It is worth noting that despite the significant number of CSOs in the postSuharto era, their

sustainability was challenged by a substantial reduction in foreign

donor funding (Aspinall, 2010; Mietzner, 2012; Sakai, 2012). This was in contrast with

the previous era where some CSOs received foreign assistance, as mentioned earlier.

There are three reasons for this situation. Firstly, since 2004, Indonesia has been

considered a politically stable country. Secondly, since 2006, the status of the

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Indonesian economy has grown and Indonesia has become a lower-middle income

country. Thirdly, in 2009, the “Jakarta Commitment” was issued by the Indonesian

Government in agreement with 26 multilateral and bilateral agencies to channel their

financial support directly to the government. As a result, many CSOs experienced

financial constraints, particularly secular CSOs (Sakai, 2012). Therefore, I contend

that secular CSOs are less active than religious ones. FBOs are able to generate donors

from their adherents and use a variety of religious instruments such as their places of

worship (mosque, church) and religious alms giving (e.g. zakat) to attract donations.43

In the next section, I will demonstrate how it is mainly FBOs involved in disaster relief