CEQUENA VS.

BOLANTE

Facts: Prior to 1954, the subject land was originally declared for taxation purposes in the
name of Sinforoso Mendoza, father of respondent. Sinforoso died in 1930. Petitioners
were the daughters of Margarito Mendoza, Sinforo’s brother. On the basis of an
affidavit, the tax declaration in the name of Sinforoso Mendoza of the contested lot was
cancelled and subsequently declared in the name of Margarito Mendoza. Respondent is
the present occupant of the land. Earlier, respondent and Miguel Mendoza, another
brother of petitioners, during the cadastral survey had a dispute on the ownership of the
land.

The court a quo rendered its judgment in favor of petitioners. The Court of Appeals
reversed the trial court, ruling among others, that the probative value of petitioners' tax
receipts and declarations paled in comparison with respondent's proof of ownership of
the disputed parcel.

Ruling: Ownership of immovable property is acquired by ordinary prescription through

possession for ten years. Being the sole heir of her father, respondent showed through
his tax receipt that she had been in possession of the land for more than ten years since
1932. Respondent's possession was not disturbed until 1953 when the petitioners'
father claimed the land. But by then, her possession, which was in the concept of owner
— public, peaceful, and uninterrupted — had already ripened into ownership.
Furthermore she herself, after her father's demise, declared and paid realty taxes for the
disputed land. Tax receipts and declarations of ownership for taxation, when coupled
with proof of actual possession of the property, can be the basis of a claim for
ownership through prescription.

Petitioners' contend that their ownership of the disputed land was established before the
trial court through the series of tax declarations and receipts issued in the name of
Margarito Mendoza. Such documents prove that the holder has a claim of title over the
property. Aside from manifesting a sincere desire to obtain title thereto, they announce
the holder's adverse claim against the state and other interested parties.

However, tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership. At
most, they constitute mere prima facie proof of ownership or possession of the property
for which taxes have been paid. In the absence of actual public and adverse
possession, the declaration of the land for tax purposes does not prove ownership. In
sum, the petitioners' claim of ownership of the whole parcel has no legal basis.

SERINA VS. CABALLERO

Facts: Petitioners filed a Complaint for quieting of title, recovery of possession, and
damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against
respondents. They alleged in their complaint that they are the absolute owners and
have been in actual and constructive possession for thirty-five (35) years of a parcel of
land. They likewise averred that sometime in March 1982, they discovered that
respondent Caballero was claiming ownership over the said land and offering it for sale
or mortgage to third parties, and that respondents Donelas were occupying the land as
tenants and caretakers of the land. They presented a Deed of Sale, and averred that
they regularly paid taxes thereon since 1947 up to the present.

Respondent Caballero alleged that he was the lawful owner, and had been in actual
physical possession of the disputed land since time immemorial, and that the entire
parcel of land was declared for tax purposes even before the war.

The RTC rendered judgment dismissing the complaint, and upholding the right of the
respondents over the land. The CA affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC.

Ruling: Here, since the property has not been clearly identified by the petitioners, their
claim of acquisitive prescription cannot be considered. Insufficient identification of the
portion of land claimed in absolute ownership cannot ripen into ownership. Possession
as a means of acquiring ownership, while it may be constructive, is not a mere fiction.

Assuming, however, that the disputed land has been clearly identified, acquisitive
prescription will still not lie in favor of the petitioners because they were not able to
prove that they have been in possession of the property for the requisite number of
years. Prescription requires public, peaceful, uninterrupted and adverse possession of
the property in the concept of an owner for ten years, in case the possession is in good
faith and with just title. Aside from the testimony of Leonardo Vacalares that certain
tenants of the petitioners cultivated the land for a total of seven years, the petitioners did
not present any other evidence to show that they have been in actual possession of the
property for at least ten years.

