The Limits of Modernist Art as a 'Weapon of the Cold War': Reassessing the Unknown

Patron of the Monument to the Unknown Political Prisoner

Author(s): Robert Burstow
Source: Oxford Art Journal, Vol. 20, No. 1 (1997), pp. 68-80
Published by: Oxford University Press
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/1360716
Accessed: 15-04-2020 23:50 UTC

REFERENCES
Linked references are available on JSTOR for this article:
https://www.jstor.org/stable/1360716?seq=1&cid=pdf-reference#references_tab_contents
You may need to log in to JSTOR to access the linked references.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide
range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and
facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
https://about.jstor.org/terms

Oxford University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access
to Oxford Art Journal

This content downloaded from 200.144.63.150 on Wed, 15 Apr 2020 23:50:45 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 The Iimits of Modernist Art as a 'Weapon of the Cold War':
reassessing the unknown patron of the Monument to the
Unknown Political Prisoner

ROBERT BURSTOW

So in the interest of Anglo-American Cultural Relations Part 1: The CIA in revisionist histories of
and the aesthetic unity of the West,
It is a far, far better thing that the Patron like the Prisoner
Abstract Expressionism
should remain completely invisible and anonymous.
The foundations of the revisionist project were laid by
from 'The Unknown Patron' poem by Sagittarius a series of essays published in the US in the climate of
The New Statesman & Nation, 19531
political disaffection and growing radicalism which
followed the Vietnam War and Watergate Affair.5
A familiar claim of revisionist historians of post-war
These writings connected the success of Abstract
American modernist painting is that during the Cold
Expressionist painting to the needs of an emergent
War, clandestine agencies of the United States Gov-
ruling class of liberal internationalists who wished to
ernment targeted it for use as a political weapon. My
promote an image of the US abroad as a free and
essay will briefly sketch the origins of this allegation
cultivated society. They argued that the export of such
and reassess its validity. I will then demonstrate that in
painting to Western Europe was intended to promote
one instance, at least, in the early years of that decade,
ideological values of individualism and freedom.
officials in American intelligence were in fact far less
adventurous in their artistic tastes and as interested in Furthermore, they demonstrated that the American
Right had meanwhile censored and suppressed art
European sculpture as American painting. The invol-
which was allegedly communistic.6 Their critiques of
vement of the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
certain forms of critical practice and institutional
in an international sculpture competition initiated in
1951 to commission a Monument to the Unknown patronage, challenged the pre-eminent accounts of
American art, particularly those offered by the critic
Political Prisoner provides evidence that they were far
Clement Greenberg and the Museum of Modern Art's
from committed to promulgating avant-gardism, as is
(MoMA's) Director of Collections, Alfred H. Barr, Jr.
often supposed. While not wishing to contest the broad
By and large, this early revisionism was a unified
conclusions of those revisionists who have argued that
enterprise - signalled in the literature by frequent
modernist art served the political aspirations of a
endorsements of preceding revisionist writings
certain American social class, a fuller understanding
which undermined claims for the critical potential of
of this failed attempt to realise a modernist monument,
the more advanced forms of American modernist art.
suggests a far more complex situation and a need to
One of the central insights of Eva Cockcroft's
rethink existing presumptions about the CIA's aes-
seminal essay 'Abstract Expressionism, Weapon of
thetic tastes. Notwithstanding a shift away from such
the Cold War' was to identify connections between
concerns in much of the most interesting recent
officers and trustees of the MoMA and government
scholarship on Abstract Expressionism,2 it remains
intelligence. However, Cockcroft only argued that the
instructive to establish as far as possible the conditions
which gave, or denied, propagandistic potentialMoMA to and the CIA performed functions which were
certain forms of modernism. Since the attempt to 'similar and, in fact, mutually supportive'.7 Soon after
build this monument spanned the whole of the in another well known essay David and Cecile Shapiro
made the bolder, but unsubstantiated, assertion that
1950s, it also offers valuable insights into the changing
the CIA actually funded Abstract Expressionism.8 As
political utility of modernist art in that decade. How-
ever, this essay will not consider the symbolic formfirm
of historical evidence is in short supply, the art
the winning monument, nor how its form mediated historical literature has subsequently tended to be
repetitive
the historical conditions of its production, subjects on and speculative.9 Nevertheless, assertions
which I have written elsewhere.3 Nevertheless, of mythe Agency's covert involvement in the promotion
conclusions should encourage us to modify, if of
notAbstract Expressionism have now become com-
monplace in Anglo-American arts journalism and
abandon, one of the most widely assimilated claims
of revisionist histories of the period.4 television.10 Although the early revisionists never spe-
cified exactly how or when the CIA intervened, it is
usually implied that its patronage of the American
avant-garde began about 1950 and continued through-
out the decade.

68 TmE OXFORD ART JRNAL - 20:1 1997

This content downloaded from 200.144.63.150 on Wed, 15 Apr 2020 23:50:45 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 In fact, the published allegations of CIA support for nent in the Museum's International Program.16 In
Abstract Expressionism have to date invariably been fact, their first exhibition to tour Europe with a
founded on just one or two sources, literally. One is significant number of Abstract Expressionist paintings
Thomas W. Braden's notorious article, provocatively was not until 1955-6.17 Meanwhile, Greenberg has
entitled 'I'm glad the CIA is "Immoral"'" where he said that he did not believe that government officials
explains how the CIA Division he led in the early would regard Abstract Expressionism as emblematic
1950s had funded international organizations of work- of liberal democracy. (This was, of course, a time
ers, students and intellectuals identified with the non- when moder art was under attack from the far Right
communist left to defeat those of the communist left. for being communistic.'1) He also maintained that it
For example, his division funded and placed agents was insufficiently accepted by an international cul-
within the Congress for Cultural Freedom (a Europe- tural elite to have promoted a positive image of the
based organization of intellectuals), placed another as US abroad until the mid-1950s.19 These factors must
an editor of the Congress' London-based politico- cast doubt on whether Abstract Expressionism could
cultural journal, Encounter, and even paid for the have served the CIA's political agenda earlier in the
Boston Symphony Orchestra to attend the Congress' decade.
International Festival of the Twentieth-Century Arts in All the usual difficulties of empirical historical
Paris in 1952 to play Russian music which was research are compounded when scrutinising the activ-
officially forbidden performance in the Soviet Union. ities of a secret service which may still wish to
That Braden had previously worked at the MoMA has obfuscate, mislead or simply keep mum. If we
often been cited by revisionists to link that institution accept Braden's account, which has so far proved
and American modernist art with the CIA's so-called reliable, although the CIA was extremely well
'cultural campaign'. The other source used by revi- funded and was particularly keen to influence Eur-
sionist art historians is Christopher Lasch's essay, 'The opean intellectuals, writers and artists, his division did
Cultural Cold War',12 which repeats many of Braden's not fund American painting, at least not during his
admissions and reveals the complex network of trusts two years in charge between 1952 and 1954.20 In fact,
and foundations which had been used to disguise he recalls that a suggestion was made to do so, but
covert CIA subsidy to the Congress and its affiliated Alfred Barr vetoed it. Although according even to one
organizations. However, despite the disturbing nature sympathetic commentator, Irving Sandler, 'Barr was
of Braden's and Lasch's revelations, and despite theaware of the need to combat Soviet expansion and of
regularity with which they have been invoked by the potential role of American art in this effort',21 it
revisionist art historians, neither of them makes anyseems Barr did not believe American painting was
reference to clandestine exploitation of the visual good enough in the early 1950s to be effective.22
arts.13
Moreover, Braden concurs with Greenberg's percep-
The revisionists' emphasis on the CIA's promotion tion that it would be overestimating the cultural
of Abstract Expressionism usually presupposes that sophistication of government officials to assume that
such art was supported by certain American critics they would have then associated avant-garde art with
and curators, and shipped abroad in disproportio- liberal democracy. Braden may have been only
nately large quantities throughout the 1950s by insti- slightly exaggerating when he claimed that no-one in
tutions such as the MoMA. Furthermore, if somewhat the CIA knew 'the difference between Socialist Real-
contradictorily, it presumes that these paintings were ism and finger painting'.23 Similarly, if we are to
politically serviceable to the liberalist cause either believe Cord Meyer, who worked in Braden's division
because formalist criticism had effectively rendered and later controlled it, he also denies having funded
them apolitical or, more commonly, because their American art, apparently oblivious to the irony that he
gestural abstract form was interpreted as emblematic regarded painters, unlike writers, as too individualistic
of Western freedom of expression or, more broadly, of to be of relevance to the ideological struggle.24
liberal democracy itself. However, the rebuttals of Although a recent British television documentary25
revisionism which have been made by some of those alleged that the Agency was the 'secret patron' of the
who have been demonized as cultural or intellectual MoMA's touring exhibition, Moder Art in the United
'cold warriors' - or by other historians on their behalf States, 'working covertly at several removes from the
- have helped to make clear that not all of these show's organizers and front men', no evidence was
presumptions are tenable. It is now evident that Alfred forthcoming and, even if this was the case, Abstract
Barr's liking for Abstract Expressionism was, in fact, Expressionism was only one facet of a wide-ranging
short-lived and never total, his critical account of it was selection of work. Furthermore, it is significant that
never formalist, and its exhibition and acquisition by this was not until 1955. At present, it seems unlikely
the MoMA was not particularly intensive.14 Indeed, that the CIA particularly targeted Abstract Expres-
Barr always preferred European modernism. The sionism, and that if they did fund exhibitions in which
MoMA's Director of Circulating Exhibitions, Porter it was included, that was only after it had come of age
McCray - who Cockcroft singled out as 'a particu- in the mid-1950s. Cancellation of the State Depart-
larly powerful and effective man in the history of ment's 1946 European touring exhibition which had
cultural imperialism'15 - correctly insists that controversially included abstract paintings, may have
Abstract Expressionism was never especially promi- made CIA officers more cautious.26 If the Agency was

