PNB reiterating his request to pay the obligation with the said certificate.

A few days after, PNB answered that they could not

EFFECT AND APPLICABILITY OF LAW accept petitioner’s certificate because of the amendment of its charter. Petitioner then requested PNB to reconsider its decision
1. TANADA v TUVERA, 146 SCRA 446
which was referred to the Legal Department, the said department expressed that they could not accept petitioner’s certificate
FACTS: The petitioner calls upon the court to subject all laws, presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,
because of the amendment in its charter. The Court of First Instance of Iloilo granted the petition and ordered the respondent
executive orders, and administrative orders being enacted to be published first in the Official Gazette as well as a fifteen day
bank to give due course of the vested right of the petitioner which was acquired previous to the enactment of R.A. No. 1576 by
period before said law can be made valid in accordance to Article 2 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
accepting his backpay certificate as payment for the obligation to PNB woth costs of the proceedings against PNB. Hence, this
ISSUE: Whether or not the mandatory publication of the law in the Official Gazette is a requirement for its effectivity.
appeal by PNB. The findings and conclusions stated below are assigned as errors that the trial court has commited.
HELD: For the people to have a reasonable amount of time to learn about certain laws or decrees being enacted by their
That in a letter, PNB has impliedly admitted the right of petitioner to apply or offer his certificate in payment of his obligation
government, sufficient appropriation of time and publication is necessary. According to Article 2 of the Civil Code, all laws must
to respondent.
be given 15 days upon its publication in the Official Gazette for it to be enacted. This is to give sufficient time for the people to
That the MR filed by PNB, did not affect the petitioner's vested right already created and acquired at the time he offered to
learn of such laws as well as to respect their right to be informed. The respondents however brought up the fact that the Official
pay his obligation with his certificate before the passage of Rep. Act No. 1576.
Gazette may not be the most effective medium for the people to be educated of certain new laws given its erratic publication
Rep. Act No. 1576 does not nullify the right of the petitioner to pay his obligation with his backpay certificate.
dates as well as its limited number of readers, with lieu of more potent mediums of instructions such as newspapers of general
That the writ of mandamus would lie against the appellant.
circulation because of its wide readership and regular dates of printing. The court nevertheless rules that such periodicals are not
Issue: Whether or not the amendment in Republic Act No. 1576 can apply retroactively to the payment of the petitioner using his
what is required by the Civil Code and such amendments are left to the legislative branch of the government. Having said this,
backpay acknowledgment certificate.
the court finds in favor of publishing all laws, presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, executive orders, and
Held: No. The decision of the Supreme Court in the Florentino case, the PNB was declared authorized to accept the backpay
administrative orders with a 15 day leeway, or unless stated, for them to take into effect.
certificate as payment for the obligation. Although it was promulgated on April 28, 1956, after petitioner has offered to pay using
his backpay certificate, it is nevertheless obvious that on or before said April 24, 1956, the right to have his certificate applied for
2. Executive Order No 200
the payment of his obligation with the appellant already existed by virtue of Republic Act No. 897. So that when the appellant in
Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette or in a
its letter of July 18, 1956, replied that "in the meantime that our motion for reconsideration of the said decision is still pending
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided.
the resolution of the Supreme Court, we regret to advise that we cannot yet grant your request", the said appellant already knew
or should have known that a right was vested, only that its enforcement had to wait the resolution of this Court which it handed
3. Zulueta v. Zulueta G.R. No. 428
on February 15,1957, by maintaining its decision. The Court agrees with the facts and circumstance of the lower court in which it
Facts: Heirs of the late Don Clemente Zulueta nominated each auditors and a separate one as auditor umpire. The two auditors
PNB impliedly admitted the right of the petitioner to apply his backpay certificate in payment of his obligation. This
nominated by the heirs failed to agree and filed separate reports. The auditor umpire had his side with the auditor of the
notwithstanding, whether implied or expressed, the admission by the PNB of Buyco's right, has already lost momentum or
plaintiff. The opposition was filed by the defendant. The court directed actions to be followed and forwarded to Doña Francisca
importance, because of the amendment made. "Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided" (Art. 4,
for her to create her demands due to disagreements of both parties. On May 7, on plaintiff’s demand, to change the 15 days to a
New Civil Code). It is said that the law looks to the future only and has no retroactive effect unless the legislator may have
7 days within which she must express her demands. The defendant filed another petition to suspend the proceedings until the
formally given that effect to some legal provisions. That all statutes are to be construed as having only prospective operation,
new Code of Procedure takes effect on June 5, citing it is more advantageous on her rights. The court denied the petition as the
unless the purpose and intention of the Legislature to give them a retrospective effect is expressly declared or is necessarily
term for filing has expired. Reason cited by defendant is her mistake as to the term prescribed which prevented her from filing an
implied from the language used; and that every case of doubt must be resolved against retroactive effect. These principles also
opposition for auto of June 22.
apply to amendments of statutes. Republic Act No. 1576 does not contain any provision regarding its retroactive nor such may be
ISSUE: Whether or not Doña Francisca is entitled to relief against the consequences of her failure to interpose her appeal against
implied from its language. It simply states its effectivity upon approval. The amendment, therefore has no retroactive effect, and
the auto of June 22 within the period fixed by the law.
the present case should be governed by the law at the time the offer in question was made. The rule is familiar that after an act is
HELD: No. It is shown that the party acted with mistake of law and ignorance and misconception of the provisions of the law
amended, the original act continues to be in force with regard to all rights that had accrued prior to such amendment. It is true
regarding the time within which the appeal should be submitted. Ignoratia legis non excusat
that "acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void, except when the law itself authorizes
their validity" (Art 5, New Civil Code). It should be recalled, however, that since the prohibitive amendment of the PNB's charter
4. Consunji v Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 137873
should not be given retroactive effect; and that the law, at the time Buyco made his offer, allowed, in fact compelled, the
Facts: Jose Juego, a construction worker of D.M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower, to his death. Jose
respondent bank to accept the Buyco's certificate, the above provision finds no application herein. In view hereof, mandamus is
Juego’s widow then filed a petition for damages in the Regional Trial Court against the deceased employer. The employer raised
the proper remedy and the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed with costs against the respondent-appellant.
the defense that Maria Juego already availed of the benefits provided by the State Insurance Fund. Considering the ruling in
A vested right or a vested interest may be held to mean some right or interest in property that has become fixed or established,
Pacarra vs. Cebu Autobus Company, an injured worker has a choice of either to recover from the employer the fixed amounts set
and is no longer open to doubt or controversy. Section 9-A of Republic Act No. 1576, passed on June 16, 1956, amending the
by the Workmen’s Compensation Act or to prosecute an ordinary civil action against the tort fees for higher damages but he
Charter of the respondent-appellant bank, provides: "The Board of Directors shall have the power and authority: In its discretion,
cannot pursue both actions simultaneously. The Regional Trial Court rendered a decision in favor of the widow Maria Juego. On
to accept assignment of payments, certificates of indebtedness of the government or other such similar securities: Provided,
appeal by D.M. Consunji, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court.
however, that the authority herein granted shall not be used as regards backpay certificates."
Issue: Whether or not respondent is prohibited from recovering damages under the Civil Code.
Held: No. Respondent is not barred from recovering damages under the Civil Code although she has already availed the benefits
6. Cebu Portland Cement Co. v CIR 25 SCRA 789
of the State Insurance Fund. The respondent’s case is an exception because private respondent was not aware of petitioner’s
Facts: By virtue of a decision of the CTA, as modified on appeal by the Supreme Court, the CIR was ordered to refund to Cebu
negligence when she filed her claim for benefits from the State Insurance Fund. She was not only ignorant of the facts, but of her
Portland Cement Company the amount of P 359,408.98, representing overpayments of ad valorem taxes on cement produced
rights as well. The decision of the court is affirmed.
and sold by it. When respondent moved for a writ of execution, petitioner opposed on the ground that the private respondent
had an outstanding sales tax liability to which the judgment debt had already been credited. In fact, it was stressed, there was
5. Buyco v PNB 2 SCRA 682
still a balance owing on the sales taxes in the amount of P 4,789,279.85 plus 28% surcharge. The CTA granted the CIR’s
Facts: On April 24, 1956, petitioner Marcelino Buyco was indebted to PNB in the amount of P5,102.90 plus interest. The loan of
motion. The CIR claims that the refund should be charged against the tax deficiency of the private respondent on the sales of
petitioner was due to his deficit on his 1952-53 crop loan with PNB, The said loan was secured by a mortgage of real property.
cement under Section 186 of the Tax Code. His position is that cement is a manufactured and not a mineral product and
Petitioner is a holder of backpay acknowledgment certificate which is under Rep. Act No. 897 in the amount of P22,227.69
therefore not exempt from sales taxes. The petitioner also denies that the sales tax assessments have already prescribed because
payable in thirty (30) years. Petitioner offered to pay the PNB using his backpay acknowledgement certificate but PNB answered
the prescriptive period should be counted from the filing of the sales tax returns, which had not yet been done by the private
that their motion for reconsideration (Florentino case, April 28, 1956) was still under consideration by the court such that they
respondent. Meanwhile, the private respondent disclaims liability for the sales taxes, on the ground that cement is not a
cannot grant yet his request. Later on, the Court denied PNB’s motion for reconsideration after which petitioner wrote again to

1
 manufactured product but a mineral product. As such, it was exempted from sales taxes. Also, the alleged sales tax deficiency
could not as yet be enforced against it because the tax assessment was not yet final, the same being still under protest and still to
be definitely resolved on the merits. Besides, the assessment had already prescribed, not having been made within the
reglementary five-year period from the filing of the tax returns.  HELD: Yes, because of accepting the benePts from the company does not amount to estoppel. An employee because of the
Issue: Whether or not sales tax was properly imposed upon private respondent.
Held: Yes, because cement has always been considered a manufactured product and not a mineral product. This matter was
extensively discussed and categorically resolved in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Republic Cement Corporation, decided
on August 10, 1983, stating that cement quacement was never considered as a mineral product within the meaning of Section
246 of the Tax Code, notwithstanding that at least 80% of its components are minerals, for the simple reason that cement is the
product of a manufacturing process and is no longer the mineral product contemplated in the Tax Code (i.e.; minerals subjected
to simple treatments) for the purpose of imposing the ad valorem tax. The argument that the assessment cannot as yet be
enforced because it is still being contested loses sight of the urgency of the need to collect taxes as "the lifeblood of the
government." If the payment of taxes could be postponed by simply questioning their validity, the machinery of the state would
grind to a halt and all government functions would be paralyzed.
7. Government v. Municipality of Binalonan 32 Phil 634
8. Gongon v. Court of Appeals, 32 SCRA 412
Facts: The Government purchased an estate from the Roman Catholic Church under the provisions of Section 1 Commonwealth
Act No. 539. Matias Gongon , sub lessee, filed an application with the defunct Rural Progress Administration for the purchase of a
lo claiming preferential right  as bona fide occupant. This application was opposed by Amanda Aquino, lessee, who also filed her
own application, alleging that as bona fide tenant or lessee she had preferential right to purchase a lot. Gongon’s motion was
denied by the Land Tenure Administration. Accordingly, the Land Tenure Administration executed a deed of sale in favor of
Aquino, as a result, she obtained Transfer Certificate of the lot in her name. Gongon filed a motion for reconsideration having
denied by the Court of Appeals for review contending that the appellate erred in failing to recognize his right as sub lessee-
tenant to the lot in question and in not cancelling the sale thereof to Aquino as well as its registration in her name; in holding
that he had waived his right to the lot in question in favor of Aquino and ordering him to pay rentals plus attorney’s fees and
costs.
Issue: The issues in this appeal are whether or not Gongon had the preferential right to purchase the lot in question and if he
has, whether or not the alleged waiver of whatever right he might have had over said lot is valid
Held: The court interpreted Section 1 of the Commonwealth Act No. 539, “ the intendment of the law is to award the lots to
those who may apply in the order mentioned” that is , “ the first choice is given to the bona fide ‘tenants’ and the second to the
‘occupants’ and last to the private individuals. The court also considered the fact that the sub lessees executed a document
expressly agreeing to vacate the lots any time the tenant so require together with the affidavit of one of the sub lessees
acknowledging the right of the tenant to purchase the lot and renouncing whatever rights he may have to purchase it and
Gongons petition is that his preferential right could not validly waived for it is against public policy under Article 6 of the New
Civil Code. Wherefore the decision is reversed the award of the lot in question ro Aquino is set aside; transfer certificate is
ordered cancelled; and Gongon declared to have preferential right to purchase the said lot.
9. San Miguel Corporation v. Cruz 31 SCRA 819
Facts: San Miguel Corporation led a petition for review of the decision of Court of Industrial Relation, nding it guilty of unfair
labor practices and ordering the giving of the back wages of Macario Cruz. According to the case on October, 1957, a labor
organization of San Miguel Corporation named Pagkakaisa Samahang Manggagawa sa S.M.B., stage a strike against it. After it,
they resume their work. A driver employee named Macario Cruz was called by his oPcial Mr. Camahort and shown to Cruz a
newspaper, showing him as one of the striker. Cruz was told by his oPcial that if he did not stop from joining the union activities he
will be dismissed . On March 17, 1958, Cruz was advised to retire from the company. Cruz must have already received
information thereof before it could be sent by the company because under date of 15 March 1958 said employee wrote the
company requesting that the benePts due him on account of his retirement be given in only one instalment. Cruz led with the SSS
an application for disability benePts but he was denied because the case falls under sickness benePts and his membership to it was
less than a year. After 3 years, Cruz charged the SMB on the Court of Industrial Relations with unfair labor practices for his
dismissal. The judge rendered ordering the respondent to reinstate the employee back wages but deducting there the amount he
2
already received as his retirement pay. The company sought consideration before the court and when the same was denied on
june 5 1967, the present petition for review was led.
ISSUE: Does the employee who has accepted retirement pay may still question and validity of his retirement.
necessities in life cannot resist from the money that was oPered. The company are deemed not to waived any of the rights of the
employees. The court decision under is being reversed, the complaint for labor practise against the petitioner was dismissed.
10. Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association Inc. v. Feliciano, 13 SCRA 377
Facts: On December 26, 1964, Jose Y. Feliciano, Chairman and General Manager of the Rice and Corn Administration, wrote the
President of the Philippines urging the immediate importation of 595,400 metric tons of rice, thru a government agency which
the President may designate, pursuant to the recommendation of the National Economic Council. The President submitted said
letter to his cabinet for consideration and on December 28, 1964, the cabinet approved the needed importation. On January 4,
1965, the President designated the Rice and Corn Administration as the government agency authorized to undertake the
importation. Considering that said importation, the Iloilo Palay and corn Planters Association alleged that it is contrary to RA
3453 which prohibits the government from importing rice and tat there is no law appropriating funds to finance the same. They
said that it its illegal because it is prohibited by RA 3452 which in Section 10 provides that the importation of rice and corn is only
left to private properties upon payment of the corresponding taxes. They claim that RCA is prohibited from doing
so. According to them, RA 2207 which provides that should there be an existing or imminent shortage in the local supply of rice
of suh gravity as to constitute a national emergency and certified by the NEC, the president may authorize such importation thru
any government agency he may designate - is repealed by RA 3452.
Issue: Whether or not RA 2207 which allows importation of rice by government agency during national emergency is repealed by
RA 3452
Held: No, RA 2207 is not repealed by RA 3452. Section 16 of RA 3452 contains a repealing clause which provides "All laws or parts
thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.". This repealing clause is not an
express repealing clause because it fails to identify or designate the act/s that are intended to be repealed. Rather, is is a clause
which predicates the intended repeal upon the condition that a substantial conflict must be found in existing and prior acts. Such
being the case, the presumption against implied repeals and the rule against strict construction regarding implied repeals apply
ex proprio vigre. The failure to add a specific repealing clause indicates that the intent was not to repeal any existing law, unless
on irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exists in the terms of the new and old laws. Here there is no inconsistency. While
the two laws are geared towards the same ultimate objective, their methods of approach are different; one is by a total ban of
rice importation and the other by a partial ban, the same being applicable only to the government during normal period. Also, RA
3452 only authorizes importation during normal times, but when there is shortage in the local supply of sucy gravity as
to constitute a national emergency, we have to turn to RA 2207. These two laws are therefore not inconsistent and so implied
repeal does not ensue.
11. Floresca v. Philex Mining Corporation, 136 SCRA 136
FACTS: Several miners, who, while working at the copper mines underground operations at Tuba, Benguet on June 28, 1967, died
as a result of the cave-in that buried them in the tunnels of the mine. The heirs of the deceased claimed their benefits pursuant
to the Workmen’s Compensation Act before the Workmen’s Compensation Commission. They also petitioned before the regular
courts and sue Philex for additional damages, pointing out in the complaint 'gross and brazen negligence on the part of Philex in
failing to take necessary security for the protection of the lives of its employees working underground'. Philex invoked that they
can no longer be sued because the petitioners have already claimed benefits under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, which,
Philex insists, holds jurisdiction over provisions for remedies.
ISSUE: Whether or not the heirs of the deceased have a right of selection between availing themselves of the worker’s right
under the Workmen’s Compensation Act and suing in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages (actual, moral
and exemplary) from the employers by virtue of that negligence or fault of the employers or whether they may avail themselves
cumulatively of both actions. 
Held: The court held that although the other petitioners had received the benefits under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, such
may not preclude them from bringing an action before the regular court because they became cognizant of the fact that Philex
has been remiss in its contractual obligations with the deceased miners only after receiving compensation under the Act. Had
petitioners been aware of said violation of government rules and regulations by Philex, and of its negligence, they would not
have sought redress under the Workmen’s Compensation Commission which awarded a lesser amount for compensation. The
choice of the first remedy was based on ignorance or a mistake of fact, which nullifies the choice as it was not an intelligent
choice. The case should therefore be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings. However, should the petitioners be
successful in their bid before the lower court, the payments made under the Workmen’s Compensation Act should be deducted
from the damages that may be decreed in their favor.

12. Noblejas v. Teehankee 23 SCRA 774
Facts: Antonio Noblejas, herein petitioner, was the duly appointed and confirmed Commissioner of Land Registration. Under the
terms provided in Republic Act No. 1151, the said Commissioner is entitled to the same compensation, emoluments and
privileges as those of a judge of the Court of First Instance.
On March 7, 1968, respondent Secretary of Justice sent to the petitioner a letter requiring him to explain in writing why no
disciplinary action should be taken against petitioner for "approving or recommending approval of subdivision, consolidation and
consolidated-subdivision plans covering areas greatly in excess of the areas covered by the original titles."
Noblejas answered and apprised the Secretary of Justice that, as he enjoyed the rank, privileges, emoluments and compensation
of a Judge of the Court of First Instance, he could only be suspended and investigated in the same manner as a Judge of the
Courts of First Instance, and, therefore, the papers relative to his case should be submitted to the Supreme Court, for action
thereon conformably to section 67 of the Judiciary Act (R. A. No. 296) and Revised Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.
On March 17, 1968, petitioner Noblejas received a communication signed by the Executive Secretary, "by authority of the
President", whereby, based on "finding that a prima facie case exists against you for gross negligence and conduct prejudicial to
the public interest", petitioner was "hereby suspended, upon receipt hereof, pending investigation of the above charges."
On March 18, 1968, petitioner applied to this Court, reiterating the contentions advanced in his letter to the Secretary of Justice,
claiming lack of jurisdiction and abuse of discretion, and praying for restraining writs. In their answer respondents admit the facts
but denied that petitioner, as Land Registration Commissioner, exercises judicial functions, or that the petitioner may be
considered a Judge of First Instance within the purview of the Judiciary Act and Revised Rules of Court 140; that the function of
investigating charges against public officers is administrative or executive in nature; that the Legislature may not charge the
judiciary with non-judicial functions or duties except when reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of judicial duties, as it would
be in violation of the principle of the separation of powers.
Issues: Whether or not the Commissioner of Land Registration may only be investigated by the Supreme Court?
Held: No. If the law had really intended to include the general grant of “rank and privileges equivalent to Judges”, the right to be
investigated and be suspended or removed only by the Supreme Court, then such grant of privileges would be unconstitutional,
since it would violate the doctrine of separation of powers because it would charge the Supreme Court with an administrative
function of supervisory control over executive officials, simultaneously reducing pro tanto,the control of the Chief Executive over
such officials. There is no inherent power in the Executive or Legislative to charge the Judiciary with administrative functions
except when reasonable incidental to the fulfillment of judicial duties. The judiciary cannot give decisions which are merely
advisory, nor can it exercise or participate in the exercise of functions which are essentially legislative or administrative. The
Supreme Court and its members should not and cannot be required to exercise any power or to perform any trust or to assume
any duty not pertaining to or connected with the administration of judicial functions. As such, RA 1151 while conferring the
same privileges as those of a judge, did not include and was not intended to include, the right to demand investigation by the
Supreme Court, and to be suspended or removed only upon the Court’s recommendation. Said rights would be violative of the
Constitution. The suspension of Noblejas by the ES valid.
13. Lidasan v. COMELEC, 21 SCRA 496
Facts: On June 18, 1966, the Chief Executive signed into law House Bill 1247, known as Republic Act 4790 entitled “An Act
Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the province of Lanao Del Sur ” reads:
Sec. 1. Barrios Togaig, Madalum, Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko
Colodan, Kabamakawan, Kapatagan, Bongabong, Aipang, Dagowan, Bakikis, Bungabung, Losain, Matimos and
Magolatung, in the municipalities of Butig and Balabagan, Province of Lanao del Sur, are separated from said
municipalities and constituted into a distinct and independent municipality of the same province to be known as
the Municipality of Dianaton, Province of Lanao del Sur. The seat of government of the municipality shall be Togaig.
Sec. 2. The first mayor, vice-mayor and councilors of the new municipality shall be elected in the nineteen hundred
sixty-seven general elections for local officials.
Sec. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Bara Lidasan, a resident and taxpayer of the detached portion of Parang, Cotabato and a qualified voter for the 1967 election. He
prays that Republic Act of 4790 be declared unconstitutional; and the Comelec’s resolutions of August 15, 1967 and September
20, 1967 implementing the same for electoral purposes, be nullified. R.A 4790, the new municipality of Dianaton, Lanao del sur
shall comprise the barrios Kapatagan, Bongabong, Aipang, Dagowan, Bakikis, Bungabung, Losain, Matimos and Magolatung
situated in the municipality of Balabagan, Lanao del sur, the barrios of Togaig and Madalum situated in the municipality of
Buldon, Cotabato the barrios of Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko Colodan,
Kabamakawan situated in the municipality of Parang, also of Cotabato. On September 7, 1967, the Office of the President
recommended to COMELEC that the operation of the statute be suspended until “clarified by correcting legislation.” Comelec, by
3
resolution of September 20, 1967, declared that the statute “should be implemented unless declared unconstitutional by the
Supreme Court.”
Issue: Whether or not the title of a statute conforms with the constitutional requirement.
Held: Republic Act 4790 is null and void. The title – “An Act creating the municipality of Dianaton, in the province of Lanao del
Sur- projects the impression that solely the province of Lanao del Sur is affected by the creation of Dianaton. Not the slightest
intimation is there that communities in the adjacent province of Cotabato are incorporated in this new Lanao del Sur town. Such
title did not inform the members of Congress as to the full impact of the law; it did not appraise the people in the towns of
Buldon and Parang Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being taken away from their
towns and province and added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur. Transfer of a sizeable portion of territory from one
province to another of necessity involves reduction of area, population and income of the first and the corresponding increase of
those of the other.
14. Victorias Milling Company, Inc v Social Security Commission 4 SCRA 627
Facts: The Social Security Commission issued Circular No. 22 on October 15, 1958 requiring all employers in computing premiums
to include employee’s remuneration all bonuses and overtime time pay, as well as the cash value of other media remuneration.
The petitioner(Victorias Milling Company, Inc.) protest against the circular as it is contrary to a previous Circular No. 7 dated
October 7, 1957. Circular No. 7 excludes overtime pay and bonus in the computation of the employers’ and the employees’
respective monthly premium contributions. The counsel questioned the validity of the circular. Social Security Commission
overruled the objections
Issue: Whether or not Circular No. 22 is a rule or regulation as contemplated in Section 4(a) of Republic Act 1161 empowering
the Social Security Commission “to adopt, amend and repeal subject to the approval of the President such rules and regulations
as may be necessary to carry out the provisions and purposes of this Act”
Held: Republic Act No. 1161 before its amendment defines compensation as: All remuneration for employment include the cash
value of any remuneration paid in any medium other than cash. Except: that part of the remuneration in excess of P500 received
during the month; bonuses, allowances or overtime pay; and dismissal and all other payments which the employer may make,
although not legally required to do so. Republic Act No. 1792 changed the definition of “compensation” to: (f) Compensation —
All remuneration for employment include the cash value of any remuneration paid in any medium other than cash except that
part of the remuneration in excess of P500.00 received during the month. Circular No. 22 was issued to advise the employers and
employees concerned with the interpretation of the law as amended which was Social Security Commission’s duty to enforce.
The Commission simply stated their opinion as to how the law should be construed and that such circular did not require
presidential approval and publication in the Official Gazette for its effectivity. Whereas if it renders an opinion or a statement of
policy, it merely interprets a pre-existing law. Administrative interpretation of law is at best merely advisory for it is the courts
that finally determine what the law means. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Resolution appealed from is hereby affirmed, with
costs against appellant. So ordered.
15. Caltex Inc. v. Palomar, 18 SCRA 247
Facts: Petitioner conceived the “Caltex Hooded Pump Contest” where participants have to estimate the actual number of liters a
hooded gas pump can dispense during a specific period of time. There was no fee or consideration required to be paid, nor any
purchase of any Caltex products to be made in order to join the contest. Foreseeing the extensive use of mail for advertising and
communications, Caltex requested clearance for Respondent Postmaster General but was denied citing said contest is a “gift
enterprise” deemed as a non-mailable matter under the anti-lottery provisions of the Postal Law. Hence, Petitioner filed a
petition fordeclaratory relief.
Issue: W/N the “Caltex Hooded Pump Contest” falls under the term “gift enterprise” which is banned by the Postal Law.
Held: No, said contest is not a gift enterprise. The word “lottery” is defined as a game of chance where the elements of which are
(1) consideration, (2) chance, and (3) prize. The term “gift enterprise” and “scheme” in the provision of the Postal Law making
unmailable “any lottery, gift, enterprise, or scheme for the distribution of money or any real or personal property by lot, chance,
or drawing of any kind” means such enterprise as will require consideration as an element. The intent of the prohibition is to
suppress the tendency to inflame the gambling spirit and to corrupt public morals. There being no element of consideration in
said contest, the spirit of the law is preserved.
16. People v. Licera, 65 SCRA 270
Facts: In 1961, accused was granted an appointment as secret agent of Governor Leviste. In 1965, accused was charged with
illegal possession of firearms. The SC held that where at the time of his appointment, People v. Macarandang (1959) was
applicable, which held that secret agents were exempt from the license requirement, and later People v. Mapa (1967) was
decided, the earlier case should be held applicable.
HELD: Art. 8 of the Civil Code decrees that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution form part of this
 jurisdiction's legal system. These decisions, although in them¬selves not law, constitute evidence of what the laws mean. The
application or interpretation placed by the courts upon a law is part of the law as of the date of the enactment of the said law
since the Court's application or interpretation merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the construed law
purports to carry into effect.
A new doctrine abrogating an old rule operates prospectively and should not adversely affect those favored by the old rule.
