Daf Ditty Pesachim 11: A Knotty Situation

My tale is one of tortuous frustration,

when two ropes caused me aggravation,
and my every effort resulted in a situation
that left me in a state of angry indignation!

Oh, what a knotty problem I had got,

when I found I could not knot a needed knot!
Though needing help on how to knot a knot,
no one I knew, knew how to knot my needed knot!

I had two short ropes - which I’d a need to knot,

and which I’d knot together with a special knot,
but it never worked, for the knot did not knot,
and my knot came undone! I felt such a clot!

Firstly, I took the ropes, which I twisted tight

together, but still the end result, was not right,
for when I tugged, the knot, not only fell apart,
but showed no sign of a knot! Making a fresh start,

I took one rope, and placed it firmly under

the other. This was so easy, I did wonder
if my actions should have been reversed,
for it too fell apart! Oh, how I cursed!

Seems tying knots is not for faint hearts,

for any knot, that’s not knotted, soon parts
when it’s put to the test! That I’m not a knot
expert, you can tell. Truly, my forte is not

that of being very good at tying knots,

for I do not understand what knots
need, to keep them from falling apart!
Tying a knot right, right from the start,

is important, and that’s why my knot

was not reliable, but why I did not
understand. Yes, I’ve tied many knots.
but they’re knots known as Granny Knots.

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Other knots are what folks call a Slip Knot.
Then there’s the Turk’s Head - a special knot,
as is the Cat’s Paw, Clove Hitch, and Bowline.
Truth to tell, - none of these resembles mine!

Then there’s a Timber Hitch, which is a knot

that truly puzzles me, and not an easy knot to knot!
There’s many other knots, that need the greatest skill,
such as the Hangman’s Knot - a knot that’s made to ****!

Whilst the sheepshank? That’s a tricky one to see!

So many knots, but they’re not knots for me.
Methinks of all the knots, the one true knot for me,
is the “Lover’s Knot”, which I have tied successfully!

Dennis Barter: (I Could Not Knot a Knot.)

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MISHNA: Rabbi Yehuda says: One searches for leaven on the evening of the fourteenth of
Nisan, and on the fourteenth in the morning, and at the time of the removal of leaven. And
the Rabbis say: that is not the case; however, if one did not search on the evening of the
fourteenth, he should search on the fourteenth during the day.

Rav Yosef raised an objection to this explanation, seeking to prove that even according to Rabbi
Yehuda one need not conduct three searches for leaven. He explained that Rabbi Yehuda lists the
three times when one may conduct a search for leaven. It was taught in a baraita that Rabbi
Yehuda says: Anyone who did not search at these three times may no longer search.

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Apparently, Rabbi Yehuda does not hold that one must conduct three searches. Rather, in regard
to whether or not one may conduct a search for leaven if he failed to conduct a search at one of
those three opportunities, it is from this point forward that they disagree. The Rabbis hold that
one may conduct the search even after the time of the removal of leaven, and Rabbi Yehuda
disagrees.

And here, in the mishna, it is about this that they disagree: One Sage, Rabbi Yehuda, maintains
that before the prohibition against eating leaven takes effect, yes, one may conduct a search;
after the prohibition against eating leaven takes effect, no, one may no longer conduct a search,
due to a rabbinic decree lest one come to eat from the leaven while searching for it. And the
Rabbis maintain: We do not issue a decree lest one come to eat from the leaven, and he may
therefore conduct a search even after the prohibition against eating leaven has taken effect.

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The Gemara raises a difficulty: And does Rabbi Yehuda issue a decree lest one come to eat
from the leaven in whose removal he is engaged?

But didn’t we learn in a mishna: Once the omer offering was sacrificed, people would go out
and find the markets of Jerusalem filled with flour and toasted grain, all from the new crop.

This grain was undoubtedly harvested and processed when the Torah prohibition against eating
from the new crop was still in effect.

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However, with regard to those people who harvest the crop before the omer is sacrificed, they act
contrary to the will of the Sages. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir.

The concern is that while working with the grain they might come to eat from it, despite the fact
that it is still prohibited.

Rabbi Yehuda says: They act in accordance with the will of the Sages. And in that case, Rabbi
Yehuda did not issue a decree lest one eat from it. Why, then, does he issue a decree with regard
to leaven?

Rava said that the prohibition of new grain is different: Since before the omer you permitted
one to harvest the crop only by picking it by hand and may not harvest it in the typical manner,
he will remember the prohibition and refrain from eating it.

That is not the case with regard to leaven.

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Abaye said to him: This works out well in explaining Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion with regard to the
time when one is picking the grain; however, with regard to the time of grinding and sifting,
what can be said? Apparently, it is permitted to perform these acts in a typical manner. Why,
then, is there no concern lest one eat the grain at that stage?

The Gemara responds: This is not difficult, as one also performs grinding in an atypical manner.
One must grind the grain before the sacrificing of the omer with a hand mill, not with a mill
powered by an animal or by water. Likewise, sifting is performed atypically, not in the interior of
the sifter. Instead, it is performed on top of the sifter. Since all of these actions are performed in
an atypical manner, there is no concern lest he come to eat the grain.

The Gemara raises another difficulty: However, with regard to that which we learned in a mishna:
One may harvest grain from a field that requires irrigation and from fields in the valleys, as
their grain ripens long before the omer is sacrificed, but one may not pile the produce, and the

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Gemara adds: And we established that this mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi
Yehuda; what can be said? The use of the term: One may harvest, in this mishna indicates that
the grain was harvested in a typical manner, not by hand.

Rather, Abaye said: This difference between the cases of the omer and leaven is not based on the
manner in which one harvests, grinds, or sifts. Instead, the reason for the different rulings is that
from new grain, one distances himself, as it is prohibited to eat the new grain all year until the
omer is offered. But from leavened bread one does not distance himself, as it is permitted during
the rest of the year. Therefore, he is more likely to unwittingly eat leaven.

RASHI

The above conclusion was that Rabbi Yehuda distinguishes between prohibitions involving
substances from which people regularly separate themselves and prohibitions involving substances
from which people are not used to keeping their distance. The Gemara asks: And anywhere that
one does not distance himself from a prohibition, does Rabbi Yehuda issue a decree that one
must keep away from a prohibited item to avoid accidentally using it?

