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DIGEST ETHICS // REQUIREMENT INTO THE BAR

QUERY OF ATTY. KAREN M. SILVERIO-BUFFE, FORMER Clerk of Court – BRANCH 81, ROMBLON, ROMBLON – ON
THE PROHIBITION FROM ENGAGING IN THE PRIVATE PRACTICE

Facts:
The query, as originally framed, related to Section 7(b)(2) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713, as amended (or the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees). This provision places a limitation on public officials and
employees during their incumbency, and those already separated from government employment for a period of one (1) year
after separation, in engaging in the private practice of their profession. Section 7(b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 provides:
SECTION 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. - In addition to acts and omissions of public officials and employees now
prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public
official and employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxx
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. - Public officials and employees during their incumbency shall
not:
xxx
(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided, that such
practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions; or
xxx
These prohibitions shall continue to apply for a period of one (1) year after resignation, retirement, or separation from public
office, except in the case of subparagraph (b) (2) above, but the professional concerned cannot practice his profession in
connection with any matter before the office he used to be with, in which case the one-year prohibition shall likewise apply.
The query arose because Atty. Buffe previously worked as Clerk of Court VI of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 81 of
Romblon; she resigned from her position effective February 1, 2008. Thereafter (and within the one-year period of
prohibition mentioned in the above-quoted provision), she engaged in the private practice of law by appearing as private
counsel in several cases before RTC-Branch 81 of Romblon.
Atty. Buffe alleged that Section 7(b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 gives preferential treatment to an incumbent public employee, who
may engage in the private practice of his profession so long as this practice does not conflict or tend to conflict with his
official functions. In contrast, a public official or employee who has retired, resigned, or has been separated from
government service like her, is prohibited from engaging in private practice on any matter before the office where she used
to work, for a period of one (1) year from the date of her separation from government employment.
Issue: Whether or not Atty. Karen Silverio-Buffe may appear as private counsel before RTC-Branch 81 of Romblon within
the 1 year prohibition.
Held:
NO!
Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713 generally provides for the prohibited acts and transactions of public officials and employees.
Subsection (b)(2) prohibits them from engaging in the private practice of their profession during their incumbency. As an
exception, a public official or employee can engage in the practice of his or her profession under the following conditions:
first, the private practice is authorized by the Constitution or by the law; and second, the practice will not conflict, or tend to
conflict, with his or her official functions.
The Section 7 prohibitions continue to apply for a period of one year after the public official or employee's resignation,
retirement, or separation from public office, except for the private practice of profession under subsection (b)(2), which can
already be undertaken even within the one-year prohibition period. As an exception to this exception, the one-year
prohibited period applies with respect to any matter before the office the public officer or employee used to work with.
The Section 7 prohibitions are predicated on the principle that public office is a public trust; and serve to remove any
impropriety, real or imagined, which may occur in government transactions between a former government official or
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employee and his or her former colleagues, subordinates or superiors. The prohibitions also promote the observance and
the efficient use of every moment of the prescribed office hours to serve the public.
Parenthetically, in the case of court employees, Section 7(b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 is not the only prohibition to contend with;
Section 5, Canon 3 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel also applies. The latter provision provides the definitive rule
on the "outside employment" that an incumbent court official or court employee may undertake in addition to his official
duties:
Outside employment may be allowed by the head of office provided it complies with all of the following requirements:
(a) The outside employment is not with a person or entity that practices law before the courts or conducts business with the
Judiciary;
(b) The outside employment can be performed outside of normal working hours and is not incompatible with the
performance of the court personnel's duties and responsibilities;
(c) That outside employment does not require the practice of law; Provided, however, that court personnel may render
services as professor, lecturer, or resource person in law schools, review or continuing education centers or similar
institutions;
(d) The outside employment does not require or induce the court personnel to disclose confidential information acquired
while performing officials duties;
(e) The outside employment shall not be with the legislative or executive branch of government, unless specifically
authorized by the Supreme Court.
Where a conflict of interest exists, may reasonably appear to exist, or where the outside employment reflects adversely on
the integrity of the Judiciary, the court personnel shall not accept outside employment. [Emphasis supplied]
In both the above discussed aspect of R.A. No. 6713 and the quoted Canon 3, the practice of law is covered; the practice of
law is a practice of profession, while Canon 3 specifically mentions any outside employment requiring the practice of law. In
Cayetano v. Monsod, we defined the practice of law as any activity, in and out of court, that requires the application of law,
legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. Moreover, we ruled that to engage in the practice of law is to perform
those acts which are characteristics of the profession; to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which
device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill. Under both provisions, a common objective is to
avoid any conflict of interest on the part of the employee who may wittingly or unwittingly use confidential information
acquired from his employment, or use his or her familiarity with court personnel still with the previous office.
After separation from the service, Section 5, Canon 3 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel ceases to apply as it
applies specifically to incumbents, but Section 7 and its subsection (b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 continue to apply to the extent
discussed above. Atty. Buffe's situation falls under Section 7.
A distinctive feature of this administrative matter is Atty. Buffe's admission that she immediately engaged in private practice
of law within the one-year period of prohibition stated in Section 7(b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713.
As we discussed above, a clerk of court can already engage in the practice of law immediately after her separation from the
service and without any period limitation that applies to other prohibitions under Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713. The clerk of
court's limitation is that she cannot practice her profession within one year before the office where he or she used to work
with. In a comparison between a resigned, retired or separated official or employee, on the one hand, and an incumbent
official or employee, on the other, the former has the advantage because the limitation is only with respect to the office he or
she used to work with and only for a period of one year. The incumbent cannot practice at all, save only where specifically
allowed by the Constitution and the law and only in areas where no conflict of interests exists. This analysis again disproves
Atty. Buffe's basic premises.
By acting in a manner that R.A. No. 6713 brands as "unlawful," Atty. Buffe contravened Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which provides:
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE
RESPECT FOR LAW AND FOR LEGAL PROCESSES
CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND THE DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we find Atty. Karen M. Silverio-Buffe GUILTY of professional misconduct for violating
Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. She is hereby FINED in the amount of Ten
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Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00), and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of this violation and the commission of other acts
of professional misconduct shall be dealt with more severely.

ATTY. EDITA NOE-LACSAMANA VS ATTY. YOLANDO F. BUSMENTE

A.C. No. 7269 / November 23, 2011

Carpio, J:

Facts:

In a civil case before the RTC, Pasig City, Atty. Edita Noe-Lacsamana alleged in her complaint that she was the
counsel for Irene Bides, the plaintiff in the case, while Atty. Yolando Busmente was the counsel for the defendant Imelda B.
Ulaso. Alleging that Ulaso's deed of sale over the property subject of Civil Case No. SCA-2481 was annulled, an ejectment
case was filed before the MTC, San Juan, in which, Busmente also appeared as a counsel. Another case for falsification
was filed against Ulaso where Busmente also appeared as counsel. Noe-Lacsamana alleged that one Atty. Elizabeth Dela
Rosa or Atty. Liza Dela Rosa would accompany Ulaso in court, projecting herself as Busmente's collaborating counsel. He
further alleged that the court orders and notices specified Dela Rosa as Busmente's collaborating counsel but upon
verification with the court and the IBP, she discovered that Dela Rosa was not a lawyer. Busmente asserted that Dela Rosa
was a law graduate and has been his paralegal assistant for a few years, but ended in 2000. He also alleged that Dela
Rosa was able to misrepresent herself as a lawyer in the case by conniving with the his former secretary, Regine Macasieb
and he also alleged that he did not represent Ulaso in Civil Case No. 9284 and his signature in the answer presented as
proof by Noe-Lacsamana was forged.

Issue:

Whether or not Busmente is guilty of directly or indirectly assisting Dela Rosa in her illegal practice of law that
warrants his suspension from the practice of law?

Ruling:

The court agreed with IBP’s decision in suspending Busmente from the practice of law for 6 months. It has been
established that Dela Rosa who is not a member of the Bar misrepresented herself as respondent’s collaborating counsel.
There was also sufficient evidence to prove that respondent allowed Dela Rosa to illegally practice law, appear in court, and
give legal assistance to respondent’s client. In Busmente’s allegation that he was totally unaware of Civil Case No. 9284, it
was clearly showed in Ulaso’s counter-affidavit that the respondent was the legal counsel and that he allowed Dela Rosa to
give legal assistance to Ulaso and he also failed to impugn his signatures in other documents.

Proven that Busmente allowed Dela Rosa to appear in court and give legal assistance, the respondent violated
Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states that “A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the
unauthorized practice of law.” The term “practice of law” implies customarily or habitually holding oneself out to the public
as a lawyer for compensation as a source of livelihood or in consideration of his services. Holding one’s self out as a lawyer
may be shown by acts indicative of that purpose, such as identifying oneself as attorney, appearing in court in
representation of a client, or associating oneself as a partner of a law office for the general practice of law. The lawyer's
duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the unauthorized practice of law is founded on public interest and policy.
Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in education and character.
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EN BANC[ B.M. No. 1036, June 10, 2003 ]

DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE, COMPLAINANT,
VS.
EDWIN L. RANA, RESPONDENT

Facts:

 Rana was among those who passed the 2000 Bar Examinations. before the scheduled mass oath-taking, complainant
Aguirre filed against respondent a Petition for Denial of Admission to the Bar.

 The Court allowed respondent to take his oath. Respondent took the lawyer’s oath on the scheduled date but has not
signed the Roll of Attorneys up to now.

 Complainant alleges that respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel for a candidate in an election.

 On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims that respondent is a municipal government employee, being a
secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate. As such, respondent is not allowed by law to act as counsel for
a client in any court or administrative body.

On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, complainant accuses respondent of acting as counsel for vice
mayoralty candidate George Bunan without the latter engaging respondent’s services. Complainant claims that respondent
filed the pleading as a ploy to prevent the proclamation of the winning vice mayoralty candidate.

Issue:

 Whether or not respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and thus does not deserve admission to the
Philippine Bar

Ruling:

 the Court held that “practice of law” means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform acts which are usually
performed by members of the legal profession. Generally, to practice law is to render any kind of service which requires the
use of legal knowledge or skill.

 The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a privilege. It is limited to persons of good moral
character with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The exercise of this privilege presupposes possession of
integrity, legal knowledge, educational attainment, and even public trust since a lawyer is an officer of the court. A bar
candidate does not acquire the right to practice law simply by passing the bar examinations. The practice of law is a
privilege that can be withheld even from one who has passed the bar examinations, if the person seeking admission had
practiced law without a license.

 True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the lawyer’s oath. However, it is the signing in the Roll
of Attorneys that finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The fact that respondent passed the bar examinations is
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immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law. Respondent should know that two
essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his lawyer’s oath to be administered by this
Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys.

JULIO ZETA, complainant, vs. FELICISIMO MALINAO, respondent.

A.M. No. P-220 December 20, 1978

Facts:

An administrative complaint was filed against Felicisimo Malinao, a court interpreter of the Court of First Instance of
Catbalogan, by certain Julio Zeta charging him of illegally appearing in court; grave misconduct in office inciting and
instigating persons to grab land or coerce and tell them not to be afraid as he is a court employee and has influence over
judges; crime of falsification for tampering his daily time records because even he has been out practicing in the court, he
would fill his time record as present; and violation of the Civil Service Law by engaging in private practice of profession
without permission from the Department Head.

Issue:

Whether or not the acts of the respondent constitutes misconduct and result to his dismissal from service.

Ruling:

Yes. It is clear that respondent’s actions constitute grave misconduct and his defense that "his participation for
defendants' cause was gratuitous as they could not engage the services of counsel by reason of poverty and the absence of
one in the locality" cannot, considering that in appearing as counsel in court, he did so without permission from his superiors
and, worse, he falsified his time record of service to conceal his absence from his office on the dates in question.

WHEREFORE, respondent Felicisimo Malinao is hereby ordered dismissed from his position as interpreter in the Court of
First Instance, with prejudice to reemployment in the judicial branch of the government.

In re: Elmo S. Abad

B.M. No. 139. March 28, 1983.

Abad-Santos, J.

FACTS:

Charged by Atty. Procopio S> Beltran, Jr., president of the Philippine Trial Lawyers Association, Inc., of practicing law
without having been previously admitted to the Philippine Bar, Mr. Elmo S. Abad could not deny and had to admit the
practice.

ISSUE:
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WON respondent constituted contempt of court.

RULING:

Yes. Respondent should know that two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his
lawyer’s oath to be administered by the Supreme Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys (Rule 138, Secs. 17 and
19, Rules of Court).