17. People v. Jabinal, 55 SCRA 607
Facts: The instant case was an appeal form the judgment of the Municipal Court of Batangas finding the accused guilty of the
crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition.  The validity of the conviction was based upon a retroactive application of
the Supreme Court’s ruling in People vs. Mapa. As to the facts, a determined by the trial court, the accused admitted that on
September 5, 1964, he was in possession of the revolver and the ammunition described in the complaint was without the
requisite license a permit. He however, contended that he was a SECRET AGENT appointed by the governor, and was likewise
subsequently appended as Confidential Agent, which granted him the authority to possess fire arm in the performance of his
official duties as peace officer.  Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in People vs. Macarandang and People vs. Lucero, the
accused sought for his aquittal. Noting and agreeing to the evidence presented by the accused, the trial court nonetheless
decided otherwise, citing that People vs. Macarandang and People vs. Lucero were reversed and subsequently abandoned in
people vs. mapa.
Issue: Should appellant be acquitted on the bases of Supreme Court rulings in Macarandana and Lucero, or should his conviction
stand in view of the completer reversal of Macarandang and Lucero doctrine in Mapa?
Held: The judgment appealed was reversed, and the appellant was acquitted. The doctrine laid down in lucero and Macarandang
was part of the jurisprudence, hence, of the law, at the time appellant was found in possession of fire arm in question and he was
arraigned by the trial court.  It is true that the doctrine was overruled in Mapa case in 1967, but when a doctrine of the Supreme
Court is overruled and a new one is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should not apply to partres
who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof.
18. Secretary of Justic v. Catolico, 68 SCRA 62
Facts: Two administrative complaints and four charges of “serious misconduct and gross disregard of law” were formulated
against Judge Alfredo Catolico. The first complaint concerned that of the naturalization of 50 naturalized citizens which the the
respondent declared the oath taking of the petitioners null and void. The second and third complaints which relate to
respondent’s dismissal of the cases which have not been tried for more than thirty days and refusal to recognize not only the
authority of the Court to authorize the continuation of the corresponding proceedings but also the personality of the Clerk of this
Court to transmit to him the pertinent resolutions of the Court. The fourth complaint regarding the respondents alleged bias and
prejudice either in his questioning of the witnesses or in acquitting the accused. Respondent claims that all his impugned
actuations were motivated by his desire to comply with the rules and the law and, most of all, the best interests of justice which
require the speedy and expeditious disposition of cases. Respondents plead that “if at all there was any error committed it is of
the mind rather than the heart”
Issue: Whether or not the respondent acted with “serious misconduct and gross disregard of law” in the four complaints charged
against him.
Held: For the obvious reason that all the facts involved in the first three complaints relate to matters of record in the proceedings
in this Court in which respondent had been duly heard, no further administrative proceedings were held after respondent filed
his answer. In the first charge, the Court has, in a way, admonished the respondent, adding that they “should not lose the proper
judicial perspective, and should see to it that in the execution of their sworn duties they do not overstep the limitations of their
power as laid down by statute and by the rules of procedure”. With reference to the second and third charges of the Secretary,
the Court had already reprimanded respondent for his offense for his refusal to “apply the law” as interpreted by the tribunal.
Anent the fourth charge, the report of the investigator is to the effect that the actuations of respondent complained of by Mrs.
Olaes were not due to any improper or personal motive and were just the result of the innocuous eccentricities and odd ways
and ideas of respondent which could not be categorized as serious misconduct nor deserving of any heavier sanction than
admonition. While the Court was awaiting said report, however, in a letter dated April 17, 1975, respondent informed the Court
that His Excellency, President Ferdinand E. Marcos had accepted his resignation effective January 11, 1974, “without prejudice to
his receiving whatever rights he may be entitled to under the retirement and other existing laws.” Premises considered, and in
line with the established policy regarding similar situations wherein the President has accepted resignations without prejudice to
the grant of legally possible retirement benefits thus rendering administrative cases pending against the official concerned, moot
and academic, the Court resolved to DISMISS the cases against respondent.
4
19. Wiegel v. Sempio Diy, 143 SCRA 499
Facts: Respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel asked the Family Court for the declaration of Nullity of his first marriage on 1978 with
petitioner Lilia Oliva Wiegel on the ground of Lilia’s previous existing marriage to one Eduardo A. Maxion on 1972. Lilia, however,
claimed that such previous marriage was null and void for having been vitiated by force upon both her and the first husband and
that the first husband was at the time of the marriage in 1972 already married to someone else.
Held: Status of the First Marriage
Petitioner’s first marriage which was allegedly vitiated by force committed against both parties, if true, will make the marriage
voidable, not void. There is no need for petitioner to prove that her first marriage was vitiated by force committed against both
parties because assuming this to be so, the marriage will not be void but merely voidable (Art. 85, Civil Code), and therefore valid
until annulled. Since no annulment has yet been made, it is dear that when she married respondent she was still validly married
to her first husband, consequently, her marriage to respondent is VOID (Art. 80, Civil Code).
Judicial Declaration of Nullity of First Marriage
The first marriage though void still needs according to Supreme Court, a judicial declaration of such fact and for all legal intents
and purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her marriage with respondent Karl
Wiegel, therefore there is no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first husband at the time they
married each other. Accordingly, the marriage of petitioner and respondent Karl Wiegel would be regarded VOID under the law.
20. Corpus v. Cabaluna, 55 SCRA 374
Facts: On August 26, 1953, Lourdes Corpus filed complaint at RTC against Tiburcia Brabanco and Felix Amijana as civil case No.
2843 concerning the ownership of two parcels of land Barrio Bugang, Alimodian, Iloilo. The RTC Iloilo rendered judgement in
favor of Corpus on September 5, 1995. The Court of Appeals affirmed it on February 26, 1963. On July 30,1963, Adriano
Camarista executed a deed of sale in favor of Procopio Cabalfin and the document was ratified by Judge Cabaluna, Jr. On March
4, 1964, Lourdes Corpus filed a petition on the ground that cadastral lot 1762 is the same parcel of lot in civil case 2843 which
was awarded to her. On April 26, 1966, Corpus filed a complaint with the RTC Iloilo against spouses Procopio and Cleofe Cabalfin
for annulment of the aforementioned decision. Corpus also charged Judge Cabaluna, Jr. before the Secretary of Justice with
having committed “gross fraud”.
Issue: Whether not deed of sale ratified by Judge Cabaluna make guilty of “gross fraud”.
Held: Fraud is serious charge which cannot be lightly inferred from allegations or circumstances surrounding a particular
situation, but must be supported by clear and convincing proof. For the charge of “gross fraud” to prosper there is need of clear
and convincing evidence that respondent knew that one of the parcels involved in civil case 2843 and adjudicated to
complainant was the same property which he awarded to spouses Cabalfin in the cadastral proceeding; such evidence is,
however, wanting in the record of this case. The acts of respondent in ratifying the deed of sale of lot 1762 executed by Adriano
Camarista in favor of spouses Cabalfin and adjudicating said lot to the latter as vendees thereof are not in themselves
“fraudulent”, to use the word of complainant, in the absence of any showing that respondent  connived with the claimant
Adriano Camarista and/or spouses Cabalfin in causing the approval of the latter’s claim over the land in question to the prejudice
of the rights of complainant. The court exonerate the respondent and dismiss the charge against him. The act of the Judge
Cabaluna in ratifying the deed of sale executed by Camarista, are not in “fraudulent”. The respondent did not any show any signs
of conniving with Camarista or Cabalfin in affrirming the latters claim.
21. CIR v. Primetown Property Group, G.R. No. 162155, August 28, 2007
Facts: On April 14, 1998 Primetown Property Group. Inc. filed its final adjusted return. On March 11, 1999 Gilbert Yap, vice chair
of Primetown Property Group. Inc., filed for the refund or tax credit of income tax paid in 1997. However, it was not acted upon.
Thus Primetown filed a petition for review but the Court of Tax Appeals dismissed it claiming that it was filed beyond the two-
year reglementary period provided by section 229 of the National Internal Revenue Code. The Court of Tax Appeals further
argued that in National Marketing Corp. vs. Tecson the Supreme Court ruled that a year is equal to 365 days regardless of
whether it is a regular year or a leap year.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent’s petition was filed within the two-year reglementary period.
Held: The Supreme Court held that the petition was filed within the two-year reglementary period because Article 13 of the New
Civil Code that provides that a year is composed of 365 years is repealed by Executive Order 292 or the Administrative Code of
the Philippines. Under Executive Order 292, a year is composed of 12 calendar months.
22. Garvida v Sales, 271 SCRA 767
Facts: Petitioner Garvida applied for registration as member and voter of the Katipunan ng Kabataan of a certain barangay.
However, the Board of election tellers denied her application on the ground that she is already 21 years and 10 months old. She
already exceeded the age limit for membership as laid down in Sec 3(b) of COMELEC resolution no. 2824. The municipal circuit
trial court found her to be qualified and ordered her registration as member and voter in the Katipunan ng Kabataan. The Board
 of Election Tellers appealed to the RTC, but the presiding judge inhibited himself from acting on the appeal due to his close
association with petitioner. However, private respondent Sales a rival candidate, filed with the COMELEC en banc a “Petition of
Denial and/or Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy” against Garvida for falsely representing her age qualification in her
certificate of candidacy. He claimed that Garvida is disqualified to become a voter and a candidate for the SK for the reason that
she will be more than twenty-one (21) years of age on May 6, 1996; that she was born on June 11, 1974 as can be gleaned from
her birth certificate.
Issue: Whether or not Garvida can assume office as the elected SK official
Held: In the case at bar, petitioner was born on June 11, 1974. On March 16, 1996, the day she registered as voter for the May 6,
1996 SK elections, petitioner was twenty-one (21) years and nine (9) months old. On the day of the elections, she was 21 years,
11 months and 5 days old. When she assumed office on June 1, 1996, she was 21 years, 11 months and 20 days old and was
merely ten (10) days away from turning 22 years old. Petitioner may have qualified as a member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan
but definitely, petitioner was over the age limit for elective SK officials set by Section 428 of the Local Government Code and
Sections 3 [b] and 6 of Comelec Resolution No. 2824. Thus, she is ineligible to run as candidate for the May 6, 1996 Sangguniang
Kabataan elections.
or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon the citizens of the Philippines, even though living
abroad.” Here, at the time the divorce decree was issued, Vicenta, like her husband, was still a Filipino citizen. She was then still
subject to Philippine law, which does not admit absolute divorce. Thus, under Philippine law, the divorce was invalid.
2.) Yes. The Court ruled that it can be gleaned from the facts and considerations that Tenchavez is entitled to a decree of legal
separation on the basis of adultery as provided under Art. 333 of the Revised Penal Code. Since our jurisdiction does not
recognize Vicenta’s divorce and second marriage as valid, her marriage and cohabitation with the American is technically
“intercourse with a person not her husband” from the standpoint of Philippine Law. Her refusal to perform her wifely duties, and
her denial of consortium and her desertion of her husband also constitute in law a wrong for which the husband is entitled to the
corresponding indemnity. Thus, the latter is entitled to a decree of legal separation conformably to Philippine law.
As to moral damages the Court assessed Tenchavez’s claim for a million pesos as unreasonable, taking into account some
considerations. First, the marriage was celebrated in secret, and its failure was not characterized by publicity or undue
humiliation on his part. Second, the parties never lived together. Third, there is evidence that Tenchavez had originally agreed to
the annulment of the marriage, although such a promise was legally invalid, being against public policy. Fourth, the fact that
Tenchavez is unable to remarry under our law is a consequence of the indissoluble character of the union that he entered into
voluntarily and with open eyes. Therefore, he should recover P25,000 only by way of moral damages and attorney’s fees.

3. NORMA DEL SOCORRO V. WILSEM

FACTS:
Norma A. Del Socorro and Ernst Van Wilsem contracted marriage in Holland. They were blessed with a son named Roderigo
Norjo Van Wilsem. Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by the appropriate Court of
THE CONFLICT RULES AND THE RENVOI DOCTRINE Holland. Thereafter, Norma and her son came home to the Philippines. According to Norma, Ernst made a promise to provide
1. Immunities under the 1961 Vienna Convention
monthly support to their son. However, since the arrival of petitioner and her son in the Philippines, Ernst never gave support to
In the first category are the members of the diplomatic staff who, together with their immediate families, have full diplomatic
Roderigo. Respondent remarried again a Filipina and resides again the Philippines particulary in Cebu where the petitioner also
immunity in the tradi- tional sense. However, even these individuals are not covered in certain specific kinds of cases such as
resides. Norma filed a complaint against Ernst for violation of R.A. No. 9262 for the latter’s unjust refusal to support his minor
actions related to personal real estate transac- tions, transfers of property after death, and professional and commercial acts
child with petitioner. The trial court dismissed the complaint since the facts charged in the information do not constitute an
transacted outside of official functions.
offense with respect to the accused, he being an alien
The second category is comprised of members of the administrative and technical staff. This group, together with their families,
ISSUES:
has full criminal immunity but only enjoys civil and administrative immunity for acts per- formed in the course of their duties.
1. Does a foreign national have an obligation to support his minor child under the Philippine law?
This is in contrast to the absolute immunity they had under the domestic statutes, now repealed.
2. Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his unjustified failure to support his
The third category is the members of the service staff, who also enjoyed full immunity under the prior law. Under the Convention
minor child.
they only have immunity for acts performed in the course of their official duties.
RULING:
The last category, private servants, includes servants in the personal employ of a member of the embassy. These people no
1. YES. While it is true that Respondent Ernst is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we agree with the RTC that he is subject
longer have any diplomatic immunity.
to the laws of his country, not to Philippine law, as to whether he is obliged to give support to his child, as well as the
consequences of his failure to do so. This does not, however, mean that Ernst is not obliged to support Norma ’s son altogether.