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But didn’t we learn in a mishna: A person may not pierce a hole in an eggshell, and fill it with
oil, and place it beside a lamp so that the egg will drip additional oil into the lamp and thereby
extend the time that it burns? And this is the ruling even if it is not an actual egg but an
earthenware tube, from which most people consider it unsuitable to drink. The concern is lest one
forget and take the tube and use the oil for some other purpose, and violate the prohibition against
extinguishing a flame on Shabbat.

Mishnah Shabbat 2:4

The fundamental dispute in this mishna is with regard to the determination whether or not
indirect acts of kindling and extinguishing fall within the parameters of the prohibition on
Shabbat. The Rabbis said: A person may not pierce a hole in an eggshell and fill it with oil, and
place it over the mouth of a lamp so that the egg will drip additional oil into the lamp and
thereby extend the time that it burns. And this is the ruling even if it is not an actual egg but an
earthenware vessel. And Rabbi Yehuda permits doing so.

However, if the craftsman, who crafts ceramic vessels, attached the egg to the lamp from the
outset, one is permitted to fill it with oil because it constitutes a single, large vessel. The Rabbis
decreed that a person may not fill a bowl with oil, and place it beside the lamp, and place the
unlit head of the wick into the bowl so that it draws additional oil from the bowl and thereby
extend the time that the lamp burns. And Rabbi Yehuda permits doing so.

And Rabbi Yehuda permits using a tube in that manner, as he is not concerned lest one remove
it. Apparently, Rabbi Yehuda does not issue a decree even with regard to an item from which
people do not distance themselves, e.g., oil.

The Gemara answers: There, due to the stringency of Shabbat, one distances himself, as on
Shabbat one is careful to distance himself from a candle or anything placed alongside it.

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10
And the Gemara raised a contradiction between this halakha of Shabbat and another halakha
of Shabbat, as it was taught in a baraita: With regard to the rope of a bucket that was severed
on Shabbat, where one needs the rope to draw water from a well, he may not tie it with a regular
knot, as by Torah law it is prohibited to tie a permanent knot.

Rather, he may tie it into a bow. However, Rabbi Yehuda says: One may wrap a money belt
[punda] around it or a sash [pesikya], provided that he does not tie it into a bow, lest he tie a
proper knot.

The Gemara continues: Likewise, the contradiction between one statement of Rabbi Yehuda and
the other statement of Rabbi Yehuda is not difficult, as the reason for the opinion of Rabbi
Yehuda is not because he issues a decree to prohibit tying a bow due to the prohibition against
tying a knot.

Rather, the reason is more fundamental, because Rabbi Yehuda maintains that a bow itself is
a full-fledged knot. According to Rabbi Yehuda, tying a bow is included in the prohibition against
tying a knot on Shabbat.

Summary

A person is detached from chadash but is not detached from chametz.

We learned that Rabbi Yehudah maintains that one cannot handle a forbidden food because he
may come to eat from it, yet we learned in a Mishnah that once the omer offering (the omer offering
was a minchah offering brought on the sixteenth day of Nissan, which is the second day of Pesach;
the omer was comprised of fine barely flour that was made from that year’s new crop) was offered,
people would find that very day that the marketplaces of Jerusalem contained regular flour and
oven-dried grain from the new crop (known as chadash, which could not be used until the omer
was offered), and Rabbi Meir maintains that this practice was done against the will of the
Chachamim.1

Rabbi Yehudah, however, maintains that the Chachamim did not object to this practice out of a
concern that one working with the new grain may come to eat it before the omer was offered. The
Gemora suggests according to one opinion that with regard to chadash, a person is detached from
the new grain because a person will not eat from the new grain all year round, so there is no reason

1
The flour was being sold immediately after the omer had been offered, so the grain had obviously been picked, ground, and dried
in an oven before Pesach.

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to suspect that by handling the new grain he will come to eat from it without thinking. Regarding
chametz, however, a person is accustomed to eating chametz throughout the year, so we are
concerned that if he would find chametz after it is prohibited, he may come to eat it, so Rabbi
Yehudah decreed that one should not search for chametz on the fourteenth after chametz is
prohibited.

There is a dispute if on Shabbos one can perforate an eggshell and fill it with
oil and place the eggshell next to a lamp so the oil will drip into the burning
lamp.

The Chachamim maintain that one cannot perforate an eggshell on Shabbos, fill the shell with oil,
and place the shell next to a lamp, in order that the oil in the shell drips into the lamp. The reason
this is forbidden is because we are concerned that the person may remove oil from the shell for
another use and this is a violation of the melachah of extinguishing. Rabbi Yehudah, however,
maintains that this is permitted, although people are not detached from oil, as they use it all, the
time. Nonetheless, Rabbi Yehudah permits using this lamp, because the stringency of Shabbos
causes people to detach themselves from any Shabbos prohibition. Rabbi Yehudah reasons that a
person will not make a mistake and take from the oil.

There is a dispute regarding a rope of a pail that snapped on Shabbos if one can
tie the ends of the knot together.

The Chachamim maintain that if the rope of a pail snapped on Shabbos, one is forbidden to tie the
ends of the rope into a knot, because one is prohibited from tying a knot on Shabbos. Rather, one
should tie the ends of the rope with a bow. Rabbi Yehudah, however, maintains that one can wind
a hollow belt or garter around the torn ends as long as he does not fashion the ends of the rope into
a bow, because rabbi Yehudah is concerned that while tying the two ends together, he may come
to fashion a regular knot instead of a bow.

Although the Chachamim ruled that one cannot perforate the eggshell and place it next to the lamp
to allow the oil to drip, that is because one will confuse oil that he normally uses with the oil in the
shell, and he will come to remove then oil from the shell.

With regard to tying, however, the Chachamim maintain that one will not confuse tying a bow
with tying a knot. Rabbi Yehudah, however, maintains that tying a bow is not forbidden because
one may come to tie a knot, but rather because tying a bow is also under the prohibition of tying a
knot.

There is a dispute whether one can tie a pail to the top of the well with a garter
using a regular knot.

The Chachamim maintain that one can tie a pail to the top of a well with a garter using a regular
knot because he will not forget about his garter, and he will replace the garter with a normal rope
after Shabbos.

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Such a knot that is not permanent is permitted to fashion on Shabbos. One cannot tie a regular rope
to the pail, however, because we are concerned that he may leave the rope there permanently and
then he is in violation of tying a permanent knot on Shabbos.