Letter of Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo Case Digest

The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in
all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules
shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of
the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and
quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court. (Sec. 5, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution)

Issues:

1. Is petitioner entitled to exemption from payment of his dues during the time that he was inactive in the practice of law that
is, when he was in the Civil Service from 1962-1986 and he was working abroad from 1986-2003?

2.  Does the enforcement of the penalty of removal amount to a deprivation of property without due process?

Held:

1. No. A membership fee in the Bar association is an exaction for regulation. If the judiciary has inherent power to regulate
the Bar, it follows that as an incident to regulation, it may impose a membership fee for that purpose. It would not be
possible to put on an integrated Bar program without means to defray the expenses. The doctrine of implied powers
necessarily carries with it the power to impose such exaction.

The payment of dues is a necessary consequence of membership in the IBP, of which no one is exempt. This means that
the compulsory nature of payment of dues subsists for as long as ones membership in the IBP remains regardless of the
lack of practice of, or the type of practice, the member is engaged in.

2. No. Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its being one that entitles the holder of a  license to
practice a profession, we do not here pause to consider at length, as it [is] clear that under the police power of the State,
and under the necessary powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the respondents right to practice law
before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the
fee as a regulatory measure is recognize[d], then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided
altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary.
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But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege, and as such must bow to
the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyers public responsibilities.

As a final note, it must be borne in mind that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions, one of which is
the payment of membership dues. Failure to abide by any of them entails the loss of such privilege if the gravity thereof
warrants such drastic move. (Letter of Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr., Requesting Exemption from Payment of IBP Dues, B.M.
No. 1370. May 9, 2005)

IN RE: PETITION TO SIGN IN THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS MICHAEL A. MEDADO, PETITIONER. (DIGEST)

B.M. No. 2540

September 24, 2013

TOPIC:

Admission to the Bar, Unauthorized Practice of Law, Canon 9, Signing of the Roll of Attorneys

FACTS:

Michael A. Medado passed the Philippine bar exams in 1979. On 7 May 1980, he took the Attorney’s Oath at the PICC. He
was scheduled to sign in the Roll of Attorneys on 13 May 1980, but failed to do so allegedly because he had misplaced the
Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys. Several years later, while rummaging through his things, he found said Notice. He then
realized that he had not signed in the roll, and that what he had signed at the entrance of the PICC was probably just an
attendance record.

He thought that since he already took the oath, the signing of the Roll of Attorneys was not as important. The matter of
signing in the Roll of Attorneys was subsequently forgotten.

In 2005, when Medado attended MCLE seminars, he was required to provide his roll number for his MCLE compliances to
be credited. Not having signed in the Roll of Attorneys, he was unable to provide his roll number.

About seven years later, in 2012, Medado filed the instant Petition, praying that he be allowed to sign in the Roll of
Attorneys. Medado justifies this lapse by characterizing his acts as “neither willful nor intentional but based on a mistaken
belief and an honest error of judgment.

The Office of the Bar Confidant recommended that the instant petition be denied for petitioner’s gross negligence, gross
misconduct and utter lack of merit, saying that petitioner could offer no valid justification for his negligence in signing in the
Roll of Attorneys.
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ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner may be allowed to sign the Roll of Attorneys.

RULING:

Yes, the Supreme Court granted the petition subject to the payment of a fine and the imposition of a penalty equivalent to
suspension from the practice of law.

Not allowing Medado to sign in the Roll of Attorneys would be akin to imposing upon him the ultimate penalty of disbarment,
a penalty reserved for the most serious ethical transgressions. In this case, said action is not warranted.

The Court considered Medado’s demonstration of good faith in filing the petition himself, albeit after the passage of more
than 30 years; that he has shown that he possesses the character required to be a member of the Philippine Bar; and that
he appears to have been a competent and able legal practitioner, having held various positions at different firms and
companies.

However, Medado is not free from all liability for his years of inaction.

A mistake of law cannot be utilized as a lawful justification, because everyone is presumed to know the law and its
consequences.

Medado may have at first operated under an honest mistake of fact when he thought that what he had signed at the PICC
entrance before the oath-taking was already the Roll of Attorneys. However, the moment he realized that what he had
signed was just an attendance record, he could no longer claim an honest mistake of fact as a valid justification. At that
point, he should have known that he was not a full-fledged member of the Philippine Bar, as it was the act of signing therein
that would have made him so. When, in spite of this knowledge, he chose to continue practicing law, he willfully engaged in
the unauthorized practice of law.

Knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law likewise transgresses Canon 9 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. At the heart of Canon 9 is the lawyer’s duty to prevent the unauthorized practice of law. This duty likewise
applies to law students and Bar candidates. As aspiring members of the Bar, they are bound to conduct themselves in
accordance with the ethical standards of the legal profession.

Medado cannot be suspended as he is not yet a full-fledged lawyer. However, the Court imposed upon him a penalty akin to
suspension by allowing him to sign in the Roll of Attorneys one (1) year after receipt of the Resolution. He was also made to
pay a fine of P32,000. Also, during the one-year period, petitioner was not allowed to engage in the practice of law.
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Case Title: ROGELIO A. TAN, NORMA TAN and MALIYAWAO PAGAYOKAN, Petitioners,
vs.
BENEDICTO M. BALAJADIA, Respondent.
Docket G.R. No. 169517
Number:
Date: March 14, 2006
Digest by: NICKO
Summary/Nature of the Case:
Facts of the Case
1. This is an original petition for contempt filed by
petitioners Rogelio Tan, Norma Tan and Maliyawao
Pagayokan against respondent Benedicto Balajadia.
Petitioners allege that on May 8, 2005, respondent
filed a criminal case against them with the Office of
the City of Prosecutor of Baguio City for usurpation of
authority, grave coercion and violation of city tax
ordinance due to the alleged illegal collection of
parking fees by petitioners from respondent.
2. In paragraph 5 of the complaint-affidavit, respondent
asserted that he is a "practicing lawyer based in
Baguio City with office address at Room B-207, 2/F
Lopez Building, Session Road, Baguio City.
However, certifications issued by the Office of the Bar
Confidant3 and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
showed that respondent has never been admitted to
the Philippine Bar. Hence, petitioners claim that
respondent is liable for indirect contempt for
misrepresenting himself as a lawyer.
3. Respondent avers that the allegation in paragraph 5
of the complaint-affidavit that he is a practicing lawyer
was an honest mistake. He claims that the secretary
of Atty. Paterno Aquino prepared the subject
complaint-affidavit which was patterned after Atty.
Aquino’s complaint-affidavit. It appears that Atty.
Aquino had previously filed a complaint-affidavit
against petitioners involving the same subject matter.
Issue/s
1. Whether respondent is liable for indirect contempt for
misrepresenting himself as a lawyer?
Ruling
No. The respondent is not liable for indirect contempt.
1. SC ruled that records support respondent’s claim that
he never intended to project himself as a lawyer to
the public. It was a clear inadvertence on the part of
the secretary of Atty Aquino.
2. Respondent has satisfactorily shown that the
allegation that he is a practicing lawyer was the result
of inadvertence and cannot, by itself, establish intent
as to make him liable for indirect contempt. In the
cases where we found a party liable for the
unauthorized practice of law, the party was guilty of
some overt act like signing court pleadings on behalf
of his client; appearing before court hearings as an
attorney; manifesting before the court that he will
practice law despite being previously denied
admission to the bar; or deliberately attempting to
practice law and holding out himself as an attorney
through circulars with full knowledge that he is not
licensed to do so.
3. In the case at bar, no evidence was presented to
show that respondent acted as an attorney or that he
intended to practice law. Consequently, he cannot be
made liable for indirect contempt considering his lack
of intent to illegally practice law.
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Disposition: Petition dismissed. Respondent is WARNED 3rd year high school by utilizing the school records of his
to be more careful and circumspect in his future actions. cousin and name-sake, Juan M. Publico.
                i.     PUBLICO has not completed Grade 4

               ii.     Tapel instituted an administrative case against

Additional Notes: Section 3(e), Rule 71 of the Rules of his nephew for falsification of school records or
Court provides: credentials.

2. PUBLICO PASSED THE BAR, took the lawyer's

oath, and signed the Roll of Attorneys.
Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge 3. Legal Officer-Investigator, Ricardo Paras, Jr.,
and hearing. – After a charge in writing has been filed, investigated and reported:
and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment 1. September 1961, Dulcisimo Tapel
thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court dropped the complaint on the ground that his witnesses
and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of had turned hostile.
                i.     Motion denied, his witnesses had already
any of the following acts may be punished for indirect
testified.
contempt:
2. Recommended PUBLICO’s name to be
stricken off the roll of attorneys.
xxxx                 i.     Respondent falsified his school records

               ii.     Thereby violating the provisions of Sections 5

and 6, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court, which require
(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, completion by a bar examinee or candidate of the
and acting as such without authority; prescribed courses in elementary, high, pre-law and law
school, prior to his admission to the practice of law.

