VETERANS FEDERATION PARTY v. COMELEC, GR No.

136781, 2000-10-06
Facts:
On
1998, the first election for party-list representation was held simultaneously with the national
elections. A total of one hundred twenty-three (123) parties, organizations and coalitions
participated.
the Comelec en banc proclaimed thirteen (13)... party-list representatives from twelve (12)
parties and organizations, which had obtained at least two percent of the total number of
votes cast for the party-list system.
. Two of the proclaimed representatives belonged to Petitioner APEC
PAG-ASA (People's Progressive Alliance for Peace and Good Government Towards
Alleviation of Poverty and Social Advancement) filed with the Comelec a "Petition to
Proclaim [the] Full Number of Party-List Representatives provided by the Constitution." It
alleged... that the filling up of the twenty percent membership of party-list representatives in
the House of Representatives, as provided under the Constitution, was mandatory.
. It further claimed that the literal application of the two percent vote requirement and the
three-seat limit... under RA 7941 would defeat this constitutional provision, for only 25
nominees would be declared winners, short of the 52 party-list representatives who should
actually sit in the House.
Comelec Second Division... granting PAG-ASA's Petition. It also ordered the proclamation
of herein 38 respondents who, in addition to the 14 already sitting, would thus total 52 party-
list representatives.
In allocating the 52 seats, it disregarded the two percent-vote... requirement prescribed
under Section 11 (b) of RA 7941. Instead, it identified three "elements of the party-list
system," which should supposedly determine "how the 52 seats should be filled up." First,
"the system was conceived to enable the marginalized sectors of the
Philippine society to be represented in the House of Representatives." Second, "the system
should represent the broadest sectors of the Philippine society." Third, "it should encourage
[the] multi-party system."
The twelve (12) parties and organizations, which had earlier been proclaimed winners on
the basis of having obtained at least two percent of the votes cast for the party-list system,
objected to the proclamation of the 38 parties and filed separate Motions for
Reconsideration.
They contended that (1) under Section 11 (b) of RA 7941, only parties, organizations or
coalitions garnering at least two percent of the votes for the party-list system were entitled
to seats in the House of Representatives; and (2) additional seats, not exceeding two for
each,... should be allocated to those which had garnered the two percent threshold in
proportion to the number of votes cast for the winning parties, as provided by said Section
11.
Issues:
7941
Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives mentioned in Section 5 (2),
Article VI of the Constitution, mandatory or is it merely a ceiling? In other words, should the
twenty percent allocation for party-list solons be filled up completely and all the... time?
Are the two percent threshold requirement and the three-seat limit provided in Section 11
(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
Whether the Twenty Percent Constitutional Allocation Is Mandatory
The Statutory Requirement and Limitation
Method of Allocating Additional Seats
Ruling:
Court agrees with petitioners that the assailed Resolutions should be nullified, but disagrees
that they should all be granted additional seats.
We rule that a simple reading of Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, easily conveys the
equally simple message that Congress was vested with the broad power to define and
prescribe the mechanics of the party-list system of representation. The Constitution
explicitly sets... down only the percentage of the total membership in the House of
Representatives reserved for party-list representatives.
In the exercise of its constitutional prerogative, Congress enacted RA 7941. As said earlier,
Congress declared therein a policy to promote "proportional representation" in the election
of party-list representatives in order to enable Filipinos belonging to the marginalized and...
underrepresented sectors to contribute legislation that would benefit them. It however
deemed it necessary to require parties, organizations and coalitions participating in the
system to obtain at least two percent of the total votes cast for the party-list system in order
to be... entitled to a party-list seat. Those garnering more than this percentage could have
"additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes." Furthermore, no winning party,
organization or coalition can have more than three seats in the House of Representatives.
Thus the... relevant portion of Section 11(b) of the law provides:
"(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total
votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each; Provided, That those
garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to... additional seats in
proportion to their total number of votes; Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or
coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats."