2. TENCHAVEZ V. ESCAÑO
In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the burden of proving the foreign
FACTS:
law. In the present case, Ernst hastily concludes that being a national of the Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the
Pastor and Vicenta entered into a secret marriage before a Catholic chaplain. Upon discovery of their daughter’s marriage,
matter of provision of and capacity to support. While Ernst pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing his position that he
spouses Mamerto and Mena sought priestly advice where it was suggested that the marriage be recelebrated. However, the
is not obliged to support his son, he never proved the same. It is incumbent upon Ernst to plead and prove that the national law
recelebration did not take place and the newlyweds eventually became estranged. Later, unknown to Pastor, Vicenta left for the
of the Netherlands does not impose upon the parents the obligation to support their child. Foreign laws do not prove themselves
United States. There, she filed a complaint for divorce on the ground of extreme mental cruelty, and an absolute divorce was
in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and
granted by the Court of Nevada. She later sought for the annulment of her marriage from the Archbishop of Cebu. Vicenta
proved. Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application would work undeniable injustice to the citizens or
eventually married an American in Nevada and acquired American citizenship.
residents of the forum. To give justice is the most important function of law; hence, a law, or judgment or contract that is
Tenchavez filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cebu against Vicenta and her parents whom he charged with having
obviously unjust negates the fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws. Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the
dissuaded and discouraged their daughter from joining him and alienating her affections, and against the Roman Catholic Church
Netherlands neither enforce a parent’s obligation to support his child nor penalize the non-compliance therewith, such obligation
for having decreed the annulment of the marriage. He asked for legal separation and one million pesos in damages. Vicenta
is still duly enforceable in the Philippines because it would be of great injustice to the child to be denied of financial support
claims a valid divorce from Tenchavez and an equally valid marriage to her American husband; while her parents filed a
when the latter is entitled thereto.
counterclaim for moral damages, denying that they had in any way influenced their daughter’s acts. The trial court did not decree
2. YES. The court has jurisdiction over the offense (R.A 9262) because the foreigner is living here in the Philippines and committed
a legal separation but freed Tenchavez from supporting his wife and to acquire property to her exclusion. It granted the
the offense here
counterclaim of the Españo spouses for moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees against Tenchavez, to the extent of
P45,000.00. Thus, he filed a direct appeal to the Supreme Court.
4. Miciano vs. Brimo
ISSUES:
FACTS:
1.) Whether or not the divorce obtained by Vicenta abroad was valid and binding in the Philippines;
The judicial administrator of the estate of the deceased, Joseph Brimo, filed a scheme of partition. However, one of the brothers
2.) Whether or not Tenchavez is entitled to legal separation and to moral damages.
of the deceased opposed the said partition.
HELD:
According to the scheme and its provision, that the deceased requests that all his relatives respect his wishes, otherwise those
1.) No. The Court held that under Philippine law, the valid marriage between Tenchavez and Escaño remained subsisting and
who opposed the same shall be cancelled in said disposition in favor of the oppositor.
undissolved notwithstanding the decree of absolute divorce that the wife sought and obtained in Nevada. Article 15 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines which was already in force at the time expressly provided that “Laws relating to family rights and duties

5
 The apellant in the case, who opposed the same, based his opposition on the fact that the deceased was a Turkish citizen, that
his disposition should be in accordance with the laws of his nationality.  failed to appear due to Dengue. The other counsel, Jaime Cruz, for DBP was likewise absent; he’s also a witness. On Aug 25 th, the
ISSUE:
WON the disposition shall be made in accordance with Philippine Laws
WON there shall be cancellation of disposition/s in favor of the appellant-oppositor  appealed before the CA averring that it was denied due process when it was not allowed to cross examine the witnesses of CCC
HELD:
No, although the disposition provides an express provision that it shall be governed by Philippine Laws and those who opposed
the condition of the provisions given shall be cancelled from the disposition, the fact is that the condition itself is void for being
contrary to law. Article 792 of the Civil Code provides: “Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or good morals shall be
considered as not imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever, even should the testator
otherwise provide.” It is contrary to law because it expressly ignores the decedent’s national law, according to Article 10 of the
Civil Code, such national law shall govern his testamentary dispositions. Therefore, the institution of the legatees are
unconditional and are valid, as well as those favorable to herein appellant-oppositor.
5. Testate of Amos Bellis vs. Edward A. Bellis, et al
FACTS:
Amos G. Bellis was a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States. He had five legitimate children with his first wife
(whom he divorced), three legitimate children with his second wife (who survived him) and, finally, three illegitimate children. 6
years prior Amos Bellis’ death, he executed two(2) wills, apportioning the remainder of his estate and properties to his seven
surviving children.  The appellants filed their oppositions to the project of partition claiming that they have been deprived of their
legitimes to which they were entitled according to the Philippine law. Appellants argued that the deceased wanted his Philippine
estate to be governed by the Philippine law, thus the creation of two separate wills.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Philippine law be applied in the case in the determination of the illegitimate children’s successional rights
HELD:
Court ruled that provision in a foreigner’s will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine
law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot be ignored in view of those matters that Article
10 — now Article 16 — of the Civil Code states said national law should govern.
Where the testator was a citizen of Texas and domiciled in Texas, the intrinsic validity of his will should be governed by his
national law. Since Texas law does not require legitimes, then his will, which deprived his illegitimate children of the legitimes, is
valid.
The Supreme Court held that the illegitimate children are not entitled to the legitimes under the texas law, which is the national
law of the deceased.
HUMAN RELATIONS
1. Development Bank of the Philippines vs Court of Appeals
FACTS:
Continental Cement Corp. entered into a loan contract with DBP. In 1979, CCC entered into a MOA with DBP restructuring its
loans. In November 1985, DBP filed for a foreclosure against the assets of CCC. In December 1985, CCC petitioned before RTC
Bulacan to enjoin DBP and the Sheriff of Bulacan from foreclosing its assets and praying further that its loan terms with DBP be
restructured and that the interest rate terms in the promissory note be declared null and void. A TRO was issued in favor of CCC.
In December 1986, PP 502 was issued transferring nonperforming assets of the gov’t to Asset Privatization Trust. One of those
transferred was CCC’s account. DBP filed a petition to dismiss the pending case as it CCC could no longer deal with DBP but rather
with APT. The trial court denied the petition and has instead allowed APT to join the proceeding pursuant to PP 502 as amended.
To determine CCC’s indebtedness to DBP/APT, the RTC designated JC Laya (former BSP Gov and DepEd Sec) as chair of a fact
finding commission. He was given 60 days to come up with a report and he was given a lot of extensions thereafter. After several
months, he was able to come up with the report. The parties then filed their reactions to the report and during the trial they
were given a chance to cross examine each other’s witnesses. After cross examination, they were ordered to submit their
position papers as to their calculation of the amount of indebtedness. CCC’s computation is at P43.6M, the Commissioner’s
computation is at P61.6M while DBP/APT’s calculation is at P2.6B. In June 1992, 3 of CCC’s witnesses were scheduled to be cross
examined by APT’s counsel as DBP’s counsel had already done so. APT’s counsel was not able to do so raising the issue that he
6
just took over the case and needs time to prepare. The cross examination was reset to August 24-26, 1992 but counsel for APT
RTC ordered that due to the foregoing the case is deemed submitted for decision. APT filed for a motion for reconsideration. It
was denied and the RTC ruled that the indebtedness to be paid by CCC is the calculation came up with by the Commissioner. APT
nor was it allowed to present further witnesses. CCC averred that by the failure of APT’s counsel to appear APT has waived such
right. The CA sustained the RTC’s decision.
ISSUE: 
Whether or not APT was denied of due process.
HELD: The SC sustained the CA’s ruling. Long ingrained in jurisprudence is the principle that there can be no denial of due
process where a party had the opportunity to participate in the proceedings but did not do so. The withdrawal of APT’s
previous counsel in the thick of the proceedings would be a reasonable ground to seek postponement of the hearing. However,
such reason necessitates a duty, nay an obligation, on the part of the new counsel to prepare himself for the next scheduled
hearing. The excuse that it was due to the former counsel’s failure to turn over the records of the case to APT, shows the
negligence of the new counsel to actively recover the records of the case. Mere demands are not sufficient. Counsel should have
taken adequate steps to fully protect the interest of his client, rather than pass the blame on the previous counsel. The due
process requirement is satisfied where the parties are given the opportunity to submit position papers, as in this case. Both
parties, CCC and DBP/APT, were given opportunity to submit their respective position papers after the Commissioner rendered
his report. Contained in their position papers were their respective comments and objections to the said report. Furthermore,
the parties were also given the chance to cross-examine the Commissioner and his representative. They were likewise granted
opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses of the other party, however, like in APT’s case, they were deemed to have waived
their right, as previously discussed. The essence of due process is that a party be afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard
and to support any evidence he may have in support of his defense. What the law prohibits is absolute absence of the
opportunity to be heard, hence, a party cannot feign denial of due process when he had been afforded the opportunity to
present his side.
2. A L B E N S O N E N T E R P R I S E S C O R P . v s T H E C O U R T O F A P P E A LS
FACTS:
Petitioner Albenson Enterprises Corporation delivered to Guaranteed Industries, Inc. located at 3267 V. Mapa Street, Sta.
Mesa, Manila, mild steel plates. As part payment thereof, Albenson was given Pacific Banking Corporation Check No. 136361 in
the amount of P2,575.00 and drawn against the account of E.L. Woodworks. When presented for payment, the check was
dishonored for the reason “Account Closed.”  Petitioner Albenson, traced the origin of the dishonored check and discovered
that the president of Guaranteed, the recipient of the unpaid mild steel plates, was one “Eugenio S. Baltao.” Petitioners wrote
private respondent demanding that he make good the amount of the check. Respondent Baltao, through counsel, denied that he
issued the check, or that the signature appearing thereon is his.
Albenson filed a complaint against Eugenio S. Baltao for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. It appears, however, that
private respondent has a namesake, his son Eugenio Baltao III, who manages a business establishment, E.L. Woodworks, on
the ground floor of same building
Because of the alleged unjust filing of a criminal case against him for allegedly, respondent Baltao filed before the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City a complaint for damages against herein petitioners Albenson Enterprises, Jesse Yap, its owner, and
Benjamin Mendiona, its employee.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner can claim damages  under ART 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code or the principle of abuse of Rights.
HELD:
NO. Petitioners could not be said to have violated the principle of abuse of right. What prompted petitioners to file the case
for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 against private respondent was their failure to collect the amount of P2,575.00 due
on a bounced check which they honestly believed was issued to them by private respondent. Private respondent, however,
did nothing to clarify the case of mistaken identity at first hand. Instead, private respondent waited in ambush and thereafter
pounced on the hapless petitioners at a time he thought was propitious by filing an action for damages. The Court will not
countenance this devious. There is no proof of a sinister design on the part of petitioners to vex or humiliate private respondent
by instituting the criminal case against him.
3. Cogeo-Cubao Operators and Drivers Association vs. Court of Appeals
FACTS:
It appears that a certificate of public convenience to operate a jeepney service was ordered to be issued in favor of Lungsod
Silangan to ply the Cogeo-Cubao route sometime in 1983 on the justification that public necessity and convenience will best be
 served, and in the absence of existing authorized operators on the lined apply for . . . On the other hand, defendant-Association
was registered as a non-stock, non-profit organization with the Securities and Exchange Commission on October 30, 1985 . . .
with the main purpose of representing plaintiff-appellee for whatever contract and/or agreement it will have regarding the
ownership of units, and the like, of the members of the Association . . .
Perturbed by plaintiffs' Board Resolution No. 9 . . . adopting a Bandera' System under which a member of the cooperative is
permitted to queue for passenger at the disputed pathway in exchange for the ticket worth twenty pesos, the proceeds of which
shall be utilized for Christmas programs of the drivers and other benefits, and on the strength of defendants' registration as a
collective body with the Securities and Exchange Commission, defendants-appellants, led by Romeo Oliva decided to form a
human barricade on November 11, 1985 and assumed the dispatching of passenger jeepneys . . . This development as initiated
by defendants-appellants gave rise to the suit for damages.
Defendant-Association's Answer contained vehement denials to the insinuation of take over and at the same time raised as a
defense the circumstance that the organization was formed not to compete with plaintiff-cooperative. It, however, admitted that
it is not authorized to transport passengers . . .
ISSUE:  the on-coming car was also on its right lane going to Cubao
Whether or not the petitioner usurped the property right of the respondent.
HELD:  
Yes. Under the Public Service Law, a certificate of public convenience is an authorization issued by the Public Service Commission
for the operation of public services for which no franchise is required by law. In the instant case, a certificate of public
convenience was issued to respondent corporation on January 24, 1983 to operate a public utility jeepney service on the Cogeo-
Cubao route. x x x
A certification of public convenience is included in the term "property" in the broad sense of the term. Under the Public Service
Law, a certificate of public convenience can be sold by the holder thereof because it has considerable material value and is
considered as valuable asset (Raymundo v. Luneta Motor Co., et al., 58 Phil. 889). Although there is no doubt that it is private
property, it is affected with a public interest and must be submitted to the control of the government for the common good
(Pangasinan Transportation Co. v. PSC, 70 Phil 221). Hence, insofar as the interest of the State is involved, a certificate of public
convenience does not confer upon the holder any proprietary right or interest or franchise in the route covered thereby and in
the public highways (Lugue v. Villegas, L-22545, Nov . 28, 1969, 30 SCRA 409). However, with respect to other persons and other
public utilities, a certificate of public convenience as property, which represents the right and authority to operate its facilities for
public service, cannot be taken or interfered with without due process of law. Appropriate actions may be maintained in courts
by the holder of the certificate against those who have not been authorized to operate in competition with the former and those
who invade the rights which the former has pursuant to the authority granted by the Public Service Commission (A.L. Ammen
Transportation Co. v. Golingco. 43 Phil. 280).
In the case at bar, the trial court found that petitioner association forcibly took over the operation of the jeepney service in the
Cogeo-Cubao route without any authorization from the Public Service Commission and in violation of the right of respondent
corporation to operate its services in the said route under its certificate of public convenience.