THE OXFoRD ARTJOURNAL - 20:1 1997 69

This content downloaded from 200.144.63.150 on Wed, 15 Apr 2020 23:50:45 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
interested in exploiting the ideological resonance of involves, as a preliminary, securing royal patronage..., and
modernist art during the McCarthy years, we might a whole facade of bankers and big business men, not only
here but in U.S.A. ... He also hints that of course our
expect it to turn to those critically established 'Mas-
ters' of European modernism so admired by Barr. policy will not have to be too offensive to such people ... I
Indeed, the exhibition selected from the MoMA's am very sceptical - indeed, I see the beginning of the end
for any ideals I ever had for the I.C.A.... I do not believe
collections which accompanied the Congress for Cul-
that we could possibly maintain any degree of indepen-
tural Freedom's 1952 Paris festival was not of Abstract
dence if we become a charitable dependency of Big
Expressionism but of 'Masterpieces' of European Business ... I don't see a lot of cunning tycoons such as
modernism.27 Similarly, the competition for a Monu- Dolan associates giving immense sums of money to support
ment to the Unknown Political Prisoner, organized by an activity which they would rightly suspect of being
the Institute of Contemporary Arts (ICA) in London 'subversive'.33
in the early 1950s, offers further evidence of the CIA's
interest in European modernism. Despite Read's views, the Management Committee
accepted Kloman's proposal, attracted not only by the
opportunity to enhance the Institute's financial posi-
Part 2: The Monument to The Unknown tion but also its international reputation.34 Thereafter,
Political Prisoner the competition was organized more-or-less single-
handedly by Kloman, who worked without pay from
The ICA would have seemed an appropriate institu- an outside office. However, curiously, both Kloman
tion to organize a world-wide sculpture competition in and Dolan resigned long before there was any pros-
1951, given the unequalled international acclaimpect of Dolan's ambitious scheme coming to fruition
received by British modernist sculptors identified or the winning design in Kloman's sculpture competi-
with the Institute, above all, Henry Moore. Moreover, being built.
tion
the Institute's president, the poet and critic Herbert Despite a popular perception that the ICA had pro-
Read, was one of the internationally best known communist leanings, fuelled within days of the com-
apologists for contemporary sculpture.28 Yet, signifi- petition proposal by newspaper reports identifying
cantly, for the British 'advanced guard H.Q.'29 to Guy Burgess and Donald Maclean - Soviet defectors
sponsor such a competition was, in several respects, from British intelligence - as members of the Insti-
anomalous: firstly, thematic monumental sculpture tute, the theme of the competition accorded with the
was regarded by the international avant-garde as a prevailing liberal-leftism of the ICA's leadership. Both
Read
discredited genre - especially since its exploitation by and the Institute's vice-chairman, Roland Pen-
fascist and communist regimes - and, secondly, rose, had abandoned their pre-war communist alle-
however broadly framed, such a contemporary and giances and the idea of a monument celebrating the
explicitly political theme was out of keeping with the freedom of the individual may even have had some
Institute's early exhibition subjects. Nonetheless, appeal to Read's anarchist instincts. The competition
because of recurring financial deficits and fears that prospectus presented the theme in extremely broad
over-reliance on state subsidy would lead to artistic humanitarian and apolitical terms:
compromise, the Management Committee had agreed
The organisers ... wish to emphasise that the competition
to sponsor the competition as part of a more extensive
is international in scope, and that in their view the theme
fund-raising scheme devised by a public relations
should be regarded as of universal significance ... they have
company. The offer of extremely generous funding
felt a desire to have commemorated all those men and
for a competition on the theme of the 'Unknown
Political Prisoner' came from 'one or two American women who in our times have given their lives or their
liberty to the cause of human freedom.35
industrialists'.30 It was communicated by Anthony
J. T. Kloman who, as part of the fund-raising
Nevertheless, in a period when the liberal and con-
scheme, had recently been appointed as ICA Director
of Public Relations.31 Kloman, an American, was a servative Western press carried stories of Soviet labour
camps, of East German refugees flooding into West
former art gallery director and US cultural attache.
Berlin and of the killing and imprisonment of UN
The offer was especially problematic for Read who
(mostly US) forces by communist forces in Korea, the
loathed American capitalism and idealized the Insti-
tute as a 'microcosm of a modern, anarchistic theme was widely regarded as directed at the com-
munist bloc. The proposed sculpture was described as
society'.32 Indeed, Read had earlier privately
a 'monument to democracy'36 and even likened to the
expressed profound misgivings over the motives of
the PR firm's controversial Irish-American director: Statue of Liberty.37 Thus Read, as a pacifist, may have
felt further compromised having publicly refused 'any
participation, moral or physical, in war between East
.. approaches ... have been made to us by a certain Pat
and West'.38
Dolan ... He has offered, on terms, to get us all the money
we need, and is confident that he can raise half a million for The prestige and integrity of the competition were
a British equivalent of the Museum of Modern Art. I don't undoubtedly enhanced by both Read's and Moore's
want to raise the question of his bona fides ... if you sup membership of the Central Committee39 and presence
with the devil you must use a long spoon. Dolan's scheme at the first press conference in early 1952 (Fig. 1).

70 THE OXFORD ART JOURNAL - 20:1 1997

This content downloaded from 200.144.63.150 on Wed, 15 Apr 2020 23:50:45 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Fig. 1. Central Committee for the Unknown Political
Prisoner Competition at the press announcement of the
Competition, Institute of Contemporary Arts, London, Jan-
uary 1951. Left to right: Roland Penrose, Henry Moore,
Herbert Read, Anthony Kloman and John Rothenstein.
I1'
(Photograph: Hulton Getty Picture Collection Ltd.)

According to later press reports, the competition drew

a huge response of 3500 entries, though many, no
doubt, were attracted by the unprecedented sum of Fig. 2. Reg Butler, Maquette for a Monument to the
?11500 prize money. Nevertheless, as a number of Unknown Political Prisoner, 1952, bronze sheet and wire
commentators noted, several of the most celebrated
on stone base. 45.7 cm.h. Collection Rosemary Butler.
western European sculptors were absent.4 The reason (Photograph: Rosemary Butler.)
may have been an unwillingness to risk their estab-
lished reputations or, as the Burlington Magazine
suggested,41 perhaps because in 'certain left-wing
artistic circles' there was a reluctance to be associated
with an event which failed to distinguish between
different types of political prisoners. The competition's
claim to be of 'universal significance' was further 'apotheosis' implied by the absence of the prisoner
undermined by the refusal of the Soviet Union and from his 'prison' and a heavenward soaring 'spire'
its satellite countries to participate. That sculptors(Fig. 2).
were permitted to enter from a number of right-wing Although the juries' bias towards the modernist
dictatorships suggests a confidence that the competi-entries was conspicuous at the Tate Gallery's exhibi-
tion theme was not directed primarily at them. tion of finalists and prize-winners, provoking some
Similarly, many sculptors from the US participated dissension among reviewers in the British newspaper
although, or perhaps because, the country was then inand periodical press, most professional critics
the grip of intense political persecution with theacknowledged the power and suitability of Butler's
McCarthy witch-hunts and public trials of allegedproject, even some of those who usually disparaged
communists. Most of the entries, finalists and, to an modernist art.4 But those publications representing
even greater extent, prize-winners were drawn frommore extreme opinions in matters of aesthetics and
the major post-war Western powers, especially Britain,politics were united in their opprobrium, bringing the
France, Italy and the US. The juries for the national pro-Stalinist Daily Worker into a strange alliance with
elimination contests and for the final awards included The Times.43 The controversy was further inflamed by
internationally distinguished critics, curators and art a parliamentary protest against Butler's monument
historians, most notably Barr and Read, and consti- mounted by a group of forty, mostly Conservative,
tuted an unmistakable bias in favour of modernist art. MPs, with the public support of the Prime Minister
The British sculptor Reg Butler was awarded the Sir Winston Churchill, and by a premeditated attack
Grand Prize for a design which ingeniously integrated on Butler's maquette in the Tate by an apparently
forms derived from the architecture and instruments outraged Hungarian refugee artist who, ironically,
of imprisonment, execution, surveillance and electro- claimed to be a former political prisoner of the
nic broadcasting, with a suggestion of escape or communists.

