Intervening in Complex Humanitarian

Emergencies: The Role of Regional

Cooperation

B J Ö R N H E T T N E a n d F R E D R I K S Ö D E R B A U M

Conflict management, conflict intervention and post-conflict

reconstruction are major issues in the development discourse. It is
also a field where regional cooperation has a great potential, but where
the success stories are few. The same is true for multilateral
interventions. This only proves that the whole approach to conflict
management is misconceived and too much focused on short-term
‘fire-brigade’ actions. The point of departure in this article is that
conflicts and ‘complex humanitarian emergencies’ are not sudden
events but should rather be seen as historical structures that are
transformed over time. By analysing a conflict as a historical structure
going through distinct phases – (1) the early prevention, or ‘provention’
of conflict, (2) preventive diplomacy, (3) modes of external intervention,
(4) peace settlement, (5) conflict resolution, and (6) post-conflict
reconstruction – it is shown how conflict management can be redirected
towards the root causes of conflict, but also towards the rather neglected
post-conflict reconstruction phase. The two case studies in the article
(the Balkans and West Africa) show that conflict management usually
comes too late, utilising the wrong means and that post-conflict
reconstruction is poorly understood, underfinanced and generally
neglected. The analysis shows that the institutional preconditions for
regional conflict management and conflict resolution are uneven and
underdeveloped. Hence, a regional integration approach is needed to
make this process sustainable. Finally, there is also need for a
multilateral rules system in order to increase the legitimacy and legality
of intervention in humanitarian crises.

Björn Hettne is Professor at the Department of Peace and Development Research (Padrigu) at Göteborg
University. He is author of a number of books and articles on development theory, international political
economy, European integration, regionalism and ethnic relations. He was project leader and co-editor of
the five-volume UNU/WIDER series on the New Regionalism, published by Palgrave Macmillan.
Email: b.hettne@padrigu.gu.se. Fredrik Söderbaum is Associate Professor at the Department of Peace
and Development Research (Padrigu) at Göteborg University and associate research fellow at the
United Nations University/Comparative Regional Integration Studies, Bruges, Belgium. He has
published widely on the topic of regionalism. Email: f.soderbaum@padrigu.se.

The European Journal of Development Research, Vol.17, No.3, September 2005, pp.449–461
ISSN 0957-8811 print/ISSN 1743-9728 online
DOI: 10.1080/09578810500209247 q 2005 Taylor & Francis
450 THE EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH

Les conflits et les «urgences humanitaires complexes» ne sont pas des

événements soudains et devraient être abordés comme des structures
historiques qui sont transformées dans le temps. En analysant un conflit
comme étant une structure historique qui passe à travers des phases
distinctes, il est montré que la gestion de conflit peut être réorientée vers
les racines du conflit mais également vers la phase plutôt négligée, qui
est celle de la reconstruction d’après conflit. Les études de cas (les
Balkans et l’Afrique de l’Ouest) démontrent que la gestion de conflit
vient généralement trop tard et avec des moyens inadéquats. Elles
révèlent également que la phase de reconstruction est mal comprise,
sous financée et souvent négligée. Les conditions institutionnelles
requises pour la résolution et la gestion des conflits régionaux sont
inégales et généralement peu développées et, dès lors, une approche
d’intégration régionale est nécessaire afin de rendre ce processus
durable. Finalement, l’amélioration de la légitimité et de la légalité des
interventions lors de crises humanitaires nécessite un système de règles
multilatéral adéquat.

