ACCESSION

HEIRS OF EMILIANO NAVARRO vs. IAC & HEIRS OF SINFOROSO PASCUAL

Facts: 
 On October 3, 1946, Sinforoso Pascual filed an application for foreshore lease covering a tract of
foreshore land in Sibocon, Balanga, Bataan, having an area of approximately seventeen (17)
hectares. This application was denied on January 15, 1953. So was his motion for
reconsideration.
 Subsequently, petitioners' predecessor-in-interest, also now deceased, Emiliano Navarro, filed a
fishpond application with the Bureau of Fisheries covering twenty five (25) hectares of foreshore
land also in Sibocon, Balanga, Bataan. Initially the application was denied, eventually however
the grant was given.
 Pascual claimed that this land is an accretion to his property, The Talisay River as well as the
Bulacan River flow downstream and meet at the Manila Bay thereby depositing sand and silt on
Pascual's property resulting in an accretion thereon. Sinforoso Pascual claimed the accretion as
the riparian owner.
 On March 25, 1960, the Director of Lands, represented by the Assistant Solicitor General, filed
an opposition thereto stating that neither Pascual nor his predecessors-in-interest possessed
sufficient title to the subject property, the same being a portion of the public domain and,
therefore, it belongs to the Republic of the Philippines.
 On November 10, 1975, the court a quo rendered judgment finding the subject property to be
foreshore land and, being a part of the public domain, it cannot be the subject of land
registration proceedings.
 On appeal, the respondent court reversed the findings of the court a quo and granted the
petition for registration of the subject property but excluding certain areas. A motion for
reconsideration was filed by in the CA but the same was denied.
 Anchoring their claim of ownership on Article 457 of the Civil Code, petitioners vigorously argue
that the disputed 14-hectare land is an accretion caused by the joint action of the Talisay and
Bulacan Rivers which run their course on the eastern and western boundaries, respectively, of
petitioners' own tract of land.

Issue: 
Whether or not the petitioners can rightfully claim the land under the principle of accretion

Held: 
NO. The petitioner’s claim is misplaced. The principle of accretion is only applicable to owners whose
estates are adjacent to rivers as stated in Article 457 of the Civil Code . The disputed land is an accretion
not on a river bank but on a sea bank, or on what used to be the foreshore of Manila Bay which adjoined
petitioners' own tract of land on the northern side. As such, the applicable law is not Article 457 of to
Civil Code but Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 . The disputed property is an accretion on a
sea bank, Manila Bay being an inlet or an arm of the sea; as such, the disputed property is, under Article
4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, part of the public domain. As part of the public domain, the
herein disputed land is intended for public uses, and "so long as the land in litigation belongs to the
national domain and is reserved for public uses, it is not capable of being appropriated by any private
person, except through express authorization granted in due form by a competent authority. "Only the
executive and possibly the legislative departments have the right and the power to make the declaration
that the lands so gained by action of the sea is no longer necessary for purposes of public utility or for
the cause of establishment of special industries or for coast guard services.Petitioners utterly fail to
show that either the executive or legislative department has already declared the disputed land as
qualified, under Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, to be the property of petitioners as
owners of the estates adjacent thereto.

Gulla vs Labrador

Facts:
 The respondents filed a complaint of Accion Publiciana against the spouses Gulla. The
respondents sought to recover possession over the 2 lots located in San Felipe Zambalez
and in which tax delarations were paid under their name since 1986.
 In 1996, the spouses Gulla occupied a portion of the property fronting the China Sea, as
well as the 562-square-meter lot within the salvage area. The spouses Gulla then
constructed a house in the occupied property and fenced its perimeter.
 A verification survey was conducted where it stated in its report that Sps Gulla had
occupied Lots A, B and C where in Lot A was already outside the titled property of the
Labradors but is within the salvage area.
 The trial court rendered its decision in favor of the respondents, thus ordering Sps Gulla
to vacate the said properties.
 In their appeal, the CA affirmed the ruling of the trial court, thus applying Article 440 of
the New Civil Code, that the Labradors had the right to possess the land, it being
inseparably attached to the titled property as an accessory. It further held that
“economic convenience is better attained in a state of single ownership than in co-
ownership,” and that “natural justice demands that the owner of the principal or more
important thing should also own the accessory.

Issue:
W/N the petitioners are entitled to the possession of the area outside the titled property of the
respondents and is within the Salvage Zone.

Held:
NO. The trial court, the RTC and the CA were one in ruling that the 562-square-meter property,
Lot A, is part of the public domain, hence, beyond the commerce of men and not capable of
registration. In fact, the land is within the salvage zone fronting the China Sea as well as the
property covered by OCT No. P-13350 in the name of respondents. The provision relied upon is
Article 440 of the New Civil Code, which states that “[t]he ownership of property gives the right
by accession to everything which is produced thereby, or which is incorporated or attached
thereto, either naturally or artificially.” The provision, however, does not apply in this case,
considering that Lot A is a foreshore land adjacent to the sea which is alternately covered and
left dry by the ordinary flow of the tides. Such property belongs to the public domain and is not
available for private ownership until formally declared by the government to be no longer
needed for public use. Respondents thus have no possessory right over the property unless
upon application, the government, through the then Bureau of Lands, had granted them a
permit.
There is no question that no such permit was issued or granted in favor of respondents. This
being the case, respondents have no cause of action to cause petitioners’ eviction from the
subject property. The real party-in-interest to file a complaint against petitioners for recovery of
possession of the subject property and cause petitioner’s eviction therefrom is the Republic of
the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General. Consequently, petitioners cannot be
required to pay any rentals to respondents for their possession of the property.