4. 11 years later, PUBLICO filed a Petition for

In RE: Petition for Reinstatement in the Roll of Attorneys, Reinstatement alleging that he had never received, for
JUAN T. PUBLICO had he been informed, nor did he have any knowledge of
the Resolution of the Court ordering the Bar Division to
strike his name from the Roll of Attorneys.
In RE: Petition for Reinstatement in the Roll of Attorneys, 1. He was advised to inquire into the
JUAN T. PUBLICO outcome of the disbarment case against him.
2. He resigned from all his positions in
public and private offices, and transferred to Manila.
3. Prayed that Court allow reinstatement
FACTS: taking into consideration his exemplary conduct from the
time he became a lawyer, his services to the community
1. THREE PETITIONS (from Publico, faculty of the numerous awards, resolutions and/'or
Polytechnic University, Civic Association in Manila): commendations he received,
1. Petition to take the Bar Exam in 1960                 i.     Court denied the Petition.
after failing in the 1959 Bar Examination.
2. His uncle, TAPEL, opposed the petition                ii.     Petitioner moved for reconsideration was denied
alleging that his nephew is not a person of good moral by the Court for lack of merit.
character for having misrepresented, sometime in 1950,
when he was 16 years old, that he was eligible for 4. 5th plea avers that his enrollment in Third
Year High School in Manila was through the initiative of
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his uncle, Dulcisimo B. Tapel who accompanied him to
school and enrolled him in a grade level above his
qualifications in spite of his demonstrations
                    i.     Misrepresentation committed was precipitated by
his uncle; that being merely 16 year old, he could not be
expected to act with discernment as he was still under the
influence of his uncle, who later on caused his
disbarment
                   ii.     No opposition has been filed to any of the
petitions.
ISSUE:
WON PUBLICO can be reinstated, for being in exemplary
moral character despite not completing pre-law
requirements? YES.
HELD:
Petitioner is hereby ordered REINSTATED in the Roll of
Attorneys.
1. REINSTATEMENT CRITERIA:
1. WON the applicant shall be reinstated
rests to a great extent in the sound discretion of the court,
2. Court action will depend WON it decides
that the public interest in the orderly and impartial
administration of justice will be conserved by the
applicant's participation therein in the capacity of an
attorney and counselor at law.
3. Applicant must, like a candidate for
admission to the bar, satisfy the court that he is a person
of good moral character — a fit and proper person to
practice law.
4. Court will take into consideration the
applicant's character and standing prior to the
disbarment, the nature and character of the charge for
which he was disbarred, his conduct subsequent to the
disbarment, and the time that has elapsed between the
disbarment and the application for reinstatement.
In the Matter of JAMES JOSEPH HAMM
Arizona Supreme Court No. SB-04-0079-M
211 Ariz 458, 123 p.3d 652, 2005
Petitioners: James Hamm
Petition: To review the recommendation provided by
Committee on Character and Fitness (the Committee)
denying the Petitioner’s application for admission to the
State Bar of Arizona (the Bar).
FACTS:
- Hamm, the Petitioner, was sentenced to life in
prison for one-count of first degree murder to
which he pled guilty. Prior to serving his
sentence, Hamm had been separated from his
wife with whom he had a son and had supported
himself by selling and using marijuana, other
drugs and drinking alcohol.
- The crime for which Hamm was sentenced to life
imprisonment is for the murder of Morley and
Well, who were killed by Hamm along with two
accomplices, Garland Wells and Bill Reeser. The
three robbed and killed Morley and Well by
shooting them with a gun and leaving their
bodies lying in the dessert.
- While in prison, Hamm exhibited good conduct
and became a model prisoner which earned him
a conditioned parole. Hamm was released after
serving nearly seventeen years in prison. From
conditioned parole, Hamm absolutely discharged
on December 2001.
- While on parole, Hamm graduated from the
Arizona State University College of Law. In July
1999, Hamm passed the Arizona bar
examination and, in 2004, filed his Character and
Fitness Report with the Committee.
- In its report, the Committee stated that, in
reaching its conclusions, it considered the
following:
 Hamm’s unlawful conduct, which
included the commission of two violent
“execution style” murders and his
testimony as to the facts surrounding the
murders
 Hamm’s omissions on his Application
and his testimony in explaining his failure
to disclose all required information.
 Hamm’s neglect of his financial
responsibilities and/or violation of a
longstanding child support court order
12
and his testimony as to his failure to
comply with the court order.
 Hamm’s mental or emotional instability
impairing his ability to perform the
functions of an attorney including his
testimony as to any diagnosis and
treatment.
ISSUE: Whether or not Hamm can be admitted to the
Bar.
HELD: No, the Supreme Court decided that Hamm failed
to prove his burden that he is of good moral character on
the following grounds:
- Hamm failed to show rehabilitation from past
criminal conduct by not accepting full
responsibility for serious criminal misconduct -
Staples’ murder although he accepted
responsibility for the death of Morley.
- Hamm was not completely up-front in his
testimony to the murder of which he claims that
he only intended to rob and not to kill. This is
contrary to the facts – he accepted the gun and
brings it with him in the car, shot Morley without
attempting robbery and shot hit again to ensure
he is dead and shot Staples when he attempted
to escape.
- Hamm’s failure to fulfill his long overdue
obligation to support his child who he was aware
existed.
- Hamm’s failure to disclose the incident involving
him and his wife, Donna, when he submitted his
application to the Committee. This incident gave
rise to Hamm being questioned by the law
enforcers which should have been reflected by
Hamm in the application – Question 25.
- Hamm’s act of quoting lines from Supreme
Courts’ decision and use the same in the
introduction for his petition.
JULIO ZETA, complainant, vs. FELICISIMO MALINAO,
respondent.
A.M. No. P-220 December 20, 1978
Facts:
An administrative complaint was filed against
Felicisimo Malinao, a court interpreter of the Court of First
Instance of Catbalogan, by certain Julio Zeta charging
him of illegally appearing in court; grave misconduct in
office inciting and instigating persons to grab land or
coerce and tell them not to be afraid as he is a court
employee and has influence over judges; crime of
falsification for tampering his daily time records because
even he has been out practicing in the court, he would fill
his time record as present; and violation of the Civil
Service Law by engaging in private practice of profession
without permission from the Department Head.
Issue:
Whether or not the acts of the respondent
constitutes misconduct and result to his dismissal from
service.
Ruling:
Yes. It is clear that respondent’s actions
constitute grave misconduct and his defense that "his
participation for defendants' cause was gratuitous as they
could not engage the services of counsel by reason of
poverty and the absence of one in the locality" cannot,
considering that in appearing as counsel in court, he did
so without permission from his superiors and, worse, he
falsified his time record of service to conceal his absence
from his office on the dates in question.
WHEREFORE, respondent Felicisimo Malinao is hereby
ordered dismissed from his position as interpreter in the
Court of First Instance, with prejudice to reemployment in
the judicial branch of the government.
G.R. Nos. 89591-96. August 13, 1990.*
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE
HON. BONIFACIO SANZ MACEDA, Presiding Judge of
Branch 12, Regional Trial Court of Antique, and
AVELINO T. JAVELLANA, respondents.
13
Same; Same; Same; Grave abuse of discretion is present
when the respondent judge continued in hearing the
respondent's petition for bail; Reasons; Case at bar.—
The Court, however, holds that respondent Judge
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when he insisted in continously
hearing private respondent's petition for bail and in
ordering the arrest and commit Same; Same; Same;
Grave abuse of discretion is present when the
respondent judge continued in hearing the respondent's
petition for bail; Reasons; Case at bar.—The Court,
however, holds that respondent Judge committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when he insisted in continously hearing
private respondent's petition for bail and in ordering the
arrest and commit.
Same; Same; Same; Postponements and continuances
are part and parcel of our procedural system of
dispensing justice.—Although the matter of adjournment
and postponement of trials is within the sound discretion
of the court, such discretion should always be predicted
on the consideration that more than the mere
convenience of the courts or of the parties in the case,
the ends of justice and fairness should be served thereby.
After all, postponements and continuances are part and
parcel of our procedural system of dispensing justice.
Same; Same; Same; Contempt; Nature of; Purpose of.—
Besides, contempt of court presupposes a contumacious
attitude, a flouting or arrogant belligerence, a defiance of
the court. And, while courts are inherently empowered to
punish for contempt to the end that they may enforce
their authority. preserve their integrity, maintain their
dignity, and insure the effectiveness of the administration
of justice, nevertheless, such power should be exercised
on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle, for
the power to punish for contempt, being drastic and
extraordinary in its nature, should not be resorted to
unless necessary in the interest of justice.
Same; Same; Judge; Rule that a judge is left to decide for
himself whether he will desist, for just and valid reasons,
from sitting in a case.—In the case at bar, the reason
relied upon for the inhibition or disqualification of
respondent Judge, i.e. manifest partiality to private
respondent, is not based on any of the grounds
enumerated in the first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137
which per se disqualifies a judge from sitting in a case,
but on the second paragraph thereof. The settled rule is
that the judge is left to decide for himself whether he will
desist, for just or valid reasons, from sitting in a case,
Respondent Judge has not as yet decided whether or not
he will inhibit himself from further hearing Criminal Cases
Nos. 3350-3355 in the face of the prosecution's motion to
disqualify or inhibit him. It would be premature for the
Court at this stage to rule on the matter.
Soliman M. Santos, Jr. v. Atty. Francisco R. Llamas
A.C. No. 4749. January 20, 2000
Facts: Complaint for misrepresentation and non-payment
of bar membership dues. It appears that Atty. Llamas,
who for a number of years now, has not indicated the
proper PTR and IBP OR Nos. and data in his pleadings. If
at all, he only indicated “IBP Rizal 259060” but he has
been using this for at least 3 years already. On the other
hand, respondent, who is now of age, averred that he is
only engaged in a “limited” practice of law and under RA
7432, as a senior citizen, he is exempted from payment
of income taxes and included in this exemption is the
payment of membership dues.
Held: GUILTY. Rule 139-A requires that every member of
the Integrated Bar shall pay annual dues and default
thereof for six months shall warrant suspension of
membership and if nonpayment covers a period of 1-
year, default shall be a ground for removal of the
delinquent’s name from the Roll of Attorneys. It does not
matter whether or not respondent is only engaged in
“limited” practice of law. Moreover, the exemption invoked
by respondent does not include exemption from payment
of membership or association dues.
14
            In addition, by indicating “IBP Rizal 259060” in his
pleadings and thereby misprepresenting to the public and
the courts that he had paid his IBP dues to the Rizal
Chpater, respondent is guilty of violating the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides: Rule 1.01 – A
lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral
or deceitful conduct. His act is also a violation of Rule
10.01 which provides that: A lawyer shall not do any
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor
mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.
            Lawyer was suspended for 1 year or until he has
paid his IBP dues, whichever is later.
PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF
LAW, BENJAMIN M. DACANAY, PETITIONER
Facts:
 Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March
1960. He practiced law until he migrated to Canada in
December 1998 to seek medical attention for his
ailments. He subsequently applied for Canadian
citizenship to avail of Canada’s free medical aid program.
His application was approved and he became a Canadian
citizen in May 2004.
 On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225
(Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003),
petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship. On that
day, he took his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen
before the Philippine Consulate General in Toronto,
Canada. Thereafter, he returned to the Philippines and
now intends to resume his law practice.
Issue:
 Whether petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay lost his
membership in the Philippine bar when he gave up his
Philippine citizenship
Ruling:
 The Constitution provides that the practice of all
professions in the Philippines shall be limited to Filipino
citizens save in cases prescribed by law. Since Filipino
citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar, loss
thereof terminates membership in the Philippine bar and,
consequently, the privilege to engage in the practice of
law. In other words, the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso
jure terminates the privilege to practice law in the
Philippines. The practice of law is a privilege denied to
foreigners.
 The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by
reason of naturalization as a citizen of another country
but subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is
because “all Philippine citizens who become citizens of
another country shall be deemed not to have lost their
Philippine citizenship under the conditions of [RA 9225].”
Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of
another country is deemed never to have lost his
Philippine citizenship if he reacquires it in accordance
with RA 9225. Although he is also deemed never to have
terminated his membership in the Philippine bar, no
automatic right to resume law practice accrues.
 Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal
profession in the Philippines and he reacquires his
Filipino citizenship pursuant to its provisions “(he) shall
apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to
engage in such practice.
IN RE: PETITION RE-ACQUIRE THE PRIVILEGE TO
PRACTICE LAW IN THE PHILIPPINES, EPIFANIO B.
MUNESES
B.M. No. 2112               July 24, 2012
Facts:
On June 8, 2009, a petition was filed by Epifanio B.
Muneses with the Office of the Bar Confidant praying that
he be granted the privilege to practice law in the
Philippines.
15
The petitioner alleged that he became a member of the
IBP on March 21, 1966; that he lost his privilege to
practice law when he became a citizen of the USA on
August 28, 1981; that on September 15, 2006, he re-
acquired his Philippine citizenship pursuant to R.A. No.
9225 or the "Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act
of 2003" by taking his oath of allegiance as a Filipino
citizen before the Philippine Consulate General in
Washington, D.C., USA; that he intends to retire in the
Philippines and if granted, to resume the practice of law.  5. Certificate of Good Standing issued by the IBP;
Issue: Whether or not to grant the petition to resume the
privilege to practice law in the Philippines
Ruling:
The Court reiterates that Filipino citizenship is a
requirement for admission to the bar and is, in fact, a
continuing requirement for the practice of law. The loss
thereof means termination of the petitioner’s membership
in the bar;ipso jure the privilege to engage in the practice
of law. Under R.A. No. 9225, natural-born citizens who
have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are deemed
to have re-acquired their Philippine citizenship upon
taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic. Thus, a
Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country
and later re-acquires his Philippine citizenship under R.A.
No. 9225, remains to be a member of the Philippine Bar.
However, as stated in Dacanay, the right to resume the
practice of law is not automatic.  R.A. No. 9225 provides
that a person who intends to practice his profession in the
Philippines must apply with the proper authority for a
license or permit to engage in such practice.
Thus, in pursuance to the qualifications laid down by the
Court for the practice of law, the OBC required the herein
petitioner to submit the original or certified true copies of
the following documents in relation to his petition:
1. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship;
2. Order (for Re-Acquisition of Philippine citizenship);
3. Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines;
4. Identification Certificate (IC) issued by the Bureau of
Immigration;
6. Certification from the IBP indicating updated payments
of annual membership dues;
7. Proof of payment of professional tax; and
8. Certificate of compliance issued by the MCLE Office.
The OBC further required the petitioner to update his
compliance, particularly with the MCLE. After all the
requirements were satisfactorily complied with and finding
that the petitioner has met all the qualifications and none
of the disqualifications for membership in the bar, the
OBC recommended that the petitioner be allowed to
resume his practice of law.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff and
appellant, vs. EUSTACIO DE LUNA, ET AL., defendants
and appellees. People vs. De Luna, et al., 102 Phil. 968,
[Nos. L-10236-48 January 31, 1958
BAR FLUNKERS; TAKING OATHS AS LAWYERS
BEFORE A NOTARY PUBLIC CONSTITUTES
CONTEMPT OF COURT.—Appellees know that they did
not pass the bar examination. Although they sought
admission to the Bar under the Bar Flunkers Act, they
were subsequently notified of the resolution of the
16
Supreme Court denying their petitions. This
notwithstanding, they took their oaths as lawyers before a
notary public and formally advised the Court, not only of
such fact, but, also, that they will practice in all courts of
the Philippines. Held: The oath as lawyer is a prerequisite
to the practice of law and may be taken only before the
Supreme Court by those authorized by the latter to
engage in such practice. The resolution of the Supreme
Court denying appellees' petition for admission to the Bar
implied, necessarily, a denial of the right to take said
oath, as well as a prohibition of the taking thereof. By
taking oaths before a notary public, appellees expressed
clearly their intent to, and did, in fact, challenge and defy
the authority of the Supreme Court to pass upon and
settle, in a final and conclusive manner, the issue
whether or not they should be admitted to the bar, as well
as, embarrass, hinder and obstruct the administration of
justice and impair the respect due to the courts of justice
and the Supreme Court, in particular, in violation of
section 3, subdivision (b) of Rule 64 of the Rules of Court.
Such acts, therefore, constitute contempt of court.
CONTEMPT OF COURT; MEANS BY WHICH
CONTEMPT MAY BE COMMITTED; "HOLDING OUT TO
THE PUBLIC AS ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW"; CASE AT
BAR.—The lower court is, seemingly, under the
impression that appellees could not be guilty of contempt
of court unless they actually engaged in the practice of
law or "held out to the public" as lawyers "by means of
circulars." Such view is inaccurate, for "assuming to be
an attorney * * * and acting as such without authority," is,
only one of the means by which contempt of court may be
committed, under said Rule 64, section 3, of the Rules of
Court. Besides, by taking "the oath of office as attorney-
at-law" and notifying the Supreme Court that they had
done so and would "practice law in all courts of the
Philippines", the appellees had, for all intents and
purposes, "held out to the public" as such attorney-at-law
(U.S. vs. Ney and Bosque, 8 Phil. 146).
ID.; ID.; JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE TO TRY AND PUNISH THE CONTEMPTS
AT BAR.—If the contemptuous acts were committed ,not
against the Court of First Instance where the amended
informations for contempts were filed, but against the
Supreme Court, does the former court have jurisdiction to
try and punish said contempts? In the first place,
according to said informations, the act charged were
committed in contempt of the Supreme Court, as well as
of all other courts of the Philippines, including the Court of
First Instance of Manila. In the second place, pursuant to
Section 44 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, courts of first
instance have original jurisdiction over criminal cases, in
which the penalty provided by law is imprisonment f or
more than six months, or a fine of more than two
thousand pesos. Inasmuch as a fine not exceeding
P1,000 may be imposed in the cases of contempt under