Rabbi Yehudah maintains that one can even tie the pail to the top of the well with a rope. The
Gemora explains that the rope referred to here is a weaver’s rope, which one will not leave tied to
the pail because it is not strong or because the weaver will not allow the rope to remain there
because he requires the rope for his work.

The Chachamim forbid one to tie the pail with a weaver’s rope because if we permit him to tie the
pail with a weaver’s rope, he may come to tie the pail with a regular rope which is forbidden. Rabbi
Yehudah, however, maintains that because of the stringency of Shabbos one will not come to tie
the pail with a regular rope.

REMOVING OIL FROM A LAMP ON SHABBOS

Rav Mordechai Kornfeld writes:2

Our Daf cites the Mishnah in Shabbos (29b) see above, that states that according to the
Chachamim, one may not place, on Erev Shabbos, a reed (or other receptacle that contains oil)
with a hole in it above a burning flame so that the oil will drip into the lamp on Shabbos. The
Chachamim were concerned that one might be tempted to take oil from the container on Shabbos
and thereby transgress an Isur d'Oraisa.

What Melachah will he perform if he removes oil from the container?

RASHI explains that he will perform the Melachah of Mechabeh, extinguishing a flame.
How does one extinguish the flame in the lamp by removing oil from the container that drips into
the lamp? Although he indirectly causes the flame in the lamp to go out sooner, this is considered
"Geram Kibuy" and should not be prohibited, because we rule like the Rabanan (Shabbos 120a)
who permit Geram Kibuy! (ROSH, Beitzah 2:17)

ROSH answers that the act of removing oil from the container is more severe than other acts of
Geram Kibuy. In a normal case of Geram Kibuy, one places earthenware pots full of water around
a fire so that the water will extinguish the fire when the pots burst (see Shabbos 120a-120b).

This form of Geram Kibuy is permitted. In contrast, when one removes oil so that it does not drip
into the lamp, one causes the fire to go out in a more direct way -- by removing its fuel, the oil.

Removal of the fire's fuel is a more direct act of extinguishing than placing something in the fire's
path which will eventually extinguish the fire. Therefore, this act is forbidden because of
Mechabeh, even though it merely causes the fire to go out sooner.

2
https://www.dafyomi.co.il/pesachim/insites/ps-dt-011.htm

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(TOSFOS in Beitzah (22a, DH veha'Mistapek) does not accept this logic. Tosfos maintains that
one who removes oil from an oil lamp is not Chayav for Mechabeh, because the removal of the
fuel of a fire is a normal act of Geram Kibuy and is permitted. For this reason, Tosfos permits
cutting (with a flame, so as not to make a Kli) the bottom half of a candle that is lit, even though
doing so removes the flame's fuel.

Why, then, may one not remove oil from an oil lamp?

Tosfos explains that at the very moment that one removes oil from a lamp that is burning, the flame
becomes smaller or weaker. Making the fire smaller or weaker is an act of Mechabeh.

According to Tosfos, why should removing oil from the container that drips into the lamp be
forbidden? The container itself is not burning; it merely holds the oil which drips into the lamp
that is burning.

How can removing some of the oil possibly affect the fire?

TIFERES SHMUEL (on the Rosh in Beitzah) explains that according to Tosfos, the fear is that
one will remove all of the oil from the receptacle. By removing all of the oil, it
will immediately stop dripping into the lamp, and thus the flame will be affected immediately.

However, this answer is difficult to understand, because even when one removes all of the oil, one
does not weaken the flame itself. One merely prevents the oil from being added to the lamp to
strengthen the flame. Stopping the drip does not lessen the existing fire in any measure.

Perhaps Tosfos maintains that the Gemara refers to a case in which the oil in the receptacle drips
directly into the oil lamp in such a way that there is a steady stream of oil (or an elongated drop of
oil) from the receptacle into the lamp. When one removes oil, it is possible that he might draw
back that stream of oil minutely and lessen the amount of oil supplied to the flame in the lamp.
This effectively would be the same as removing oil directly from the oil lamp itself, which,
according to Tosfos, causes the flame to weaken.

A slipknot (called an -Anivoh) is not a Halachic knot, and may be made on Shabbos even
if tight (and meant to remain permanently).3 This is because a slipknot is so designed as to make
it possible to undo the knot without reversing the original act or process that created the knot. This
characteristic is an indication that the Anivoh is not a true knot.

3
The 39 Melachos, by Rabbi Dovid Ribiat

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Example: A slipknot is made so that the rope or string passes through the center of the knot. The
presence of the string in the center of the knot allows one to easily undo the knot by simply pulling
the string through it. This is not a Kesher because a true Halachic knot can only be undone by
extricating the knotted string and pulling it apart, i.e., reversing the original act that created the
knot.

Neckties

There is basis to classify a necktie as a form of Anivoh because the narrow end of the tie passes
through the center of the knot and can be easily pulled out to undo the knot. The necktie-knot is
designed to have an adjustable loop (or "noose") to allow room for the neck. The slack of the loop
is also meant to allow one to easily undo the knot between uses. As long as the loop is still
somewhat open, it is easy to pull out the narrow end of the tie. Once this is done, the remaining
knot simply unravels as the two ends are pulled apart. However, a necktie is not completely
identical to a slipknot (which is the classic example of an Anivoh).

In the case of a slipknot, the knot can be undone by pulling the ends of the string in any direction.
As such, a slipknot lacks the fundamental characteristics of a true Halachic knot. This is not the
case with a necktie, in which a tight knot is formed if the loop is closed; this tight knot is not easily
undone.

Some Poskim rule that one is forbidden to make a necktie on Shabbos because of the question of
Koshair. However, many of the foremost Poskim permit making a necktie on Shabbos if one is in
the habit of untying it every day.

However, if the tie is not usually undone after wearing, making the tie on Shabbos is questionable.

Bow-knots

A bow-knot, such as the type used to tie one's shoes, is actually a kind of slipknot formed over a
single knot. The Halachic term for this is Anivoh Al Gabei Kesher - literally, a bow on top of a
knot.

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A bow-knot differs from a slipknot in that it is formed out of the beginnings of a true Kesher. The
two laces are wound once around each other before the loops are formed and bound.

The initial winding (i.e. twining) of the two laces is actually a rudimentary Kesher. Making this
rudimentary Kesher by itself would be completely permitted, as it cannot hold for any length of
time.

