) and Hobbyists, Inc. (ALA-EH)
(PLM) LINGKOD)
204455 12-041 Manila Teachers Savings and Loan Association,
204236 12-254 Firm 24-K Association, Inc. (FIRM 24-K)
(PLM) Inc. (Manila Teachers)
(PLM)
204374 12-228 Binhi-Partido ng mga Magsasaka Para sa mga
204238 12-173 Alliance of Bicolnon Party (ABP)
(PLM) Magsasaka (BINHI)
(PLM)
204370 12-011 (PP) Ako An Bisaya (AAB)
204239 12-060 Green Force for the Environment Sons and
(PLM) Daughters of Mother Earth (GREENFORCE) 204435 12-057 1 Alliance Advocating Autonomy Party
(PLM) (1AAAP)
204321 12-252 Ang Agrikultura Natin Isulong (AANI)
(PLM) 204486 12-194 1st Kabalikat ng Bayan Ginhawang
(PLM) Sangkatauhan (1st KABAGIS)
204323 12-210 Bayani Party List (BAYANI)
(PLM) 204410 12-198 1-United Transport Koalisyon (1-UTAK)
(PLM)
204341 12-269 Action League of Indigenous Masses (ALIM)
(PLM) 204421, 12-157 Coalition of Senior Citizens in the Philippines,
204425 (PLM) Inc. (SENIOR CITIZENS)
204358 12-204 Alliance of Advocates in Mining Advancement
12-191
(PLM) for National Progress (AAMA)
(PLM)
204359 12-272 Social Movement for Active Reform and
204436 12-009 (PP), Abyan Ilonggo Party (AI)
(PLM) Transparency (SMART)
12-165
204356 12-136 Butil Farmers Party (BUTIL) (PLM)
(PLM)
204485 12-175 (PL) Alliance of Organizations, Networks and
Resolution dated 11 December 2012 Associations of the Philippines, Inc. (ALONA)
204402 12-061 (PL) Kalikasan Party-List (KALIKASAN) 204484 11-002 Partido ng Bayan ng Bida (PBB)
Resolution dated 11 December 2012
204153 12-277 Pasang Masda Nationwide Party (PASANG
(PLM) MASDA)
The Issues
We rule upon two issues: first, whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners
from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections, either by denial of their
new petitions for registration under the party-list system, or by cancellation of their
existing registration and accreditation as party-list organizations; and second,
whether the criteria for participating in the party-list system laid down in Ang
Bagong Bayani and Barangay Association for National Advancement and
Transparency v. Commission on Elections49 (BANAT) should be applied by the
COMELEC in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections.
The Court’s Ruling
We hold that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in following
prevailing decisions of this Court in disqualifying petitioners from participating in
the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections. However, since the Court adopts in
this Decision new parameters in the qualification of national, regional, and sectoral
parties under the party-list system, thereby abandoning the rulings in the decisions
applied by the COMELEC in disqualifying petitioners, we remand to the COMELEC
all the present petitions for the COMELEC to determine who are qualified to
register under the party-list system, and to participate in the coming 13 May 2013
party-list elections, under the new parameters prescribed in this Decision.
The Party-List System
The 1987 Constitution provides the basis for the party-list system of
representation. Simply put, the party-list system is intended to democratize political
power by giving political parties that cannot win in legislative district elections a
chance to win seats in the House of Representatives.50 The voter elects two
representatives in the House of Representatives: one for his or her legislative
district, and another for his or her party-list group or organization of choice. The
1987 Constitution provides:
Section 5, Article VI
(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two
hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected
from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as
provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total
number of representatives including those under the party list. For three
consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats
allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by
selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law,
except the religious sector.
Sections 7 and 8, Article IX-C
Sec. 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or coalition shall be
valid, except for those registered under the party-list system as provided in this
Constitution.
Sec. 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered under the party-list
system, shall not be represented in the voters’ registration boards, boards of
election inspectors, boards of canvassers, or other similar bodies. However, they
shall be entitled to appoint poll watchers in accordance with law.
Commissioner Christian S. Monsod, the main sponsor of the party-list system,
stressed that "the party-list system is not synonymous with that of the
sectoral representation."51 The constitutional provisions on the party-list system
should be read in light of the following discussion among its framers:
MR. MONSOD: x x x.
I would like to make a distinction from the beginning that the proposal for the party
list system is not synonymous with that of the sectoral representation. Precisely,
the party list system seeks to avoid the dilemma of choice of sectors and who
constitute the members of the sectors. In making the proposal on the party list
system, we were made aware of the problems precisely cited by Commissioner
Bacani of which sectors will have reserved seats. In effect, a sectoral
representation in the Assembly would mean that certain sectors would have
reserved seats; that they will choose among themselves who would sit in those
reserved seats. And then, we have the problem of which sector because as we will
notice in Proclamation No. 9, the sectors cited were the farmers, fishermen,
workers, students, professionals, business, military, academic, ethnic and other
similar groups. So these are the nine sectors that were identified here as "sectoral
representatives" to be represented in this Commission. The problem we had in
trying to approach sectoral representation in the Assembly was whether to stop at
these nine sectors or include other sectors. And we went through the exercise in a
caucus of which sector should be included which went up to 14 sectors. And as we
all know, the longer we make our enumeration, the more limiting the law become
because when we make an enumeration we exclude those who are not in the
enumeration. Second, we had the problem of who comprise the farmers. Let us
just say the farmers and the laborers. These days, there are many citizens who are
called "hyphenated citizens." A doctor may be a farmer; a lawyer may also be a
farmer. And so, it is up to the discretion of the person to say "I am a farmer" so he
would be included in that sector.