consideration, it follows that the same is within the
original jurisdiction is concurrent with that of the Supreme
Court, in view of the inherent power of the latter to punish
those guilty of contempt against the same.
4.ID. ; ID. ; CONCURRENT JURISDICTION OF LOWER
COURT AND SUPREME COURT; COURT AGAINST
WHOM THE ACT WAS COMMITTED HAS
PREFERENTIAL RIGHT.—In the event of concurrent
jurisdiction over cases of contempt of court, the court
against whom the act of contempt was committed has the
preferential right to try and punish the guilty party.
However, the court concerned (the Supreme Court in the
present case) may elect not to exercise its concurrent
jurisdiction over the acts of contempt in question, as it did
in the present case, when the said Court referred the
case to the City Fiscal of Manila for investigation and
appropriate action. In such a case, the Court of First
Instance of Manila may not refuse to exercise its
jurisdiction over the case.
Case Digest, in re: Other Legal Ethics Cases
Title: SOPHIA ALAWI, Complainant, vs.
ASHARY M.
ALAUYA, Clerk of Court VI,
Shari'a District Court,
Marawi City, Respondent [A.M.
SDC-97-2-P 24
February 1997]
Ponente: Chief Justice Narvasa
17
FACTS:
Sophia Alawi was a sales representative of E. B Villarosa
and Partners Co., of Davao City, a real estate and
housing company. Ashari M. Alauya is the incumbent
Executive Clerk of Court of the 4th Judicial Sharia District
in Marawi City. They were classmates and used to be
friends. Through Alawi's agency, a contract was executed
for the purchase on installments by Alauya of one of the
housing units of Villarosa. In connection, a housing loan
was also granted to Alauya by the NHMFC. Not long
afterwards, Alauya addressed a letter to the president of
Villarosa and Co. advising of the termination of his
contract with the company. He claimed that his consent
was vitiated because Alawi had resorted to gross
misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of
confidence. He also wrote similar letters to the vice
president of Villarosa and the vice president of NHMFC.
Upon learning of Alauya's letters, Alawi filed an
administrative complaint against him.
Contention: One of Alawi’s grounds was Alauya's
usurpation of the title of ‘Attorney’, which only regular
members of the Philippine Bar may properly use.
Defense of the accused: Alauya justified his use of the
title ‘Attorney’, by the assertion that it is synonymous with
the title ‘counselor-at-law’, a title to which Sharia's
lawyers have a rightful claim, adding that he prefers the
title of ‘Attorney’ because ‘Counselor’ is often mistaken
for ‘councilor’ (konsehal).
ISSUE:
Whether or not Alauya, a member of the Sharia Bar can
use the title ‘attorney’.
RULING:
No he cannot. The title ‘Attorney’ is only reserved to
those who passed the regular Philippine Bar
Examinations. Persons who pass the Sharia Bar are not
full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar.
In the Know: The case of bar examinee Marcos Antonio
Purisima
MANILA, Philippines—In March 2000, Supreme Court
Associate Justice Fidel Purisima was relieved as
chairman of the 1999 Bar Examination Committee for not
disclosing to the court that his nephew, Marcos Antonio
“Mark Anthony” Purisima, was among those who took the
exam.
Mark Anthony is the son of Purisima’s elder brother,
retired Manila Judge Amante Purisima.
Justice Purisima apologized to the court, but was
censured by his peers, who also ordered the forfeiture of
half of his P500,000 fee as chairman of the 1999 exam
committee.
Sources said the Supreme Court accepted the apology,
but not Purisima’s explanation that he did not know his
nephew took the exam or had been planning to take it in
1999.
Due to public outrage and with some quarters calling the
censure “a mere slap on the wrist,” Purisima’s case was
later referred to a special commission composed of
retired justices. The commission was tasked with
conducting a separate investigation of the scandal.
The Supreme Court also ordered Purisima to comment
on a petition brought by about 100 law students, asking
the court to conduct an “impartial, thorough and speedy”
probe of the circumstances surrounding the 1999 bar
exam.
Purisima quietly retired in October 2000 without giving
reporters copies of his comments on the petition.
Although Mark Anthony Purisima passed the 1999 exam,
he was stricken off the list of new lawyers who were to
take the oath in May that year.
The justices unanimously decided to disqualify him after
discovering that he falsified a certification that he had
taken the pre-bar review and refresher course required
for candidates who had failed the exam more than three
times.
18
PAGUIA VS. OFFICE OF THE PRESDENT
FACTS:
Petitioner Alan F. Paguia (petitioner), as citizen and
taxpayer, filed this original action for the
writ of certiorari to invalidate President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo’s nomination of respondent
former Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. (respondent
Davide) as Permanent Representative
to the United Nations (UN) for violation of Section 23 of
Republic Act No. 7157 (RA 7157), the
Philippine Foreign Service Act of 1991. Petitioner argues
that respondent Davide’s age at
that time of his nomination in March 2006, 70, disqualifies
him from holding his post.
Petitioner grounds his argument on Section 23 of RA
7157 pegging the mandatory
retirement age of all officers and employees of the
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) at
65. Petitioner theorizes that Section 23 imposes an
absolute rule for all DFA employees,
career or non-career; thus, respondent Davide’s entry
into the DFA ranks discriminates
against the rest of the DFA officials and employees.
ISSUE: Petitioner’s lack of capacity to sue and mootness.
Ruling:
An incapacity to bring legal actions peculiar to petitioner
also obtains. Petitioner’s
suspension from the practice of law bars him from
performing "any activity, in or out of
court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and
experience."Certainly, preparing a petition raising
carefully crafted arguments on equal
protection grounds and employing highly legalistic rules
of statutory construction to parse
Section 23 of RA 7157 falls within the proscribed conduct.
A supervening event has rendered this case academic
and the relief prayed for moot.
Respondent Davide resigned his post at the UN on 1
April 2010.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition.
SO ORDERED.
IN MATTER OF THE ADMISSION TO THE BAR AND
OATH-TAKING OF SUCCESSFUL BAR APPLICANT AL
C. ARGOSINO
DOCTRINES:
The practice of law is a high personal privilege limited to
citizens of good moral character, with special education
qualifications, duly ascertained and certified.
Requirement of good moral character is of greater
importance so far as the general public and proper
administration of justice is concerned.
All aspects of moral character and behavior may be
inquired into in respect of those seeking admission to the
Bar.
19
Requirement of good moral character to be satisfied by
those who would seek admission to the bar must be a
necessity more stringent than the norm of conduct
expected from members of the general public.
Participation in the prolonged mindless physical beatings
inflicted upon Raul Camaligan constituted evident
rejection of that moral duty and was totally irresponsible
behavior, which makes impossible a finding that the
participant was possessed of good moral character.
Good moral character is a requirement possession of
which must be demonstrated at the time of the application
for permission to take the bar examinations and more
importantly at the time of application for admission to the
bar and to take the attorney's oath of office.
FACTS:
On February 4, 1992 ,Argosino, together with 13 others,
was charged with the crime of homicide in connection
with the death of one Raul Camaligan. The death of
Camaligan stemmed from the affliction of severe physical
injuries upon him in course of "hazing" conducted as part
of the university fraternity initiation rites. On February 11,
1993, the accused were consequently sentenced to suffer
imprisonment for a period ranging from two (2) years, four
(4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years.
Eleven (11) days later, Mr. Argosino and his colleagues
filed an application for probation with the lower court. The
application was granted on June 18 1993. The period of
probation was set at two (2) years, counted from the
probationer's initial report to the probation officer
assigned to supervise him.
Less than a month later, Argosino filed a petition to take
the bar exam. He was allowed and he passed the exam,
but was not allowed to take the lawyer's oath of office.
On April 15, 1994, Argosino filed a petition to allow him
to take the attorney's oath and be admitted to the practice
of law. He averred that his probation period had been
terminated. It is noted that his probation period did not
last for more than 10 months.
ISSUE: Whether Argosino should be allowed to take the
oath of attorney and be admitted to the practice of law
HELD:
Mr. Argosino must submit to this Court evidence that he
may now be regarded as complying with the requirement
of good moral character imposed upon those who are
seeking admission to the bar. He should show to the
Court how he has tried to make up for the senseless
killing of a helpless student to the family of the deceased
student and to the community at large. In short, he must
show evidence that he is a different person now, that he
has become morally fit for admission to the profession of
law.
He is already directed to inform the Court, by appropriate
written manifestation, of the names of the parents or
brothers and sisters of Camaligan from notice.
Law Student Rule
FERDINAND A. CRUZ, PETITIONER,
VS.
20
ALBERTO MINA, HON. ELEUTERIO F GUERRERO
AND HON. ZENAIDA LAGUILLES, RESPONDENTS
Facts:
 Ferdinand A. Cruz filed before the MeTC a formal Entry
of Appearance, as private prosecutor, where his father,
Mariano Cruz, is the complaining witness.
 The petitioner, describing himself as a third year law
student, justifies his appearance as private prosecutor on
the bases of Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court
and the ruling of the Court En Banc in Cantimbuhan v.
Judge Cruz, Jr. that a non-lawyer may appear before the
inferior courts as an agent or friend of a party litigant. The
petitioner furthermore avers that his appearance was with
the prior conformity of the public prosecutor and a written
authority of Mariano Cruz appointing him to be his agent
in the prosecution of the said criminal case.
 However, in an Order dated February 1, 2002, the MeTC
denied permission for petitioner to appear as private
prosecutor on the ground that Circular No. 19 governing
limited law student practice in conjunction with Rule 138-
A of the Rules of Court (Law Student Practice Rule)
should take precedence over the ruling of the Court laid
down in Cantimbuhan; and set the case for continuation
of trial.
Issue:
 whether the petitioner, a law student, may appear before
an inferior court as an agent or friend of a party litigant
Ruling:
 The rule, however, is different if the law student appears
before an inferior court, where the issues and procedure
are relatively simple. In inferior courts, a law student may
appear in his personal capacity without the supervision of
a lawyer. Section 34, Rule 138 provides:
Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. — In the court
of a justice of the peace, a party may conduct his
litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend
appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an
attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his
litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his
appearance must be either personal or by a duly
authorized member of the bar.
Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior court
as an agent or friend of a party without the supervision of
a member of the bar. (Emphasis supplied)
SECOND DIVISION[ A.C. No. 5737, October 25, 2004 ]
FERDINAND A. CRUZ, COMPLAINANT,
VS.
ATTY. STANLEY CABRERA, RESPONDENT.
Facts:
 Complainant alleges that he is a fourth year law student;
since the latter part of 2001, he instituted several actions
against his neighbors; he appeared for and in his behalf
in his own cases; he met respondent who acted as the
counsel of his neighbors; during a hearing on January 14,
2002, in one case before the Regional Trial Court, Branch
112, Pasay City, presided by Judge Caridad Cuerdo.
 Respondent’s imputations were uncalled for and the
latter’s act of compelling the court to ask complainant
whether he is a lawyer or not was intended to malign him
before the public, inasmuch as respondent knew that
complainant is not a lawyer, having appeared for and in
his behalf as a party litigant in prior cases; respondent’s
imputations of complainant’s misrepresentation as a
lawyer was patently with malice to discredit his honor,
with the intention to threaten him not to appear anymore
in cases respondent was handling; the manner,
substance, tone of voice and how the words “appear ka
ng appear, pumasa ka muna!” were uttered were totally
with the intention to annoy, vex and humiliate, malign,
ridicule, incriminate and discredit complainant before the
public.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent violated Rule 8.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility
21
Whether or not complainant is not precluded from
litigating personally his cases
Whether or not complainant is engaged in the practice of
law  customarily or habitually holding herself out to the public
Ruling:
 1. We hold that respondent’s outburst of “appear ka ng
appear, pumasa ka muna” does not amount to a violation
of Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Such single outburst, though uncalled for, is not of such
magnitude as to warrant respondent’s suspension or
reproof. It is but a product of impulsiveness or the heat of
the moment in the course of an argument between them.
It has been said that lawyers should not be held to too
strict an account for words said in the heat of the
moment, because of chagrin at losing cases, and that the
big way is for the court to condone even contemptuous
language.
 2. Nonetheless, we remind respondent that complainant
is not precluded from litigating personally his cases. A
party’s right to conduct litigation personally is recognized
by Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court: SEC. 34.
By whom litigation conducted. — In the court of a justice
of the peace a party may conduct his litigation in person,
with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that
purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court,
a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of
an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal
or by a duly authorized member of the bar.
 3. The practice of law, though impossible to define
exactly, involves the exercise of a profession or vocation
usually for gain, mainly as attorney by acting in a
representative capacity and as counsel by rendering legal
advise to others. Private practice has been defined by
this Court as follows:
x x x. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it
consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of
acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent
habitual exercise. Practice of law to fall within the
prohibition of statute [referring to the prohibition for
judges and other officials or employees of the superior
courts or of the Office of the Solicitor General from
engaging in private practice] has been interpreted as
customarily or habitually holding one’s self out to the
public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such
services. x x x.
 Clearly, in appearing for herself, complainant was not
as a lawyer. Neither was she demanding payment for
such services. Hence, she cannot be said to be in the
practice of law.
 On the other hand, all lawyers should take heed that
lawyers are licensed officers of the courts who are
empowered to appear, prosecute and defend; and upon
whom peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are
devolved by law as a consequence. Membership in the
bar imposes upon them certain obligations. Mandated to
maintain the dignity of the legal profession, they must
conduct themselves honorably and fairly. Though a
lawyer’s language may be forceful and emphatic, it
should always be dignified and respectful, befitting the
dignity of the legal profession. The use of intemperate
language and unkind ascriptions has no place in the
dignity of judicial forum.
Cantimbuhan v. Cruz, November 29, 1983 Digest, 211
Phil. 373
PONENTE: RELOVA, J.:
Basis of this petition is Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules
of Court which states:
"SEC. 34.  By whom litigation conducted.  - In the court of
a justice of the peace a party may conduct his litigation
in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by
him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney.  In
any other court, a party may conduct his litigation
personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance
must be either personal or by a duly authorized member
of the bar."
FACTS:
Appeal from the Order, dated August 16, 1979, of
respondent Judge Nicanor J. Cruz, Jr., of
the then Municipal Court of Parañaque, Metro Manila,
disallowing the appearances of petitioners Nelson
B. Malana and Robert V. Lucila as private prosecutors in
22
Criminal Cases Nos. 58549 and 58550, both for less
serious physical injuries, filed against Pat. Danilo San
Antonio and Pat. Rodolfo Diaz, respectively, as well as
the Order, dated September 4, 1979, denying the motion
for reconsideration holding, among others, that
"the fiscal's claim that appearances of friends of party-
litigants should be allowed only in places where there is a
scarcity of legal practitioner.  the municipal court a party may conduct his litigation in
Records show that on April 6, 1979,
petitioner Romulo Cantimbuhan filed separate criminal
complaints against Patrolmen Danilo San Antonio and
Rodolfo Diaz for less serious physical injuries,
respectively, and were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos.
58549 and 58550 in the then Municipal Court
of Paranaque, Metro Manila.
Petitioners Nelson B. Malana and Robert
V. Lucila, in 1979, were senior law students of the U. P.
College of Law where, as part of the curriculum of the
university they were required to render legal assistance to
the needy clients in the Office of the Legal Aid.  Thus, in
August 1979, petitioners Malana and Lucila filed their
separate appearances, as friends of complainant-
petitioner Cantimbuhan.  Herein respondent
Fiscal Leodegario C. Quilatan opposed the appearances
of said petitioners, and respondent judge, in an Order
dated August 16, 1979, sustained the respondent
fiscal and disallowed the appearances of
petitioners Malana and Lucila, as private prosecutors
in said criminal cases.  Likewise, on September 4, 1979,
respondent Judge issued an order denying petitioners'
motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court should allow non-members of
the bar to appear in court and prosecute cases or defend
litigants in the guise of being friends of the litigants.
HELD:
YES. Orders issued by respondent judge dated
August 16, 1979 and September 4, 1979 which
disallowed the appearances of petitioners Nelson
B. Malana and Robert V. Lucila as friends of party-litigant
petitioner Romulo Cantimbuhan, where se aside and
respondent judge was ordered to ALLOW the
appearance and intervention of
petitioners Malana and Lucila as friends of Romulo
Cantimbuhan.  Accordingly, the temporary
restraining order issued on November 8, 1979 was
LIFTED.
The court found merit in the petition.  Section 34,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, clearly provides that in
person with the aid of an agent appointed by him for the
purpose.  Thus, in the case of Laput vs. Bernabe, 55 Phil.
621, a law student was allowed to represent the accused
in a case pending before the then Municipal Court, the
City Court of Manila, who was charged for damages to
property through reckless imprudence. "It is accordingly
our view that error was committed in the municipal court
in not allowing Crispiniano V. Laput to act as an agent or
friend of Catalino Salas to aid the latter in conducting his
defense."
The permission of the fiscal is not necessary for
one to enter his appearance as private prosecutor.  In the
first place, the law does not impose this condition.  What
the fiscal can do, if he wants to handle the case
personally is to disallow the private prosecutor's parti-
cipation, whether he be a lawyer or not, in the trial of the
case.  On the other hand, if the fiscal desires the active
participation of the private prosecutor, he can just
manifest to the court that the private prosecutor, with its
approval, will conduct the prosecution of the case under
his supervision and control.  Further, We may add that if
a non-lawyer can appear as defense counsel or as friend
of the accused in a case before the municipal trial court,
with more reason should he be allowed to appear as
private prosecutor under the supervision and control of
the trial fiscal.
In the two criminal cases filed before the
Municipal Court of Parañaque, petitioner Cantimbuhan,
as the offended party, did not expressly waive the civil
action nor reserve his right to institute it separately and,
therefore, the civil action is deemed impliedly instituted in
said criminal cases.  Thus, said
complainant Romulo Cantimbuhan has personal
interest in the success of the civil action and, in the
prosecution of the same, he cannot be deprived of his
right to be assisted by a friend who is not a lawyer.
23