However, with the formation of a bow-knot, the entire knot system becomes firm and lasting.
Hence, the formation of the bow-knot causes the initial rudimentary knot to evolve into a type of
semi-permanent knot which may not be made on a permanent basis.

Therefore, one is only permitted to make a bow-knot if it is meant to be undone within 24 hours.

Example: Ornamental ribbon or lace sewn (at the ends) to a blouse, etc. may not be made into a
decorative bow-knot if the bow-knot is to remain for 24 hours or more.

Decorative bow-knots designed to remain permanently

A decorative bow-knot that is ordinarily meant to remain permanently is a true Kesher Shel
Kayama, and may not be made even if the person making it intended to undo it that same day.
(According to many Poskim, making this knot is the melacha of Koshair M'deoraisa.)

For example, permanently attached laces to a slip-on shoe, or ribbons sewn on a blouse may not
be tied into a decorative bow-knot because these knots are strictly ornamental, and are not used
for regularly fastening the garment,. They are thus meant to be tied only once, with the hope that
the bow-knot will remain permanently in place.

Similarly, if any of these bow-knots became loose, they may not be retied on Shabbos or Yom
Tov.

A temporary bow-knot that was later left for longer than 24 hours

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In the case of temporary bow-knots (and other semi-skilled knots that are usually made for a
limited time), the actual duration of the knot is not critical, but rather the intention of the one
making the bow-knot. Therefore, if the original true intention was to make a bow-knot for less
than 24 hours, but the knot was inadvertently left in place for a longer period, no transgression was
done.

Knotty Situations4
Rabbi Yirmiyohu Kaganoff writes:5

4
Born in Washington, D.C., and raised in New York City, Rabbi Yirmiyohu Kaganoff, ‫שליט”א‬, attended Ner Israel Rabbinical
College in Baltimore, MD, from where he received a Bachelor’s degree in ’76, Semicha in ’77 and a Doctorate in Talmudic Law
in ’81.
5
http://rabbikaganoff.com/?s=knotty+situations

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Mrs. Goldstein ties her tichel on Shabbos the way her mother always did. Her son Yankie explains
that she should not tie or untie her tichel this way since it is a double knot. Must Mrs. Goldstein
tie her tichel differently? And may she untie the knot that is holding the tichel on her head?

Yankie’s older brother Reuven returns from yeshivah and tells his mom that it is okay to tie the
baby’s shoes with a double knot. Mom has never done this, always assuming that one cannot tie a
double knot on Shabbos, even though baby Rivka’s shoes almost never stay tied on Shabbos as a
result. Of course, Yankie does not miss the opportunity to disagree with Reuven and emphasize
that one may not tie the shoes on Shabbos just as one may not tie the tichel.

What’s a mother to do?

She calls the Rav, who continues his explanation ….

Some knots are prohibited min haTorah, others are prohibited midirabbanan, while others are
completely permitted. Any knot that may not be tied may not be untied either. If tying it involves
a Torah prohibition, then untying it is forbidden min haTorah (Mishnah Shabbos 111b). If tying
the knot is only midirabbanan, then untying it is midirabbanan. If one is allowed to tie a particular
knot, one may also untie it (Rambam Hilchos Shabbos 10:7).

We learned that according to Rashi and most Rishonim, it is prohibited min haTorah to tie a
permanent knot, midirabbanan to tie a semi-permanent knot, and that it is permitted to tie a
temporary knot. Everyone agrees that Rashi permits tying any knot that will be untied within 24
hours from when it is tied (Beis Yosef 317). On the other hand, everyone agrees that Rashi forbids
tying a knot that is left untied for a week or more. Authorities dispute whether Rashi prohibits
tying a knot meant to last more than 24 hours but less than a week, some viewing this knot as semi-
permanent and others as temporary (Rama 317:1). One may follow the lenient opinion under
extenuating circumstances (Biyur Halacha 317:4 s.v. she’einam kevuim).

According to Rambam, a knot that is permanent is prohibited min haTorah only when it is a type
of knot that a craftsman would use, called a “kesher uman.” A permanent knot that would not be
used by a craftsman is only midirabbanan. In addition, a knot that a craftsman would tie but is not

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permanent is also only midirabbanan, whereas a knot that is neither permanent nor used by a
craftsman is totally permitted. There is some uncertainty as to what is considered a “craftsman’s
knot.” Because of this question, some poskim rule that one should not tie any knot very tightly
even though one intends to untie it shortly (Shiltei HaGibborim).

According to both Rashi and the Rambam, one may tie a knot that will be untied within 24 hours
if it is not extremely tight. Thus, according to all opinions, one may tie a gartel on Shabbos or the
belt on a bathrobe or any other garment that is usually untied as it is removed and is not tied very
tightly. Similarly, a woman may tie her tichel in place because a woman always unties this knot
when she removes it so that she does not dishevel her hair.

TYING A KNOT IN A PIECE OF STRING

Tying a knot with a piece of string or length of rope around itself so that it does not slip through a
hole or unravel is usually prohibited min haTorah according to all opinions (Gemara Shabbos 74b;
Rama 317:1). This knot usually remains permanent and thus is certainly a Torah violation
according to Rashi. Even according to the Rambam that only a craftsman’s knot incurs a Torah
transgression, this is a very tight knot that a craftsman would use for this purpose. (It is interesting
to note that some people call this “a stevedore’s knot,” implying that it is a craftsman’s knot.)
Thus, tying a knot on a threaded needle to hold it in place is prohibited min haTorah.

For the same reason, making a knot on the end of one’s tzitzis to prevent them from unraveling is
prohibited min haTorah. Similarly, it is prohibited min haTorah to tie a balloon on Shabbos.
Therefore, some authorities prohibit blowing up a balloon on Shabbos because of the possibility
that one may mistakenly tie it.

WHAT IS CONSIDERED A CRAFTSMAN’S KNOT?

The definition of a craftsman’s knot is difficult to ascertain. Obviously, it has to be very tight, but
are there other requirements? Because of this uncertainty, a custom developed not to tie any knot
on Shabbos that involves tying one knot on top of another (Shiltei HaGibborim; Rama 317:1)

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which is how most knots are tied. Thus, one might assume that Mrs. Goldstein may not tie her
tichel with a double knot as Yankie told her.