4. Valenzuela V. CA (1996)
FACTS:
June 24, 1990 2 am: While driving from her restaurant at Araneta avenue towards the direction of Manila, Ma. Lourdes
Valenzuela noticed that she had a flat tire so she parked along the sidewalk about 1 1/2 feet away, place her emergency lights
and seeked help. She was with her companion Cecilia Ramon. While she was pointing her tools to the man who will help her fixed
the tires, she was suddenly hit by another Mitsubishi Lancer driven by Richard Li who was intoxicated and she slammed accross
his windshield and fell to the ground. She was sent to UERM where she stayed for 20 days and her leg was amputated and was
replaced with an artificial one. Her expenses totalled 147, 000 [120,000 php (confinement) + 27, 000 (aritificial leg)]
RTC: Richard Li guilty of gross negligence and liable for damages under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. Alexander Commercial, Inc.,
Li’s employer, jointly and severally liable for damages pursuant to Article 2180 P41,840 actual damages, P37,500 unrealized
profits because of the stoppage of plaintiffs Bistro La Conga restaurant 3 weeks after the accident on June 24, 1990, P20,000 a
month as unrealized profits of Bistro La Conga restaurant, from August, 1990 until the date of this judgment, P30,000.00, a
month, for unrealized profits in 2 Beauty salons, P1,000,000 in moral damages, P50,000, as exemplary damages, P60,000, as
reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.
CA: there was ample evidence that the car was parked at the side but absolved Li's employer
Li: 55 kph - self serving and uncorraborated
7
Rogelio Rodriguez, the owner-operator of an establishment located just across the scene of the accident: Valenzuela’s car parked
parallel and very near the sidewalk and Li was driving on a very fast speed and there was only a drizzle (NOT heavy rain)
ISSUE: 
1. W/N Li was driving at 55 kph - NO
2. W/N Valenzuela was guilty of contributory negligence - NO
3. W/N Alexander Commercial, Inc. as Li's employer should be held liable - YES
4. W/N the awarding of damages is proper. - YES.
HELD:
CA modified with reinstating the RTC decision
1. NO
 If Li was running at only about 55 kph then despite the wet and slippery road, he could have avoided hitting
the Valenzuela by the mere expedient or applying his brakes at the proper time and distance
 it was not even necessary for him to swerve a little to the right in order to safely avoid a collision with the on-coming car
since there is plenty of space for both cars, since Valenzuela car was running at the right lane going towards Manila and
2. NO.
Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has
suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is required to conform for his own protection
 emergency rule
 an individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation of danger and is required to act without much time to
consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails to
undertake what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be a better solution, unless the emergency was brought
by his own negligence
 She is not expected to run the entire boulevard in search for a parking zone or turn on a dark Street or
alley where she would likely find no one to help her
 She stopped at a lighted place where there were people, to verify whether she had a flat tire and to
solicit help if needed
 she parked along the sidewalk, about 1½ feet away, behind a Toyota Corona Car
3. YES.
 Not the principle of respondeat superior, which holds the master liable for acts of the servant (must be in the course of
business), but that of pater familias, in which the liability ultimately falls upon the employer, for his failure to exercise the
diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of his employees
 Ordinarily, evidence demonstrating that the employer has exercised diligent supervision of its employee during the
performance of the latter‘s assigned tasks would be enough to relieve him of the liability imposed by Article 2180 in
relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code. 
 situation is of a different character, involving a practice utilized by large companies with either their employees of
managerial rank or their representatives.
 Moreover, Li’s claim that he happened to be on the road on the night of the accident because he was coming from a social
visit with an officemate in Parañaque was a bare allegation which was never corroborated in the court below. It was
obviously self-serving. Assuming he really came from his officemate’s place, the same could give rise to speculation that
he and his officemate had just been from a work-related function, or they were together to discuss sales and other work
related strategies.
 Alexander Commercial, Inc. has not demonstrated, to our satisfaction, that it exercised the care and diligence of a good
father of the family in entrusting its company car to Li
4. YES.
 As the amount of moral damages are subject to this Court’s discretion, we are of the opinion that the amount of P1,000,000.00
granted by the trial court is in greater accord with the extent and nature of the injury -. physical and psychological - suffered by
Valenzuela as a result of Li’s grossly negligent driving of his Mitsubishi Lancer in the early morning hours of the accident.
 the damage done to her would not only be permanent and lasting, it would also be permanently changing and
adjusting to the physiologic changes which her body would normally undergo through the years. The replacements, changes, and
adjustments will require corresponding adjustive physical and occupational therapy. All of these adjustments, it has been
documented, are painful.
5. MAGBANUA vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
FACTS:
The plaintiffs filed a petition against the respondents all surenamed Perez alleging that they are shared tenants of the
defendants, and that the latter divert the flow of water from their farm lots which caused the drying up of their landholdings and
asked to vacate their areas for they could not plant palay due to lack of water. The trial court rendered a decision in favor to the
plaintiffs and ordered the defendants to pay moral and exemplary damages to the plaintiffs. The defendants appealed to the IAC
which the latter affirmed the appeal by deleting the award of moral and exemplary damages to be awarded to the plaintiffs.
Upon the reinstatement of the IAC, the trial court did not agree to the appellate court in its decision because the former believe
that as shared tenants, they are entitled to be maintained as agricultural lessees in peaceful cultivation in their respective
landholdings.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the tenants of defendants were entitled to moral and exemplary damages.
HELD:
The petition is granted and the decision under review is modified and each of the plaintiffs is entitled to receive award of moral
and exemplary damages by the defendants.
Under the law, the landowners have an obligation to keep the tenant in the peaceful and continuous cultivation of his
landholding. In this case, it shows that the petitioners were denied irrigation water for their farm lots in order to make them
vacate their landholdings. The defendants violated the plaintiff’s rights and caused prejudiced to the latter by the diversion of
water. Under Article 2219 (10), the Civil Code permits the award of moral damages for acts mentioned in Article 21 of the same
Code which provides, Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another  in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. The defendants acted in an oppressive manner which is
contrary to the morals of the petitioners and therefore, they are liable for the compensation to the latter.
6. Gasheem Shookat Baksh vs. CA
FACTS:
Private respondent, Marilou Gonzales, filed a complaint dated October 27, 1987 for damages against the petitioner for the
alleged breach of their agreement to get married.  She met the petitioner in Dagupan where the latter was an Iranian medical
exchange student who later courted her and proposed marriage.  The petitioner even went to Marilou’s house to secure
approval of her parents.  The petitioner then forced the respondent to leave with him in his apartment.  Marilou was a virgin
before she lived with him.  After a week, she filed a complaint because the petitioner started maltreating and threatening her.  to pay Harrington P50,600.00... representing the amounts of the bank drafts in his name.
He even tied the respondent in the apartment while he was in school and drugged her.  Marilou at one time became pregnant
but the petitioner administered a drug to abort the baby. Petitioner repudiated the marriage agreement and told Marilou to not
live with him since he is already married to someone in Bacolod.  He claimed that he never proposed marriage or agreed to be
married neither sought consent and approval of Marliou’s parents.  He claimed that he asked Marilou to stay out of his
apartment since the latter deceived him by stealing money and his passport.  The private respondent prayed for damages and
reimbursements of actual expenses.
ISSUE: Whether breach of promise to marry can give rise to cause for damages.
HELD:
The existing rule is that breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong.  The court held that when a man uses his
promise of marriage to deceive a woman to consent to his malicious desires, he commits fraud and willfully injures the woman.  Josephine wrote the PCIB to ask for the basis of its findings that she was grossly negligent and liable to pay the amount of
In that instance, the court found that petitioner’s deceptive promise to marry led Marilou to surrender her virtue and
womanhood.
Moral damages can be claimed when such promise to marry was a deceptive ploy to have carnal knowledge with the woman and
actual damages should be paid for the wedding preparation expenses.  Petitioner even committed deplorable acts in disregard of
the laws of the country.
Therefore, SC set aside the decision of CA awarding damages to the respondent.
7. Constantino v Mendez
FACTS:
Michael Constantino, an illegitimate child, as represented by Amelita, her mother, sought monthly support from Ivan Mendez
including Amelia’s complaint on damages. The latter and Amelita met in a restaurant in Manila where she was working as a
waitress. Ivan invited him at his hotel and through promise of marriage succeeded in having sexual intercourse with Amelita;
afterwards, he admitted being a married man. In spite of that, they repeated their sexual contact. Subsequently, she became
pregnant and had to resign from work.
Trial court ruled in favor of Amelita providing actual and moral damages, acknowledging Michael as Ivan’s illegitimate child and
giving monthly support to the latter which was set aside by CA.
8
ISSUE:
WON the alleged illegitimate child is entitled for the monthly support.
HELD:
No. The illegitimate child is not entitled for the monthly support since Amelita Constantino has not proved by clear and
convincing evidence her claim that Ivan Mendez is the father of her son Michael Constantino.
Pertinent provisions of the Family Code are as follows:
Article 165. Children conceived and born outside a valid marriage are illegitimate, unless otherwise provided in this Code.
Article 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate
children.
Michael Constantino is a full-term baby born on August 3, 1975 so that citing medical science, the conception of the child must
have taken place about 267 days before August 3, 1975 or sometime in the second week of November, 1974. While Amelita
testified that she had sexual contact with Ivan in November 1974, nevertheless said testimony is contradicted by her letter
addressed to Ivan Mendez, informing the latter that the former is four (4) months pregnant so that applying the period of the
duration of actual pregnancy, the child was conceived on or about October 11, 1974. Consequently, in the absence of clear and
convincing evidence establishing paternity or filiation, the complaint must be dismissed.
8. BDO V Gomez
FACTS:
Josephine D. Gomez (Josephine) was a teller at the Domestic Airport Branch of the PCIB when a certain Colin R. Harrington
opened Savings Account No. 373-28010-6 with said branch in January 1985.
The following day, Harrington presented two (2) genuine bank drafts dated January 3, 1985, issued by the Bank of New Zealand.
The first draft was in the sum of US$724.57 payable to "C.R. Harrington," while the second draft was in the sum of US$2,004.76
payable to "Servants
Upon receipt of the bank drafts, Josephine asked her immediate supervisor, Eleanor Flores, whether the drafts payable to
"Servants C/C.R. Harrington" were acceptable for deposit to the savings account of Harrington. When Flores answered in the
affirmative, and after receiving... from the bank's foreign exchange supervision a Philippine Currency conversion of the amounts
reflected in the drafts, Josephine received the deposit slip.
On two (2) separate dates, a certain individual representing himself as Harrington withdrew the sums of P45,000.00 and
P5,600.00. Subsequently, the bank discovered that the person who made the withdrawals was an impostor. Thus, the bank had
The PCIB issued a memorandum asking Josephine to explain why no disciplinary action should be taken against her for having
accepted the bank drafts for deposits. Josephine reasoned that being a new teller she was not yet fully oriented with the various
aspects of the job. She... further alleged that she had asked the approval of her immediate supervisor prior to receiving the
deposits.
On November 14, 1985, the PCIB deducted the amount of P-423.38 from Josephine's salary. Josephine wrote the PCIB to ask why
the deduction was made.
After due investigation on the matter, the PCIB issued another memorandum finding Josephine grossly negligent and liable for
performing acts in violation of established operating procedures. The memorandum required Josephine to pay the amount of P-
50,600.00 through deductions in... her salary, allowance, bonuses, and profit sharing until the amount is fully paid.
P50,600.00. During trial, the RTC found that the PCIB did not even respond to this letter. PCIB, however, alleged that it had
replied to Josephine's... letter, and explained that she was afforded due process and the deductions made prior to January 15,
1986, were merely a withholding pending the investigation.
On February 10, 1986, Josephine filed a complaint for damages with prayer for preliminary injunction before the RTC of Makati
City. She claimed that the PCIB had abused its right by gradually deducting from her salary the amount the bank had to pay
Harrington.
In its May 25, 1999 decision, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of Josephine and ordered the PCIB to pay her actual damages
The RTC considered the PCIB's manner of deducting from the salary and allowance of Josephine as having been rendered in bad
faith and contrary to morals, good custom, and public policy.
In its May 23, 2011 decision, the CA affirmed the May 25, 1999 RTC decision.
ISSUES:
PCIB contends that the CA gravely erred in ruling that its actions were in total and wanton disregard of Articles 19 and 21 of the
Civil Code because the courts a quo summarily imputed bad faith on how it had treated Josephine.
HELD:
 Article 19 of the Civil Code provides that every person in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties must act
with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. The principle embodied in this provision is more
commonly known as the
"abuse of right principle." The legal sanctions for violations of this fundamental principle are found in Articles 20[9] and 21[10] of
the Civil Code.
[Article 19], known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain standards which must
be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights but also in the performance of one's duties. These standards are the
following: to... act with justice; to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes a
primordial limitation on all rights; that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A
right, though by itself... legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some
illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in
damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for... which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. But while Article 19
lays down a rule of conduct for the government of human' relations and for the maintenance of social order, it does not provide
a remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for damages under either
Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper.
Both the RTC and the CA found the acts of the PCIB were in clear violation of Article 19 of the Civil Code and held the PCIB liable
for damages. While the PCIB has a right to penalize employees for acts of negligence, the right must not be exercised unjustly
and illegally. In... the instant case, the PCIB made deductions on Josephine's salary even if the investigation was still pending.
Belatedly, the PCIB issued a memorandum finding Josephine grossly negligent and requiring her to pay the amount which the
bank erroneously paid to Harrington's impostor.
When Josephine asked for legal and factual basis for the finding of negligence, the PCIB refused to give any. Moreover, the PCIB
continued to make deductions on Josephine's salary, allowances, and bonuses.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED
Principles:
The principle embodied in this provision is more commonly known as the
"abuse of right principle." The legal sanctions for violations of this fundamental principle are found in Articles 20[9]... and
21[10]... of the Civil Code.
[Article 19], known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain standards which must
be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights but also in the performance of one's duties. These standards are the
following: to... act with justice; to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes a
primordial limitation on all rights; that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A
right, though by itself... legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some
illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in
damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for... which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. But while Article 19
lays down a rule of conduct for the government of human' relations and for the maintenance of social order, it does not provide
a remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for damages under either
Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper.
