Lowy, Sader - The Militarization of The State in Latin America

The Militarization of the State in Latin America
Author(s): Michael Lowy, Eder Sader, Stephen Gorman

Source: Latin American Perspectives, Vol. 12, No. 4, State and Military in Latin America
(Autumn, 1985), pp. 7-40
Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2633892 .
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The Militarizationof the
State in Latin America
by
Michael Lowyand Eder Sader*
TranslatedbyStephenGorman
Military havebeena characteristic

dictatorships featureofLatin
America'spoliticalhistorysincethetimeof themilitarycaudillos
(Bolivar,San Martin,
O' Higgins,andothers)wholedtheprocessesof
nationalemancipation of the nineteenth
at the beginning century.
Since thatepoch,militarydictatorshavebeenone oftheresources
utilizedby the dominantclasses to imposeorderduringtimesof
crisis.
Afterindependence, military regimesconstituted the meansof
offtheremnants
finishing ofcolonialism.Latertheseregimes werethe
meansforrepressing the"plebeian"tendencies within theemancipa-
tionmovements thatthreatened the oligarchicsociety.Ultimately
theywerethemeansforimposing theformation ofnationalstatesin
thefaceoftheseparatist tendencies oftheoligarchy's mostbackward
Withestablishment
fractions. oftheneworder, thecaudillosgaveway
tomorestablepoliticalsystemsthatbetterrepresented theoligarchy
as a whole(Halpenrn Donghi,1969).
as theprimary
Inthiscentury, exporteconomiesofmanycountries
begantodisplaysymptoms ofprofound crisisandas thesocialstrug-
glesthatthisprovoked becamemoreviolent, militaryregimesbecame
an instrumentforsafeguarding establishedinterests.Itwas nolonger
a matterofimposing a neworderbutofdefending andmaintaining the
*Michael Lowy is Research Director at the Centre National de Recherche Scien-

tifique(CNRS-Paris) and Lecturer at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences
Sociales. Eder Sader is Lecturerin Sociology at the Universityof Sao Paulo. The
translationwas substantiallycompleted by the late Stephen Gorman,who taughtat
NorthTexas State Universityand who was the authorof several books on Peru and
Central America. It was thenfinishedby Robert Dash, who accepts fullresponsibil-
ityforany errors.This is an updated and expanded versionof an articlethatappeared
firstin Revue Jiers-Monde(Paris) in October-December 1976 and then appeared in
CuadertnosPoliticos (Mexico) in July-September1977.
LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES, Issue 47, Vol. 12 No. 4, Fall 19857-40

? 1985 Latin AmericanPerspectives
7
8 LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES
existingone,andtherefore military tyranniesbecamethenorminthe

mostbackward regions.Whentheprocessofurbanization provoked a
broadening ofthebasesofpoliticalpower,itwas oftenfrom theranks
of the militarythat the leaders of an antioligarchic movement
emerged,as withthetenientes(a civilian-military oppositionmove-
ment)ofBrazilinthe1920s,Marmaduke Grovein Chilein1932,and
JacoboArbenzin Guatemalain 1944.
By theendofWorldWarII thesechangeshadbeenconsolidated,
ingeneralduringthe1930s,andundertheimpactofthedemocratic
ideologythathad contributed to the victoryover the Nazis, the
number ofmilitarydictatorships haddiminished notably. The North
American EdwinLieuwin(1964a:8) countednomorethan
sociologist
seven governments out of twentyin the regionruledby military
officersin 1947.
Nevertheless, duringthelasttwenty yearsorso, therehasbeenan
unprecedented multiplication of militaryregimes,a progressive
elimination of"representative democracies," anda massiveinflux of
members oftheofficer corpsintothepoliticalarena.Together with
countries frequentlygoverned bytheirmilitaries (suchas Boliviaand
the CentralAmericanrepublics),some nationswithlongcivilian
traditionshavebeenaffected as well.Brazil,inwhosehistory there
had neverbeena military regimeinthestrictsenseoftheterm(the
Estado Novo of GetulioVargas,1937-1945, was nota military dic-
tatorship,properly speaking)has nowbeengovernedbyitsmilitary
formorethantwenty years;andChileandUruguay, withdemocratic
parliamentary traditionsofa Europeantype(orofa Europeaninclina-
tion),also foundthemselves subjectedto militarized power.
Militarypowercan be definedas a formof statein whichthe
military hierarchy(thehighestandintermediate levelsoftheofficer
corps)occupiesthecentralpositions inthepoliticalrealm-thatis, it
controls theessentialgovernment postsandthetopoffices withinthe
stateapparatus(ministries, directorships oflargestateenterprises,
andkeyadministrative positions).Giventhisdefinition, itcanbe said
thattheoverwhelming majority of thepopulationof thecontinent
livestodayundera military regime.
Whatpreciselyis meantby themilitarization of thestate,or the
politicizationofthearmy?According to Lieuwin,we mustdisabuse
ourselvesofthemyththatthearmedforcesinLatinAmericaconsti-
tutean essentiallymilitaryinstitution: " Thatthisis an errorbecomes
evidentwhenwe examineitsrealfunctions. Therearetwo-and only
two-legal militaryfunctionsfor an armedforcesorganization,
Lowy,Sader / MILITARIZATION OF THE STATE 9
namely,to defendthenationfromexternalaggressionandto defend

thegovernment bypreservinginternal
order"(Lieuwin,1964b:95).
Butaccording toLieuwin,theLatinAmerican armedforcesconfront
no externalenemiesand,ratherthandefending constitutional
gov-
ernments, have tendedwithconsiderablefrequency to overthrow
them.Fromour perspective, however,thisdistinction
is notvery
meaningful:Defendinga governmentandoverthrowing one areboth
political acts. It is impossibleto call the intervention
of the armyto
defenda "constitutional" government apoliticaland purelymilitary
whenitis repressive (e.g.,theeventsofTlatelolcoinMexicoin1968)
or when it occurs duringa democraticuprising(e.g., the "con-
stitutionalist"insurrection intheDominicanRepublicof1965).
The militarization ofthestateis notsimplythetransition fromthe
purelymilitary to thepolitical,but theoverwhelming of the state
apparatusas a wholebythearmedforces-inessencethe"coloniza-
tion"ofthemajority ofstateandstate-related structures(attheapex
ofthepyramid) by themilitary and thepartialor totalfusionofthe
repressive apparatuses withotherapparatuses ofthesystemofpoliti-
cal domination.
This militarization maybe open and explicitbutmayalso take
moreindirect, " subterranean" forms inwhichthearmedforcesdo not
occupythe frontline in the politicalsense. They do not govern
directly,butexerciserathertightcontrolovertheformalholdersof
poweror increasingly occupystatestructures, as in theadministra-
tionofcertain"vital"regions, the"unlimited" extensionofmilitary
justice,andso forth. Suchhas beenthecase in Colombia.
Generally, military regimesand civiliandictatorships are desig-
natedby the conceptof "statesof exception."This terminology
seemsveryquestionable inthesensethatitimplicitly considersthe
"constitutionalist" state(formal) democratic orparliamentary, as the
norm,and themilitary stateas theexception.The history of Latin
Americafrom itsindependence untilthetwentieth century,andover-
all in thelasttwenty years(thisis also validforAsia, Africa,and
southern Europe)tendsto suggestthecontrary hypothesis: thatthe
normis thecivilianormilitary dictatorship,
theexceptiontherepre-
sentative andconstitutional regime.Somesocialscientists recognize
thisdifficultyandtrytoavoiditthrough useoftheconceptof" stateof
permanent exception,"butthisseemsto me a terminological con-
tradiction:iftheexception ispermanent, itceasestobe anexception.
Beyondthe terminological discrepancy, thereis a deeperprob-
lem here:thatthe exerciseof powerby the dominantclasses in
Latin America(and elsewhere)requirestheconstantand habitual

(not exceptional)utilizationof coercionas the principalformof
domination.
Gramsci(1975:165)definesthestateas a "hegemony armored by
coercion,"understanding hegemony as thetotality ofthestructures
andinstitutions capableofcreating socialconsensusaroundthedom-
inantclass.
These structures, the"ideologicalapparatuses"(school,church,
politicalparties,press, radio, etc.), by themselvescould never
guarantee thedomination oftheruling class; theyalwaysrequirethe
presenceofan "ultimate guarantee" ofthesocialorderintheformof
instruments ofcoercion,the"repressive apparatuses"(army, police,
paramilitary forces,etc.). But to the extentthatthe equilibrium
betweenthetwostructures is disturbed andthefocusofpowershifts
clearlytowardtherepressive apparatuses, itis possibleto speakofa
"predominantly coercivestate,"aprovisional termthatI prefer tothe
equivocalconceptofa stateofexception.
In LatinAmerica,theexplosivecharacter ofsocialcontradictions
has constantly provokedshifts ofthistype.In thepasttwenty years
however, a newhistorical stagecanbe discerned thatis characterized
bytheextensionofpredominantly coercivestatesovermostofthe
continent as a consequenceof a profound crisisofhegemony. The
ideologicalapparatuses, incapableofskillfully performing theirfunc-
tionsas generators ofconsensus,havefoundthemselves displacedby
orabsorbedwithin therepressive apparatuses, inparticular thearmed
forces.Schools,universities, thechurch,and politicalpartieshave
experienced anincreasingly intensecrisisandencountered increasing
difficulties inpropagating theideologyoftheestablished order.The
mostnotableexceptionis Mexico,wherethe overallcomplexof
apparatusesresponsible forpropagating theofficial ideologyof the
MexicanRevolution, dominated by thePartidoRevolucionaria In-
stitutional (the InstitutionalRevolutionary Party-PRI), has been
able to guaranteetheadherence(or neutralization) of thepopular
classes,making recourseto themassiveuse ofcoerciveinstruments
(as seenin 1968)infrequent.
It is important toemphasizethatthemilitarization ofthestatehas
notmeanttheexclusiveuse ofcoercionas a formofdomination; not
onlyhavetheideologicalapparatuses continued tofulfill
theirrolebut
thearmyhas itselfperformed an ideologicalrolein transmitting a
numberof themesthatvarywiththe conjuncture: economicde-
velopment, nationalunity,defenseagainstsubversion, and so on. In