Republic v. Holy Trinity Realty Development Corporation (HTRDC)

GR No. 172410. April 14, 2008

Facts:
 On December 29, 2000, Petitioner, represented by Toll Regulatory Board (TRB),
filed before the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan a Consolidated Complaint for Expropriation
against landowners whose properties would be affected by the expansion of the
North Luzon Expressway. Respondent HTRDC was one of the affected landowner.
 On March 18, 2002, TRB filed a motion for the issuance of a Writ of Possession,
manifesting that it deposited a sufficient amount to cover the payment of 100% of
the zonal value of the affected properties, in the total amount of PhP 28,406,700.00,
with Land Bank South Harbor Branch. The RTC issued, on March 19, 2002, the Writ
of Possession.
 On March 3, 2003, HTRDC filed with the RTC a Motion to Withdraw Deposit, praying
that the respondent be allowed to withdraw the amount of PhP 22,968,000.00, out
of the TRB’s advance deposit of PhP 28,406,700.00, including the interest which
accrued thereon. The RTC issued an Order, on April 21, 2003, directing Land bank
South Harbor Branch to release in favor of HTRDC the amount of PhP22, 968,000.00.
However, the issue on the interest earned by the amount deposited in the bank, if
there any, should still be threshed out.
 On March 11, 2004, the RTC ordered that the interest earnings from the deposit of
P22,968,000.00 respecting 100% of the zonal value of the affected properties in this
expropriation proceedings under the principle of accession are considered as fruits
and should pertain to HTRDC. TRB filed a Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC
granted the motion and ruled that the issue on the payment of interest should be
ventilated before the Board of Commissioners which will be created later for the
determination of just compensation. HTRDC filed a Motion for Reconsideration. The
motion was denied by the RTC.
 On appeal to the Court of Appeals by HTRDC, the CA ruled that the interest which
accrued on the amount deposited in the expropriation accounts belongs the HTRDC
by virtue of accession.
 The Republic filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari before the SC. They argued the
HTRDC is entitled only to an amount equivalent to the zonal value of the
expropriated property, nothing more and nothing less as provided under Sec. 4 of
RA 8974. They further argued that it is only during the determination of just
 compensation when the court will appoint commissioners and determine claims for
entitlements to interest.

ISSUE: W/N the interest earned by the deposited amount in the expropriation account
would accrue to HRTDC by virtue of accession?

HELD:
YES, the Court ruled that HTRDC is determined to be the owner of only a part of the
amount deposited in the expropriation account, in the sum of PhP 22,968,000.00. Hence, it
is entitled by right of accession to the interest that had accrued to the said amount only.
When the TRB deposited the amount as advance payment for the expropriated property
with an authorized government depositary bank for purposes of obtaining a writ of
possession, it is deemed to be a constructive delivery of the amount corresponding to the
100% zonal valuation of the expropriated property. Since HTRDC is entitled thereto and
undisputably the owner of the principal amount deposited by TRB, conversely, the interest
yield, as accession, in a bank deposit should likewise pertain to the owner of the money
deposited.

Further, the Court pointed out that TRB does not object to HTRDC’s withdrawal of
the amount of PhP22,968,000.00 from the expropriation account, provided that it is able to
show (1) that the property is free from any lien or encumbrances and (2) that it is the
absolute owner thereof. The said conditions do not put in abeyance the constructive
delivery of the said amount to HTRDC pending the latter’s compliance therewith.

Art. 1187, NCC provides that the effects of a conditional obligation to give, once the
condition have been fulfilled, shall retroact to the day of the constitution of the obligation.
Hence, when HTRDC complied with the given condition, as determined by the RTC in its
Order dated (April 21, 2003), the effects of constructive deliver retroacted to the actual
date of the deposit of the amount in the expropriation account of DPWH.

SPS. MACASAET vs SPS. MACASAET G.R. 154391-92 Sept. 30, 2004

Facts:
 Petitioners Ismael and Teresita Macasaet and Respondents Vicente and Rosario Macasaet are first-
degree relatives. Ismael is the son of respondents and Teresita is his wife.
 On December 10, 1997, the parents filed with the MTC of Lipa an ejectment suit against the
children.
 Respondents alleged that they were the owners of 2 parcels of land, situated at Banay-banay, Lipa
City; that by way of a verbal lease agreement, Ismael and Teresita occupied these lots in Mar. 1992
and used them as their residence and the situs of their construction business; and that despite
repeated demands, petitioners failed to pay the agreed rental of P500.
 Ismael and Teresita denied the existence of any verbal lease agreement. They claimed that
respondents had invited them to construct their residence and business on the subject lots in order
that they could all live near one another, employ marivic, the sister of Ismael, and help in resolving
the problems of the family.
 They added that it was the policy of respondents to allot the land they owned as an advance grant
of inheritance in favor of their children.
 The MTCC ruled in favor of respondents and ordered petitioners to vacate the premises. It opined
that Ismael and Teresita had occupied the lots, not by virtue of a verbal lease agreement, but by
tolerance of Vicente and Rosario.
 As their stay was merely tolerance, petitioners were necessarily bound by an implied promise to
vacate the lots upon demand.
 On appeal, the regional trial court updheld the findings fo the MTCC. However, the RTC allowed the
respondents to appropriate the building and other improvements introduced by petitioners, after
payment of the indemnity provided for by Art. 448 in relation to Art. 546 and 548 of the NCC.
 The CA sustained the finding of the two lower courts that Ismael and Teresita had been occupying
the subject lots only by the tolerance of Vicente and Rosario. Citing Calubayan v. pascual, the CA
further ruled that petitioners status was analogous to that of a lessee or a tenant whose term of
lease had expired, but whose occupancy continued by tolerance of the owner.
 Consequently , in ascertaining the right of the petitioners to be reimbursed for the improvements
they had introduced on respondents properties, the appellate court applied the Civil Codes
provisions on lease.