VICTORIANO BULACAN, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FAUS- results of the relocation survey. We agree with the
TINO TORCINO and FELIPA TORCINO, defendants-ap- appellee that the appellants are now estopped on this
pellants. issue because they themselves prayed in the stipulation
of facts that the findings of the goedetic engineer would
Pleadings and Practice; Attorneys; Ejectment; In be bases for the decision of the court of first instance. We
municipal courts a complaint verified by plaintiff may be see no error, much less any grave abuse of discretion, in
signed “Friend Counsel for the Plaintiff” by a non-member the lower courts’ findings that the house of the Torcinos
of the Bar.—The Rules are clear. In municipal courts, the encroached on the lot of Victoriano Bulacan.
litigant may be assisted by a friend, agent, or an attorney.
However, in cases before the regional trial court, the
litigant must be aided by a duly authorized member of the
bar. The rule invoked by the Torcinos applies only to
cases filed with the regional trial court and not to cases
before a municipal court.

Same; Same; Same; Same.—Court procedures are often

technical and may prove like snares to the ignorant or the
unwary. In the past, our law has allowed non-lawyers to
appear for party litigants in places where duly authorized
members of the bar are not available. (U.S. v. Bacansas,
6 Phil. 539). For relatively simple litigation before
municipal courts, the Rules still allow a more educated or
capable person to appear in behalf of a litigant who
cannot get a lawyer. But for the protection of the parties
and in the interest of justice, the requirement for
appearances in regional trial courts and higher courts is
more stringent.

Same; Same; Same.—In the case before us, the

complaint was verified by the party litigant himself. In the
verification, the plaintiff specifically stated that he had
caused Mr. Nuñes to conduct the litigation and to sign the
complaint in his behalf, indicating his awareness that
Nuñes is not a registered lawyer. There is, therefore,
added justification for the pleading to be admitted rather
than dismissed.

Estoppel; A party cannot impugn results of survey he

agreed to be made.—The Torcinos try to impugn the
24

champerty. In the case at bar, complainant presented

Solicitation of Legal Services
LINSANGAN vs. TOLENTINO
Facts:
A complaint for disbarment was filed by Pedro
Linsangan against Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for
solicitation of clients and encroachment of professional
services. Complaint alleged that respondent, with the
help of paralegal Fe Marie Labiano, convinced his clients
to transfer legal representation. Respondent promised
them financial assistance and expeditious collection on
their claims. To induce them to hire his services, he
persistently called them and sent them text messages. To
support his allegations, complainant presented the sworn
affidavit of James Gregorio attesting that Labiano tried to
prevail upon him to sever his lawyer-client relations with
complainant and utilize respondent’s services instead, in
exchange for a loan of P50, 000.00. Complainant also
attached “respondent’s” calling card. Respondent, in his
defense, denied knowing Labiano and authorizing the
printing and circulation of the said calling card.
Issue:
Whether or not Tolentino’s actions warrant disbarment.
Held:
substantial evidence (consisting of the sworn statements
of the very same persons coaxed by Labiano and
referred to respondent’s office) to prove that respondent
indeed solicited legal business as well as profited from
referrals’ suits. Through Labiano’s actions, respondent’s
law practice was benefited. Hapless seamen were
enticed to transfer representation on the strength of
Labiano’s word that respondent could produce a more
favorable result. Based on the foregoing, respondent
clearly solicited employment violating Rule 2.03, and Rule
1.03 and Canon 3 of the CPR and section 27, Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court. Any act of solicitations constitutes
malpractice which calls for the exercise of the Court’s
disciplinary powers. Violation of anti-solicitation statues
warrants serious sanctions for initiating contact with a
prospective client for the purpose of obtaining
employment. Thus in this jurisdiction, the Court adheres
to the rule to protect the public from the Machiavellian
machinations of unscrupulous lawyers and to uphold the
nobility of the legal profession.
Canon 2: A lawyer shall make his legal services available
in an efficient and convenient manner compatible with the
independence, integrity and effectiveness of the
profession. Rule 2.03: A lawyer shall not do or permit to
be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal
business