it is necessaryto distinguish
reality, betweenthe conceptsof the
militaryregimeand thepredominantly coercivestate:theydo not
alwayscoincide.Therehavebeenmilitary regimes inwhichcoercion
playednomoreimportant a rolethanina so-calledconstitutional state
(Peruunderthegovernment ofVelascoAlvarado),and,incontrast,
thereare examplesof civilianregimesbased almostexclusivelyon
repression andterror (Haiti).
To comprehend theconductofthemilitary inpower,itis essential
toemphasizethatthemilitary a classnora " caste"
as a unitis neither
andthatitspoliticalpracticecannotbe entirely explainedintermsof
the social originsof its members.Thus the predominance of the
agrarianoligarchyin the hierarchyof the navy and the petty-
bourgeois composition ofthearmy-togivean exampleprominent in
Latin America-mayat timeshelpin understanding differences in
conductand even conflicts amongdifferent branchesof thearmed
forces.But"theunityofthearmedforces,"beyondthemyth, refers
to a concretephenomenon: thefactthatmembersof the military
belongto a singlesocial categoly. A social categoryis a groupdefined
byitsrelations withextra-economic instancesofthesocialstructure,
ideological(intellectuals, students)or political(bureaucracy, mili-
tary).Therefore, just as thereis a certainunityin theconductof
studentsindependent oftheirsocialorigins,thereis in everysocial
categorya certainextra-class community determined by theircom-
monrelations withtheideologicaland politicalapparatuses.There-
fore,themilitary, as theleadinggroupofthecoerciveapparatusofthe
state,constitutes a relativelyhomogeneoussocial categorywhose
conductis broadlydefined bythisspecificdetermination. Fromthis
resultsa relativeautonomy ofthemilitarized statewithrespecttothe
dominant classes,although itis alwaysinthelastinstancetheguard-
ian of the orderestablishedby these classes. This autonomyis
broaderinthestateformcalled"Bonapartist" inwhichthemilitary
presents itselfinthepoliticalarenaas anarbitrator amongthevarious
classes,andnarrower inregimes inwhich,through themediation ofa
military-industrial complexor by the cooptationof the generals
withinadministrative councils,thereis a truesocialfusionofmilitary
andentrepreneurs (e.g., Brazil).
Inconsequence, thepetty-bourgeois socialoriginofthemajority of
theprofessional sectorsof LatinAmericanarmies,contrary to the
usualanalysisofNorthAmerican military
sociology,is nota decisive
factorexceptwhenthemilitary apparatusentersintocrisisand the

amongsocial
unityof thebarracksgivesway to conflicts
artificial
theinstitution.
classesthatspreadthroughout
FACTORS IN THE MILITARIZATION

OF LATIN AMERICAN REGIMES
Behindthistendency towardthemilitarization oftheLatinAmeri-

can statelies a profound ofsocialrelations.On theone
modification
hand,the capitalistdevelopment achievedin the mostimportant
countries inthe1950sand1960srequired newforms ofcapitalaccumu-
lation.On theotherhand,aftertheCubanRevolution politicalstrug-
glesentereda newphaseofconfrontation, withnewobjectives,new
alliances,andnewformsofexpression.
It goeswithout sayingthatthereis inpracticeno strictseparation
betweeneconomicand politicalfactors.The transition to a new
modelofcapitalist accumulation was nota purelyeconomicphenom-
enon.The newconditions ofexploitationofthelaborforcebrought
withthemnewpoliticalfactorsrelatedto itsrealization.New rela-
tionsamongclasses becamenecessary. Butthemodelofaccumula-
tionthattook shape was the resultof thesenew social relations,
established according to thecapacityofeachclass,stratum, orclass
fraction toimposeitsinterests. The distinction betweenpoliticaland
economicfactors hereisnotintended toestablish a clearseparationof
thetwo levels,as thiswouldbe contrary to theiressence. In em-
phasizing thespecificityofthetwokindsoffactors, mypurposeis to
clarify theparticular conditionsofeach situation.
The state,in its role as the centerof powerin society,is the
dominant expression ofestablishedsocialrelations.As a reflection
of
thecurrent stageofcapitalaccumulation and therelations between
thedifferent forcesin theclass struggle,thestateis simultaneously
the instrument of thedominantsocial classes forconsolidating or
modifying a mode of accumulationand theirinstrument forcon-
solidatingor modifying theequilibriumoftheexistingsocialforces.
For thisreason,the state,class struggle, and theaccumulation of
capitalmutually penetrateeach otheron all levels. Each of these
phenomena appearswithinthecontextoftheothers,thewholecon-
stitutingwhatwe call the" socialformation."
Whatarethecauses ofthistendency towardthemilitarization of

thestateinLatinAmericasincethebeginning ofthe1960s?
It is evidentthatthe Cuban Revolutionis one of the decisive
historical eventsforunderstanding thisevolution.The CubanRev-
olutionprofoundly affected thetraditional systemsofdomination by
setting inmotionor intensifying a crisisofhegemony without prece-
denton thecontinent. All of theideologicalapparatuses-schools,
thechurch,politicalparties-wereaffected in varyingdegreesac-
cording tothecountry andtheperiod.Thecrisistookdiverseforms:
extremeradicalization of studentmovements, theappearanceof a
revolutionary Christian current in certainsectorsoftheclergy, fac-
tionalsplitswithinthevarioustraditional "populist"parties,suchas
thePeruvianAlianzaPopularRevolucionaria Americana (American
PopularRevolutionary Alliance- APRA) andtheVenezuelanAc-
cion Democriatica (DemocraticAction-AD).
As a resultofthecombination ofeconomicdevelopment andthe
impactoftheCubanRevolution thereoccurredin LatinAmericaa
significant intensificationofsocialcontradictions thatbrought about
theeruptionof previously disorganized social strata(campesinos),
the developmentand "politicization"of industrialconflicts,the
appearanceof radicalforcesof oppositionto the statusquo, and
thequestioning of authority and disciplinewithinthearmedforces
themselves.
Itwas tocope withthesemultiple threats andtorebuildthefailing
systemofhegemony thata military andpredominantly coercivestate
was substituted forthe"constitutional" state,withthereplacement
of traditional politicalpersonnelby military functionaries.We can
invertGramsci'sformula andspeakofthestateas coercionwrapped
inhegemony: whentheprotective cover(theideologicalapparatuses)
is stripped away,thecoercivenucleuscomesto thesurface.
These social, political,and ideologicalfactorscombinewitha
fundamental economicone: thenewmodeofcapitalaccumulation in
Latin Americaand its implications at the level of the state. It is
necessary,therefore, to outlinethe process of Latin American
capitalistdevelopment in thepreceding period,roughly fromWorld
WarI to theendofthe1940s.The longcrisisoftheworldmarketin
thatperiodcreatedfavorableconditionsforchangein the motive
centerof the Latin Americaneconomiesfromtheprimary export
sectorto theinternal industrialsector.The splitbetweenproduction
andconsumption so characteristic ofperipheral economiesseemedto
be disappearing (see Furtado,1973,and MauroMarini,1973).The

reductionin Latin Americanexports,whose consequencewas a
contractionofthecapacityoftheseeconomiestoimport, freedmone-
taryresourceson theone hand,and createdconsumersforthede-
velopment ofan "import-substitution" typeofindustry on theother
(Barrosde Castro,1968;Furtado,1973;Frank,1968;MauroMarini,
1973,1974;PeraltaRamos,1972;Pinto,1959;and Tavares,1972).
Thisprocessofindustrialization beganinthebranchesofproduc-
tionoffinished consumergoodsthatwereless complextechnologi-
cally,thetextileandfoodindustries, takingadvantageofan abundant
laborforceand theavailability of local raw materials.The growth
ofthese"wage-goods"branchesofindustry reflected
theincreased
consumption demandsofwageearners.Thisis notto say,however,
thattheabove-mentioned splitbetweenthespheresofproduction and
consumption tendedtodisappear.IfLatinAmerican industrialization
was to proceedwithoutabandoningits primaryexportbase, the
modesofproduction andcirculation had to be adaptedto thatbase.
LatinAmericanindustrial bourgeoisies developedas appendicesof
primary exportsystems.Theforeign currency earningsnecessaryto
import machinery camefromexports.Monopolistic appropriation of
landgenerated an important reserveoflaborchargedwithproviding
laborpowerat a low price. Demandsof theprimary exportsector
frequentlyconstituted, forthemostpart,theconsumption market for
localindustries.
Followingthecrisisof 1929,alteration of the conditionsof the
world marketproducedsignificant changes in Latin America's
powersystems.On theone hand,a processofindustrialization was
initiated.
Ontheother, absenceofanindustrial bourgeoisiepolitically
independent oftheruralbase led to a compromise powersystemin
whichindustrialinterestswere defendedby governments whose
broadsocialbases permitted them,starting froma fundamental pact
withtheancientoligarchy, totipthebalancetowardindustry. Vargas
inBrazilin1930,C'ardenas inMexicoin1934,theliberalgovernment
in Colombiain 1934,theFrentePopular(PopularFront)in Chilein
1938,and Peronin Argentina in 1945all redirectedtheactionofthe
statewiththeobjectiveofcreating an internalmarket.Theseregimes
differedfromone anotherowingto diversealliancesandrelations of
forcesand differences in stageof development. But theywereall
promoters ofan extensiveprocessofindustrialization, a strengthen-
ingoftheroleofthestate,andtheincorporation ofnewcontingents of
laborintotheurbanlabormarket,withoutbreakingtherelationof
dependency createdby theprimaryexporteconomythatprovided
themwiththeforeign earningsnecessaryforimports.This is what
causedRuyMauroMarinito say,
Uprootedfromthe mode of circulationthatcharacterizedthe export

economy,thedependentindustrialeconomyreproduced,in a specific
form,theaccumulationof capital based on theoverexploitationof the
wvorker.As a consequence, it also reproduced,althoughin a modified
wvay,thenmode ofcirculationthatcorrespondsto thattypeofaccumula-
tion. Now, it is not thedisassociation ofproductionand citculationof
merchandisein termsof the world marketthat is operatinigbut the
separation betweenthehighand thelow spheresof circulationwithin
the economyitself,a separationithat,not being counteractedby the
faictorsthatoperate withinthe classic capitalist economy,acquires a
mtiuch radical character[1973: 63-64].
mrior-e
The politicalregimesthatinstalledthemselves afterthebeginning