9. Obana v Court of Appeals
FACTS:
On November 21, 1964, Anicleto Sandoval (owner of Sandoval’s and Sons Rice Mill) was approached by Chan Lin who offered to
purchase from him 170 cavans of rice at the price of P37.25 per cavan. The driver attempted to collect the payment from Chan
Lin and Petitioner Anacleto Sandoval but the latter refused, stating that he had already made the payment to Chan Lin. Further
demands having been met with refusal, Sandoval, as plaintiff, filed suit for Replevin against petitioner, before the Municipal
Court of San Fernando, La Union which ordered petitioner- defendant to pay to Sandoval ½ of the cost of the rice or P2,805. On
appeal by the petitioner to the court of First Instance, judgment was rendered dismissing the complaint. On appeal to
respondent Appellate Court, Sandoval obtained a reversal in his favor. Hence, the present petition seeks for the review of the
decision of Court of Appeals ordering Obaña in action for Replevin to return to Sandoval, Private Respondent herein, 170 cavans
of rice or to pay its value in the amount P37.25 per cavan, with legal interest from the filing of the complaint until fully paid.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner-dependent had unjustly enriched himself at the expense of another by holding on to property no
longer belonging to him.
HELD:
The judgment under review is hereby affirmed. Costs against petitioner. No person should be benefited without a valid basis or
justification, shall enrich himself at the expense of another and hold on to a property no longer belonging to him. The petition-
defendant in his own testimony said that he was repaid the sum of P5,600 by Chan Lin and claimed that he delivered the rice
9
back to them. However, the driver denied that the rice had ever been returned. The driver’s version is more credible since
Sandoval’s lawyer had manifested in open court that they would have withdrawn the complaint if the return of the rice had been
effected. In law and equity, therefore, Sandoval is entitled to recover the rice, or the value thereof since he was not paid the
price therefor.
10. Republic v. Lacap, G.R. No. 158253
FACTS:
Case is a petition for certoriari, assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed, with modifications, ruling by the
RTC granting the complaint for Specific Performance and damages filed by Lacap against RP
Dist. Eng. Of Pampanga issued an invitation to bid dated Jan 27, 1992 where Lacap and two other contractors were pre-qualified.
Being the lowest bidder, Lacap won the bid for concreting of a certain baranggay, and thereafter undertook the works and
purchased materials and labor in connection with. On Oct 29, 1992, Office of the Dist. Eng conducted final investigation of end
product and fount it 100% completed according to specs. Lacap thereafter sought the payment of the DPWH. DPWH withheld
payment on the grounds that the CoA disapproved final release of funds due to Lacap’s license as contractor having expired. Dist.
Eng sought the opinion of DPWH legal. Legal then responded to Dist. Eng that the Contractors License Law (RA 4566) does not
provide that a contract entered into by a contractor after expiry of license is void and that there is no law that expressly prohibits
or declares void such a contract. DPWH Legal Dept, through Dir III Cesar Mejia, issued First Indorsement on July 20 1994
recommending that payment be made to Lacap. Despite such recommendation, no payment was issued. On July 3, 1995,
respondent filed the complaint for Specific Performance and Damages against petitioner before the RTC.14. On September 14,
1995, petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the grounds that
the complaint states no cause of action and that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the nature of the action since respondent did
not appeal to the COA the decision of the District Auditor to disapprove the claim. Following the submission of respondent’s
Opposition to Motion to Dismiss,the RTC issued an Order dated March 11, 1996 denying the Motion to Dismiss. The OSG filed a
Motion for Reconsideration18 but it was likewise denied by the RTC in its Order dated May 23, 1996. On August 5, 1996, the OSG
filed its Answer invoking the defenses of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies and the doctrine of non-suability of the
State. Following trial, the RTC rendered on February 19, 1997 a decision ordering DPWH to pay Lacap for the contract of the
project, 12% interest from demand until fully paid, and the costs of the suit
CA affirmed the decision but lowered interest to 6%.
ISSUE:
WON a contractor with an expired license is entitled to be paid for completed projects.
HELD:
A contractor with an expired license is entitled payment for completed projects, but does not exonerate him from corresponding
fines thereof. Section 35 of R.A. No. 4566 explicitly provides:
“SEC. 35. Penalties. Any contractor who, for a price, commission, fee or wage, submits or attempts to submit a bid to construct,
or contracts to or undertakes to construct, or assumes charge in a supervisory capacity of a construction work within the purview
of this Act, without first securing a license to engage in the business of contracting in this country; or who shall present or file the
license certificate of another, give false evidence of any kind to the Board, or any member thereof in obtaining a certificate or
license, impersonate another, or use an expired or revoked certificate or license, shall be deemed guilty of misdemeanor, and
shall, upon conviction, be sentenced to pay a fine of not less than five hundred pesos but not more than five thousand pesos. The
"plain meaning rule" or verba legis in statutory construction is that if the statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must
be given its literal meaning and applied without interpretation. The wordings of R.A. No. 4566 are clear. It does not declare,
expressly or impliedly, as void contracts entered into by a contractor whose license had already expired. Nonetheless, such
contractor is liable for payment of the fine prescribed therein. Thus, respondent should be paid for the projects he completed.
Such payment, however, is without prejudice to the payment of the fine prescribed under the law.
11. ELADlA DE LIMA vs. LAGUNA TAYABAS CO.
FACTS:
On June 3, 1958, an accident between a Laguna Tayabas Co. (LTB) bus and Seven-up Bottlers Co. delivery truck resulted to the
death of an LTB passenger named Petra dela Cruz. Two other LTB passengers namely Eladia de Lima and Nemesio Flores also
incurred physical injuries. De Lima, Flores and the heir of dela Cruz filed suits to the bus company.
In December 29, 1971, the petitioners requested to expedite the decision of the case with the hope that the legal interest is to be
given immediately from the date of the decision. By January 31, 1972, the decision was given. Again, the petitioners reiterated
their request for the modification of the decision in such a way that the effectivity is to be rolled back to December 27, 1963.
Furthermore, the heir of dela Cruz filed a reconsideration for the increase of indemnity from P3,000 to P12,000. With this
pending motion for reconsideration, LTB filed an appeal for the case. The appellate court turned down the motion for
 reconsideration of the plaintiffs indicating that an appeal should have been filed for the awarding of the legal interest. The
petition was reviewed in 1988, thirty years after the actual incident.
ISSUES:
a. Whether the effectivity of the decision is to be rolled back as requested by the plaintiffs.
b. Whether the lower court was erroneous in the delay of the decision for the increase in the claim of the heir of Petra dela Cruz.
HELD:
The court granted the petition noting that the plaintiffs were unable to make an appeal in the lower court due to the fact that the
petitioners are seeking judicial remedy as impoverished individuals. They were hopeful that the adjudged amount will be
provided to them by the transportation company. With the case pending for thirty years, the court aptly found this as a sufficient
justification to grant the legal interest as well as the increase in indemnity.
It was found that the rolling back of the effectivity date was necessary to compensate for the monetary loss the plaintiffs
incurred from the accident, death and court proceedings. Moreover, the claim for Petra dela Cruz was increased from P3,000.00
to P30,000.00. The decision was immediately executory in response to the identified urgent need of the plaintiffs.
12. Domingo & Paguyo v Astorga
FACTS:
Petitioners owned a five-storey named Paguyo Building over the land owned by the Armas family. Pending civil case, petitioners
and Armases entered into compromise agreement for the former to acquire the lot. In dire need of money, petitioner entered
into agreement “Receipt of Earnest Money” with herein respondent for the sale of former’s property and lot which was to be
purchased from Armases. Petitioner (Lourdes) later entered into Deed of Absolute Sale of Paguyo Building with the respondent,
who also paid for the accrued and subsequent real property taxes. Petitioner filed Complaint rescission of “Receipt of Earnest
Money” alleging there has been fraud on the part of respondents. The RTC and Court of Appeals ruled in favor of respondents
with damages.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner’s complaint for rescission is tenable.
HELD:
NO. Petitioners’ contentions lack merit. For one, on top of the amount received by petitioners, respondents had to shoulder
accrued real estate taxes. For another, respondents believe it was the value for their money inasmuch as the building stands on a
lot with a lot owner reluctant to sell it. For a third, said amount was arrived considering the depreciated value of the building in
view o economic and political uncertainties that time. Except in cases specified by law, lesion or inadequacy of cause shall not
invalidate a contract, unless there has been fraud, mistake or undue influence. (Art. 1355, NCC) Gross inadequacy of the price
does not affect a contract of sale, except as may indicate a defect in the consent, or the parties really intended a donation or
some other act of contract. (Art.1470, NCC)
13. RCPI vs VERCHEZ 2006
FACTS:
Respondent Grace Verchez-Infante (Grace) hired the services of Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. (RCPI) to send a
telegram to her sister respondent Zenaida Verchez-Catibog (Zenaida), asking her to send money for their mother Editha Verchez
(Editha) who at that time was confined in a hospital in Sorsogon. But it took 25 days before such message was conveyed to
Zenaida.
When Editha died, her husband, respondent Alfonso Verchez (Alfonso), along with his daughters Grace and Zenaida and their
respective spouses, filed an action for damages against RCPI before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Sorsogon. They alleged that
the delay in the delivery of the message contributed to the early death of Editha. RCPI argues, among other things, that the delay
in the delivery is caused by force majeure; hence they must  be released from any liability. The RTC rendered judgement against
RCPI. RCPI appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE:
W/N RCPI may be held liable for damages.
Held:
Yes. Article 1170 of the Civil Code provides: Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or
delay, and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages. (Italics supplied) Passing on this codal
provision, this Court explained: In culpa contractual x x x the mere proof of the existence of the contract and the failure of its
compliance justify, prima facie, a corresponding right of relief. The law, recognizing the obligatory force of contracts, will not
permit a party to be set free from liability for any kind of misperformance of the contractual undertaking or a contravention of
the tenor thereof. A breach upon the contract confers upon the injured party a valid cause for recovering that which may have
been lost or suffered. In the case at bar, RCPI bound itself to deliver the telegram within the shortest possible time. It took 25
days, however, for RCPI to deliver it.
10
RCPI invokes force majeure, specifically, the alleged radio noise and interferences which adversely affected the transmission
and/or reception of the telegraphic message. Additionally, its messenger claimed he could not locate the address of Zenaida and
it was only on the third attempt that he was able to deliver the telegram.
For the defense of force majeure to prosper, it is necessary that one has committed no negligence or misconduct that may have
occasioned the loss. An act of God cannot be invoked to protect a person who has failed to take steps to forestall the possible
adverse consequences of such a loss. One’s negligence may have concurred with an act of God in producing damage and injury to
another; nonetheless, showing that the immediate or proximate cause of the damage or injury was a fortuitous event would not
exempt one from liability. When the effect is found to be partly the result of a person’s participation – whether by active
intervention, neglect or failure to act – the whole occurrence is humanized and removed from the rules applicable to acts of
God.
Article 1174 of the Civil Code states that no person shall be responsible for a fortuitous event that could not be foreseen or,
though foreseen, was inevitable. In other words, there must be an exclusion of human intervention from the cause of injury or
loss.24 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Assuming arguendo that fortuitous circumstances prevented RCPI from delivering the telegram at the soonest possible time, it
should have at least informed Grace of the non-transmission and the non-delivery so that she could have taken steps to remedy
the situation. But it did not. There lies the fault or negligence.
14. Hing v Choachuy
FACTS:
Sometime in April 2005, Aldo Development & Resources, Inc. (owned by Choachuy’s) filed a case for Injunction and Damages
with Writ of Preliminary Injunction or Temporary Restraining Order against the Hing’s. The latter claimed that the Hing’s
constructed a fence without a valid permit and that it would destroy the walls of their building. The court denied the application
for lack of evidence.  So in order to get evidences for the case, on June 2005, Choachuy illegally set-up two video surveillance
cameras facing the Hing’s property. Their employees even took pictures of the said construction of the fence. The Hing’s then
filed a case against the Choachuy’s for violating their right to privacy. On October 2005, the RTC issued a order granting the
application of the Hing’s for TRO and directed the Choachuy’s to remove the two video surveillance cameras they installed. The
Choachuy’s appealed the case to the Court of Appeals and  the RTC’s decision was annulled and set aside. The Hing’s then raised
the case to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: 
Whether or not the installation of two video surveillance cameras of Choachuy’s violated the Hing’s right to privacy.
HELD:
Such act of the Choachuy’s violated the right of privacy of the Hing’s under Article 26(1) prohibiting the “prying into the privacy of
another’s residence.” Although it is a business office and not a residence, the owner has the right to exclude the public or deny
them access.
15. Ledesma v Court of Appeals
FACTS: 
A college student was scheduled to graduate with magna cum laude honors. However, this was deprived of her because her
lending of money to members of an organization of which she was a member, purportedly in violation of existing school rules
and regulations, according to the President of the State College. This was done although the Bureau of Public Schools already
intervened and instructed give her said honors. Despite this, she was made to graduate as a plain student. The Supreme Court
held the President liable for damages.
ISSUE:
IS THE PRESIDENT LIABLE FOR DAMAGES?
HELD:
Yes, the President is liable for damages.
We find no reason why the findings of the trial and appellate courts should be reversed. It cannot be disputed that Violeta Delmo
went through a painful ordeal which was brought about by the petitioner’s neglect of duty and callousness. Thus, moral damages
are but proper. As we have affirmed in the case of Prudenciado v. Alliance Transport System, Inc., 148 SCRA 440, 448):
"There is no argument that moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation,
moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of defendant's wrongful act or omission." (People v. Bayln, 129
SCRA 62, 1984)
16. Correa v CFI of Bulacan
FACTS:
On December 13, 1968, respondent Court rendered judgment in Civil Case No. 3621-M in favor of therein plaintiffs (private
respondents herein) and adversely against therein defendants Eufemio T. Correa (petitioner herein). The pertinent portions of
the decision read as follows: "This Court finds that defendants Eufemio T. Correa and Virgilio Sarmiento, municipal mayor and
municipal treasurer of Norzagaray, Bulacan respectively,
should be ordered personally to pay the salaries which the plaintiffs failed to receive by reason of their illegal removal from office
until they are actually reinstated. The aforesaid decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals on March 22, 1976, and the
motion for reconsideration of the Appellate Court's decision was denied on May 11, 1976. On August 24, 1976, the decision of
the Court of Appeals became final and executory. It is in connection with the efforts of the petitioner to quash the writ of
execution issued to enforce the aforestated final judgment that the present proceedings arose.