Yes. Rule 2.03 of the CPR provides that a lawyer

shall not do or permit to be done any act designed A.C. No. 5299               August 19, 2003
primarily to solicit legal business. Hence, lawyers are
prohibited from soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN JR. vs.ATTY. RIZALINO T.
either personally or through paid agents or brokers. Such SIMBILLO
actuation constitutes malpractice, a ground for
FACTS:
disbarment. Rule 2.03 should be read in connection with
Rule 1.03 of the CPR which provides that lawyer, shall
not for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit
or proceeding or delay any man’s cause. This rule
proscribes “ambulance chasing” (the solicitation of almost
any kind of legal business by an attorney, personally or
through an agent in order to gain employment) as a
measure to protect the community from barratry and
25
This administrative complaint arose from a paid
advertisement that appeared in the issue of the
newspaper, Philippine Daily Inquirer, which reads:
"ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE Specialist 532-4333/521-
2667."Further research by the Office of the Court
Administrator and the Public Information Office revealed
that similar advertisements were published in the issues
of the Manila Bulletin and issue of The Philippine Star.
Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., in his capacity as Assistant
Court Administrator and Chief of the Public Information
Office, filed an administrative complaint against Atty.
Rizalino T. Simbillo for improper advertising and
solicitation of his legal services, in violation of Rule 2.03
and Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court.
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines finding respondent
guilty of violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of
the Rules of Court, and suspended him from the practice
of law for one (1) year with the warning that a repetition of
similar acts would be dealt with more severely.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Atty. Simbillo committed an
act in violation of Rule 2.03 and Rule 3.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of
the Rules of Court.
RULING:
Yes. It has been repeatedly stressed that the practice of
law is not a business. It is a profession in which duty to
public service, not money, is the primary consideration.
The gaining of a livelihood should be a secondary
consideration.
The following elements distinguish the legal profession
from a business:
1. A duty of public service, of which the
emolument is a by-product, and in which one
may attain the highest eminence without making
much money;
2. A relation as an "officer of the court" to the
administration of justice involving thorough
sincerity, integrity and reliability;
3. A relation to clients in the highest degree of
fiduciary;
4. A relation to colleagues at the bar
characterized by candor, fairness, and
unwillingness to resort to current business
methods of advertising and encroachment on
their practice, or dealing directly with their clients
There is no question that respondent committed the acts
complained of. He himself admits that he caused the
publication of the advertisements. What adds to the
gravity of respondent’s acts is that in advertising himself
as a self-styled "Annulment of Marriage Specialist," he
wittingly or unwittingly erodes and undermines not only
the stability but also the sanctity of an institution still
considered sacrosanct despite the contemporary climate
of permissiveness in our society. Indeed, in assuring
prospective clients that an annulment may be obtained in
four to six months from the time of the filing of the case,
he in fact encourages people, who might have otherwise
been disinclined and would have refrained from
dissolving their marriage bonds, to do so.
Therefore, respondent RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO is found
GUILTY of violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of
the Rules of Court. He is SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for ONE (1) YEAR effective upon receipt of this
Resolution.
Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility read:
Rule 2.03. – A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done
any act designed primarily to solicit legal business.
Rule 3.01. – A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of
any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified,
self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his
qualifications or legal services.
26
Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court states:
SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by
Supreme Court, grounds therefor. – A member of the bar
may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of
a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of
the oath which he is required to take before the
admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience
appearing as attorney for a party without authority to do
so.
Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 3, California.
Ralph J. GEFFEN, Plaintiff Cross-Defendant and
Appellant, v. Russell J. MOSS, Defendant Cross-
Complainant and Respondent.
Civ. 46079.
    Decided: November 24, 1975
FACTS: Ralph J. Geffen appeals from a judgment
entered in favor of Russell J. Moss in an action for
damages for breach of contract. It appears without
conflict that, because of an appointment as a United
States magistrate precluding him from continuing the
private practice of law, attorney Geffen entered into a
written agreement with attorney Moss whereby Geffen
agreed to sell and Moss to buy ‘the physical assets, files
and work in process' of Geffen's law practice. The total
purchase price was $27,500. Fifteen thousand dollars
was paid in accordance with the terms of the contract.
The action seeks to recover an unpaid balance of
$12,500 plus attorney's fees and costs.
The pertinent provisions of the contract are as follows:
The purchase shall include:
A. Entire law library, excepting not to exceed ten (10)
books to be agreed upon between the parties, and
Martindale-Hubbell (1969);
B. Any and all furniture, fixtures, furnishings and
equipment, excepting not to exceed six (6) items of decor
(not major items) selected by Geffen; and
C. Subject to approval thereof by the respective clients,
all cases and legal matters now pending in the above law
practice except personal injury or wrongful death cases
and the following legal matters:
Geffen will sublet to Moss, at the same rental (Three
Hundred Dollars ($300.00) per month (and upon the
same terms and conditions as are provided in the Master
Lease held by him, Suite 7 (six (6) rooms) now occupied
by Geffen at 11850 East Firestone Boulevard, Norwalk,
California, for a term of three (3) years. Upon full payment
of the purchase price, Geffen will assign to Moss said
Master Lease and will assist in procuring a further lease
in Moss' name alone as lessee thereafter upon request of
Moss.
Geffen expresses an intention to exert his influence for
the continued welfare of the practice and to encourage
present and former clients to utilize the legal services of
the office in the future.
Of the total purchase price, Fifteen Thousand Dollars
($15,000.00) is attributable to the fair value of physical
assets sold.'
The trial court found, among others, that the plaintiff's
attempt to sell the expectation of future patronage of his
former and current clients and to encourage them to
patronize the defendant, and the defendant's attempt to
purchase the future patronage of the plaintiff's former and
current clients and the recommendation of himself by the
plaintiff to those former and current clients constitutes an
attempt to buy and sell the good will of a law practice,
and such sale or attempted sale of the good will of the
law practice is contrary to public policy and against the
spirit and intent of Rules 2 and 3 of Section 6076 of the
Business and Professions Code, ‘The State Bar Act’ and
of the ABA Canons of Ethics No. 4, EC 4—6, prohibiting
the sale of a law practice as a going business.
27
ISSUE: Whether or not the provision of the contract which
states that Geffen expresses an intention to exert his
influence for the continued welfare of the practice and to
encourage present and former clients to utilize the legal
services of the office in the future is contrary to public
policy and unenforceable.
HELD: YES. Noting that the fair value of the physical
assets, defined as library, furniture, fixtures, furnishings
and equipment is established in the contract to be
$15,000 and that all fees earned for work done by Moss
or collected for work in progress belong to Moss, we
immediately wonder what the additional consideration,
payable in monthly installments totaling $12,500 covers.
It does not appear to be for assignment of the lease since
that act is contingent upon and to be made after full
payment of the total purchase price of $27,500. What
else was being sold for the $12,500 now being sought by
Geffen in this action?
No attack is made upon the sufficiency of the evidence to
support the finding that the parties ‘considered the
expectation of future business from present and former
clients as a principal motivating factor in this sale
transaction’ and that without that expectation the value of
the law office would not exceed $15,000.
Noting, as found by the trial court, that two able
experienced attorneys drew the agreement to sell only
insofar as this could be accomplished ‘within the limits
and confines of the canons of ethics,’ they themselves
acknowledge some applicable limitation on the scope of
the sale. We agree that, insofar as the parties purport to
sell the physical assets and to assign the leasehold and
dispose of pending office matters, the agreement does
not violate public policy as expressed in the canons of
legal ethics. However, it appears obvious to us that both
parties, recognizing a limitation against the sale of good
will, nevertheless attempted to avoid a proscription
against such by deliberately failing to mention good will
as such in the agreement. We cannot say that the trial
court's resolution of the matter was unreasonable. The
attempted sale of the expectation of future patronage by
former and current clients of a law office coupled with an
agreement to encourage said clients to continue to
patronize the purchaser of the physical assets of the
office, under the facts of this case, may well be said to
constitute an attempt to buy and sell the good will of a law
practice as a going business, contrary to public policy,
and that the portion of the agreement purporting to so do
is invalid and unenforceable.
The following language found in Linnick v. State Bar, 62
Cal.2d 17, 21, 41 Cal.Rptr. 1, 3, 396 P.2d 33, 35,
although involving the activities of a lay person and an
attorney, indicates the existence of applicable ethical
considerations:
‘Rule 3 of the Rules of Professional Conduct, however,
prohibits an attorney from remunerating another for either
‘soliciting’ or ‘obtaining’ employment for him. Whether or
not a lay intermediary solicits the business referred, he
may not keep the best interests of the clients paramount
when he profits from his referrals. He is likely to refer
claimants, not to the most competent attorney, but to the
one who is compensating him. (See Hildebrand v. State
Bar, 36 Cal.2d 504, 521, 523, 225 P.2d 508 (concurring
opinion by Traynor, J.);
‘The nature of a professional partnership for the practice
of law, the reputation of which depends on the skill,
training and experience of each individual member, and
the personal and confidential relationship existing
between each such member and the client, places such a
partnership in a class apart from other business and
professional partnerships. The legal profession stands in
a peculiar relation to the public and the relationship
existing between the members of the profession and
those who seek its services cannot be likened to the
relationship of a merchant to his customer. (Barton v.
State Bar, 209 Cal. 677, 682, 289 P. 818.) Thus, our
research has brought to light no case in this jurisdiction in
which an allowance was made to a partner for goodwill
upon the dissolution of a partnership created for the
practice of law.’ The judgment is modified by striking
therefrom that portion awarding defendant attorney's
fees. In all other respects the judgment is affirmed.
In re Krasner
204 N.E 2d (1965)
Facts:
28
The Board of Managers and Committee on Grievances of
the Chicago Bar Association as commissioners of the
court have filed a report recommending that respondent
be suspended from the practice of law for a period of five
years on the basis of findings that he had unethically
engaged in conduct which constituted a division of fees
with laymen and the employment of solicitors to procure
law business. Respondent has filed exceptions to the
report contending there is no evidence to support such
findings.
The disciplinary proceeding was an outgrowth of an
indictment returned to a Federal district court wherein a
man named David E. Vogele was charged with evasion of
income tax. He pleaded guilty and declared that he was a
professional "ambulance chaser" and that the source of
his unreported income had been payments from some
twenty lawyers, of whom respondent was one. The trial
judge brought the matter to the attention of the Chicago
Bar Association and as a consequence an inquiry was
made and a complaint filed against respondent. At the
hearing, the evidence on behalf of the complainant
association consisted only of the testimony of respondent
and his partner, and certain ledger sheets and cancelled
checks of the partnership. For the respondent, two
judges, numerous attorneys and a businessman testified
to his good character and reputation and to his
professional integrity.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Krasner should be
suspended.
Held:
Yes. Canon 28 of the Canons of Ethics provided that it is
disreputable to breed litigation by seeking out those with
claims for personal injuries or those having any other
grounds of action in order to secure them as clients, or to
employ agents or runners for like purposes, or to pay or
reward, directly or indirectly, those who bring or influence
the bringing of such cases to his office. Also, Canon 34
provided that no division of fees for legal services is
proper except with another lawyer, based upon a division
of service or responsibility. Based upon the evidence
substantially as related, it was the finding of the
commissioners that respondent had violated these
canons. The proof shows that during a period of about
two and one-half years Vogele referred some 70 to 75
cases to respondent, all being personal injury cases
except for "a divorce or two," and was paid sums totalling
in excess of $20,000 for such referrals. And while
respondent describes the payments as gifts or gratuities,
it is clear that such payments were remuneration for law
business sent to respondent.
Although canons of ethics adopted by bar associations
are not binding obligations, nor enforcible by the courts
as such, they constitute a safe guide for professional
conduct and an attorney may be disciplined for not
observing them. And while neither the solicitation of law
business nor the division of fees here involved imports
venality, fraudulent practices or moral turpitude, they are
nevertheless practices which have long been condemned
as a blight upon the legal profession.
The court is aware that respondent has had no dealings
with Vogele or Skidmore for a number of years, and that
he apparently terminated the relationship with these men
of his own accord. Once again, however, the mere
cessation of improper practices does not serve to
completely exonerate an attorney for his past misdeeds,
nor to forestall all discipline. Under all of the
circumstances, the extreme penalty of disbarment is not
warranted; however, the respondent should be
suspended from the practice of law for one year.
Fabilo vs. IAC
G.R. No. L-68838             March 11, 1991
FLORENCIO FABILLO and JOSEFA TANA (substituted
by their heirs Gregorio Fabillo, Roman Fabillo, Cristeta F.
Maglinte and Antonio Fabillo), petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT (Third Civil Case Division) and ALFREDO
MURILLO (substituted by his heirs Fiamita M. Murillo,
Flor M. Agcaoili and Charito M. Babol), respondents.
29
In the instant petition for review on certiorari, petitioners
seek the reversal of the appellate court's decision
interpreting in favor of lawyer Alfredo M. Murillo the
contract of services entered into between him and his
clients, spouses Florencio Fabillo and Josefa Taña.
In her last will and testament dated August 16, 1957,
Justina Fabillo bequeathed to her brother, Florencio, a
house and lot in San Salvador Street, Palo, Leyte which
was covered by tax declaration No. 19335, and to her
husband, Gregorio D. Brioso, a piece of land in
Pugahanay, Palo, Leyte.  After Justina's death, Florencio
filed a petition for the probate of said will. On June 2,
1962, the probate court approved the project of partition
"with the reservation that the ownership of the land
declared under Tax Declaration No. 19335 and the house
erected thereon be litigated and determined in a separate
proceeding."  because the payment of said fee is not made during the
Two years later, Florencio sought the assistance of
lawyer Alfredo M. Murillo in recovering the San Salvador
property.
Florencio and Murillo entered into a contract.
Pursuant to said contract, Murillo filed for Florencio
Fabillo Civil Case No. 3532 against Gregorio D. Brioso to
recover the San Salvador property. The case was
terminated on October 29, 1964 when the court, upon the
parties' joint motion in the nature of a compromise
agreement, declared Florencio Fabillo as the lawful
owner not only of the San Salvador property but also the
Pugahanay parcel of land.
Consequently, Murillo proceeded to implement the
contract of services between him and Florencio Fabillo by
taking possession and exercising rights of ownership over
40% of said properties. He installed a tenant in the
Pugahanay property.
Sometime in 1966, Florencio Fabillo claimed exclusive
right over the two properties and refused to give Murillo
his share of their produce.  Inasmuch as his demands for
his share of the produce of the Pugahanay property were
unheeded, Murillo filed on March 23, 1970 in the then
Court of First Instance of Leyte a complaint captioned
"ownership of a parcel of land, damages and appointment
of a receiver" against Florencio Fabillo, his wife Josefa
Taña, and their children Ramon Fabillo and Cristeta F.
Maglinte.
Issue: WON the contract of services agreed upon is in
violation of Article 1491 of the Civil Code.
Held: The contract of services did not violate said
provision of law. Article 1491 of the Civil Code, prohibits
lawyers from acquiring by purchase even at a public or
judicial auction, properties and rights which are the
objects of litigation in which they may take part by virtue
of their profession. The said prohibition, however, applies
only if the sale or assignment of the property takes place
during the pendency of the litigation involving the client's
property. 
Hence, a contract between a lawyer and his client
stipulating a contingent fee is not covered by said
prohibition under Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code
pendency of the litigation but only after judgment has
been rendered in the case handled by the lawyer. In fact,
under the 1988 Code of Professional Responsibility, a
lawyer may have a lien over funds and property of his
client and may apply so much thereof as may be
necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements. 
As long as the lawyer does not exert undue influence on
his client, that no fraud is committed or imposition
applied, or that the compensation is clearly not excessive
as to amount to extortion, a contract for contingent fee is
valid and enforceable.  Moreover, contingent fees were
impliedly sanctioned by No. 13 of the Canons of
Professional Ethics which governed lawyer-client
relationships when the contract of services was entered
into between the Fabillo spouses and Murillo. 
However, SC disagree with the courts below that the
contingent fee stipulated between the Fabillo spouses
and Murillo is 40% of the properties subject of the
litigation for which Murillo appeared for the Fabillos. A
careful scrutiny of the contract shows that the parties
intended forty percent of the value  of the properties as
Murillo's contingent fee. This is borne out by the
stipulation that "in case of success of any or both cases,"
Murillo shall be paid "the sum equivalent to forty per
centum of whatever benefit"  Fabillo would derive from
favorable judgments. The same stipulation was earlier
embodied by Murillo in his letter of August 9, 1964
aforequoted.
30
Worth noting are the provisions of the contract which
clearly states that in case the properties are sold,
mortgaged, or leased, Murillo shall be entitled
respectively to 40% of the "purchase price," "proceeds of
the mortgage," or "rentals." The contract is vague,
however, with respect to a situation wherein the
properties are neither sold, mortgaged or leased because
Murillo is allowed "to have the option of occupying or
leasing to any interested party forty per cent of the house
and lot." Had the parties intended that Murillo should
become the lawful owner of 40% of the properties, it
would have been clearly and unequivocally stipulated in
the contract considering that the Fabillos would part with
actual portions of their properties and cede the same to
Murillo.
The ambiguity of said provision, however, should be
resolved against Murillo as it was he himself who drafted
the contract.  This is in consonance with the rule of
interpretation that, in construing a contract of professional
services between a lawyer and his client, such
construction as would be more favorable to the client
should be adopted even if it would work prejudice to the
lawyer.  Rightly so because of the inequality in situation
between an attorney who knows the technicalities of the
law on the one hand and a client who usually is ignorant
of the vagaries of the law on the other hand.  1. Atty. Renato Lazaro Bondal (respondent) stands
Considering the nature of the case, the value of the
properties subject matter thereof, the length of time and
effort exerted on it by Murillo, we hold that Murillo is
entitled to the amount of P3,000.00 as reasonable
attorney's fees for services rendered in the case which
ended on a compromise agreement. In so ruling, we
uphold "the time-honored legal maxim that a lawyer shall
at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession so that his basic ideal becomes one of
rendering service and securing justice, not money-
making. For the worst scenario that can ever happen to a
client is to lose the litigated property to his lawyer in
whom all trust and confidence were bestowed at the very
inception of the legal controversy."  thereof as success fee.
JAYNE Y. YU, complainant, vs.
RENATO LAZARO
BONDAL, respondent.
Facts
Jayne Yu contracted the services of Atty Renato
Lazaro Bondal for 5 civil cases. However, she
contends that he lost cases due to his gross
negligence in failure to attend hearings, to
appeal, and to present certain evidence. Jayne
Yu also contends that she was coerced to