Issue:
W.O.N. the courts should fix the duration of possession.
Held:
 That Ismael and Teresita had a right to occupy the lots is therefore clear, the issue is the duration of
possession. In the absence of a stipulation on this point, Art. 1197 of the civil Code allows the courts
to fix the duration or the period.
 Article 1197. If the obligation does not fix a period, but from its nature and the circumstances it can
be inferred that a period was intended, the courts may fix the duration thereof.
 The courts shall also fix the duration of the period when it depends upon the will of the debtor.
 Article 1197, however, applies to a situation in which the parties intended a period. Such
qualification cannot be inferred from the facts of the present case.
 The mere failure to fix the duration of their agreement does not necessarily justify or authorize the
courts to do so
 It can be safely concluded that the agreement subsisted as long as the parents and the children
mutually benefited from the arrangement.
 Effectively, there is a resolutory condition in such an agreement.
 Their possession which was originally lawful became unlawful when the reason therefore – love and
solidarity – ceased to exist between them.

Vda. De Nazareno vs. Court of Appeals, Salasalan, Rabaya, Labis GR No. 98045

FACTS:
 Antonio Nazareno is an owner of a titled property situated beside an accretion area along the
banks of Cagayan River.
  Jose Salasalan & Leo Rabaya leased parcels of land from Nazareno. When Salsalan & Rabaya
stopped paying rentals, Nazareno filed an ejectment suit. The Municipal Trial Court ruled in
favor of Nazareno; the RTC affirmed the decision. Thus, Nazareno filed an application with the
Bureau of Lands to perfect his title over the accretion area being claimed by him.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject land is a public land?

ARGUMENTS:

VDA. DE NAZARENO SALASALAN AND RABAYA

 The subject land is a private land being an  They contend the public character of the
accretion to Antonio Nazareno’s titled subject land.
property.  Mere application of the Miscellaneous
 Art. 457 of the Civil Code which provides Sales Patent by Nazareno is an admission
that “To the owners of lands adjoining that the land being applied is a public
the banks of rivers belong the accretion land.
which they gradually receive from the
effects of the current of the waters”.
 The accumulation was gradual and
imperceptible, resulting from the action
of the waters or current of the Balacanas
Creek and Cagayan River.

RULING:
The Court ruled that the subject land is part of the public domain since the accretion was man-made or
artificial. Under Article 457 of the Civil Code: “To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers
belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters.”
But the Court provides the following requisites of accretion (Rules of Alluvion):

1. That the deposition of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible;

2. That it be the result of the action of the waters of the river (or sea); and

3. That the land where the accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers (or sea coast).

In Republic v. CA, “the requirement that the deposit should be due to the effect of the current of the
river is indispensable”. In Hilario v. City of Manila, “the word “current” indicates the participation of the
body of water in the ebb and flow of waters due to high and low tide”.
Here, the subject land was the direct result of the dumping of sawdust by the Sun Valley Lumber Co.
consequent to its sawmill operations.
NARVASA v. IMBORNAL

Topic: Accession

RECIT READY: Petitioners are claiming ownership over the property currently in possession of the Imbornals by
reason of (2) accretions despite not being riparian owners. The Supreme Court held that only riparian owners may
benefit from accretion of a land. Since it was the Imbornals who were in possession of a land adjacent to that of the
river, they are the rightful owners of the property resulting from accretion.

FACTS:

●  Basilia Imbornal+ (Basilia) had four (4) children, namely, Alejandra, Balbina, Catalina, and Pablo. Francisco I.
Narvasa, Sr. (Francisco) and Pedro Ferrer (Pedro) were the children of Alejandra, while petitioner Petra Imbornal
(Petra) was the daughter of Balbina.

●  Petitioners are the heirs and successors-in-interest of Francisco, Pedro, and Petra (Francisco, et al.)

●  Respondents are Emiliana, Victoriano, Felipe, Mateo, Raymundo, Maria, and Eduardo, all surnamed Imbornal,
are the descendants of Pablo.

●  Meanwhile, Catalina’s husband, Ciriaco Abrio (Ciriaco), applied for and was granted a homestead patent over
a 31,367-sq. m. riparian land (Motherland) adjacent to the Cayanga River in San Fabian, Pangasinan.

 Ciriaco - Northern portion of the Motherland; Respondents Imbornal - Southern portion of the Motherland

●  First Accretion: approximately 59,772 sq. m. in area, adjoined the southern portion of the Motherland. On August
15, 1952, OCT No. P-318 was issued in the name of respondent Victoriano, married to Esperanza Narvarte,
covering the First Accretion.

● Second Accretion: an area of 32,307 sq. m., more or less, abutted the First Accretion on its southern portion.
Subsequent OCT was likewise issued.

● Francisco et al. filed a complaint for reconveyance, partition, and or damages against respondents Imbornal.

● Francisco et al. argues that:

○ Through deceit, fraud, falsehood, and misrepresentation, respondent Victoriano, with respect to the First
Accretion, and the respondents collectively, with regard to the Second Accretion, had illegally registered the said
accretions in their names, notwithstanding the fact that they were not the riparian owners (as they did not own the
Motherland to which the accretions merely formed adjacent to).

○ Thus, bewailing that respondents have refused them their rights not only with respect to the Motherland,
but also to the subsequent accretions, Francisco, et al. prayed for the reconveyance ofsaid properties, or, in the
alternative, the payment of their value, as well as the award of moral damages in the amount of ₱100,000.00, actual
damages in the amount of ₱150,000.00, including attorney’s fees and other costs.