processand whose objectivewas the de-
of the industrialization
velopmentof thatprocesswere sustainedby a broadsocial base
composedofnewlevelsoffunctionaries favoredbytheextension of
thestate'sroleand thegrowthof employment opportunities in the
tertiarysector,liberalprofessionals,and smallproperty ownersfa-
voredby the increasein urbanrents.Even withinthe exploited
classes,newcontingents ofworkersincorporated withintheindus-
triallaborforce,enjoying privilegestheyhadnotpossessedas rural
workersor subproletarians, constituted thebasis forpopulist-type
relations.The dynamicof thisextensiveindustrialization process,
whichhad producedtheconditionsforcompromise, wentbeyond
thoseconditions.Havingbegunwiththebranchesof intermediate
consumergoods production, morecomplexbranchesof
it affected
intermediate and capitalgoods as a consequenceof thepressures
exertedon theimportcapacityof thesystem,and thisproduceda
changein thefocusof accumulation forthosesectors.Duringthe
1950s,thedemandsofthistransformation becameevidentinMexico,
Brazil,and Argentina. The governing bourgeoisies attempted, with
greateror lessersuccess,to respondto themintermsofthelogicof
theaccumulation process.
In theprocessofimportsubstitution, thereis a moment at which
theamountofinvestment necessaryforthetransition toa newstage
callsforresolution oftheproblemoftheshortageofinternal capital
andtheavailabilityofinternational
capital.The solicitation
offoreign
capital has to be accompaniedby definiteattractions, the most
important of whichare favorablelegislationfortherepatriation of
profits, ofinfrastructural
theavailability resourcesatverylowprices,
and,aboveall,a cheapworkforce.Insofaras theworldmarket again
broadened,inthepostwarperiod,thedependency oftheperipheral
industrialization
processincreased;thiswasevidentinthetechnolog-
ical models that dominatedit and acceleratedthe process of
monopolization oftheeconomy.
The introduction of a technologytoo highlydevelopedforthe
LatinAmerican modelsproducedan expansionofproductivity farin
excessofthedevelopment oftheproductivebase. Thisis to saythat
theamountofnewinvestment didnotcompensate fortheunemploy-
mentproducedby technological innovation.We have here,then,a
crisisofrealization:
of income
The bipolariz-ation on)theoniehand, to str-ainl
tendcls the
expanditled exacerbate the contracldictions
reproductionof calpitalandicl
andtc, onithe other handtc, throulghthe niewt, orientaition1of capitail accumu-
to hail'e asaS by-product aiiieit' niodification of the
tlitioni, /listriblution of
inicotneto the beniefitof ai thirdc(ate gor --commonlyxcalled themiddi//(le
classes-----and
to the(let/i/lie
ntoftheworkingclass. Thisthirdca tegorv
(lenilaids the reactivationoj the process of accuudaltion when it is
capable of dloinigso, thait is, wh/Jel
the repressionlintegration of the
working class is achieved without too much shock [Salamna, 1974:
58-59].
This demandis not an artificiala posteriori creationbut a direct

productoftheabove-mentioned modeofaccumulation. On theone
hand,thetechnicalcharacteristics of modemindustries requirean
increaseinthenumber ofunproductive workers.Undertheprevail-
ingconditions offormation
ofthelaborforceinthesecountries, these
workers achieveremuneration levelsmuchhigher thanthoseofman-
ual laborers.On theotherhand,thedifficulties in therealization
of
capitalprovokea diversionofcapitalfromtheproductive sphereto
commerceand services.Employment in thissphereincreases,pro-
ducingmanymoreprivileged consumers.
Undertheseconditions, theincremental expansionofthemarket
does notnecessarilyimplyan increasein the remuneration of the
workforce.On thecontrary, it impliestheoverexploitation of this
forceto guaranteean "overaccumulation' capableofsustaining the
intensificationof consumption of a limitedprivilegedbase. This

necessityto exertpressureso as to diminish thecostofproduction,
andto compensate forthelimitsofthemarketby an increaseinthe
prices of products,is incompatiblewith populistregimesand
bourgeois democracy.
By thisI do not meanthatthe authoritarian regimesimposed
throughout LatinAmericago alongwithits industrialization. The
bourgeoisie doesnotchooseitsregimes ofdomination atitspleasure;
theseare theresultoftherelationsof socialforcespresentin each
situation.Incontrast,I arguethatthepoliticalconditions mostfavor-
able for the developmentof capitalistindustrialization in the
periphery, in thepresentstageofcapitalistaccumulation guarantee
therepression oftheelementary formsofresistance bytheworking
classes. (Here I am speakingof a stagein an international sense,
because independent of thelevelof development achievedin each
country byitsindustry itis international
conditionsofaccumulation
thatpreventa repetition of theprocessof importsubstitution for
relativelyclosednationalmarkets seeninthe1930s.)Forthisreason,
theregimes thatrelyonthepopulistmobilization ofthemasseswithin
theframework offormaldemocracyrepresent increasinglyunstable
and precariousbalances of forces,not the "normalform"of
bourgeois domination seenthroughout thecontinent.
FORMS OF MILITARIZATION
OF THE STATE
Militarydictatorshipseliminatethe balancedrepresentation of
differentfractions
of thedominant classes. In theirplace arisesan
executivethatconcentrates all ofthefunctions ofgovernment andis
directlydependenton thearmedforces.
The unique characteristicsof the armed forces-"profes-
sionalism,"authoritariandiscipline,rigidhierarchy,andan ideology
of defenseof order-naturally give military regimesa repressive
aspect.Thisdirectresortto repression is clearlya symptom ofthe
crisesoflegitimacyofbourgeoisdomination ofthecontinent. Butif
welookclosely, wecandistinguish betweenmilitary regimes basedon
therepressivefunction (Argentina, Chile,Uruguay, andothers)and
those thatcombinesemipopulist characteristics with repressive
measures(Peru underVelasco Alvarado,PanamaunderTorrijos,

andso on). Amongthemilitary regimes orientedtowardrepression,
we mustfurther distinguishtraditionalmilitary which
dictatorships,
comeintobeingtomaintain theprimary-export frommilitary
society,
thatarisein responseto thecontradictions
dictatorships createdby
theindustrialcapitalistsociety;it willbe seen thatthesediffer
in
accordancewiththedifferent functions theyperform.
TRADITIONAL MILITARY DICTATORSHIPS
Traditionalmilitary dictatorships,
beingproductsof relatively
simplesocieties,haverelatively simplefunctions: toensuretheover-
exploitation ofruralworkersandprevent theestablishedorderfrom
beingthreatened bycompetition amongrivalsectorsoftheoligarchy.
In a way,theseregimesmediatebetweentheruraloligarchy ofthe
countryand the foreigncompanies(or company)thatcontrolits
externalcommerce. Theyreceivetheassistanceofthelocaloligarchy
inprotecting theirinterestsagainstforeigncapitalandinguaranteeing
internalorder.Thanksto thissupport, thetraditionalmilitary
tyran-
niesareabletoimposeorderfrom aboveontheinterminable conflicts
amongoligarchic groups.Butthetyrants inturnbelongtocliquesand
utilizepowerto theiradvantage.
In thissense,thesedictatorships cannotachievetheunification of
thedominant class. The stigmaofcorruption thatseemstoadhereto
themlike theirown shadowsis simplythe absence of legal, in-
stitutionalizedtheft.For thisreason,theyare at thesametimein-
struments oftheforeign companiesandofthelocaldominant classin
theirfunction ofcontrolling thenationaleconomy. Suchis theproper
description of the Trujillodictatorshipin the DominicanRepublic
and the Somoza dictatorship in Nicaragua,accordingto Halpenn
Donghi:
In thesecountries,
belatedlyattainin1gtheexpanisioni
of exports,the
is the instrument
dictatorship of economicconquestby the ruling
group. The Truxjillo
familyin Santo Domingoand the Somozas in
Nicaraguahelpthemselves to a largepartofthenationalpatrimony.
Thesepracticessubordinatethetraditionaloligarchyandallowforthe
oftherepresenttatives
penetrationi ofthedominant economy:thecon-
oftheDominicanlandbyNorthAmerican
qcuest sugarcompacnies andl
Nicaraguaby UnitedFruit.In bothcases, thedictatorship is tiedto
previoIIs North Americantimilitaryoccupation; the chiefsof tie Na-

tional Guards, exceptionallywvellairm-led owe their
antidtiaintaiined,
positionIs to the occupier and count oni military assistance for their
fromthetraditionial
inidependlence bases of local pow-ver.
The Nationial
Guartdsare loval to thedictatoranidare less subjectto theinfliuences
of
the oligarchythan1 armnies[1969: 238].
Letus examinethismoreclosely.Whataretheproblems thatthese

dictatorshipsendeavortoresolve,uponwhatkindsofsocialrelations
aretheybased,andwhatcontradictions do theyengender?
At thebeginning of thecentury, the UnitedStates,Britain,and
France sharedin the economicdominationof Nicaragua. The
nationalist
government of Zelayatriedto utilizethiscompetition to
improve theconditionofthelocaleconomy. The UnitedFruitCom-
panythenorganized an armedmovement thatoVerthrew theregime.
The directintervention of the UnitedStates in 1911ensuredthe
"election"ofa newpresident whowas a member oftheConservative
party,butwhentheU.S. forceswithdrew fromNicaraguain1924,a
civilwar ensued. In 1926,U.S. Marineslandedagainand forced
liberaland conservativegeneralsto makepeace. Amongtheliberal
generalswhoopposedtheresulting government, however, therewere
forcesthatexpressedtheaspirations oftheworkers.For these,the
fundamental problemwas thesituation of exploitationimposedby
foreignpower.AugustoCesarSandino,a former worker
agricultural
and miner, headeda smallarmythatfought theNationalGuardand
theoccupationforcesuntil1930.After thedefeatoftheseinsurgents,
GeneralAnastasioSomoza,commander oftheNationalGuard,led
thecoup d'etatthatbeganhislongreign.
The Somoza dictatorship was imposedthrough thepowerofthe
NationalGuard;it overcamethe Sandinothreatand ensuredthe
existenceofa nationalstatefreefrom militaryoccupationbutonethat
wouldguaranteetheunopposedeconomicdomination oftheNorth
Americancompany.
The powerof a personor ofa clan (Trujillo,Duvalier,Somoza,
Stroessner)maintained by a loyal and privilegedNationalGuard
corresponds tothenecessitiesofa simplesocietybasedontheexport
ofprimary products.Withaneyetowardmaximizing theearnings for
companiesinthistypeofactivity, theterror ofthestateis obligedto
crushtheslightestmanifestation ofopposition. Thelocalpopulation,
whosedemandsformorewagescanonlyincreasethecostsofproduc-
tionand reduceincome,is notallowedto consumethewealthpro-

