An Arctic foreign policy for Canada by Gerald Graham After years of neglect, Canada may be on the verge of having an Arctic policy — of at least an Arctic foreign policy. A numberof recent developments have increasingly four attention to the polar region. There was the it ofthe United States ship the Polar Sea through the Northwest Passage. and the loss of European markets for northern seal produets. In June 1986 there was the Report of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and of the House of Commons on Canada’s International Relations entitled Independence and Incernationalism (better known as the Hockin-Simard Report, after the joint chairmen). ‘This was followed in December by the governments reply ‘entitled Canada's International Relations: Response ofthe Government. The parliamentary study emphasized the need fora thorough review of how we regard the Areti, in both its domestic and international dimensions, Domestic and foreign Arctic policy ‘The Parliamentary report cited the need for a ‘co- hherent Arctic policy.” Unfortunately, this country stil does ‘not have one. Not since Jean Chretien’ 1972 pronounce: ‘ment placing people and the environment ahead of eco- ‘nomic development has there been any serious attempt on the part of the government to develop an Arctic policy. Instead, what we have is series of often unrelated and sometimes confiting policies dealing with such important matters as sovereignty, economic development, land claims and protection ofthe environment. ‘The government has, to its credit taken a number of steps on the sovereignty issue. In September 1985 the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark, an- nounced « number of measures intended to buttress our claimsto the North. These included the drawing of straight baselines around the Arctic archipelago, an enhanced mil- tary presence, and plans to build an Arctic Class 8 ieebreaker Still our approach to both northern and citcumpolar affairs has been a patchwork one over the years. The present government has until now shown little interest in developing a domestic Arctic policy. In responding to the Hockin-Simard Report it has, however, recognized the reed for such a policy, and for achieving consistency be- tween foreign and domestic polices in the polar region, Still. the absence ofa coherent domestic Arctic poly has not deterted the government from unveiling what it consi- ders to be the basis for an integrated and comprehensive northern foreign policy Time for coherence Turn up the northern lights ‘The government, we are told, intends to attach higher priority o the northern dimension of Canada’s fo cign relations. Henceforth, northern foreign policy is t0 have four dominant themes: 1. butressng sovereignty over Arctic waters 2. modernizing northern defences 3. preparing for commercial use of the Northwest Passage; and 4 expanding cumpolar relations. ‘The government notes the interrelated nature ofthese themes, and the fact hat they provide essential balance and Support one another. Let us brety examine each ofthese themes in tara Sovereignty Implementation of Mr, Clarks September 185 action plan continues. Talks withthe United States concerning the featus of the Northwest Passage, which Canada considers internal waters but which the Uaited States considers an international strat, ae in progres, Plans are proceeding for construction ofan Aree Class 8 icebreatcr The Ginadian Offshore Application Act has been introduced intg Parliament. More importantly, we are informed that “additional sovercigny enhancing measures are being de- veloped.” Finally, the Key role of Canada’ Inu in Ur northern presence, including the historical development of ‘our Arce aims, is recognized, Their interests in north mn foreign policy are to be fll taken into account, How ‘ve, this falls short of ncuding them inthe formulation of foreign policy something they have sought inthe area of cmvironmentai agreements or instance Defence Since 1985 Canadian airborne patrols in the Arctic, as well as naval activity in the eastern Arctic, have been increased. This growing militarization includes installation of the North Warning System, upgrading of northern ait- fields to handle fighter aircraft, and the renewal of the Gerald Graham is an Ottawa-based consultant Specializing in international affairs. His clients have Included the Government of Canada, the United Nations ‘and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.Time for coherence NORAD Agreement. The acquisition of new submarines is also being explored “The government notes the growing strategic impor- tance ofthe entire Arctic region, which in its opinion polls, makes demilitarization “extremely unlikely” for the time being. Having said this, the government will strive to limit “excessive” militarization ofthe Arctic. Commercial use of the Northwest Passage ‘Canada intends to encourage international shipping through the Northwest Passage, which the goverament considers to be a Canadian waterway subject to Canadian Jaws, Pollution prevention measures will be intended t0 facilitate rather than impede navigation. The sovereignty clement in controlling shipping through the Passage is clearly and forcefully expressed in the government’ e= sponse to the Joint Committee Circumpolar cooperation Currently Canada has limited cooperation with the United States in the Arctic. There is a 1984 protocol on ‘Canada-USSR cooperation in Arctic sciences, plus a Ma rine Environmental Cooperation Agreement with Den ‘mark. Me. Clark’ response to the Hockin-Simard Report indicates that further cooperation will only be. pursued if resources become availabe. This country will, however, be appointing an honorary consul in Nuuk, the capital of Greenland. It is also considering sending high level delega- tions to Nordic countries, and organizing symposiums t0 ‘consider Arctic issues Lastly, the government acknowledges that the Inuit Circumpolar Conference (ICC), an international non-gow~ ‘emmental organization linking Inuit from Canada, the United States and Denmark, has an important role to play in crcumpolar relations. In the past the government has, displayed a lukewarm attitude to the ICC, whose resolu tions are often at variance with government policy. HOCKIN-SIMARD RECOMMENDATIONS AND GOVERNMENT RESPONSE ‘The Special Joint Committee made a total of nine specific recommendations relating 10 Canada's Arctic for- eign policy. Each of these recommendations, along with the governments response, wil be briefly examined 1. Development of an Arctic foreign policy “The government accepts the need for such a policy and, as mentioned above, has outlined the four basic themes which are to constitute it. 2. Land claims setlement and development of renewable “The necssiy of achicving settlement of and claims in the North with the Dene and Metis of the Mackencie Naley andthe Init ofthe eastern Arc, tecogized by the government The governments new land aims pois, Snnounced in December 1986, could pave the wy for Sctling northern lame. The claim ofthe Invi of the este Arctic was sted in 984 ‘On he question of renewable resources, however the government appears to reject the Commie’ eal for Strenuous eifors ro resis campaigns spun ur products, 12 International Peapectives Marc Apel 987 preferring instead to support the efforts of private groups Such as Indigenous Survival International in this area. The seal controversy is cited as an example of government ineffectiveness. The Department of External Affairshas in the past been criticized forthe collapse of the seal market ‘and for filing to defend vigorously in Europe the sealing industry. 53, Funding of the Canada-USSR exchange program ‘The Committee recommended, and the government accepted, that this Arctic program's funding be strengthened. 4, Development of circumpolar cooperation ‘The Committee recommended a concerted program to develop cooperative arrangements with all northern states, For its part, the government promised to explore ‘ways to expand both bilateral and multilateral relations through visits, bilateral discussions and formal agreements 'S. Development of relations with Greenland ‘The government accepts the Committee's recommen: dation that Canada pay particular attention to developing good relations with Greenland, where Home Rule is now ineffect. Given the decision to reduce our representation abroad, which included closing the Embassy in Helsinki, Mr Clark could hardly embrace the Committee's call for the establishment of a Consulate in Nuuk, the principal ‘community in Greenland, 6, Acceptance of Canada's claim to the Northwest Passage ‘The government sidesteps the Committee’ call for renewed efforts to secure the agreement of the United States to this country’s claim that the Passage is internal ‘waters rather than an international strat. We are merely informed that since September 1985 discussions “have been sunderway.”| 7, Submission of the Passage dispute to the International Court of Justice “The Committce suggests that inspite ofthe absence of ‘an agreement concerning navigation through the North- ‘west Passage, the government should nonetheless wait be- fore going to the Worid Court. The government is of the view that to comment on alternatives to negotiation Would bbe premature 8. Equipping the Canadian Navy with diesel electric submarines The government appears to accept the Committee’. suggestion fort to consider the possibilty of equipping the [Navy with such submarines, which are expected t0 be capable of operating under the Aretic ice. 9. Demiltarization ofthe Arctic region ‘The government politely rejects the Committee's con- troversial recommendation that Canada, along with her polar neighbors, seek the demiltarization of the Arctic region on the grounds that it “does not seem practicable,” since the Soviet Union is unlikely to cooperate, No men tion is made of the willingness of the United States to cooperate,EVALUATING REPORT AND RESPONSE ‘The Special Joint Committee was undoubtedly correct in citing the overall need for an Arctic and circumpolar policy Forits part, the government has chosen to outhine a ircumpolar policy even though wehave no coherent Arctic Policy on which to base i. In spite of this limitation, the ‘choice ofthe four themes mentioned above — sovercignty, defence, use of the Passage and circumpolar cooperation sa sensible one. On the whole these themes appear to bbe mutually compatible and self-reinforcing. There is hhowever. no indication as to whether these themes are isted in order of prion ‘The Committees suggested “wait and see’ approach to adjudication of the Northwest Passage dispute with the United States is also sensible, particulary since commer: cial transit of the Passage cannot now be expected before the late 1990s, given the energy situation, It is not clear however, how’ the Canadian government would react t0 another attempt of transit by @ US Coast Guard icebreaker, ‘The passage by the Polar Sea was a direct challenge to Canadian sovereignty, thus it may be in Canada’ interest to secure American agreement to our claims in exchange for agreeing to transit. Whether the United States, with ts alobal security interests, would find this palatable solu: tion is another matter. ‘The call by the Committee forthe promotion of north- em renewable resource developments enlightened. Given the finite nature of non-renewable resources, sagging mar- ets and high northern exploration and development costs, the renewable sector may be the only economic hope for 3 viable North inthe long term. Thus, one ean only regret, Mr. Clatk’s shortsighted response to the Committee’ recommendation Greenland retatons “The Commitee pons out the growin ned for good relation with Greenland. Quite aside from our ishing and ning iar with this autonomous part of Denmark, the area one of strategie importance Ovrtres hans Blready been made by East Bloc counties to curry favor with Greenland’ Home Rule gseroment and an ICC resolution called forthe removal ofthe US base a Tule "The Commitee didnot comment onthe question of whether bulling an expensive Aric Clase 8 sbreaker ‘asa good iden, Opinion vided on this Sour and the Commie fel tacked the experi to make a recom smendaton. might wel ave erie fom commenting Gn another more comple hse the demlitarzation of the Aree. On thie topic the Commitee. thinking was tmudaled st best anghis Conuson Ts reflected ins ‘reommentaton iting propose that the Arctic Osean be declared nucleases sone the Commitee dealt withthe question Gf whether an Aniartetypetepme shoul be promoted for the Arcic region, 1 corredy pointed Ou thatthe ‘seopolal station inthe two feglons was completly Siterent Unfortunatly arrived at thisconchsion forall the wrong reasons. To Ge but one example the Report, mistakenly ssers that Antarctica belongs to no county ‘Theres act the very real seven courte fave nly been "osen ance 1959) The Commitee appets to reject the notion Ota musleer-(re zone delaratton or Time for coherence the Arctic, on the grounds that the support of the two superpowers would be required. Having sald ths, however. it goes on to recommend the “demiltarization” of the ‘Arctic region. At fist blush this would appear to go further than @ nuclear-free zone declaration. If this interpretation correct, one wonders how this recommendation is meant to relate (o the Committee’ earlier cal for a heightened Canadian defence presence in the Arctic. “Mr. Clark’ response to the Committee indicates that more sovereignty gestures ate in the cards. After the Mush ‘of moves announced in September 1985, it wil be interest- ing to see what the government has in mind, Tt may be contemplating the creation of a 200-mile exclusive eco ‘nomic zone off all our coasts. Notably lacking in both the Committee Report and the governments response to itis any mention of the Diapor maritime boundary dispute with the United States inthe oil and gas-rich Beaufort Sea. This could heat up in 1987, Neglected environment Pethaps the most overlooked area of Canadas nascent etic foreign policy isthe environment. Protection ofthe vironment was undoubtedly dominant Arctic concen ‘Tring the 1970s, starting withthe pasing of the Arche ‘Waters Potluion Prevention Act {AWPPA) in 197), and followed by Me Chretien aforementioned statement in 1972 and the Berger Commission report onthe Mackenzie Valley pipeline in the mid-eventes Inthe eighties, how exer, the northern economy has assumed greater prion. As the Beaufort Environment Assessment Panel (BEAB) indieated, smal sale development projects are acceptable inthe North, subject to stringent envionmental controls ‘With acceptance of the “ce-covered area clause inthe Law ofthe Sea Treaty, Canada ls no longer as concerned aout threats to her environmental security vindication internationally ofthe AWPPA has led the government withdraw its exception to the World Courts jurisdiction in matters of Arctic marine pollution. Nevertheless, a8 dis. Eussed below theresa hot of ntemstional environmental problems outstandingin the Arctic, problems that have not Been felccted in ether the Comanitiees Report or the government’ response toit Protection ofthe environment does not gure among the four themes tsted although it foes appear as one ofthe eight heading for cieumpolar ‘cooperation. ‘SCOPE FOR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ‘One of the more encouraging aspects ofthe govern- ment’s response 10 the Hockin-Simard Report is the announcement that it intends to explore ways to cooperate with all northern states in areas of mutual interest, There are some real possibilities for future bilateral and mul lateral cooperation in trade, security, native people, en- vironment, economic development, education, health, and science and technology, even though to date there has been relatively litle multilateral cooperation ofa formal nature in the Arctic. One exception is the 1974 Polar Bear Con- vention. Informal cooperation occurs within the ICC andTime for coherence the Comité Arctique, a Monaco-based non-governmental ‘organization which promotes Arctie science. There is little Tikelihood of an Antarctic-style regime for the Arctic until such time as the strategic importance of the region sub- sides. Nevertheless, there is a raft of eircumpolar matters which demand attention, both here and abroad. A non- ‘exhaustive lists shown in the chart Conclusion ‘As we move toward the 2st century, Canada is begin- ito take a number of steps inthe area of Arctic foreign policy. Not surprisingly, most of these initiatives have to do with protecting fundamental national interests, ie.. sov- ereignty and defence. Nevertheless. there is an indication that certain tentative steps willbe taken on other problems inthe region. One should not expect rapid progress in the “Arctic: the pace of developments in the region is relatively slow, and southern rather than northern concerns often predominate. East-West tensions also play an important part ‘Canada has much to learn from the experience of her polar neighbors, and much knowledge to impart as well ‘What this country lacks is forum to draw together the various people conce®ned with Arctic and circumpolar ‘matters — government, scientific and seademic communi ties, native groups and non-governmental organizations. ‘One can only hope thatthe Canadian polar institute prom- ‘Canada's circumpolar agenda ‘Subject tasve ‘Sale ol nore technology aoroad. ‘Cooperation wih NATO ales: possible ‘Semataraaton or itary feo one oem peccess: syst of so Soren Oe Ce hiratna we ‘Aes ran; Are haze. greenhouse eect ‘Petecton ofthe manne ernment Joint ventures in mining ane ot ana gas Vase ‘Socunty Provision of northern heath care sere, ‘Greabon fa Siete Commitee on Arce Research, on use ote lan. ised in September 1985 by the then Minister of Indian Alfairs and Northern Development, David Crombie. will ‘raw these various communities together into a united ‘Arctic effort. a