Considering the foregoing statutory requirements, it will be shown presently that Section 5
(2), Article VI of the Constitution is not mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for party-list
seats in Congress.
The two percent threshold is consistent not only with the intent of the framers of the
Constitution and the law, but with the very essence of "representation." Under a republican
or representative state, all government authority emanates from the people, but is exercised
by... representatives chosen by them.
But to have meaningful representation, the elected persons must have the mandate of a
sufficient number of people. Otherwise, in a legislature that features the party-list system,
the result might be the proliferation of... small groups which are incapable of contributing
significant legislation, and which might even pose a threat to the stability of Congress. Thus,
even legislative districts are apportioned according to "the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and... progressive ratio"[22] to ensure meaningful
local representation.
All in all, we hold that the statutory provision on this two percent requirement is precise and
crystalline. When the law is clear, the function of courts is simple application, not
interpretation or circumvention.
Consistent with the Constitutional Commission's pronouncements, Congress set the seat-
limit to three (3) for each qualified party, organization or coalition. "Qualified" means having
hurdled the two percent vote threshold. Such three-seat limit ensures the entry of various...
interest-representations into the legislature; thus, no single group, no matter how large its
membership, would dominate the party-list seats, if not the entire House.
After careful deliberation, we now explain such formula, step by step.
Step One. There is no dispute among the petitioners, the public and the private
respondents, as well as the members of this Court, that the initial step is to rank all the
participating parties, organizations and coalitions from the highest to the lowest based on
the... number of votes they each received. Then the ratio for each party is computed by
dividing its votes by the total votes cast for all the parties participating in the system. All
parties with at least two percent of the total votes are guaranteed one seat each. Only these
parties... shall be considered in the computation of additional seats. The party receiving the
highest number of votes shall thenceforth be referred to as the "first" party.
Step Two. The next step is to determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to, in
order to be able to compute that for the other parties. Since the distribution is based on
proportional representation, the number of seats to be allotted to the other parties... cannot
possibly exceed that to which the first party is entitled by virtue of its obtaining the most
number of votes.
For example, the first party received 1,000,000 votes and is determined to be entitled to two
additional seats. Another qualified party which received 500,000 votes cannot be entitled to
the same number of seats, since it garnered only fifty percent of the votes won by... the first
party. Depending on the proportion of its votes relative to that of the first party whose
number of seats has already been predetermined, the second party should be given less
than that to which the first one is entitled.
The other qualified parties will always be allotted less additional seats than the first party for
two reasons: (1) the ratio between said parties and the first party will always be less than
1:1, and (2) the formula does not admit of mathematical rounding off, because there is... no
such thing as a fraction of a seat. Verily, an arbitrary rounding off could result in a violation
of the twenty percent allocation. An academic mathematical demonstration of such incipient
violation is not necessary because the present set of facts, given the number of... qualified
parties and the voting percentages obtained, will definitely not end up in such constitutional
contravention.
Principles:
The Legal and Logical Formula for the Philippines
In crafting a legally defensible and logical solution to determine the number of additional
seats that a qualified party is entitled to, we... need to review the parameters of the Filipino
party-list system.
they are as follows:
First, the twenty percent allocation - the combined number of all party-list congressmen
shall not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the House of Representatives,
including those elected under the party list.
Second, the two percent threshold - only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent
of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are "qualified" to have a seat in the
House of Representatives;
Third, the three-seat limit - each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually
obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one "qualifying" and two additional
seats.
Fourth, proportional representation - the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to
shall be computed "in proportion to their total number of votes."

ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY v. COMELEC, GR No. 147589, 2001-06-26

Facts:
With the onset of the 2001 elections, the Comelec received several Petitions for registration
filed by sectoral parties, organizations and political parties.
Akbayan Citizens Action Party filed before the Comelec a Petition praying that "the names
of [some of herein respondents] be deleted from the 'Certified List of Political
Parties/Sectoral Parties/Organizations/Coalitions Participating in the Party List System... for
the May 14, 2001 Elections' and that said certified list be accordingly amended." It also
asked, as an alternative, that the votes cast for the said respondents not be counted or
canvassed, and that the latter's nominees not be proclaimed.
Bayan Muna and Bayan Muna-Youth also filed a Petition for Cancellation of Registration
and Nomination against some of herein respondents.
ng Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party filed a Petition... before this Court... assailed Comelec
Omnibus Resolution No. 3785.
Issues:
Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list elections.
Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to 'marginalized and underrepresented'
sectors and organizations.
Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Omnibus
Resolution No. 3785."
Participation of Political Parties
Grave Abuse of Discretion
Ruling:
The party-list system is a social justice tool designed not only to give more law to the great
masses of our people who have less in life, but also to enable them to become veritable
lawmakers themselves, empowered to participate directly in the enactment of... laws
designed to benefit them. It intends to make the marginalized and the underrepresented not
merely passive recipients of the State's benevolence, but active participants in the
mainstream of representative democracy. Thus, allowing all individuals and groups,
including those... which now dominate district elections, to have the same opportunity to
participate in party-list elections would desecrate this lofty objective and mongrelize the
social justice mechanism into an atrocious veneer for traditional politics.
We now rule on this issue. Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot
be disqualified from the party-list elections, merely on the ground that they are political
parties.
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides that members of the House of
Representatives may "be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional,
and sectoral parties or organizations."
Furthermore, under Sections 7 and 8, Article IX (C) of the Constitution, political parties may
be registered under the party-list system.
Commissioner Monsod stated that the purpose of the party-list provision was to open up the
system, in order to give a chance to parties that consistently place third or fourth in
congressional district elections to win a seat in Congress.
The linchpin of this case is the clear and plain policy of the law: "to enable Filipino citizens
belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and
who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation
and... enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become
members of the House of Representatives."
Crucial to the resolution of this case is the fundamental social justice principle that those
who have less in life should have more in law. The party-list system is one such tool
intended to benefit those who have less in life. It gives the great masses of our people
genuine... hope and genuine power. It is a message to the destitute and the prejudiced, and
even to those in the underground, that change is possible. It is an invitation for them to
come out of their limbo and seize the opportunity.

Case Digest: Banat v Comelec, GR 179271 (2009)

FACTS:  Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) filed before the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a petition to proclaim the full number of party list representatives
provided by the Constitution. However,  the recommendation of the head of the legal group of
COMELEC’s national board of canvassers to declare the petition moot and academic was approved by
the COMELEC en banc, and declared further in a resolution that the winning party list will be resolved
using the Veterans ruling. BANAT then filed a petition before the SC assailing said resolution of the
COMELEC. 
ISSUE:  (1) Is the 20% allocation for party-list representatives provided in Sec 5 (2), Art VI of the
Constitution mandatory or is it merely a ceiling?   (2)Is the 2% threshold and “qualifier” votes prescribed
by the same Sec 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional.

DECISION:  Dismissed 

RATIO DECIDENDI:  1) Neither the Constitution nor RA 7941 mandates the filling up of the entire 20%
allocation of party-list representatives found in the Constitution. The Constitution, in paragraph 1, Sec 5
of Art VI, left the determination of the number of the members of the House of Representatives to
Congress. The 20% allocation of party-list representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list representatives
cannot be more then 20% of the members of the House of Representatives. (2) No. We rule that, in
computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the two percent threshold for
the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Sec 11(b) of RA 7941 is
unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible to
achieve the maximum number of available party-list seats when the available party-list seat exceeds 50.
The continued operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution of the additional seats
frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the House of
Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives.We therefore strike down the two percent
threshold only in relation to the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Sec
11 (b) of RA 7941. The two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full
implementation of Sec 5 (2), Art VI of the Constitution and prevents the  attainment of “the  -broadest
possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the  House of Representatives.”   (3) No.
Neither the Constitution nor RA 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in the party-list
system. On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major political parties to
participate in party-list elections through their sectoral wings. However, by vote of 8-7, the Court
decided to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing major political parties from participating in the
party-list elections, directly or indirectly.  

[CASE DIGEST] Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. COMELEC (G.R. No.

203766)
April 2, 2013 | G.R. No. 203766

Atong Paglaum, Inc. and 51 other disqualified party list groups, petitioners
COMELEC, respondent

FACTS: 

In line with the then upcoming national elections in May 2013, approximately 280 groups and
organizations manifested their desire to participate in the party-list elections. However, 52 of these
groups were subsequently disqualified by COMELEC, including some that were duly registered and
accredited as political parties. The reasons for their exclusion were based on the contention that said
groups failed to establish they were representatives of marginalized and underrepresented sectors and
that their nominees were indeed members of the sectors they were seeking to represent. 