ducedbytheimportant sectorsoftheeconomy.
Thus,theseregimes employforce,extreme misery, andignorance
to repressthepopulation.The revolutionary energiesthatdevelop
withinthiscontextare illustrated by the Mexican Revolutionof
1910-1915,thecampesinoinsurrection inEl Salvadorin1932,thelong
struggleofSandino,andtheCubanRevolution.Another factoralso
diminishes thestability ofsuchdictatorships. Dependingas theydo
onpoliceterror andprotecting thecorruption ofthedominant clique,
theyoffer theurbanmiddleclassnomorethanleftovers ofautocratic
power.As these classes growand become stronger, theyin turn
strengthen democraticand moralizingmovements.These petty-
bourgeoisinitiatives areassistedbycertainfractions oftheoligarchy,
andtheironlyconsequenceis theperpetuation ofthecycleofmilitary
coupsthroughout LatinAmerica.In reality, fromthispointofview
the Cuban Revolution,the 1979NicaraguanRevolution,and the
current struggles in El Salvadorand Guatemalarepresent a turning
point.Attheoutset,theUnitedStatestolerated FidelCastrobecause
hismovement appearedto be nothing morethana newliberalrebel-
lion againsta corrupttyranny, whichin a few yearswould itself
becomeanother corrupt tyranny. Bylinking itsdemocratic objectives
withthe profoundsocial aspirationsof the workingmasses, the
CubanRevolution signaleda newdynamic andclosedthedoortothe
liberalschemesoftheold oligarchies.
Boliviais a veryspecialcase. Therestorative cycleoftheBolivian
armedforcesaftertherevolution of1952endedin1964withthecoup
d'etat of Barrientos.The antilaborcharacterof the Barrientos,
B'anzer,andGarciaMeza regimes is verysignificantifwe considerthe
actual political forces of the Bolivian proletariat.From this
standpoint, theseregimeslookmorelikenewmilitary dictatorships
thantraditional ones. Butjust as therevolutionary strugglesofthe
Bolivianproletariat hadtoovercometheweight oftheruralsectorand
thebackwardness ofthecountry, thelackofa corresponding social
base prevented themilitary dictatorships from following theBrazilian
model.In Bolivia,themilitary dictatorshipscannotbe an instrument
oftheindustrial monopoly sector,itis insteadaninstrument ofmedia-
tionbetweensectorsofthenationalbourgeoisie andimperialism via
thestate'scontrolofminerals.Seenthisway,the situation resembles
thetraditional dictatorship, whoseparticular feature is thenationali-
a
zationoftheminingsector, legacy ofthe 1952 revolution. Butthe
principallegaciesof 1952 are the experience and maturity of the
proletariat,
whichimpedeanyreactionary stabilization
ofthecountry.
The "cocaine coup" of GarciaMeza in 1980and thesuccessionof
coupsandcountercoups thatfollowedillustrate
thechronic instability
ofBolivianmilitary regimes.
The triumph oftheSandinistaRevolution ofJuly19,1979demon-
stratedthe vulnerabilityof traditionalmilitarydictatorshipsonce
again.It showedthatthepolitical-militaryoverthrow ofa traditional
militarydictatorship
was possiblewithin thecontextofitslossofany
socialbaseanditsconfrontation bya broad-based massrevolutionary
movement capableof initiating
an armedinsurrection. Nicaragua's
revolutionaryvictoryforitspartdeepenedthecrisisofothermilitary
regimesin CentralAmerica,above all in El Salvador-wherethe
militaryhas tried to camouflageits power with "Christian
Democracy"-andin Guatemala,withitsmilitary chiefspersonally
involvedinprofitable petroleum businessesand landspeculationin
the so-calledFranja Transversal del Norte(NorthernTransverse
Strip),indirectassociationwithmultinationalcorporations(Shenan-
doah, GettyOil, Texaco,etc.).
NEW MILITARY DICTATORSHIPS
The newmilitary shareswiththetraditional

dictatorship one the
function of copingwithworkers'capacityto reactto overexploita-
tion.In addition,
inthatitcorrespondstoa different
stageofcapitalist
development ithas itsowntasks.In analyzingtheparticular
condi-
tionsinwhichsuchregimes EmirSaderidentifies
originate,
a crisisofhegemonywithinthepoliticalsystemthatinvariablyaccom-
panies coalitions of a reformist
nature-petty-bourgeoisreformism or
Wuorker reformism-ingovernment,aimed at reorderingthesystemof
dominationthroughthemediationof class conflictand thepositioning
ofconciliatoiymass leaders . . . Thesegovernmentsconstitutethelast
possible solution vithintheprevailingsystemat the end of the 1930s
and beginningof the 1940s: parliamentarydemocraticgovernmenital
regimnes,ideologically populist and functionallyauthoritarianand
elitist.Insofaras theseintermediatesolutionscainnotbe achieved in a
durable fashion, the political systemn is condemned to a definiitive
failure[Sader, 1977:19].
The antilabor
character
ofthistypeofdictatorshipis moreappar-
entthanin thetraditional a more
because it confronts
dictatorship
developedlabormovement thathas maturedduringperiodsofrela-

tiveliberty.Because thistypeappearsat moreadvancedstagesof
capitalist
concentration, itorderstheinternalconflicts
ofthedomi-
nantclassesbyaccelerating themonopolizationofcapital.Therefore,
itislogicalthatthegovernments thatreflect
theinterests
ofmonopoly
capitalshouldbe thosethatsubstituteclassconciliation
fortherepre-
sentationofpoliticallyexcludedsectors.Now,thepoliticalexpres-
sionofsuchinterests impliesoverallactionmuchmorecomplexthan
thepoliticaldirectionoftheoldprimary exportsectors.To theplace
previously occupiedbytheoldtyrant andhiscliquethenewmilitary
dictatorship elevatesthe armedforcesto a managerialbody.The
successofthedictatorship is measuredbyitscapacitytoconvertthe
armedforcesnotonlyintoa centralorganofpowerbutalso intothe
sole partyexpressingthe interestsof the hegemonicfractionof
capital.
The armed forces are the last elemiient affectedby the system of
dominationand depenidoniits hierarchicalstructure,whichdoes riot
protectthemfromclass strugglebutdoes diminishtheirvulnierability to
the effectsof the violenitsociail anidpolitical strugglescurrenlt
in the
conjunctureof the society. For these reasons, in its capacity as ani
the militatyrepresentsthe ultimatebase of operationsfor
institution,
the reconstructionof the conditionsfor political domination and
economic exploitation[Emir Sader, 1977: 23].
The bestexampleoftheseregimesis theBraziliandictatorship.

Theconditions ofcapitalistaccumulation beginninginthemid-1950s
preparedthe way. The industrialization process had developed
through a massiveinfluxof foreign capitalthathad injectedgreat
dynamism intobasic industriesand theproduction of durablecon-
sumergoodsfora limited high-income urbanconsumersector.In the
early1960s,the maintenance of thisprocessrequirednew invest-
mentsin thesedynamicsectors,butthecapacityto attractforeign
capitaldependedon the capacityof the systemto containlabor
demands,guaranteehighratesof exploitation, and rationalizethe
economy, eliminating unitsofproduction
less profitable at thesame
timethata newconcentration ofearnings wasoperating infavorofthe
dynamicsectors.The politicalregimethathaddirectedtheprevious
stageoftheindustrializationprocesshad shownsignsofbeinginca-
pableofsatisfying
thesenewnecessities.Thepoliticalweight givento
all thebourgeoisfractions in therepresentative democraticmodel

impededimplementation ofa coherent andrationalnationalpolicyof
capitalistconcentration. Relationsofa populisttypewiththemasses
also impededtheapplication ofa policyofwagecontrols.
Confronted withthenew necessitiesof capitalistaccumulation,
thebourgeoisieabandonedpopulismwhenthepopularmovement
beganto rushaheadofthepopulistleaders.Butitspoliticalorganiza-
tions,the PartidoSocial Democriatico (Social DemocraticParty-
PSD) and the Partido TrabalhistaBrasileiro(Brazilian Labor
Party-PTB) remainedimbuedwiththispopulismor at leastwere
incapableofovercoming itwithintheframework ofa parliamentary
democracy, theUnia6 Democrfitica Nacional(NationalDemocratic
Union-UDN). Thus,thearmedforcespresented themselves as the
" armedwing"ofa broadcoalition.Thepolicyofpurging theLeftand
the populistcurrentin orderto avoid concessionsto the masses
progressively eliminatedbourgeoisleadersfromthepoliticalscene
andemptiedcivilinstitutions ofall power.In theprocessofcombat-
ting"subversion"and "rationalizing" the politicaland economic
apparatusofthestate,thearmedforcesemergedas thebackboneof
thestate,progressively reducing thelegislature,thejudiciary,andthe
partiestoa purelydecorative roleand controllingthe influenceofthe
press,theuniversities, and thechurch.
Withoutthe counterweight of any politicalrepresentation, the
military dictatorship appliedthe policyof monopolistic capitalto
overcometheeconomiccrisisthathad hungoverthecountry since
1962.It utilizeda policyof wage controls,repression of unionlife,
creditrestrictions, incentivesforforeign capital,increasingratesof
exploitation, andrestrictionoftheconsumer "wagegoods"market; it
acceleratedmonopolistic concentration andthedenationalization of
theeconomy.
It was notuntilDecember1968,withtheliquidation of thelast
vestigesofthebourgeoisrepublic, thatthemilitary dictatorshipwas
consolidated.Duringthatyear,theaccumulated contradictions that
arosefrom theeconomiccrisisandthesolutions appliedtoitandfrom
thepoliticalrepression reachedtheirlimit.Inresponsetotheextreme
unpopularity of themilitarygovernment, theold bourgeoisinstitu-
tionsmanifested some intentions of "sendingthemilitary back to
theirquarters."But thisbourgeoisopposition,facedwiththefirst
symptoms oftheradicalization ofa popularopposition, retreated and
was eclipsed.The Leftcontinued tobe equallyimmature andfragile.
The military dictatorship was thenable to resumethe initiative,

executing anothercoup,dismantling alltradeunionandpoliticallife.
Morethana newvictory ofthearmedforces,Institutional ActNo. 5
was a decisiveturning pointfortheregime.On thepretextof the
necessity"to fight againstrevolutionary warfare,"themilitary dic-
tatorshipsuppressedtheparliament and official parties,destroyed
whatlittleautonomy stillexistedinthejudiciary, suspendedpolitical
rightsof bourgeoisleaderswho represented a politicalalternative,
and gatheredunderits directcontrolall principalideologicalap-
paratuses,fromtheuniversity to thepress.The military-police re-
pressiveapparatusacquiredautonomy within thearmedforces,given
thewayinwhichtheregime wasconsolidated. Thisprevented itfrom
creatinginstitutionalchannelsofexpression forthediversesectorsof
thedominant class,anditsideologicallegitimacy becamedependent
onitseconomicsuccess.Inthisregard, thedictatorship couldalready
countontheeffects oftheeconomicrecovery thatbeganin1967.The
continual increaseinnationalproduction, realizedthrough increased
exploitationoftheworking masses,offered extraordinary prospects
forprofittolargeinvestors andbrought abouta significant riseinthe
incomeof the privilegedstrataof the urbanmiddleclasses. This
impededanyattempt at bourgeoisopposition duringthisperiod.
The formin whichthe military dictatorship ensuredcapitalist
recoveryprotectedthe "monopolistic path" of capitalistdevelop-
ment.The overexploitation ofworkersfacilitated accumulation but
without developing theinternal marketfor"wage goods," a sphere
thatlackedinterestformonopolistic capitalinBrazil.Acceleration of
thecapitalisttransformation inagriculturealso tookplace through a
processofincreasing proletarianizationofcampesinos,andcontrib-
utedto a reduction inthecostofindustrial production. The solicita-
tionofforeign capitalandthecreditpoliciesoftheregimeintensified
imperialistdomination oftheeconomy. Establishment ofa system for
financingtheconsumption ofdurablegoodsbroadened conditions for
realizationofprivileged productive sectorsbyimperialist capital.
ThestabilityoftheBrazilianmilitary regime thusresulted from the
factthatitdidnotrestsolelyon repression. It legitimated itselfinthe
eyes of the entirecapitalistclass by offering conditionsof high
profitability investments, even considerablenumbersof
for and
salariedworkersbenefited fromeconomicimprovement. Theywere
wonovernotbytheexplicitideologyoftheregime,itsconservative
authoritarianism, but by its appeal to individualism and political
indifferenceand the"realization"of consumerism. Withthese,the

atomization ofcivilsocietywas reinforced.
Withtheworldeconomicrecessionbeginning in1974,however, the
economy, thatassuredthelegitimacy oftheregime, andso dependent
on theoutsideworld,reacheditslimits.The mostlucidfigures inthe
government realized that theymust look for other sources of
legitimation. GeneralErnesto Geisel assumedthe presidencyin
1974 with a projectof "aberturapolitica" and the reappraisal
of civil institutions:liberalizationof censorship,of electoral
propaganda, and so on. Although this"decompression" couldbring
to thesurfaceall sortsof underground opposition,thegovernment
soughtto keep themundercontrolwithitseconomicreorientation
andsocialdepoliticization.
Nevertheless,thegovernment was unableto containthewave of
opposition.Its intention to "launcha new cycleof accumulation"
collidedwiththemagnitude oftheeconomiccrisis,whichendedby
breaking theold solidarityofthedominant classesandweakening the
"military party."At the same time,thedynamicof social protest
considerably surpassedhaughty expectations ofmeninpower.The
eruption ofmassivelaborstrikes beginning in1978revealedtheexist-
ence of a social movement whosetendenciestowardpoliticaland
tradeunionautonomy madetheprojectof "transition fromabove"
Thisis notbyanymeansto say thatthemilitary
difficult. teamlost
control, butto maintain it,ithad to broadenitsprogram ofconces-
sions and liberalizationsconsiderably.With President Joao
Figueiredoin1979theprojectchangedfrom oneofsimple"liberaliza-
tionof themilitary dictatorship" to one of "authoritarian democ-
racy."To accomplishthis,themilitary teamrequiredcertaincondi-
tions:(1) controlofthemechanisms of representation,withrestric-
tionson theorganization ofparties,limitations on legislativeaction,
and,aboveall, an electoralreform thatdistorted theresults,and(2)
themaintenance ofmechanisms "of exception,"whether in legisla-
tion(thenationalsecuritylaw,forexample)or withregardto the
personnel mustered forthesepractices(hencethedirectrejection of
anyinvestigation thatthreatened theexistenceofthe"paramilitary"
groups).But at everystep it became moredifficult to reconcile
liberalization
withthemaintenance oftheseconditions, andtheelec-
tionsof1982showedthelimitsoftheBrazilianmilitary project.
The increasing weightof the state'seconomicapparatushad a
tendency to strengthen thepowerofthegovernmental bureaucracy
withrespecttoprivatecapitalists; butintheveryprocessofapplying
a policyfavorableto largecapital,theofficer corpsof the armed
forceswas absorbedbyit.Thegeneralsandtheirtechnocrats wereno
longerthedefenders ofthecapitalistsystemwhileremaining separate
fromthecapitalist class; nowtheybelongedtothatclassandentered
intothemanagement ofthemajorcompanies.The officer corpsthat
directedthecentersofpoliticalpowerwas nowtheprivileged repre-
sentative oflargecapital.In thissense,itwas possibleto speakofa
"military party"as theprincipal expression ofcapitalist interests.
Thesamecrisisofhegemony producedtheBarrientos dictatorship
in Bolivia(1964),theOnganiadictatorship in Argentina (1966),the
B'anzerdictatorship inBolivia(1971),andthePinochet dictatorship in
Chile(1973).The inability ofthebourgeoisie to forgea socialforce
capable of defeating the leftwithinthe contextof representative
democracyand theincapacity oftheleftto overcomethebourgeois
reactionopenedthewayfora military solution.Thelevelofviolence
oftheSeptember11Chileancoup can be explainedin termsof the
characteristics of theenemiesthathad to be broughtdown. The
strength and flexibilityof Chileanparliamentary democracyhad
servedto institutionalize redistribution by the stateof theincome
generated bytheforeign monopoly inthemining sector.Thepolitical
systemfunctioned to regulaterelations amongthedominant groups
and betweenall ofthesegroupsand theforeign enclave,to winthe
supportofthe"middlesectors"integrated in variouswaysintothe
bureaucratic apparatus,and to keepthelabormovement withinthe
law via recognition of the rightsof unionsand of minorpolzticos
belonging tothemostorganized sectors.Whenthissystem provedno
longereffective in containing theautonomousdynamicof thepro-
letariat,thebourgeoisie, in seekingto eliminate it,was hampered by
thecountry'slegal traditions and thepoliticalmaturity of thepro-
letariat.Thesetwofactorshadalso impededthecoupd'etatthatwas
intended to preventAHlende fromtakingofficein 1970afterhiselec-
tion.
The gradualriseoftheChileanlaborandpopularmovement be-
came apparentin thelate 1950s.In 1958Allendecame onlyabout
30,000votesshortofwinning theelection.Thecontinued advanceof
theleftcoalitionledthebourgeoisie toabandonitsownconservative
candidatein1964anduniteinsteadaroundthe"revolution inliberty"
ofEduardoFrei,whorepresented a Kennedy-inspired reaction tothe
Cuban Revolution.Afterthreeyearsof apparentsuccess,the Frei
regimeprovedincapableofmaintaining thetimidreforms promoted
by his Partido Democratico-Cristiano (Christian Democratic

Party-PDC). The campesinosocialbase, initially wonoverbythe
beginning oftheagrarian reform, didnotmakeup forthesplitofthe
bourgeois blocprovokedbythereactionoftheruraloligarchy orfor
theincreaseincampesinorevolutionary energies,whichoutpacedthe
cooptivepossibilities oftheregime.The urbansocialbase gainedby
theFreigovernment's populistpolicieson housingandcollectivism
also failedtocompensate forthepopulargroundswell initiatedbythe
revolutionary Left.
In 1970the risingLeft confronted a dividedbourgeoisie.The
platformof Allende's Unidad Popular (Popular Unity-UP)
coalition-toconverttheeconomyto one of popularconsumption
anddemocratize thestate-replacedtheDC projectoforganizing the
internal marketand integrating thepopularbases intoa bourgeois
state.Sucha projectcarriedthecontradictions oftheChileansitua-
tionto theirlimits.
The existenceof a government consisting fundamentally of tra-
ditionalpartiesof the Chileanproletariat, in such a junctureof
economiccrisisandmassrisingnecessarily createda prerevolution-
arysituation.The bourgeoisie, whichdidnotcontrolgovernmental
powerandfearedtheorientation thattheprocesscouldtake,could
noteffectively confronttheeconomiccrisis.Therefore, itreactedby
checkinginvestments andengaging in speculation,thusaggravating
thecapitalistcrisis(Mauro Mariniand Seputlveda, 1974;and Eder
Sader,1974).
The massmovement, propelled bythecrisisandstimulated bythe
presence of a popular government,expanded and became
radicalized.As theinstitutionalized channels,privileged bythepol-
icyof "thedemocratization of thestate,"revealedtheirlimits,the
embryos ofdualpowerappeared.Thus,thepolicyoftheMovimiento
de Izquierda Revolucionario(Movementof the Revolutionary
Left-MIR), basedon thedevelopment oftheseembryos, ceased to
be simplya proclamation; itbecameattachedto thedynamics ofthe
numerically moreimportant fractions of theworkingclass and of
sectorsoftheUP itself.ButtheUP,consistent withitsownstrategy,
soughttouse itsstability as an appealagainstincreasedintervention
bythearmedforces.
Within thebourgeoisie, thePDC andtheright ingeneralwerealso
forcedto lookto a military solution.The PDC's objectivewas obvi-
ouslynota military dictatorship thatmight depriveitofdirectpolitical
authority. Its strategywas the"destabilization" ofthegovernment:
forcing all demandsto theirmaximum and exacerbating all discon-

tent,atthesametimeholding theUP prisoner tothe"stateoflaws"in
orderto preventit fromresolvingin its favorthe contradictions
created.But so riskya policycannotbe followedindefinitely. The
social forcesthatwereset in motionhad theirown dynamic,and
although themobilization oftheRightsucceededindestabilizing the
government, itdidnotsucceedinoverthrowing it. On thecontrary,
foreveryreactionary offensive therewas a popularcounteroffensive
thatincitedthe government to further assaultson the bourgeois
regime.The institutional "destabilization" gave way to a new in-
stitutionalization of"popularpower."
Thebourgeoisie, perceiving thissituation, shifted thebattlefieldto
thebourgeoisstateandparticularly to thearmedforces.The almost
completepreservation of the traditional armedforces,withtheir
ideologyoforderand blinddiscipline, allowedthemto perform the
roleof privileged agentof the"restoration." Withthis,thearmed
forceswentwellbeyondtheliquidation ofAllendeandpopularresist-
ance andthereestablishment ofthedemocratic orderdesiredbythe
ChristianDemocrats.The processthattranspired inBrazilbetween
1964and 1968,whenthe military dictatorship coexistedwiththe
vestigesofa "civilpower,"didnotoccurinChile.Theparliament did
notsurvive,andbourgeoispoliticalpartiesdisappeared.The univer-
sityfellvictimto military intervention, andthemeansofmasscom-
munication werebrought underdirectmilitary control.Thejudicial
apparatuslikewisefellunderthedirection ofthearmedforces.The
military beganmanaging thegovernment inaccordancewithitsown
institutional character, whileconserving itsownhierarchy, afterthe
bloody"purges"ofSeptember.
The statewas practicallyreducedto the armedforces,which
performed executive,legislative, andjudicialfunctions andsoughtto
becometheonlytruepartyofthedominant class. To achieve thelast
objective,theystressedtheevilsofthesystem politicalparties,to
of
whichtheyattributed divisionofthecountry andthethreat ofsocial
revolution. In placeofall this,thedictatorship proposed itsideology
of nationalunity,to be formedthrough thedepoliticization of the
country to
anditssubjection military rule. Itdemonstrated itsrepres-
siveefficacy byitsmonopoly offorce,itsnationalcentralization, and
itsmonolithic discipline. Its abilityto impose itselfas an adequate
representative ofthebourgeoisie dependedonitssuccessinsuppress-
ingresistance and in reestablishing theeconomy.
Destruction of thewholelegalapparatusdid notmeanthatthe

militarydictatorship controlled allnationallife.Even ifone does not
takeintoaccounttheclandestine reorganization oftheLeftand the
workers'movement, notall of theold channelsof thebourgeoisie
weredefinitively liquidated.Although itistruethattodaythereareno
bourgeoisparties,in the truemeaningof the term,one does find
pressuregroupsthatact withinand through thearmedforces.The
PDC itselfwas transformed (temporarily?) intoa pressure groupthat
used itspotentialsocialbase to exerta certaininfluence on various
sectorsofthearmedforces.Together withthePDC, otherorganiza-
tionsperformed thesamefunction: thechurch,leadingdailies,the
law school,and so forth.The armedforces,fortheirpart,having
overcomethepoliticaldivisionsthatexistedin Chileansociety,al-
lowedthesedivisionsto penetrate theirownranks.The survivalof
themilitary dictatorship was subjectto itsabilityto return orderto
capitalistaccumulation in thecountry. In thisperiod,in additionto
the sacrificesof the workingmasses, expressedby massiveun-
employment and bywagesthatcausedmalnutrition and misery, the
militarymovedagainstthesmallandmedium-sized capitalistsectors,
as is demonstrated by thedisappearance of thesesectorsfromthe
nation'seconomiclife.The regimehadto demonstrate to thelatent
opposition inthesesectorsitscapacityto stemtherevolution and,at
thesametime,ensurehigherratesofexploitation ofthelaborforce.
The argument was convincing onlyto thosewhosaw thatthesalva-
tionofcapitalism hadtocomebeforetheirownsurvival as capitalists.
Thepressure exertedoncapitalists ingeneralwas muchstronger than
itwas inBrazil,eitherbecauseofthegravity oftheChileancrisisor
becauseofthepeculiarities oftheeconomicpoliciesoftheChilean
junta,which,beingoriented towardeconomicliberalism, openedthe
country tothedomination oflargecompanies without counteracting it
by stateaction.Although it is truethat,fromthepoliticalpointof
view,Chileancapitalists hada muchstronger politicaltraditionthan
theirBraziliancounterparts, theyweremuchmoreconstrained bythe
threatoftheproletariat. Therefore, bourgeois opposition didnotrisk
open confrontation and utilizedits discontent to influence certain
sectorsofthearmedforceswiththeobjectiveofmakingtheregime
moreflexible.
But how can a regimebecomemoreflexiblewhenits stability
derivespreciselyfromtheomnipotence ofitscommandcenters?If
theChileanmilitary regimehas beenthehardestofthenewmilitary
it is because Chileansocietywas themostcontami-

dictatorships,
natedby thesubversivetendenciesof theexploitedclasses. Its re-
pressiveefficacyis achievedat directcost to its legitimacy. If it
succeedsinestablishing newperspectives forcapitalist
development,
itwillrecoveritslegitimacy amongthesectorsthatderivebenefits
fromthatdevelopment. But if,beforeachievingthis,thecontradic-
tionscreatedby theregimeprecipitate a crisiswithinthesystemof
dominationdue to itsrigidity,theentirestatewillbe affected.
POPULIST MILITARY COALITIONS
In someinstances,civiliangovernments withpopulisttendencies
originating in representative democraticsystemsfallunderdirect
controlofthearmedforces.Thishappensin situations inwhichthe
conditions fora military coupareas yetlackingbutthedevelopment
ofclass conflict callsforincreasedintervention ofthearmedforces.
The military in thiscontexthas becomemorethanthe "ultimate
reserveoforder"thatintervenes only"in thelastinstance,"butitis
notyetthedirectholderofpoliticalpower.Itscontinual intervention
inanddirectcontrol overpoliticalactionsgiveevidenceofthegravity
ofthecrisisandtheimpossiblity ofimmediate resolution.
In thiscase we are notdealingwithmilitary governments with
populistprojects,as in Peru,or even military regimeswithcivilian
facades,as was thecase withBordaberry in Uruguay.In thesetwo
cases, a military couphadalreadydestroyed therepresentative dem-
ocraticsystem andestablishedanewpoliticalequilibrium. Inthecase
ofa populistmilitary coalition,
politicalinstabilityarisesfrom thefact
thattherepresentative democracyis no longercapable of guaran-
teeingthestability ofbourgeoisdomination without at thesametime
producing thefactorsnecessaryfortheestablishment of a military
dictatorship.
Such a situationis necessarily transitory;ifitis prolonged, as in
Argentina, it worsensall thesystem'scontradictions. This typeof
coalitionlackstheefficacy ofmilitaryrepression orpopulistmobiliza-
tion.In contrast, populistmilitarycoalitionstendtoneutralize them-
selvesandto stimulate thedevelopment ofsocialconflict.
In Argentina, thefirst
militarysolution(1966-1973) hadno success,
butneither didthePeronist government succeedinachieving political
stabilizationforthecountry. The military dictatorship was imposed
by thecoup of JuanCarlos Onganiain 1966.After1955,withthe
defeatoftheworkers'movement thatfounditselfunderthedirection
of the populistbourgeoisie(Peron),the Frondizigovernment had
provedthatitwas impossible togoverninopposition tothisworkers'
movement(even if Peronismand the Leftwere energetically re-
pressed)underrepresentative democratic conditions.The military
coup of 1962overthrew thatgovernment, inaugurating a periodof
civiliangovernment underdirectcontrol ofthearmedforces,charged
withperforming thenecessarypoliticalpurges.
The failureofthishybrid formof regime,whoseciviltaskswere
assumedby representatives of diverseradicaltendencies, revealed
theimpossibilityofsustaininga representativegovernment counter to
Peronism.The middleclasses, the social base of radicalismpar
excellence,wereattracted bythePeronist opposition.The Ongania
dictatorshipsimultaneously managedto liquidateparliamentary
democracy anddividetheworkers'movement. Fromthepositionof
strength thatthecoupconferred on him,Onganiasoughttonegotiate
withthePeronistlaborbureaucracy.
The semi-insurrectionaryeruption of theworkers'movement in
1969,an expressionofan autonomousproletarian dynamicwithre-
spectto theorthodoxlaborbureaucracy, destroyed thebases ofthe
"'stability"thatOnganiaplanned.In 1970,a new coup d'etatde-
stroyed the Ongania regime and broughtRoberto Marcelo
Levingston tothepresidency;hewouldbe deposedshortly thereafter
by AlejandroLanusse. None ofthevicissitudes ofthemilitary dic-
tatorship succeededinbreaking theworking class capacityforstrug-
gle. Faced withthecombativeness ofitsrevolutionary fractions,the
government hadno recoursebuttodividetheworking class through
concessionsto thecorruptunionleaders.Thus,theArgentine dic-
tatorship couldneverprovideimperialist capitalwitha laborforceas
cheap and "disciplined"as the Brazilianone, and was therefore
unableto establishthebases fora capitalistexpansionofthesame
type.
The armedforces,recognizing theirdefeat,decidedto effect-
through a maneuverof Lanusse-an organizedretreat.Lanusse's
call forelectionswas presentedas partof an "organizedretreat"
of the "militaryparty"designedto avoid overthrow by the rising
revolutionary movement and maintainitscontrolover thecivilian
government. Thesuccessofthisformula necessarily dependedonthe
dominanttendenciesin Peronism,whichhad unifiedthe rapidly
developingmassmovement. The calculationsturnedout to be cor-
rect:theconfidence of themassesin Peronplayeda compensating

rolewithrespecttotheforcesliberated bythe"politicalopening."In
thecriticalinitialperiod,thisconfidence servedtoisolaterevolution-
arytendencies.Whenthebourgeoisprojectof Peronism pushedthe
leftwingof thismovement intoopposition, thearmedforceswere
moreor less preparedforit. Peronismhad serveditspurpose,and
preciselybecauseithad doneso wellitdivided,and tendedtoward
dissipation.In thisstage,availingitselfofthemilitaryapparatusthat
hadbeenkeptintact,the"military party"revealeditselfas thetrue
bourgeoisparty.Undertheseconditions, itcontrolled
theadvanceof
Peronism, to whichit had passedtheresponsibility of dividing
and
discipliningtheworking class. Giventhatthelatteralreadypossessed
an autonomous classdynamic, thePeronistgovernment ceasedtobe
forthebourgeoisie
efficient and no longerrepresented anythingfor
the proletariat. The military coup of March1976was the logical
consequenceofthisimpasse.
MILITARY SEMIPOPULISM
Another typeofmilitaryregime is military

semipopulism, inwhich
coercionis notprimary oris considerably lesspronounced thaninthe
forms mentioned up to now. In this the
typeofregime, armytries-
andtoa certain extentsucceeds-toperform theroleofan ideological
apparatus themasses certainpopulistpartiesand achievesa
for of
modicum ofconsensusthrough a setofsocialreforms andnationalist
measures(or policies presentedas such). One cannot speak of
populisminthestrictsenseoftheterm,becausethereis little,ifany,
popularmobilization inlabororpoliticalmassorganizations suchas
theArgentine Confederaci6n Generaldel Trabajo(GeneralConfed-
erationof Workers-CGT), the VenezuelanAD, and so on. The
attempt oftheseregimes toappropriate civilianpopularinstruments,
dulystaffed andgivennewlifebymilitary personnel,generally results
insemifailure, theclassicexamplebeingthePeruvianSINAMOS.
These regimesare usuallycharacterized by "Bonapartism,"a
relativelyhighlevelofautonomy withregard tothedominant classes
andan apparent roleofarbitrator amongantagonistic socialforces.In
military Bonapartism, the armygoverns,eliminating politicalper-
sonnelandtraditional institutions(parties,parliaments,magistrates,
etc.) of thedominant classes,and developsa policythatobtainsa
certainpopularsupportand simultaneously safeguardsthe estab-

lished social and economic order. This is generallyled by a
charismatic-typeindividual(the "Bonaparte")who exercisesthe
functionsofarbitrator
withinthemilitaryapparatus.
In the1940sand1950s,LatinAmericaexperienced variousexam-
ples of militaryBonapartismtransformed into populistcivilian
Bonapartism.This was the case with Per6n,withthe Bolivian
MovimientoNacional Revolucionaria(National Revolutionary
Movement-MNR).In thecase ofexistingsemipopulist regimes on
thecontinent,thistransition andthestatemaintains
hasnotoccurred,
itsmilitarized
character.
Threeexamplesof thistypeof regimeare those of Peru, Panama,
andEcuador.The Peruviancase is byfarthemostimportant, owing
to thescopeofreforms undertaken and to itspoliticalimpacton the
continent and beyond.The Panamanianand Ecuadorianregimes
appearto limittheirsemipopulism to variouseconomicand diplo-
maticmeasuresinopposition to certainNorthAmericaninterests.
In hisanalysisofthePeruvianregime, thesociologist JulioCotler
defined thetwoaxesofthepopulistmilitary modelas "themoderniza-
tionofthecapitalistsystemandtheneutralization ofpopularmobili-
zation"(Cotler,1969:11).Modernization meansontheone hand,the
eliminationoftraditional
oligarchicstructures and,ontheotherhand,
reformulation ofthesystem ofdependency; neutralizationimpliesthe
demobilization ofanypopularmovement thatoverstepsthebounds
or rhythms oftheprocessofmodernization establishedby themili-
taryregime.
ThecausesoftheOctober1968coupthatoverthrew the"constitu-
tional"government of PresidentFernandoBelaunde Terrywere
locatedon differentlevelsofthesocialreality:
The incapacityof thetraditionalpoliticalsystemto modernizesocial

relations above all in the countryside and to realize the reforms
necessaryfor maintenanceof the social order in particular,the
impotenceof the governmentand the parliamentto overcomethe
landed oligarchy'sresistanceto the agrarianreformurgentlyneeded
aftermassivepeasantmobilizationsof the 1960sand guerrillamove-
mentsamongdiscontented ruralpopulations.
The crisis of hegemonydue to the weakening,corruption,and
demoralizationboth of the governmentand of the parliamentary
opposition(theAPRA) and a successionofpoliticalscandals,thelast
of which was the capitulationistagreementwiththe International

PetroleumCompany(Villaneuva,1969).
The authoritarian/modernistnationalismthatconstituted thespecific
ideologyof the Peruvianmilitaryas a social category,allowingan
understandingofitsreactionto thissituationand theestablishmentof
the"semipopulist"junta presidedoverbyVelasco Alvarado.
Thislatterbegantotakeshapeafter1958withtheestablishment of
theCentrode AltosEstudiosMilitares (CenterofAdvancedMilitary
Studies-CAEM), whose instructors included,alongsidethe tra-
ditionalmilitary, developmentalist economistsclose to ECLA (the
UnitedNations'EconomicCommission forLatin America).This
was the genesisof an ideologicalcombination sui generis of the
political-military problematicof counterinsurgency and socio-
economicconcernsofa modernizing andreformist type.The practi-
cal conclusion ofthisinstructionwasthateconomicdevelopment and
socialprogress werethebestguarantees againstsubversion.As the
sociologist Liisa North(1966:53) observed,"thenewmilitary ideol-
ogyproposestheimprovement ofsocialandeconomicconditions so
thatthegrievanceson thebasis of whichrevolutionary groupscan
obtainsupportwillbe eliminated."
The1968coupwasonlythelastofa seriesofpoliticalinterventions
by the army,whichalso constituted milestonesin its ideological
evolutiontowarda "reformist" conception.In 1962thearmytook
powerin orderto preventpresident-elect VictorRaul Haya de la
Torrefromassumingoffice.(Since 1932,the yearof the APRA's
uprising inthecityofTrujillo, thearmedforceshadconsidered Haya
de la Torre'spartythe"historicalenemy.")Duringtheshortduration
ofthemilitary regime(1962-1963) itwas confronted withthelargest
masscampesinomovement inrecentPeruvian history,intheVallede
la Convenci6n.Combinedintervention ofthepoliceandthemilitary
finallysucceededin crushing anddestroying campesinounionsand
militiasdirectedby the MarxistHugo Blanco. Aftertheelectoral
victoryin 1963of BelauindeTerry, thecandidatesupportedby the
military, thearmedforcesretired fromthepoliticalscene,onlyto
return in 1965to confront a newdangerto theestablished order:the
ruralguerrillas of the Movimiento de la IzquierdaRevolucionaria
(Movement oftheRevolutionary Left-MIR), a Marxistbreakaway
from theAPRA ledbyLuis de la PuenteUceda, andtheEjercitode

Liberaci6nNacional(ArmyofNationalLiberation-ELN), a dissi-
dentcommunist grouplead by HectorBejar.Thejointchiefsofstaff
ofthearmedforcesforcedthepresident to suspendtheconstitution
andgrantbroadpowerstothearmyunderthecommandof Generals
JuanVelascoAlvaradoandJorgeFernandezMaldonado(twofuture
leadersof the 1968junta). This counterinsurgency operationsuc-
ceeded in physicallycrushingthe guerrillasand theircampesino
sympathizers.
circles,thesetwoexperiences
In militaiy significantly
contributed
to strengtheningtheconclusionsdrawnfromtheCAEM seminars:
onlyeconomicdevelopment, socialreforms,and themodernization
oftherelations ofproduction couldprevent threatstotheestablished
orderandresurgence ofrevolutionary fociandguaranteesocialpeace
and"nationalsecurity." In thewordsoftheforeign ministerGeneral
EdgardoMercadoJarrin, in a speechbeforetheUnitedNationsin
September 1969:
The concepts of well-being,development,and securityarefirmlyand

directlyrelated,giventhatthemiseryand exploitationthatexistat the
base of underdevelopednationsfan an explosivesituationwhose con-
to dramatizeherewvithexcessive words[cited
sequences I do not wvant
in Cotler,1969:12].
Underthecircumstances, thescandalof the Act of Talara (the

agreement reachedbetweentheBelautnde Terrygovernment andthe
International PetroleumCompany(IPC), whichcontained incredible
concessionsto the U.S. petroleum company)was simplythe im-
mediatecauseofthemilitary takeover in1968.Ofcourse,nationalism
was fromthe outset one of the centralpolitical axes of the
semipopulist junta,whichmovedfromtheexpropriation oftheIPC
properties (therefineryof Talara,etc.) to a seriesof protectionist
measures(suchas thedeclaration of a 200-milelimitforterritorial
waters)andfurther (suchas Cerrode Pasco).
nationalizations
Nevertheless, thecombinedeffects ofthesenationalist measures
didnotplace Peru'sdependency inquestionbutonlyreformulated it
in termsmorefavorableto the Peruvianbourgeoisie.Thus, in a
parallelto thenationalization
oftheIPC, petroleum agreementsand
concessionswere signedwitha seriesof otherNorthAmerican
transnational companies:OccidentalPetroleum Corporation,British
Petroleum, Belco Petroleum, GettyOil,StandardOilofIndiana,and

others.In an articleentitled"Oil: Boom intheAndes,"Newssweek
pointedoutthat
"although Peru's m1ilitary regime expropriatedIniternationalPetrco-

leumn. . General JuantVelasco . . is opening up the countryto
foreigndrills. . . For the moment,at least, all threecouintries
[Peru,
Ecuado,; and Colombial seem inclinedto give thepriorityto oil pro-
ductionratherthannsationtalistfervor"[ Newsweek, October18,1971].
Foranotherthing,in1969thePeruvianmilitarygovernment signed
a contractwithSouthernPeru Copperforthe exploitation of the
Cuajonedeposits,amongtherichestintheworld.Copper,itshould
be noted,is one of Peru's principalexports($234 millionin 1969
comparedwith$10.9millionforpetroleum).
DiverseandrepeateddeclarationsbyVelascoAlvarado,president
ofthejunta,clearlydemonstrated thelimitsofPeruviannationalism
anditsfearofdisruptingtheglobalsystem ofdependency.Ina speech
on July28, 1968,thegeneralsaid,
Developmlenit ica requiresforeign1

in1LatiniAm1er capital. But thiscapi-
tal does notcomnehereforphilantthropic reasons. It comesfor itsown
initerests.
Weare dealing, therefore, witha muttual interestthatshould
be m1acnaged in a manntier
that is clear and just for the benefitof both
parties.
Thismoderation explains,inturn,whytheauthorities
oftheUnited
Statescontemplated the development regimeslike the
of military
Peruvian.In hisreport Nixonin1970,NelsonRockefel-
to President
lerwrote,
is arising which often becomes a poweiful factor