● RTC: Petitioners
● CA: Reversed, ruled in favor of the Imbornals

ISSUE: Whether or not the Imbornals have the better right over the property resulting from the FIRST and
SECOND accretion
HELD:

● YES, the Imbornals have the better right. Francisco et al. failed to prove their ownership rights over the
Motherland.

●  Article 457 of the Civil Code states the rule on accretion as follows: "[t]o the owners of lands adjoining the banks
of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters."

●  Being the owner of the land adjoining the foreshore area, respondent is the riparian or littoralowner who has
preferential right to lease the foreshore area as provided under paragraph 32 of the Lands Administrative Order No.
7-1, dated 30 April 1936, which reads:

○ 32. Preference of Riparian Owner. – The owner of the property adjoining foreshore lands, marshy lands or lands
covered with water bordering upon shores or banks of navigable lakes or rivers, shall be given preference to apply
for such lands adjoining his property as may not be needed for the public service, subject to the laws and regulations
governing lands of this nature, provided that he applies therefor within sixty (60) days from the date he receives a
communication from the Director of Lands advising him of his preferential right.

●  That rule in paragraph 32 is in consonance with Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 which provides
that, while lands added to the shore by accretions and alluvial deposits caused by the action of the sea form part of
the public domain, such lands, "when they are no longer washed by the waters of the sea and are not necessary for
purposes of public utility, or for the established [sic] of special industries, or for the coast guard service, "shall be
declared by the Government "to be the property of the owners of the estates adjacent thereto and as increment
thereof."

●  In other words, article 4 recognizes the preferential right of the littoral owner (riparian according to paragraph 32)
to the foreshore land formed by accretions or alluvial deposits due to the action of the sea.
● Accordingly, therefore, alluvial deposits along the banks of a creek or a river do not form part of the public
domain as the alluvial property automatically belongs to the owner of the estate to which it may have been added.
The only restriction provided for by law is that the owner of the adjoining property must register the same under the
Torrens system; otherwise, the alluvial property may be subject to acquisition through prescription by third persons

● In this case, Francisco, et al. and, now, their heirs, i.e., herein petitioners are not the riparian owners
of the Motherland to which the First Accretion had attached, hence, they cannot assert ownership
over the First Accretion.

● Consequently, as the Second Accretion had merely attached to the First Accretion, they also have no right over the
Second Accretion.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated November 28, 2006 and the Resolution dated May 7,
2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 57618 are hereby AFFIRMED, and a new judgment is entered
DISMISSING the Amended Complaint dated February 27, 1984 filed in said case.

Dinglasan delos santos and her 4 daughters vs Abejon GR 215820

Facts:
 Pedro Delos santos was married to Erlinda. They marriage was governed by the Conjugal
Partnership of Gains.
 Apr 8, 1988(1998 nakalagay sa case pero typo lang talaga to pramis sure ako) the
spouses borrowed P100,000 from Teresita(Pedro’s sister). To secure the loan, they
mortgaged their land located at Makati.
  Pedro died on 1989.
Erlinda was unable to pay the loan. As such she agreed to sell the land to Teresita for
P150,000. (100k amount of the loan + 50k interest). Teresita was accordingly apprised of
Pedro’s death.
 3 years later, on July 8, 1992, A Deed of Sale was issued in favor of Teresita containing
both the signature of Pedro and Erlinda. Teresita likewise executed the release of
mortgage.
In the meantime Erlinda and her daughters(heirs) were still occupying the land.
 Thereafter, respondents constructed a building thereon worth P2M(Improvements).
Erlinda and daughters also occupied the building. They refused to vacate it holding that
there was in fact no sale as Pedro’s signature was forged.
 Respondents demanded the P150,000 but to no avail.
This prompted respondents to file a complaint before the RTC for cancellation of Title
with collection of a sum of money(Specifically for the collection of P150,000)
 During the Pre-trial, the ff were among the stipulated and agreed facts by the
parties(dami talaga to mga classmates pero eto lang yung relevant)
a. The DOS and the release of mortgage were both Forged.
b. The P100,000 loan subsists (not 150,000)
c. Petitioners are still occupying the land as well as the building constructed therein
 RTC Ruling
- It declared the sale null and void.
- It held the petitioners liable to pay respondents a total of P,2,200,000 consisting of
P100,000 plus 12% interest from Jul 8, 1992 as well as P2,000,000 for the costs of
the construction of the building and P100,000 atty fees.
 Aggrieved the, petitioners appealed to the CA but CA affirmed the RTC order
 Petitioners filed for review on certiorari before the SC

Issues
 Issues
1. Where the parties bound to honor the admissions made during the pre-trial. (eto
lang yung relevant na issue sa topic naten mga classmates)
2. What is the petitioner’s liability for the loan (P100,000)
3. What is the petitioner’s liability for the Building (worth 2,000,000)

Ruling
 On issue #1
Answer
- Oo naman
Legal Basis
 - A pre-trial is a procedural device intended to clarify and limit the basic issues raised
by the parties and to take the trial of cases out of the realm of surprise and
maneuvering.
Application
- In this case, they admitted to such facts during the pre-trial.
Conclusion
- Hence they are bound to honor the admissions made.
 On issue 2
- P100,000 for Pedro and Erlinda’s conjugal property and if insufficient yung conjugal
prop(kasama estate ni husband) then Erlinda solidarily liable with her separate
property.
(Hindi kasama yung mga daughters)
Legal basis
- Under the conjugal partnership of gains, if the debt was constructed during
marriage, then it is chargeable to conjugal partnership and if it be insufficient then,
they shall each be solidarily liable with their separate properties.