THE OxFORD ART JOURNAL - 20:1 1997 71

This content downloaded from 200.144.63.150 on Wed, 15 Apr 2020 23:50:45 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 Prior to the award of the Grand Prize to Butler, an
offer to site the full-scale winning monument in West
Berlin had been made by the city's mayor, Dr Ernst
Reuter, who had been among the staunchest anti-
communist liberals at the Congress for Cultural Free-
dom's inaugural conference in Berlin in 1950. Reuter
was 'anxious to have something to equal the effect' of
East Berlin's recently erected, colossal Soviet Victory
Monument.44 As the most distant outpost of capitalist
democracy, and the recent focus of Cold War tension
with the blockade and airlift, this was the most
provocative site imaginable, producing disquiet from
some members of the ICA's Advisory Council that this
would 'exaggerate the political implications of the
competition' and make it 'a source of international
friction'.45 This did not prevent the scheme proceeding
and in 1956 a hill-top site was made available on the
edge of the British occupied zone from where the
Monument, at a proposed height of 100-200 feet,
would be visible from a great distance, dramatically
overlooking the Soviet sector, as envisioned in Butler's
photomontages4 (Fig. 3).
The anonymous donor had been described at the
first press conference as 'an internationalist whose
primary interest is the arts and one who has for a
long time done much in a quiet way to assist artists
and art organisations in general'.47 His identity was a
topic of speculation only in the less liberal sections of
the press: an editorial in the connoisseural Apollo
magazine declared: '. . . the whole thing was a
clever piece of propaganda showmanship for abstract
art, financed from some source which had an interest
in this modernism . . .',4 while the Daily Worker
identified the competition less ambiguously as an
'American attempt to embroil sculptors in the Cold
War'.4 The donor was, in fact, the American oil
millionaire, John Hay Whitney, whose business,
political and philanthropic interests were manifold,
including ownership of a charitable foundation and a
venture capital company, both ten million dollar
funds.5 As a collector of early modernist art, Whitney
was a long-standing trustee and benefactor of the
MoMA who, like other liberals, understood its collec-
tion in political terms as a symbol of the 'freedom ...

-=.. v

Fig. 3. Photomontage made by Reg Butler showing the Working Modelfor the Monument on the proposed site, the Humboldt
Hohe, Wedding, West Berlin, 1957. (Photograph: Rosemary Butler.)

72 THE OXFORD ART JOURNAL - 20:1 1997

This content downloaded from 200.144.63.150 on Wed, 15 Apr 2020 23:50:45 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
fundamental to a democratic society'.51 A moderate Whitney and Kloman are most likely to have had
Republican and one of the party's chief financiers, mutual, long-standing acquaintances - whose iden-
Whitney, like his close friend Eisenhower, was an tities they might have wished to conceal - through
internationalist, supportive of the 'Open Door' policy their common membership of the Office of Strategic
which rejected pre-war isolationism and sought Services (OSS), the wartime forerunner of the CIA.
increased US stability and prosperity through One such shared friend was the American public
increased political, economic and cultural contact relations consultant, Patrick Dolan, who had intro-
with the non-communist world.52 As an ardent anglo- duced Kloman to the London ICA. Dolan, whom
phile, Whitney's endeavours were rewarded in 1957 Herbert Read so distrusted, had been the Chief of
when Eisenhower, as president, made him the ambas- OSS 'Morale Operations Europe', engaged in various
sador to Great Britain. Thus, in its international scope, forms of psychological warfare, and had remained a
its organization in Britain, its bias towards modernist contact in Britain for American intelligence after the
art and its theme of individual freedom, the sculpture- war.61 Whitney's, Kloman's and Dolan's membership
competition seemed to have Whitney's personal stamp of the OSS provides a notable precedent for their later
upon it. The cost of the competition would have been involvement in government intelligence. Whitney had
insignificant beside his wealth. That he wished for other friends and business associates who, as OSS
anonymity is not surprising given his general dislike of veterans, had remained professional intelligence offi-
publicity and the particular risk that he might again cers and risen to high-rank in the CIA.62 In the 1960s,
become the target of attacks from the Republican far Whitney himself was directly linked with the Agency's
Right - Senator Dondero's notorious congressional covert operations when the New rork Times claimed
denunciations of moder art had already lambasted that he had served on the board of the CIA proprietary
the MoMA when Whitney was Chairman of the board Radio Free Europe, a propaganda station broadcasting
of Trustees.53 His identity as the patron of the to the Eastern bloc, and identified one of his charitable
competition was a well kept secret known to few trusts as a CIA 'front'.63 That the CIA was involved in
beyond Kloman.54 this competition is, in fact, no longer a matter of
However, confidential correspondence exchanged conjecture: in 1958 Whitney passed to the Assistant
between the chief organizers of the competition reveals Deputy Director of the Clandestine Service, Richard
that interest in the monument actually extended far Helms,6 material pertaining to the monument, refer-
beyond Whitney and uncovers a complex, duplicitous ring to it as 'the Kloman matter with which you are
and compromising story. Firstly, it suggests that familiar', and requesting a meeting in Washington.65
Kloman consistently exaggerated the number of The CIA's programme of psychological warfare
entries to the competition, possibly even to Whitney.55 against the Soviet Union and its satellite countries
Secondly, Alfred Barr emerges as a key figure in efforts began in earnest in late 1949, following Soviet attain-
to build the monument who sometimes acted as an ment of atomic capability. The previous year, Direc-
intermediary between Whitney and Kloman. Barr
tive 10/2 of the National Security Council had
regarded it as 'an international gesture of quite established the Office of Special Projects within the
exceptional artistic, moral and propaganda value',fledgling CIA to undertake 'covert operations' against
like Reuter relishing its contrast with the 'banal,
the USSR, including the diffusion of propaganda. The
pompous Soviet monuments in the Soviet sector of directive defined 'covert operations' as follows:
Berlin'.56 Thirdly, and most significantly, the corres-
pondence provides firm, though not unexpected,
... all activities . . . which are conducted or sponsored by
evidence that Whitney's role, apart from contributing
this Government against hostile foreign states or groups or
to the cost of the US preliminary at the MoMA wasin support of friendly states or groups but which are so
not all that it seemed. Barr evidently had some sense
planned and executed that any U.S. Government respon-
of this by early 1955 when he wrote to Kloman: sibility
'I for them is not evident to unauthorized persons and
that if uncovered the U.S. Government can plausibly
gather that Penrose and Butler are not at all aware that
the so-called donor's contribution was a very modest disclaim any responsibility for them.6
amount and that he was acting really as an anony-
mous front for the expenditure of funds coming from
In 1950, NSC-68 intensified these activities, calling
quite another source . . 57 Kloman's and Whitney's
for 'a non-military counter-offensive against the
letters contain repeated references to some third
USSR including covert economic, political, and
parties who are described as 'the original backers' or,
psychological warfare to stir up unrest and revolt in
more enigmatically, as 'our old friends', though always
the satellite countries'.67 That year, US Congress
coded within scare quotes. These 'friends' also voted $111 millions for anti-Soviet activities in the
declared their hope that the monument would have field of ideas which had to be spent by the end of
'valuable propaganda and publicity use'.5 It is evident
June 1951.6 The CIA's Clandestine Service, by then
that the so-called 'friends' had been involved in the known as the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC),
project from the beginning: according to Barr, played a key role in implementing this directive.69
Kloman had been 'commissioned' to organize theBetween 1949 and 1952, according to one historian of
competition59 and, according to Kloman, the backersthe CIA, 'In concept, manpower, budget, and scope
had 'entirely approved' the original prospectus.60 of activities, OPC simply skyrocketed'.70 The OPC