The third problem is that when we go into a reserved seat system of sectoral
representation in the Assembly, we are, in effect, giving some people two votes
and other people one vote. We sought to avoid these problems by presenting a
party list system. Under the party list system, there are no reserved seats for
sectors. Let us say, laborers and farmers can form a sectoral party or a sectoral
organization that will then register and present candidates of their party. How do
the mechanics go? Essentially, under the party list system, every voter has two
votes, so there is no discrimination. First, he will vote for the representative of his
legislative district. That is one vote. In that same ballot, he will be asked: What
party or organization or coalition do you wish to be represented in the Assembly?
And here will be attached a list of the parties, organizations or coalitions that have
been registered with the COMELEC and are entitled to be put in that list. This can
be a regional party, a sectoral party, a national party, UNIDO, Magsasaka or a
regional party in Mindanao. One need not be a farmer to say that he wants the
farmers' party to be represented in the Assembly. Any citizen can vote for any
party. At the end of the day, the COMELEC will then tabulate the votes that had
been garnered by each party or each organization — one does not have to be a
political party and register in order to participate as a party — and count the votes
and from there derive the percentage of the votes that had been cast in favor of a
party, organization or coalition.
When such parties register with the COMELEC, we are assuming that 50 of the
250 seats will be for the party list system. So, we have a limit of 30 percent of 50.
That means that the maximum that any party can get out of these 50 seats is 15.
When the parties register they then submit a list of 15 names. They have to submit
these names because these nominees have to meet the minimum qualifications of
a Member of the National Assembly. At the end of the day, when the votes are
tabulated, one gets the percentages. Let us say, UNIDO gets 10 percent or 15
percent of the votes; KMU gets 5 percent; a women’s party gets 2 1/2 percent and
anybody who has at least 2 1/2 percent of the vote qualifies and the 50 seats are
apportioned among all of these parties who get at least 2 1/2 percent of the vote.
What does that mean? It means that any group or party who has a constituency of,
say, 500,000 nationwide gets a seat in the National Assembly. What is the
justification for that? When we allocate legislative districts, we are saying that any
district that has 200,000 votes gets a seat. There is no reason why a group that
has a national constituency, even if it is a sectoral or special interest group, should
not have a voice in the National Assembly. It also means that, let us say, there are
three or four labor groups, they all register as a party or as a group. If each of them
gets only one percent or five of them get one percent, they are not entitled to any
representative. So, they will begin to think that if they really have a common
interest, they should band together, form a coalition and get five percent of the
vote and, therefore, have two seats in the Assembly. Those are the dynamics of a
party list system.
We feel that this approach gets around the mechanics of sectoral representation
while at the same time making sure that those who really have a national
constituency or sectoral constituency will get a chance to have a seat in the
National Assembly. These sectors or these groups may not have the constituency
to win a seat on a legislative district basis. They may not be able to win a seat on a
district basis but surely, they will have votes on a nationwide basis.
The purpose of this is to open the system. In the past elections, we found out that
there were certain groups or parties that, if we count their votes nationwide; have
about 1,000,000 or 1,500,000 votes. But they were always third place or fourth
place in each of the districts. So, they have no voice in the Assembly. But this way,
they would have five or six representatives in the Assembly even if they would not
win individually in legislative districts. So, that is essentially the mechanics, the
purpose and objectives of the party list system.
BISHOP BACANI: Madam President, am I right in interpreting that when we speak
now of party list system though we refer to sectors, we would be referring to
sectoral party list rather than sectors and party list?
MR. MONSOD: As a matter of fact, if this body accepts the party list system, we do
not even have to mention sectors because the sectors would be included in the
party list system. They can be sectoral parties within the party list system.
xxxx
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I just want to say that we suggested or
proposed the party list system because we wanted to open up the political system
to a pluralistic society through a multiparty system. x x x We are for opening up
the system, and we would like very much for the sectors to be there. That is
why one of the ways to do that is to put a ceiling on the number of
representatives from any single party that can sit within the 50 allocated
under the party list system. x x x.
xxx
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, the candidacy for the 198 seats is not
limited to political parties. My question is this: Are we going to classify for
example Christian Democrats and Social Democrats as political parties? Can
they run under the party list concept or must they be under the district
legislation side of it only?
MR. VILLACORTA. In reply to that query, I think these parties that the
Commissioner mentioned can field candidates for the Senate as well as for
the House of Representatives. Likewise, they can also field sectoral
candidates for the 20 percent or 30 percent, whichever is adopted, of the
seats that we are allocating under the party list system.
MR. MONSOD. In other words, the Christian Democrats can field district
candidates and can also participate in the party list system?
MR. VILLACORTA. Why not? When they come to the party list system, they
will be fielding only sectoral candidates.
MR. MONSOD. May I be clarified on that? Can UNIDO participate in the party
list system?
MR. VILLACORTA. Yes, why not? For as long as they field candidates who
come from the different marginalized sectors that we shall designate in this
Constitution.
MR. MONSOD. Suppose Senator Tañada wants to run under BAYAN group and
says that he represents the farmers, would he qualify?
MR. VILLACORTA. No, Senator Tañada would not qualify.
MR. MONSOD. But UNIDO can field candidates under the party list system and
say Juan dela Cruz is a farmer. Who would pass on whether he is a farmer or not?