The petitioners' argument that the payment of taxes on the property since May 31, 1948
constitutes proof of their possession of the subject land for thirty-five years is untenable.
Tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership. At most, they
constitute mere prima facie proof of ownership of the property for which taxes have
been paid. In the absence of actual, public and adverse possession, the declaration of
the land for tax purposes does not prove ownership.

RAMEL VS. AQUINO

Facts: Daniel Aquino is the registered owner of a Lot. He mortgaged the property to the
DBP. The property was in danger of being foreclosed as respondents had no means to
pay for the loan. Thus, they offered to sell to petitioners a portion of the mortgaged
property. Petitioners were to buy the said portion and would assume the remaining
mortgage obligation of respondents with DBP.

Respondents also sold to petitioners a part of the southern portion of the mortgaged
property. Petitioners paid the full amount and were allowed by respondents to take
possession of the parcels of land sold. Since then, they allegedly introduced
improvements to the property.

Petitioners applied for a re-structuring of the mortgage loan with the DBP for a period of
ten years, allegedly with the conformity of respondents. Petitioners went to DBP to pay
for the amortization but they found out that respondents had paid the bank. Petitioners
offered to return to respondents the said sum but the latter refused to accept the offer.
Instead, respondents told petitioners that they would return whatever they have paid for
the land, and threatened to withdraw the certificate of title of the land from the bank.

Petitioners filed with the trial court for Specific Performance with Preliminary Injunction
and Damages. The trial court restrained the respondents from withdrawing the
certificate of title and the Release of Mortgage. The bank was also enjoined from
releasing the title to respondents. Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals which
affirmed the decision of the trial court and denied their Motion for Reconsideration.

Ruling: The trial court ruled and the appellate court rightly affirmed that petitioners
substantially violated their obligation. Hence, respondents are entitled to a rescission of
the contract.

Art. 546. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor; but only the
possessor in good faith may retain the thing until he has been reimbursed therefor.

Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the possessor in good faith with the same
right of retention, the person who has defeated him in the possession having the option
of refunding the amount of the expenses or of paying the increase in value which the
thing may have acquired by reason thereof.

The evidence show that both parties failed to prove their respective claims. In the
absence of evidence from both parties on their claims, offsetting is improper. The right
to offset may exist but the question of how much is to be offset is factual in nature and
needs to be proved by proper evidence.
MWSS VS. COURT OF APPEALS
Facts: The City of Dagupan filed a complaint against the former NAWASA, now the
Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS), for recovery of the ownership
and possession of the Dagupan Waterworks System. Judgment was rendered by the
trial court in favor of the CITY on the basis of a stipulation of facts. The trial court found
NAWASA to be a possessor in bad faith and hence not entitled to the reimbursement
claimed by it. The appellate court affirmed the judgment of the trial court.

Ruling: Article 449 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides that "he who builds,
plants or sows in bad faith on the land of another, loses what is built, planted or sown
without right to indemnity." As a builder in bad faith, NAWASA lost whatever useful
improvements it had made without right to indemnity.

Moreover, under Article 546 of said code, only a possessor in good faith shall be
refunded for useful expenses with the right of retention until reimbursed; and under
Article 547 thereof, only a possessor in good faith may remove useful improvements if
the can be done without damage to the principal thing and if the person who recovers
the possession does not exercise the option of reimbursing the useful expenses. The
right given a possessor in bad faith is to remove improvements applies only to
improvements for pure luxury or mere pleasure, provided the thing suffers no injury
thereby and the lawful possessor does not prefer to retain them by paying the value
they have at the time he enters into possession.

SABIDO VS. IAC

Facts: An action for quieting of title which was filed by the Spouses Dasal against herein
petitioners, on the question of ownership over two parcels of land. The trial court
presided declared the petitioners as owners of said Lots. However, when the decision
was being carried out to put the petitioners in possession of one Lot, the Provincial
Sheriff found three (3) persons occupying portions of said lot. One of them as private
respondent Dominador Sta. Ana.