However, most poskim permit tying the tichel as Mrs. Goldstein has been doing and as her mother
did before her. This is because of a combination of several reasons:

Several poskim contend that the custom not to tie a double knot is only when one ties a knot very
tightly (L’vushei S’rad and Pri Megadim on Magen Avraham 317:4; also see Chazon Ish 52:17)
whereas a tichel is tied fairly loosely. Other poskim contend that the custom not to tie a double
knot is only if one intends to leave it tied for more than a day (Aruch HaShulchan 317:10). Thus
there is substantive reason to permit tying a tichel with a double knot (Shmiras Shabbos
K’Hilchasah 15:ftn 167).

It should be noted that many poskim permit double knotting a child’s shoes for the same reason
since the knot is not very tight. Others prohibit it because the reason for the upper knot is to make
the lower knot and bow very tight and that is considered tying a double knot tightly (Shmiras
Shabbos K’Hilchasah 15:53).

ANIVAH

The Gemara concludes that it is permitted to tie an “anivah” on Shabbos. What is an anivah?

Any knot that can be untied without undoing the original knot by pulling on one side of the knot
is an anivah and is permitted. This includes tying bows (without additional knots, see below) and
slipknots (Mordechai, Halachos Ketanos #940). A slipknot is so called because it slips easily along
the cord on which it is made.

The poskim dispute whether one may tie a temporary knot and then a bow on Shabbos. Does the
bow make the knot more permanent and therefore a problem? Most poskim prohibit tying a bow
onto a temporary knot, considering the knot thus created a semi-permanent knot that is prohibited
(Rama 317:5; Taz; Magen Avraham ad loc.).

TYING RIBBONS AND BOWS

20
According to what we have explained, one may not tie a ribbon around a package on Shabbos in
the usual fashion because this involves tying a double knot. However, one may tie the ribbon
without a knot by making two bows even if one ties the bows very tightly (Mishnah Berurah
317:29; Biyur Halacha 317:5 s.v. anivah).

If someone forgot to tie the aravos and hadasim to the lulav before Yom Tov, one cannot tie with
a knot and bow on top of it unless it is a type of knot that one unties every day. One may tie it with
a bow on top of a bow (Taz 317:7).

SUMMARY OF KNOTS

We have learned that one may not tie a permanent or semi-permanent knot or a craftsman’s knot,
and also that one may not tie one tight knot on top of another. According to many poskim, one
may tie a loose knot on top of another loose knot and therefore a woman may tie her tichel with
two knots one on top of the other. Tying a bow or slip knot is permitted since the knot is taken
apart without undoing it but by pulling it apart.

Thus, Mrs. Goldstein may continue to tie her tichel and there are poskim who even permit double
knotting baby Rivka’s shoes. (Although others prohibit double knotting shoes.)

PERMANENT BONDING

Tying knots in a permanent way not only affects halacha but also has hashkafic ramifications.
When Moshe Rabbeinu asked to understand Hashem’s ways, Hashem told him that as long as he
was alive, he would only be able to recognize Hashem “from behind.” Chazal explain that Hashem
showed Moshe the knot of His tefillin, which represents the permanent attachment that exists
between Hashem and the Jewish people.

Just as tefillin are tied with a permanent knot, so too Hashem’s relationship with the Jewish
people is a permanent bond. And just as the tefillin straps tie what is below to what is above, so
too their knot connects our mundane world below to the Heavenly world above.

21
Kesher Aniva
Harav Baruch Gigi writes:6

I. Chakhamim and R. Yehuda

Our Daf (and Shabbat 113a) records the following argument relating to the laws of
Shabbat: According to the Chakhamim, it is forbidden to make a knot to join together the rope of
a bucket that has broken. However, it is permitted to make a slip-knot (aniva) in order to join the
two sides together. According to R. Yehuda, though, even making a slip-knot is forbidden.
(Nevertheless, it is permitted to wind a hollow belt or band around the strands in order to join them
together.)

The gemara (Shabbat 113a) continues to explain that the Chakhamim and R. Yehuda
disagree as to the definition of the act of KOSHER (tying) - one of the 39 forbidden melakhot on
Shabbat. According to R. Yehuda, a slip-knot (aniva) IS included in the definition; whereas the
Chakhamim are of the opinion that it is not. Furthermore, according to Chakhamim, there is no
reason to forbid making a slip-knot, even mi-de-rabbanan, as there is no chance that one will,
thereby, come to make a forbidden knot (kesher).

II. Melekhet Kosher - The forbidden act of TYING

The Mishna (Shabbat 111b) states that it is forbidden to make a kesher of camel-riders or
sailors on Shabbat. However, there are two opposing opinions in the Rishonim as to the defining
characteristics of a forbidden kesher. According to Rashi (s.v. ve-eilu) and the Rosh, the sole
criterion necessary in order to classify a knot as forbidden, is PERMANENCE (kayama). Thus, a
kesher is defined as "a knot which is meant to be long-lasting" (kesher shel kayama). According
to the Rif and the Rambam (Shabbat 10:1), however, there are TWO criteria to consider:

1. PERMANENCE (kayama)- in agreement with Rashi and the Rosh; AND

2. CRAFTSMANSHIP - only a knot which is the work of a skilled craftsman (ma'aseh uman) is
forbidden.

Seemingly, this argument is based on conflicting understandings of the melakha of kosher.

According to Rashi, only the RESULT is important and, thus, he defines the melakha as merely
the JOINING TOGETHER of two separate strands. However, they are only considered to be joined
together if the knot has permanence. According to the Rambam, though, both the RESULT and
the METHOD are critical and, thus, not only must the knot have permanence, it must also be of a
certain quality or standard - defined as ma'aseh uman.

Following from the above, it would seem that there are two possible approaches to explain
why Chakhamim, in opposition to R. Yehuda, permit one to make an aniva on Shabbat:

6
https://www.etzion.org.il/en/kesher-aniva-11a

22
1. Aniva is NOT considered a kesher shel kayama.
2. Aniva is NOT the work of a craftsman.

According to Rashi, only the first reason would be relevant, while the Rambam could take
either, or both, into account. In order to understand why aniva does not fulfill the necessary
criterion, it is necessary to investigate these two opinions in more detail.