MR. TADEO. Kay Commissioner Monsod, gusto ko lamang linawin ito. Political
parties, particularly minority political parties, are not prohibited to participate
in the party list election if they can prove that they are also organized along
sectoral lines.
MR. MONSOD. What the Commissioner is saying is that all political parties can
participate because it is precisely the contention of political parties that they
represent the broad base of citizens and that all sectors are represented in them.
Would the Commissioner agree?
MR. TADEO. Ang punto lamang namin, pag pinayagan mo ang UNIDO na isang
political party, it will dominate the party list at mawawalang saysay din yung sector.
Lalamunin mismo ng political parties ang party list system. Gusto ko lamang
bigyan ng diin ang "reserve." Hindi ito reserve seat sa marginalized sectors. Kung
titingnan natin itong 198 seats, reserved din ito sa political parties.
MR. MONSOD. Hindi po reserved iyon kasi anybody can run there. But my
question to Commissioner Villacorta and probably also to Commissioner Tadeo is
that under this system, would UNIDO be banned from running under the party list
system?
MR. VILLACORTA. No, as I said, UNIDO may field sectoral candidates. On
that condition alone, UNIDO may be allowed to register for the party list
system.
MR. MONSOD. May I inquire from Commissioner Tadeo if he shares that
answer?
MR. TADEO. The same.
MR. VILLACORTA. Puwede po ang UNIDO, pero sa sectoral lines.
MR. MONSOD: Sino po ang magsasabi kung iyong kandidato ng UNIDO ay hindi
talagang labor leader or isang laborer? Halimbawa, abogado ito.
MR. TADEO: Iyong mechanics.
MR. MONSOD: Hindi po mechanics iyon because we are trying to solve an
inherent problem of sectoral representation. My question is: Suppose UNIDO fields
a labor leader, would he qualify?
MR. TADEO: The COMELEC may look into the truth of whether or not a
political party is really organized along a specific sectoral line. If such is
verified or confirmed, the political party may submit a list of individuals who
are actually members of such sectors. The lists are to be published to give
individuals or organizations belonging to such sector the chance to present
evidence contradicting claims of membership in the said sector or to
question the claims of the existence of such sectoral organizations or
parties. This proceeding shall be conducted by the COMELEC and shall be
summary in character. In other words, COMELEC decisions on this matter
are final and unappealable.52 (Emphasis supplied)
Indisputably, the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended the party-list system to
include not only sectoral parties but also non-sectoral parties. The framers
intended the sectoral parties to constitute a part, but not the entirety, of the party-
list system. As explained by Commissioner Wilfredo Villacorta, political
parties can participate in the party-list system "For as long as they field
candidates who come from the different marginalized sectors that we shall
designate in this Constitution."53
In fact, the framers voted down, 19-22, a proposal to reserve permanent seats to
sectoral parties in the House of Representatives, or alternatively, to reserve the
party-list system exclusively to sectoral parties. As clearly explained by Justice
Jose C. Vitug in his Dissenting Opinion in Ang Bagong Bayani:
The draft provisions on what was to become Article VI, Section 5, subsection (2),
of the 1987 Constitution took off from two staunch positions — the first headed by
Commissioner Villacorta, advocating that of the 20 per centum of the total seats in
Congress to be allocated to party-list representatives half were to be reserved to
appointees from the marginalized and underrepresented sectors. The proposal
was opposed by some Commissioners. Mr. Monsod expressed the difficulty in
delimiting the sectors that needed representation. He was of the view that
reserving seats for the marginalized and underrepresented sectors would stunt
their development into full-pledged parties equipped with electoral machinery
potent enough to further the sectoral interests to be represented. The Villacorta
group, on the other hand, was apprehensive that pitting the unorganized and less-
moneyed sectoral groups in an electoral contest would be like placing babes in the
lion's den, so to speak, with the bigger and more established political parties
ultimately gobbling them up. R.A. 7941 recognized this concern when it banned
the first five major political parties on the basis of party representation in the House
of Representatives from participating in the party-list system for the first party-list
elections held in 1998 (and to be automatically lifted starting with the 2001
elections). The advocates for permanent seats for sectoral representatives made
an effort towards a compromise — that the party-list system be open only to
underrepresented and marginalized sectors. This proposal was further whittled
down by allocating only half of the seats under the party-list system to candidates
from the sectors which would garner the required number of votes. The majority
was unyielding. Voting 19-22, the proposal for permanent seats, and in the
alternative the reservation of the party-list system to the sectoral groups, was
voted down. The only concession the Villacorta group was able to muster was an
assurance of reserved seats for selected sectors for three consecutive terms after
the enactment of the 1987 Constitution, by which time they would be expected to
gather and solidify their electoral base and brace themselves in the multi-party
electoral contest with the more veteran political groups.54 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, in the end, the proposal to give permanent reserved seats to certain sectors
was outvoted. Instead, the reservation of seats to sectoral representatives was
only allowed for the first three consecutive terms.55 There can be no doubt
whatsoever that the framers of the 1987 Constitution expressly rejected the
proposal to make the party-list system exclusively for sectoral parties only, and
that they clearly intended the party-list system to include both sectoral and non-
sectoral parties.
The common denominator between sectoral and non-sectoral parties is that they
cannot expect to win in legislative district elections but they can garner, in
nationwide elections, at least the same number of votes that winning candidates
can garner in legislative district elections. The party-list system will be the entry
point to membership in the House of Representatives for both these non-traditional
parties that could not compete in legislative district elections.