INTRODUCTION: GLOBALISATION, DISORDER AND HUMANITARIAN

INTERVENTION

Globalisation is sometimes said to be the current form of development. The

fundamental problem with globalisation is selectiveness. The exclusivist
implications lead to ‘politics of identity’. A postmodern line of reasoning
acknowledges the fact that globalisation has undermined the nation-state order,
but tries to identify some sort of logic in this seemingly turbulent situation in
which domestic chaos or ‘durable disorder’ can go on for decades, thus no longer
being abnormal [Duffield, 2001]. It is interesting to note that the new
entrepreneurs in the ‘new wars’ [Kaldor, 1999] often rationalise their behaviour
in accordance with the hegemonic economic ideology. They are not only ‘locals’
but operate in a globalised system. Thus the description of such situations as state
disintegration, ‘black holes’ and ‘failed states’ is somewhat simplified. A new
political economy is emerging, both local and global at the same time [Reno,
1998].
In terms of ‘development’, disorder can mean a generalised warlord economy
with limited influence of external forms of authority on the local power-holders
and social forces. The mode of development possible in such a context may at
best be some sort of ‘primitive accumulation’. Obviously the standard definitions
of development studies are hard to apply in this situation. Development aid has in
this context been reduced to a civil form of humanitarian intervention, and the
major reason for intervention is violent conflict; to prevent it, to manage it, or to
INTERVENING IN COMPLEX HUMANITARIAN EMERGENCIES 451

reconstruct societies in post-conflict situations. In the globalised world there has

emerged, as a result of the spread of disorder, a qualitatively new discourse on
intervention called ‘humanitarian intervention’: a coercive involvement by
external powers in a ‘domestic conflict’ with the purpose of preventing anarchy,
punishing human rights abuses, and promoting democracy and ‘good
governance’. It can be seen as an extension of international development
assistance into a more coercive form challenging established principles of
territorial sovereignty. The recent focus upon human security rather than state
security is significant for understanding the change of the security and
development discourse and the fundamental challenge to sovereignty. Implied in
concepts such as ‘human security’, ‘human development’, ‘human emergency’
and ‘humanitarian intervention’ is the idea of a transnational responsibility for
human welfare.
By the often used concept complex humanitarian emergencies (CHEs) we
mean here serious multidimensional crises (including the ‘black hole’ syndrome
and ‘failed states’), which not only imply physical destruction but also social
exclusion, depletion of ‘social capital’, erosion of civil society, decay of
institutions and decline of civility. It is a destruction of the social and moral
substance of society and the issue of coercive intervention from outside naturally
arises, at least as an option.
In the new situation development assistance and conflict prevention are
converging concerns. This article seeks to contribute to a deeper understanding of
conflict management and humanitarian interventions through a particular focus
on the role of regional cooperation.

REGIONALISM AND CONFLICT

The idea that conflicts within a certain region are best dealt with directly by the
region concerned is not new; in fact it was discussed already when the UN was
formed. In the earlier debate, however, the ‘region’ was simply conceived as an
intermediate actor, to which a security task could be delegated from the
multilateral level. With increasing regionalisation, however, the region becomes
an actor in its own right, transforming itself from object to subject. Most
multidimensional regional organisations have developed some kind of
institutionalised conflict mechanism (e.g. EU, ECOWAS, ASEAN, SADC). It
is important that this regional capacity should have an institutional foundation
rather than being an ad hoc improvisation, a ‘coalition of the willing’.
Regions are thus important actors in conflicts and CHEs. The emphasis on
regional interventions is triggered by the belief that a regional organisation can
take the role of mediator in ethnic conflicts better than the immediately concerned
states, and in terms of culture and values still be closer to the parties than
international/multilateral, extra-regional mediators. As will be shown below
452 THE EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH

there is, however, also the risk of taking sides in the conflict, or exploiting the
situation for political and economic gains.
A discussion of the comparative advantage of regional cooperation must
consider the realistic alternatives, the level of regionalisation and the
effectiveness of relevant regional organisations. An explicit discussion of this
issue focusing on (i) consensus building, (ii) support structure, (iii) engagement
in conflict resolution and (iv) restraint of third parties can be found in Diehl
[1994]. Furthermore, there are distinct problems such as resource constraints,
organisational weaknesses, lack of neutrality and the role of the regional
hegemon. Diehl’s conclusion is thus rather negative for regional as compared to
multilateral peacekeeping [Diehl, 1994: 131]. However, one has to admit that
multilateral peacekeeping is not always forthcoming, and if it comes it usually
comes late and for the wrong reasons.
Regionalisation of conflict may have such dire consequences for a region with
weak institutions that intervention has to be improvised as an emergency. As will
be revealed in the cases below, such interventions are often suboptimal, but
ineffectiveness may nevertheless sometimes be preferable to inaction. At least
there are learning processes involved. We have to recognise that most
international and regional (and unilateral) interventions in domestic conflicts so
far have been failures, mainly because of the extreme complexity of intervening
in a society in conflict. The discussion below concerning what we call the conflict
circle will pinpoint the complexities involved and indicate when and with what
means external interventions should take place.
In discussing regional crisis management in the longer perspective beyond
intervention in an ongoing conflict, it is important to link security regionalism and
development regionalism. The two aspects of regionalism, security and
development, are complementary and mutually supportive. By security
regionalism, we mean attempts by states and other actors in a particular
geographical area – a region in the making – to transform a security complex with
conflict-generating interstate and intrastate relations towards a security
community with cooperative external (interregional) relations and domestic
(intraregional) peace. The concept also includes more acute interventions in crises,
but the long-term implications should always be kept in mind. Development
regionalism means concerted efforts from states and other actors in a particular
region to enhance the economic complementarity of the constituent political units
and capacity of the total regional economy. This can be through trade agreements
or through more comprehensive regional development strategies.

THE CONFLICT CIRCLE

Conflicts are not sudden events but should rather be seen as historical structures
that are transformed over time. We suggest six crucial elements in a framework
INTERVENING IN COMPLEX HUMANITARIAN EMERGENCIES 453

particularly adapted for analysis of external (including regional) involvement in

protracted conflicts: (1) the early prevention, or ‘provention’ of conflict; (2)
confidence-building measures and preventive diplomacy; (3) modes of external
intervention; (4) peace settlement; (5) conflict resolution; and (6) post-conflict
reconstruction. The analysis builds on the idea of a ‘conflict circle’ as a simplified
way of understanding conflict dynamics, but it must be emphasised that there is
no ‘natural history of conflict’ in the real world. The ‘conflict circle’ could be
relatively short, if conflict resolution takes place before the conflict turns violent,
or very long, if early conflict prevention fails.

1. Provention. The very first phase precedes the ‘conflict’ even in its latent form.
This is called ‘provention’, combining the promotion of conditions conducive
to peace and the prevention of conditions conducive to violence [Burton,
1990]. The normative position taken here is to try to prevent a conflict before
it even emerges by dealing with structural root causes. In this context we are
particularly interested in a regional approach, where ‘provention’ would
imply an effort to remove the very root causes of conflicts inherent in the
usually imbalanced development process. Hence the importance of
‘development regionalism’, which is a way to break vicious circles.
International development assistance also has a proventive role, to the extent
that a conflict consciousness is ‘mainstreamed’ into international develop-
ment cooperation. This is acknowledged in the Cotonou agreement between
the EU and the ACP countries, which apart from conflict prevention and post-
conflict reconstruction also deals with the issue of what here is called
provention.
2. Prevention. One source of the current interest in prevention is Boutros-
Ghali’s Agenda for Peace [1992], where he called for early warning systems,
fact-finding missions and confidence-building measures. The idea caught on
and a number of regional associations have some conflict prevention body, at
least on paper. There are also an increasing number of specialised NGOs. The
first preventive intervention was in Macedonia. Boutros-Ghali’s definition is
by itself a stage approach as he defines preventive diplomacy as ‘action to
prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes
from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they
occur’ [Boutros-Ghali, 1992: 11]. In this definition the first stage seems to
coincide with what above was called provention, and the third stage implies
that the conflict has already turned violent. Here conflict prevention is
confined to the period (or stage of the conflict circle) after it has become
manifest but before it has turned violent.
3. Intervention. Intervention mostly means military intervention in order to put
an end to a violent conflict or a CHE. Whether it is termed ‘humanitarian
454 THE EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH

intervention’ or not is due to the nature of the crisis. Distinctions can be made
among different modes of military intervention in acute security crises:
. The unilateral carried out by one intervenor without asking for
permission.
. The bilateral where there is some kind of (more or less voluntary)
agreement between the intervenor and the country in which the
intervention is made.
. The plurilateral by an ad hoc group of countries or some more permanent
form of non-territorial security alliance.
. The regional carried out by a regional organisation.
. The multilateral, finally, normally means a UN-led or at least UN-
sanctioned operation, which implies the involvement of the whole
‘international community’.
Here we are mainly concerned with regional and multilateral engagement
as the two modes which, preferably in some kind of combination, should be
the predominant form of humanitarian intervention in the future, to the extent
that legality and legitimacy continue to play a role in international relations.
Unilateral and most plurilateral interventions lack legality in terms of
international law but may on some occasions appear legitimate (see the
discussion of Kosovo below).
4. Peace settlement is the formal ending of a conflict and may include principles of
conflict resolution to be applied, or simply be confined to conditions of ceasefire.
There are also endings which are not formalised in a peace agreement, for
instance a military victory of one side, or when fighting reaches a stalemate. In
the latter cases long term peace-building is usually not considered. The idea of a
‘hurting stalemate’ is based on the strategy of separating the conflict, presumably
having a logic of its own, and social change in general [Zartman, 1985]. In
accordance with the more holistic approach favoured here, it is, on the contrary,
essential that the terms of the peace agreement address the root causes. The fact
that so many peace agreements do not hold is the main argument for focusing on
root causes. There are also more ‘superficial’ reasons to continue a war, namely
the many vested interests (the greed factor), which develop in the course of
warfare.
5. Conflict resolution may of course take place before a conflict turns violent. Here
we discuss post-conflict resolutions. In any case the way out of the conflict goes
through political restructuring of some kind, i.e. a new political relationship
between the contending groups. There are in principle three forms of conflict
resolution in divided societies. First, constitutional change, modifying the
skewed ethnic power structure and establishing a power-sharing arrangement
within a particular state formation. Second, the dismemberment of the state,
INTERVENING IN COMPLEX HUMANITARIAN EMERGENCIES 455

sometimes accompanied by an organised ‘ethnic cleansing’, is an option that

remains open when the preferred solution – constitutional reform – has failed.
Third, a completely reversed process is the integration of neighbouring states
into a regional formation (ultimately to become a regional security community),
a process, providing solutions to ethnic tensions simply by downplaying the role
of borders, so central to the old Westphalian order based on national sovereignty.
6. Post-conflict reconstruction is completely different from the physical rebuilding
of war-torn societies (for instance in post-Second World War Europe) in which
the inner societal coherence is still intact. In the process of normalisation it is of
utmost importance that the destroyed society is reintegrated in the regional
economy, communication network, and system of resources in a supportive way
through regional cooperation.

In what follows we investigate two contrasting cases. In the simultaneous

humanitarian crises in West Africa and in the Balkans there was initially little
interest from the outside world. The Liberian crisis was the first in a number of
conflicts in the West African war zone. It started during the Gulf Crisis (1990 –
91) and the Yugoslav break-up (beginning in 1991) happened before Maastricht
was a reality (1993). Thus, in neither case was there much preparedness for what
happened. The institutional development was crisis-led.

THE BALKANS

The Balkans proved to be a difficult challenge for regional crisis management, and
we are still not able to assess the outcome of the attempts at conflict resolution. One
can speak of a primitive ‘regional security complex’ (with high negative security
interdependencies) [Buzan and Waever, 2003]; peoples are split among several
states; there is no formal regionalism; there are few spontaneous regional activities
apart from smuggling; and there is certainly no regional civil society. It provides a
major security dilemma for the new Europe, since the sub-region must be seen as
forming part of Europe rather than constituting its ‘near abroad’.
The various attempts at conflict prevention in the Yugoslav crisis appeared rather
ambiguous and tentative, since the situation as such was unprecedented. Bosnia and
later Kosovo are examples where prevention has been confused and ineffective. In
the Bosnian crisis, gradually every conceivable security organisation (the EC troika,
UN, OSCE, NATO) became involved in a sort of trial and error process, and
ultimately an ad hoc group of great powers, rather reminiscent of the nineteenth
century type of power balance politics known as the Concert of Europe, took over the
negotiations (plurilateralism). Ultimately, the US pillar of NATO, leading to the
Dayton agreement in November 1995, was the single most efficient factor in putting
an end to the Bosnian war – if not the conflict.
456 THE EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH

In the case of Kosovo, the sovereign state of Yugoslavia was attacked by

NATO because of terrorising its own (Albanian) population. As a consequence,
part of its territory was de facto occupied and cut off from the rest of the country
(1999). This intervention was also of still more doubtful legitimacy in terms of
existing international law. Kosovo was important not only for crisis management
in Europe but also for the changing legal status of intervention in humanitarian
emergencies. The NATO intervention not only acknowledged such a right (and
duty) but also bypassed the UN since a veto could be expected in the Security
Council. The subsequent Independent International Commission on Kosovo took
a bold approach in acknowledging the possibility of external intervention by a
‘coalition of the willing’ (here called plurilateral intervention) even in the
absence of multilateral (UN) sanction. The Kosovo report says that this
intervention in the light of then existing international law was ‘illegal’ but
‘legitimate’ [Independent International Commission on Kosovo, 2000].
The first really preventive regional intervention was in Macedonia, which
has become a key testing ground for an independent, post-NATO European
security policy. Unfortunately no ‘proventive’ measures (such as removing
injustices and making the influence of ethnic groups more balanced) were
taken in this case, which shows the unfortunate bias towards focusing on one
method of intervention at the time. Few observers would thus consider the EU
response to the Balkan crises (Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia) an unqualified
success. The record has rather underlined the persistent power vacuum in a
Europe searching for a viable security order, institutional responses lagging
behind the events.
In the future the question of prosperity and peace in the Balkans will be a
European (EU) responsibility. It seems necessary, however, to sort out who is
doing what in the institutional overkill that characterises the European
integration. Even if the various security organisations declare that their
cooperation is excellent, their mandates and objectives are not the same.
The Dayton model confirmed the ethnic cleansing during the war, as very few
returning refugees could reclaim their original homes. The subsequent peace
process, which therefore turned out to be longer than was expected at the time
(it is still not concluded), was supervised by a complex, rather improvised
plurilateral organisation led by NATO (its European pillar) and, in charge of civil
affairs, a High Representative of the EU. Subsequent elections with increasingly
nationalist outcomes show that the post-conflict reconstruction has been largely
without results.

WEST AFRICA

The African continent is similarly plagued by insecurity and conflicts.

Although there are of course exceptions, the security problem is not in the first
INTERVENING IN COMPLEX HUMANITARIAN EMERGENCIES 457

