MANECLANG VS.

BAUN

Facts: Margarita Suri Santos died intestate, leaving several parcels of land. She was
survived by her husband Severo Maneclang and 9 children. Consequently, a petition for
the settlement of her estate was filed by Hector S. Maneclang, one of her legitimate
children, with the CFI of Dagupan City, Pangasinan. At the time of the filing of the
petition, 7 of her 9 children were below the age of 18 but no guardian ad litem was
appointed by the court for the minor children.

Feliciano, the administrator of the intestate estate filed a petition asking the court to give
him the authority to dispose of so much of the estate that is necessary to meet the debts
enumerated in the petition. While notice thereof was given to the surviving spouse, no
such notice was sent to the heirs of Margarita. Said petition was granted despite
absence of notice to the heirs. The new administrator then executed a deed of sale of a
portion of the lot in favor of the Dagupan City, and was approved by the intestate court.

Dagupan City immediately took possession of the land and constructed thereon a public
market. It has been in continuous and uninterrupted possession of the property since
the construction of the market. Some other parcels of land belonging to the intestate
estate were sold by the administrator pursuant of the same authority previously granted.
The new judicial administratrix of the intestate estate, Adelaida S. Maneclang, filed with
the CFI of Pangasinan an action for the annulment of the sales made by the previous
administrator pursuant to the order cancellation of titles, recovery of possession and
damages against the vendees and the City of Dagupan.

RULING: The City of Dagupan is a buyer in good faith. The order granting the motion
for authority to sell was secured during the incumbency of the then judicial administrator
Pedro Feliciano. As such, there was already the order authorizing the sale. Under
Article 526 of the Civil Code, a possessor in good faith is one who is not aware that
there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it; furthermore,
mistake upon a doubtful or difficult question of law may be the basis of good faith. It
implies freedom from knowledge and circumstances which ought to put a person on
inquiry. Here, there is no circumstance to have alerted the City of Dagupan, to a
possible flaw or defect in the authority of the judicial administrator to sell the property.

However, Article 528 of the Civil Code provides that: “Possession acquired in good faith
does not lose this character except in the case and from the moment facts exist which
show that the possessor is not unaware that he possesses the thing improperly or
wrongfully.” The filing of a case alleging bad faith on the part of a vendee gives cause
for cessation of good faith. Good faith ceases from the date of receipt of the summons
to appear at the trial and if such date does not appear in the record, that of the filing of
the answer would control. The date of service of summons to the City of Dagupan is not
clear from the record. Accordingly, its possession in good faith must be considered to
have lasted up to that date where it filed its answer. Upon the filing of the Answer, the
City of Dagupan already became a possessor in bad faith.

VILLAFUERTE VS. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: Petitioners are operating a gasoline station which is Peewee’s Petron

Powerhouse Service Station and General Merchandise on the premises of three
adjoining lots. One of these lots is owned by private respondent De Mesa; the other lot
is owned by private respondent Daleon; the third lot is owned by Yap-Tan, who is the
mother of petitioner Perlita Tan-Villafuerte. Petitioners leased the lots owned by private
respondents de Mesa for a year. However, as regards the lot owned by private
respondent Daleon, the petitioners were not as lucky. Petitioners received a demand
letter from Daleon ordering them to vacate the said premises, but they ignored such.
Therefore, Daleon filed a complaint for ejectment but no settlement was reached so the
Lupon issued a certification for Daleon to file action.

Conversely, the lease agreement between the petitioners and private respondent de
Mesa expired. De Mesa sent a demand letter demanding the petitioners to vacate but
the petitioners did not yield to such demand. Daleon and de Mesa then caused the
closure of the petitioner’s gasoline station by constructing fences around it.
Subsequently, the petitioner Villafuerte countered with a complaint for damages with
preliminary mandatory injunction against the private respondents.

RULING: It was not appropriate for Daleon and De Mesa to fence the premises on their
own causing the stoppage of the operation of the petitioner’s gasoline Art. 536 of the
Civil Code provides that: “In no case may possession be acquired through force or
intimidation as long as there is a possessor who objects thereto. He who believes that
he has an action or a right to deprive another of the holding of a thing, must invoke the
aid of the competent court, if the holder should refuse to deliver the thing.”

There should be a proper recourse of one who claims to be entitled to the possession of
a thing. However, private respondents failed to exhaust the proper remedy, and
personally took it upon themselves to evict petitioners from their properties, which act
was in clear contravention of the law.