The indisputable intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution to include in the
party-list system both sectoral and non-sectoral parties is clearly written in
Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution, which states:
Section 5. (1) The House of Representative shall be composed of not more that
two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be
elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who,
as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution is crystal-clear that there shall be "a
party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations." The commas after the words "national," and "regional," separate
national and regional parties from sectoral parties. Had the framers of the 1987
Constitution intended national and regional parties to be at the same time sectoral,
they would have stated "national and regional sectoral parties." They did not,
precisely because it was never their intention to make the party-list system
exclusively sectoral.
What the framers intended, and what they expressly wrote in Section 5(1), could
not be any clearer: the party-list system is composed of three different groups, and
the sectoral parties belong to only one of the three groups. The text of Section 5(1)
leaves no room for any doubt that national and regional parties are separate from
sectoral parties.
Thus, the party-list system is composed of three different groups: (1) national
parties or organizations; (2) regional parties or organizations; and (3) sectoral
parties or organizations. National and regional parties or organizations
are different from sectoral parties or organizations. National and regional parties
or organizations need not be organized along sectoral lines and need not
represent any particular sector.
Moreover, Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution mandates that, during
the first three consecutive terms of Congress after the ratification of the 1987
Constitution, "one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be
filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as
may be provided by law, except the religious sector." This provision clearly shows
again that the party-list system is not exclusively for sectoral parties for two
obvious reasons.
First, the other one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives would
naturally be open to non-sectoral party-list representatives, clearly negating the
idea that the party-list system is exclusively for sectoral parties representing the
"marginalized and underrepresented." Second, the reservation of one-half of the
party-list seats to sectoral parties applies only for the first "three consecutive terms
after the ratification of this Constitution," clearly making the party-list system fully
open after the end of the first three congressional terms. This means that, after this
period, there will be no seats reserved for any class or type of party that qualifies
under the three groups constituting the party-list system.
Hence, the clear intent, express wording, and party-list structure ordained in
Section 5(1) and (2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution cannot be disputed:
the party-list system is not for sectoral parties only, but also for non-sectoral
parties.
Republic Act No. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, which is the law that
implements the party-list system prescribed in the Constitution, provides:
Section 3. Definition of Terms. (a) The party-list system is a mechanism of
proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of
Representatives from national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or
coalitions thereof registered with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC).
Component parties or organizations of a coalition may participate independently
provided the coalition of which they form part does not participate in the party-list
system.
(b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of
parties.
(c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an
ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of
government and which, as the most immediate means of securing their
adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and
members as candidates for public office.
It is a national party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory
of at least a majority of the regions. It is a regional party when its constituency is
spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority of the cities and
provinces comprising the region.
(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any
of the sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy
pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector.
(e) A sectoral organization refers to a group of citizens or a coalition of groups of
citizens who share similar physical attributes or characteristics, employment,
interests or concerns.
(f) A coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly registered national, regional, sectoral
parties or organizations for political and/or election purposes. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7941 defines a "party" as "either a political party or a
sectoral party or a coalition of parties." Clearly, a political party is different from a
sectoral party. Section 3(c) of R.A. No. 7941 further provides that a "political
party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or
platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government." On
the other hand, Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 7941 provides that a "sectoral
party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors
enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the
special interest and concerns of their sector." R.A. No. 7941 provides different
definitions for a political and a sectoral party. Obviously, they are separate and
distinct from each other.
R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and regional parties or organizations
to represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors. To require all
national and regional parties under the party-list system to represent the
"marginalized and underrepresented" is to deprive and exclude, by judicial fiat,
ideology-based and cause-oriented parties from the party-list system. How will
these ideology-based and cause-oriented parties, who cannot win in legislative
district elections, participate in the electoral process if they are excluded from the
party-list system? To exclude them from the party-list system is to prevent them
from joining the parliamentary struggle, leaving as their only option the armed
struggle. To exclude them from the party-list system is, apart from being obviously
senseless, patently contrary to the clear intent and express wording of the 1987
Constitution and R.A. No. 7941.
Under the party-list system, an ideology-based or cause-oriented political party is
clearly different from a sectoral party. A political party need not be organized as a
sectoral party and need not represent any particular sector. There is no
requirement in R.A. No. 7941 that a national or regional political party must
represent a "marginalized and underrepresented" sector. It is sufficient that the
political party consists of citizens who advocate the same ideology or platform, or
the same governance principles and policies, regardless of their economic
status as citizens.
Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941 states that "the sectors shall include labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers,
and professionals."56 The sectors mentioned in Section 5 are not all necessarily
"marginalized and underrepresented." For sure, "professionals" are not by
definition "marginalized and underrepresented," not even the elderly, women, and
the youth. However, professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth may "lack
well-defined political constituencies," and can thus organize themselves into
sectoral parties in advocacy of the special interests and concerns of their
respective sectors.
Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941 provides another compelling reason for holding that the
law does not require national or regional parties, as well as certain sectoral parties
in Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941, to represent the "marginalized and
underrepresented." Section 6 provides the grounds for the COMELEC to refuse or
cancel the registration of parties or organizations after due notice and hearing.
Section 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. — The COMELEC may,
motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested party, refuse or cancel,
after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral
party, organization or coalition on any of the following grounds:
(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association organized for
religious purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;
(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party,
foundation, organization, whether directly or through any of its officers or members
or indirectly through third parties for partisan election purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at
least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two
(2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered.
None of the 8 grounds to refuse or cancel registration refers to non-representation
of the "marginalized and underrepresented."
The phrase "marginalized and underrepresented" appears only once in R.A.