instance defined by the conventional security dilemma, but arises rather due to
domestic factors and the weakness or ‘failure’ of the states themselves. During
the Cold War such intrastate crises were not allowed to escalate, especially not
into brutal civil wars, and were seldom regionalised as has been the case since
the 1990s.
Although most contemporary conflicts in West Africa are defined as
‘domestic’, they are deeply embedded in a regional context and quickly become
regionalised. This implies that the conventional distinctions between
international and domestic and between state actors and other actors have
become blurred and even lose much of their significance in the new situation.
Instead of speaking of a larger number of isolated so-called civil wars, we may
speak of regional war zones. The root causes of the various conflicts can be traced
far back in the history and the political logic of these countries, including their
international connections.
The Liberian crisis was the first to break out in a series of crises and coups in
the West African war zone; a pattern there is still no end to. In the wake of the
Liberian crisis, some ECOWAS member states agreed, in a rather improvised
manner, on the establishment of a peacekeeping force, the ECOWAS Ceasefire
Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). In August 1990, an ECOMOG force, ‘Operation
Liberty’, was sent to Liberia. Although it took several years of fighting, turmoil
and change of official rulers in neighbouring Sierra Leone, in 1997 ECOMOG
was sent to this country as well, and more recently to other conflict sites around
West Africa.
During much of the 1990s the ECOMOG often met with positive reactions
around the world, and was surrounded by claims that it gradually helped to solve
the conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone. What has received much less attention,
however, are the many problematic aspects of the regional interventions in
Liberia and Sierra Leone. For instance, there was a heated split within ECOWAS
itself regarding the ECOMOG intervention, and the fact that it would serve
Nigeria’s myopic agenda. Nigeria was the most important actor behind the
intervention, and the Nigerian dictator at the time, Ibrahim Babingida, warned the
other West African leaders of a pattern of insurgencies throughout the region:
‘Today it is Liberia, tomorrow it could be any one of you’ [Adeleke, 1995: 577].
The ECOMOG intervention was also contested by the OAU on the grounds that it
was the OAU, and not ECOWAS, that had the legitimate mandate to intervene
under the OAU Charter. Furthermore, in more or less all cases the ECOMOG
intervention forces became part of the conflicts and even fuelled further violence.
The various groups, including ECOMOG, soon lost sight of why and whom they
were fighting, but they all also became embroiled in the warlord political
economy logic of the war [Bøås, 2001: 711]. Needless to say, in a situation where
violence has already erupted, it can be difficult to refrain from the use of military
force. But it is possible to conclude that the interventions were certainly not
458 THE EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH

success stories. This is a similarity to the Balkans in spite of the great institutional
differences.
There were clearly alternative strategies of conflict management and so-called
‘peace-making’ in West Africa. Conflict management and interventions were
generally introduced too late and undertaken with the wrong means. As
emphasised in the conflict circle, military interventions are often a direct result of
the lack of proventive and preventive strategies in the first place. In general the
regional interventions were short-sighted. It was believed that conflicts could be
‘solved’ by ‘quick-fix’ military solutions and ‘fire brigade’ operations, which
seek to put everything back as it used to be, or that the often deep-seated
historical conflicts could be solved through peace agreements or multiparty
elections. One fundamental problem in this regard is that conflict often continues
soon after a ceasefire agreement has been signed and the intervention force has
left the scene. Peace agreements are certainly necessary, but violence tends to
break out again simply because the root causes of the conflict are not addressed.
In cases where the political economy of warlordism has become deep-seated this
is of course extremely difficult.
The immediate and medium-term challenge in the effort to consolidate
security regionalism is to move towards a more coordinated, transparent, norm-
based and institutionalised structure with proventive and preventive means as
well as proper post-conflict reconstruction rather than the current ‘quick-fix’
strategies [Adibe, 1997]. This implies that the ECOMOG, and other regional
intervention projects, must transcend the present ‘fire brigade’ operations,
whereby military intervention is conducted on an arbitrary basis, and in which
personal relationships and the mood and temper of political leaders are allowed to
destroy or manipulate the process. It would also prevent the security organisation
being an instrument in the hands of the political leaders to be used against
domestic opposition within the countries or for their own personal interests. For
this to occur there needs to be a change of attitude on the part of politicians and
the national bureaucracy as well as foreign donors on how to understand conflict
dynamics and how to build peace.
Similarly, the special relationship to the United Nations Observer Mission in
Liberia (UNOMIL), which in fact was the first really organised partnership
between the UN and a regional intervention force, is interesting, but a failure as
well: ‘those looking for a model of UN burden-sharing with regional
arrangements should be directed away from ECOWAS and Liberia’ [Adibe,
1997: 84]. In spite of many important differences compared to the Liberian case,
the relationship between ECOMOG and the UN missions in Sierra Leone was not
functioning smoothly either, and the most important lessons can perhaps be learnt
from how this relationship should not be handled [Adebajo, 2004: 204 –6].
Despite this we believe that a model based on joint UN and regional conflict
management must be developed.
INTERVENING IN COMPLEX HUMANITARIAN EMERGENCIES 459
CONCLUSION