TE OXFORD ARTJOURNAL - 20:1 1997 73

This content downloaded from 200.144.63.150 on Wed, 15 Apr 2020 23:50:45 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
assigned projects from Washington to their overseas contrasted distinctly with that of his reactionary pre-
'field stations' which employed large numbers of decessor, General Walter Bedell Smith. Dulles, Helms
contract personnel. Their projects frequently targeted and Wisner - who collectively headed covert activities
Soviet refugees and emigres in Central Europe, such throughout the period that efforts to erect the monu-
as through the creation in 1950 of Radio Free Europe, ment continued - were not only professionally and
regarded internally as one of their most successful socially well connected, they were, as it happens, old
initiatives. The OPC's director, Frank Wisner, exer- friends who had all served together in the same OSS
cised almost absolute control over their activities and unit in Berlin at the end of the war where they shared
liked boastfully to compare his propaganda operation a perception of the Soviet Union as the main threat to
to a 'mighty Wurlitzer' on which he could play any post-war America.76
tune he wished.7' After the CIA's reorganization in If the CIA's Clandestine Service conceived this
project, as seems almost certain, it should not b
1952, Wisner continued to head an enlarged Clandes-
tine Service with Richard Helms - Whitney's known
understood as acting narrowly in the interests of th
contact- as his second-in-command. Braden later US Government. G. W. Domhoff's thesis that an
identified these two as among the five officers American
'who national social upper class owns or controls
over the next fifteen years were to conceivethe and
entire State and cultural apparatus (including the
manage the major US intelligence operations against
CIA, of course) has been usefully developed by Fred
the Soviet Union'.72 Orton, who has emphasized the division within that
Although extremely small beer in terms ofruling
the class between the conservative, nationalist,
OPC's resources, the theme and European orientationisolationist 'old guard', personified by McCarthy
and
of the sculpture competition were in keeping with the Dondero, and the sophisticated, internationalis
'business liberals', like Rockefeller and Whitney.77
activities of the Clandestine Service, resembling those
later undertaken by Braden's division, of which Thismoredivision was also apparent within the ranks o
the CIA in the early 1950s where the powerful
is known. Their operations spotlit Stalinist oppression
by subsidising the performance and publication in positions
the occupied by Dulles, Helms and Wisner
West of those forms of European culture whichwere wereindicative of the ascendancy of liberals over the
proscribed in the East. Indeed, the use of Whitney conservative
as a 'old guard', personified by Dulles' mili-
tary predecessor. The presence of well educated,
'front' conformed to Wisner's policy of co-operating
liberal-minded lawyers and academics like Braden
with wealthy individuals. Kloman's brief appointment
to the ICA even resembles the infamous placing and of a Meyer in senior posts in the Agency was the
CIA 'agent' as co-editor of the journal Encounter. result
Both of a change in recruitment policy after about
of these high-risk projects seemed to have involved1950. When the McCarthy witch-hunts turned on the
CIA, Dulles and his new recruits fought a vigorous
infiltrating contract personnel into British cultural
organizations dominated by leftist, but non-commu- and successful defence, contributing to the Agency's
public
nist, politics (while allowing the host organizations a reputation as a comparatively liberal, 'free-
high degree of autonomy in their affairs). Braden thinking' institution, in striking contrast to Hoover's
FBI.78
believed that this policy was highly successful, claim-
ing that 'the Boston Symphony Orchestra won more There would, no doubt, have been considerable
acclaim for the US in Paris than John Foster Dulles or
attraction for these liberal Agency officers in a project
Dwight D. Eisenhower could have brought with for aamodern-day 'Statue of Liberty' commemorating
hundred speeches'. The three ground rules for thehis
victims of what Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., in the
bible of Cold War liberalism, had recently identified
'fronts' were to use 'legitimate, existing organizations',
'protect the integrity of the organization by as not
the ultimate symbol of totalitarianism, the concen-
tration camp.79 These officers could also be expected
requiring it to support every aspect of official Amer-
ican policy' and, above all, 'limit the money to
to approve a project which encouraged a form of
amounts private organizations can credibly spend'.73 Western art proscribed in the Soviet Union. The
His Chief of Operations, Wisner, particularly extolled high international prestige of British modernist sculp-
the advantages of forming collaborative arrangements ture made the ICA an attractive sponsor, while its
with the richest members of the American bourgeoi- financial plight made it susceptible to foreign
sie, declaring that it was 'essential to secure the overtadvances. Moreover, here was an opportunity to
cooperation of people with conspicuous access to
penetrate a British institution known to have attracted
wealth in their own right'.74 Contact with this privi- communist sympathizers. Dolan and Kloman, as OSS
leged social class was facilitated by Wisner's veterans own living in Britain who had connections with
independent wealth and was further extended in
American art galleries, who shared a sympathy for
early 1951 by the appointment of Allen Dulles to
modernist art and an antipathy to British left-wing
oversee the merger of clandestine operations. As politics, would have been well suited and placed to
former New York lawyers, Wisner and Dulles socia- implement such a project.80 But in a period when
lized with the East Coast elite, Dulles, for example, conservative paranoia feared modern art as a commu-
using the same New York club as Whitney.75 After nistic threat, Dulles and his officers would have
1953, as the first civilian Director of Central Intelli- needed to be circumspect in any attempt to use it as
gence, Dulles' high public profile in such circles part of their covert offensive. US government sponsor-