No. 7941, in Section 2 on Declaration of Policy.57 Section 2 seeks "to promote
proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of
Representatives through the party-list system," which will enable Filipinos
belonging to the "marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations
and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies," to become
members of the House of Representatives. While the policy declaration in Section
2 of R.A. No. 7941 broadly refers to "marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties," the specific implementing provisions of R.A. No. 7941
do not define or require that the sectors, organizations or parties must be
"marginalized and underrepresented." On the contrary, to even interpret that all the
sectors mentioned in Section 5 are "marginalized and underrepresented" would
lead to absurdities.
How then should we harmonize the broad policy declaration in Section 2 of R.A.
No. 7941 with its specific implementing provisions, bearing in mind the applicable
provisions of the 1987 Constitution on the matter?
The phrase "marginalized and underrepresented" should refer only to the
sectors in Section 5 that are, by their nature, economically "marginalized and
underrepresented." These sectors are: labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and
other similar sectors. For these sectors, a majority of the members of the
sectoral party must belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented." The
nominees of the sectoral party either must belong to the sector, or must
have a track record of advocacy for the sector represented. Belonging to the
"marginalized and underrepresented" sector does not mean one must "wallow in
poverty, destitution or infirmity." It is sufficient that one, or his or her sector, is
below the middle class. More specifically, the economically "marginalized and
underrepresented" are those who fall in the low income group as classified by the
National Statistical Coordination Board.58
The recognition that national and regional parties, as well as sectoral parties of
professionals, the elderly, women and the youth, need not be "marginalized and
underrepresented" will allow small ideology-based and cause-oriented parties who
lack "well-defined political constituencies" a chance to win seats in the House of
Representatives. On the other hand, limiting to the "marginalized and
underrepresented" the sectoral parties for labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and
other sectors that by their nature are economically at the margins of society, will
give the "marginalized and underrepresented" an opportunity to likewise win seats
in the House of Representatives.
This interpretation will harmonize the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 and will
give rise to a multi-party system where those "marginalized and
underrepresented," both in economic and ideological status, will have the
opportunity to send their own members to the House of Representatives. This
interpretation will also make the party-list system honest and transparent,
eliminating the need for relatively well-off party-list representatives to masquerade
as "wallowing in poverty, destitution and infirmity," even as they attend sessions in
Congress riding in SUVs.
The major political parties are those that field candidates in the legislative district
elections. Major political parties cannot participate in the party-list elections since
they neither lack "well-defined political constituencies" nor represent "marginalized
and underrepresented" sectors. Thus, the national or regional parties under the
party-list system are necessarily those that do not belong to major political
parties. This automatically reserves the national and regional parties under the
party-list system to those who "lack well-defined political constituencies," giving
them the opportunity to have members in the House of Representatives.
To recall, Ang Bagong Bayani expressly declared, in its second guideline for the
accreditation of parties under the party-list system, that "while even major political
parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the Constitution to participate in the
party-list system, they must comply with the declared statutory policy of enabling
‘Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors xxx to be
elected to the House of Representatives.’ "However, the requirement in Ang
Bagong Bayani, in its second guideline, that "the political party xxx must represent
the marginalized and underrepresented," automatically disqualified major political
parties from participating in the party-list system. This inherent inconsistency in
Ang Bagong Bayani has been compounded by the COMELEC’s refusal to register
sectoral wings officially organized by major political parties. BANAT merely
formalized the prevailing practice when it expressly prohibited major political
parties from participating in the party-list system, even through their sectoral wings.
Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941 expressly prohibited the "first five (5) major political
parties on the basis of party representation in the House of Representatives at the
start of the Tenth Congress" from participating in the May 1988 party-list
elections.59 Thus, major political parties can participate in subsequent party-
list elections since the prohibition is expressly limited only to the 1988 party-
list elections. However, major political parties should participate in party-list
elections only through their sectoral wings. The participation of major political
parties through their sectoral wings, a majority of whose members are
"marginalized and underrepresented" or lacking in "well-defined political
constituencies," will facilitate the entry of the "marginalized and underrepresented"
and those who "lack well-defined political constituencies" as members of the
House of Representatives.
The 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 allow major political parties to participate
in party-list elections so as to encourage them to work assiduously in extending
their constituencies to the "marginalized and underrepresented" and to those who
"lack well-defined political constituencies." The participation of major political
parties in party-list elections must be geared towards the entry, as members of the
House of Representatives, of the "marginalized and underrepresented" and those
who "lack well-defined political constituencies," giving them a voice in law-making.
Thus,to participate in party-list elections, a major political party that fields
candidates in the legislative district elections must organize a sectoral wing, like a
labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, professional, women or youth wing, that can
register under the party-list system.
Such sectoral wing of a major political party must have its own constitution, by-
laws, platform or program of government, officers and members, a majority of
whom must belong to the sector represented. The sectoral wing is in itself an
independent sectoral party, and is linked to a major political party through a
coalition. This linkage is allowed by Section 3 of R.A. No. 7941, which provides
that "component parties or organizations of a coalition may participate
independently (in party-list elections) provided the coalition of which they form part
does not participate in the party-list system."
Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941 prescribes the qualifications of party-list nominees. This
provision prescribes a special qualification only for the nominee from the youth
sector.
Section 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as
party-list representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a
registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1)
year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and write, a bona
fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least
ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25)
years of age on the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but
not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election.
Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term
shall be allowed to continue in office until the expiration of his term.1âwphi1
A party-list nominee must be a bona fide member of the party or organization
which he or she seeks to represent. In the case of sectoral parties, to be a bona
fide party-list nominee one must either belong to the sector represented, or
have a track record of advocacy for such sector.