Application
- In this case, the loan was contracted while the marriage was still subsisting and
while Pedro was still alive.
- Alternatively, the respondents may choose to foreclose the mortage on the land
because it was constituted to secure the loan obligation.

Conclusion
- Thus RTC and CA erred in also holding the 4 daughters liable with their mom.
(Should’ve limited to the estate na mamanahin nila if ever man)
 On issue 3
Answer
- Wala pa, niremand sa trial court

Legal Basis
- Art 453 of the civil code provides that where both the landowner and the builder….
acted in bad faith, they shall be treated as if both of them were in good faith.
- In relation to this Art 448 provides that petitioners may either
1. Appropriate the improvements for himself after reimbursing the buyer or
2. Sell the land to the buyer

Application
- In this case, both of them knew the defect in the execution of the deed of sale.
Conclusion
 - For the purpose of determining indemnity for the building, and the application of Art
453, 458, 546 and 548 of the civil code, the case should be remanded to the RTC.

[G.R. No. 149295. September 23, 2003]

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner, vs. GENEROSO DE JESUS

FACTS:

Respondent filed a complaint against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court of Occidental
Mindoro for recovery of ownership and possession, with damages, over the questioned
property. On 26 March 1993, he had caused a verification survey of the property and discovered
that the northern portion of the lot was being encroached upon by a building of petitioner to the
extent of 124 square meters. Despite two letters of demand sent by respondent, petitioner failed
and refused to vacate the area.

Petitioner asserted that when it acquired the lot and the building sometime in 1981 from then
Mayor Bienvenido Ignacio, the encroachment already was in existence and to remedy the
situation, Mayor Ignacio offered to sell the area in question (which then also belonged to
Ignacio) to petitioner at P100.00 per square meter which offer the latter claimed to have
accepted. The sale, however, did not materialize when, without the knowledge and consent of
petitioner, Mayor Ignacio later mortgaged the lot to the Development Bank of the Philippines.

The trial court decided the case in favor of respondent declaring him to be the rightful owner.

The Court of Appeals sustained the trial court.

ISSUE: W/N PETITIONER IS A BUILDER IN GOOD FAITH

HELD:

In reference to Article 448, et seq., of the Civil Code, a builder in good faith is one who, not
being the owner of the land, builds on that land believing himself to be its owner and unaware of
any defect in his title or mode of acquisition.

The essence of good faith lies in an honest belief in the validity of ones right, ignorance of a
superior claim, and absence of intention to overreach another. Applied to possession, one is
considered in good faith if he is not aware that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any
flaw which invalidates it. Evidently, petitioner was quite aware, and indeed advised, prior to its
acquisition of the land and building from Ignacio that a part of the building sold to it stood on the
land not covered by the land conveyed to it.

Equally significant is the fact that the building, constructed on the land by Ignacio, has in
actuality been part of the property transferred to petitioner. Article 448, of the Civil Code refers
to a piece of land whose ownership is claimed by two or more parties, one of whom has built
some works (or sown or planted something) and not to a case where the owner of the land is
the builder, sower, or planter who then later loses ownership of the land by sale or otherwise for,
elsewise stated, where the true owner himself is the builder of works on his own land, the issue
of good faith or bad faith is entirely irrelevant.
In fine, petitioner is not in a valid position to invoke the provisions of Article 448 of the Civil
Code.

# 124

G.R. No. 197857 September 10, 2014

SPOUSES FRANCISCO SIERRA vs.
PAIC SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE BANK, INC

FACTS:

On May 31, 1983, Goldstar Conglomerates, Inc. (GCI), represented by Guillermo Zaldaga
(Zaldaga), obtained from Summa Bank, now respondent Paic Savings and Mortgage Bank, Inc.
(PSMB) a loan in the amount of P1,500,000.00 as evidenced by a Loan Agreement. As security
therefor, GCI executed in favor of PSMB six (6) promissory notes6 in the aggregate amount of
P1,500,000.00 as well as a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over a parcel of land covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 308475.7 As additional security, petitioners Francisco
Sierra, Rosario Sierra, and Spouses Felix Gatlabayan and Salome Sierra mortgaged four(4)
parcels of land in Antipolo City.

Eventually, GCI defaulted in the payment of its loan to PSMB, thereby prompting the latter to
extrajudicially foreclose the mortgage on the subject properties. Since petitioners failed to
redeem the subject properties within the redemption period, their certificates of title were
cancelled and new ones were issued in PSMB’s name.

Petitioners averred that under pressing need of money, with very limited education and lacking
proper instructions, they fell prey to a group who misrepresented to have connections with
Summa Bank and, thus, could help them secure a loan. Petitioners likewise lamented that they
were not furnished copies of the loan and mortgage documents, or notified/apprised of the
assignment to PSMB, rendering them unable to comply with their obligations under the subject
deed. They further claimed that they were not furnished a copy of the statement of account nor
a copy of the petition for foreclosure prior to the precipitate extrajudicial foreclosure and auction
sale which failed to comply with the posting and notice requirements.22 In light of the foregoing,
petitioners prayed that the real estate mortgage and the subsequent foreclosure proceedings,
and all derivative titles and rights arising therefrom be declared null and void ab initio, and that
the subject properties be reconveyed back to them, with further prayer for compensatory and
exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees.

PSMB maintained that: (a) it acted in good faith with respect to the subject transactions and that
petitioners’ action should be directed against the group who deceived them;27 (b) the subject
properties were mortgaged to securean obligation covered by the loan agreement with GCI;28
(c) the mortgage was valid, having been duly signed by petitioners before a notary public;29 (d)
the foreclosure proceedings were regular, having complied with the formalities required by
law;30 and (e) petitioners allowed time to pass without pursuing their purported right against
Summa Bank and/or PSMB.
ISSUE: 1. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONERS ARE MERE ACCOMODATION
MORTGAGAGORS
2. W/N THE ACTION HAS PRESCRIBED AND BARRED BY LACHES

HELD:

Petitioners’ claim of lack of "proper instruction on the intricacies in securing [the] loan from the
bank" is belied by the fact that petitioners Francisco and Rosario Sierra had previously
mortgaged two (2) of the subject properties twiceto the Rural Bank of Antipolo.Moreover,
petitioners did not: (a) demand for any loan document containingthe details of the transaction,
and (b) offer to pay the purported partial loan proceeds they received at any time, complaining
thereof only in 1991 when they filed their complaint. Indeed, the foregoing circumstances clearly
show that petitioners are aware that they were mere accommodation mortgagors, debunking
their claim that mistake vitiated their consent to the mortgage.

There being valid consent on the part of petitioners to act as accommodation mortgagors. As
mere accommodation mortgagors, petitioners are not entitled to the proceeds of the loan, nor
were required to be furnished with the loan documents53 or notice of the borrower’s default in
paying the principal, interests, penalties, and other charges on due date,54 or of the
extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings, unless stipulated in the subject deed.55 As jurisprudence
states, an accommodation mortgagor is a third person who is not a debtor to a principal
obligation but merely secures it by mortgaging his or her own property.

Anent the 2nd issue, Petitioners contends that the applicable provision is the ten-year
prescriptive period of mortgage actions under Article 1142 of the Civil Code. Based on case law,
a "mortgage action" refers to an action to enforcea right necessarily arising from a mortgage.59
In the present case, petitioners are not "enforcing"their rights under the mortgage but are, in
fact, seeking to be relieved therefrom.The complaint filed by petitioners is, therefore, not a
mortgage action as contemplated under Article 1142.

Since the complaint for annulment was anchored on a claim of mistake, i.e., that petitioners are
the borrowers under the loan secured by the mortgage, the action should have been brought
within (4) years from its discovery. The discovery of the averred mistake should appear to be
reckoned from June 19, 1984.

As the records disclose, despite notice on June 19, 1984 of the scheduled foreclosure sale,
petitioners, for unexplained reasons, failed to impugn the real estate mortgage and oppose the
public auction sale for a period of more than seven (7) years from said notice.

COMMUNITIES CAGAYAN INC. v. SPS. NANOL

Facts:
Respondent-spouses Arsenio and Angeles Nanol entered into contract to Sell with petitioner
Communities Cagayan, Inc., whereby the former  agreed to sell to respondent-spouses a house
and Lots 17 and 19″ locate Block 16,  Camella  Homes  Subdivision,  Cagayan de  Oro City.
Respondent-spouses  availed of  petitioner’s  in-house financing  thus,  undertaking  to  pay the 
loan  over  four years,  from  1997 to 2001.  Sometime in 2000,  respondent  Arsenio
demolished  the  original  house  and constructed  a three-story  house  allegedly valued at  P
3.5  million,  more  or  less.18 In July  2001,  respondent  Arsenio  died,  leaving his  wife,  herein
respondent Angeles,  to  pay for  the  monthly  amortizations.

Issue: Whether or not respondents are considered builders in good faith entitled to
indemnification for necessary and useful expenses and/or to buy the land under Art. 448 – YES

Ruling:
 As  a  general  rule,  Article  448  on builders  in good faith does  not  apply where there
is a contractual  relation  between  the  parties,  such  as  in  the  instant case. 
 Article 448  of the  Civil  Code  applies  when  the builder believes  that  he is the owner 
of the  land  or that  by  some  title  he  has  the  right  to build  thereon, or that,  at
least,  he  has  a  claim  of  title  thereto. 
 However,  in  some  special  cases,  this  Court  has used  Article 448  by recognizing good
faith beyond this  limited definition.  We  thus  hold  that  Article  448  is also applicable
to theinstant  case. First,  good faith  is  presumed  on the  part  of the respondent-
spouses. Second,  petitioner  failed to rebut  this presumption. Third, no evidence was
presented  to  show  that  petitioner  opposed  or  objected  to  the improvements
introduced by the  respondent-spouses. 
 We  can validly presume that petitioner consented to the improvements being
constructed. This  presumption  is  bolstered  by  the  fact  that  as  the  subdivision
developer, petitioner  must  have given  the respondent-spouses  permits to 
commence  and undertake the construction. Under Art. 453, “it is understood that
there  is  bad faith  on the  part  of the  landowner whenever the  act was done with his
knowledge  and without  opposition on his  part.” 
 We hold that petitioner, as landowner, has two options. It may appropriate the new
house by reimbursing respondent Angeles the current market value thereof minus the
cost of the old house. Under this option, respondent Angeles would have "a right of
retention which negates the obligation to pay rent." In the alternative, petitioner may
sell the lots to respondent Angeles at a price equivalent to the current fair value thereof.
However, if the value of the lots is considerably more than the value of the
improvement, respondent Angeles cannot be compelled to purchase the lots.

ANGELES V. PASCUAL

Facts:
Neighbors Regidor Pascual (Pascual) and Pedro Angeles (Angeles) were registered owners of
adjacent parcels of land located in Cabanatuan City. Pascual owned Lot 4, Block 2 (Lot 4) of the
consolidation-subdivision plan while Angeles owned Lot 5, Block 2 (Lot 5) of the same
consolidation-subdivision plan. Each of them built a house on his respective lot, believing all the
while that his respective lot was properly delineated. It was not until Metropolitan Bank and
Trust Company (Metrobank), as the highest bidder in the foreclosure sale of the adjacent Lot 3,
Block 2 (Lot 3), caused the relocation survey of Lot 3 and discovered that Pascual's house had
encroached on Lot 3. As a consequence, Metrobank successfully ejected Pascual.
In turn, Pascual caused the relocation survey of his own Lot 4 and discovered that Angeles'
house also encroached on his lot. Of the 318 square meters comprising Lot 4, Angeles occupied
252 square meters, leaving Pascual with only about 66 square meters. Pascual demanded
rentals for the use of the encroached area of Lot 4 from Angeles, or the removal of Angeles'
house. Angeles refused the demand. Accordingly, Pascual sued Angeles for recovery of
possession and damages in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Cabanatuan City.

Issue:
Whether the CA's application of Article 448 of the Civil Code was correct and proper – YES

Ruling:

 The provision contemplates a person building, or sowing, or planting in good faith on

land owned by another. The law presupposes that the land and the building or plants
are owned by different persons, like here.
 Good faith consists in the belief of the builder that the land he is building on is his and in
his ignorance of a defect or 􏰌aw in his title.
 Article 448 of the Civil Code, which spells out the rights and obligations of the owner of
the land as well as of the builder, is unquestionably applicable.
 The land being the principal and the building the accessory, preference is given to
Pascual as the owner of the land to make the choice as between appropriating the
building or obliging Angeles as the builder to pay the value of the land.

OCHOA V. APETA

Facts:

Since 1910, the above-named petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest have

been occupying Lot No. 1580 consisting of 886 square meters situated in
Malaban, Biñan, Laguna. Mauro Apeta and Apolonia Almazan, respondents,
found that they are the true owners of Lot No. 1580 being occupied by
petitioners.

Engr. Romulo Unciano of the Bureau of Lands of Region IV to conduct a resurvey

of the disputed property. The result of the resurvey (approved by the Bureau of
Lands) shows that Lot No. 1580, occupied by petitioners, was registered in the
name of Margarita Almada, respondents' predecessor-in-interest.
Issue:

whether petitioners were builders in good faith - YES

Ruling:

 Good faith is an intangible and abstract quality with no technical meaning

or statutory definition, and it encompasses, among other things, an honest
belief, the absence of malice and the absence of design to defraud or to
seek an unconscionable advantage.
 we are convinced that petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest were
in good faith when they built their houses and apartment building on Lot
No. 1580
 Under Art. 448, Under the foregoing provisions, the landowner can make a
choice — either by appropriating the building by paying the proper
indemnity or obliging the builder to pay the price of the land. The choice
belongs to the owner of the land, a rule that accords with the principle of
accession that the accessory follows the principal and not the other way
around. He must choose only one.

MIRALLOSA V. CARMEL DEV’T CORP.

Facts:

CDC owned Pangarap Village. In 1973, Marcos issued PD 923 which cancelled
CDC’s titles and opened the property for disposition to members of Malacañang
Homeowners’ Association. In 1988, SC declared PD 293 unconstitutional.
In 1995, petitioner occupied Lot 32 after a MHAI member issued an affidavit in
their favor. CDC demanded they vacate as late as 2002, and filed a complaint for
unlawful detainer in 2003. Petitioner argued that the action has prescribed, and
that he is a builder in good faith.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner is a builder in good faith.

Ruling:

 We hold that petitioner is not a builder in good faith.

  A builder in good faith is "one who builds with the belief that the land he is
building on is his, or that by some title one has the right to build thereon,
and is ignorant of any defect or flaw in his title." 67
 Since petitioner only started occupying the property sometime in 1995
(when his predecessor-in-interest executed an Affidavit in his favor), or
about seven years after Tuason was promulgated, he should have been
aware of the binding effect of that ruling.
 He thus loses whatever he has built on the property, without right to
indemnity, in accordance with Article 449 of the Civil Code.

DACLISON V. BAYTION

Facts:

Baytion leased portions of the property to third persons. Erected on the said property was a
one-story building which was divided into seven units or stalls. One of the stalls was leased to a
certain Leonida Dela Cruz. When the lease of Dela Cruz expired, Daclison took possession of the
portion leased and occupied by Leonida without the prior knowledge and consent of Baytion.
Since then, Daclison had been occupying the contested portion and using it for his business
without paying anything to Baytion.

Upon learning of Daclison’s unauthorized entry into the subject portion of the property. Baytion
demanded that he vacate it. Despite oral and written demands to vacate, Daclison refused to
do so. This prompted Baytion to file the complaint for forcible entry and damages.

Issue:

Who has a better right of possession over the property, Baytion or Daclison?

Ruling:

 Baytion does not have a better right over the contested portion. Baytion’s
contention that he owns that portion by reason of accretion is misplaced. This
contested portion cannot be considered an accretion under Article 457 on the
New Civil Code.
 To begin with, the land came about not by reason of a gradual and
imperceptible deposit. The deposits were artificial and man-made and not
the exclusive result of the current from the creek adjacent to his property.
Baytion failed to prove the attendance of the indispensable requirement that
the deposit was due to the effect of the current of the river or creek. Alluvion
must be the exclusive work of nature and not a result of human intervention.
  Furthermore, the disputed property cannot also be considered an improvement
or accession under Article 445 of the New Civil Code. It must be noted that
Article 445 uses the adverb “thereon” which is simply defined as “on the thing
that has been mentioned.” In other words, the supposed improvement must be
made, constructed or introduced within or on the property and not outside so
as to qualify as an improvement contemplated by law. Otherwise, it would just
be very convenient for landowners to expand or widen their properties in the
guise of improvements.
 Baytion, not being the owner of the contested portion, does not have a better
right to possess the same. In fact, in his initiatory pleading, he never claimed to
have been in prior possession of this piece of property. His claim of ownership is
without basis.

FERNANDO JR. V. ACUNA

Facts:

A parcel of land was registered in the names of Spouses Jose Fernando and Lucila Tinio and spouses
Antonia Fernando and Felipe Galvez. When they died intestate, the property remained undivided. The
heirs and successors-in-interest, herein petitioners failed to agree on the division of the subject
property.
Respondent Leon Acuna averred that the portion of the property identified as Lot 1303 was already
adjudicated the petitioners' predecessor-in-interest. He likewise claimed the portion identified as Lot
1302 was also already adjudicated to other people as well.

Issue:

Can the petitioners validly claim the ownership of the Sapang Bayan? – NO

Ruling:

 Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the principle of accretion is applicable ("to the owners of
lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the
effects of the current of the waters." Art. 457, CC).
 The character of the Sapang Bayan property was not shown to be of the nature that is being
referred to in the provision which is an accretion known as alluvion. In fact the parties could not
agree how Sapang Bayan came about. Whether it was a gradual deposit received from the river
current or a dried-up creek bed connected to the main river could not be ascertained.
 Even assuming that Sapang Bayan was a dried-up creek bed, under Article 420 of the CC, rivers
and their natural beds are property of public dominion. In the absence of any provision of law
vesting ownership of the dried-up river bed in some other person, it must continue to belong to
the State.
 the Court similarly ruled that a dried-up creek bed is property of public dominion: A creek, like
the Salunayan Creek, is a recess or arm extending from a river and participating in the ebb and
flow of the sea. As such, under Article 420 the Salunayan Creek, including its natural bed, is
 property of the public domain which is not susceptible to private appropriation and and
acquisitive prescription.
 Therefore, on the basis of the law and jurisprudence on the matter, Sapang Bayan cannot be
adjudged to any of the parties in this case.

SPS. AQUINO V. SPS. AGUILAR

Facts:
Sps. Crispin and Teresa Aquino are the owners of a house and lot. Since 1981, the property has
been occupied by Teresa’s sister, Josefina Aguilar and her family. Respondents stayed on the
property with the consent of petitioners who were then residing in the US.
While respondents were occupying the property, the house previously constructed therein was
demolished and a 3-storey building built in its place. Respondents occupied half of the 3 rd floor
for the next 20 years without payment.
Petitioners sent a letter to the respondents asking them to vacate the premises but to no avail.

Issue:
Whether or not respondents are builders in good faith – NO

Ruling:

By law, one is considered in good faith if he is not aware that there exists in his title or mode of
acquisition any flaw which invalidates it. The presence of evidence that petitioners prohibited
the respondents from building their own structure on a portion of the property negates good
faith on the part on the latter. The fact that the petitioners did not thereafter remind
respondents of this is of no moment, what is crucial is that the petitioners left the respondents
clear instructions not to build on the land.
Petitioners as owners of the land, have the right to appropriate what has been built on the
property without any obligation to pay indemnity therefor, and that respondents have no right
to a refund of any improvement built therein, pursuant to Art. 449 and 450 of the Civil Code.
Under Art. 452 of the NCC, a builder in bad faith is entitled to reimbursement BUT without the
right of retention over the premises.

BAGAIPO V. IAC

Facts:
Petitioner Dionisia P. Bagaipo is the registered owner of Lot No. 415 located at the southeast
portion of the Davao River while private respondent Leonor Lozano is the owner of a registered
parcel of land located across and opposite the southeast portion of Bagaipo’s lot facing the
Davao River.
On May 26, 1989, Bagaipo filed a complaint for Recovery of Possession with Mandatory Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and Damages against Lozano, praying for the surrender of Lozano’s
possession over a certain parcel of land which is supposedly included in the area belonging to
Bagaipo and for the recovery of a land area which Bagaipo allegedly lost when the Davao River
traversed her property. She argued that because of the change in the course of said river, her
property became was divided into three lots, namely Lots 415-A, 415-B, and 415-C.

Issue:

CELESTIAL V. CACHOPERO

Facts:
Siblings Rachel Celestial and Jesse Cachopero  had a dispute over a piece of land which was a
dried-up creek, as Cachopero was trying to obtain a Miscellaneous Sales Application (MSA) to
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) alleging that he had been the
owner of that land whereon he built a house and other improvements. However, Celestial
protests that she has preferential right over the land because it is adjacent to and is the only
outlet from her house. According to the Bureau of Land, the land in dispute was a creek and is
therefore outside the commerce of man. 

Issue: Whether or not the land in question is owned by one of the parties when it is classified as
outside the commerce of man - NO

Ruling:
 A dried up creek is property of public dominion and not susceptible to acquisitive
prescription.
 Article 461 of the Civil Code is applicable only when "river beds are abandoned through
the natural change in the course of the waters."
 The provision pertains to situations where there has been a change in the course of a
river, not where the river simply dries up. In the instant Petition, it is not even alleged
that the Salunayan Creek changed its course. In such a situation, commentators are of
the opinion that the dry river bed remains property of public dominion.
 Since property of public dominion is outside the commerce of man and
not susceptible to private appropriation and acquisitive prescription, the adverse
possession which may be the basis of a grant of title in the confirmation of an imperfect
title refers only to alienable or disposable portions of the public domain.
 It is only after the Government has declared the land to be alienable and disposable
agricultural land that the year of entry, cultivation and exclusive and adverse possession
can be counted for purposes of an imperfect title.