Reading Nietzsche Ulisses James Joyce

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Reading  Nietzsche  in    

James  Joyce’s  Ulysses  


 

Nathan  Miller  

With  Special  Thanks  To:  

Robert  Baker  

and  

John  Hunt  

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2009048


Miller  2  
 

Let  us  face  ourselves.  We  are  Hyperboreans;  we  know  very  well  how  far  off  we  live.  ‘Neither  

by  land  nor  by  sea  will  you  find  the  way  to  the  Hyperboreans’  –  Pindar  already  knew  this  

about  us.  Beyond  the  north,  ice,  and  death  –  our  life,  our  happiness.  We  have  discovered  

happiness,  we  know  the  way,  we  have  found  our  way  out  of  the  labyrinth  of  thousands  of  

years.  

-­‐Friedrich  Nietzsche,  The  Antichrist  

As  the  ancient  poet  Ovid  tells  us,  the  labyrinth  created  by  the  master  architect  Daedalus  was  

filled  with  passageways  so  confusing  and  seemingly  endless  that  Daedalus  himself  was  almost  

unable  to  find  his  way  back  to  the  entrance  of  his  own  deceptive  creation.  The  labyrinth’s  captive,  

Theseus,  was  only  able  to  escape  his  dark  and  winding  prison  by  following  a  thread  left  behind  by  

Ariadne,  which  led  him  through  the  “maze  of  conflicting  passageways”1  back  to  the  entrance.  

In  many  ways,  James  Joyce  creates  a  labyrinth  of  his  own  in  his  celebrated  modernist  work,  

Ulysses,  a  novel  regarded  by  many  as  not  only  one  of  the  most  important  and  influential  novels  of  

the  twentieth  century  (many  argue  it  is  the  most  important),  but  also  one  of  the  most  complex  and  

difficult  novels  to  read  in  any  kind  of  productive  way.  Indeed,  Ulysses  quickly  becomes,  like  

Daedalus’  labyrinth,  a  maze  of  “conflicting  passageways,”  of  references  and  allusions  to  anything  

and  everything  under  the  sun:  from  flatulence  and  bodily  functions  to  orthodox  Catholic  doctrine,  

from  drinking  songs  to  Greek  and  Roman  mythology,  from  Irish  national  history  to  Shakespeare,  

the  novel  leads  the  reader  on  an  epic,  and  at  times  confusing,  journey.  In  Ulysses,  Joyce  has  created  a  

literary  world  that  offers  the  reader  innumerable  avenues  of  exploration  in  the  quest  to  try  to  make  

some  sense  of  the  novel  as  a  whole,  and  indeed  this  is  one  of  the  most  remarkable  features  of  the  

book.  Joyce  acknowledged  (and  perhaps  celebrated)  this  aspect  of  Ulysses;  at  one  point  shortly  after  

the  completion  of  Ulysses,  he  jokingly  confessed  to  Jacques  Benoist-­‐Méchin,  a  friend  of  his,  that  “I’ve  

                                                                                                                       
1
 Ovid,  Metamorphoses  

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2009048


Miller  3  
 

put  in  [Ulysses]  so  many  enigmas  and  puzzles  that  it  will  keep  the  professors  busy  centuries  arguing  

over  what  I  meant,  and  that’s  the  only  way  of  ensuring  one’s  immortality.”2    

There  are  many  potential  interpretive  “threads”,  so  to  speak,  leading  out  of  the  labyrinth  

that  is  Ulysses:  the  extraordinary  volume  of  detail  and  allusion  alone  guarantees  this.  However,  one  

of  the  more  interesting  and  seldom  explored  threads  through  Ulysses  involves  the  idea  of  another  

individual  whose  work  –  like  Joyce’s  –  generated  significant  amounts  of  controversy  and  discussion  

in  intellectual  circles  during  the  years  of  Joyce’s  early  life:  Friedrich  Nietzsche.  Joyce’s  attraction  to  

Nietzsche  has  at  best  received  little  attention  in  scholarship,  though  the  familiarity  of  the  former  

with  the  latter  is  evident  in  Ulysses,  Dubliners,  and  elsewhere.  The  influence  of  Nietzsche’s  ideas  

upon  Joyce’s  thought  can  be  felt  throughout  his  writing,  and  as  this  paper  will  suggest,  there  is  

much  to  be  gained  from  reading  Ulysses  through  a  Nietzschean  interpretive  frame.    A  mapping  of  

the  fundamental  dimensions  of  Nietzsche’s  thought  onto  the  characters  and  artistic  shape  of  Ulysses  

yields  new  and  meaningful  insights  into  the  novel  that  have  for  the  most  part  remained  

unaccounted  for.  Joyce  shared  many  of  Nietzsche’s  concerns  with  the  prevailing  modern  mindsets,  

and  as  this  paper  suggests,  incorporates  fundamental  aspects  of  the  latter’s  thought  into  his  work  

both  implicitly  and  explicitly.  

I. Joyce’s  Life  and  Background  

To  understand  why  Joyce  would  be  drawn  to  Nietzsche’s  work,  it  is  necessary  to  go  back  to  

Joyce’s  formative  years,  and  trace  the  development  of  his  thought  through  circumstances  that  left  

an  indelible  mark  on  the  future  writer.  James  Joyce  was  born  in  1882,  and  grew  up  in  a  family  

environment  that  was  decidedly  Catholic.  As  one  might  expect  of  a  boy  from  an  Irish  Catholic  

family,  he  was  educated  at  small  Jesuit  schools.  While  Joyce  did  extremely  well  in  his  studies,  he  was  

not  fully  persuaded  by  the  Jesuits,  and  as  a  young  man  began  to  develop  a  deep  skepticism  toward  

                                                                                                                       
2
 Richard  Ellman,  James  Joyce,  521  
Miller  4  
 

Christianity  that  would  eventually  culminate  in  his  complete  rejection  of  it.  Joyce’s  issues  with  

Christianity  can  be  traced  back  to  1896,  when  the  young  man,  an  adolescent  of  fully  fourteen  years,  

began  his  sexual  life,  first  with  a  maid  servant  and  subsequently  with  a  prostitute  along  the  canal  

bank  in  Dublin.3  At  some  point  after  these  events  Joyce,  reeling  from  Father  Cullen’s  sermons  at  

Belvedere  College  (where  Joyce  was  a  student),  went  to  confess  his  sexual  sins  and  entered  a  short  

period  of  ‘reform’  that  lasted  into  1897.  Joyce  slowly  began  rethinking  the  events  surrounding  his  

personal  ‘revival’  and  became  convinced  that  the  sermons  which  had  first  moved  him  to  confession  

had  in  fact  simply  played  to  the  weakest  part  of  his  nature,  and  as  such  should  not  be  given  any  

weight.    

Joyce  was  unwilling  to  accept  the  idea  of  living  with  continual  guilt  over  what  he  believed  

were  his  most  human  desires,  and  so,  at  the  age  of  fifteen,  his  faith  in  the  teachings  of  Catholicism  

began  to  falter.  Accounts  of  Joyce’s  later  adolescent  years  suggest  that  his  newfound  disregard  for  

the  teachings  of  the  Church  only  grew  stronger  as  he  grew  older.  He  began  to  think  of  Christianity  

less  in  terms  of  its  religious  value  and  more  in  terms  of  its  value  as  a  source  of  fodder  for  his  artistic  

ambitions.  He  came  to  believe,  suggests  Richard  Ellmann,  that  Christianity  was  a  “superior  kind  of  

human  folly.”4  Ellmann  observes  that  although  Joyce  continually  strove  to  distance  himself  from  the  

religious  aspects  of  Christianity,  he  at  the  same  time  was  engaged  actively  in  redefining  and  re-­‐

appropriating  elements  of  the  faith  in  secular  artistic  terms.  He  could  claim  a  kind  of  artistic  

allegiance  to  Christianity,  but  no  longer  regarded  himself  as  a  Christian  in  the  religious  sense.  It  was  

from  this  point  of  view  that  Joyce  would  later  be  able  to  criticize  Christianity  on  the  grounds  that  it  

was  suppressive  of  the  human  spirit,  which  Joyce  believed  only  art  was  truly  capable  of  affirming.    

It  seems  likely  that  the  family  situation  in  the  Joyce  home  may  have  contributed  to  James’  

ultimate  rejection  of  Christianity  as  well.  His  father,  John  Joyce,  was  a  loudly  professing  Catholic  

                                                                                                                       
3
 Ibid,  48  
4
 Ibid,  66  
Miller  5  
 

who  attended  mass  on  Easter  and  Christmas  Eve,  and  a  heavy  drinker;  not  surprisingly,  the  elder  

Joyce  was  also  notorious  for  managing  both  his  affairs  and  his  money  extremely  poorly,  which  

resulted  in  the  family’s  frequent  moves  when  the  money  for  rent  was  instead  used  to  stand  rounds  

of  ale  for  John  Joyce’s  drinking  pals  at  the  local  pub.  Joyce’s  father  had  learned  over  his  many  years  

of  financial  mismanagement  how  to  deal  with  landlords,  but  in  spite  of  his  inventiveness  at  avoiding  

evictions  for  failing  to  pay  rent,  the  family  was  forced  to  find  new  lodging  with  disturbing  

regularity,  and  many  of  their  accumulated  belongings  ended  up  in  the  hands  of  the  pawnbroker.  

The  food  situation  in  the  Joyce  household  was  not  much  better;  the  family  often  lived  on  credit  from  

local  grocers  who  hoped  to  have  their  accounts  settled  when  the  unlikely  day  should  come  that  John  

Joyce  did  not  drink  his  entire  pension  from  a  pint  glass.  James  regarded  the  situation  at  home  as  

deplorable,  blaming  his  father’s  neglectful  ways  for  the  family’s  struggles,  and  ultimately  for  the  

death  of  James’  mother.    

At  the  same  time  that  his  skepticism  toward  Christianity  was  growing  stronger,  Joyce  was  

gravitating  toward  a  new  impulse  in  his  thinking:  the  affirmation  of  the  human  spirit.  The  Circe  

episode  of  Ulysses  describes  an  encounter  between  Leopold  Bloom  and  Stephen  Dedalus,  the  

autobiographical  character  that  represents  Joyce’s  younger  self:    

Were  their  views  on  some  points  divergent?  

Stephen  dissented  openly  with  Bloom’s  view  on  the  importance  of  dietary  and  civic  selfhelp  

while  Bloom  dissented  tacitly  from  Stephen’s  views  on  the  eternal  affirmation  of  the  spirit  

of  man  in  literature.5  

Stephen’s  belief  in  the  “eternal  affirmation  of  the  spirit  of  man  in  literature”  reflects  Joyce’s  own  

recognition  of  an  unending  potential  to  express  and  therefore  affirm  all  aspects  of  human  existence  

in  art  itself.  Hence  art  became  for  Joyce  an  attractive  candidate  as  a  replacement  for  the  Catholic  

                                                                                                                       
5
 Ulysses,  666  
Miller  6  
 

faith  which  he  felt  denied  and  repressed  his  most  human  qualities,  such  as  his  sexuality.  

Chronologically  speaking,  Joyce’s  rejection  of  Christianity  corresponds  with  his  growing  passion  

(that  at  times  borders  on  obsession)  for  the  arts:  instead  of  focusing  his  energies  of  developing  

piety,  he  devoted  himself  voraciously  to  writing  stories  and  poems,  singing,  going  to  the  theater,  

and  reading.  He  discovered  and  was  immediately  enthralled  with  the  playwright  Ibsen,  whose  

approach  to  drama  informed  Joyce’s  artistic  style  to  a  great  extent.  As  Ellmann  observes,  Joyce’s  

relentless  self-­‐examination  was  formed  largely  in  response  to  what  he  interpreted  as  Ibsen’s  idea  

that  the  artist  should  be  brutally  self-­‐honest  within  his  work.6  Ibsen’s  work  also  played  an  

important  role  in  shaping  another  key  aspect  of  Joyce’s  notion  of  the  artist:  the  idea  of  the  great  

artist  as  an  exile.7  These  themes  of  rigorous  self-­‐examination  and  artistic  exile  which  he  gravitated  

toward  in  Ibsen  helped  situate  Joyce’s  thought  and  prepared  him  for  his  impending  encounter  with  

Nietzsche,  which  was  soon  to  come.  

Whether  he  was  conscious  of  it  at  the  time  or  not,  Joyce’s  thought  was  already  beginning  to  

take  on  a  shape  that  would  find  in  Nietzsche’s  philosophy  a  certain  resonance.  His  rejection  of  his  

Catholic  faith  largely  on  the  grounds  that  it  forced  him  to  deny  some  of  the  most  fundamental  

features  of  his  own  humanity  is  entirely  compatible  with  certain  dimensions  of  Nietzsche’s  criticism  

of  Christianity  as  denying  the  human  spirit.  The  idea  that  a  state  of  guilt  is  a  fundamental  condition  

of  the  Christian  life  –  a  condition  which  Joyce  ultimately  refused  to  accept  –  is  in  fact  one  of  the  focal  

points  of  Nietzsche’s  critique  of  Christian  morality.  In  identifying  art  as  a  viable  replacement  for  

Christianity,  Joyce  in  effect  no  longer  recognizes  the  Christian  God’s  claim  of  authority  in  the  world;  

in  some  sense  he  already  acknowledges  the  truth  of  Nietzsche’s  controversial  claim  –  that  “God  is  

dead.”  Finally,  Joyce’s  conviction  that  he  must  leave  Ireland  in  order  to  become  a  great  writer  –  

                                                                                                                       
6
 Ellmann,  54  
7
 Dante  Alighieri  wrote  his  epic,  The  Divine  Comedy,  while  living  in  exile  from  Florence,  Italy,  and  he  was  arguably  
Joyce’s  favorite  writer.  According  to  Ellman,  Joyce  was  referred  to  as  “Dublin’s  Dante,”  and  saw  himself  as  a  kind  of  
Dantean  exile.  See  Ellman,  75;  109.    
Miller  7  
 

which  he  did  twice8  –  suggests  a  need  to  “break  free”  from  his  upbringing,  his  family  situation,  and  

his  nationality;  this  impulse  is  in  some  ways  reminiscent  of  Nietzsche’s  idea  of  self-­‐surpassing  

(though  this  was  likely  not  a  large  part  of  Joyce’s  thinking  at  the  time).  As  he  had  grown  older,  Joyce  

had  identified  a  number  of  things  in  his  world  that  he  did  not  like,  or  did  not  accept,  or  both,  and  it  

is  at  roughly  this  point  in  his  life  that  Joyce  discovered  the  work  of  Friedrich  Nietzsche.  