In disqualifying petitioners, the COMELEC used the criteria prescribed in Ang
Bagong Bayani and BANAT. Ang Bagong Bayani laid down the guidelines for
qualifying those who desire to participate in the party-list system:
First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must represent the
marginalized and underrepresented groups identified in Section 5 of RA
7941. x x x
Second, while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and
the Constitution to participate in the party-list system, they must comply with the
declared statutory policy of enabling "Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized
and underrepresented sectors x x x to be elected to the House of
Representatives." x x x.
xxxx
Third, x x x the religious sector may not be represented in the party-list system. x x
x.
xxxx
Fourth, a party or an organization must not be disqualified under Section 6 of RA
7941, which enumerates the grounds for disqualification as follows:
"(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association, organized for
religious purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;
(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party,
foundation, organization, whether directly or through any of its officers or members
or indirectly through third parties for partisan election purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at
least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two
(2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered."
Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project organized or
an entity funded or assisted by, the government. x x x.
xxxx
Sixth, the party must not only comply with the requirements of the law; its
nominees must likewise do so. Section 9 of RA 7941 reads as follows:
"SEC 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. - No person shall be nominated as
party-list representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a
registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one
(1)year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and write,
a bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at
least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five
(25) years of age on the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but
not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral
representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to
continue in office until the expiration of his term."
Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization must represent
marginalized and underrepresented sectors; so also must its nominees. x x
x.
Eighth, x x x the nominee must likewise be able to contribute to the formulation
and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole.
(Emphasis supplied)
In 2009, by a vote of 8-7 in BANAT, this Court stretched the Ang Bagong
Bayani ruling further. In BANAT, the majority officially excluded major political
parties from participating in party-list elections,60 abandoning even the lip-service
that Ang Bagong Bayani accorded to the 1987 Constitution and R.A.No. 7941 that
major political parties can participate in party-list elections.
The minority in BANAT, however, believed that major political parties can
participate in the party-list system through their sectoral wings. The minority
expressed that "[e]xcluding the major political parties in party-list elections is
manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional Commission,
and R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot engage in socio-political engineering and
judicially legislate the exclusion of major political parties from the party-list
elections in patent violation of the Constitution and the law."61 The
experimentations in socio-political engineering have only resulted in confusion and
absurdity in the party-list system. Such experimentations, in clear contravention of
the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941, must now come to an end.
We cannot, however, fault the COMELEC for following prevailing jurisprudence in
disqualifying petitioners. In following prevailing jurisprudence, the COMELEC could
not have committed grave abuse of discretion. However, for the coming 13 May
2013 party-list elections, we must now impose and mandate the party-list
system actually envisioned and authorized under the 1987 Constitution and
R.A. No. 7941. In BANAT, this Court devised a new formula in the allocation of
party-list seats, reversing the COMELEC's allocation which followed the then
prevailing formula in Ang Bagong Bayani. In BANAT, however, the Court did not
declare that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion. Similarly, even
as we acknowledge here that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of
discretion, we declare that it would not be in accord with the 1987 Constitution and
R.A. No. 7941 to apply the criteria in Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT in
determining who are qualified to participate in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list
elections. For this purpose, we suspend our rule62 that a party may appeal to this
Court from decisions or orders of the COMELEC only if the COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion.
Thus, we remand all the present petitions to the COMELEC. In determining who
may participate in the coming 13 May 2013 and subsequent party-list elections, the
COMELEC shall adhere to the following parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national
parties or organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral
parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not
need to organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any
"marginalized and underrepresented" sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under
the party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A
political party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district
elections can participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that
can separately register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an
independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and
underrepresented" or lacking in "well-defined political constituencies." It is enough
that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their
sector. The sectors that are "marginalized and underrepresented" include labor,
peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped,
veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack "well-defined political
constituencies" include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the
"marginalized and underrepresented" must belong to the "marginalized and
underrepresented" sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of
sectoral parties or organizations that lack "well-defined political constituencies"
must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or
organizations that represent the "marginalized and underrepresented," or that
represent those who lack "well-defined political constituencies," either must belong
to their respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their
respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or organizations
must be bona-fide members of such parties or organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified
if some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one
nominee who remains qualified.
The COMELEC excluded from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections
those that did not satisfy these two criteria: (1) all national, regional, and sectoral
groups or organizations must represent the "marginalized and underrepresented"
sectors, and (2) all nominees must belong to the "marginalized and
underrepresented" sector they represent. Petitioners may have been disqualified
by the COMELEC because as political or regional parties they are not organized
along sectoral lines and do not represent the "marginalized and
underrepresented." Also, petitioners' nominees who do not belong to the sectors
they represent may have been disqualified, although they may have a track record
of advocacy for their sectors. Likewise, nominees of non-sectoral parties may have
been disqualified because they do not belong to any sector. Moreover, a party may
have been disqualified because one or more of its nominees failed to qualify, even
if the party has at least one remaining qualified nominee. As discussed above, the
disqualification of petitioners, and their nominees, under such circumstances is
contrary to the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941.
This Court is sworn to uphold the 1987 Constitution, apply its provisions faithfully,
and desist from engaging in socio-economic or political experimentations contrary
to what the Constitution has ordained. Judicial power does not include the power
to re-write the Constitution. Thus, the present petitions should be remanded to the
COMELEC not because the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in
disqualifying petitioners, but because petitioners may now possibly qualify to
participate in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections under the new
parameters prescribed by this Court.