Bulacan. Petitioner invoked the principle that when judgment is rendered against an officer of the municipal corporation who is
sued in his official capacity for the payment of back salaries of officers illegally removed, the judgment is binding upon the
corporation, whether or not the same is included as party to the action. Petitioner contends that it is the municipality of
Norzagaray that is liable.
ISSUE:
The issue is whether or not respondent Court in denying the Motion to Quash the Writ of Execution acted with grave abuse of
discretion or with lack or excess of jurisdiction.
HELD:
In the discharge of governmental functions, "municipal corporations are responsible for the acts of its officers, except if and
when, and only to the extent that, they have acted by authority of the law, and in conformity with the requirements thereof." A
public officer who commits a tort or other wrongful act, done in excess or beyond the scope of his duty, is not protected by his
office and is personally liable therefor like any private individual.This principle of personal liability has been applied to cases
where a public officer removes another officer or discharges an employee wrongfully, thereported cases saying that by reason of
non-compliance with the requirements of law in respect to removal from office, the officials were acting outside their official
authority.
Respondent Court, therefore, did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner's motion to quash writ of execution.
The writ was strictly in accordance with the terms of the judgment.
17. Sarmiento v Court of Appeals
FACTS:
Gregorio Limpin, Jr. and Antonio Apostol, doing business under the name and style of ‘Davao Libra Industrial Sales,’ filed an
application for an Irrevocable Domestic Letter of Credit with the plaintiff Bank for the amount of P495,000.00 in favor of LS Parts
Hardware and Machine Shop (herein after referred to as LS Parts) for the purchase of assorted scrap irons. Said application was
signed by defendant Limpin and Apostol. The aforesaid application was approved, and plaintiff Bank issued Domestic Letter of
Credit No. DLC No. DVO-78-006 in favor of LS Parts for P495,000.00.   Thereafter, a Trust Receipt dated September 6, 1978, was
executed by defendant Limpin and Antonio Apostol (Exh. ‘C’). In said Trust Receipt, the following stipulation, signed by defendant
Lorenzo Sarmiento, Jr. The defendants failed to comply with their undertaking under the Trust Receipt. The defendants claim
that they cannot be held liable as the 825 tons of assorted scrap iron, subject of the trust receipt agreement, were lost when the
vessel transporting them sunk, and that said scrap iron were delivered to ‘Davao Libra Industrial Sales’, a business concern over
which they had no interest whatsoever.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Sarmiento is liable nowithstanding the loss of the scrap iron  involved exclusively the criminal and civil liability of the latter arising from his criminal negligence. In other words, appellant's
HELD:
Yes In the present case, private respondent’s complaint against petitioners was based on the failure of the latter to comply with
their obligation as spelled out in the Trust Receipt executed by them.This breach of obligation is separate and distinct from any
criminal liability for “misuse and/or misappropriation of goods or proceeds realized from the sale of goods, documents or
instruments released under trust receipts”, punishable under Section 13 of the Trust Receipts Law (P.D. 115) in relation to Article
315(1), (b) of the Revised Penal Code. Being based on an obligation  ex contractu and not ex delicto, the civil action may proceed
independently of the criminal proceedings instituted against petitioners regardless of the result of the latter
18. PNB v Catipon
FACTS:
Dalmacio Catipon bought onions from J.V. Ramirez and Co., Inc. in 1951. The son of Ramirez told Catipon that the only way he could get
the onions is for him to sign a trust receipt from Philippine National Bank (PNB). Catipon at that time had no knowledge or intention to
11
be bound by the trust receipt but he signed it anyway so that he could get the onions he already paid for. Catipon subsequently
disposed of the onions by selling them. Ramirez later became insolvent and the trust receipt went unpaid and since it was in Catipon’s
name, PNB sued him for estafa for misappropriating the merchandise (onions). The lower court acquitted Catipon because his guilt was
not satisfactorily established. Now PNB filed an action for recovery against Catipon. Catipon assailed the civil suit and he argues that
PNB did not reserve its right to file a separate civil action.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Catipon is still liable regardless of his acquittal in the criminal case.
HELD:
Yes. The acquittal was because of the fact that his guilt was not satisfactorily established hence his acquittal was based on reasonable
doubt and under the law, such acquittal does not preclude a suit to enforce the civil liability for the same act or omission, under Article
29 of the new Civil Code. This is even if there was no prior reservation by PNB to file a civil suit. Catipon is ordered to pay PNB without
prejudice to Catipon’s rights against Ramirez.
19. Bernaldez v BLTI
FACTS:
Appellant, Jovito Bernaldes and his brother, Nicasio, boarded one of appellee's passenger trucks (B.L.T. Co. No. 322 with plate
No. 1470) in the town of Guindulman, Bohol, on the way to Tagbilaran, the bus fell off a deep precipice in barrio Balitbiton,
municipality of Garcia-Hernandez, resulting in the death of Nicasio and in serious physical injuries to Jovito. A complaint for
damges against apellee, Bohol Land Transportation Co. was filed. Defendant moved for the dismissal of the complaint on two
grounds, namely, that the cause of action alleged therein was barred by a prior judgment, and that it did not state a cause of
action. At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, it was established that in Criminal Case No. 2775 of the same court,  the driver of
the bus involved in the accident, was charged with double homicide thru reckless imprudence but was acquitted on the ground
that his guilt had not been established beyond reasonable doubt, and that appellees, through their attorneys, intervened in the
prosecution of said case and did not reserve the right to file a separate action for damages. The lower court sustained the motion
on the ground of bar by prior judgment, and dismissed the case. Hence, this appeal
ISSUE:
WON a civil action for damages against the owner of a public vehicle, based on breach of contract of carriage, may be filed after
the criminal action instituted against the driver has been disposed of, if the aggrieved party did not reserve his right to enforce
civil liability in a separate action.
WON whether the intervention of the aggrieved party, through private prosecutors, in the prosecution of the criminal case
against the driver — who was acquitted on the ground of insufficiency of evidence — will bar him from suing the latter's
employer for damages for breach of contract, in an independent and separate action.
HELD:
YES. Article 31 of the New Civil Code expressly provides that when the civil action is based upon an obligation not arising from
the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and
regardless of the result of the latter. This provision evidently refers to a civil action based, not on the act or omission charged as a
felony in a criminal case, but to one based on an obligation arising from other sources, such as law or contract. Upon the other
hand it is clear that a civil action based on contractual liability of a common carrier is distinct from the criminal action instituted
against the carrier or its employee based on the latter's criminal negligence. The first is governed by the provisions of the Civil
Code, and not by those of the Revised Penal Code, and it being entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, the same
may be instituted and prosecuted independently of, and regardless of the result of the latter. In the case at bar, the civil action
instituted against appellee is based on alleged culpa contractual incurred by it due to its failure to carry safely the late Nicasio
Bernaldes and his brother Jovito to their place of destination, whereas the criminal action instituted against appellee's driver
action concerned the civil liability of appellee as a common carrier, regardless of the liabilities of its driver who was charged in
the criminal case. The failure, on the part of the appellants, to reserve their right to recover civil indemnity against the carrier can
not in any way be deemed as a waiver, on their part, to institute a separate action against the latter based on its contractual
liability, or on culpa aquiliana, under Articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. (Parker, et al. vs. Panlilio, et al.,G.R. No. L-4961, March
5, 1952). As a matter of fact, such reservation is already implied in the law which declares such action to be independent and
separate from the criminal action. Moreover, it has been held that the duty of the offended party to make such reservation
applies only to defendant in the criminal action, not to persons secondarily liable (Chaves, et al. vs. Manila Electric, 31 Phil. 47).
YES. Appellants, through private prosecutors, were allowed to intervene in the criminal action against appellee's driver, but if
that amounted inferentially to submitting in said case their claim for civil indemnity, the claim could have been only against the
driver but not against appellee who was not a party therein. As a matter of fact, however, inspite of appellee's statements to the
contrary in its brief, there is no showing in the record before Us that appellants made of record their claim for damages against
the driver or his employer; much less does it appear that they had attempted to prove such damages. The failure of the court to
 make any pronouncement in its decision concerning the civil liability of the driver and/or of his employer must therefore be due
to the fact that the criminal action did not involve at all any claim for civil indemnity. Lastly, as appellee's driver was acquitted
only on reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages against him may be instituted for the same act or omission (Rule 107, par.
[d]; Art. 29, New Civil Code). If such is the rule as against him, a fortiori, it must in the case of his employer.
20. Vinzons-Chato v. Fortune Tobacco
FACTS:
This is a case for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code filed by Fortune against Liwayway as CIR.
On June 10, 1993, the legislature enacted RA 7654, which provided that locally manufactured cigarettes which are currently
classified and taxed at 55% shall be charged an ad valorem tax of “55% provided that the maximum tax shall not be less than Five
Pesos per pack.” Prior to effectivity of RA 7654, Liwayway issued a rule, reclassifying “Champion,” “Hope,” and “More” (all
manufactured by Fortune) as locally manufactured cigarettes bearing foreign brand subject to the 55% ad valorem tax. Thus,
when RA 7654 was passed, these cigarette brands were already covered.
In a case filed against Liwayway with the RTC, Fortune contended that the issuance of the rule violated its constitutional right
against deprivation of property without due process of law and the right to equal protection of the laws.
For her part, Liwayway contended in her motion to dismiss that respondent has no cause of action against her because she
issued RMC 37-93 in the performance of her official function and within the scope of her authority. She claimed that she acted
merely as an agent of the Republic and therefore the latter is the one responsible for her acts. She also contended that the
complaint states no cause of action for lack of allegation of malice or bad faith.
The order denying the motion to dismiss was elevated to the CA, who dismissed the case on the ground that under Article 32,
liability may arise even if the defendant did not act with malice or bad faith.
Hence this appeal.
ISSUES:
o Whether or not a public officer may be validly sued in his/her private capacity for acts done in connection with the discharge
of the functions of his/her office
o Whether or not Article 32, NCC, should be applied instead of Sec. 38, Book I, Administrative Code
HELD:
On the first issue, the general rule is that a public officer is not liable for damages which a person may suffer arising from the just
performance of his official duties and within the scope of his assigned tasks. An officer who acts within his authority to administer
the affairs of the office which he/she heads is not liable for damages that may have been caused to another, as it would virtually
be a charge against the Republic, which is not amenable to judgment for monetary claims without its consent. However, a public
officer is by law not immune from damages in his/her personal capacity for acts done in bad faith which, being outside the scope
of his authority, are no longer protected by the mantle of immunity for official actions.
Specifically, under Sec. 38, Book I, Administrative Code, civil liability may arise where there is bad faith, malice, or gross
negligence on the part of a superior public officer. And, under Sec. 39 of the same Book, civil liability may arise where the
subordinate public officer’s act is characterized by willfulness or negligence. In Cojuangco, Jr. V. CA, a public officer who directly
or indirectly violates the constitutional rights of another, may be validly sued for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code even
if his acts were not so tainted with malice or bad faith.
Thus, the rule in this jurisdiction is that a public officer may be validly sued in his/her private capacity for acts done in the course
of the performance of the functions of the office, where said public officer: (1) acted with malice, bad faith, or negligence; or (2)
where the public officer violated a constitutional right of the plaintiff.
On the second issue, SC ruled that the decisive provision is Article 32, it being a special law, which prevails over a general law (the
Administrative Code).
Article 32 was patterned after the “tort” in American law. A tort is a wrong, a tortious act which has been defined as the
commission or omission of an act by one, without right, whereby another receives some injury, directly or indirectly, in person,
property or reputation. There are cases in which it has been stated that civil liability in tort is determined by the conduct and not
by the mental state of the tortfeasor, and there are circumstances under which the motive of the defendant has been rendered
immaterial. The reason sometimes given for the rule is that otherwise, the mental attitude of the alleged wrongdoer, and not the
act itself, would determine whether the act was wrongful. Presence of good motive, or rather, the absence of an evil motive,
does not render lawful an act which is otherwise an invasion of another’s legal right; that is, liability in tort in not precluded by
the fact that defendant acted without evil intent.
21. Aberca v Ver
FACTS:
This case stems from alleged illegal searches and seizures and other violations of the rights and liberties of plaintiffs by various
intelligence units of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, known as Task Force Makabansa (TFM) ordered by General Fabian Ver
12
“to conduct pre-emptive strikes against known communist-terrorist (CT) underground houses in view of increasing reports about
CT plans to sow disturbances in Metro Manila,”. Plaintiffs allege, among others, that complying with said order, elements of the
TFM raided several places, employing in most cases defectively issued judicial search warrants; that during these raids, certain
members of the raiding party confiscated a number of purely personal items belonging to plaintiffs; that plaintiffs were arrested
without proper warrants issued by the courts; that for some period after their arrest, they were denied visits of relatives and
lawyers; that plaintiffs were interrogated in violation of their rights to silence and counsel; that military men who interrogated
them employed threats, tortures and other forms of violence on them in order to obtain incriminatory information or
confessions and in order to punish them; that all violations of plaintiffs constitutional rights were part of a concerted and
deliberate plan to forcibly extract information and incriminatory statements from plaintiffs and to terrorize, harass and punish
them, said plans being previously known to and sanctioned by defendants.
Plaintiffs sought actual/compensatory, moral damages, exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. A motion to dismiss was filed by
defendants, through their counsel, then Solicitor-General Estelito Mendoza, alleging among others that (1) plaintiffs may not
cause a judicial inquiry into the circumstances of their detention in the guise of a damage suit because, as to them, the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended; (2) assuming that the courts can entertain the present action, defendants are immune
from liability for acts done in the performance of their official duties.
ISSUE: 
1. WON the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus bars a civil action for damagesfor illegal searches conducted
by military personnel and other violations of rights and liberties guaranteedunder the Constitution?
2. If such action for damages may be maintained, may a superior officer under the notion of respondent superior be answerable
for damages, jointly and severally with his subordinates, to the person whose constitutional rights and liberties have been
violated?