The case studies suggest that conflict management usually comes too late and
with the wrong means. Provention is of course problematic in the sense of being
counterfactual. That a conflict never takes place is not the source of satisfaction
that it should be. Prevention, on the other hand, attracts a lot more interest, since
everybody can see the difference in terms of material costs and the amount of
suffering between a conflict subdued at an early stage and a conflict that is fully
developed, not to speak of the costs of post-conflict reconstruction. Despite that,
prevention usually comes too late, because the mechanisms for early
management of emerging conflicts are at best embryonic. Early warning has
not quite become the instrument hoped for, which is most clearly exemplified
by Kosovo. Similarly, the Liberian crisis erupted without much reaction from
the ‘international community’. The same can be said about the Rwandan
genocide as well as the current crisis in Darfur. The discussion on the Darfur
crisis simply echoes past errors: late reaction, uncertainties about whose
responsibility it is to react, etc. The UN is undergoing a crisis in credibility. The
USA is busy elsewhere. The EU is divided and passive. The Arab League is
reluctant. Generally, the African Union does take on a role, but the resources for
this are very limited. The real problem is, thus, not early warning but early
action, or the lack of it. For these reasons conflict management tends to be
identified with peacekeeping – or rather (as current trends suggest) peace
enforcement.
In the case of Liberia the crisis took place in the shadow of the first Gulf war.
When the global community finally acted by the establishment of UNOMIL, the
response was too weak, undertaken for the wrong reasons, along with a
malfunctioning relationship with ECOMOG. The international community seems to
be able to deal with only one crisis at the time, which is one comparative advantage
of regional crisis management. In the African cases this management is so far usually
confined to ending the actual warfare, i.e. peace enforcement. There are too little
resources for either provention or post-conflict reconstruction. Here international
development assistance and global cooperation thus has an important role to play.
The need is to encourage the development of specialised institutions for conflict
management, preferably within regional organisations. Over time these institutions
must be able to make independent assessments of emerging conflicts, the earlier the
better, at the same time as they have operational capacity. Nevertheless, it is essential
that all phases of the conflict circle are kept in mind all the time in order not to repeat
the original mistakes which led to the crisis.
Since there are few successful interventions in ongoing conflicts there should
be a stronger focus on the early phase, i.e. provention and prevention rather than
military interventions. In poor regions this has to be part of the international
development aid system and mutually agreed on in partnership arrangements.
460 THE EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH

Future policies should therefore strengthen the capacity to act in different

phases of the conflict circle, not only the peacekeeping phase. The post-conflict
reconstruction in particular is poorly understood, underfinanced and generally
neglected. A regional integration approach is needed to make this process
sustainable. Therefore there is an urgent need to financially support the
establishment of specialised security units within, and firmly under the control of,
the emerging regional organisations.
Moreover, further development of (regional) security mechanisms are
predicated upon more clearly defined, norm-based and institutionalised
procedures so that the private (or semi-public) interest of political leaders can
be regulated. Such institutionalisation is an important strategy to ensure a shift
from the political economy of violence and militarised notions of state stability
towards new and more appropriate solutions to the complex conflicts and CHEs.
In other words, there is a need to encourage the new role for regional
peacekeeping but raise the level of legality/legitimacy by multilateral sanctions,
normally through the UN. The optimal form of peacekeeping combines the
legitimacy of multilateral (UN) interventions with the higher efficiency in terms
of closeness and commitment with regional interventions. Although they need to
be relevant for their own specific types of security threats, there should be some
kind of multilaterally acknowledged rules system in order to prevent abuses. A
multi-tiered approach (multilateral-regional) can be sequenced, since the
multilateral operation takes longer time to organise compared to the regional.
It is also important to keep the full conflict circle in mind, which necessitates
coordination and coherence in development policy, linking it to trade policy,
foreign policy, environmental policy, security policy, etc., whether this is
organised bilaterally, regionally or multilaterally.

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