III. RASHI

According to Rashi, one is forbidden to make a kesher shel KAYAMA - regardless of its
status as a ma'aseh uman. Previously, we defined the permanence of a knot as a function of whether
it is long-lasting or not. This definition is ambiguous - on one hand, we could rely on
SUBJECTIVE criteria such as the person's INTENTION at the time of tying the knot and only
prohibit his action if he intends to leave the knot tied for an extended period of time. On the other
hand, we could focus on OBJECTIVE criteria, such as the inherent NATURE of the knot and
prohibit knots which are usually of permanent nature, regardless of the individual's intention at the
time of tying.

If we consider subjective criteria only, it is difficult to understand why it is permitted,

according to Chakhamim to tie a slip-knot if one intends it to last a long time. Thus, it seems that
even Rashi is concerned with objective criteria.

This view is supported by the comment of Rashi in Shabbat (daf 111b s.v. ein chayavin):
The mishna states that, according to R. Meir, one is not liable if he ties a knot that one could undo
with ONE hand (a one-handed kesher). This applies, says Rashi, even if his intention was to leave
the knot permanently tied. If one can undo the knot using one hand, the OBJECTIVE criterion that
is needed to define a kesher as forbidden is NOT met - the kesher must be one that is inherently
regarded as a kesher shel kayama. Thus, we can conclude that according to Rashi's interpretation
of Chakhamim, an ANIVA by its very nature is TEMPORARY - regardless if it is left tied for five
minutes or for fifty years.

IV. One-handed kesher & aniva

It is unclear, though, from the mishna how R. Meir relates to aniva and this is dealt with
in the gemara. The gemara raises TWO possibilities as to how a one-handed kesher differs from a
regular, forbidden, knot (according to R. Meir):

1. The one-handed kesher differs in STRUCTURE. It is inherently formed in such a way so that it
can be untied using one hand, even though it is tied tightly.
2. The knot resembles a forbidden kesher in every way. However, it was simply not tied tightly
and can be undone.

According to the first possibility, R. Meir would also permit a slip knot, which can be
untied easily (with one hand) although it is tight. However, according to the second possibility,

23
R. Meir would prohibit a slip knot, which was tied tightly. The gemara is UNABLE to reach a
conclusion regarding R. Meir's opinion concerning aniva and leaves the issue unresolved.

Now let us focus on the opinion of the Chakhamim. They PERMIT one to tie an aniva on
Shabbat, yet FORBID tying a one-handed kesher. At first glance, this creates a contradiction.
Although, both an aniva and a one-handed kesher differ structurally from a kesher shel kayama,
there is seemingly more reason to forbid an aniva than a one-handed kesher as an aniva is tied
tightly.

Furthermore, it seems that Chakhamim are unconcerned with the fact that the knot can be easily
undone, and do not define kesher shel kayama based on objective criterion. (This is the reason they
argue with R. Meir concerning a one-handed kesher.) Thus, they should view an aniva stringently
and agree with R. Yehuda who forbids making it on Shabbat.

As a result of this problem, the Ritva and the Rid claim that, in fact, R. Meir and
Chakhamim AGREE that it is permissible to tie a one-handed kesher - R. Meir is merely explaining
the position of Chakhamim. (The opinion of Chakhamim with regards to a one-handed kesher is
not explicitly mentioned in mishna.)

Thus, Chakhamim who permit one to make an aniva on Shabbat will most definitely permit one to
tie a knot that can be undone with one hand. Nonetheless, the opinion of R. Meir concerning aniva
is still unclear to the gemara as explained above - he may prohibit an aniva, since it is tied tightly,
while permitting a loose knot which can be easily untied.

However, most Rishonim do NOT accept this interpretation and conclude, le-halakha, that
the Chakhamim PERMIT an aniva but FORBID a one-handed kesher. This can be explained as
follows: An aniva is not at all defined as a kesher, since inherent in its design is the possibility to
undo it and, thus, it is seen as "undone" even while it is tied. A one-handed kesher, though, IS
defined as a kesher, and the fact that it has been tied loosely does NOT detract from this definition.7

RIF and RAMBAM

As mentioned previously, the Rambam and the Rif can allow aniva based on the following:

1. Aniva is NOT defined as a kesher shel kayama (knot of permanence); AND/OR

2. Aniva is NOT defined as a ma'aseh uman which defines the act of the melakha.

If we adopt the second option, then we can explain that this point is the basis of the
argument between R. Yehuda and Chakhamim. Only Chakhamim require both components: 1.
permanence and 2. act of kesher. R. Yehuda (similar to Rashi's explanation of Chakhamim) only
requires permanence. Therefore, aniva which is not created through a halakhically recognized

7
This explanation of aniva is NOT compatible with the gemara's assumption, that R. Meir would prohibit an aniva, if allowing a
one-handed kesher based only upon its looseness.

24
ma'aseh kesher, but is permanent, is permitted by the Chakhamim while prohibited by R.
Yehuda. Alternatively, and R. Yehuda could explain that aniva is, in fact considered a ma'aseh
kesher, consequently, is forbidden, even if he accepts the same basic criterion of kesher as the
Chakhamim.

These two explanations of R. Yehuda are seemingly dependent on an argument in Eiruvin

(97a): It is not permitted to make an aniva for tefillin in order to strap them to one's body so that
they make be carried into a protected area on Shabbat. According to R. Chisda, this is because an
aniva is NOT considered a kesher that is fit for tefillin. According to Abaye, however, it is fit for
tefillin. However, the criterion of kesher with respect to tefillin, are not necessarily identical with
those of Shabbat.

V. Aniva -Heter le-khatchila

It is difficult to understand why Chakhamim allow an aniva to be tied on Shabbat - surely

it should be forbidden, at the very least, mi-de-rabbanan. This should be true if we consider an
aniva as a kesher shel kayama but NOT ma'aseh uman, or even if we don't consider it to be a kesher
shel kayama but define it as a ma'aseh uman. Since it is similar in at least ONE respect to a kesher
that is FORBIDDEN mi-de-oraita, it should in turn be forbidden mi-de-rabbanan.

It could be claimed, that according to the Chakhamim, aniva is NEITHER a kesher shel
kayama nor a ma'aseh uman - thus, bearing NO resemblance whatsoever to a forbidden kesher.
Consequently, it is permissible even mi-derabbanan. Although, this possibility does exist, it is
highly improbable that Chakhamim and R. Yehuda have such an extreme argument, for according
to R. Yehuda, aniva is BOTH a kesher shel kayama AND a ma'aseh uman.