ISSUE: 
Whether or not COMELEC erred in disqualifying 52 party list groups from participating in the May 2013
elections. 

HELD:

No, what COMELEC did was merely follow existing jurisprudence set forth by the SC in its earlier
rulings. So for purposes of setting uniform standards and understanding of the party-list system in the
Philippines, the Court provides a lengthy account of the history and dynamics of the party-list system
as embodied in the 1987 Constitution and as envisioned by the Framers, and institutes new guidelines
to be used in resolving issues of similar nature in the future. 

Q: Where can the party-list system be found in the 1987 Constitution? 

A: Section 5, Art. VI; Sections 7 and 8, Art. IX-C

Q: What is the rationale behind the party-list system?

A: To democratize political power by giving political parties that cannot win in legislative district
elections a chance to win seats in the House of Representatives.

Q: Is the party-list system synonymous with sectoral representation?

A: No. Under the party-list system, all voters get to have two votes: one for their choice of legislative
district representative, and another for their choice of party-list representative. But under sectoral
representation, majority of the electorate will only have one vote, which is for their choice of
legislative district representative. In contrast, members of sectoral communities (e.g. farmers,
laborers, indigenous cultural communitoes, etc.) will have two votes: one for their district
representative and another for their choice of sectoral representative. In other words, sectoral
representation is discriminatory.

Q: Is the party-list system exclusive to sectoral parties?

A: No. The party-list system is open to both sectoral and non-sectoral groups. The framers intended
sectoral groups to constitute a part, but not the entirety, of the party-list system.

Q: Who can participate in party-list elections?

A: As per Section 5(1) of Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution, any of the following can take part in party-
list elections: national parties and organizations, regional parties and organizations, and sectoral
parties and organizations.  

Q: What is the enabling law of the party-list system?

A: RA No. 7941, or the Party-List System Act.

Q: Do party-list groups need to represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors?

A: No. Art. 6 of RA No. 7941 identifies six grounds for disqualification of a party-list group, and none of
these grounds touches on the failure of a party to represent the marginalized and underrepresented.
For non-sectoral groups, it is enough that its members are united in their cause or ideology. But for
sectoral groups, a majority of their members must come from marginalized and underrepresented
sectors.

Q: What are the marginalized and underrepresented sectors?

A: Section 5 of RA No. 7941 lists the following as marginalized and underrepresented sectors: labor,
peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas
workers, and other similar sectors. 

Case Digest: Abayon vs HRET

ISSUE:  Whether or not respondent HRET has jurisdiction over the question of qualifications of
petitioners Abayon and Palparan. 

FACTS:  petitioner Daryl Grace J. Abayon is the first nominee of the Aangat Tayo party-list organization
that won a seat in the House of Representatives during the 2007 elections. Respondents filed a petition
for quo warranto with respondent HRET against petitioner Abayon. They claimed that Aangat Tayo was
not eligible for a party-list seat in the House of Representatives, since it did not represent the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors since she did not belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, she being the wife of an incumbent congressional district representative. It
was Aangat Tayo that was taking a seat in the House of Representatives, and not Abayon who was just
its nominee. All questions involving her eligibility as first nominee, said Abayon, were internal concerns
of Aangat Tayo. 

RATIO DECIDENDI:  although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the elections, it is not the
organization that sits as and becomes a member of the House of Representatives. Section 5, Article VI of
the Constitution,5 identifies who the “members” of that House are: Sec. 5. (1). The House of
Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise
fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and
the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the
basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a
partylist system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. (Underscoring
supplied) Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution9 provides that the HRET shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to, among other things, the qualifications of the members of the House of
Representatives. Since, as pointed out above, party-list nominees are “elected members” of the House
of Representatives no less than the district representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and
pass upon their qualifications. By analogy with the cases of district representatives, once the party or
organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath and
assumed office as member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election
contests relating to his qualifications ends and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins.10 The Court holds
that respondent HRET did not gravely abuse its discretion when it dismissed the petitions for quo
warranto against Aangat Tayo party-list and Bantay party-list but upheld its jurisdiction over the
question of the qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan.