The Court agrees that the RTC of Las Piñas City had territorial jurisdiction over the case.

Although the bank account for the joint venture was set up in San Juan City, in which the
P400,000.00 capital contribution of the private complainants was deposited and
eventually
withdrawn, Belen issued four checks from her residence in Las Pifias City. These checks were
picked up by the messenger sent by the petitioners.
The Court has ruled in the case of Tan v. People that "[t]he delivery by the private
complainant of the check and its acceptance by [the accused] signified not merely the transfer
to
the accused of the money belonging to private complainant, [but] it also marked the creation of
a
fiduciary relation between the parties.
The Court agrees that the RTC of Las Piñas City had territorial jurisdiction over the case.
Although the bank account for the joint venture was set up in San Juan City, in which the
P400,000.00 capital contribution of the private complainants was deposited and
eventually
withdrawn, Belen issued four checks from her residence in Las Pifias City. These checks were
picked up by the messenger sent by the petitioners.
The Court has ruled in the case of Tan v. People that "[t]he delivery by the private
complainant of the check and its acceptance by [the accused] signified not merely the transfer
to
the accused of the money belonging to private complainant, [but] it also marked the creation of
a
fiduciary relation between the parties.
The Court agrees that the RTC of Las Piñas City had territorial jurisdiction over the case.
Although the bank account for the joint venture was set up in San Juan City, in which the
P400,000.00 capital contribution of the private complainants was deposited and
eventually
withdrawn, Belen issued four checks from her residence in Las Pifias City. These checks were
picked up by the messenger sent by the petitioners.
The Court has ruled in the case of Tan v. People that "[t]he delivery by the private
complainant of the check and its acceptance by [the accused] signified not merely the transfer
to
the accused of the money belonging to private complainant, [but] it also marked the creation of
a
fiduciary relation between the parties.
The Court agrees that the RTC of Las Piñas City had territorial jurisdiction over the case.
Although the bank account for the joint venture was set up in San Juan City, in which the
P400,000.00 capital contribution of the private complainants was deposited and
eventually
withdrawn, Belen issued four checks from her residence in Las Pifias City. These checks were
picked up by the messenger sent by the petitioners.
The Court has ruled in the case of Tan v. People that "[t]he delivery by the private
complainant of the check and its acceptance by [the accused] signified not merely the transfer
to
the accused of the money belonging to private complainant, [but] it also marked the creation of
a
fiduciary relation between the parties.

G.R. No. 100709 November 14, 1997

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, JOSEFINA L. MORATO, SPOUSES NENITA CO and ANTONIO
QUILATAN AND THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF QUEZON PROVINCE, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Will the lease and/or mortgage of a portion of a realty acquired through free patent constitute
sufficient ground for the nullification of such land grant?

Should such property revert to the State once it is invaded by the sea and thus becomes
foreshore land?

Doctrine: When the sea moved towards the estate and the tide invaded it, the invaded property
became foreshore landand passed the realm of the public domain and accordingly cannot be a
subject of a free patent.
Article 420 of the New Civil Code
The following things are property of public dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and
bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar
character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for
some public service or for the development of the national wealth. (339a)

Facts:
Josefina Morato, private respondent, applied sometime in 1972 a free patent on a parcel of land
situated at Pinagtalleran, Calauag, Quezon.
On January 16, 1974, the patent was approved and the Register of Deeds issued an Original
Certificate of Title in favor of Morato on February 4, 1974. Both the free patent and the
title specifically required that the land shall not be alienated or encumbered within five years
from the date of the issuance of the patent.
Upon reports that Morato encumbered the said land, violating the 5-year prohibition of the
patent, the District Land Officer in Lucena City conducted an investigation. The officer found out
that Morato mortgaged the said property to Nenita Coand Antonio Quilatan on October 24,
1974, who subsequently built a house on it.
Two years later, or on February 2,1976, part of the property was also leased by Morato to
Perfecto Advincula where a warehouse was thereafter constructed. Moreover it was found out
that the said property was a portion of the Calauag Bay, five to six feet deep under water during
high tide and two feet deep at low tide, and not suitable to vegetation.
Petitioner then filed a complaint for the cancellation of the title and reversion of the parcel of
land to the public domain on the grounds that the land is a foreshore land and was mortgaged
and leased within the five-year prohibitory period. The lower court dismissed the complaint
ruling that there was no violation of the five-year ban since Morato did not encumber nor
alienate the land as it was merely leased, and the mortgage the latter entered into with Nenita
Co and Antonio Quilatan

RTC dismissed petitioner's complaint. In finding for private respondents for they
found no violation of the 5-year period ban against alienating or encumbering the
land, because the land was merely leased and not alienated. It also found that
the mortgage to Nenita Co and Antonio Quilatan covered only the improvement
and not the land itself.

Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.

Issue:
Whether the questioned land is a foreshore land and thus must be reverted to the public domain

Held:
Yes. The subject land in this case, being foreshore land, should therefore be returned to the
public domain

The Supreme Court defines foreshore land in the case of Republic vs. Alagad,
169 SCRA 455, 464, as follows:

Otherwise, where the rise in water level is due to, the

"extraordinary" action of nature, rainful, for instance, the portions
inundated thereby are not considered part of the bed or basin of
the body of water in question. It cannot therefore be said to be
foreshore land but land outside of the public dominion, and land
capable of registration as private property.

A foreshore land, on the other hand has been defined as follows:

. . . that part of (the land) which is between high

and low water and left dry by the flux and reflux of
the tides . . . . (Republic vs. C.A., Nos. L-43105, L-
43190, August 31, 1984, 131 SCRA 532;
Government vs. Colegio de San Jose, 53 Phil 423)

The strip of land that lies between the high and low
water marks and that is alternatively wet and dry
according to the flow of the tide. (Rep. vs.
CA, supra, 539).
It was found out that years before the issuance of the free patent to private respondent, the
questioned land was subjected to several natural calamities like earthquakes and typhoons that
caused severe erosion of the land. Then private respondent introduced improvements and
developments to the land.
At the time then of the issuance of free patent of land to Morato, it was not covered by water but
due to the gradual sinking of the land caused by natural calamities, the sea advances had
permanently invaded a portion of subject land. During high tide, at least half of the land is 6 feet
deep under water and three feet deep during low tide. The Calauag Bay has extended up to a
portion of the land. Thus, uncontestedly, the land has become a foreshore land and is de facto
now a part of the public domain pursuant to Article 420 of the New Civil Code.