Sta. Ana claimed ownership by purchase of a bigger area of which the lot is a part. He
stated that the two other persons occupying the disputed portion are his tenants.
Subsequently, an order of demolition was issued by the trial court against the private
respondent. This order was challenged by the private respondent. After conducting an
ocular inspection and hearing, private respondent was ordered to vacate the lot upon
finding that there is no proof that what the respondent allegedly purchased covers a
portion of the Lot.
A resolution fnding that there was privity between the private respondent and the
spouses Dasal as to the ownership of another lot and as to the possession over the
western portion of the private road and the disputed Lot ; and that said lot and the
private road are not included in the land purchased by the respondent. According to the
trial court, respondent knew that the land was already in dispute between Dasal and the
petitioners.

Ruling: Private respondent could not be considered a builder in good faith as to entitle
him to the alternative choice of retention; and that the demolition of the private
respondent's construction on the lot and on the private road is a logical consequence of
the finding that he was privy to the losing parties. The private respondent has to remove
all his constructions over the lot and vacate the premises. This is his only option. Being
adjudged in privy with the spouses Dasals, he cannot avail himself of the rights granted
to a builder in good faith. He, therefore, must remove all his useful improvements over
the lot at his own expense and if the same have already been removed, he cannot be
entitled to the right of retention or to any reimbursement.

EDU VS. GOMEZ

Facts: Subject matter of this case is a 1968 model Volkwagen, bantam car allegedly
owned by Lt. Walter A. Bala. The Office of the Commission on Land Transportation
received a report on that the said car was stolen. Petitioners recognized subject car in
the possession of herein private respondent Abello and immediately seized and
impounded the car as stolen property. Likewise, herein petitioner Edu seized the car
pursuant to Section 60 of Republic Act 4136 which empowers him to seize the motor
vehicle. Herein private respondent Abello filed a complaint for replevin with damages in
respondent court. Respondent CFI Judge found that the car in question was acquired by
Lucila Abello by purchase from its registered owner.

Ruling: The acquirer or the purchaser in good faith of a chattel of movable property is
entitled to be respected and protected in his possession as if he were the true owner
thereof until a competent court rules otherwise. In the meantime, as the true owner, the
possessor in good faith cannot be compelled to surrender possession nor to be required
to institute an action for the recovery of the chattel, whether or not an indemnity bond is
issued in his favor. The filing of an information charging that the chattel was illegally
obtained through estafa from its true owner by the transferor of the bona fide possessor
does not warrant disturbing the possession of the chattel against the will of the
possessor.

EDCA VS. SANTOS

Facts: Professor Jose Cruz placed an order by telephone with the petitioner company
for books, payable on delivery. EDCA prepared the corresponding invoice and delivered
the books as ordered, for which Cruz issued a personal check. Cruz sold 120 of the
books to private respondent Leonor Santos. EDCA having become suspicious over a
second order placed by Cruz even before clearing of his first check, made inquiries with
the De la Salle
College where he had claimed to be a dean and was informed that there was no such
person in its employ.

EDCA then went to the police, which set a trap and arrested Cruz. The private
respondents sued for recovery of the books after demand for their return was rejected
by EDCA.

Ruling: Ownership in the thing sold shall not pass to the buyer until full payment of the
purchase price only if there is a stipulation to that effect. Otherwise, the rule is that such
ownership shall pass from the vendor to the vendee upon the actual or constructive
delivery of the thing sold even if the purchase price has not yet been paid. Non-payment
only creates a right to demand payment or to rescind the contract, or to criminal
prosecution in the case of bouncing checks. But absent the stipulation above noted,
delivery of the thing sold will effectively transfer ownership to the buyer who can in turn
transfer it to another.

Actual delivery of the books having been made, Cruz acquired ownership over the
books which he could then validly transfer to the private respondents. The fact that he
had not yet paid for them to EDCA was a matter between him and EDCA and did not
impair the title acquired by the private respondents to the books.