compromise in an agreement she was not
satisfied with. She filed a charge against the
lawyer for not returning the files entrusted with
him and prays for the return of the acceptance
fee given.
Office of Bar Confidant recommended the
dismissal of the complaint for failure to
substantiate.
SC ruled in favor of the lawyer, and that the
dismissal of her cases was not purely imputable
to the fault of the lawyer.
Detailed Facts
charged in a complaint filed by Jayne Y. Yu (complainant)
for gross negligence and violation of Canon 16  and Rule
16.03 of the Code of Professional for his alleged failure to
attend to the five cases she referred to him and to return,
despite demand, the amount of P51,716.54 she has paid
him.
2. Complainant alleged she engaged the services of
respondent as counsel in the 5 civil cases
3. In the Retainer Agreement, complainant agreed to pay
respondent the amount of P200,000.00 as Acceptance
Fee for the five cases, with an Appearance Fee of
P1,500.00 pesos per hearing; and in the event that
damages are recovered, she would pay respondent 10%
4. Despite receipt of two checks amounting to 51, 716.00,
respondent failed to file a case against Swire Realty and
Development Corp;  due to respondent's negligence, the
case for estafa against Lourdes Fresnoza Boon was
dismissed by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati
31
City and was not timely appealed to the Department of
Justice;  satisfactory proof. The charges against him must thus be
5. respondent negligently failed to inform complainant,
before she left for abroad, to leave the necessary
documents for purposes of the preliminary investigation
of the case filed against Julie Teh before the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Makati City, which case was eventually
dismissed
6. and respondent compelled her to settle the two cases
for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 against Mona Lisa San Juan
and Elizabeth Chan Ong under unfair and unreasonable
terms.
7. Through complainant's counsel (Chavez Laureta and
Associates Law Office) which sent a letter  to respondent,
she demanded for the return of the records of the
cases,and the checks issued to himdc2005
8. As respondent failed and continues to refuse to comply
with complainant's valid demands in evident bad faith and
to her prejudice, she filed the present complaint charging
him with flagrant violation of Canon 16 and Canon 16.03
of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
9. The Office of the Bar Confidant, by Report and
Recommendation,  recommends the dismissal of the
complaint for failure of complainant to substantiate it.
ISSUE: SHOULD RESPONDENT LAWYER BE
COMPELLED TO RETURN THE ACCEPTANCE FEE?
HELD. NO.
An acceptance fee is not a contingent fee, but is an
absolute fee arrangement which entitles a lawyer to get
paid for his efforts regardless of the outcome of the
litigation.
That complainant was dissatisfied with the outcome of the
four cases does not render void the above retainer
agreement for respondent appears to have represented
the interest of complainant. Litigants need to be reminded
that lawyers, are not demi-gods or "magicians" who can
always win their cases for their clients no matter the utter
lack of merit of the same or how passionate the litigants
may feel about their cause. 37
In sum, this Court finds well taken the finding of the Office
of the Bar Confidant that complainant failed to establish
the guilt of respondent by clear, convincing and
dismissed. 
However, since respondent had been advised by
complainant through counsel Chavez Laureta and
Associates, by letter of July 18, 2001, that she intended
to terminate his services, as of said date, he was obliged,
under Rule 22.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, viz:
Rule 22.02 — A lawyer who withdraws
or is discharged shall, subject to a
retainer lien, immediately turn over all
papers and property to which the client
is entitled, and shall cooperate with his
successor in the orderly transfer of the
matter, including all information
necessary for the proper handling of
the matter,
to immediately turn over all papers and property
which complainant entrusted to his successor.
WHEREFORE, the complaint is hereby DISMISSED.
Respondent is, however, hereby directed to RETURN all
the records in his possession relative to the cases he
handled for complainant.
In re R.M.J. (1982)
Related cases in Attorney Advertising and Free Speech
In In re R.M.J.,  455 U.S. 191 (1982), the Supreme Court
unanimously ruled that a Missouri ethics rule
restricting advertising by lawyers was unconstitutional
under the First Amendment. The Court’s decision
reversed a Missouri Supreme Court ruling that upheld the
constitutionality of the ethics rule while issuing a private
reprimand to a lawyer for failing to comply with the
advertising restrictions. This is one of several decisions in
which the Court has decided the extent to which the First
Amendment protections apply to the regulation of lawyer
advertising.
32
Missouri law limited attorney advertising to 10 categories
The law in question limited advertising to 10 categories of
information:  as too restrictive, the Court emphasized that the states
 Name, address, and telephone number
 Areas of practice
 Date and place of birth
 Schools attended
 Foreign language ability
 Offices hours
 Fee for an initial consultation
 Availability of a schedule of fees
 Credit arrangements
 The fixed fee to be charged for certain “routine”
legal services
Law was result of trying to comply with previous Court
decisions
Writing the opinion for the Court, Justice Lewis F. Powell
Jr. reviewed the Missouri ethics rule regulating lawyer
advertising which had been revised in an effort to comply
with the Court’s prior decision in Bates v. State Bar of
Arizona  (1977). In Bates,  the Court decided that lawyer
advertising was a form of commercial speech protected
by the First Amendment but still could be regulated to
prevent false, deceptive, or misleading advertising. Prior
to the decision in Bates,  Missouri and most other states
had an absolute prohibition on lawyer advertising.
In response to the Bates  decision, the Committee on
Professional Ethics and Responsibility of the Supreme
Court of Missouri revised the ethics rule regulating lawyer
advertising in an effort to strike a balance between a
complete prohibition and unlimited advertising. In
applying these restrictions to advertising by the lawyer
R.M.J., the Missouri Supreme Court reprimanded the
lawyer for failing to adhere to the precise language of the
rule. In striking down the Missouri ethics rule, the Court
determined that the information published by the lawyer
was not inherently misleading, had not been shown to be
misleading, and the Supreme Court of Missouri had failed
to demonstrate any substantial justification for the
restrictions.
Court struck down law but emphasized the states'
authority to regulate misleading advertising
Although the Court struck down the Missouri ethics rule
retain authority to regulate advertising that is inherently
misleading or misleading in practice. The Court noted that
efforts to regulate lawyer advertising must consist of
carefully drawn restrictions, and that the First and
Fourteenth Amendments require that any restrictions
imposed must be no more extensive than reasonably
necessary to further substantial government
interests. R.M.J.  helped lay the groundwork for several
other Court decisions defining the permissible limits on
lawyer advertising.
JULIETA BORROMEO SAMONTE, complainant, vs.
ATTY. ROLANDO R. GATDULA, Branch Clerk of Court,
respondent.
Facts:
In a verified complaint, respondent, RTC Branch Clerk of
Court, Quezon City, was charged with grave misconduct
in engaging in the private practice of law. Complainant
was the representative of her sister, plaintiff in Civil Case
No. 37-14552 for ejectment pending with the MTC. The
execution of that decision in favor of plaintiff was enjoined
by Branch 220, RTC, Quezon City where respondent is
the Branch Clerk of Court. Complainant alleged that
respondent tried to convince her to change his lawyer if
she wanted the execution of the judgment to proceed and
even gave her his calling card with the name Baligod,
Gatdula, Tacardon, Dimailig and Celera Law Offices with
address at 220 Mariwasa Bldg., 717 Aurora Blvd., Cubao,
Quezon City which complainant attached to her affidavit-
complaint. Respondent, when asked to comment,
claimed that it was complainant who showed him said
calling card and asked him if he could handle the case
but to which he refused as he was not connected with the
law firm, though he was invited to join the firm. The case
33
was set for hearing for several times but complainant nor
her counsel did not appear. The return of the service
stated that complainant was abroad. Respondent testified
in his own behalf and vehemently denied complainants
allegation. He, however, did not deny that his name
appeared on the calling card or that the calling card was
printed without his knowledge and consent.
Issue: won Atty. Gatdula is guilty of an infraction.
Held: Yes, while the respondent vehemently denies the
complainant's allegations, he does not deny that his
name appears on the calling card attached to the
complaint which admittedly came into the hands of the
complainant. Respondent does not claim that the calling
card was printed without his knowledge or consent and
the calling card carries his name primarily and the name
of "Baligod, Gatdula, Tacardon, Dimailig and Celera with
address at 220 Mariwasa Bldg., 717 Aurora Blvd., Cubao,
Quezon City" in the left comer. The card clearly gives the
impression that he is connected with the said law firm.
The inclusion/retention of his name in the professional
card constitutes an act of solicitation which violates
Section 7 sub-par. (b)(2) of Republic Act No. 6713,
otherwise known as "Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees" which
declares it unlawful for a public official or employee to,
among others: "(2) Engage in the private practice of their
profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law,
provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to
conflict with official functions."
Respondent Rolando R. Gatdula, was reprimanded for
engaging in the private practice of law with the warning
that a repetition of the same offense will be dealt with
more severely. He is further ordered to cause the
exclusion of his name in the firm name of any office
engaged in the private practice of law.
ADRIANO E. DACANAY, complainant
vs.
BAKER & MCKENZIE and JUAN G. COLLAS JR., LUIS
MA. GUERRERO, VICENTE A. TORRES, RAFAEL E.
EVANGELISTA, JR., ROMEO L. SALONGA, JOSE R.
SANDEJAS, LUCAS M. NUNAG, J. CLARO TESORO,
NATIVIDAD B. KWAN and JOSE A. CURAMMENG, JR.,
respondents.
FACTS:
Lawyer Adriano E. Dacanay, admitted to the bar in 1954
sought to enjoin Juan G. Collas, Jr. and nine other
lawyers from practising law under the name of Baker &
McKenzie, a law firm organized in Illinois.
In 1979 respondent Vicente A. Torres used the letterhead
of Baker & McKenzie which contains the names of the ten
lawyers asking Rosie Clurman for the release of 87
shares of Cathay Products International, Inc. to H.E.
Gabriel, a client.
Atty. Dacanay denied any liability of Clurman to Gabriel
and He requested that he be informed whether the lawyer
of Gabriel is Baker & McKenzie "and if not, what is your
purpose in using the letterhead of another law office."
ISSUE:
Whether or not the use of a foreign law office name is
allowed.
HELD: No.
RATIO:
Baker & McKenzie is a professional partnership
organized in 1949 in Chicago, Illinois.
Being an alien law firm, cannot practice law in the
Philippines (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Rules of Court)
Sec. 1, Rule 138, Rules of Court:
Who may practice law. - Any person heretofore duly
admitted as a member of the bar, or hereafter admitted
as such in accordance with the provisions of this rule, and
34
who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice
law.
Respondents', being members of the bar and using the
firm name Baker & McKenzie constitutes a representation
that being associated with the firm they could "render
legal services of the highest quality to multinational
business enterprises and others engaged in foreign trade
and investment"
This is unethical because Baker & McKenzie is not
authorized to practise law here.
The Director of Religious Affairs v. Estanislao Bayot A.C.
No. L-1117 March 20, 1944
Estanislao Bayot caused the publication of an
advertisement of his services in the Sunday Tribune, in
direct violation of the provision of Section 25, Rule 127
which imposes a prohibition on soliciting cases at law for
the purpose of gain either personally or through paid
agents or brokers.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent is guilty of malpractice
Held:
Yes. His act of causing the publication of an
advertisement constitutes malpractice. Law is a
profession and not a trade. A member of the bar
degrades himself or herself in adopting the practices of
mercantilism through advertising his or her services like a
merchant advertising wares.
However, considering the fact that Bayot is a young
lawyer and that he promises to refrain from repeating the
same misconduct, the Court exercised leniency. He was
merely reprimanded for his violation and he was
reminded that the most effective advertisement possible
is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for
professional capacity as well as fidelity to trust.
In re Luis B. TAGORDA
March 23, 1929
FACTS
In 1928, Luis Tagorda was a provincial board member of
Isabela. He admits that during his campaign, he made
use of a card written in Spanish and Ilocano which, in
translation means that he is a lawyer and a notary public;
and that as a notary public he can do notarial acts such
as execution of deeds of sale, can renew lost documents,
and etc.; that as a lawyer, he can help clients collect
debts; that he offers free consultation; and that he is
willing to serve the poor. The respondent further admits
that he is the author of a letter addressed to a lieutenant
of barrio in his home municipality advising the latter that
even though he was elected as a provincial board
member, he can still practice law; that he wants the
lieutenant to tell the same to his people; that he is willing
to receive works regarding preparations of sales
contracts and affidavits etc.; that he is willing to receive
land registration cases for a charge of three pesos.
ISSUE Whether or not Tagorda is guilty of malpractice.
HELD
Yes. Tagorda admitted doing the foregoing acts. The
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain,
either personally or through paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice.
The most worthy and effective advertisement possible,
even for a young lawyer, and especially with his brother
lawyers, is the establishment of a well- merited reputation
for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot
be forced, but must be the outcome of character and
conduct. Solicitation of business by circulars or
advertisements, or by personal communications or
interviews not warranted by personal relations, is
unprofessional. It is equally unprofessional to procure
business by indirection through touters of any kind,
whether allied real estate firms or trust companies
advertising to secure the drawing of deeds or wills or
offering retainers in exchange for executorships or
trusteeships to be influenced by the lawyer. Indirect
advertisement for business by furnishing or inspiring
35
newspaper comments concerning the manner of their
conduct, the magnitude of the interests involved, the
importance of the lawyer’s position, and all other like self-
laudation, defy the traditions and lower the tone of our
high calling, and are intolerable.
It is unprofessional for a lawyer to volunteer advice to
bring a lawsuit, except in rare cases where ties of blood,
relationship or trust make it his duty to do so.
Tagorda’s liability is however mitigated by the fact that he
is a young inexperienced lawyer and that he was
unaware of the impropriety of his acts. So instead of
being disbarred, he was suspended from the practice of
law for a month.
DECISION
Respondent Luis B. Tagorda be and is hereby suspended
from the practice as an attorney-at-law for the period of
one month from April 1, 1929.
Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc., 223 SCRA 378
FACTS:
Mauricio C. Ulep, petitioner, prays this Court "to order the
respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., to cease and desist
from issuing advertisements similar to or of the same
tenor as that of Annexes `A' and `B' (of said petition) and
to perpetually prohibit persons or entities from making
advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law
profession other than those allowed by law.” The
advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as
follows:
Annex A
SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.
Please call: 521-0767,
LEGAL5217232, 5222041
CLINIC, INC.8:30 am-6:00 pm
7-Flr. Victoria Bldg. UN Ave., Mla.
Annex B
GUAM DIVORCE
DON PARKINSON
an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam
Divorce through The Legal Clinic beginning Monday to
Friday during office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration
Problems, Visa Ext.
Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special Retiree's Visa.
Declaration of Absence.
Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in
the Phil. US/Foreign
Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.
THE 7 F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave.
LEGALErmita, Manila nr. US Embassy
CLINIC, INC. Tel. 521-7232521-7251522-2041; 521-0767
It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements
above reproduced are champertous, unethical,
demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the
confidence of the community in the integrity of the
members of the bar and that, as a member of the legal
profession, he is ashamed and offended by the said
advertisements, hence the reliefs sought in his petition as
herein before quoted.
In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of
publication of said advertisements at its instance, but
claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in
the rendering of "legal support services" through
paralegals with the use of modern computers and
electronic machines. Respondent further argues that
assuming that the services advertised are legal services,
36
the act of advertising these services should be allowed
supposedly in the light of the caseof John R. Bates and
Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of Arizona, reportedly
decidedby the United States Supreme Court on June 7,
1977.
Issue:
Whether or not the services offered by respondent, The
Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it constitutes practice
of law and, in either case, whether the same can properly
be the subject of the advertisements herein complained
of.
Held:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that the services offered by
the respondent constitute practice of law. The definition of
“practice of law” is laid down in the case of Cayetano vs.
Monsod, as defined:Black defines "practice of law"
as:"The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and
the application of legal principles and technique to serve
the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to
appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the
conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of
pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and
special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of
legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal
advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all
actions taken for them in matters connected with thelaw."
The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal
support services can neither be seriously considered nor
sustained. Said proposition is belied by respondent's own
description of the services it has been offering. While
some of the services being offered by respondent
corporation merely involve mechanical and technical
know-how, such as the installation of computer systems
and programs for the efficient management of law offices,
or the computerization of research aids and materials,
these will not suffice to justify an exception to the general
rule. What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation
gives out legal information to laymen and lawyers. Its
contention that such function is non-advisory and non-
diagnostic is more apparent than real. In providing
information, for example, about foreign laws on marriage,
divorce and adoption, it strains the credulity of this Court
that all that respondent corporation will simply do is look
for the law, furnish a copy thereof to the client, and stop
there as if it were merely a bookstore. With its attorneys
and so called paralegals, it will necessarily have to
explain to the client the intricacies of the law and advise
him or her on the proper course of action to be taken as
may be provided for by said law. That is what its
advertisements represent and for which services it will
consequently charge and be paid. That activity falls
squarely within the jurisprudential definition of "practice of
law." Such a conclusion will not be altered by the fact that
respondent corporation does not represent clients in court
since law practice, as the weight of authority holds, is not
limited merely to court appearances but extends to legal
research, giving legal advice, contract drafting, and so
forth. That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to
carry out its services is not controlling. What is important
is that it is engaged in the practice of law by virtueof the
nature of the services it renders which thereby brings it
within the ambit of the statutory prohibitions against the
advertisements which it has caused to be published and
are now assailed in this proceeding. The standards of the
legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of
his talents. (SEE CANON 2) A lawyer cannot, without
violating the ethics of his profession, advertise his talents
or skills as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising
his goods. The proscription against advertising of legal
services or solicitation of legal business rests on the
fundamental postulate that the practice of law is a
profession. The canons of the profession tell us that the
best advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-merited
reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust,
which must be earned as the outcome of character and
conduct. Good and efficient service to a client as well as
to the community has a way of publicizing itself and
catching public attention. That publicity is a normal by-
product of effective service which is rightand proper. A
good and reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to
generate it and to magnify his success. He easily sees
the difference between a normal by-product of able
service and the unwholesome result of propaganda.
U.S. v. Ney
G.R No. 3593 – 23 March 1907
J. Tracey (En Banc)
Topic: A lawyer shall not directly or indirectly assist in the
unauthorized practice of law
Plaintiff: United States
Defendants: C.W. Ney and Juan Garcia Bosque
37