According  to  Ellman,  it  was  somewhere  in  the  vicinity  of  1903  when  James  Joyce  first  

became  acquainted  with  Nietzsche’s  writing,9  and  there  is  a  fair  amount  of  evidence  that  suggests  

Joyce  quickly  became  familiar  with,  and  even  took  somewhat  seriously,  the  philosopher’s  ideas.  In  a  

card  addressed  to  Dublin  publisher  George  Roberts  and  dated  July  13,  1904,  Joyce  signed  his  name  

“James  Overman,”10  using  as  his  last  name  the  literal  English  translation  of  the  German  

“übermensch,”  the  word  which  Nietzsche  uses  in  both  The  Gay  Science  and  Thus  Spoke  Zarathustra  

to  refer  to  his  self-­‐overcoming  individual.  It  seems  unlikely  that  Joyce  would  have  used  such  a  

reference  with  someone  who  would  not  have  grasped  its  significance  with  regards  to  Nietzsche,  and  

indeed  there  is  a  fair  amount  of  evidence  which  supports  the  idea  that  there  were  at  least  a  few  of  

Joyce’s  friends  and/or  acquaintances  in  Dublin  who  were  familiar  with  the  philosopher’s  writings.11  

Also  during  1904,  Joyce  began  work  on  the  collection  of  short  stories  that  would  eventually  be  

published  as  Dubliners,  and  it  is  here  that  another  indication  of  Joyce’s  interest  in  Nietzsche  

appears.  In  the  story  titled  “A  Painful  Case,”  which  Joyce  finished  writing  in  1905,  he  includes  The  

                                                                                                                       
8
 As  mentioned  in  the  previous  footnote,  Joyce  needed  to  think  of  himself  as  an  exile,  and  so  he  departed  Dublin  
under  self-­‐imposed  “exile”  on  two  separate  occasions:  first  in  1902  to  Paris  (he  gave  up  on  the  idea  and  returned  
to  Dublin  fairly  quickly),  and  then  again  in  1904  for  Pola,  Rome,  and  ultimately  Trieste,  where  he  would  stay  for  
many  years.  The  story  of  Ovid’s  Daedalus  provide  an  interesting  point  of  comparison  to  Joyce.  Daedalus,  wishing  to  
escape  from  his  imprisonment  in  a  tower,  turns  his  minds  to  “obscure  arts”  and  fashions  wings  for  himself  and  his  
son  Icarus  to  fly  away.  Like  Daedalus,  Joyce  is  trying  to  “fly  away”  from  Dublin.  
9
 Ellman  142  
10
 Letters,  vol.1  need  page  
11
 Both  Davidson  and  Ellman  claim  that  a  number  of  Dubliners,  notably  Yeats,  were  passing  around  copies  of  
Nietzsche’s  books  around  this  time.  
Miller  8  
 

Gay  Science  and  Thus  Spoke  Zarathustra  among  the  favorite  reading  of  the  story’s  main  character,  

Mr.  James  Duffy.12    

Perhaps  the  strongest  evidence  of  Joyce’s  interest  in  Nietzsche  comes  from  the  catalogue  of  

the  library  he  left  behind  in  Trieste  when  he  moved  to  Paris  in  June  of  1920.  While  it  impossible  to  

determine  the  full  extent  of  Joyce’s  knowledge  of  Nietzsche,  Joyce  owned  translations  of  The  Birth  of  

Tragedy,  The  Case  of  Wagner,  Nietzsche  Contra  Wagner,  and  The  Gay  Science,  all  of  which  were  

printed  between  the  years  of  1909  and  1911.13  The  philosophy  section  of  Joyce’s  collection  was  

relatively  small,  although  it  did  include  one  or  two  works  each  from  Aristotle,  Aquinas,  Berkeley,  

Hume,  Schopenhauer,  Russell,  and  John  Stuart  Mill.  His  interest  in  Thomas  Aquinas  (and  thus  

Aristotle  as  well)14  notwithstanding,  it  would  seem  that  by  comparison  no  other  philosopher  

piqued  Joyce’s  interest  in  quite  the  way  that  Nietzsche  did,  judging  by  the  works  of  philosophy  

found  in  Joyce’s  library:  he  discovered  in  Nietzsche  a  thinker  whose  singular  and  radical  ideas  

would  animate  his  as  yet  unwritten  masterpiece,  Ulysses,  a  work  which  would  be  a  radical  in  its  own  

right.  

II. Friedrich  Nietzsche:  Conceptual  Orientations  

  The  application  of  a  Nietzschean  interpretive  frame  to  Ulysses  necessitates  a  brief  overview  

and  explanation  of  several  main  ideas  in  Nietzsche’s  philosophy.  However,  one  of  the  implicit  

problems  with  such  an  overview  is  the  fact  that  in  scholarly  circles,  opinions  of  Nietzcshe’s  most  

basic  ideas  are  often  far  from  settled,  and  in  many  cases  there  remains  vigorous  debate  about  what  

Nietzsche  actually  meant  by  what  he  said,  not  to  mention  the  relevant  implications.  Consequently,  

in  discussing  the  dimensions  of  Nietzsche’s  philosophy  that  I  am  applying  to  a  reading  of  Ulysses  –  

his  proclamation  of  the  death  of  God,  his  notion  of  the  übermensch,  his  doctrine  of  eternal  

                                                                                                                       
12
 Dubliners  321;  
13
 Richard  Ellmann,  The  Consciousness  of  James  Joyce,  Appendix  A    
14
 Note  on  Aquinas  and  Aristotle  
Miller  9  
 

recurrence,  and  his  fundamental  concern  with  nihilism  that  underlies  these  ideas  –  I  must  qualify  

my  efforts  with  the  acknowledgment  that  I  am  presenting  the  interpretations  that  I  take  to  have  the  

strongest  arguments  and/or  textual  support,  and  about  which  there  seems  to  be  at  least  a  small  

modicum  of  consensus  among  Nietzsche  scholars.15  It  is  far  beyond  my  purpose  (or  ability  for  that  

matter)  to  attempt  a  comprehensive  analysis  and  explication  of  Nietzsche’s  philosophy:  my  

purpose,  rather,  is  to  offer  what  is  admittedly  an  extremely  simplified  overview  of  the  central  

themes  of  Nietzsche’s  thought,  such  that  it  might  be  usefully  applied  (at  least  in  a  basic  sense)  to  a  

modern  work  of  literature.  

In  the  prologue  to  his  exposition  of  Friedrich  Nietzsche’s  life  and  philosophy,  Walter  

Kaufmann  succinctly  summarizes  the  general  state  of  affairs  in  the  arena  of  scholarship  on  the  

philosopher:  “Nietzsche  became  a  myth  even  before  he  died  in  1900,  and  today  his  ideas  are  

overgrown  and  obscured  by  rank  fiction.”16  Few  names  in  the  recent  history  of  philosophy  are  as  

well  known  among  those  with  little  or  no  knowledge  of  philosophy  as  Nietzsche’s,  and  

understandably  so,  for  Nietzsche’s  opposition  to  the  dominant  moral  framework  of  the  last  several  

centuries  in  the  Western  world  –  namely,  Christianity  –  has  been  highly  publicized.  Yet  Nietzsche’s  

issues  with  Christianity,  though  having  perhaps  garnered  him  a  great  deal  of  attention,  are  in  fact  

connected  to  a  much  deeper  and  probing  critique  of  Western  civilization  that  extends  all  the  way  

back  to  ancient  philosophy.  For  Nietzsche,  it  is  not  Christianity  in  itself  that  is  the  problem;  rather,  

Christianity  (and  moreover,  the  Christian  worldview)  is  simply  another  articulation,  a  religious  

variant,  of  a  mentality  that  is  deeply  embedded  in  Western  culture,  and  that  Nietzsche  believes  has  

brought  it  to  a  point  of  crisis.  Nietzsche’s  proclamation  of  the  death  of  God,  his  doctrine  of  eternal  

                                                                                                                       
15
 I  wish  to  acknowledge  here  that  my  understanding  of  Nietzsche’s  philosophy  owes  a  great  deal  to  the  work  of  
Walter  Kaufmann,  Bernd  Magnus,  Kathleen  Higgins,  Robert  Solomon,  Robert  Baker,  and  others.  The  influence  of  
their  ideas  will  undoubtedly  be  seen  in  my  discussion  of  Nietzsche’s  thought.  
15  
Kaufmann,  Nietzsche:  Philsopher,  Psychologist,  Antichrist,  3  
Miller  10  
 

recurrence,  his  notion  of  the  übermensch,  and  his  critique  of  Christianity  are  all  fundamentally  

related  to  his  ultimate  philosophical  aim:  to  confront  and  deal  with  nihilism.  

The  concept  of  nihilism  involves,  for  Nietzsche,  a  combination  of  the  devaluing  of  that  which  

has  real  value  and  a  notion  of  “otherworldliness”  or  “afterworldliness,”  which  ultimately  are  

created  in  response  to  suffering  and  incapacity,  according  to  the  teacher  Zarathustra.17  Nietzsche  

points  to  the  growth  of  nihilism  throughout  the  history  of  Western  philosophy,  and  in  a  section  of  

Twilight  of  The  Idols  titled  “How  the  ‘True  World’  Finally  Became  A  Fable:  History  of  An  Error,”  he  

traces  nihilism  in  its  current  state  all  the  way  back  to  Plato’s  idea  of  what  Nietzsche  ironically  refers  

to  as  the  “true  world”:  the  world  of  the  Platonic  forms  that  is  knowable  only  to  the  philosopher.18  

Plato’s  theory  of  forms  postulates  the  existence  of  a  realm  of  the  forms  that  is  beyond  this  world  

and  this  life,  from  which  this  world  and  this  life  derive  their  meaning,  order,  and  significance;  in  the  

most  basic  sense,  it  is  a  dualist  metaphysical  framework.  It  is  with  ideas  such  as  this  that  Nietzsche  

takes  issue.  Nietzsche  understands  any  philosophy  or  religion  that  posits  a  realm  “beyond”  to  be  

expressing  a  basic  desire  to  escape  (or  “transcend,”  if  you  wish)  the  reality  of  human  existence  and  

the  human  condition;  they  effectively  offer  a  promise  that  there  exists  a  “real”  world  other  than,  and  

in  addition  to,  this  one.  The  problem,  as  Nietzsche  sees  it,  is  that  the  dualist  conceptions  of  a  “true  

world”  proposed  in  the  Platonist  and  Christian  traditions  share  one  thing  in  common:  they  

essentially  devalue  (or  completely  deny)  what  Nietzsche  considers  the  most  vibrant  and  important  

qualities  of  our  real  human  existence  –  our  impulses  and  instincts,  our  senses,  our  capacities,  and  

our  potential  power  as  human  beings.  This  is  why  Nietzsche  says  that  Platonism  and  Christianity  

are  nihilist.  In  his  estimation,  dualist  metaphysics  (expressed  in  various  philosophical  and  religious  

traditions)  has  been  stretched  to  the  point  of  exhaustion  over  the  course  of  history;  the  idea  is  no  

                                                                                                                       
17
 Kaufmann,  The  Viking  Portable  Nietzsche  (VPN,  143  
18
 VPN,  485  
Miller  11  
 

longer  sustainable,  and  as  a  result,  dualist  metaphysics  has  finally  collapsed  upon  itself  in  the  

modern  period.  This  is  the  state  of  things  in  Western  civilization  as  Nietzsche  encounters  it.  

The  hyperbolic  and  often  scathing  attacks  on  Christianity  for  which  Nietzsche  is  perhaps  

most  famous  potentially  eclipse  the  larger  concerns  of  his  philosophy,  which  aims  to  illuminate  and  

propose  a  solution  to  the  very  real  problem  of  nihilism  in  Western  humankind.  He  asserts  that  in  

nihilism  human  existence  has  reached  a  crisis  point,  in  which  “the  highest  values,  God,  the  Absolute,  

the  timeless  and  eternal  –indeed  truth  itself  –  have  ceased  to  hold  sway  over  the  individual”19  –  in  

other  words,  the  idea  of  “real  world”  beyond  which  guides  and  gives  meaning  to  this  life  (i.e.  dualist  

metaphysics)  has  become  bankrupt.  The  Western  world,  by  his  assessment,  is  destined  to  become  a  

kind  of  waste  land,  and  the  human  existence,  without  the  hope  of  a  “true  world,”  is  characterized  by  

a  complete  lack  of  depth  or  significance.  One  of  the  aspects  of  this  perceived  state  of  affairs  that  

Nietzsche  finds  especially  troubling  is  that  Western  culture  as  a  whole  seems  to  be  completely  

oblivious  to  the  reality  of  its  own  condition.  Nietzsche  senses  that  once  humankind  “wakes  up”  to  

this  reality  –  that  the  absolute  values  it  purports  to  depend  upon  are  essentially  empty  and  

therefore  irrelevant  –  there  will  be  nothing  left  to  stop  Western  society  from  disintegrating  

completely  in  the  absence  of  a  coherent  worldview.    

It  is  thus  against  the  backdrop  of  nihilism  that  Nietzsche  takes  the  opportunity  to  point  out  

the  obvious:  God  is  dead.20  Nietzsche’s  most  quoted  claim  appears  initially  in  the  third  part  of  The  

Gay  Science,  and  subsequently  reappears  at  the  beginning  of  Thus  Spoke  Zarathustra  and  then  again  

in  the  fifth  part  of  The  Gay  Science,  which  he  wrote  after  completing  Zarathustra.  While  it  is  a  well-­‐

known  fact  that  Nietzsche  was  an  adamant  atheist,  one  should  not  understand  Nietzsche’s  

statement  to  constitute  an  absolute  metaphysical  claim  about  the  existence  of  a  supreme  being:  

rather,  Nietzsche  is  trying  to  point  out  that  the  “belief  in  the  Christian  God  has  become  

                                                                                                                       
19
 Bernd  Magnus,  Nietzsche’s  Existential  Imperative,  10  
20
 The  Gay  Science,  sec  108  
Miller  12  
 

unbelievable.”21  He  asserts  that  not  only  do  few  people  realize  that  the  event  –  the  death  of  God  –  

has  happened,  but  even  fewer  are  aware  of  its  significance,  which  he  spells  out  clearly:  

Much  less  may  one  suppose  that  many  people  know  as  yet  what    this  event  really  means  –  

and  how  much  must  collapse  now  that  this  faith  has  been  undermined  because  it  was  built  

upon  this  faith,  propped  up  by  it,  grown  into  it:  for  example,  the  whole  of  our  European  

morality.22  

The  implication  of  Nietzsche’s  claim  is  simple  and  troubling:  with  the  triumph  of  nihilism  and  the  

death  of  God,  the  basic  assumptions  upon  which  the  Western  moral  tradition  is  grounded  disappear  

as  well,  bringing  about  the  inevitable  demise  of  morality  as  such.  What  is  interesting  about  

Nietzsche’s  perspective  is  that  he  sees  the  emergence  of  the  Platonist  and  Christian  dualist  

frameworks  as  symptomatic  of  nihilism  (despair/disgust  over  the  human  condition,  and  the  desire  

to  escape  through  either  reason  or  religion)  but  also  sees  their  collapse  bringing  about  the  climax  of  

nihilism  as  well.  This  seems  to  be  one  of  the  ambiguities  –  or  even  paradoxes  –  in  Nietzsche’s  

thinking.  One  of  the  more  plausible  explanations  attempting  to  resolve  the  apparent  contradiction  

is  offered  by  Bernd  Magnus,  who  suggests  that  the  positing  of  any  dualist  metaphysics  is  itself  an  

expression  of  a  distressed  condition,  and  a  symptom  of  a  decline  of  life23;  that  is,  it  expresses  an  

existing  condition  of  nihilism.  At  the  same  time,  Magnus  maintains  that  Nietzsche  is  all-­‐too-­‐aware  

that  Western  culture  will  be  unable  to  stomach  the  realization  that  the  dualistic  thrust  which  has  

informed  its  existence  since  the  time  of  Plato  is  untenable,  and  will  find  itself  once  again  in  the  

distressed  condition  of  nihilism,  albeit  in  a  far  more  severe  sense.    

  Appearing  exclusively  in  Thus  Spoke  Zarathustra,  the  übermensch  is  a  fundamental  

dimension  of  Nietzsche’s  solution  to  the  problem  of  nihilism.  Literally  meaning  “over  man,”  

                                                                                                                       
21
 The  Gay  Science,  sec  343  
22
 Ibid,  343  
23
 Magnus,  120-­‐124  
Miller  13  
 

although  it  also  been  translated  as  “superman”,  übermensch  is  the  term  Nietzsche  uses  to  describe  a  

“self-­‐overcoming,  self-­‐possessed”24  individual,  one  who  overcomes  the  sickness  of  nihilistic,  

“afterworldly”  thinking,  creates  new  values,  and  ultimately  affirms  his  or  her  own  life  to  the  fullest  

possible  extent.  “I  teach  you  the  übermensch.  Man  is  something  that  shall  be  overcome.”25  

Nietzsche’s  idea  of  the  übermensch  involves  a  process  of  self-­‐overcoming,  a  transformation  of  the  

individual,  and  a  “going-­‐under”  (untergehen)  as  he  refers  to  it  in  Zarathustra.26  Zarathustra’s  

inaugural  speech  yields  some  insights  into  the  nature  of  this  process.    

In  “On  the  Three  Metamorphoses,”  Zarathustra  describes  a  “going-­‐under”  –  a  progression  of  

spiritual  change  –  that  Nietzsche  believes  is  vital  for  the  individual  who  would  overcome  the  

nihilistic  attitude  toward  life  within  themselves  and  thus  overcome  nihilism  itself.  In  the  first  stage  

of  this  transformation,  the  spirit  of  the  individual  becomes  like  a  camel,  a  beast  of  burden.  There  are  

many  things  that  are  difficult  for  the  human  spirit,  says  Zarathustra,  but  its  strength  demands  of  

itself  the  things  which  are  “difficult  and  the  most  difficult.”27  The  spirit-­‐as-­‐camel  wants  to  take  upon  

itself  the  greatest  possible  load  it  can  carry,  and  so  it  kneels  down  “wanting  to  be  well  laden”28;  

laden,  that  is,  with  the  values  of  its  culture.  And  the  spirit-­‐as-­‐camel  carries  the  burden  of  these  

values  well:  it  is  able  to  “understand,  internalize,  and  appropriate  the  values  of  its  culture.”29  

However,  once  the  spirit  has  burdened  itself  to  the  fullest  possible  extent  with  these  values,  it  seeks  

its  own  desert,  a  state  of  isolation  and  reflection,  and  it  is  here  that  the  second  stage  of  the  change  

occurs.  The  spirit  transforms  itself  from  a  camel  into  lion,  from  a  beast  of  burden  into  a  beast  of  

might,  and  overcomes  itself.  A  lion’s  strength  is  what  is  required  for  the  spirit  to  be  able  to  assert  

itself  and  say  “I  will,”  and  for  it  to  be  able  to  confront  and  defeat  “the  great  dragon  that  the  spirit  

                                                                                                                       
24
 Magnus  33  
25
 Zarathustra,  9  
26
 This  is  described  in  greater  detail  in  the  Prologue,  section  4.  Zarathustra,  11  
27
 Zarathustra  25  
28
 Ibid.  
29
 Magnus,  35  
Miller  14  
 

will  no  longer  call  lord  and  god”:  the  dragon  called  “thou  shalt,”  which  identifies  itself  as  all  created  

value.30  The  lion  conquers  the  great  dragon  called  value,  and  in  doing  so  it  negates  the  values  which  

the  camel  once  carried  as  its  burden.  The  lion  does  not  and  cannot  create  new  values  –  “that  not  

even  the  lion  can  accomplish,”  says  Zarathustra  –  but  the  lion  can  create  the  freedom  that  is  

necessary  for  the  creation  of  new  values.  The  spirit-­‐as-­‐lion  engages  in  complete  negation,  it  opens  

up  the  space  for  new  values,  but  the  spirit  must  still  undergo  a  final  transformation  in  order  to  

create  new  values:  it  transforms  itself  from  a  lion  into  a  child.  

  Why  must  the  lion  become  a  child?  Because  the  child  is  a  new  beginning,  a  forgetting,  a  first  

movement,  a  game,  and  most  importantly,  it  is  a  “sacred  Yes-­‐saying,”  Zarathustra  says.31  The  child  

encounters  the  world  from  a  fresh  perspective,  it  does  not  remember  the  old  values,  and  thus  it  is  

not  bound  think  of  the  world  as  the  lion  and  camel  did.  And  because  of  this,  the  spirit  can  say  “yes”:  

it  can  fully  affirm  itself,  its  place  within  the  fluctuation  and  flux  of  the  larger  world,  and  the  process  

of  becoming  –  the  “eternal  cycle  of  genesis,  growth,  decay  and  death.”32  The  wholesale  affirmation  

of  this  world,  and  of  one’s  place  within  it,  is  at  the  core  of  Nietzsche’s  philosophy  and  his  solution  to  

nihilism:  it  is  the  culmination  of  the  metamorphosis  of  spirit,  the  process  of  going-­‐under  and  of  self-­‐

overcoming,  that  he  believes  is  the  only  way  for  an  individual  to  truly  overcome  nihilism.    

  The  final  piece  of  Nietzsche’s  thought  left  to  examine  is  one  that  Bernd  Magnus  claims  is  “no  

doubt  the  most  difficult,  if  not  the  most  obscure”33:  his  doctrine  of  eternal  recurrence.  The  doctrine  

of  eternal  recurrence  surfaces  at  a  number  of  places  in  Nietzsche’s  work,  including  Thus  Spoke  

Zarathustra,  but  is  perhaps  most  clearly  expressed  in  a  section  of  The  Gay  Science  in  which  

Nietzsche  asks  us  to  imagine  living  our  same  lives,  exactly  the  same  in  all  of  their  smallest  details,  

over  and  over  again,  infinitely.  Nietzsche  then  asks  what  our  reaction  to  this  imagined  reality  would  

                                                                                                                       
30
 Zarathustra  25-­‐26  
31
 Zarathustra  26  
32
 Magnus,  9  
33
 Magnus  38  
Miller  15  
 

be:  would  we  be  devastated,  or  would  we  welcome  the  thought?  He  concludes  the  section  with  a  

final  question:  “[How]  well-­‐disposed  would  you  have  to  become  to  yourself  and  your  life  to  crave  

nothing  more  fervently  than  this  ultimate  and  eternal  confirmation  and  seal?”34  While  there  are  at  

least  three  (and  likely  more)  competing  general  interpretations  of  this  doctrine,  the  interpretation  

which  seems  to  me  to  have  the  strongest  case  and  the  best  fit  within  the  overall  scope  of  Nietzsche’s  

thought  is  the  one  offered  by  Bernd  Magnus,  who  proposes  that  the  doctrine  of  eternal  recurrence  

should  be  interpreted  as  an  existential  imperative,  with  a  heuristic  or  diagnostic  function.  Magnus  

asserts  that  “[eternal]  recurrence  (and  its  real  or  possible  truth)  is  a  visual  and  conceptual  

representation  of  a  particular  attitude  toward  life,”  and  he  spells  out  exactly  he  means:  “the  attitude  

toward  life  captured  in  the  doctrine  of  eternal  recurrence  is  the  expression  of  nihilism  already  

overcome.”35  The  attitude  toward  life  that  Nietzsche  is  interested  in  portraying  is  one  of  affirmation,  

one  which  expresses  “life  as  celebration,”  and  the  implication  is  apparent:  only  someone  who  has  

undergone  the  transformation  from  camel  to  lion  to  child  described  in  Zarathustra  –  in  other  words,  

only  an  übermensch  –  would  be  well  enough  disposed  towards  themselves  and  their  life  –  including  

all  of  its  failures,  tragedies,  joys,  and  successes  –  to  wish  for  its  eternal  repetition.  Eternal  

recurrence  becomes  a  way  for  us  to  determine  our  condition  (i.e.  whether  we  have  truly  overcome  

nihilism)  by  testing  our  attitude  toward  life;  in  another  sense  it  helps  us  to  overcome  nihilism  by  

showing  us  the  attitude  we  must  adopt  toward  life:  

My  formula  for  greatness  in  a  human  being  is  amor  fati:36  that  one  wants  nothing  to  be  

different,  not  forward,  not  backward,  not  in  all  eternity.  Not  merely  bear  what  is  necessary,  

                                                                                                                       
34
 The  Gay  Science,  sec  341  
35
 Magnus,  142  
36
 Latin:  love  of  fate  
Miller  16  
 

still  less  conceal  it  –  all  idealism  is  mendaciousness  in  the  face  of  what  is  necessary  –but  love  

it.37  

III. Ulysses:  A  Nietzschean  Interpretive  Frame  

Stephen  

The  opening  scene  of  Ulysses  finds  the  characters  Stephen  Dedalus  and  his  friend  Buck  

Mulligan  having  an  exchange  regarding,  among  other  things,  the  death  of  Stephen’s  mother;  it  is  

within  this  exchange  that  Buck  Mulligan  identifies  both  himself  and  Stephen  as  being  ‘hyperborean’,  

alluding  to  Nietzsche’s  concept  of  the  übermensch  –  an  individual  who  has,  among  other  things,  

been  liberated  from  the  demands  of  any  moral  system  (which  in  this  case  means  Christian  morality,  

specifically).  Mulligan  is  evidently  not  only  familiar  with  such  a  notion  of  freedom  (at  one  point  he  

jokingly  refers  to  himself  and  Stephen  as  übermenschen,  or  supermen),  but  in  fact  embraces  it,  as  

evidenced  by  the  joy  he  apparently  finds  in  turning  his  morning  shave  into  a  parody  of  the  Catholic  

mass,  or  his  “mad  gaiety”  at  chanting  ‘The  Ballad  of  Joking  Jesus”  later  on  in  the  episode.38  Clearly,  

for  Mulligan  few  things  are  sacred,  especially  things  pertaining  to  religion  and  morality;  however,  

Mulligan’s  flagrant  disregard  for  the  confines  of  Christian  propriety  appears  at  times  to  be  almost  

playful,  a  sort  of  carefree,  “all-­‐in-­‐good-­‐fun”  mentality.  It  is  difficult  to  take  him  seriously  as  an  

example  of  the  individual  who  embodies  Nietzsche’s  self-­‐affirming  approach  to  life.    

Stephen,  on  the  other  hand,  seems  to  adopt  a  much  more  calculated  attitude  toward  things,  

and  invites  a  more  careful  consideration  from  a  Nietzschean  point  of  reference.  By  contrast  to  

Mulligan,  Stephen’s  actions  suggest  a  far  more  embedded  and  deep-­‐seated  resistance  to  the  

conventions  of  the  Christian  ethic.  “No  mother,”  he  remembers  saying  (though  perhaps  only  in  his  

                                                                                                                       
37
 Friedrich  Nietzsche,  Ecce  Homo,  258  
38
 Ulysses,  18  
Miller  17  
 

mind,  it  isn’t  clear),  “let  me  be  and  let  live.”39  This  rebuke  appears  as  Stephen  refuses  to  join  those  

kneeling  in  prayer  for  his  dying  mother,  an  act  loaded  with  significance:  not  only  does  Stephen  

refuse  his  mother,  ignoring  the  traditional  Christian  doctrine  of  honoring  one’s  parents,  he  also  

refuses  to  take  part  in  prayers  for  the  dying,  suggesting  either  a  lack  of  belief,  or  a  more  deep-­‐

seated  and  willful  indifference  toward  accepted  Christian  practices,  or  both.  Even  the  ‘hyperborean’  

Buck  Mulligan,  who  is  supposedly  liberated  from  conformity  to  traditional  Christian  ideals,  takes  

exception  with  Stephen’s  action,  sharply  criticizing  it  as  stemming  not  from  being  ‘above  the  

crowd,’40  but  from  something  else,  something  which  is  (to  Mulligan’s  way  of  thinking)  more  

“sinister”41  and  even  heartless.  Though  Mulligan  attributes  Stephen’s  actions  to  dark  motives,  the  

reader  may  come  to  understand  Stephen’s  refusal  of  his  mother  as  ultimately  a  principled  and  

calculated  response,  as  evidenced  by  the  gravity  of  the  event(s)  such  as  Stephen  recalls  it.  The  

Nietzschean  frame  helps  to  situate  the  actions  of  both  Buck  Mulligan  and  Stephen  Dedalus  in  a  

particular  light;  while  both  men’s  actions  may  be  seen  respectively  as  choices  (rather  than  mindless  

reactions)  in  defiance  of  Christian  value,  only  Stephen’s  actions  might  be  thought  of  as  deliberate  

and  premeditated  moral  choices  (as  compared  to  Buck  Mulligan,  whose  ‘liberation’  is  largely  

inconsequential  and  silly)  constituting  a  refusal  of  the  dominating  discourse  of  Christian  morality.  

  The  notion  of  the  übermensch,  as  we  have  seen,  is  intrinsically  connected  to  another  one  of  

Nietzsche’s  ideas,  which  becomes  essential  to  understanding  Stephen’s  vision  of  himself  as  an  

individual  and  an  artist:  the  death  of  God.  Stephen’s  outright  dismissal  of  Christianity  as  such  

amounts  in  the  most  basic  sense  to  an  affirmation  of  Nietzsche’s  often-­‐quoted  and  controversial  

claim  that  “God  is  dead,”  and  at  the  very  least  becomes  Stephen’s  own  assertion  that  if  God  is  not  in  

fact  dead,  he  is  certainly  meaningless  in  the  real  world.  Throughout  Ulysses,  Stephen  identifies  

himself,  both  directly  and  indirectly,  as  a  version  of  Nietzsche’s  übermensch:  one  who  frees  himself  
                                                                                                                       
39
 Ibid,  10  
40
 See  note  1.92  in  Don  Gifford,  Ulysses  Annotated  (University  of  California,  1974)  
41
 Ulysses  5  
Miller  18  
 

from  the  oppression  and  nihilism  of  religion  (which  in  Stephen’s  case  means  Christianity)  in  order  

to  create  his  own  values,  his  own  morality,  who  then  with  god-­‐like  authority  imposes  his  own  

values  and  morality  upon  the  world  around  himself.  In  the  wake  of  the  ‘death  of  God’,  Stephen  

assumes  the  role  of  god,  and  the  notion  of  the  ‘artist-­‐as-­‐god’  becomes  one  of  the  foundational  

principles  of  Stephen’s  view  of  life,  along  with  his  approach  to  art  (and  in  his  case,  literature).  In  

view  of  his  vision  of  the  artist-­‐as-­‐god,  it  is  not  surprising  that  Stephen’s  thought  (and  also  his  

dialogue  with  other  characters)  throughout  Ulysses  frequently  is  obsessed  with  Christian  theology  

and  cosmology;  though  Stephen  ultimately  rejects  the  Christian  cosmology,  he  still  values  the  

coherence  and  comprehensiveness  of  its  account  of  the  world  and  of  human  existence,  and  seeks  to  

replicate  this  coherence  within  his  own  philosophical  and  artistic  framework.    

In  an  early  sounding  of  Stephen’s  developing  philosophical  and  metaphysical  concerns,  

Buck  Mulligan  in  Telemachus  wryly  compares  Stephen  to  Saint  Thomas  Aquinas,  a  famous  

Dominican  theologian  and  philosopher,  and  also  to  Aristotle.  “No,  no,”  shouts  Mulligan  in  response  

to  a  request  for  Stephen  to  explain  his  unique  interpretation  of  Hamlet,  “I’m  not  equal  to  Thomas  

Aquinas  and  the  fiftyfive  reasons  he  has  made  to  prop  it  up.  Wait  till  I  have  a  few  pints  in  me  first.”42  

Mulligan’s  quip,  with  its  linking  together  of  Aquinas  and  the  “fiftyfive  reasons”  (an  allusion  to  

Aristotle’s  assertion  of  fifty-­‐five  immutable  celestial  spheres  from  the  Metaphysics43),  is  itself  

significant,  as  the  philosophical  project  of  Thomas  Aquinas  largely  seeks  to  reconcile  Aristotelian  

thought  with  Christian  truth(s);  thus,  Mulligan’s  reference  to  Stephen  as  both  an  Aquinas  figure  and  

an  Aristotle  figure  implicitly  suggests  that  Stephen  may  be  seeking  to  reconcile  something  secular  

with  something  divine,  and  possibly  to  provide  a  rational  account  of  his  own  ideas  of  ultimate  

realities,  and  the  divine.  Given  the  fact  that  Stephen  is  an  aspiring  artist,  this  passage  seems  to  

suggest  that  Stephen  is  wrestling  with  certain  questions,  and  that  he  is  looking  to  philosophy  for  

                                                                                                                       
42
 Ibid  17  
43
 Ulysses  Annotated,  1.547  
Miller  19  
 

answers  to  these  questions.  The  allusions  to  philosophy  in  this  passage  throw  open  a  door  to  a  

potentially  deeper  understanding  of  Stephen  Dedalus  as  a  character,  and  create  new  possibilities  of  

interpretation  of  both  his  artistic  project,  and  in  a  larger  sense,  Ulysses  itself.    

The  philosophical  allusions  which  begin  surfacing  in  Stephen’s  thoughts,  from  his  interior  

monologues  in  the  Nestor  episode  of  Ulysses,  lend  further  support  to  an  understanding  of  Stephen  as  

a  man  whose  interest  in  philosophy  serves  a  particular,  though  as  yet  still  unclear,  purpose.  

Pondering  the  fates  of  Pyrrhus  and  Julius  Caesar,  Stephen  asks  the  question  “what  if,”  and  thinks  of  

the  “infinite  possibilities  [the  concrete,  actual  event]  have  ousted.”44  This  thought  echoes  Aristotle’s  

distinction  between  potential  and  actuality,  from  his  Physics;  Stephen’s  thoughts  turn  immediately  

from  the  Aristotelian  metaphysical  frame  to  questions  from  his  Poetics,  in  which  Aristotle  suggests  

that  a  poet,  as  an  artist  (which  Stephen  wishes  to  become  in  the  true  sense)  deals  not  with  what  

actually  has  happened,  but  rather  with  “the  kind  of  thing  which  would  happen  [emphasis  added].”45  

Stephen  presumably  possesses  a  familiarity  with  Aristotle  from  his  knowledge  of  Aquinas,  and  

Aristotelian  ideas  continue  to  move  in  and  out  of  his  thoughts  as  he  (presumably)  attempts  to  

rearrange  them  into  some  kind  of  logical  structure.  At  this  point  it  becomes  possible  to  begin  

interpreting  Stephen  as  not  only  an  aspiring  artist,  but  also  as  a  man  wrestling  with  intellectual  

questions  as  well;  clearly,  he  is  attempting  to  develop  some  kind  of  theoretical  or  conceptual  

framework,  and  looking  to  philosophy  –  and  particularly  Aristotle’s  philosophy,  it  would  seem  –  for  

answers.  

His  contemplation  of  Averroës  and  Moses  Maimonides  later  in  Nestor  begins  to  offer  some  

insight  into  the  nature  of  Stephen’s  intellectual  and  philosophical  quest,  as  well  as  deepening  the  

reader’s  understanding  of  him  as  an  individual.  As  he  assists  one  of  his  young  students  with  sums,  

Stephen’s  mind  wanders  to  two  influential  Aristotelian  scholars,  Averroës  and  Moses  Maimonides,  

                                                                                                                       
44
 Ulysses  25  
45
 Aristotle,  Poetics  51a-­‐b  
Miller  20  
 

whom  he  remembers  with  what  appears  to  be  almost  sadness,  noting  that  they  are  “gone…from  the  

world”  (28).  The  significance  of  these  particular  philosophers  with  regard  to  Stephen  lies  in  the  fact  

that  both  men’s  philosophy  attempts  to  reconcile  Aristotelian  philosophy  with  religious  orthodoxy:  

Averroës  was  concerned  to  reconcile  Aristotle  with  Moslem  orthodoxy,  whereas  Maimonides  

sought  to  reconcile  Orthodox  Judaism  with  Aristotle.46  Both  men,  and  especially  Maimonides,  had  a  

significant  impact  upon  Thomas  Aquinas,  who  ultimately  sought  to  reconcile  Aristotelian  thought  

with  Christian  doctrine,  and  with  whom  Stephen  is  frequently  compared  throughout  the  pages  of  

Ulysses.  47  Stephen,  in  a  reversal  of  the  biblical  reference  to  Christ  from  the  Gospel  of  John,  refers  to  

these  philosophers  as  a  “darkness  shining  in  brightness  which  brightness  could  not  comprehend,”48  

suggesting  in  his  play  on  the  allusion  to  Christ  that  they  posited  certain  truth(s)  which  the  

“brightness”  (as  a  metaphor  for  religious  orthodoxy)  was  either  unable  or  unwilling  to  accept.  In  

other  words,  Stephen  thinks  of  these  men  as  promoting  ideas  that  are  essentially  antithetical  to  the  

dogma  and  conclusions  of  Christianity.  Stephen’s  preoccupation  with  these  particular  Aristotelian  

philosophers,  all  of  whom  sought  to  connect  certain  notions  of  the  divine  with  philosophical  

thought,  gestures  perhaps  towards  Stephen’s  own,  similarly  oriented  ambition  to  connect  his  own  

notion  of  “highest  values”  (as  Nietzsche  calls  them)  with  a  rational,  philosophical  framework,  which  

will  perhaps  be  an  antithesis  to  Christianity’s  account  of  the  world.  

The  early  episodes  of  Ulysses,  and  particularly  Telemachus  and  Nestor,  establish  Stephen  as  

an  individual  who  in  many  ways  resembles  the  übermensch  that  Nietzsche  describes.  At  the  same  

time,  it  also  becomes  clear  that  Stephen  is  interested  in  developing  (or  perhaps  has  already  

developed)  a  philosophical  and/or  metaphysical  framework  of  his  own  that  will  replace  the  

Christian  cosmology,  while  still  providing  within  his  own  cosmological  framework  the  kind  of  

                                                                                                                       
46
 See  FN  5  and  James  Cappio,  “Aristotle,  Berkeley,  and  Proteus:  Joyce’s  Use  of  Philosophy”  in  Philosophy  and  
Literature  5.1  (1981):  21  
47
 Gifford,  2.158  
48
 Ulysses  28  
Miller  21  
 

coherent  and  comprehensive  explanation  of  the  world  that  the  Christian  framework  offers.  These  

early  episodes  introduce  and  establish  Stephen’s  character  and  his  larger  artistic  and  intellectual  

project;  in  subsequent  chapters,  Stephen’s  belief  in  the  artist-­‐as-­‐god  is  more  fully  developed,  as  well  

as  his  larger  theory  and  its  implications.  In  the  Scylla  and  Charybdis  episode,  which  Joyce  scholar  

Garold  Sharpe  suggests  is  “the  most  comprehensive  statement  of  James  Joyce’s  metaphysical  

beliefs,”49  the  narrative  finally  arrives  at  the  long-­‐anticipated  revelation  of  Stephen’s  theory  of  

Shakespeare,  which  spells  out  in  a  larger  sense  Stephen’s  manifesto  of  his  new  ‘cosmology’  of  the  

artist.  

  Scylla  and  Charybdis  takes  place  in  the  rooms  of  The  National  Library  of  Ireland,  located  in  

Dublin’s  center,  and  provides  the  setting  in  which  Stephen  discusses,  with  an  audience  of  writers  

and  literature  figures,  his  theory  of  Hamlet  as  William  Shakespeare’s  own  ghost  story.  The  outset  of  

the  discussion  is  marked  by  George  William  Russell’s  claim  that  “art  has  to  reveal  to  us  ideas,  

formless  spiritual  essences,”  a  claim  which  he  connects  to  “Plato’s  world  of  ideas.”50  Russell’s  

statement  echoes  a  certain  reading  of  Plato’s  notion  of  the  “forms,”  suggesting    that  in  his  view  art  

possesses  no  inherent  value  as  such,  but  rather  is  valuable  only  to  the  extent  that  it  accurately  

reflect  or  points  to  transcendental  truth(s)  (he  mentions  Shelley  in  support  of  his  claim)  located  in  a  

spiritual  or  metaphysical  realm.51  He  classifies  other  notions  of  literary  interpretation  as  the  

“speculation  of  schoolboys  for  schoolboys,”  a  remark  which  Stephen  counters  with  his  own  

observation  that  “Aristotle  was  once  Plato’s  schoolboy.”52  The  juxtaposition  of  the  two  

philosophers,  which  librarian  John  Eglinton  claims  makes  his  “blood  boil”,  figures  prominently  in  

the  episode,  where  Plato  and  Aristotle  find  symbolic  importance  on  multiple  levels:  as  exemplifying  

the  relationship  between  the  respected  mentor  and  the  protégé  seeking  to  assert  his  own  ideas;  as  

                                                                                                                       
49
 Garold  Sharpe,  “The  Philosophy  of  James  Joyce”  in  Modern  Fiction  Studies  9.2  (1963):  120  
50
 Ulysses  185;  see  also  note  9.52-­‐53  in  Gifford  
51
 Gifford,  9.51    
52
 Ulysses,  185  
Miller  22  
 

embodying  two  widely  different  approaches  to  art;  and  perhaps  most  importantly  for  Stephen,  as  

representative  of  two  vastly  different  metaphysical  accounts  of  the  world.    

  In  his  allusion  to  Plato’s  Republic,  and  the  question  of  which  philosopher  “would  banish  

[Stephen]  from  his  commonwealth,”53  Stephen  indirectly  asserts  his  identity  as  a  literary  artist,  

offering  a  glimpse  of  how  he  sees  himself,  and  of  his  overall  perspective  on  literature  as  well.  

Evidently  Stephen  already  knows  the  answer  to  his  own  question:  as  a  literary  artist,  he  would  be  

banished  from  Plato’s,  rather  than  Aristotle’s,  commonwealth.  Plato’s  criticism  of  poets  (and  

ultimate  justification  for  their  banishment  from  the  ideal  city),  is  constituted  in  three  basic  claims:  

first,  Plato  criticizes  poetic  content,  asserting  that  poets  often  tell  untrue  stories.  Next,  he  criticizes  

the  form  of  poetic  art  (for  him  this  includes  all  literature),  which  he  says  is  an  imperfect  imitation  of  

an  imitation  of  an  eternal  and  unchanging  form.  Finally,  Plato  argues  that  poetry  destroys  the  

rational  part  of  the  soul  by  enlarging  and  appealing  to  the  irrational  part:  that  is,  the  part  of  the  soul  

which  experiences  emotions.  54  On  the  other  hand,  Aristotle’s  Poetics,  with  which  Stephen  is  

familiar,  affirms  the  poet’s  importance,  and  his/her  capacity  to  produce  art  which  will  –  through  

inspiring  language  and  depiction  of  human  action,  among  other  things  –  stir  the  emotions  and  lead  

individuals,  through  the  experience  of  art,  to  a  greater  understanding  of  the  virtuous  and  good  

human  life.55  Presumably,  Stephen  envisions  his  identity  as  an  artist  from  a  more  Aristotelian  

concept  of  both  literature  itself  and  the  writer  (in  contrast  here  to  both  Eglinton  and  Russell,  who  

seem  to  hold  a  more  Platonic  and  transcendentalist  view  of  literature  that  seems  more  in  keeping  

with  their  Theosophist  religious  views),  and  this  concept  is  further  formulated  in  his  subsequent  

thoughts  and  statements.  

                                                                                                                       
53
 Ibid  186  
54
 Plato’s  three  main  criticisms  of  poets,  as  summarized  here,  appear  respectively  in  Books  II,  III,  and  X  of  The  
Republic.  
55
 Gifford,  2.52  
Miller  23  
 

  In  an  interior  monologue  that  closely  follows  his  allusion  to  Plato,  Stephen,  recalling  a  

comment  from  his  conversation  with  Deasy  in  the  Nestor  episode,  thinks:  “God:  noise  in  the  street:  

very  peripatetic.  Space:  what  you  damn  well  have  to  see.”56  His  thought  points  to  several  different  

ideas  which  Stephen  is  engaging:  it  suggests  first  that  he  is  interested  in  an  approach  to  literature  

which  is,  above  all,  practical  and  rooted  in  the  concrete  realities  of  everyday  life:  he  values  the  

representation  of  actual  people,  places,  and  events,  the  kind  of  things  “that  would  happen.”  But  on  a  

deeper  level  it  suggests  that  Stephen  believes  the  essence  of  ultimate  reality  –  one  of  the  key  points  

of  difference  between  Aristotle’s  and  Plato’s  respective  philosophies  –  is  essentially  material  and  

immanent  (that  is  to  say,  existing  and  manifesting  itself  in  and  through  the  material  world)  rather  

than  transcendent  and  idealist  (existing  beyond  the  observable  world).  Stephen’s  characterization  

of  this  idea  as  “peripatetic”  carries  a  double  meaning:  the  word  ‘peripatetic’  denotes  in  a  literal  

sense  things  pertaining  to  the  Aristotelian  school  of  philosophy;  it  refers  in  a  more  general  sense  to  

one  who  walks  from  place  to  place,  i.e.  “someone  in  the  street”  (a  thought  which  is  strikingly  

humorous,  given  the  narrative  of  Ulysses).  Stephen’s  thinking  also  suggests  that  his  notion  of  truth  

(if  he  in  fact  believes  in  any  notion  of  ultimate  truth)  is  manifested  within  the  material  world  

(specifically,  in  art)  rather  than  outside  of  it.  His  equating  of  “God”  with  street  noise  suggests  that  

he  believes  truth  expressed  and  apprehended  in  tangible,  concrete  objects  and  experiences,  as  

opposed  to  the  notion  that  truths  and/or  ideals  exist  solely  in  a  transcendental  realm  beyond  the  

material  world  and  cannot  therefore  be  embodied  in  objects,  an  idea  that  Plato  (and  in  similar  

ways,  the  Theosophists  alluded  to  throughout  Scylla  and  Charybdis)  asserts  in  his  philosophy.  Taken  

together,  the  ‘peripatetic’  element  and  the  ‘God  is  the  noise  in  the  street’  element  suggest  that  

Stephen  believes  art  itself  becomes  a  location  for  the  creating  of  truth,  a  location  of  the  ultimate  

realities  of  existence;  he  envisions  his  art  as  an  infusing  of  the  commonplace  experiences  of  life  

described  in  his  art  with  truth  or  value  as  defined  by  the  artist  (that  is,  the  artist-­‐as-­‐god).  

                                                                                                                       
56
 Ulysses  186  
Miller  24  
 

  Stephen  proceeds  to  set  his  theory  of  art  into  motion  with  his  discussion  of  Shakespeare:  

having  for  the  moment  finished  debating  the  differences  between  Plato  and  Aristotle,  John  Eglinton  

gives  Stephen  the  floor  with  an  introductory  announcement  that  “[Stephen]  will  have  it  that  Hamlet  

is  a  ghoststory.”57  “[W]ith  tingling  energy,”  Stephen  begins  to  tell  a  story  for  his  audience:  he  re-­‐

creates  a  performance  of  the  play  Hamlet,  in  which  William  Shakespeare  himself  plays  the  part  of  

Old  Hamlet’s  ghost,  speaking  to  “the  son  of  his  soul,”58  the  young  Prince  Hamlet  of  Denmark.  

Stephen’s  reference  to  Hamlet  as  a  “son”  of  Shakespeare  in  once  sense  points  to  the  similarity  

between  the  character’s  name  and  that  of  Shakespeare’s  biological  son,  Hamnet,  who  dies  at  a  

young  age.  In  another  sense,  though,  it  is  extremely  suggestive  of  the  notion  that  the  playwright  is  

in  a  deeper  sense  the  ‘father’  of  his  work,  his  characters;  the  writer  in  fact  fathers  his  writing(s).  

Stephen  returns  to  the  fathering/birthing  theme  with  his  remark  that  Socrates  learned  from  his  

mother  both  dialectic  and  “how  to  bring  thoughts  into  the  world.”59  Stephen  is  clearly  suggesting  

that  the  relationship  between  the  artist  and  the  work  of  art  is  essentially  that  of  father  and  son;  he  

is  also  asserting  that  it  is  within  work  of  art  that  the  artist’s  thoughts  are  born  into  the  world.  At  this  

point  the  reason  for  Stephen’s  obsessive  interest  in  the  Christian  doctrine  of  consubstantiality  

throughout  Ulysses  –  the  belief  that  the  Father  and  Son,  though  separate  persons,  share  the  same  

substance  –  becomes  obvious:  he  is  appropriating  the  doctrine  of  consubstantiality  for  his  own  

metaphysical  framework  of  the  artist.  Stephen  refers  back  to  the  concept  of  consubstantiality  of  

father  and  son  (or  by  implication,  artist  and  work  of  art)  throughout  the  episode,  concluding  finally  

that  Shakespeare  is  “all  in  all”  (212)60,  both  father  and  son,  an  assertion  with  which  the  initially  

skeptical  John  Eglinton  is  in  agreement.    

                                                                                                                       
57
 Ulysses  187  
58
 Ulysses  188  
59
 Ibid  190  
60
 This  is  also  a  biblical  allusion;  see  I  Corinthians  15:28  
Miller  25  
 

  There  is  a  larger  implication  of  Stephen’s  new  ‘doctrine’  of  the  consubstantiality  of  the  artist  

and  the  work  of  art,  as  well:  if  father  (artist)  and  son  (work  of  art)  share  the  same  substance,  then  

the  work  of  art  is  not  only  the  offspring  of  the  artist,  as  suggested  earlier,  but  the  artist  comes  to  

exist,  or  live,  within  his  own  work  of  art  as  well.  This  idea  holds  paramount  importance  for  Stephen,  

and  indeed  he  understands  the  whole  of  Shakespeare’s  work,  including  “all  the  other  plays  which  I  

have  not  read,”61  in  terms  of  Shakespeare  ‘giving  birth,’  as  it  were,  to  his  entire  life,  to  himself  in  

fact,  within  his  plays  and  poems.  One  way  that  Stephen  substantiates  this  idea  is  by  drawing  

connections  between  the  characters  and  plots  of  Shakespeare’s  plays,  and  the  real  people  and  

events  of  his  own  life.  He  uses  the  similarity  between  the  names  ‘Hamlet’  and  ‘Hamlet’  to  suggest  

that  Shakespeare  is  perhaps  avenging  his  betrayal  by  his  wife  Anne  Hathaway’s  adultery  through  

his  writing,  calling  upon  the  ‘son  of  his  soul’  to  take  up  his  cause.  Stephen  links  the  birth  of  

Shakespeare’s  granddaughter  with  his  emergence  from  a  period  of  dark  struggle  and  turmoil,  and  

the  corresponding  change  in  the  tone  of  his  plays,  claiming  that  the  “girl  placed  in  his  arms”62  is  

responsible  for  softening  the  heart  of  Shakespeare,  comparing  the  storms  of  his  life  to  the  

shipwrecks  experienced  by  Ulysses  (the  Latin  version  of  Odysseus)  and  Pericles  (a  title  character  

from  one  of  Shakespeare’s  plays).  The  death  of  Shakespeare’s  mother,  according  to  Stephen,  

provides  a  scene  for  the  play  Coriolanus;  similarly,  the  death  of  his  son  Hamnet  becomes  the  “death-­‐

scene  of  young  Arthur  in  King  John.”63  He  claims  that  the  villain  Iago,  who  torments  the  hero  Othello  

with  thoughts  of  Desdemona’s  infidelity,  symbolizes  Shakespeare’s  “unremitting  

intellect…ceaselessly  willing  that  the  moor  in  [Shakespeare]  shall  suffer”  (212)  Stephen  argues  that  

the  betrayals  which  Shakespeare  experiences  at  the  hands  of  both  his  wife  Anne  and  his  friend  (or  

possible  love  interest)  William  Herbert  become  a  theme  which  pervades  all  of  Shakespeare’s  work:  

“[t]he  note  of  banishment,”  as  Stephen  sums  up,  “banishment  from  the  heart,  banishment  from  the  

                                                                                                                       
61
 Ulysses,  212  
62
 Ibid,195  
63
 Ibid,  208  
Miller  26  
 

home,  sounds  uninterruptedly  from  The  Two  Gentlemen  of  Verona  onward  till  Prospero  break  his  

staff”  (212).  In  short,  the  whole  of  Shakespeare’s  life  and  world  is,  from  Stephen’s  perspective,  

living  in  some  form  within  in  all  of  his  writing,  or  as  he  puts  it:  “…through  the  ghost  of  the  unquiet  

father  (or  artist)  the  image  of  the  unliving  son  (or  work  of  art)  looks  forth”  (194).  

At  this  point  it  becomes  possible  to  synthesize  the  threads  of  Stephen’s  seemingly  

disconnected  philosophical,  religious,  and  aesthetic  concerns  into  a  single,  unified  idea  that  

constitutes  the  new  metaphysical  framework  envisioned  by  Stephen,  and  in  a  larger  sense,  James  

Joyce.  In  an  echo  of  Nietzsche’s  concepts  of  ‘death  of  God’  and  of  the  übermensch,  Stephen  rejects  

the  Christian  accounts  of  reality,  value,  and  truth,  and  installs  himself,  as  an  artist,  in  the  place  of  the  

Christian  God:  hence,  the  notion  of  the  artist-­‐as-­‐god,  invested  with  the  power  to  determine  his  own  

values.  By  implication  the  artist  also  becomes  the  source  of  ultimate  reality,  and  his  creation,  the  

work  of  art,  becomes  its  location.  The  notion  that  the  work  of  art  is  both  the  creation  of  artist-­‐as-­‐

god  as  well  as  the  location  of  ultimate  reality  encapsulates  Stephen’s  rejection  of  both  Platonic  and  

religious  notions  of  transcendence  as  such,  and  his  affirmation  of  a  version  of  Aristotelian  

materialism,  that  is,  the  idea  that  ultimate  reality  exists  and  is  manifested  only  in  the  material  world  

(and  specifically  for  Stephen,  in  material  works  of  art).  Stephen’s  interest  in  Thomas  Aquinas,  

Averröes,  and  Moses  Maimonides  –  men  who  sought  to  reconcile  versions  of  monotheism  and  

Aristotle’s  philosophy  –  is  finally  explained  in  his  transformation  of  the  Christian  doctrine  of  

consubstantiality  into  his  own  secular  metaphysics  of  the  artist,  a  hybrid  idea  that  makes  possible  

his  claim  that  the  artist  and  his  work  are  one  in  substance.  In  the  sense  that  the  work(s)  of  art  

encompasses  or  contains  the  entirety  of  a  human  life  –  namely,  the  artist’s  –  it  becomes  not  only  

relevant  to  every  human  being,  but  in  fact  accounts  for  the  whole  of  human  existence:  it  becomes  its  

own  cosmos,  with  the  artist  at  its  center  –  as  god.  The  idea  that  the  work  of  art  is  the  creation  of  

artist-­‐as-­‐god  and  the  location  of  ultimate  reality  encapsulates  Stephen’s  rejection  of  both  Platonic  

and  religious  notions  of  transcendence  as  such,  his  rejection  of  nihilistic  frameworks.    
Miller  27  
 

Bloom  

It  is  not  difficult  to  make  the  case  that  if  anyone  in  Ulysses  deserves  to  be  able  to  escape  

from  life’s  struggles,  it  is  Leopold  Bloom.  This  is  in  part  made  easier  because  Bloom’s  trials  and  

tribulations  seem  to  be  much  more  beyond  his  control  by  comparison  to  other  characters.  It  is  

possible  to  see  how  Stephen’s  cockiness  and  cynicism  could  be  at  least  partly  to  blame  for  the  fact  

that  he  is  overlooked  and  at  times  even  ostracized  socially,  whereas  Bloom  is  mistrusted  by  others  

and  kept  at  a  distance  through  no  fault  of  his  own,  but  simply  because  he  is  a  Jew  by  birth,  among  

other  things.  At  first  glance  it  is  easy  to  read  Stephen,  with  his  lofty  ambitions  and  his  outward  

defiance  of  religious  ideals,  as  the  powerful,  assertive,  self-­‐overcoming  übermensch  type;  but  upon  

closer  examination  it  is  in  fact  Bloom  who  comes  to  express  this  idea  in  a  more  meaningful,  

substantial,  and  relevant  way.  We  must  keep  in  mind  that  Bloom’s  journey  over  the  course  of  June  

16,  1904  is  above  all  things  a  kind  of  epic  journey,  with  Bloom  as  its  epic  hero,  but  he  is  not  a  hero  

in  the  traditional  sense.  He  is  not  called  upon  to  fight  battles,  slay  beasts,  or  conquer  new  lands;  

nevertheless  he  must  display  the  same  kinds  courage  and  strength  necessary  for  battle  in  order  to  

face  and  overcome  the  little  (and  big)  tragedies  that  are  inseparable  from  his  life,  and  indeed  from  

all  human  life.  Bloom  must  ultimately  find  a  way  to  overcome  the  tragic  in  life  not  by  escaping  it,  as  

Stephen  seems  at  times  to  be  trying  to  do,  but  by  accepting  it,  embracing  it,  and  finding  his  way  

through  it.  Stephen  has  yet  to  fully  realize  the  kind  of  self-­‐overcoming  approach  to  life  that  

Nietzsche  envisions,  in  which  a  human  being  affirms  their  own  life  most  fully  by  affirming  life  itself,  

by  affirming  the  whole,  whereas  Bloom  illustrates  it  beautifully  in  all  of  his  humanness.    

In  the  Lotus-­‐Eaters  episode  of  Ulysses,  Bloom  leaves  his  house  for  the  day  and  is  headed  to  a  

funeral  mass  for  the  deceased  Paddy  Dignam.  Bloom’s  conduct  during  the  funeral  mass  gives  us  a  

clue  as  to  his  overall  mentality  toward  religion,  which  becomes  important  in  relation  to  the  larger  

question  of  whether  Bloom’s  attitude  toward  life  is  that  of  a  self-­‐overcoming  person.  He  observes  
Miller  28  
 

the  priest  giving  communion  to  some  women  at  the  altar  and  thinks,  “Corpus.  Body.  Corpse.  Good  

idea  the  Latin.  Stupefies  them  first.  Hospice  for  the  dying.”64  While  Bloom  is  willing  to  participate  in  

the  socially  mandated  practice  (and  it  appears  that  he  does  it  solely  for  the  sake  of  tradition),  he  is  

clearly  convinced  that  it  is  empty  and  serves  no  real  purpose  except  to  comfort  those  who  perhaps  

are  not  aware  that  they  are  living  ‘dead’  lives.  “There’s  a  big  idea  behind  it,”  he  thinks,  “kind  of  a  

kingdom  of  God  within  you  feel…lulls  all  pain.  Wake  this  time  next  year.”65  Bloom  sees  religion  as  

something  that  merely  exists  as  an  escape  from  the  pain  of  human  existence,  which  echoes  

Zarathustra’s  claim  that  religion  is  drunken  joy  that  allows  people  to  look  away  from  their  suffering  

and  forget  their  pain.66    

Bloom’s  mind  continues  to  wander  extensively  over  the  course  of  the  service:  he  imagines  a  

clandestine  rendezvous  with  a  girl  in  the  church,  imagines  what  a  “gay  old  time”67  the  Benedictine  

monks  must  have  had  chanting  and  brewing  liquor  after  hours,  concludes  that  the  Catholic  Church  

is  a  wonderful  organization  because  it  is  runs  “like  clockwork.”  What  is  interesting  in  Bloom’s  

thought  is  the  fact  that  although  he  has  no  use  for  religion,  his  mind  is  not  occupied  with  harping  on  

the  manifold  faults  of  the  Church  or  the  perceived  emptiness  of  Christian  doctrine:  in  other  words,  

he  is  simply  unaffected  and  indifferent.  Unlike  Stephen,  he  is  not  driven  by  the  continual  need  to  

destroy  the  Church  precisely  because  he  sees  it  for  what  it  is,  acknowledges  its  presence  (and  its  

emptiness),  and  moves  beyond  it.  He  does  not  feel  any  hostility  or  vindictiveness  toward  

Christianity.  This  mentality  stands  in  stark  contrast  to  Stephen’s,  in  that  Stephen  feels  a  constant  

need  throughout  Ulysses  to  negate  Christianity,  which  is  itself  ironic  given  that  he  wants  to  preserve  

certain  aspects  of  Christian  doctrine  for  his  own  purposes  as  an  artist.  

                                                                                                                       
64
 Ulysses  80  
65
 Ibid  81  
66
 TPN,  143  
67
 Ulysses  82  
Miller  29  
 

In  the  Hades  episode,  the  narrative  continues  to  follow  (among  a  host  of  other  things)  the  

issue  of  Bloom’s  religious  beliefs,  this  time  more  specifically  in  regard  to  Bloom’s  thoughts  on  the  

possibility  of  heaven  and  hell,  or  any  other  kind  of  afterlife.  Simply  put,  he  believes  there  isn’t  one.  

Standing  at  the  graveside  service  for  Paddy  Dignam,  he  muses:  

The  resurrection  and  the  life.  Once  you  are  dead  you  are  dead.  That  last  day  idea.  Knocking  

them  all  up  out  of  their  graves.  Come  forth,  Lazarus!  And  he  came  fifth  and  lost  the  job.  Last  

day!  Get  up!  Then  every  fellow  mousing  around  for  his  liver  and  his  lights  and  the  rest  of  his  

traps.  Find  damn  all  of  himself  that  morning.68    

Bloom’s  hilarious  imagining  of  the  frantic  chaos  on  the  “last  day”  confirms  his  lack  of  belief  in  the  

afterlife,  in  a  world  beyond,  which  continues  further  into  the  funeral  service.    

We  are  praying  now  for  the  repose  of  his  soul.  Hoping  you’re  well  and  not  in  hell.  Nice  

change  of  air.  Out  of  the  fryingpan  of  life  and  into  the  fire  of  purgatory.69  

Having  concluded  his  obligation,  Bloom  leaves  the  cemetery  reflecting  that  Dignam  is  now  “out  of  

sight,  out  of  mind,”70  suggesting  his  final  thoughts  about  a  life  after  this  life,  a  world  beyond  this  

one:  in  the  end,  there  is  nothing  but  this  life.  At  first  glance,  it  might  seem  that  Bloom  is  

simpleminded,  that  his  thoughts  reflect  a  lack  of  depth,  or  that  he  is  simply  obtuse  to  the  gravity  of  

the  issue  of  death:  however,  it  is  this  very  mentality  –  that  death  is  in  some  ways  just  a  fact  of  life  

which  gets  too  much  attention  –  that  is  integral  with  a  much  more  important  idea,  on  which  helps  

Bloom  to  confront  and  overcome,  rather  than  avoid  and  escape,  the  tragic  dimensions  of  his  life.  

That  Bloom  does  not  identify  any  life  beyond  this  one  is  important  for  several  reasons.  First  

of  all,  it  shows  us  that  despite  his  willingness  to  participate  in  religious  ritual  for  the  sake  of  

                                                                                                                       
68
 Ulysses,  105  
69
 Ibid,  111  
70
 Ibid,  111  
Miller  30  
 

decorum,  Bloom  is  not  in  fact  religious  at  heart.  If  he  believes  in  the  existence  of  God  at  all  (and  it  is  

possible  to  make  a  good  argument  in  favor  of  Bloom’s  not  believing  in  the  existence  of  God),  he  

certainly  does  not  believe  that  God  has  anything  whatsoever  to  do  with  the  world  as  we  know  it.  If  

there  is  a  God  (in  the  Christian  sense)  then  there  must  also  be  a  hereafter,  a  life  beyond:  but  there  is  

no  life  beyond,  according  to  Bloom,  and  so  it  follows  that  there  is  no  God  for  Bloom  either.  Secondly,  

Bloom’s  belief  that  this  life  is  all  there  is,  that  “once  you  are  dead  you  are  dead,”  also  implies  that  

Bloom  is  not  looking  beyond  this  life  for  meaning  and  value:  that  he  sees  life  itself  as  the  most  

valuable  thing  of  all.  The  everyday  failures,  successes,  joys,  and  pains  of  human  existence  do  not  

serve  some  higher  purpose,  they  do  not  find  some  higher  value  in  world  beyond;  if  this  were  the  

case  then  everything  in  life  would  be  for  the  sake  of  something  else,  and  Bloom  never  even  

considers  this  a  possibility.  Bloom’s  meditation  on  the  afterlife  (or  the  lack  of  it,  to  be  precise)  

suggests  that  he  is  not  stuck  in  the  kind  of  nihilistic  thinking  that  constitutes  Christianity  and  the  

various  forms  of  Platonism  according  to  Nietzsche.  It  is  as  if  Bloom  has  already  reached  the  

conclusion  that  “God  is  dead,”  that  belief  in  the  Christian  (or  Jewish)  god  is  not  believable.    

The  illumination  of  Bloom’s  beliefs  about  religion  and  the  afterlife  is  not  the  only  item  of  

importance  in  Hades:  the  episode  also  provides  a  glimpse  of  the  specific  kinds  of  suffering  Bloom  is  

dealing  with.  While  on  his  way  to  Paddy  Dignam’s  funeral,  Bloom  reflects  on  the  tragic  loss  of  his  

infant  son:  “If  little  Rudy  had  lived.  See  him  grow  up.  Hear  his  voice  in  the  house.  Walking  beside  

Molly  in  an  Eton  suit.”71  In  the  vast  wanderings  of  his  mind  Bloom’s  thoughts  frequently  returns  to  

the  issue  of  his  lost  son,  with  Rudy’s  death  being  one  of  the  elements  that  frames  Bloom’s  entire  life.  

In  Hades  we  are  also  made  aware  that  Bloom  still  feels  the  weight  of  the  loss  of  his  father.  On  the  

carriage  ride  to  the  cemetery,  one  of  Bloom’s  colleagues,  unaware  of  Bloom’s  past,  raises  the  issue  

of  suicide:  he  remarks  that  it  is  the  worst  death  of  all,  that  it  is  the  greatest  disgrace  to  have  in  the  

family,  and  that  it  is  the  mark  of  a  coward.  Only  after  all  this  has  been  said  does  it  become  apparent  
                                                                                                                       
71
 Ibid,  89  
Miller  31  
 

that  Bloom’s  father  committed  suicide,  a  fact  that  is  still  a  regular  part  of  Bloom’s  memory.  Finally,  

Hades  is  the  site  of  Bloom’s  first  encounter  (there  are  three  separate  encounters  over  the  course  of  

the  day)  with  the  man  that  his  wife  Molly  is  about  to  begin  an  affair  with:  Blazes  Boylan.  Bloom  is  

already  painfully  aware  of  the  impending  liaison,  and  the  encounter  with  Boylan  puts  the  finishing  

touch  on  a  trifecta  of  unnecessary  human  suffering  in  Bloom’s  life:  the  death  of  a  son,  the  suicide  of  

a  father,  and  the  betrayal  of  a  wife.  

It   is   not   coincidental   that   the   Hades   episode   should   deal   with   Bloom’s   religious   views  

(moreover,  his  lack  of  religious  beliefs)  while  at  the  same  time  gesturing  toward  the  larger  issues  of  

tragic   suffering   at   work   in   Bloom’s   life,   for   one   of   the   beauties   of   Leopold   Bloom   is   that   he   deals  

with  the  difficulties  of  life,  indeed  with  the  whole  of  life  itself,  on  his  own  and  without  the  “help”  of  

religion.  The  juxtaposition  of  Leopold  Bloom  and  his  deceased  father  is  particularly  striking,  for  it  is  

apparent   in   Bloom’s   memories   of   his   father   in   the   Lotus-­‐Eaters,   Hades   and   Aeolus   episodes   that  

Rudolf   Virag   (Bloom)   was   in   at   least   one   respect   quite   the   opposite   of   Leopold   Bloom:   he   was   a  

pious   man   of   faith.   While   watching   the   Freeman   Journal’s   typesetter   reading   text   backwards   in  

Aeolus,   Bloom   remembers   his   father   reading   the   Hebrew   Haggadah   backwards   during   the  

celebration   of   the   Jewish   Passover   when   Bloom   was   a   child:   “Poor   papa   with   his   haggadah   book,  

reading  backwards  with  his  finger  to  me.  Pessach.  Next  year  in  Jerusalem.  Dear,  O  dear!  All  that  long  

business  about  that  brought  us  out  of  the  land  of  Egypt  and  into  the  house  of  bondage   alleluia.”72  

What   is   interesting   here   (but   not   accidental)   is  the   fact   that   Bloom   is   remembering   the   words   from  

the  Haggadah  incorrectly,  for  the  Israelites  in  fact  praised  God  for  delivering  them  from  the  house  

of  bondage,  not  into  it.  Clearly,  however,  Bloom  sees  the  faith  of  his  father  as  another  kind  of  jump  

from  the  frying  pan  into  the  fire,  so  to  speak,  and  understands  the  “promise”  of  religion  simply  as  

the  exchange  of  one  form  of  bondage  for  another.  

                                                                                                                       
72
 Ibid,  122  
Miller  32  
 

It  is  perhaps  most  ironic  of  all  that  Bloom’s  father,  the  pious  man  of  faith,  despairs  of  this  life  

to   such   a   degree   that   he   decides   to   take   his   own,   despite   the   “meaning”   and   significance   his   faith  

supposedly   conveys   upon   his   existence.   Although   Bloom   pities   his   father,   referring   to   him  

throughout   Ulysses   as   “poor   papa,”   he   somehow   does   not   share   his   father’s   deeply   pessimistic  

outlook  on  life,  and  this  seems  to  suggest  another  implicit  critique  of  the  Judeo-­‐Christian  worldview  

and  of  religion  as  a  whole.  According  to  the  Judeo-­‐Christian  perspective,  it  would  be  Leopold  Bloom,  

rather  than  his  father,  who  would  have  no  reason  to  see  life  in  a  positive  light,  lacking  an  “eternal  

hope”;   however,   in   Ulysses   it   is   quite   the   opposite   that   is   true,   and   we   can   only   conclude   that   this   is  

not  an  oversight  on  Joyce’s  part.  By  investing  Bloom  with  a  kind  of  resilient  outlook,  and  his  father  

with   an   insurmountable   pessimism   towards   life,   Joyce   is   gesturing   toward   Nietzsche’s   claim   that   in  

the  end  the  Judeo-­‐Christian  worldview  leads  one  to  devalue  and  ultimately  despise  this  life.    

How   then   does   the   non-­‐religious   Bloom   encounter   and   respond   to   the   difficult   and  

sometimes  tragic  dimensions  of  his  life?  In  recognizing  this  life  as  the  only  thing  that  really  matters,  

Bloom   is   able   to   accept,   confront,   and   ultimately   overcome   the   tragic   in   his   life   –   the   death   of   Rudy,  

his  father’s  suicide,  and  Molly’s  infidelity,  among  other  things  –  with  a  resilience  that  affirms  both  

himself  and  his  life.  Rudy’s  untimely  death  as  an  infant  and  Molly’s  affair  with  Blazes  Boylan  are  the  

two   sources   of   pain   that   most   frequently   occupy   Bloom’s   mind   over   the   course   of   the   day,   a   fact  

made   more   significant   by   the   relationship   between   the   two   seemingly   unrelated   events.   In   the  

Ithaca   episode,   it   is   revealed   that   Leopold   and   Molly   Bloom   have   not   had   sexual   relations   since   just  

before   the   birth   of   their   son   Rudy,   a   span   of   close   to   eleven   years.   Their   lack   of   intimacy   is   largely   a  

repercussion  of  tragic  event,  for  elsewhere  Bloom  admits  that  he  could  never  find  the  desire  to  be  

intimate  with  Molly  after  his  son’s  death.  Hence  the  sexual  frustration  which  Molly  confesses  to  in  

Penelope,   and   which   leads   her   to   consider   beginning   an   affair   with   Boylan,   is   by   implication   an  

indirect  consequence  of  Rudy’s  death  also.  The  two  seemingly  separate  issues  go  hand-­‐in-­‐hand  for  
Miller  33  
 

Bloom,  and  although  he  often  thinks  about  them  separately,  dealing  with  one  entails  dealing  with  

the  other  to  a  certain  extent.    

What   is   revealing   about   Bloom’s   attitude   toward   life   is   that   he   does   not   try   to   moralize  

about  Rudy’s  death,  he  does  not  try  to  rationalize  and/or  justify  it,  nor  does  he  try  to  assign  to  it  a  

larger   meaning   according   to   some   system   of   religious   beliefs:   he   simply   accepts   Rudy’s   death   as  

something   that   is   painful,   something   that   is   neither   right   nor   wrong,   something   that   is   an  

unchangeable  part  of  his  existence.  Recalling  the  circumstances  around  Rudy’s  birth  in  the  Calypso  

episode,  Bloom  remembers  the  words  of  the  midwife  who  assisted  Molly:  “She  knew  from  the  first  

poor  little  Rudy  wouldn’t  live.  Well,  God  is  good  sir.  She  knew  at  once.”73  Bloom  sees  the  midwife’s  

remark   –   that   “God   is   good,   sir”   –   for   what   it   is:   a   cliché   that   is   intended   to   mask   a   fatalistic  

perspective   on   tragedy   of   the   situation.   Yet   Bloom   does   not   take   a   position   in   response   to   this  

statement,  because  it  is  irrelevant  to  him.  What  is  relevant  is  allowing  Rudy’s  death  to  be  what  it  is  –  

a  sad  part  of  Bloom’s  life  –  while  refraining  from  trying  to  categorize  it  as  ‘good’  or  ‘bad,’  or  from  

trying  to  redefine  it  altogether.  This  attitude  carries  Bloom  throughout  his  day,  and  viewed  through  

a   Nietzschean   frame,   is   indicative   of   his   healthy   disposition   toward   life.   The   mark   of   Bloom’s  

healthy  mentality  is  that  he  does  not  feel  the  constant  need  to  change,  redeem,  or  negate  the  past:  

unlike   the   midwife,   he   does   not   try   to   suggest   that   in   some   way   Rudy’s   infant   death   was   actually  

good  after  all,  or  not  painful.  He  accepts  the  pain  as  an  integral  part  of  his  humanity;  he  accepts  that  

it  is  part  of  life  itself.    

Bloom’s   willingness   to   go   on   living   with   the   pain   of   losing   Rudy,   rather   than   denying   and  

negating   it,   is   at   least   in   part   responsible   for   the   feelings   Bloom   develops   for   Stephen,   and   helps  

open  the  door  for  a  potential  friendship  between  the  two.  In  Oxen  of  the  Sun,  Bloom  and  Stephen  are  

together   in   a   maternity   ward   when   Bloom   remembers   that   Molly   buried   Rudy   in   a   wool   sweater,  

                                                                                                                       
73
 Ulysses,  66  
Miller  34  
 

and   suddenly   he   views   Stephen   from   a   father’s   perspective,   “and   as   sad   as   [Bloom]   was   that   him  

failed  a  son  of  such  gentle  courage,  (for  all  accustomed  him  of  real  parts)  so  grieved  he  also  in  no  

less   measure   for   young   Stephen   for   that   he   lived   riotously   with   these   wastrels   and   murdered   his  

goods   with   whores.”74   Regarding   the   notion   of   a   father-­‐son   relationship   emerging   between   the   two  

men,  the  analog  between  Ulysses  and  Homer’s  Odyssey  is  particularly  useful,  as  Stephen  and  Bloom’s  

meeting  in  the  former  is  reminiscent  of  Telemachus’  reunion  with  his  father,  Odysseus,  in  the  latter.  

We   are   told   in   both   Eummaus   and   Ithaca   that   although   Stephen   and   Bloom   are   in   many   ways  

different,   they   are   alike   in   many   ways   as   well,   and   Stephen’s   departure   from   Bloom’s   house   in  

Ithaca   suggests   the   real   possibility   that   a   new   friendship   is   beginning.75   This   seems   all   the   more  

significant  given  the  fact  that  it  has  apparently  been  over  ten  years  since  Bloom  had  a  thorough  and  

stimulating   conversation   on   such   a   wide   range   of   topics   as   he   does   with   Stephen.   The   suggestion   is  

that   this   is   the   first   time   since   Rudy’s   death   that   Bloom   has   engaged   with   anyone   in   more   than   a  

superficial  sense,  and  as  such  it  is  a  breakthrough  for  him,  an  overcoming  of  the  past  that  does  not  

negating  the  past.    

Bloom’s   final   encounter   of   the   day   –   with   Molly   –   offers   a   final   glimpse   of   how   the   hero  

works   his   way   through   difficult   realities.   All   throughout,   Bloom   has   known   that   Molly   and   Blazes  

Boylan  are  planning  to  rendezvous,  and  has  put  off  the  unavoidable  confrontation  with  the  reality  

of   Molly’s   affair   by   wandering   around   Dublin   into   the   wee   hours   of   the   morning.   However,   once  

Stephen  departs  and  Bloom  turns  in  for  the  night,  he  is  forced  to  face  reality  of  “new  clean  bedlinen,  

additional  odours,  the  presence  of  a  human  form,  hers,  the  imprint  of  a  human  form,  male  not  his.”76  

Now  Bloom  knows  for  certain  that  the  breach  of  marriage  has  occurred,  and  like  any  normal  man,  

he   is   affected   with   feelings   of   “envy,   jealousy,   abegnation,   [and]   equanimity.”77   Bloom’s   feelings  

                                                                                                                       
74
 Ibid,  391  
75
 Ibid,  656,  666  
76
 Ibid,  731  
77
 Ibid,  732  
Miller  35  
 

quickly   give   way   to   reflection,   and   rather   than   moralizing   about   Molly’s   “sins”   or   making   value  

judgments  about  her  actions,  he  simply  concludes  that  it  happened.  He  does  not  ignore  the  fact  of  

Molly’s  adultery,  but  he  does  not  harp  on  it  either.  Instead,  having  acknowledged  and  submitted  to  

the  new  reality  of  his  life  and  marriage,  he  begins  to  move  beyond  it  and  into  a  sense  of  satisfaction.  

He   turns   to   Molly   and   “[kisses]   the   plump   mellow   yellow   smellow   melons   of   her   rump,   on   each  

plump  melonous  hemisphere,  in  their  mellow  yellow  furrow,  with  obscure  prolonged  provocative  

melon-­‐smellonous  osculation.”78  In  the  end  he  responds  to  Molly’s  adultery  by  continuing  to  affirm  

his  own  desires  and  her  as  the  object  of  his  desire.  He  has  gone  under  and  overcome.  