WHEREFORE, all the present 54 petitions are GRANTED. The 13 petitions, which
have been granted Status Quo Ante Orders but without mandatory injunction to
include the names of petitioners in the printing of ballots, are remanded to the
Commission on Elections only for determination whether petitioners are qualified to
register under the party-list system under the parameters prescribed in this
Decision but they shall not participate in the 13 May 2013 part-list elections. The
41 petitions, which have been granted mandatory injunctions to include the names
of petitioners in the printing of ballots, are remanded to the Commission on
Elections for determination whether petitioners are qualified to register under the
party-list system and to participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections under
the parameters prescribed in this Decision. The Commission on Elections may
conduct summary evidentiary hearings for this purpose. This Decision is
immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 189466               February 11, 2010
DARYL GRACE J. ABAYON, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL,
PERFECTO C. LUCABAN, JR., RONYL S. DE LA CRUZ and AGUSTIN C.
DOROGA, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 189506
CONGRESSMAN JOVITO S. PALPARAN, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (HRET), DR.
REYNALDO LESACA, JR., CRISTINA PALABAY, RENATO M. REYES, JR.,
ERLINDA CADAPAN, ANTONIO FLORES and JOSELITO
USTAREZ, Respondents.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
These two cases are about the authority of the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET) to pass upon the eligibilities of the nominees of the party-list
groups that won seats in the lower house of Congress.
The Facts and the Case
In G.R. 189466, petitioner Daryl Grace J. Abayon is the first nominee of the Aangat
Tayo party-list organization that won a seat in the House of Representatives during
the 2007 elections.
Respondents Perfecto C. Lucaban, Jr., Ronyl S. Dela Cruz, and Agustin C.
Doroga, all registered voters, filed a petition for quo warranto with respondent
HRET against Aangat Tayo and its nominee, petitioner Abayon, in HRET Case 07-
041. They claimed that Aangat Tayo was not eligible for a party-list seat in the
House of Representatives, since it did not represent the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors.
Respondent Lucaban and the others with him further pointed out that petitioner
Abayon herself was not qualified to sit in the House as a party-list nominee since
she did not belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors, she being
the wife of an incumbent congressional district representative. She moreover lost
her bid as party-list representative of the party-list organization called An Waray in
the immediately preceding elections of May 10, 2004.
Petitioner Abayon countered that the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) had
already confirmed the status of Aangat Tayo as a national multi-sectoral party-list
organization representing the workers, women, youth, urban poor, and elderly and
that she belonged to the women sector. Abayon also claimed that although she
was the second nominee of An Waray party-list organization during the 2004
elections, she could not be regarded as having lost a bid for an elective office.
Finally, petitioner Abayon pointed out that respondent HRET had no jurisdiction
over the petition for quo warranto since respondent Lucaban and the others with
him collaterally attacked the registration of Aangat Tayo as a party-list
organization, a matter that fell within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC. It was
Aangat Tayo that was taking a seat in the House of Representatives, and not
Abayon who was just its nominee. All questions involving her eligibility as first
nominee, said Abayon, were internal concerns of Aangat Tayo.
On July 16, 2009 respondent HRET issued an order, dismissing the petition as
against Aangat Tayo but upholding its jurisdiction over the qualifications of
petitioner Abayon.1 The latter moved for reconsideration but the HRET denied the
same on September 17, 2009,2 prompting Abayon to file the present petition for
special civil action of certiorari.
In G.R. 189506, petitioner Jovito S. Palparan, Jr. is the first nominee of the Bantay
party-list group that won a seat in the 2007 elections for the members of the House
of Representatives. Respondents Reynaldo Lesaca, Jr., Cristina Palabay, Renato
M. Reyes, Jr., Erlinda Cadapan, Antonio Flores, and Joselito Ustarez are members
of some other party-list groups.
Shortly after the elections, respondent Lesaca and the others with him filed with
respondent HRET a petition for quo warranto against Bantay and its nominee,
petitioner Palparan, in HRET Case 07-040. Lesaca and the others alleged that
Palparan was ineligible to sit in the House of Representatives as party-list nominee
because he did not belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors that
Bantay represented, namely, the victims of communist rebels, Civilian Armed
Forces Geographical Units (CAFGUs), former rebels, and security guards. Lesaca
and the others said that Palparan committed gross human rights violations against
marginalized and underrepresented sectors and organizations.
Petitioner Palparan countered that the HRET had no jurisdiction over his person
since it was actually the party-list Bantay, not he, that was elected to and assumed
membership in the House of Representatives. Palparan claimed that he was just
Bantay’s nominee. Consequently, any question involving his eligibility as first
nominee was an internal concern of Bantay. Such question must be brought, he
said, before that party-list group, not before the HRET.
On July 23, 2009 respondent HRET issued an order dismissing the petition against
Bantay for the reason that the issue of the ineligibility or qualification of the party-
list group fell within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC pursuant to the Party-List
System Act. HRET, however, defended its jurisdiction over the question of
petitioner Palparan’s qualifications.3 Palparan moved for reconsideration but the
HRET denied it by a resolution dated September 10, 2009,4 hence, the recourse to
this Court through this petition for special civil action of certiorari and prohibition.
Since the two cases raise a common issue, the Court has caused their
consolidation.
The Issue Presented
The common issue presented in these two cases is:
Whether or not respondent HRET has jurisdiction over the question of
qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan as nominees of Aangat Tayo and
Bantay party-list organizations, respectively, who took the seats at the House of
Representatives that such organizations won in the 2007 elections.