HELD:
1. NO. The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not destroy petitioners’ right and cause of action for
damages for illegal arrest and detention and other violations of their constitutional rights. The suspension does not render valid
an otherwise illegal arrest or detention. What is suspended is merely the right of the individual to seek release from detention
through the writ of habeas corpus as a speedy means of obtaining his liberty.
2. YES. Article 32 of the Civil Code renders any public officer or employee or any private individual liable in damages for
violating the Constitutional rights and liberties of another, as enumerated therein. The doctrine of respondent superior has
been generally limited in its application to principal and agent or to master and servant (i.e. employer and employee)
relationship. No such relationship exists between superior officers of the military and their subordinates.  Be that as it may,
however, the decisive factor in this case, in our view, is the language of Article 32. The law speaks of an officer or employee or
person ‘directly’ or “indirectly” responsible for the violation of the constitutional rights and liberties of another. Thus, it is not
the actor alone (i.e. the one directly responsible) who must answer for damages under Article 32; the person indirectly
responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury caused to the aggrieved party.
By this provision, the principle of accountability of public officials under the Constitution 5 acquires added meaning and a larger
dimension. No longer may a superior official relax his vigilance or abdicate his duty to supervise his subordinates, secure in the
thought that he does not have to answer for the transgressions committed by the latter against the constitutionally protected
rights and liberties of the citizen. Part of the factors that propelled people power in February 1986 was the widely held
perception that the government was callous or indifferent to, if not actually responsible for, the rampant violations of human
rights. While it would certainly be go naive to expect that violators of human rights would easily be deterred by the prospect
of facing damage suits, it should nonetheless be made clear in no ones terms that Article 32 of the Civil Code makes the
persons who are directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for the transgression joint tortfeasors.
22. Marcia v CA
FACTS:
In 1956, a passenger bus in Pampanga operated by private respondent Victory Liner, Inc. and driven by its employee Felardo
Paje, collided with a jeep driven by Clemente Marcia, resulting in the latter's death and in physical injuries to herein petitioners.
Thereupon, an information for homicide and serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence was filed against Paje in the CFI of
Pampanga. A month later, an action for damages was filed in the CFI of Rizal by petitioners against the Victory Liner, Inc. and
Paje, alleging that, the mishap was due to the reckless imprudence and negligence of the latter in driving the passenger bus. Paje
was convicted by the CFI but was acquitted on appeal ruling that appellant was not even guilty of civil negligence and that it was
a pure accident. The CFI of Rizal subsequently dismissed the civil case.
 ISSUE:  bigamy. The civil action for annulment must first be decided before the action for bigamy can proceed. Wherefore,
W/N the civil action is an independent one, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action.
HELD:
 Decision affirmed.
Reckless imprudence or criminal negligence is not one of the three crimes mentioned in Article 33 of the Civil Code. The above
article speaks only of defamation, fraud and physical injuries. The injuries suffered by herein petitioners were alleged to be the
result of criminal negligence; they were not inflicted with malice. Hence, no independent civil action for damages may be
instituted in connection therewith.
The charge against Felardo Paje was not for homicide and physical injuries but for reckless imprudence or criminal negligence
resulting in homicide and physical injuries suffered by Edgar Marcia and Renato Yap. They are not one of the three crimes
mentioned in Article 33 of the Civil Code and, therefore, no civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution.
PREJUDICIAL QUESTIONS
1. Benitez v Concepcion, 2 SCRA 178
FACTS:
That on May 4, 1946 Rufino Ibanez, Ong ho and Chingsiokeng (wife of Yu bon Chiong) executed a real estate
mortgage at Philippine National Bank (PNB) for the payment of the Debtor (Yu bon Chiong) with an amount of
P50,000,00  the mortgage was amended on March 26, 19657 to secure the payment of the increase indebtness of
the petitioner which had risen to P170,000,00. The petitioner failed to pay the debt that causes the PNB to file with
the CFI of Rizal a civil case against the petitioner and respondent (civil case 449). On July 24, 1957 Ong ho filed a
complaint in the CFI manila civil case 33251 against the PNB and petitioners for the annulment of the two deeds of
mortgage, claiming that his signature in the said documents was forged. On July 16, 1958  Respondent Ong ho filed
a Criminal case complaint before the city fiscal of manila, charging the petitioner falsification of deeds of mortgage
involved in civil case no. 994. On July 2, 1958 Petitioner filed a motion before the respondent fiscal for the dismissal
of the criminal complaint on the ground that there’s a civil prejudicial question of which should be resolved first.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a civil prejudicial question exist in the said petition
HELD:
No, disputes arises from the fact that both civil case no. 33251 and criminal case O.s no 15190  arose from the same
transaction or fact. Where both a civil and criminal action arising from the same fact are filed in court the criminal
case takes precedence (Rule 107, Sec 1b)
2. Zapanta v Montesa, 4 SCRA 510
FACTS:  are actions to annul the marriages entered into by accused in a bigamy case does not mean that "prejudicial
On May 20, 1958 Olimpia Y. Co filed a bigamy case against Merardo L. Zapanta alleging that the latter having
previously married to Estrella Guarin, and without having the said marriage dissolved contracted a second marriage
with the complainant. On June 16, 1958, Zapanta filed a case against Co for the annulment of their marriage on the
ground of duress force and intimidation. Co filed a motion to dismiss the complaint upon the ground that it stated
no cause of action but was denied after a few days. On Sept. 2, 1958, Zapanta filed a motion to suspend
proceedings on the ground that the civil case was a prejudicial question. Respondent judge denied the motion as
well as petitioners motion for reconsideration and ordered his arraignment. After entering a plea of not guilty,
petitioner field the present action.
ISSUES:
The prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before the court and jurisdiction to try the same must
be lodged in another court.
Should the question for annulment of the second marriage prosper on the ground that Zapanta’s consent thereto
was obtained by means of duress, force and intimidation?
HELD:
Zapanta’s act was involuntary and can not be the basis of his conviction for bigamy. Thus, the issue involved in the
action for the annulment of the second marriage is determinative of petitioner’s guilt or innocence of the crime of
13
the writ prayed for in the petition was hereby granted. Without any costs
3. Jimenez v Aberia, 22 SCRA 1380
FACTS:
That Criminal case no TM-235 of the CFI of Cavite Respondents Ofelia v. Tang and Estefania De la Cruz Olanday
were charged of Estafa. The respondent filed civil case no. 6636 against the Jimenez in the CFI of Quezon
Contesting the validity of a certain receipt signed by them on October 26, 1962, the complain that they never
received any amount from the Jimenez and that their signatures questioned in the receipt were secured by means
of Fraud, Deceit and Intimidation employed by the petitioner.
The respondents then filed a motion in the above mentioned criminal action to suspend its proceedings on the
ground that the issue involved in civil case 6636 of CFI of Quezon was a prejudicial Question.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a prejudicial question can be raised in the motion of the respondent
HELD:
No, There were no prejudicial questions regarding the criminal case arisen from the civil case, the alleged
prejudicial question is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the parties charged of estafa, the accused
simply blocked the proceedings by filing an independent civil action against the complainant, The issue raised by
the respondent is simply a matter of defense interposed in the criminal proceedings
4. Landicho v Relova, 22 SCRA 731
FACTS:
On February 27, 1963, petitioner was charged before the Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch I, presided
over by respondent Judge, with the offense, of bigamy. It was alleged in the information that petitioner "being then
lawfully married to Elvira Makatangay, which marriage has not been legally dissolved, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with Fe Lourdes Pasia." On March 15, 1963, an action was
filed before the Court of First Instance of Batangas, likewise presided plaintiff respondent Judge Fe Lourdes Pasia,
seeking to declare her marriage to petitioner as null and void ab initio because of the alleged use of force, threats
and intimidation allegedly employed by petitioner and because of its allegedly bigamous character. On June 15,
1963, petitioner as defendant in said case, filed a third-party complaint, against the third-party defendant
Elvira Makatangay, the first spouse, praying that his marriage with the said third-party defendant be declared null
and void, on the ground that by means of threats, force and intimidation, she compelled him to appear and
contract marriage with her before the Justice of the Peace of Makati, Rizal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the civil case filed is a prejudicial question.
HELD:
Where the first wife filed a criminal action for bigamy against the husband, and later the second wife filed a civil
case for annulment of the marriage on the ground of force and intimidation, and the husband later files a civil case
for annulment of marriage against the first wife, the civil cases are not prejudicial questions in the determination of
his criminal liability for bigamy, since his consent to the second marriage is not in issue. "The mere fact that there
questions" are automatically raised in civil actions as to warrant the suspension of the criminal case. In order that
the case of annulment of marriage be considered a prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the accused, it
must be shown that petitioner's consent to such marriage must be the one that was obtained by means of duress,
force and intimidation to show that his act in the second marriage must be involuntary and cannot be the basis of
his conviction for the crime of bigamy.
The situation in the present case is markedly different. At the time the petitioner was indicted for bigamy, the fact
that two marriage ceremonies had been contracted appeared to be indisputable. And it was the second spouse, not
the petitioner who filed the action for nullity on the ground of force, threats and intimidation. And it was only later
that petitioner as defendant in the civil action, filed a third party complaint against the first spouse alleging that his
marriage with her should be declared null and void on the ground of force, threats and intimidation. Assuming the
first marriage was null and void on the ground alleged by petitioner, that fact would not be material to the outcome
of the criminal case. Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the
same must be submitted to the judgment of a competent court and only when the nullity of the marriage is so
declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration, the presumption is that the marriage
exists.
 Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage
assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy."
5. Beltran v People, GR No 137567, June 20, 2000
FACTS:
Meynardo and Charmaine were married in 1973. After 24 years of marriage, Meynardo filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage with Charmaine on the ground of psychological incapacity. Charmaine, however,
alleged that it was Meynardo who left the conjugal home, and is now living with Milagros, his paramour. Charmaine
filed a case for concubinage against Meynardo before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City. Meynardo
filed a Motion to Defer Proceedings in the Metropolitan Trial Court, saying that the pendency of the petition for
nullity of his marriage with Charmaine poses a prejudicial question to the criminal case. The lower court denied the
motion as well as the motion for reconsideration filed by Meynardo, hence he filed a Petition for Certiorari with
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction before the Regional Trial Court to stop the lower court
from trying his case. The RTC denied his petition and the motion for reconsideration.  issue in the annulment of marriage is not similar or intimately related to the issue in the criminal case for parricide.
ISSUE:  Further, the relationship between the offender and the victim is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the
Whether the pendency of a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage poses a prejudicial question to a
prosecution for concubinage filed by the wife?
HELD:
No. The pendency of a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage does not pose a prejudicial question to a
prosecution for concubinage. The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting
decisions. It has two essential elements:
(a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action;
and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of petitioner’s marriage is not a prejudicial question to the
concubinage case. For a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the suspension of the
latter pending the final determination of the civil case, it must appear not only that the said civil case involves the
same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that in the resolution of the issue or
issues raised in the aforesaid civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.
In the case at bar it must also be held that parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for
themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of the competent courts and only when the
nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the
presumption is that the marriage exists for all intents and purposes. Therefore, he who cohabits with a woman not
his wife before the judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for
concubinage. The lower court therefore, has not erred in affirming the Orders of the judge of the Metropolitan Trial
Court ruling that pendency of a civil action for nullity of marriage does not pose a prejudicial question in a criminal
case for concubinage.
Whether or not the resolution of the action for annulment of marriage is a prejudicial question that warrants the
suspension of the criminal case for frustrated parricide.
HELD:
The elements of a prejudicial question under Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure, which
are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the
subsequent criminal action and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed, were not met. Civil action must be instituted first before the filing of the criminal action.     In this case, the
civil case for annulment was filed after the filing of the criminal case for frustrated parricide.  Further, the resolution
of the civil action is not a prejudicial question that would warrant the suspension of the criminal action. There is a
prejudicial question when a civil action and a criminal action are both pending, and there exists in the civil action an
issue which must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed because howsoever the issue
raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal
case. The relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in the crime of parricide.   However, the
 
accused. The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Article 36  of the Family Code  is whether
petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations.   The issue in parricide is
whether the accused killed the victim.  In this case, since petitioner was charged with frustrated parricide, the issue
is whether he performed all the acts of execution which would have killed respondent as a consequence but which,
nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of petitioner’s will.  At the time of the
commission of the alleged crime, petitioner and respondent were married.  The subsequent dissolution of their
marriage, in case the petition in Civil Case is granted, will have no effect on the alleged crime that was committed at
the time of the subsistence of the marriage.  In short, even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent is
annulled, petitioner could still be held criminally liable since at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, he
was still married to respondent.

6. Pimentel v Pimentel, GR No. 172060, September 13, 2010

FACTS:
Respondent, Maria Chrysantine Pimentel, filed an action for frustrated parricide against petitioner, Joselito R.
Pimentel. The Information for Frustrated Parricide was dated 30 August 2004 and was raffled to RTC Quezon City
on 25 October 2004. The pre-trial and trial was set on 14 February 2005. She also filed on 5 November 2004, a
petition, dated 4 November 2004, for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Section 36 of the Family Code on the
ground of psychological incapacity. Petitioner received summons to appear before the Regional Trial Court of
Antipolo City on 7 February 2005, for the pre-trial and trial of the Civil Case. He then filed an urgent motion to
suspend the proceedings before the RTC Quezon City on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question
asserting that the relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in parricide, the outcome of
Civil Case would have a bearing in the criminal case filed against him before the RTC Quezon City. The RTC Quezon
City held that the pendency of the case before the RTC Antipolo is not a prejudicial question that warrants the
suspension of the criminal case before it. The Court of Appeals also denied the petition holding that the issue in the
criminal case for frustrated parricide differs from the issue in the civil action for annulment of marriage. It ruled
that even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent would be declared void, it would be immaterial to the
criminal case because prior to the declaration of nullity, the alleged acts constituting the crime of frustrated
parricide had already been committed.  At the time of the commission of the crime, the marriage is still subsisting.
ISSUE:

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