ARAMBULO VS. GUNGAB

FACTS: Respondent Emerenciana made a formal demand to petitioners to vacate the
subject property, but petitioners refused so Emerenciana sought the assistance of the
barangay authorities but no amicable settlement was reached. She then filed separate
ejectment complaints against the petitioners before the MeTC, alleging that she owns
the subject property; she tolerated petitioners’ occupancy of certain portions of the
subject property without rent; and espite her demands, they refused to vacate the
subject property

On the other hand, petitioners assert that Victoria Arambulo is a co-owner. Thus,
Victoria and her brother filed a case for transfer and reconveyance of title before the
RTC of Quezon City. The MeTC dismissed ejectment case for lack of cause of action.
The RTC affirmed, but the CA reversed and ordered petitioners to vacate the portion of
the subject property under their occupancy or possession, and to surrender the same
forthwith to Emerenciana.

RULING: The cause of action of Emerenciana was for unlawful detainer since she
alleged that (1) she owns the subject property; (2) she allowed petitioners to occupy it
by tolerance; (3) she withdrew her consent and demanded that petitioners vacate it, but
they refused. Her complaints were also filed within one year from the date of her last
demand.

Persons who occupy the land of another at the latter’s tolerance or permission, without
any contract between them is bound by an implied promise that they will vacate the
same upon demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy
against them. Here, petitioners’ occupation of the subject property was by mere
tolerance, they are not entitled to retain its possession under Article 448 of the Civil
Code. They are aware that their tolerated possession may be terminated any time and
they cannot be considered as builders in good faith.

Prior physical possession by the plaintiff is not necessary in an unlawful detainer case.
It is enough that she has a better right of possession. Thus, petitioners’ prior physical
possession of the property does not automatically entitle them to continue in said
possession and does not give them a better right to the property.

BARNACHEA VS. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: Respondents filed their complaint for ejectment against the petitioners before
the MTC involving lots titled in respondent’s name, which are adjacent to the property
that the petitioners own and occupy. The complaint was dismissed, but was revived.
Instead of filing a new Answer, a Motion for Extension of Time to File Answer was filed
by petitioners which the MTC denied. The petitioners responded to this denial by filing a
motion for reconsideration. Meanwhile, the respondents filed a Motion for the Issuance
of a Writ of Execution. To avert the implementation of the writ of execution, the
petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal. The MTC issued an order declaring the petitioners'
Motion for
Reconsideration abandoned because of the Notice of Appeal they previously filed.

Subsequently, petitioner’ sister filed a Petition for Quieting of Title with the RTC.
Petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for the Suspension of Proceedings but this was
denied by the RTC. Hence, petitioners brought the denials to the CA. The CA denied
the petition and the petitioners' subsequent motion for reconsideration.

RULING: The ejectment case filed by the respondents against petitioners is for unlawful
detainer. A plain reading of the complaint shows the respondents' positions that the
petitioners were in prior possession of the disputed property; that the respondents
allowed them to occupy the disputed property by tolerance; that the respondents
eventually made a demand that the petitioners vacate the property; and that the
petitioners refused to vacate the property in light of the defenses they presented.
Separately from the complaint, the respondents characterized the action they filed
against the petitioners in the MTC as an unlawful detainer when they stated in their
memorandum that "as alleged in the complaint, what was filed by the respondents was
an ejectment suit for unlawful detainer.

Also, there is complete absence of any allegation of force, intimidation, strategy or

stealth in the complaint with respect to the petitioners' possession of the respondents'
property. While admittedly no express contract existed between the parties regarding
the petitioners' possession, the absence does not signify an illegality in the entry nor an
entry by force, intimidation, strategy or stealth that would characterize the entry as
forcible. It has been held that a person who occupies land of another at the latter's
tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an
implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which a summary action for
ejectment is the proper remedy. The status of the defendant is analogous to that of a
lessee or tenant whose terms has expired but whose occupancy continues by tolerance
of the owner.

LLOBRERA VS. FERNANDEZ

FACTS: Fernandez, who is one of the registered co-owners of a land in Dagupan City,
sent a demand letter to Sps. Llobrera et al to vacate the subject premises. Petitioners
refused and no settlement was reached on the barangay level. Thus, Fernandez filed a
complaint for ejectment and damages.
Petitioners asserted that they occupied the lot since beginning of 1945 with the
permission of Gualberto de Venecia, one of co-owner, on condition of payment of
monthly rental. Sometime June 1996, they were prompted to consign the same and pay
it to Banco San Juan instead which they maintained and update their payment.

The MTCC, RTC and CA favored Fernandez.

RULING: The possession of the subject property is not founded on contract. Petitioners
failed to present any written memo of the alleged lease arrangements between them
and De Venecia. Absent such proof of any contractual basis for their possession, the
legal implication is that they were possessing by mere tolerance. Therefore, the person
occupying is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he/she will vacate upon
demand. The bank deposits made, as consignation, has no legal effect insofar as the
respondent is concerned since there is no contractual relationship. Therefore,
Fernandez cannot be compelled to receive such deposits.