FACTS: constitutes a substantial attempt to engage in

• 1902: Court ruled Bosque was not entitled to
admission to the practice of law in the Philippines as
he chose to remain a Spanish subject after
sovereignty, hence not qualified for admission to the
bar
• 1904: Bosque and Ney, a practicing attorney, put up a
law office. Bosque said he would devote himself to
consultation and office work relating to Spanish law.
The paper was headed "Law Office - Ney & Bosque.
Juan G. Bosque, jurisconsulto español - C.W. Ney,
abogado americano."
• Bosque has not personally appeared in courts, and
except for one oversight, papers from the office were
signed not with the firm name alone nor with any
designation of the firm as attorneys, but with the
words "Ney & Bosque - C.W. Ney, abogado."
• On two occasions (1 May 1905 and 15 Sept 1906),
the Court refused to consider petitions signed with the
name of the defendants
• 2 October 1906: The Court sent the papers to the
Attorney-General to take appropriate action, which
resulted to the filing of this case
practice
o The law office of the defendants amounted to an
assertion of his right and purpose, not qualified
by saying he would devote himself to consultation
and office work relating to Spanish law
o Bosque saying that he was a Spanish lawyer is
not a disclaimer of his status to practice law in
the Philippines
o Conduct of the Bosque amounts to disobedience
of an order made in a proceeding to which he
was a party (when the Court decided he cannot
be admitted to the Bar)
• Ney is liable under Sec. 232 (2) for signing the
pleadings
RULING: Defendants are fined 200 pesos, to be paid into
the office of the clerk of this court within ten days

ISSUES: W/N either of the defendants should be

punished for contempt

HELD: YES, both are guilty of contempt

• Sec. 102 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CCP) states
every pleading must be subscribed by the party or his
attorney and prohibits names of any other persons;
agents or otherwise
• This offense was aggravated by the fact that one of
those who signed was denied admission to the bar
• Contempt is defined by Sec. 232 of the CCP as:
1. Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ,
process, order, judgment, or command of a court,
or injunction granted by a court or judge;
2. Misbehavior of an officer of the court in the
performance of his official duties or in his official
transactions.
Where the law defines contempt, the power of the courts
is restricted to punishment for acts so defined. (Ex-parte
Robinson)
• Bosque is liable for contempt under 232 (1):
Disobeyed the court order disallowing him to practice
law
o Irregular signature to papers, though affixed by
his associate, had his authorization and