The Court’s Ruling
Petitioners Abayon and Palparan have a common theory: Republic Act (R.A.)
7941, the Party-List System Act, vests in the COMELEC the authority to determine
which parties or organizations have the qualifications to seek party-list seats in the
House of Representatives during the elections. Indeed, the HRET dismissed the
petitions for quo warranto filed with it insofar as they sought the disqualifications of
Aangat Tayo and Bantay. Since petitioners Abayon and Palparan were not elected
into office but were chosen by their respective organizations under their internal
rules, the HRET has no jurisdiction to inquire into and adjudicate their
qualifications as nominees.
If at all, says petitioner Abayon, such authority belongs to the COMELEC which
already upheld her qualification as nominee of Aangat Tayo for the women sector.
For Palparan, Bantay’s personality is so inseparable and intertwined with his own
person as its nominee so that the HRET cannot dismiss the quo warranto action
against Bantay without dismissing the action against him.
But, although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the elections, it is
not the organization that sits as and becomes a member of the House of
Representatives. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution,5 identifies who the
"members" of that House are:
Sec. 5. (1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two
hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected
from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as
provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. (Underscoring supplied)
Clearly, the members of the House of Representatives are of two kinds: "members
x x x who shall be elected from legislative districts" and "those who x x x shall be
elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and
sectoral parties or organizations." This means that, from the Constitution’s point
of view, it is the party-list representatives who are "elected" into office, not their
parties or organizations. These representatives are elected, however, through that
peculiar party-list system that the Constitution authorized and that Congress by law
established where the voters cast their votes for the organizations or parties to
which such party-list representatives belong.
Once elected, both the district representatives and the party-list representatives
are treated in like manner. They have the same deliberative rights, salaries, and
emoluments. They can participate in the making of laws that will directly benefit
their legislative districts or sectors. They are also subject to the same term
limitation of three years for a maximum of three consecutive terms.
It may not be amiss to point out that the Party-List System Act itself recognizes
party-list nominees as "members of the House of Representatives," thus:
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State shall promote proportional representation
in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-
list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or
coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to the marginalized
and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-
defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and
enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole,
to become members of the House of Representatives. Towards this end, the State
shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain
the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the
House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win
seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible.
(Underscoring supplied)
As this Court also held in Bantay Republic Act or BA-RA 7941 v. Commission on
Elections,6 a party-list representative is in every sense "an elected member of the
House of Representatives." Although the vote cast in a party-list election is a vote
for a party, such vote, in the end, would be a vote for its nominees, who, in
appropriate cases, would eventually sit in the House of Representatives.
Both the Constitution and the Party-List System Act set the qualifications and
grounds for disqualification of party-list nominees. Section 9 of R.A. 7941, echoing
the Constitution, states:
Sec. 9. Qualification of Party-List Nominees. – No person shall be nominated
as party-list representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of
not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election, able
to read and write, bona fide member of the party or organization which he
seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the
election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the
election.1avvphi1
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25)
but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election. Any
youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his
term shall be allowed to continue until the expiration of his term.
In the cases before the Court, those who challenged the qualifications of
petitioners Abayon and Palparan claim that the two do not belong to the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors that they ought to represent. The
Party-List System Act provides that a nominee must be a "bona fide member of the
party or organization which he seeks to represent."7
It is for the HRET to interpret the meaning of this particular qualification of a
nominee—the need for him or her to be a bona fide member or a representative of
his party-list organization—in the context of the facts that characterize petitioners
Abayon and Palparan’s relation to Aangat Tayo and Bantay, respectively, and the
marginalized and underrepresented interests that they presumably embody.
Petitioners Abayon and Palparan of course point out that the authority to determine
the qualifications of a party-list nominee belongs to the party or organization that
nominated him. This is true, initially. The right to examine the fitness of aspiring
nominees and, eventually, to choose five from among them after all belongs to the
party or organization that nominates them.8 But where an allegation is made that
the party or organization had chosen and allowed a disqualified nominee to
become its party-list representative in the lower House and enjoy the secured
tenure that goes with the position, the resolution of the dispute is taken out of its
hand.

Parenthetically, although the Party-List System Act does not so state, the
COMELEC seems to believe, when it resolved the challenge to petitioner Abayon,
that it has the power to do so as an incident of its authority to approve the
registration of party-list organizations. But the Court need not resolve this question
since it is not raised here and has not been argued by the parties.

What is inevitable is that Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution9 provides that the
HRET shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to, among other things, the
qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives. Since, as pointed
out above, party-list nominees are "elected members" of the House of
Representatives no less than the district representatives are, the HRET has
jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their qualifications. By analogy with the cases of
district representatives, once the party or organization of the party-list nominee has
been proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath and assumed office as
member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over
election contests relating to his qualifications ends and the HRET’s own jurisdiction
begins.10

The Court holds that respondent HRET did not gravely abuse its discretion when it
dismissed the petitions for quo warranto against Aangat Tayo party-list and Bantay
party-list but upheld its jurisdiction over the question of the qualifications of
petitioners Abayon and Palparan.

WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the consolidated petitions and AFFIRMS

the Order dated July 16, 2009 and Resolution 09-183 dated September 17, 2009
in HRET Case 07-041 of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal as well
as its Order dated July 23, 2009 and Resolution 09-178 dated September 10, 2009
in HRET Case 07-040.

SO ORDERED.