74 THE OXFORD ART JOURNAL - 20:1 1997

This content downloaded from 200.144.63.150 on Wed, 15 Apr 2020 23:50:45 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
ship of the ICA would certainly have been controver-
sial in the early 1950s, not only outside the Agency but
also inside it. Management of the project by the CIA
would have circumvented possible Congressional cen-
sure from right-wing Republicans like Dondero, while
the OPC's relative autonomy within the Agency's
highly compartmentalized structure, especially at the
time the project was initiated, meant that OPC
projects did not require authorization from the State
or Defense Departments (with whom they normally
liaised directly), or even from the DCI, then Bedell
Smith, who is most unlikely to have approved it.81
However, what must have seemed to 'the friends' a
very promising project did not have the planned
outcome. Four months after Butler's victory, the back-
ers withdrew their support,82 leaving Kloman and
Whitney in an extremely awkward and embarrassing
situation. Their reasons were plain, as Kloman com-
municated to Whitney: 'Unfortunately, the carpet was
pulled out from under my feet too soon by our
"friends" who lost interest because they considered
the Butler sculpture too ultra modern [my italics]'.83 It
seems that although sophisticated East Coast liberals
in the CIA shared similar political beliefs and social
backgrounds to Barr and others who financed and
managed the MoMA at this time, they did not
necessarily accept, as both Greenberg and Braden
have indicated, the most extreme forms of modernist
art as emblematic of liberal democracy.4 (Perhaps the
backers anticipated that the Grand Prize would be
won by a more moderate 'humanistic' modernist, like
Henry Moore for example?85) The backers' withdra-
wal meant that Whitney and Kloman - who for two
years had stalled and misled an uncomprehending
ICA Management Committee6 - now appeared to
have reneged on their promise to provide funds for the
erection of the winning monument. Barr suggested to
Kloman how the dibacle might be explained: '.. . you
could point out that the reason the "corporate" funds
were not forthcoming was the direct consequence of
the British reception of the prize-winning design
...87 But whereas Barr lamented the negative reac-
tion of the British press, Whitney shared the backers'
dislike of Butler's vanguardism.'8 By 1956, with
Kloman desperate to get Whitney and himself 'off
the hook' and 'the friends' acknowledging their pre-
dicament,89 Kloman briefly rekindled their interest in
the monument, though they now offered only one
tenth of the cost and insisted on a site in Berlin. For
two years Kloman chased additional funds90 until his
activities were again curtailed by 'pressure from
Washington'.9' Amid new, and somewhat perverse,
complaints from the backers about the 'monumental
size' of Butler's proposed monument,92 and after a visit
to the capital, Kloman acknowledged that their com-
mitment was permanently lost, blaming: 'Changes in
administration, lack of funds and the feeling that the
Germans can pretty well afford to do what they want
now . . .',93 Whitney even intervened directly, taking
the matter to a higher level in Washington than
Kloman was able to, perhaps to Dulles or, quite
THE OXFRD ART JOURNAL - 20:1 1997
This content downloaded from 200.144.63.150 on Wed, 15 Apr 2020 23:50:45 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
conceivably, to his friend the President.9 But without
success: in 1960, what little support there was in West
Germany collapsed and the newspapers finally pro-
nounced the scheme dead.95
Kloman's explanation of this second and final
cancellation of the monument project is revealing, if
incomplete. By 1958, Wisner's influence in the Clan-
destine Service had weakened9 and there had been
fundamental changes in the nature of the Cold War.
Despite periodic international crises - most notably
Hungary and Suez in 1956 when the project was
briefly resurrected - with the liberalizations of the
Krushchevian Thaw both superpowers increasingly
sought 'peaceful coexistence'. Although Berlin
remained a sensitive diplomatic issue,97 the new eco-
nomic and political stability of West Germany,
together with the fear of growing Soviet influence in
the Middle East, produced a marked shift in US
foreign policy. The Eisenhower Doctrine of 1957,
formulated by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles
(brother of the DCI, Allen Dulles), signalled a change
in the perceived threat of 'International Communism'
away from Europe. The monument had now become
politically anomalous since a piece of blatantly anti-
Soviet propaganda standing over one hundred feet
high in this focal city of East-West relations would
have constituted an unwanted embarrassment in a
period of detente. Moreover, the concomitant relaxation
of Zhdanovian artistic doctrines in the Eastern bloc
undermined those arguments advanced by Western
liberals that modernist art was the exclusive preroga-
tive of capitalist democracy, and thereby diminished
the ideological significance of the monument's mod-
ernist form. Indeed, with hindsight, it is possible to see
that Stalin's death, just nine days before the interna-
tional jury deliberated, had effectively rendered their
task obsolete.
Subtler methods of exerting an international influ-
ence now replaced the competition's covert, interven-
tionist and rather heavy-handed attempt. By the mid
1950s, Abstract Expressionism had been linked to
values of individual freedom (through Rosenberg's
and later Barr's writings) and was accepted critically
abroad. By then, the founding of the State Depart-
ment's US Information Agency in 1953 had estab-
lished a legitimate mechanism for exporting American
culture to Europe, although one still vulnerable to
right-wing criticism of State support for allegedly
communist artists. With McCarthy's death and Don-
dero's retirement in 1956, there was greater freedom in
the export of contemporary American art. However, as
Cockcroft has correctly observed, the MoMA's pri-
vately funded Circulating Exhibitions programme,
which had operated on an international scale since
1952, could not be attacked on these grounds. By the
later 1950s the American liberal bourgeoisie was
aligning itself with the conspicuous individualism of
its native modernist art, rather than with European
modernism. As the US Ambassador in London,
Whitney now welcomed public identification with
the American art which the MoMA sent to Europe
75
and was photographed for the press at openings of the
Whitechapel's 1958 Jackson Pollock exhibition and the
Tate Gallery's 1959 exhibition of The New American
Painting (Fig. 4).
Whitney and the CIA's combined involvement in
the monument project demonstrates their common
interest in the political and economic power of an
expanding class of internationalist 'business liberals'.
Behind the competition's vaunted 'internationalism'
- further evidenced by Kloman's proposal to append
'International' to the ICA's title98 - lay the prospect
that modernism might enhance the cultural unity of
the capitalist West and, in turn, economic and political
unity. That a romantic idealist like Herbert Read was
persuaded to give the ICA's backing to such purposes
was a measure of their financial desperation; that the
Institute should have unknowingly become the reci-
pient of US government funds was a much crueller
irony. Read would certainly have been dismayed had
he known the full extent to which the ICA had
ultimately been complicit in the game of securing
international markets for American 'Big Business'. Yet
far from indicating any unified conspiracy, the failure
of the monument to be realized illuminates significant
differences between the parties in this uneasy alliance,
Fig. 4. Ambassador . H. Whitney (secondfrom right) with
specifically in respect of their valuation of the more
Sir John Rothenstein, Director of the Tate Gallery, (left),
extreme forms of modernist art. While the involve-
Gabriel White, Director of Visual Arts, Arts Council,
ment of major international institutions and critics of
(second from left) and M. Staer, U.S. Cultural Attache,
modernist art gave the competition prestige, and (right) at the opening of The New American Painting
modernist styles of sculpture were appropriate sig-
exhibition, Tate Gallery, London; photograph from
nifiers of democracy for specialist professionals like
Queen, 3 March 1959. (Photograph: The National
Kloman and Barr, for the backers the acceptability ofMagazine
a Company.)
modernist monument seemingly remained dependent
on the reaction of the popular press and, perhaps
more importantly, of Churchill's Conservative Govern- not have approved.)' As it was, speculation - or even
ment. Perhaps 'the friends' underestimated the artisticapparent knowledge - that American industrialists
adventurousness of their agent, Kloman, or their had financed the competition did not, it seems, prove
sponsor, the ICA or overlooked the probable conflict damaging to its perception by most Western commen-
between modernist innovation and public expecta- tators. However, for the monument to appear to have
tions of a traditional commemorative monument. In the universality of meaning that was claimed for it,
any case, the backers' abandonment of the project in while serving to inflame anti-communist sentiment
the face of hostile public opinion, and their sub- (with little apparent concern for political injustices of
sequent prevarication during the political Thaw,any other kind), it could not be openly identified with
demonstrates a cautious mix in Washington of con- the US Government. This deception was essential to
servatism and pragmatism. preserve the illusion that governments in the 'Free
Given their similar political outlook, there may World' did not exploit culture for political gain, unlike
seem little distinction to be made between Whitney's their Cold War adversaries. Yet resorting to a strategy
funding of cultural propaganda with his own private of elaborate concealment and financial inducement in
fortune and the CIA's with the resources of the State. order to obtain the cooperation of artists and cultural
Anyway, Whitney's close relationship with the Repub- managers - before terminating their services for
equally expedient reasons - would not have found
lican Party is typical of the manner in which the power
of governments may be deeply enmeshed with the favour with those like Read who believed that Stalin-
influence of wealthy individuals. But a separation of ism would be best defeated through the West's
the spheres of the 'private' and the 'public' is a potent exemplary behaviour. When the agents of a suppo-
and useful myth, and one which 'the friends' evidently sedly liberal and democratic government adopt sim-
wished to exploit. Although the project would have ilar exploitative methods and aesthetic prejudices to
been legitimized by NSC directives issued under the the regimes they profess to oppose, we have good
authority of Truman's Democratic administration, it cause to reflect on the contradictions of Cold War
might not have met with Congressional approval. liberalism. Once the source of the competition's
(Braden has admitted that the Clandestine Services 'corporate' funds is uncovered, the monument loses
frequently undertook projects which Congress would all pretence to universality; the implied political

76 THE OXFORD ART JOURNAL - 20:1 1997

This content downloaded from 200.144.63.150 on Wed, 15 Apr 2020 23:50:45 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 identity of the gaolers of the 'Unknown Political Notes
Prisoner' is only too apparent. Indeed, the competi-
tion theme is revealed, not as a disinterested humani- 1. 28 March 1953, p. 362.
tarian ideal, but as a rhetorical device to naturalise the 2. For example, T. J. Clark, 'In Defense of Abstract Expressionism',
idea of 'International Communism' as the threat to October, no. 69, Summer 1994, pp. 23-48; M. Leja, Reframing Abstract
Expressionism: Subjectivity and Painting in the 1940s (Yale University Press:
liberal democracy.
New Haven and London, 1993).
Yet evidence for the CIA's involvement in this
3. See my earlier essay 'Butler's Competition Project for a Monument to
particular project does not lend credence to the idea The Unknown Political Prisoner: Abstraction and Cold War Politics', Art
that Abstract Expressionist painting was similarlyHistory, vol. 12, no. 4, December 1989, pp. 472-96. The winning project is
used in the early 1950s, since this competition haddiscussed further in my unfinished doctoral dissertation.
4. Since writing the first draft of this paper I have seen Michael
an explicitly political theme and attempted to deployKimmelman's essay, 'Revisiting the Revisionists: The Modem, its critics
primarily European modernist art in the propaganda and the Cold War', in The Museum of Modem Art at Mid-Century: At Home
offensive. A misplaced emphasis in revisionist scholar-and Abroad Studies in Modern Art 4 (MoMA: New York, 1994) which also
ship has perhaps blinded us to the attempted exploita-points out inaccuracies and misconceptions in the revisionist literature,
tion of European art in the Cold War. Contrary to thethough his argument is focused on the alleged r8le of the MoMA whereas
my own is focused on the CIA. However, our conclusions are very different.
orthodoxy of revisionist histories, in this early, unso- 5. See M. Kozloff, 'American Painting during the Cold War', Artforum,
phisticated effort, it was the longer established Eur-vol. 11, no. 9, May 1973, pp. 43-54; E. Cockcroft, 'Abstract Expressionism:
opean forms of modernist art, with their secure critical Weapon of the Cold War', Artforum, vol. 12, no. 10, June 1974, pp. 39-41; J.
acceptance in the West and equally certain criticalTagg, 'American Power and American Painting', Praxis, vol. 1, no. 2, Winter
1976, pp. 59-79; D. & C. Shapiro, 'Abstract Expressionism: the Politics of
rejection in the East, which seemed most likely to offer
Apolitical Painting', Prospects, no. 3,1977, pp. 175-214; S. Guilbaut, 'The
powerful ammunition in 'the battle for the mind of New Adventures of the Avant-Garde in America', October, no. 15, Winter
Europe'. This is consistent with both Barr's and 1980, pp. 61-78; all except Tagg are reprinted in F. Frascina (ed.) Pollock
Greenberg's reservations about the limited propagan-and After: The Critical Debate (Harper & Row: London, 1985). See also S.
distic potential of American painting in the early 1950sGuilbaut, How New rork Stole the Idea of Modem Art: Abstract Expressionism,
Freedom, and the Cold War (University of Chicago: Chicago, 1973).
and, in fact, more in accord with the prevailing tastes
6. See W. Hauptmann, 'The Suppression of Art in the McCarthy
of Barr and other curatorial staff at the MoMA. Still
Decade', Artforum, vol. 12, no. 2, October 1973, pp. 48-52; J. de Hart
more revealing of the CIA's position is their earlyMathews, 'Art and Politics in Cold War America', American Historical
withdrawal of support from Butler's Monument Review, vol. 81, no. 4, October 1976, pp. 762-87.
because of its controversial 'ultra-modern' style. 7. Cockcroft, 'Abstract Expressionism: Weapon of the Cold War', p. 40.
8. D. and C. Shapiro; Abstract Expressionism: The Politics of Apolitical
Kloman explicitly blamed the project's terminationPainting', p. 207.
on 'the Philistine views of a very few in control at the 9. Of the key revisionist texts cited above, Kozloff, Cockcroft, Tagg, D.
time'.10 If Butler's semi-abstract design, deeply rootedand C. Shapiro and Guilbaut (1983) refer to the CIA. Although Guilbaut
in European modernist antecedents, was found unac- makes no explicit claims here about the Agency's activities, he hints that it
may have contributed to the funding of an exhibition of American artists at
ceptable by the CIA in 1953, how might we expect
the Galerie Maeght in Paris in spring 1947 (p. 150) and the journal Partisan
them to have regarded Pollock's or Newman's lessReview in early 1948 (p. 165), though he is unable to offer firm evidence for
scrutable inventions? The history of this monument either.
suggests that in the early 1950s when McCarthyism 10. Such claims were evident in several of the reviews of the exhibition
was at its height, despite the CIA's comparative'American Art in the Twentieth Century' at the Royal Academy of Arts,
liberalism in politics, in matters of aesthetics anLondon, and extended even to some of the more conservativejournals: see,
for example, S. Vincent, 'Cold War Warriors', The Antique Collector,
underlying populist conservatism excluded the more September 1993, p. 80. See also 'Art and the C.I.A.', in the series Hidden
ambitious forms of modernist art from their propa-Hands: A Different History of Modernism produced by Frances Stonor
ganda weaponry. Saunders, Channel 4, broadcast October-November 1995 (and the
accompanying booklet).
11. Thomas W. Braden, 'I'm Glad the C.I.A. is "Immoral"', Saturday
This is a revised version of the paper read at the 'Cold War
Evening Post, vol. 240, no. 10, 20 May 1967, pp. 10-14. Braden joined the
Culture' conference, University College London, in October CIA in 1950 and supervised the International Organizations Division
1994. I would like to thank David Blackmore for his between 1952 and 1954. His article responded to the New Tork Times
invaluable collaboration in this research and David Black- front-page exposes in 1966 and 1967 of the CIA's covert activities. It is cited

more, Steve Edwards and Fred Orton for their comments onby Cockcroft, D. and C. Shapiro and Guilbaut (1983).
12. Christopher Lasch, 'The Cultural Cold War', The Nation, no. 204,11
earlier versions of this paper and their useful suggestions,
September 1967, pp. 198-212; reprinted in B. J. Bernstein (ed.) Towards a
many of which have been incorporated into the paper. I amNew Past: Dissenting Essays in American History (Pantheon: New York, 1968),
indebted to Thomas Braden, Clement Greenberg, Joanpp. 353 ff. This essay is cited by Kozloff, D. and C. Shapiro and Guilbaut
Edwards, Ludwig Glaeser, Christina Lakin, Porter(1983).
McCray, Cord Meyer, Walter Pforzheimer and Ewan 13. Guilbaut, How New rork Stole the Idea of Moden Art (p. 150, fn. 174),
also refers toJ. Epstein, 'The CIA and the Intellectuals', New rork Review of
Phillips who have all given freely of their time in interviews.
Books, 20 April 1967, pp. 16-21; but, as the title suggests, this does not
I must also thank the Institute of Contemporary Arts,discuss CIA intervention in the visual arts.
London, the Museum of Modem Art, New rork, and the 14. Irving Sandler argues, with some justification, that Barr was slow to
J. H. Whitney Estate, New rork, for the use of theirpatronise Abstract Expressionism, was interested in the work of younger
artists by 1958 and that his post-war criticism was 'antiformalist'; see
archives. Lastly, my thanks are due to both the Arts Council
Introduction to I. Sandler and A. Newman (eds.) Defining Modem Art:
of Great Britain and the University of Derby for theirSelected Writings of Alfred H. Barr (Times Mirror Books: New York, 1986),
financial assistance with research in Canada and the US. pp. 44-5. Indeed, Barr's introductory essay to The New American Painting,