Bloom  and  Dedalus:  Synthesis  

Both   Leopold   Bloom   and   Stephen   Dedalus   exhibit   in   their   respective   lives   certain  

characteristics  or  attitudes  that  resonate  with  particular  dimensions  of  Nietzsche’s  philosophy.  At  

the   same   time,   it   seems   problematic   to   read   either   Bloom   or   Stephen   individually   as   completely  

capturing   the   spirit   of   Nietzsche’s   thought,   as   both   men   leave   certain   Nietzschean   themes  

untouched.   For   the   most   part,   Bloom   seems   to   express   Nietzsche’s   ideal   of   the   individual   who  

understands  his  own  life  without  reference  to  some  higher  realm  or   religious  hope  (in  other  words,  

to   nihilistic   thinking).   He   seems   to   know   that   God   is   dead.   And   he   seems   to   be   more   willing   to  

encounter   and   suffer   the   tragedies   of   life   without   having   the   need   to   escape   or   negate   them;   on   the  

contrary,   Bloom   is   by   comparison   more   than   willing   to   accept   his   failures   and   the   failures   of   others  

for   what   they   are.   However,   what   seems   to   be   relatively   absent   from   Bloom’s   life   (that   is,   from   a  

Nietzschean   perspective)   is   the   spirit   of   negation   that   says   “I   will,”   and   the   spirit   of   creative  

transformation   that   creates   new   values.   Bloom   exhibits   some   aspects   of   a   Nietzschean   attitude  

towards  life  fairly  clearly,  while  other  key  dimensions  are  more  difficult  to  identify  in  his  character.  

                                                                                                                       
78
 Ibid,  735  
Miller  36  
 

What  is  less  clear  in  Stephen’s  case  it  whether  his  actions  really  indicate  that  he  has  yet  

truly  overcome  himself  on  a  personal  level.  He  possesses  self-­‐confidence,  as  evidenced  in  his  

willingness  to  challenge  the  respected  literary  establishment  and  their  views  of  Shakespeare,  as  

well  as  create  his  own  theory  of  art  in  the  Scylla  and  Charybdis  episode,  yet  it  appears  that  he  still  

feels  compelled  to  construct  his  new  cosmological  framework  from  “legitimate”  philosophical  

and/or  religious  doctrines  and  ideas,79  suggesting  that  he  has  not  completely  given  up  on  the  idea  of  

the  “true  world”  that  Nietzsche  claims  is  a  fable.  Perhaps  the  most  telling  indicator  of  Stephen’s  

current  condition  is  the  fact  that  he  appears  to  be,  like  the  great  artificer  Daedalus,  searching  for  a  

way  to  “escape”;  his  efforts  could  be  interpreted  as  a  attempt  to  fashion  wings  which  will  allow  him  

to  fly  away  from  the  unpleasant  realities  of  his  life  –  his  lack  of  success  as  an  artist,  his  father  

Simon’s  disapproval,  and  his  ongoing  guilt  over  his  mother’s  death.  Such  an  attitude,  according  to  

Nietzsche,  is  not  reflective  of  one  who  has  fully  overcome  himself  in  affirming  this  life;  rather,  it  

reflects  a  lingering  despair  of  the  human  condition  that  is  not  übermenschlichkeit.  

This  is  precisely  the  point  where  Stephen’s  theory  of  Shakespeare  becomes  extremely  

informative  as  a  theory  of  Ulysses.  As  previously  said,  the  similarity  between  Stephen  and  Bloom  is  

frequently  acknowledged  throughout  Ulysses,  and  the  implicit  suggestion  is  that  there  is  a  father-­‐

son  dynamic  at  work,  both  in  terms  of  the  “resemblance”  of  the  two  men  and  in  terms  of  the  analog  

of  their  characters  in  The  Odyssey.  Following  the  drunken  reveling  of  Oxen  of  the  Sun,  Bloom  

prevents  Stephen  from  getting  into  a  fight  with  several  soldiers  at  the  end  of  Circe,  and  in  Eumaus  

the  connection  between  the  two  men  is  elicited  further:  “though  they  didn’t  see  eye  to  eye  in  

everything,  a  certain  analogy  there  somehow  was,  as  if  both  their  minds  were  travelling,  so  to  

                                                                                                                       
79
 I  have  argued  in  a  previous  paper  that  Stephen’s  “cosmology  of  the  artist”  is  itself  a  fusion  of  the  Catholic  
doctrine  of  consubstantiality  and  Aristotelian  materialism.  
Miller  37  
 

speak,  in  one  train  of  thought.”80  Following  their  walk  back  to  Bloom’s  house  from  the  cabman’s  

shelter  of  Eumaus,  the  catechistic  Ithaca  further  illuminates  a  connection  between  the  two  men:  

Did  Bloom  discover  common  factors  of  similarity  between  their  respective  like  and  unlike  

reactions  to  experience?  

Both  were  sensitive  to  artistic  impressions  musical  in  preference  to  plastic  or  pictorial.  Both  

preferred  a  continental  to  an  insular  manner  of  life,  a  cisatlantic  to  a  transatlantic  place  of  

residence.  Both  indurated  by  early  domestic  training  and  an  inherited  tendency  of  

heterodox  resistance  professed  their  disbelief  in  many  orthodox  religious,  national,  social  

and  ethical  doctrines.  Both  admitted  the  alternately  stimulating  and  obtunding  influence  of  

heterosexual  magnetism.81  

The  suggestion  is  both  that  there  is  a  fundamental  resemblance  between  Bloom  and  Stephen,  and  

that   their   minds   are   somehow   linked.   Furthermore,   the   doctrine   of   consubstantiality   that   is  

foundational  to  Stephen’s  theory  of  Shakespeare  would  suggest  in  the  case  of  Ulysses  that  if  indeed  

Bloom  and  Stephen  are  understood  figuratively  as  father  and  son,  then  figuratively  they  share  the  

same   substance.   The   implications   of   this   thought   with   regards   to   the   Nietzschean   frame   are  

particularly  fitting,  for  Nietzsche  envisions  the  true  self-­‐overcoming  mentality  as  a  fusion  of  all  the  

traits  which  Bloom  and  Stephen  respectively  exhibit.  Leopold  Bloom  and  Stephen  Dedalus,  read  as  

father   and   son   who   share   the   same   substance,   combine   to   create   a   picture   of   the   complete   life-­‐   and  

self-­‐affirming  individual  that  Nietzsche  envisions.  Bloom  undergoes  the  tragic  sufferings  of  life  and  

emerges   from   them   stronger;   Stephen   creatively   transforms   the   world   around   him.   Stephen  

negates   all;   Bloom   in   some   ways   does   not   “remember”   the   old   ways,   does   not   need   to   take   revenge  

                                                                                                                       
80
 Ulysses,  656  
81
 Ibid,  666  
Miller  38  
 

on  them.  The  two  are  meant  to  be  understood  as  one:  together,  they  constitute  the  whole  of  what  

Nietzsche  envisioned  in  the  übermensch,  the  man  who  has  overcome  himself.  

  Epilogue:  Molly  

It  is  fitting  that  Joyce  allows  Molly  to  have  the  last  word  in  Ulysses,  for  perhaps  nowhere  else  

is  the  idea  of  a  complete  and  wholehearted  affirmation  of  this  life  expressed  so  obviously  as  in  her  

final  monologue  in  the  Penelope  episode.  It  begins  with  the  “sacred  Yes-­‐saying”;  it  ends  with  the  

“sacred  Yes-­‐saying.”  Molly  says  “yes”  to  her  life  more  than  eighty  times  in  Penelope,  demonstrating  

the  attitude  of  an  individual  who  embraces  their  life,  such  as  it  is,  to  such  an  extent  that  they  would  

unhesitatingly  accept  the  opportunity  to  live  it  again,  exactly  as  it  was.  Of  all  the  characters  in  

Ulysses,  Molly  most  fully  captures  the  idea  of  Nietzsche’s  doctrine  of  eternal  recurrence  as  an  

existential  imperative,  and  as  a  diagnostic  tool  for  judging  one’s  own  approach  to  life.    

There  are  several  stylistic  aspects  of  Molly’s  monologue  that  lend  support  to  reading  her  

character  from  the  perspective  of  eternal  recurrence.  To  begin  with,  there  is  a  complete  lack  of  

punctuation:  while  there  seem  to  be  a  myriad  of  distinct  thoughts,  their  boundaries  are  unclear:  

they  merge  into  one  another  endlessly,  to  the  point  that  the  monologue  reads  like  a  single,  

continuous  sentence.  Apparently,  all  of  Molly’s  thoughts  are  interconnected:  there  is  not  one  that  is  

completely  distinct  separate  from  another.  This  seems  to  gesture  toward  Nietzsche’s  notion  of  the  

necessity  of  affirming  one’s  place  within  the  whole:  individual  lives,  like  individual  thoughts,  are  

never  completely  distinct  or  separate  from  the  whole,  but  rather  are  simply  a  part  of  the  unending  

flux,  and  of  the  process  of  becoming,  which  characterizes  the  world.  Molly’s  thoughts  endlessly  

become  other  thoughts.  In  addition  to  the  absent  boundaries  of  punctuation,  the  first  and  last  

words  of  her  monologue  are  identical,  suggesting  the  absence  of  an  absolute  beginning  or  ending.  It  

is  possible  to  reach  the  end  of  Molly’s  monologue  and  begin  again  immediately,  at  the  very  same  

place;  conceivably,  this  process  could  be  repeated  innumerable  times,  exactly  the  same  each  time.  
Miller  39  
 

This  idea  -­‐  of  the  possibility  of  endless  repetition  –  is  at  the  heart  of  Nietzsche’s  notion  of  eternal  

recurrence.  

Such  insights  add  to  the  significance  of  Molly’s  unhesitating  affirmation:  on  a  literal  level,  

she  affirms  the  realities  of  her  own  life.  She  is  not  oblivious  to  the  pain  of  life,  having  experienced  

tragedies  of  her  own,  including  a  number  that  she  shares  with  her  husband,  such  as  Rudy’s  death.  

Yet  she  realizes  on  some  level  (perhaps  unconsciously)  that  if  she  were  to  imagine  her  life  

happening  again  without  these  things  in  it,  she  would  in  fact  be  imagining  someone  else’s  life,  

wishing  to  live  someone  else’s  life,  rather  than  her  own.  Molly’s  monologue  is  one  continuous,  

never-­‐ending  reflection  on  everything  that  constitutes  her  life,  down  to  the  minutest  detail.  She  

reflects  on  old  landladies  and  her  youthful  romances,  the  loss  of  Rudy,  the  sexual  encounter  with  

Boylan  (indeed,  much  of  her  thought  is  devoted  to  comparing  Boylan  and  Bloom  in  various  ways),  

her  thoughts  about  Jews  and  Catholics,  and  in  the  end  her  love  for  Bloom  in  spite  of  his  failings  and  

shortcomings.  Molly  reflects  insightfully  on  the  whole  of  her  life,  and  concludes  that  it  is  worth  

saying  “yes”  to  it  unequivocally.    

On  a  symbolic  level,  which  is  potentially  more  significant  with  respect  to  the  idea  of  eternal  

recurrence,  Molly  unequivocally  says  “yes”  to  the  very  nature  of  life  itself,  to  life  as  a  whole,  and  not  

only  to  her  own  individual  life.  She  accepts  the  idea  of  endless  and  continual  change,  as  expressed  

stylistically  in  her  ever-­‐changing  and  morphing  thoughts.  Just  as  she  affirms  the  place  of  individual  

thoughts  within  the  transient  whole  of  her  own  thought,  she  accepts  the  place  her  individual  life  

within  the  larger  whole  of  life  itself,  within  the  whole  of  the  transient  world.  Finally,  she  embraces  

the  possibility  that  the  cycle  of  life  –  of  birth,  growth,  decay,  and  death  –  repeats  itself  over  and  

over,  innumerable  times,  just  as  her  collective  thought  might.  Such  a  person  as  Molly  is  alone  

capable  of  saying  to  the  proclaimer  of  eternal  recurrence:    


Miller  40  
 

“You  are  a  god,  and  never  have  I  heard  anything  more  divine.”82  

IV. Conclusion  

  Ulysses  is  a  dazzling,  captivating  novel  of  life-­‐affirmation,  of  self-­‐affirmation,  of  creative  

transformation.  It  is  an  affirmation  of  Joyce’s  past;  as  Richard  Ellmann  notes,  “Joyce  was  never  a  

creator  ex  nihilo83;  he  recomposed  what  he  remembered…”84  Stephen’s  theory  of  Shakespeare  is  

less  an  assertion  about  the  biographical  details  of  Shakespeare’s  life  than  a  claim  about  the  way  that  

an  artist’s  work  in  intrinsically  related  to  his  life.  Ulysses  is  also  Joyce’s  transformation  of  the  

ordinary,  commonplace  people  and  experiences  of  his  life,  past  and  present,  into  masterpiece  of  art.  

It  is  that  kind  of  book  that  Leopold  Bloom  imagines  writing  someday:  “a  miniature  cameo  of  the  

world  we  live  in.”85  It  is  a  stylistic  tour  de  force;  it  is  a  labyrinthine  maze  of  allusion;  it  is  an  epic;  it  is  

a  commentary  on  Irish  nationalism;  indeed,  Ulysses  is  all  this  and  much  more.  But  above  all,  it  is  an  

assertion  about  what  a  human  life  ought  to  look  like,  a  claim  about  the  kind  of  outlook  on  life  one  

must  adopt  to  truly  live:  taken  together,  Stephen,  Molly,  and  Leopold  Bloom  form  a  comprehensive  

picture  of  the  kind  of  powerful  approach  to  life  that  Joyce,  like  Nietzsche,  believes  is  alone  capable  

of  making  a  human  life  worth  living.  

                                                                                                                       
82
 The  Gay  Science,  section  341  
83
 Latin:  “from  nothing”  
84
 Ellmann,  364  
85
 Ulysses,  646  
Miller  41  
 

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