A newvtype of rnilita,-y
of social evolutioniin the American republics. This new military,
motivated bv tl growing impatienice with corruption, inefficiency,anid
thestagnationiofthepoliticalorde,;proposes toadapt itsauthoritarian
to the enidsof social an1deconomnic
traditioni progress.
Amongthe social transformations undertaken by thejunta,un-

doubtedlythemostimportant was theagrarianreform.By limiting
ruralholdingsto 200 hectareson thecoast and 165hectaresin the
highlands,the militarygovernment eliminatedthe socioeconomic
foundation of theold ruraloligarchy; at thesametime,through the

systemofcompensation (agrariandebtbondshad to be investedin
industry), itobligedtheexpropriated hacendadosto becomeindus-
trialcapitalists(Quijano, 1970:15). The preambleto the law em-
phasizedthattheobjectivesoftheagrarian reform, asidefrom "social
justiceintheruralworld,"weretocontribute ina decisivewaytothe
formation of a broad intermal marketand to generatethe capital
necessaryfortherapidindustrialization ofthecountry. One can add
to thesesocioeconomicobjectivesa politicaldimension, expressed
by GeneralErnestoMontagneSanchez,primeminister andminister
ofwar,on July19,1969:"theagrarianreform law is an obstacleto
theadvanceof communism." It is stilltoo earlyto tellifthePeru-
vian agrarianreform, whichis represented as the mostradicalof
thoseimposed"fromabove" (as opposedto thoseimposed"from
below" by thecampesinos,as in Mexicoand Bolivia),willachieve
itsobjectives.
The Peruvianmilitary functioned toa certainextentas a newtype
withitsuniformed
ofpoliticalparty, "militants," its"centralcommit-
tee" (the hierarchicalassemblyof the threeservices),its various
ideologicalwingsand tendencies, and so on. However,itcouldnot
performall the tasks of a political apparatus: mobilization/
neutralizationand containment ofthepopularmasses,and so forth.
Thus,ithad to acquirecivilianinstruments capableofreplacing the
politicalpartiesor traditionallabororganizations or of competing
withthem:theConfederacion de TrabajadoresRevolucionarios del
Peru(theConfederation ofRevolutionary Workers ofPeru-CTR P).
the MovimientoLaboristaRevolucionario(Revolutionary Labo-r
Movement-MLR, activein the1968Peruvianrevolution), among
others.The mostimportant of theseinstitutions was the Sistema
Nacionalde Apoyoa la MovilizacionSocial (NationalSystemof
SupportforSocial Mobilization-SINAMOS), createdin 1971and
dividedintoeightregionscorresponding to the military regions.
withinwhichthemilitary commander was also chiefofS IN AMOS.
The purposeof thisstructure was to ensurethecontainment ofthe
populationon a local basis (farms,shantytowns,barrios)and to
integratetheunions,peasantleagues,andotherpopularassociations
intothestateapparatus.
But in realitythe Velasco Alvaradoregimedid not succeed in
gaininga broadsocialbase or inpromoting a realpopularmobiliza-
tion,beingoverthrown bya military coup in 1975.The newmilitary
junta,underGeneralFrancisoMoralesBermuidez, putan endtothe

semipopulist experiment in Peruand adopteda proimperialist ori-
entation.Confronted withpopulardiscontent,it opted to pro-
gressivelyreestablish
civiliangovernment withtheconvocation ofa
constituentassemblyin1977anda presidential electionin 1980.The
victoryin thepresidential contestof BelauindeTerry(thesameex-
presidentwhohadbeenoverthrown by Velascoin1968)signaledthe
to
return government of the traditional
bourgeoispoliticalforcesthat
hadbeendisplayedbythemilitary andthereturn ofthearmedforces
to their
"constitutional"role ofguarantorsoftheestablished order.It
is interestingthat,in contrastto the situationin Argentina and
Bolivia,Peruvianmilitary semipopulism didnotmakea deepimpres-
sionon thepopularandlabormovement.
CONCLUSION
The experienceofNicaraguain 1978-1979, following thatofCuba
duringthe1950s,appearsto suggestthat,at leastin thecase ofthe
moretraditional military dictatorships,veryfew military cadres,
finding themselves ina situationofrevolutionary crisis,crossoverto
thepopularcamp:themilitary apparatuscontinuesto function right
uptoitsowndestruction as analmostmonolithic repressivemachine.
Thisdoes notmeanthatthearmedforcesand theirofficer corps
alwaysremain immune totheideological crisisthatbesetsestablished
ideological apparatuses (thechurch, theuniversities,etc.)orpolitical
apparatuses(mass parties,etc). It is probable,however,thatsuch
crisestakeradicalformsonlyinlimitedand marginal sectorsofthe
military hierarchy.Themajority ofcareerofficers willcontinue, inthe
foreseeablefuture, to choose amongmilitary semipopulism, partial
retreat from thepoliticalscene,andtheinstitution ofa predominantly
coercivestate(orsomecombination ofthesethreemodels,as seenin
Argentina in 1974-1976).
It is difficult
to determine whetherthisreduction of therangeof
politicalchoicesfortheLatinAmericanarmedforcesand theirpre-
dilection forthemoreauthoritarian alternativesaretheresultofsocial
factors(theclass originsoftheofficer corps),economic-corporative
factors("caste privileges"),or ideologicalfactors(systematic au-
thoritarian andanticommunist conservatism intheformation ofmili-
tarypersonnel).Surelyitis a fusionofthesevariousfactors.Itseems
probablethatthearmedforceswillcontinueto serveas guardians of
theestablishedorder,modernizers, reformers,
and,aboveall,agents
of repression.The presentpolicyof U.S. imperialism, underthe
Reagan administration, openlyfavorsthe mostauthoritarian and
antipopularvarietiesofmilitary statesinLatinAmerica,whether of
traditional
(CentralAmerica)or modem form(SouthernCone),
providingthemwiththebroadestpossibleeconomic,diplomatic, and
assistance.
military
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1968 Capitalisitneet sous-diveloppmnent eniAtneriqueLatine. Paris: Masper.
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Halperin Donghi, Tulio
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Lowy, Sader - The Militarization of The State in Latin America

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The Militarization of the State in Latin America

Author(s): Michael Lowy, Eder Sader, Stephen Gorman

Military havebeena characteristic

*Michael Lowy is Research Director at the Centre National de Recherche Scien-

LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES, Issue 47, Vol. 12 No. 4, Fall 19857-40

existingone,andtherefore military tyranniesbecamethenorminthe

namely,to defendthenationfromexternalaggressionandto defend

Latin America(and elsewhere)requirestheconstantand habitual

velopment, nationalunity,defenseagainstsubversion, and so on. In

factorexceptwhenthemilitary apparatusentersintocrisisand the

FACTORS IN THE MILITARIZATION

Behindthistendency towardthemilitarization oftheLatinAmeri-

Whatarethecauses ofthistendency towardthemilitarization of

be disappearing (see Furtado,1973,and MauroMarini,1973).The

Uprootedfromthe mode of circulationthatcharacterizedthe export

The politicalregimesthatinstalledthemselves afterthebeginning

This demandis not an artificiala posteriori creationbut a direct

intensificationof consumption of a limitedprivilegedbase. This

measures(Peru underVelasco Alvarado,PanamaunderTorrijos,

TRADITIONAL MILITARY DICTATORSHIPS

previoIIs North Americantimilitaryoccupation; the chiefsof tie Na-

Letus examinethismoreclosely.Whataretheproblems thatthese

tionand reduceincome,is notallowedto consumethewealthpro-

NEW MILITARY DICTATORSHIPS

The newmilitary shareswiththetraditional

developedlabormovement thathas maturedduringperiodsofrela-

The bestexampleoftheseregimesis theBraziliandictatorship.

all thebourgeoisfractions in therepresentative democraticmodel

The military dictatorship was thenable to resumethe initiative,

indifferenceand the"realization"of consumerism. Withthese,the

by his Partido Democratico-Cristiano (Christian Democratic

forcing all demandsto theirmaximum and exacerbating all discon-

Destruction of thewholelegalapparatusdid notmeanthatthe

it is because Chileansocietywas themostcontami-

POPULIST MILITARY COALITIONS

rect:theconfidence of themassesin Peronplayeda compensating

Another typeofmilitaryregime is military

certainpopularsupportand simultaneously safeguardsthe estab-

The incapacityof thetraditionalpoliticalsystemto modernizesocial

of which was the capitulationistagreementwiththe International

from theAPRA ledbyLuis de la PuenteUceda, andtheEjercitode

The concepts of well-being,development,and securityarefirmlyand

Underthecircumstances, thescandalof the Act of Talara (the

Petroleum, Belco Petroleum, GettyOil,StandardOilofIndiana,and

"although Peru's m1ilitary regime expropriatedIniternationalPetrco-

Developmlenit ica requiresforeign1

is arising which often becomes a poweiful factor

Amongthe social transformations undertaken by thejunta,un-

foundation of theold ruraloligarchy; at thesametime,through the

junta,underGeneralFrancisoMoralesBermuidez, putan endtothe

Barros de Castro, Antonio

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