Thus, it makes sense to explain the opinion of the Rambam somewhat differently. Until
this point, we have accepted that according to the Rambam, there are two criterion of EQUAL
weight that must be considered: kesher shel kayama and ma'aseh uman. When both factors are
present, it is forbidden mi-de-oraita to tie the knot; when only ONE factor is present, it is forbidden
mi-de-rabbanan to make the kesher; and when neither factor is present, it is completely
permissible. I would like to suggest, however, that according to the Rambam there is, in fact, only
ONE dominant factor to consider - chibur kayama (a permanent attachment). However, this
attachment is only forbidden mi-de-oraita if it is formed by a knot that is a ma'aseh uman. This is
only an external condition; it is not part of the basic definition of the melakha. Thus, it is
considered a ma'aseh melakha mi-de-rabbanan to tie a kesher shel kayama that is not a ma'aseh
uman. However, tying a kesher that is not one of kayama is NOT considered a ma'aseh melakha
at all - even though it is a ma'aseh uman. Nonetheless, it may still be forbidden mi-de-rabbanan,
for side reasons; perhaps in order to distance one from the prohibition of tying a kesher shel
kayama.

This distinction is clear from the order in which the Rambam sets out the halakhot of
kosher [Shabbat 10:1-2]: In the first halakha, he mentions the law of a kesher shel kayama that is
a ma'aseh uman; kesher shel kayama that is NOT a ma'aseh uman; and a knot that is neither a
kesher shel kayama nor a ma'aseh uman. It is only in the second halakha that he refers to the law
of a knot that is a ma'aseh uman but is NOT a kesher shel kayama.

25
 Our new understanding in the Rambam also explains why it is permissible to make a kesher
on Shabbat for the purpose of a mitzva, ONLY if it is not a kesher shel kayama (even though it is
a ma'aseh uman). A kesher that is NOT a ma'aseh uman but IS a kesher shel kayama may NOT be
tied eon Shabbat even for the purpose of a mitzva. The Rabbis did not permit one to do a ma'aseh
melakha de-rabbanan but they did allow one to transgress a side gezeira under these extenuating
circumstances.

Returning to the question of aniva which prompted a revised look at the opinion of the
Rambam, it is now possible to understand why it is entirely permissible to make an aniva on
Shabbat and is not forbidden even mi-de-rabbanan. As explained earlier, an aniva is considered
undone despite the fact that it is presently tied and, thus, it CANNOT be said to JOIN the two
pieces together. As a result, there is no reason to forbid making an aniva even mi-de-rabbanan
since there is neither a ma'aseh kesher de-rabbanan, nor a chance that one will consequently make
a kesher that is forbidden mi-de-oraita. (In the words of the gemara, "aniva be-kshira lo michlifi.")

SUMMARY:

Mi-de-oraita it is forbidden to tie a kesher on Shabbat. According to R. Yehuda, ANIVA

is included in this prohibition; the Chakhamim, however, permit it.

CHAKHAMIM:

Rashi is of the opinion that any kesher shel KAYAMA is forbidden to be tied on Shabbat.
Thus, aniva is permitted, according to Chakhamim as it is objectively temporary in nature. The
Rambam, however, states that only a kesher shel kayama that is ALSO a ma'aseh uman is
forbidden mi-de-oraita. Aniva is permitted, even mi-de-rabbanan as it is not even considered a
kesher. This is in distinction to a one-handed kesher that is forbidden mi-de-rabbanan as it IS a
knot. (This is according to most Rishonim - the Rid and Ritva claim, however, that it is permitted
to tie a one-handed kesher.)

R. YEHUDA

We offered two basic alternatives to explain the view of R. Yehuda:

1. Even a kesher that is not shel kayama is forbidden if it is considered to be a knot (ma'aseh
kesher).
2. We are unconcerned with the variables of ma'aseh kesher, kesher shel kayama and ma'aseh
uman. Aniva creates a CHIBUR and this is forbidden on Shabbat.

NOTE: Even Chakhamim could agree that aniva creates a chibur. However, this would not be
sufficient cause to forbid its use on Shabbat.

26
Probability Theory
Probability theory is the branch of mathematics concerned with probability. Although there are
several different probability interpretations, probability theory treats the concept in a rigorous
mathematical manner by expressing it through a set of axioms. Typically these axioms formalize
probability in terms of a probability space, which assigns a measure taking values between 0 and
1, termed the probability measure, to a set of outcomes called the sample space. Any specified
subset of these outcomes is called an event.

Central subjects in probability theory include discrete and continuous random

variables, probability distributions, and stochastic processes, which provide mathematical
abstractions of non-deterministic or uncertain processes or measured quantities that may either be
single occurrences or evolve over time in a random fashion. Although it is not possible to perfectly
predict random events, much can be said about their behavior. Two major results in probability
theory describing such behaviour are the law of large numbers and the central limit theorem.

As a mathematical foundation for statistics, probability theory is essential to many human

activities that involve quantitative analysis of data. Methods of probability theory also apply to
descriptions of complex systems given only partial knowledge of their state, as in statistical
mechanics. A great discovery of twentieth-century physics was the probabilistic nature of physical
phenomena at atomic scales, described in quantum mechanics.

27
Yesterday’s daf described a case where a person placed ten pieces of chometz around his house
for the bedikah, but then he only found nine.

What should he do?

The Gemara teaches us that this hinges upon a ‫ מחלוקת‬between Rebbe and the Chachamim in a
parallel case.

A person left two packages of ma’aser money in a pile, and when he returned, he found only one
pile. Rebbe says this pile is one of the two that was originally placed, while the Chachamim assume
that this a new package of money, which we can assume to be non-ma’aser, and both packages of
ma’aser money are still at large.

Similarly, Rebbe would hold that the nine pieces of chometz found are from the original ten, and
only one remains to be found. Chachamim hold that since we did not find ten, even the nine are
not from the original set. We must now set out to find the ten.

The Shulchan Aruch (O.C. 439:3) rules according the Chachamim, and if only nine are found, it
is necessary to search for ten more pieces.

The Acharonim explain this ruling to be true in a case where the original ten were tied together,
and the fact that we now find only nine tied together clearly indicates that this is not the grouping
of ten which was originally placed. If the original ten were separate pieces, we can be lenient and
now search only for one. We may rely upon this leniency particularly in a case where the ‫ ביטול‬was
already done, or if there is still time to do the ‫ביטול‬.