'E OXFORD ART JOURNAL - 20:1 1997 77

This content downloaded from 200.144.63.150 on Wed, 15 Apr 2020 23:50:45 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
MoMA International Circulating Exhibition of 1958-59, adopts an
existentialist interpretation. Helaine Ruth Messer has argued that Barr
did not value Abstract Expressionism highly; see H. R. Messer, 'MoMA:
Museum in Search of an Image' (unpublished PhD dissertation, Columbia
University, 1979), pp. 286-9 and 293-4.
15. Cockcroft, 'Abstract Expressionism: Weapon of the Cold War', p. 40.
16. McCray in conversations with D. Blackmore and the author, 18
October 1992, typescript pp. 18-19.
17. Modem Art in the United States: A Selection from the Collections of the
Museum of Modern Art, New rork was exhibited at galleries in several
European cities during 1955-6, including the Tate Gallery, London,
January-February 1956.
18. See especially George Dondero's Congressional speeches; reprinted
in C. Harrison and P. Wood (eds.) Art in Theory 1900-1990 (Blackwell:
Oxford, 1992), pp. 654-58.
19. R. Burstow, 'On Art and Politics: A Recent Interview with Clement
Greenberg', Frieze, no. 17, September/October 1994, p. 34.
20. Braden in conversations with D. Blackmore and the author, 16
October 1992, typescript pp. 4-7. The authenticity of Braden's account of
the Division's activities is confirmed by other former CIA officers; Cord
Meyer in conversations with D. Blackmore and the author, 16 October
1992, typescript p. 7. Indeed, Braden was ostracized after publishing his
notorious article: for example, according to Walter Pforzheimer (CIA
Legislative Counsel, 1946-56, and historian of the early CIA), Allen
Dulles (Director of Central Intelligence, 1953-61) refused to speak to
Braden after publication of the article and believed that he should not
have published the material for another twenty years; W. Pforzheimer in
conversations with D. Blackmore and the author, 16 October 1992.
21. Irving Sandler in Sandler and Newman (eds.), Defining Modern Art,
p. 46.
22. Braden in conversations with Blackmore and the author, 1992,
typescript p. 7.
23. Quoted inJ. S. Friedman, 'The Art that came in from the Cold', In
These Times, 9-15 January 1985, p. 13.
24. Meyer in conversations with Blackmore and the author, 1992,
typescript p. 8.
25. 'Art and the C.I.A.'. The programme and accompanying booklet
contain many historical inaccuracies, for example, claiming that this
exhibition and the 1958-9 touring exhibition The New American Painting
were organised by the Congress for Cultural Freedom, and that the 1952
Masterpieces of the 20th Century, which was sponsored by the Congress,
included Abstract Expressionist paintings. None of the contributors to the
programme, including three former CIA officers, claim explicitly that the
CIA supported Abstract Expressionism.
26. Advancing American Art was recalled while still in transit to Europe
after a right-wing attack. See T. D. Littlejohn and M. Sykes, Advancing
American Art: Painting, Politics and Cultural Coofrontation at Mid-Century
(University of Alabama Press, Tuscaloosa and London, 1989).
27. Masterpieces of the 20th Century, Musee de l'art Modere, Paris and
Tate Gallery, London, despite its title, the exhibition included a survey of
major European movements from Impressionism to Picasso.
28. For Read's importance to British sculpture see R. Burstow 'The
Geometry of Fear. Herbert Read and British Modem Sculpture', in B. Read
and D. Thistlewood (eds.) Herbrt Read. A British Vision of Word Art (Leeds
City Art Galleries in association with the Henry Moore Foundation and
Lund Humphries: London, 1993), pp. 119-49.
29. The description is from the London Evening Standard; see A. Massey,
'Cold War Culture and the ICA', Art &' Artists, no. 213, June 1984, p. 16.
30. See minutes of ICA Management Committee meeting, 23 May 1951,
ICA Archive, London. ?16000 was offered.
31. Kloman was described to the ICA Management Committee as the
brother-in-law of Philip Johnson of the MoMA (then Director of the
Architecture and Design Department), a New Englander who could
'deal with big business men ... not at all the aggressive type of American';
see minutes of ICA Management Committee meeting, 1 March 1951, ICA
Archive. Kloman had studied architecture at the University of Virginia and
had been Assistant Director of the Cocoran Gallery of Art in Washington,
DC. He was appointed in May 1951 and later became 'Director of
Planning' and 'Organizing Director'.
32. See D. Thistlewood, Herbert Read Formlessssn and Form: An Introduc-
tion to his Aesthetics (Routledge and Kegan Paul: London, 1984), p. 17.
33. H. Read letter to Philip James, Art Director of the Arts Council, 21
January 1951, Arts Council Archive, London.
78
This content downloaded from 200.144.63.150 on Wed, 15 Apr 2020 23:50:45 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
34. Minutes of ICA Management Committee meeting, 14 March 1951,
ICA Archive. The ICA received a fee of ?1000.
35. International Sculpture Competition: The Unknown Political Prisoner,
prospectus, np.
36. R. Melville, 'Miscellany: Exhibitions', Architectural Review, vol. 113,
no. 6751, March 1953, p. 203.
37. Daily Sketch, 18 March 1953.
38. H. Read and A. Comfort, letter to New Statesman &6 Nation,
published 13 November 1951, p. 158.
39. The Central Committee was chaired by Kloman, and comprised
three ICA officials - H. Read, R. Penrose and E. C. Gregory - and two
ICA Advisors, the Director of the Tate Gallery, Sir John Rothenstein, and
Henry Moore.
40. For example, Arp, Epstein, Giacometti, Laurens, Lipchitz, Marini,
Moore and Zadkine.
41. 'Editorial (B. Nicolson): A Modem "Ecce Homo"', The Burlington
Magazine, vol. XCV, no. 603, June 1953, p. 179. The point had been made
most forcefully by J. Berger; see 'The Unknown Political Prisoner', New
Statesman 6 Nation, vol. 45, no. 1150, 21 March 1953, p. 337.
42. See S. Bone, 'Unknown Political Prisoner: First Impressions of
Competition's Failure Confirmed', Manchester Guardian, 24 March 1953,
p. 5 orJ. Berger 'The Unknown Political Prisoner', p. 337.
43. J. Dudley, 'Art', Daily Worker, 28 March 1953; The Times, 22January
1953 and 13 March 1953.
44. 'International Sculpture Competition: The Unknown Political
Prisoner; Report to date 31 October 1952', Tate Gallery Archive, London.
45. Dr Alex Comfort and Misha Black; see minutes of AGM of ICA
Advisory Council, 7 September 1953, ICA Archive.
46. Will Grohmann set up an association chaired by Prinz Ludwig von
Hessen to promote the plan. The Akademie der Kunst published a supportive
statement in May 1956 written by one of its members, the poet Hans Egon
Holthusen. Butler visited Berlin in the first week of June 1957. Despite a
press campaign in Berlin against the Monument, the Berlin Senate offered
to donate a site. L. Glaeser in conversations with Blackmore and the
author, 17 October 1992, typescript pp. 3-4 and pp. 11-14, and L. Glaeser,
'Reg Butler: Monument for the Unknown Political Prisoner - Proposed
site in Berlin', unpublished statement written for A. H. Barr, June 1967, L.
Glaeser papers, Philadelphia.
47. Cited in 'International Sculpture Competition: The Unknown
Political Prisoner; Report to date 31 October 1952', Tate Gallery Archive.
48. Perspex, 'Shafts from Apollo's Bow: Spotlight on the Unknown',
Apollo, vol. LVII, no. 338, April 1953, p. 113.
49. J. Dudley, 'Art', Daily Worker, 28 March 1953.
50. For confirmation, see correspondence in J. H. Whitney Papers,
New York. Whitney's inheritance was largely derived from his family's
interests in the Standard Oil Company. His father's estate, which he
inherited fully in 1944, had been the largest ever when appraised for tax in
1927 at $179 millions. By 1950, Whitney had an annual income of several
million dollars. For further biographical information see E. J. Kahn, Jr.,
Jock. The Life and Times of John Hay Whitney (Doubleday: New York,
1981).
51. J. H. Whitney in Foreword to A. H. Barr (ed.), Masters of Modem Art
(MoMA: 1954). He became a trustee of the MoMA in 1930 and founded its
film archive in 1935. For his art collecting, see The John Hay Whitney
Collection, Tate Gallery: London, 1950) and The John Hay Whitney Collection
(Washington National Gallery, 1983).
52. He was one of the founders of the 'Citizens for Eisenhower'
candidacy promotion and subsequently Finance Chairman in the victor-
ious 1952 Eisenhower-Nixon presidential campaign.
53. Whitney was extremely embarrassed by these hard-line Republican
attacks; Braden in conversations with Blackmore and the author, 1992,
typescript p. 8.
54. In the US, Barr was aware of Whitney's identity, while at the ICA
only Penrose, Read and the Treasurer, E. C. Gregory, knew from the
outset; see Kloman, letter to Whitney, 16 February 1956, and Penrose, letter
to Whitney, 14 September 1954, John Hay Whitney Papers. Later Moore
and Rothenstein were informed.
55. The publicised figure of 3500 'entry applications' did not represent
the eventual number of entries, although it was often taken to, perhaps
with Kloman's connivance. Although the number of entries was rarely
cited, it must have been known. Barr gave the figure of 2000 entries in a
report to the trustees of the MoMA; Museum of Moder Art (New York)
Archives: Alfred H. Barr, Jr. Papers (AAA: 2179; 727). Barr, however,
THE OFORD ART JOURNAL - 20:1 1997
seems to have been persuaded to mislead Whitney over these figures:
having informed Whitney '3,500 entry blanks sent out, 2,000 actual
competitors', he amended this, after a meeting with Kloman, to '3,500
contestants ... around 8,000 entry blanks mailed out to applicants'; Barr,
letters to Whitney, 2 and 3 January 1958, Whitney Papers. The weight of
evidence suggests that 8000 entry application forms were sent out to
competitors, 3500 entry application forms returned and about 2000
maquettes eventually submitted.
56. Barr, letter to Whitney, 2 January 1958, Whitney Papers. Barr
continues: 'I use the nasty word "propaganda" in its original and classic
sense, de propaganda fide, in this case, faith in freedom'.
57. Barr, letter to Kloman, 6 January 1955; MoMA Archives: AHB
Papers (AAA: 2179; 786). Although Barr was apparently unaware that
Whitney was only a 'front' when he first agreed to act as an International
Juror, he was informed in order to reduce his later annoyance with
Whitney for seeming to renege on his original commitment to finance
the building of the Monument. For the same reason Barr then informed
Penrose in the summer of 1956, as he later explained to Whitney: 'I took
the opportunity to tell him (Penrose) explicitly that you were not the
financial backer though I understood you had permitted your name to be
used'; see Barr, letter to Whitney, 6 January 1958, Whitney Papers.
58. Kloman, letter to Whitney, 16 February 1956, Whitney Papers.
59. Barr, letter to Whitney, 2 January 1958, Whitney Papers.
60. Kloman, letter to Whitney, 16 February 1956, Whitney Papers.
61. Dolan was among the officers most favoured by OSS Director,
General Donovan. After the war, he continued to report for US intelligence
on European perceptions of the US and was made a consultant to the State
Department in the 1960s. He became a neighbour of Whitney's in London
in the 1950s and remained life-long friends with two other former OSS
colleagues: Kloman (who had been responsible for his OSS European
education) and William Casey (later CIA Director under Reagan). See A.
Cave Brown, The Last Hero: Wild Bill Donovan (Times Books: New York,
1982), pp. 551-4 and 651-6; further information received from Christina
Lakin, daughter of Patrick Dolan, in telephone conversations with the
author, April and May 1995.
62. For example, C. Tracy Barns was Special Assistant for Paramilitary
and Psychological Operations in the Clandestine Service, and later became
head of the CIA station in London; William H. Jackson was Deputy
Director of Central Intelligence (October 1950-August 1951).
63. E. W. Kenworthy, 'Whitney Trust got aid from a conduit of C.I.A.',
The New rork Times, 25 April 1967, p. 1.
64. Helms was Assistant Deputy Director for Plans (1952-62) in the
Clandestine Service, known properly as the Deputy Directorate for Plans
(DDP). For further information see T. Powers, The Man Who Kept the Secrets:
Richard Helms and the C.I.A. (Weidenfeld and Nicolson: London, 1979).
65. Whitney, letter to Helms, 28 May 1958, Whitney Papers.
66. Published 18 June 1948; reprinted in W. Leary (ed.), The Central
Intelligence Agency: History and Documents (University of Alabama Press,
1984), p. 132.
67. Leary (ed.), The Central Intelligence Agency, p. 44.
68. S. Guilbaut, 'Postwar Painting Games' in S. Guilbaut (ed.) Recon-
structing Modernism: Art in New York, Paris and Montreal (MIT Press:
Cambridge, MA, 1990), p. 60.
69. Formed in 1947, the CIA became operationally effective about 1949/
50. A new organisational structure took effect in August 1952 and remained
in place for the next 20 years. By 1952, the Clandestine Service (DDP) had
60% of personnel and 74% of the budget. See Leary (ed.), The Central
IntelligenceAgency, and L. Paine, The C.I.A. at Work (Robert Hale: London,
1977), p. 22.
70. The number of personnel went from 300 to nearly 3000 (plus
another 300 overseas contract personnel), the number of overseas stations
went from seven to 47 and their budget went from under $5 millions to $82
millions. It was funded on the basis of the number and importance of
projects initiated and managed, although the identity of particular projects
usually remained highly confidential; see Leary (ed.), The Central Intlli-
gence Agency, pp. 43-4.
71. Wisner was appointed Assistant Director for Policy Coordination in
September 1948; he replaced Dulles as Deputy Director for Plans in
August 1952 when Dulles became Deputy DCI. According to Braden,
Wisner more-or-less ran the CIA during its first decade; Braden, 'I'm Glad
the C.I.A. is "Immoral"', p. 12.
72. See T. Braden, 'The Birth of the C.I.A.', American Heritage, no. 28,
February 1977, p. 9.
TEx OXFORD ARTJOURNAL - 20:1 1997
This content downloaded from 200.144.63.150 on Wed, 15 Apr 2020 23:50:45 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
73. Braden, 'I'm Glad the C.I.A. is "Immoral"', pp. 11-14. By 1953,
Braden's Division had a yearly operating budget of about $35 millions;
according to Braden, the CIA estimated that the USSR was spending $250
millions per annum on propaganda; Braden in conversations with Black-
more and the author, 1992, typescript, p. 5.
74. Wisner is quoted in K. Philby, My Silent War (Grove Press: London,
1968), p. 167.
75. Dulles was appointed Deputy Director for Plans in January 1951,
Deputy DCI in August 1952 and DCI in February 1953 (resigned
November 1961). He had previously served as an advisor to successive
DCIs. For his acquaintance with Whitney, see Braden in conversations
with Blackmore and the author, 1992, typescript, p. 14.
76. See Leary (ed.), The Central Intelligence Agency, p. 46, and Powers,
The Man Who Kept the Secrets, p. 26.
77. F. Orton, 'Footnote One: the idea of the Cold War', in D. Thistle-
wood (ed.) American Abstract Expressionism (Critical Forum Series) (Liver-
pool University Press and Tate Gallery: Liverpool, 1993), pp. 179-92.
78. Allen Dulles was determined that the CIA would not be demor-
alised by McCarthy in the way that the State Department had been, under
his brother, John Foster Dulles. However, employees of Braden's Division
were 'subjected to special scrutiny because of their obvious political
liberalism' and, with the help of Hoover's FBI, at least one was fired.
When Meyer was personally attacked for his earlier allegiances with the
United World Federalists, he fought his own defence and, with Allen
Dulles' support, won a significant victory. See Richard Harris Smith,
O.S.S.: The Secret History of America's First Intelligence Agency (University of
California Press: Berkeley, 1972), pp. 368-75, and Meyer in conversations
with Blackmore and the author, 1992, typescript p. 4.
79. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., The Vital Center: the Politics of Freedom
(Houghton, Boston, 1949), pp. 87-8.
80. Dolan was an enthusiast for modernist art, architecture and design;
he was an acquaintance of Henry Moore's and bought moder painting.
He was strongly anti-Soviet and found the British Labour Party in this
period excessively left-wing; Christina Lakin in telephone conversations
with the author, April and May 1995. He also admitted that he found the
ICA 'too left wing'; see M. Garlake, 'The Relationship Between Institu-
tional Patronage and Abstract Act in Britain c.1945-1956' (unpublished
PhD dissertation, Courtauld Institute, 1987), p. 478, fn. 80: from telephone
conversation with Dolan, 13 November 1983.
81. Braden in conversation with Blackmore and the author, 1992,
typescript, pp. 9 and 16. Normal CIA internal security depended on the
sharing of information only on a 'need-to-know' principle; Leary (ed.), The
Central Inteligence Agency, p. 58. Oversight of the CIA was carried out by
generally compliant Congressional committees and its budgetary require-
ments were exempt from public disclosure. From April 1951, covert
operations were made subject to the nominal approval of the Psychological
Strategy Board, a sub-committee of the National Security Council, but the
OPC still possessed considerable independence from the DCI. In May
1951, after the competition was initiated, Bedell Smith, called for more
supervision of projects. See Leary (ed.), pp. 42-7.
82. See Barr, letter to Whitney, 2 January 1958, Whitney Papers.
83. Kloman, letter to Whitney, 4 October 1954, Whitney Papers.
84. For statements to this effect by MoMA staff, see Rene d'Harnon-
court (Barr's successor as Director of the MoMA), 'Challenge and Promise:
Modem Art and Modern Society', Magazine of Art, November 1948, p. 252,
and A. H. Barr, What is Modem Painting? (MoMA, New York, six editions
1943-56), p. 46, or 'Is Modem Art Communistic?' The New rork Times
Magazine, 14 December, 1952, pp. 22-3 and 28-30.
85. Moore, who had been expected to enter the competition, is more
likely to have been acceptable as the winner to Kloman, Whitney and 'the
friends'. Moore had an unrivalled international reputation in 1951 and his
sculpture was familiar to East Coast audiences through a retrospective at
the MoMA in 1946 and the accompanying exhibition catalogue. He was
the only British artist included in the MoMA exhibition for the Congress
for Cultural Freedom's 1952 Paris festival. J. J. Sweeney, who had selected
that exhibition and wrote the essay for the 1946 catalogue, had originally
been invited to be the US representative on the International Jury,
constituted under Kloman's authority, but was replaced by Barr because
of ill health.
86. For example, Whitney told Penrose that it was difficult for him to
contact Kloman although had already arranged a meeting with Kloman for
that day; see Whitney, letter to Penrose, 13 October 1954, and Whitney,
letter to Kloman, 5 October 1954, Whitney papers.
79
 87. Barr, letter to Kloman, 6 January 1955; MoMA Archives: AHB
Papers (AAA: 2179; 786).
88. Read told the ICA Advisory Council that the anonymous donor had
withdrawn mainly because he 'did not admire' the winning project;
minutes of the AGM of the Advisory Council, 19 May 1955, ICA Archive.
Barr wrote to Whitney: 'I know you're not particularly enthusiastic about
the design'; Barr, letter to Whitney, 16 June 1958, Whitney Papers, New
York. However, given the complexities of the situation, it is difficult to
disentangle Whitney's and 'the friends' responses.
89. Kloman, letter to Whitney, 16 February 1956, Whitney Papers.
90. Kloman liaised with Von Hessen's committee in West Germany.
Without success, he approached the Arts Council, the British Council, the
British Information Service, the Council of Industrial Design, and the
German ambassadors to Britain and the US for assistance towards the cost
which was now estimated at $100000; see A. J. T. Kloman 'The Unknown
Political Prisoner: Projected Monument for West Berlin' unpublished
statement written for A. H. Barr in 1956, p. 2; Whitney Papers.
91. Barr, letter to Whitney, 6 January 1958, Whitney Papers. Kloman
was prevented from attending a fund-raising meeting in West Germany.
92. Whitney, letter to Barr, 11 April 1958, referred to in Barr's letter to
Whitney, 6 May 1958, Whitney Papers.
80
This content downloaded from 200.144.63.150 on Wed, 15 Apr 2020 23:50:45 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
93. Kloman, letter to Barr, 3 March 1958; MoMA Archives: AHB
Papers (AAA: 2179; 752).
94. Whitney's intervention was communicated to Kloman by Barr who
then informed Whitney of Kloman's enthusiastic response: Barr, letter to
Whitney, 3 January 1958, Whitney Papers.
95. This was occasioned by the dissolution of Von Hessen's committee:
see, for example, 'The Monument: Politics give Moder Art a Setback',
Daily Express, 1960; in Tate Gallery Archive, scrapbook of newspaper
clippings.
96. Wisner retired in 1958, having suffered from stress and ill-health
since 1956. However, Helms remained second-in-command.
97. For example, by November 1958 Khrushchev had delivered an
ultimatum for the West to end its occupation of Berlin within six
months, though this was later withdrawn.
98. See Minutes of ICA Management Committee Meeting, 14 March
1951, ICA Archive.
99. Braden, 'I'm Glad the C.I.A. is "Immoral"', p. 10.
100. Kloman, letter to Whitney, 16 February 1956, Whitney Papers.
Tm OxFORD ART JOURNAL - 20:1 1997