28
Jeremy Brown writes:8

Our new tractate Pesachim, deals with all things Paschal. (Well, nearly all). What happens if there
were nine piles of matzah and one pile of forbidden leavened bread known as chametz, and along
came a mouse and took a piece from one of the piles and carried it into a house that had already
been searched for chametz. Must the house be searched a second time? To find an answer, the
Talmud quotes a Baraisa that deals with an analogous question.

‫ ב‬,‫פסחים ט‬

‫ ְוֵאינוֹ יוֵֹדַﬠ ֵמֵאיֶזה ֵמֶהן‬,‫ ְוָלַקח ֵמַאַחת ֵמֶהן‬,‫ ְוַאַחת מוֶֹכ ֶרת ְבַּשׂר ְנֵבָלה‬,‫ כּוָּלּן מוְֹכ ִרין ְבַּשׂר ְשׁחוָּטה‬,‫ ֵתַּשׁע ֲחנוּיוֹת‬:‫ִדְּתַנן‬
‫ָלַקח — ְסֵפיקוֹ ָאסוּר‬.

With regard to nine stores in a city, all of which sell kosher meat from a slaughtered animal, and
one other store that sells meat from unslaughtered animal carcasses, and a person took meat from
one of them and he does not know from which one he took the meat, in this case of uncertainty,
the meat is prohibited.

‫וַּב ִנְּמָצא — ַהֵלּ• ַאַחר ָהרוֹב‬

And in the case of meat found outside, follow the majority.

What this boils down to is this. If most stores in the city sell kosher meat then a piece of meat that
is found in the city (that is “outside”) is assumed to be kosher, since the majority of the stores sell
only kosher meat. But if a person bought meat from one of the ten stores, but he cannot recall
whether or not it was from a kosher store, the meat may not be eaten. In this latter case, we assume

8
http://www.talmudology.com/

29
that there were simply an equal number of kosher and non-kosher stores. There is a 50-50 chance
that the meat comes from a non-kosher store, and it may not be eaten.

By analogy, if the mouse took the morsel from one of the piles, the legal status of the morsel is
that of an equally balanced uncertainty concerning whether it was taken from a pile of matzah or
a pile of chametz. Consequently, the owner is required to go back and search the house all over
again.

Talmudic Probability

As Dov Gabbay and Moshe Koppel noted in their 2011 paper, there is something odd about
talmudic probability. If we find some meat in an area where there are p kosher stores and q non-
kosher stores, then all other things being equal, the meat is kosher if and only if p > q.This is clear
from the parallel text in Hullin (11a) where the underlying principal is described as ‫זיל בתר רובא‬
– follow the majority. Or as Gabbay and Koppel explain it:

Given a set of objects the majority of which have the property P and the rest of which have the
property not-P, we may, under certain circumstances, regard the set itself and/or any object in the
set as having property P.

In other words, what happens is that if there are more kosher stores than there are non-kosher, the
meat is considered to have become kosher. It's not that the meat is most likely to be kosher and
may therefore be eaten. Rather it takes on the property of being kosher.

We encountered another example of talmudic probability theory when we studied the

tractate Ketuvot. There, a newly wed husband claims that his wife was not a virgin on her wedding
night. The Talmud argues that his claim needs to be set into a context of probabilities:

1. She was raped before her betrothal.

2. She was raped after her betrothal.
3. She had intercourse of her own free will before her betrothal.
4. She had intercourse of her own free will after her betrothal.

Since it is only the last of these that renders her forbidden to her husband (stay focused and don't
raise the question of a husband who is a Cohen), the husband's claim is not supported, based on
the probabilities. Here is how Gubbay and Koppel explain the case - using formal logic:

Oh, and the reference to Bertrand's paradox? That is the paradox in which some questions about
probability - even ones that seem to be entirely mathematical, have more than one correct solution;
it all depends on how you think about the answer. One if its formulations goes like this: Given a
circle, find the probability that a chord chosen at random will be longer than the side of an
inscribed equilateral triangle. Turns out there are solutions. Gubbay and Koppel claim that just
like that paradox, the solution to many talmudic questions of probability will have more than one
correct answer, depending on how you think about that answer.

30
Rabbi Nahum Eliezer Rabinovitch, who died in May of this year at the age of 92 was the Rosh
Yeshiva of the hesder Yeshivah Birkat Moshe in Ma'ale Adumim.9 Rabbi Rabinovitch seems to
have been the first to point out the relationship between Bertrand's paradox and talmudic
probability theory in his 1970 Biometrika paper Combinations and Probability in Rabbinic
Literature. There, the Rosh Yeshiva wrote that "the rabbis had some awareness of the different
conceptions of probability as a measure of relative frequencies or a state of general ignorance."

James Franklin, in his book on the history of probability theory, notes that codes like the Talmud
(and the Roman Digest that was developed under Justine c.533)

"provide examples of how to evaluate evidence in cases of doubt and conflict. By and large, they
do so reasonably. But they are almost entirely devoid of discussion on the principles on which they
are operating."

But it is unfair to expect the Talmud to have developed a notion of probability theory as we have
it today. That wasn't its interest or focus. Others have picked up this task, and have explained the
statistics that is the foundation of talmudic probability. For this, we have many to thank, including
the late mathematician and Rosh Yeshiva, Rabbi Rabinovitch.

The [Roman] Digest and) the Talmud are huge storehouses of concepts, and to be required to have
an even sketchy idea of them is a powerful stimulus to learning abstractions.

— James Franklin. The Science of Conjecture: Evidence and Probability Before Pascal, 349.

9
He also had a PhD. in the Philosophy of Science from the University of Toronto, published in 1973 as Probability and Statistical
Inference in Ancient and Medieval Jewish Literature.

31
Knot10

Humanity is a knot
And humans are the strings
We are connected by our actions
Until we choose to disconnect
By plucking our own individual strings
And start unraveling ourselves from the knot
Once enough strings are removed
The knot is untied
As we've lost connection
Strings are now subject to the wind
And begin to wither without the knot
And without the strings
The knot is nothing
What brings the knot back
Is war
Fueled by famine
We tangle each other in terror
Where the strings must be maneuvered with precision
So we may form a knot

The shroud of strings blinds itself

As war wraps us in calamity
But after all the wars we've fought
Is this the connection we've got?
Humanity is a knot

10
Andrew Rueter Sep 2017

32